The PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of a policeman lasting until termination of the criminal case against him, as provided in Sec.

47, RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), does not violate the

policemans right to equal protection OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 108 Constitutional Law of the laws. There is substantial distinction between policemen and other
government employees; policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law, which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. Besides, Sec. 42 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service
Law), which was raised as argument for equal treatment, refers to PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION in administrative cases, not in criminal cases [Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538]. In
Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, it was held that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection
clause.

Firstly, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself; secondly, in permitting the filing of complaints in any form and in any
manner, the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoing; finally, the Office
of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, the Supreme Court found substantial distinction between the print and the
broadcast media which would justify different treatment under B.P. 881, viz: the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the pervasive presence of the broadcast media
in the lives of Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser than the freedom accorded to the print media. In Lacson
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, it was held that the petitioners and intervenors right to equal protection of the law was not violated by the
enactment of R.A. 8249 because the law was not directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

Under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman or his deputy is authorized to preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation irrespective of whether
such officer or employee is employed in the Office of the'Ombudsman or in any other government agency [Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645]. This was reiterated in Lastimosa v.
Vazquez, 243 SCRA 497, where the Supreme Court said that whether the evidence of guilt is strong to warrant PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman. There is no need for a preliminary hearing such as that required in a petition for bail.

4. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION and the right to salary. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, the Supreme Court clarified that there are two kinds of
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz:

(a) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending investigation under Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; and
(b) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 482 Law of
Public Officers dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated under Sec. 47 of the same Code. It was then held that the employee has no right to compensation
during PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending investigation, even if he is exonerated, because in order to be entitled to payment of back salaries, it is not enough that an
employee be exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, it must be shown that his suspension is unjustified. The PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of civil service
employees charged with dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct or neglect of duty, is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified
even if later the charges are dismissed. It is one of the sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good.
o However, if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated, the civil service officer or
employee is entitled not only to reinstatement but also to back salaries for the period of PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending appeal [Gloria v. CA, supra.].

5. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, the Supreme Court clarified that there are two kinds of PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of
civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension:

[a] PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending investigation, under Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; and [b] PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending appeal if
the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated under Sec. 47 of the same Code.

a) The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation if the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of
charges which would warrant his removal from the service. This is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against the
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within a
period of 90 days, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If, after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is
exonerated, he should be reinstated.
i. In Alonzo v. Capulong, G.R. No. 110590, May 10, 1995, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of a civil service officer or employee
can be ordered even without a hearing, because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step to administrative investigation. Its purpose is to prevent the
respondent from using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses, or to tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him.
ii. In Plaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008, the Court upheld Governor Democrito Plazas order of preventive OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN
POLITICAL LAW 500 Law of Public Officers suspension issued against appointive local officials facing administrative charges. The law provides for the PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION of appointive local officials and employees pending investigation of the charges against them. This is one of the sacrifices which holding a public office
requires for the public good. .
b) The authority to preventively suspend is exercised concurrently by the Ombudsman, pursuant to R.A. 6770; the same law authorizes a PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of six
months [Hagadv. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995],
i) Although Sec. 13, R.A. 3019, does not specifically authorize the Court of First Instance to preventively suspend a public officer facing criminal charges, the Court
may validly order the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of such officer. Since removal from office is within the power of the Court perpetual disqualification from
office being one of the penalties which may be imposed for violation of R.A. 3019 no amount of legerdemain would deprive the Court of the power to suspend,
suspension being necessarily included in the greater power of removal [Socrates v. Sandiganbayart, G.R. No. 11625960, February 20, 1996].
c) In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, supra., the Supreme Court held that the employee has no right to compensation during PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending investigation even
if he is exonerated. Invoking Mechem, Law of Public Officers, the Court said that in order to be entitled to payment of back salaries, it is not enough that an employee be
 exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, it must be shown that his suspension is unjustified. The PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of civil service employees charged
with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty, is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified, even if later the
charges are dismissed. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to 90 days.
d) In the same case, it was held that the employee is entitled to payment of back salaries for the period of PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending appeal if eventually they are
found innocent. This is so because PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION pending appeal is actually punitive although it is subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated
and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Sec. 47 (4) states that the
respondent shall be considered as under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay
as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Law of Public Officers 501 do so even after it is
shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five (5) years pay at the
rate last received before the suspension was imposed. On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, the period of his suspension becomes part df the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal.
i) But back salaries are not warranted when the immediate execution of the order of dismissal is justified [De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 126183, March 25,
1999]. In this case, the CSC found the petitioners liable only for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, not for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
gross violation of CS law, rules and regulations (as charged by Secretary Carino). Having been found answerable for a lesser offense, petitioners could not be
considered as being fully innocent of the charges against them. Not having been exonerated, petitioners are not entitled to back salaries.

c) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION may be imposed by the President, the governor, or the mayor [as the case may be] at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence; provided that any single PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION shall not extend beyond 60 days, and in the event several administrative cases are filed
against the respondent, he cannot be suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

i) When the petitioner failed to file his answer despite the many opportunities given to him, he was deemed to have waived his right to answer and to present evidence. At that
point, the issues were deemed joined, and it was proper for the Executive Secretary to suspend him, inasmuch as the Secretary found that the evidence of guilt was strong and
that continuance in office could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him [Joson v. Torres, supra.].
ii) The authority to preventively suspend is exercised concurrently by the Ombudsman, pursuant to R.A. 6770; the same law authorizes a PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of six
months [Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995], See also Yabut v. Office of the Ombudsman, 233 SCRA 310. The PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of an
elective local official (in this case, the Mayor of San Fernando, Romblon) by the Sandiganbayan on a charge of violation of R.A. 3019, shall, likewise, be only for a period of 60
days, not 90 days, consistent with Sec. 63, R.A. 7160, which provides that any single PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of local elective officials shall not extend beyond 60 days"
[Rios v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129913, September 26, 1997].
iii) Upon expiration of the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION, the respondent shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him,
which shall be terminated within 120 days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him.
iv) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION shall be penalized as abuse of authority.

f) Execution pendino appeal. An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being executed; the respondent shall be considered as having been placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
during the pendency of the appeal. But in Berces v. Executive Secretary, 241 SCRA 539, the Supreme Court pointed out that Administrative Order No. 18 authorizes the Office of the
President to stay the execution of a decision pending appeal. Administrative Order No. 18 was not repealed by the Local Government Code.

a) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. The local chief executive may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding 60 days any subordinate official or employee under his authority pending
investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that
the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

Pursuant to this provision, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the act of Governor Democrito Plaza preventively suspending respondents who were being investigated for
administrative complaints lodged against them. The suspension is not unjustified; it is one of the sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. To be
entitled to back salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must likewise be unjustified [Plaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138464, January 18, 2008],