Professional Documents
Culture Documents
published by Gard AS
2
Contents
Introduction 4
Loss of anchors and chain 5
Ports and places of refuge in South Africa 8
Limitations of a vessels anchoring equipment 10
Increased risks of grounding in Barranquilla, Colombia 11
Communication in pilotage passage planning 15
Harbour towage and pilotage 16
ECDIS - Charting the future of navigation 18
Anchoring within Malaysian waters off Singapore 20
Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area 21
Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined waters 22
What if...? Planning for the unexpected before an emergency develops 23
Pilot error survey 26
What happens to the pilot after a casualty? 26
Global wave watch system 27
Typhoon season precautions Hong Kong area 28
Double typhoon trouble 29
Dont fall asleep on the job - No let-up in fatigue-related casualties 31
Collisions at sea - Unavoidable? 33
A collision that should have been avoided 36
Is the pilot a part of the bridge team? 37
Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea 39
Operations in extremely cold climates 40
Winter season in Northern Baltic Sea 42
Severe ice conditions in the northern Baltic Sea 43
Anchoring - Getting into a safe haven or into a potential disaster? 44
Rubicon - The point of no return 46
Pilot on board! 47
Pilot on the bridge - Role, Authority and Responsibility 49
Who is to blame? 53
Collisions - Why do they occur? 55
Hydrodynamic interaction between ships 56
TRICOLOR - The collision, sinking and wreck removal 57
Wash damage 60
Hull and Machinery incident - The innocent victim (of an unsuccessful berthing manouevre) 61
Hull and machinery incident - Consequences of a blackout 62
Reducing maritime casualties through awareness of nautical safety 63
Ship simulators - 65
Virtual reality without P&I liability 65
Voyage Data Recorders - Black box technology paves its way into shipping 67
Computerisation of bridges and engine rooms - Progress or regression? 69
The interface between hull and machinery insurance and P&I from the P&I claims handlers
perspective 71
Introduction
This booklet contains a collection of major concern. Human error is the to improve the performance of the
loss prevention materials relating to cause behind at least 80 per cent of shipping industry:
navigational accidents, training and all navigational accidents. This figure
other issues which have been published seems to be the generally agreed Education, training and crew selection
by Gard over the last five years. The industry wide. is paramount to obtain and keep high
compilation may be used for individual quality crew. Lack of positive corrective
studies, as parts of training schemes, or Several factors have been pointed out action is a common direct cause of
as individual topics in safety meeting or as possible reasons for the increasing accidents.
education. number of human error incidents:
Situational awareness is a term used
There is a growing concern within - Integrated and complicated bridge to describe what is missing within
the industry about the increase in systems the bridge team when this happens.
navigational claims. The pattern seems - High traffic density To achieve such awareness it is
to be a steady number of claims per - High commercial pressure necessary to conduct teamwork and
ship but the severity of each claim - Larger and faster ships communication training.
increases every year. In the last 4 years - Reduced manning
alone, Gard has seen a doubling in - Increased administrative tasks on The human being is the only intelligent
the value of the claims paid as a result board barrier in our systems and only the crew
of navigational errors. Navigational - Increased number of inspections can halt the current development and
incidents represent approximately 40 - Fatigue protect the value of ships, cargo and
per cent of the numbers of all claims - Lack of experience environment.
and 50 per cent of the costs. - Lack of competence
- Poor decision making
There is a human error behind the
majority of navigational claims. The The discussion about these factors will
occasional technical failure, normally continue as long as ships ply the seas
resulting in limited damage to piers but there are some areas that need
and ships sides are rare and not of to be addressed by ship operators
Disclaimer
The information contained in this publication is compiled from material previously published by Gard AS and is
provided for general information purposes only. Whilst we have taken every care to ensure the accuracy and quality
of the information provided at the time of original publication, Gard AS can accept no responsibility in respect of any
loss or damage of any kind whatsoever which may arise from reliance on information contained in this publication
regardless of whether such information originates from Gard AS, its shareholders, correspondents or other
contributors.
chain
Anchor windlass and chain stopper.. Photo courtesy of Aker Pusnes AS.
Gard has noted an increase in cases the time to pay attention to every part scrap the length of chain or to replace a
of lost anchors. The Club experiences of the chain. Gards advice to vessels single link by a joining shackle.
about one case per 200 ships per year masters and superintendents is to take
and class societies experience about an active part in the inspection, and not An anchor chain is composed of
twice as many: one anchor lost per 100 just to leave it to the yard and the class lengths of 15 fathoms (27.5 metres)
ships a year. surveyor. Class societies will require the joined by kenter shackles, as well as
common chain links to be measured at a fore-runner next to the anchor.
Most Gard cases involving lost anchors the ends, where they are most worn, It is relatively rare for a swivel or a
are P&I-related. More and more port and allow a reduction of up to 12 per kenter shackle to break, but if a worn
authorities require that lost anchors cent of the diameter. chain has to be replaced, the fore-
be removed from the sea bed, so runner, consisting of swivel, large link
these cases become wreck removal Second-hand chains are on offer in the and joining shackles, should also be
operations. There are fewer cases market, but one should not buy them renewed. The spile pin, i.e., the conical
related to hull and machinery insurance, without a certificate of quality. Consult pin locking the kenter shackle parts
as the value of the lost anchor and the class society. One should also be together, is important. It is hammered
chain is normally lower than the aware that chains and anchors have in and sealed by a lead pellet, and this
applicable deductibles. been offered with false class certificates. has to be done in a proper way. Be sure
The low price may be an indicator. to buy only quality goods with proper
The weakest link certificates.
Gard has looked at the technical In addition to reduction by wear
reasons behind loss of anchors, and and corrosion, one of the common Lost spile pins
noted that anchors may be lost due problems of anchor chain is loose or The pin of the anchor shackle
to breakage of a common chain link, lost studs. The studs are there to keep (D-shackle), which links the fore-
joining shackle, swivel, anchor shackle the sides of the common links apart runner to the crown shackle of the
or crown shackle, and also through during pulling, to avoid that the chain anchor, is sealed in the same way
breakage of the anchor itself. One or kinks, and they also add weight to as for kenter shackles. There have
both flukes may break and, surprisingly, the chain. If a stud is lost, the strength been several cases where a chain in
also the solid anchor shank. of the link is severely reduced. It is good condition comes up without
common to see loose studs being the anchor and without the pin of
A chain is only as strong as its weakest welded up, but one should be very the anchor shackle. The spile pin,
link is an old saying, and when a part careful in doing so. The class society securing the main pin of the shackle,
of the chain breaks it may be due to should always be consulted, the seems to fall out relatively often, and
wear and corrosion or to over-stressing amount of welding should be limited, Gards investigation saw two reasons
of that part. Class societies require and the link should be both pre-heated for that. One is found at the shipyard
anchors and chain to be ranged in and slowly cooled down afterwards. where the chain was fitted. The conical
dry-dock every five years and that is In many cases it would be better to shape of the spile pin must match the
Breakage
If parts of an anchor break, there are
good reasons to suspect defects of
the cast metal, like inclusions and
fissures, but it can also be caused by
uncontrolled dropping of the anchor
on a rocky seabed. Gard has also
seen some anchor shanks breaking
off, and that has been a surprise.
Normally one would expect a chain
link to part under strain long before
the anchor shank. Examinations of the
remaining part of the broken shanks
have revealed a brittle metal structure,
caused by insufficient annealing at the
makers. The anchor shank and anchor
crown are made of cast steel, which
requires a long heat treatment after
casting. The manufacturers may have
speeded up the production, cut time
and temperatures needed for heat
treatment, and that may not have been
discovered by the authorities involved
in testing and certification. If an anchor
shank breaks, Gard recommends
sending the remaining part to a test
facility and comparing the results with
the certificate.
Operational circumstances
As for operational circumstances when
anchors are lost, some happen during
normal anchoring, if one is not able
to control the speed of the drop by
the windlass brake, or if the anchor is
dropped while the vessel is still moving
forward. Anchors and chains may also
be lost when anchoring in an area
exposed to bad weather, if the vessel
starts drifting. In such situations, there
anchoring equipment
Gard has seen an increasing number of also assumed that the vessel can use ships dragging anchors in bad weather
cases involving lost anchors, and from a scope between 6 and 10, the scope that Masters have at times placed too
class societies we learn that as many being the ratio between length of chain much trust in their vessels anchoring
as one anchor per 100 ships is lost paid out and water depth. However, equipment. Todays weather forecasts
annually. The reasons for loss of anchors large ships at deep anchorages do not are usually very reliable and Masters
and chain are many, and include have sufficient chain onboard to reach should more often choose to weigh
lack of seamanship and inadequate scopes of such magnitude. anchors and go out to sea in time if
maintenance, but also instances of the heavy weather is forecast.
chain and anchor breaking, leaving a If a ship is at anchor in ballast condition,
question mark as to the quality of such the Master should also bear in mind
parts as provided by the manufacturers. that wind forces acting on his ship may The full text of the rules for anchoring
be much larger than the calculations equipment can be found in the
In Gard, about one in 200 ships a have accounted for, as larger ship document Requirements concerning
year has an anchor related claim. side areas are now exposed, while the mooring, anchoring and towing,
Most of these are due to the loss of measurements entered in the formula by searching the web pages of
anchors at designated anchorages was taken from the summer load water the International Association of
where the authorities require the lost line. Vessels in ballast will also be more Classification Societies: www.iacs.
items to be removed, thus resulting vulnerable if they have to move away in org.uk, or directly in www.iacs.org.uk/
in a wreck removal case. The more bad weather, as both the steering and vdunifiedrequirements/ur_a_pdf148.
serious and very costly cases are when the propulsion may be affected. pdf.
a vessel starts dragging its anchor in
bad weather, and where this leads to Class societies make it clear that the
collisions with other vessels, groundings use of the anchoring equipment is
and loss of the ship, or to damage to only for the temporary mooring of a
cables and pipelines on the seabed. vessel, within a harbour or a sheltered
area, when awaiting berth, tide, etc.
Strength and limitations of It is particularly emphasized that the
anchoring equipment equipment is not designed to hold
The rules for anchoring equipment, a ship off a fully exposed coast in
the grade, length and size of chain, bad weather or to stop a vessel from
number and weight of the anchors, drifting. The anchoring equipment, as
the strength of the chain stoppers and designed in accordance with the class
the power of the anchor windlasses rules, will only hold the vessel in good
and the brakes, are established by the holding ground, while the holding
class societies. They can be found in power is significantly reduced in poor
the rules of the individual societies, holding ground.
or in the unified rules of IACS, the
International Association of Class Recommendation
Societies. It is important to be aware If a vessel is anchored in an area
that these are minimum requirements, exposed to weather, it is necessary to
and to know the assumptions made in have a policy as to when to leave. There
the calculations. have been cases when Masters have
been under commercial pressure not
For each vessel the class society will to leave the anchorage, and disasters
calculate an Equipment Number have happened because the Master
by using a formula, where the was tempted to wait and see until
displacement of the vessel, the breadth the morning, although the weather
of the ship and the height from the forecast was bad. In making his decision
summer load waterline to the top of the whether to stay or to leave, the Master
uppermost house, as well as the profile should also be aware of the limitations
view area of the hull, superstructures of his anchoring equipment. Some
and houses above the summer load Masters may not have full knowledge
waterline are included. Thus, the forces of these limitations, however, they are
on the ship by current and wind from laid down by the class societies in their
both the front and the sides are taken rules for calculating the dimensions,
into account. The formula is based weights and strengths of the anchoring
on an assumption that the speed equipment.
of the current may reach 2.5 m/sec,
and wind speed of 25 m/sec, which With the mentioned limitations in
represent quite high forces, but it is mind, it can be seen from cases of
grounding in Barranquilla,
Colombia
Background to the current and turning at the wrong
Gard and other P&I clubs have recently time. In addition to the groundings,
experienced several serious casualties the excess water flow has also led to
in the port of Barranquilla. The port other incidents such as collisions due to
of Barranquilla is located on the west miscalculating the speed and strength
bank of the Rio Magdalena (Magdalena of the current.
River) some 10 miles upriver from the
mouth, known as Bocas de Ceniza, in With the increasing volume of water,
the Caribbean Sea. The port receives the silting up of the river bed and
some 300 vessels monthly. The purpose of the mouth of the river has also
of this circular is to inform about the increased, causing changes in the
situation in Barranquilla and to help pattern of silt deposits, creating shoals
members and clients to assess the and reductions of depth where there
increased risk when entering or leaving previously were none. The changes in
this port. the river bed also have a bearing on
the speed and direction of the current.
The unusual situation in The current in the navigational channel
Barranquilla has increased due to the Bernoulli
The 2010 rainy season in Colombia, principle2. This has changed the
with unusually large volumes of rain hydrodynamics of the River.
falling for considerable periods of time Figure 1- Magdalena River & Rio Cauca
has been the worst in 40 years. The The authorities have expressed reaches the sea in Barranquilla
rainiest months of the year are usually concerned and have increased
April and October, but in 2010 due to the frequency of bathymetries and
the La Nia1 phenomenon, the late soundings of the river bed. They have
rainy season started in late August also started to provide information
and is now running into December. more regularly (bi- or tri- monthly,
Colombian climate experts estimate rather than once a month). In addition, assessment. The Master and the pilot
that the rains will continue well into a permanent dredge is now stationed should plan together to reduce the
2011, probably until March, causing the at Bocas de Ceniza to cope with the vessels side exposure to the current to
late rainy season of 2010 to merge with changing circumstances. avoid losing rudder control of the ship.
the early rainy season of 2011. At the
time of writing, this years rains have so Recommendations The circular has been drafted and
far left more than 130 people dead and Due to the unusual conditions edited by Gards local correspondent in
close to two million affected. in Barranquilla, Gard strongly Colombia Marventura Services Ltda.
recommends Masters to be aware
There are currently unusually large of the risks involved and take the
volumes of water in the rivers, and above into consideration when
special directional dams at Bocas planning the arrival or departure.
de Ceniza have been constructed Vessels entering the port should
to accelerate the flow of the river to request their agents to provide the
maintain and improve depth and thus most up to date bathymetric charts
the draught for the shipping channel. and recommendations from the local
This has created unprecedented authorities prior to entering port. When
conditions and increased the risks possible, vessels should enter the port
involved in navigating in the port of during daytime.
Barranquilla.
When possible the pilot should board
Increased risk when navigating in the the vessel three or more miles outside
port of Barranquilla the river mouth. This will allow the pilot
The severe conditions described have more time to get a better feel of the
caused difficulties for even the most handling of the ship, should there be
experienced pilots in Barranquilla an emergency situation. Masters should
and some of the incidents, including work closely with the pilots in the 1 La Nia is a coupled ocean-atmosphere
three serious groundings in October/ discussion and planning of the entering phenomenon that is the counterpart of El
November may be due in part to manoeuvre. The pilot station should be Nio as part of the broader El Nio-Southern
Oscillation climate pattern.
misjudgement of the river conditions by contacted well in advance to obtain an 2 If the volume increases and the area to
the pilots and masters. Examples of this update on the conditions in order to discharge remains the same, the same volume
could be presenting too much hull get accurate data for the onboard risk is delivered but at a higher speed.
Communication in
Gard News 200, November 2010/
January 2011
pilotage passage
planning
Good communication between master ECDIS This becomes even more important
and pilot continues to be paramount. In many areas pilots use their own with the impending implementation of
The article Master/pilot exchange electronic chart systems, displaying the full ECDIS regulation. And why not also
of information, published in Gard passage on a laptop or similar device use emails to send the waypoint details
News issue No. 154, focused on the that they bring with them on board in advance?
importance of good communication and connect to the vessels AIS pilot
between master and pilot, a problem plug. Use of such aids to navigation, Advance information leaves only
which was also highlighted in the if combined with reduced planning minor technicalities to be discussed or
articles Pilot on board! in Gard News and bad communication between confirmed at the time of pilot boarding
issue No. 181 and Is the pilot a part of bridge team and pilot, further reduces and ensures that the bridge teams full
the bridge team? in Gard News issue the ability of the OOW to monitor attention can be immediately directed
No. 185. In the following article Gard the pilots intentions regarding the towards navigation.
News revisits the topic once again.1 vessels track, changes of course and
to question any decisions made by the This is probably the way forward:
Ideally the pilot, the master and the pilot. communication of the pilots intended
officer of the watch (OOW) should passage plan in advance of the actual
discuss and agree on the intended Nowadays most vessels are equipped operation, which would facilitate input
passage plan in pilotage waters with ECDIS or ECS as aids to navigation of the plan in the ships anti-grounding
prior to commencing the passage. and support to conventional paper monitor system, the ECDIS. This would
Unfortunately, this is often not done chart navigation.2 When the passage is also allow the bridge team to familiarise
in accordance with bridge team properly represented in these electronic themselves with the intended passage
management principles. For the systems, it is possible to enable a plan and be in a better position to
master and the ships crew to be able number of automatic alarms, which add monitor the pilots actions.
to supervise the pilots performance, to the safety of navigation. However, for
or even question the pilots actions, these safety barriers to be effective, the Footnotes
they all have to be aware of the pilots passage plan must be properly agreed 1 See also the article Harbour towage and
intentions. pilotage, elsewhere in this issue of Gard News.
between vessel and pilot.
2 See article ECDIS - Charting the future of
navigation elsewhere in this issue of Gard
Pilots prevent far more accidents than In some areas pilots send passage plans News.
they cause. Nevertheless, when a pilot or passage planning information for a
boards a vessel there may be pressure particular port to vessels in advance.
on both the pilot and the bridge This proactive communication enables
team in terms of time. As a result, the the vessels bridge team to prepare
passage plans of the pilot and the and enter the expected passage in the
on-board bridge team may not be on-board systems prior to the arrival
consistent with each other. There may of the pilot, including activating the
be a lack of communication between safety settings on the vessels ECDIS/
the bridge team and the pilot regarding ECS. When the pilot arrives on board,
the intended passage, which may the bridge team is already aware of his
significantly reduce the safety of the main intentions and should be able
operation. to quickly discuss and agree on the
passage plan, including any possible
Recent findings in incidents deviations from the original plan.
investigated by Gard involving pilots However, this should not replace the
showed that common elements were all-important master-pilot exchange of
present in most of these cases: information.
(1) information had not been shared by Given the technology available today,
the master and the pilot, the transmission of intended passage
(2) there had been insufficient time for planning information in advance
the ships crew to familiarise themselves of the vessels arrival by the pilot,
with the pilots intended passage plan, pilotage authority or other responsible
(3) the pilot boarding ground was body through a simple e-mail would
frequently closer to the harbour significantly add to safe navigation and
entrance compared with the charted would assist the pilot in becoming a
boarding ground. more integral part of the bridge team.
pilotage
By Yves Beeckman, Marine Superintendent, URS, Antwerp.
It is generally assumed that tug board or the ships lines to the tug. to remind the crew of the risks of
operations are routine for ships crews (most commonly for tugs lines: thin handling tow wires and to discuss the
and that mooring parties will handle heaving line from the vessel to pick procedures.
them efficiently and swiftly. As a result, up a larger size messenger rope
master-pilot exchanges do not usually from the tug, which can be led to the During the operation
address this issue. However, in order warping drum of a winch in order to The commands used by the officer
to ensure effective harbour towage heave on board the tow wire. When in charge should be clear and well
operations, it is essential that the using ships ropes, the other option is understood by the deckhands; standard
relevant information is exchanged to lower a ships rope or send it over terminology may be developed, subject
between the master and the pilot with a heaving line. Most tugs will, to the ships working language.
beforehand, so that the mooring however, not take a lowered line when
parties can be called to their stations underway), only when departing from The crew should wear leather working
in time, fully briefed on the details of the berth gloves or gloves made from equivalent
the operation. Daily experience in a - position for passing over the heaving materials when handling a tow wire,
harbour towage department shows line (throw from the ships shoulder, never cotton gloves. Very loose work
that, unfortunately, the number of which fairlead the heaving line should clothing should also be avoided.
less-skilled mooring parties is on the be taken through) Overalls should be tight, especially
increase. This lack of skill may result - maximum speed for securing the tug, around the wrists and ankles.
in delays in securing a tug, putting so the bridge team can monitor
time pressure on the crew and thereby - bollard pull of the tug(s) Many serious personal injury incidents
increasing the risk of personal injury - VHF channels to be used for working in mooring areas involve parting lines.
or of the vessel sailing in unsafe with the tugs It is therefore important to note that
conditions, for instance in dense traffic, a snapback zone exists when a
before the tug is ready. Information required to be passed mooring line is under tension. Crews
from master to pilot should take that into account during
Exchange information beforehand The master should provide the operations and it may be a good idea
The tug information can be exchanged following information to the pilot: to indicate these areas permanently on
during the voyage under the pilots - SWL of the mooring / towing the deck. As soon as the tug is secured,
advice, as opposed to being exchanged equipment all crew stand back from the snapback
at the time of pilot boarding, when - Which fairleads are suitable for zones. Crew members should also be
there are other navigational priorities securing the tugs. If they are off centre warned to beware of hands and fingers:
to be addressed. At the start of the and only one tug is to be used, this sudden jerks in the tow wire while
towing operation the parties should all must be specifically brought to the taking the line on board or releasing the
be at their mooring stations in good attention of the pilot. tug can easily lead to personal injury.
time and have the heaving lines ready - Pushing point strength, if known. If
at the correct/required position. The no pushing points are indicated on the The officer in charge must always be
master should discuss the ETA at the hull, but the ship has a reinforced belt in visual contact with the tug during
rendezvous point and ensure that he all around, it is important to convey this securing up, so he can exchange hand
musters the crew on time, allowing for fact to the tug master. signals with the tug crew, which is
the distances to the mooring stations to usually better than trying to handle a
be covered in time, without the need to What the crew should know walkie-talkie VHF in windy conditions.
run. If the operation is to take place at The officer in charge must ensure There are ships in which the bulwarks
night, the crew should have ample time that the mooring party knows which are so high that the tug crew can not
to wake up and prepare for the period bollard(s) will be used for the tug(s), see anybody on the (forecastle) deck
out there, possibly in adverse weather how the messenger line will be led of the vessel, or anything that goes on
conditions. towards the warping drum and how the there. In such conditions, it is absolutely
tow wire will be stopped off in order essential to have one person in a
Information required to be passed to allow the strain to be taken off the specific location for signalling visually
from pilot to master messenger line and the soft eye to be to the tug. The crew should always
Due to the different types and sizes of put over the bollard. They should also signal to the tug when the tow wire is
tugs, there are many different types of be aware of the releasing procedure. secured and the tug can safely start
harbour towage manoeuvres, so the applying power. Status of the tow
master should find out the following In order to avoid disruption, if there wire should also be confirmed to the
details from the pilot in order to pass has been a crew change, the new crew master (secured, in the water, propeller
them on to his crew: should familiarise themselves with the cleared).
- ships lines or tug line mooring equipment before taking their
- type of tow wire (steel, synthetic, size, stations for the first time. Only a suitably weighted heaving
indication of their size) line should be used. Monkeys fists
- method of getting the tow wire on Regular meetings should be held should not have additional weight,
but a heaving line should not be sharp bend in the tow wire under load, be recovered from the water before
thrown without a monkeys fist. The which might cause it to snap. The tow the tug can make a new approach
latter may be blown away and may wire should never be stopped by simply (to secure up with its spare towing
be impossible to get across to the putting it on deck and standing on it; wire). When making speed through
tug. The crew should have a second the wire is too heavy and you may be the water, this will be a difficult job for
heaving line ready to throw in case the thrown off your feet or dragged along. the mooring party, because once the
first one should end up in the water. Very serious injuries will result in most messenger line is entirely on board
The ships crew should always warn the cases. The crew should also beware of or on the warping drum, it will be
tug crew before sending the heaving snaking messenger lines when they much more difficult, probably even
line across. The crew should never are released and run out. They could impossible, to wind the remaining
use a thick messenger line to throw to seriously hurt someone upon impact. towing wire in on the warping drum. In
the tug, instead of a normal heaving this case, a stopper must be used, and
line: the weight of the line coming Normally, the bow tug will have no a (second) messenger line tied to the
down may injure the tug crew; it is also problems when the tow wire is released towing wire further down the line, and
more difficult to tie two messenger in one go; the tug will be moving away then winding the wire on board can
lines together (a rope messenger from the vessel and there will be little be resumed. This process may have to
line will typically be a three strand risk of the tow wire ending up in the be repeated a considerable number
polypropylene rope of 24mm diameter). tugs propellers. However, the crew of times. It will probably be necessary,
should always try to obtain confirmation if conditions allow, for the vessel to
A tow wire should never be grabbed from the tug of how they want this reduce speed. This is a dangerous
from below, but always from above.1 If done. The stern tow wire must always operation and great care must be taken
the wire has to be released quickly in be released in a controlled way (slacked when carrying it out.
an emergency, it is always easier to just away by means of the messenger line,
release your grip on the wire and let in co-ordination with the tug crew). Footnotes
gravity do the work than to pull your When you let it go in one motion, it 1 Towing wires typically have the
fingers away from underneath the wire. will most probably end up in the tugs following dimensions: for 45 ton bollard
propellers. pull: 42mm diameter; for 65 ton bollard
The messenger line must never be pull: 48mm diameter; for 80 ton bollard
disconnected from the tow wire. As Tug emergency let go pull: 54mm diameter.
an alternative, after securing the procedures
wire over the bitt, the shackle can be Tugs working on a towing winch have a
disconnected from the soft eye of the let go system. The ships crew does
tow wire and reconnected immediately, not have to do anything to disconnect
over the wire behind the soft eye, as the wire; that will be done by the tug
a running shackle. This provides a master. He will set his winch drum free
means to give sufficient power to the and let the wire run out, until it breaks
tow wire to create enough slack so that from its securing bolt on the winch
the soft eye can be lifted easily from the drum, while he manoeuvres his tug to
bollard. If this is not done, the shackle safety.
connecting the messenger line to the
tow wire should not be allowed to However, this leaves the ships crew with
become jammed between the bollard a problem: the vessel will be trailing
and the tow wire. This would cause a up to 140m of steel wire, which has to
future of navigation
An Electronic Chart Display and not fitted with ECDIS will be required is designed to meet the requirements
Information System displays a ships to retrofit the equipment at the of marine navigation. An ENC meets
position on electronic nautical charts first survey, in accordance with the the standards set by the International
in real time with very little effort on the applicable schedule above. Although Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and
part of the navigator, and is generally the first survey may not coincide with uses a data format defined by IHO,
hailed to be an invention set to dry-docking, owners should be aware known as S-57.
revolutionise and vastly improve the that substantial work could be involved
safety of navigation. in retrofitting this equipment, which Although ENCs are available for most
could take the ship out of service. IMO frequently used routes and ports, it
Amendments to the International has recommended that consideration may be some time before ENCs cover
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea should therefore be given to carrying all navigational areas, especially more
(SOLAS) Chapter V, Regulation 19 (V/19) out the necessary modifications remote parts of the world. If ENCs are
make the carriage of an Electronic in dry dock before the mandatory not available for a certain area, ECDIS
Chart Display and Information System implementation date. The agreement may be operated in Raster Chart
(ECDIS) mandatory for ships flying of the ships flag administration would Display System (RCDS) mode. The
the flag of contracting states.1 The be required to postpone retrofitting RCDS mode uses Raster Navigation
amendment will come into force on 1st beyond this date. Charts (RNCs), which are digital copies
January 2011. of paper charts and are issued officially.
Existing ships that will be permanently The use of RNCs requires the approval
The following ships must be fitted taken out of service within two years of of the flag state, and the vessel is also
with ECDIS if engaged in international the applicable implementation date required to carry an approved portfolio of
voyages: may be exempt from its application. charts (APC), for use together with RNCs.
- passenger ships of 500 GT or upwards
constructed on or after 1st July 2012; The mandatory carriage of ECDIS Regular updates are available for ENCs
- tankers of 3,000 GT or upwards already applies to high-speed craft and RNCs. This information is normally
constructed on or after 1st July 2012; built after 2008, with the requirement available in digital format, but manual
- cargo ships, other than tankers, of applying from 2010 to high-speed craft updating is also possible. Manual
10,000 GT or upwards constructed on built before 2008. updates would normally be emergency
or after 1st July 2013; updates which may be provided by way
- cargo ships, other than tankers, of Chart carriage requirements of warnings using systems like Navtex
3,000 GT or upwards but less than From 1st January 2011 carriage of or Marine Notices. Remote updating
10,000 GT constructed on or after 1st ECDIS will be accepted as compliance may also be a possibility. It is of extreme
July 2014; with the carriage of nautical charts importance that the performance of
- passenger ships of 500 GT or upwards requirement in SOLAS V/19, paragraph the ECDIS is not compromised during
constructed before 1st July 2012 must 2.1.4, as long as the ECDIS meets the installation of updates.
be fitted not later than the first survey latest IMO performance standards2
on or after 1st July 2014; and the ship has in place a back-up If an ECDIS uses unofficial charts,
- tankers of 3000 GT or upwards system as required by IMO and the it no longer complies with SOLAS
constructed before 1st July 2012 must flag state. An electronic chart display requirements, and enjoys the same
be fitted not later than the first survey system that does not meet IMO ECDIS status as an ECS. ECDIS will provide a
on or after 1st July 2015; requirements is called an ECS, and continuous warning if the chart in use
- cargo ships, other than tankers, of does not fulfil the SOLAS chart carriage has not been issued officially.
50,000 GT or upwards constructed requirement.
before 1st July 2013 must be fitted not Limitations
later than the first survey on or after 1st In order to comply with chart carriage In addition to alarms and alerts
July 2016; requirements ECDIS can only use generated by ECDIS to indicate
- cargo ships, other than tankers, of SOLAS-approved charts (official charts).3 system malfunctions, ECDIS provides
20,000 GT or upwards but less than To meet SOLAS requirements the chart automatic route checking in the
50,000 GT constructed before 1st July must be issued by or on the authority planning stage and automatic alarms
2013 must be fitted not later than the of a government, a hydrographic and alerts to respond to set parameters
first survey on or after 1st July 2017; office authorised by a contracting during the route planning and
- cargo ships, other than tankers, of state or another relevant institution so monitoring stages. Irrespective of the
10,000 GT or upwards but less than authorised. chart on display, ECDIS will generate
20,000 GT constructed before 1st July alerts with reference to the largest scale
2013 must be fitted not later than the Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) is available of the relevant chart. However,
first survey on or after 1st July 2018. the database used with ECDIS. ENCs as the ECDIS automatic alarm function
are vector charts, issued officially is lost when it is operated in the
As can be seen from the above, ECDIS by or on the authority of a state, RCDS mode, it is recommended that
will become mandatory for certain authorised hydrographic office or other a corresponding paper chart is used
new ships on delivery. Existing ships relevant government institution and for ensuring that the best situational
Anchoring within
Loss Prevention Circular
No. 16-09
when manoeuvring in
confined waters
Gard has recently seen a noticeable the vessels draft, trim and windage Unfortunately, during these periods of
increase in cases involving significant characteristics must also be taken into increased risk, additional precautions
contact damage to fixed objects by consideration when discussing the appear not to have been taken.
vessels manoeuvring in confined vessels manoeuvrability. Pre-sailing and pre-arrival checks on
waters, mostly within port. Fixed objects manoeuvring systems are important,
include berths, docks, locks and shore 3. No agreed manoeuvring plan especially after a long ocean passage
side equipment such as cranes. The Just how the vessel will manoeuvre or stationary period. Less obvious
contact damage has resulted in some when in close proximity to fixed objects factors involve squat and/or interaction.
very large claims for the repair and/or is often not planned and/or agreed Although a loss of manoeuvring
loss of use of such objects. Outlined in advance within the bridge team capability will inevitably make contact
below are five of the most common and/or with the pilot.4 This not only avoidance more difficult, exercises
factors, in Gards experience in cases concerns the location that the vessel and drills can be used to test back-up
involving contact damage to fixed is proceeding to/from, but also other systems, including use of the ships
objects in confined waters.1 These fixed objects which the vessel will anchors. Having something in reserve
incidents also risk harming people and pass within critical close proximity. is important, but being able to put
the environment (e.g. pollution from Often, insufficient time is invested in that reserve to effective use is equally
breached oil tanks), and the ship itself advance to consider how the vessel important.
is often left with expensive repairs and can be expected to behave, given its
loss of trading time. manoeuvring characteristics and the Recommendation
prevailing conditions. The closest points It is better to abort the manoeuvre
1. Prevailing and forecast of approach are often not calculated as and make a second attempt than to
conditions not properly assessed are critical bearings, transits and ranges fail on the first. During drills, exercises
The cumulative effect of wind, sea, to assist in determining the limits of the and tests of equipment prior to arrival,
current and tidal conditions on the ship safe manoeuvring parameters. the Master should ensure that the
may not have been fully appreciated. crew is able to respond at any time
As a result of the above factors the 4. Poorly executed manoeuvre to an emergency situation related
vessel can experience difficulties in Even the best ship handlers to manoeuvring. Tasks should be
manoeuvring in a controlled fashion occasionally get it wrong, although it properly defined and assigned to
and within safe parameters. Insufficient is perhaps surprising how very wrong qualified personnel, and the Master
allowance has been made for the forces in some cases. Excessive speed is a should ensure that the company
acting on the ship. These can easily turn common factor as is pilot error and procedures are fully understood by
out to be greater than expected and the bridge team can be reluctant to everybody involved. Effective and
beyond the capabilities of the ship and, intervene when the pilot is clearly clear communication is important.
due to the unforeseen effects of the making mistakes. The Master should closely monitor the
prevailing and/or forecast conditions, manoeuvres and should not hesitate to
insufficient tugs would have been 5 Communication with tugs, terminals comment, give advice, or even abort
employed to handle the vessel. There and mooring crews leading to an approach if he is uncomfortable with
are instances where manoeuvrings in misunderstandings has also been the situation.
confined waters should be deferred a contributory factor. Even where a
until conditions have improved. This manoeuvring plan is agreed, prevailing
also includes cases of reduced visibility. circumstances can require the plan to
be changed and there may be little
2. Unfamiliarity with the ships time to react to new situations. In
manoeuvrability particular, changes in wind conditions Meeting between the MPA and the
A pilot will know the local waters best, and the movements of other vessels
P&I Clubs and their representatives in
however, the master is more familiar often create problems. In a number
Singapore, 26th June 2009.
with his vessels manoeuvrability. Due of cases it appears that aborting the
1 See also Bumps and scrapes can be costly!
to the rotation of crew, familiarity with manoeuvre to try again has not been from Gard News 183.
the ships own manoeuvring systems considered or has been left too late. 2 Some shipowners have sought to standardise
can be lacking, and, as technology equipment across vessels in their fleet and to
and computerisation is becoming 5. Loss of manoeuvring capability always assign senior officers to the same class
of vessel.
ever more prevalent, training may be The loss of engines, propulsion,
3 See Master/pilot exchange of information
needed to ensure that crew members steerage, or thrusters is, perhaps from Gard News 154.
are familiar with the vessels systems.2 surprisingly, a less common factor 4 See Guidance to Masters 2.13.4 Navigation
It is important to include information than those mentioned above. There in confined waters Bridge Resource
as to the vessels manoeuvrability in are instances where such a loss has Management.
the master/pilot information exchange occurred immediately before/after 5 See also Loss Prevention Circular no. 04-
00: Pilot on the bridge - Role, authority and
before the commencement of the manoeuvring systems have been, or responsibility.
pilotage.3 The effect of changes in are due to be, repaired or overhauled.
International Group of P&I Clubs floating objects was USD 400,000. The each pollution incident involving pilot
reports on pilot error-related report recommends better training or error the average cost was USD 1.8
claims briefing of bridge team management million. The report recommends better
The Pilotage Sub-committee of the to operate with the pilot on board, training or briefing of the bridge team
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) especially in relation to passage management to operate with the pilot
has published a report on claims over planning. on board, with emphasis on the master/
USD 100,000 involving pilot error. pilot exchange of information.
Information pooled by IG Clubs relating Collisions involving pilot error
to 260 such claims has been included in accounted for 24 per cent of claims by Groundings are the most expensive
the study, which covers the period from number and 24 per cent by cost. On pilot error claims. They are more than
20th February 1999 to 20th February average there were 14 collision cases four times as expensive as pollution
2004. per year involving pilot error and the claims and almost 20 times more
average cost of each case was USD expensive than FFO claims.
Important observations 800,000. The report recommends
The average number of incidents per bridge teams to keep a proper look-out The IG is currently maintaining a
year involving pilot error was 52. The and not to forget that their eyes are still database of pilot error incidents from
frequency did not increase from year the most sophisticated aid to do so. 21st February 2004 to the present and
to year. The average cost of each claim thereafter.
over the five year period was USD Groundings, pollution and general
850,000. The average cost did not average/salvage cases involving pilot The complete report can be
increase from year to year either. error each accounted for about three downloaded from the IG website at
per cent of the incidents by number. www.igpandi.org under News and
Claims for damage to fixed and floating There were on average two incidents Information.
objects (FFO) involving pilot error in each of these categories every year.
accounted for 65 per cent of claims by Groundings accounted for 35 per cent
number (37 claims per policy year) and of all incidents by cost. The average
33 per cent by cost. The average cost cost of each grounding involving pilot
of each claim for damage to fixed and error was USD 7.85 million and of
system
The winter season in the northern Numerical Meteorology and The forecasts are presented as lower
hemisphere has again claimed victims Oceanography Center. The service is resolution pictures which can easily be
at sea as severe weather conditions open to the general public and free of copied and forwarded by e-mail for
continue to be a challenge for ships and charge and may be subject to periods vessels with limited internet connection
their crews. The majority of the large of non-availability. on board.
casualties occurred when the ship was
affected by stormy weather. It appears Wave Watch 3 (WW3) is a web service The web page can be found at https://
information about and preparations for which provides global wave forecasts. www.fnmoc.navy.mil and the WW3 is
severe weather conditions may not be It presents the forecasts for different found at the bottom left of the page
at the required level. oceans in a self explanatory and under the menu item Oceanography
informative way. Not all ocean areas are or https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/PUBLIC/
Wave Watch III covered and the service sets out the WW3/index.html.
One important piece of information main wave patterns produced by the
is an accurate and understandable different pressure systems. The model
weather forecast. Ships shows significant waves, swell, wind
already receive information about the waves and whitecap probability. The
expected winds and temperatures but heights and directions are indicated
not all have access to wave information. by two different color schemes.
WW3 is presenting the forecast wave
Wave Watch 3 is a service provided development in 12 hour intervals up to
by the US Navy through the Fleet a maximum of 6 days ahead.
Typhoon season
Loss Prevention Circular
No. 03-07
The incident
The incident involved a two-year-old
car-carrier with space for about 6,000
cars.
At the time of the incident the vessel had about 1,300 tons of heavy fuel oil in her
bunker tanks.
No let-up in fatigue-related
casualties
Fatigue at sea is a problem which needs This is not to say that any or all of these problem remains a serious one. Despite all
urgent attention. objectives are, by definition, wrong or the attention and publicity the problem is
dangerous. It is, however, undeniable not going away. Indeed, with the growth
A serious problem that cutting costs is often the easiest to in world trade and consequent expected
There continues to be a sharp and detailed achieve of these three objectives and it increase in the number, size and value of
focus on seafarer fatigue. The Centre for is sometimes the case that the greatest ships, it is a major concern that not only are
Occupational and Health Psychology at and possibly disproportionate emphasis is fatigue-related casualties going to be with
Cardiff University in Wales has recently placed on the cost factor. us for the foreseeable future, but also that
(November 2006) published an 87-page they are likely to increase.
report into seafarer fatigue.1 The Nautical As mentioned in the 2002 article, it is
Institute is concentrating several of its natural for shipowners, operating in a Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study
forthcoming Alert! bulletins on this very competitive environment, to wish to In July 2004 the UKs Marine Accident
issue. Other industry and industry-related keep their operating costs to a minimum. Investigation Branch (MAIB), published
organisations, notably the International Thus many owners will crew their ships a report entitled Bridge Watchkeeping
Transport Workers Federation, have with no more than the minimum number Safety Study. The report may be found
carried out studies into this problem. of people required by the Standards of at www.maib.gov.uk/publications/safety_
Five years ago an article in Gard News2 Training, Certification and Watchkeeping studies.cfm. Gard strongly recommends
reported on fatigue-related casualties and Convention (STCW). This is perfectly every shipowner and operator to read this
pointed out that all sides of the industry legal and they are quite entitled to do report, especially those operating in the
were expressing concern about fatigue in so. Understandably, very few owners will, short sea and container trades. Based on
seafarers, especially officers. The article voluntarily, place themselves at what they its own investigations into many casualties
said that there are signs that the fatigue would see as a commercial disadvantage around the UK coastline, the MAIB takes
problem is getting worse, not better. by employing more crew than they are the view that, in certain trades at least, the
What if anything has changed since legally obligated to do. minimum manning levels and required
then and how? hours of rest provided for in STCW are
Unfortunately, evidence collected in insufficient to prevent fatigue-related
Regrettably, the answer seems to be recent years by many organisations inside casualties continuing to occur. Particular
very little. If anything, increased and and outside the industry in relation to reference is made to the system of a six-
increasing commercial pressure within the fatigue-related casualties suggests that the hours-on/six-hours-off watch practised on
shipping industry means that companies
and individuals in these companies are
continually required to provide the best 1 Copies can be obtained from Gard. Alternatively, further information may be obtained by
e-mailing the author at smithap@cardiff.ac.uk.
possible service, in the shortest time 2 Are we tired of hearing about fatigue-related casualties? in Gard News issue No. 166.
available and at the lowest cost possible.
Collisions at sea -
Gard News 185,
February/April 2007
Unavoidable?
By Captain Ronald Whrn, Ahlers & Vogel, Hamburg
Multiple effects
Serious collisions have multiple effects.
Often too often crew or passengers
become injured, or even worse, lose
their lives. This may cause individual
grievance and sorrow: wives lose their
husbands, children lose their fathers,
their financial situation becomes
uncertain.
2 John Cappelow, Why aircrafts dont collide, North East Branch of the Nautical Institute seminar Collisions Controlling the Chaos, Newcastle,
11th November 2006.
3 Captain Michael Lloyd FNI, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS October 2006, p. 10.
4 Svein A. Andersen, Navigation-related incidents what the claim figures tell us Gard seminar Bridge over troubled waters, Oslo, March 2006.
5 Captain Michael Lloyd, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS, October 2006, p. 11.
6 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs).
The incident reported below shows master took over the command from the This was a crossing situation, and vessel
how failure to comply with the Collision second officer. At the same time the speed A was the give-way vessel because she
Regulations causes collisions that could was reduced gradually to slow ahead. had vessel B on her starboard side.
be avoided. According to the rules, she should have
The master of vessel B now observed taken early evasive manoeuvre(s), for
The COLREGs vessel A visually as she came out from the instance by reducing speed, stopping
The Collision Regulations1 (COLREGs) breakwater. When vessel A was about two or waiting. Instead, vessel A acted as
are basic rules to avoid collisions, which miles away, the master of vessel B ordered if she was the stand-on vessel. Vessel
are well known by all officers on merchant dead slow ahead and starboard 10. A increased the speed to full ahead in
vessels. Nevertheless, infringement of one order to cross ahead of vessel B. Crossing
or more of the apparently easy-to-follow Vessel B noticed that vessel A was picking ahead of another vessel when there is
collision rules is the single most common up speed about one mile away, and called a possibility or probability of collision is
cause of collisions. her up on the VHF. The master of vessel not considered to be in accordance with
B said that vessel A should alter course to good seamanship.
Following are some of the main rules in starboard in order to perform a standard
the COLREGs: port-to-port passing. The master of vessel Vessel A kept the heading and increased
Rule 2 Navigation in accordance with A said he would pass ahead of vessel the speed. In order to avoid collision
good seamanship B, probably due to the shallow area on vessel A should have taken positive action
Rule 5 Lookout vessel As starboard side, and asked vessel in ample time and with due regard to the
Rule 6 Safe speed B to stop the engine and not to alter to observance of good seamanship. Vessel A
Rule 7 Determination of risk of collision starboard. The master of vessel B replied changed heading only about one minute
Rule 8 Action to avoid collision that this was impossible, but received no prior to the collision, hence not in enough
Rule 9 Sailing in narrow channels reply. time and not in accordance with good
Rule 10 Behaviour of vessels in or near seamanship.
traffic separation schemes The master of vessel B ordered full astern
Rule 12 Actions to be taken when and hard starboard. Vessel A did not Vessel A did not observe vessel B before
approaching other vessels notice vessel B before they called him on being contacted on the VHF. By proper
Rule 13 Overtaking the VHF. The master of vessel A claimed use of lookout and radar, vessel B should
Rule 14 Head-on situations that he could not turn starboard, that he have been discovered at an earlier stage.
Rule 15 Crossing situation informed the master of B accordingly, and
Rule 16 Action by give-way vessel said that he was picking up speed and If vessel A had used its ARPA radar
Rule 17 Action by stand-on vessel would pass ahead of vessel B. The master properly, it would have been evident that
of vessel B replied that it was not possible crossing ahead of vessel B would increase
The incident to pass ahead of his vessel. The master of the risk for collision.
The following casualty involved two vessel A claimed that he had requested
medium-size modern container vessels. vessel B to stop her engines and turn Vessel B was the stand-on vessel, but
starboard. must take its share of the blame for the
Vessel A departed from her loading port. collision. According to the rules, the
It was a dark evening but visibility was The master of vessel A then ordered hard stand-on vessel is obliged to maintain her
good. A pilot was on the bridge, together port. speed and course. However, vessel B had
with the master, the third officer and the the opportunity to alter course as soon
helmsman. After passing the breakwater At this time, the collision was as it became apparent that vessel A was
the pilot disembarked. The vessel had a unavoidable. Vessel A had a heading not taking the expected actions. Rather
course of 095, with a speed of about 8 of about 060 and a speed of 13.6 knots than calling vessel A on the VHF, vessel
knots and increasing. when the vessels collided. Vessel B had B had the opportunity to reduce speed
a heading of 340 and a speed of about 8 earlier. An early starboard manoeuvre
Vessel B was heading towards the area knots. The angle of blow was about 80. most probably would have prevented the
with a course of 353 and a speed of 13.5 Both vessels suffered significant damage. collision.
knots. Port authorities were informed
about the vessels ETA. The master The cost of repairs and the loss of income Vessel B had the opportunity to give
entered the bridge approximately one paid by the insurers were in excess of USD vessel A more sea room in order to pass
hour before arrival. 5.5 million. The apportionment of liability port-to-port. There was plenty of sea
was 75/25 against vessel A. room for vessel B on her starboard side to
Vessel B contacted port radio when stay away from the shore-side on her port
entering the area and was informed that Analysis and lessons learned side. This is considered a breach of good
vessel A was the only vessel departing Several breaches of the COLREGs caused seamanship.
the port. From that time vessel A was the collision. The most severe breaches
monitored on the AIS. A bit later vessel were the following. Lesson learned: following the simple rules
Bs course was altered to 334 and the of the COLREGs will reduce the number
of collisions at sea significantly.
1 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs).
bridge team?
By Captain Erik Blom Master of the M/V BLACK WATCH,
Fred. Olsen Cruise Lines
Hopefully the answer to the above environmental and other factors for To help bridge team members
question is yes, but this comes at a setting different watch conditions, but interact with and support the master
price. as a minimum on ships with crews of and/or the pilot.
more than 6-7, the bridge team (BT)
I have been a Captain for the last 20 consists of the master, the officer on Pilots responsibilities
years, starting in the Royal Norwegian watch (OOW) and a sailor as helmsman The pilot is on board to assist in
Navy, later becoming a pilot on the and lookout. With several shipping navigation and manoeuvring. The
Norwegian coast, until I decided to companies, especially within the cruise exchange of information between
change trade and became a cruise and oil industry, additional crew joins master and pilot does not shift the
vessel captain. Over the years I have the BT. responsibility for the safety of the vessel
worked on and managed a lot of from one to the other.
bridges, some well-functioning and the The BTs responsibility is to ensure
odd ones not working at all. a well-functioning Bridge Resource Fatigue
Management (BRM). Some of the main Chapter VIII (Fitness for duty) of the
Most readers will certainly know the objectives of BRM are: STCW Convention1 sets limits on
purpose of a well-functioning bridge To assist the ship master in managing the hours of work and minimum rest
team. Hopefully gone are the days the vessels bridge team for each requirements for watchkeepers.
when the Captain with a capital C voyage so that personnel are rested,
took all the decisions without discussing trained and prepared to handle any A pilots work environment (irregular
with anyone, and not listening to advice situation. and lengthy working hours, working
from others. On bigger ships the master To help the ship master recognise at night, unpredictable duty rosters,
now has a team around him on board to workload demands and other risk and travelling to and from their jobs)
support him in his decisions: the bridge factors that may affect decisions in can significantly contribute to fatigue.
team. setting watch conditions. Moving a large vessel in confined
To ensure bridge team members waters is a high-risk task and the pilot
Bridge team and its responsibilities are trained and aware of their assigned to that task has a responsibility
There are many combinations of responsibilities. to the state, the port authority and the
ships master.
1 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978.
Pilots are managers of high-risk
This circular is based on a recent letter industrys attention to IMO resolution practices and procedures to neglect an
received from The Danish Maritime MSC.138 (76) and indicating that a IMO recommendation. These ships will
authorities highlighting the increased number of ships are disregarding the be reported to the maritime authority in
number of navigational accidents recommendations. According to a the ships flag state.
in Danish waters, and Gards own safety study conducted by the Danish
experience with similar accidents in the Maritime Authority, during the period The following documents are available
same area. from 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2005 at www.gard.no under News in the Loss
alone, 22 ships grounded in the Great Prevention section:
As members and clients are aware, Belt and none of these ships had a pilot The Danish Maritime Authority Letter.
IMO resolution MSC.138 (76) provides on board at the time. IMO resolution MSC.138(76)
recommendations on navigation Intertanko model charterparty clauses
through the entrances to the Baltic The Danish Maritime Authority letter in recognition and support of IMO res
Sea, namely the Great Belt (Route T) illustrates and emphasises that it is MSC 138(76).
and The Sound. The recommendations highly recommended to utilise the
include the use of pilots for certain expertise and local knowledge of pilots, General information on Pilotage in
types of ships in high traffic density and that as a minimum, vessels sailing the Baltic can be found at the Baltic
waters. The purpose of IMO resolution through the Great Belt or The Sound Pilotage Authorities Commission
MSC 138(76) was to provide those follow IMOs recommendation on website at: http://www.balticpilotage.
responsible for the operation of navigation through the entrance of the com and http://www.pilotage.dk
ships with recommendations on safe Baltic Sea.
navigation through the entrances of Vessels to which the IMO
the Baltic Sea with the objectives to Denmark has also launched a recommendations do not apply are
ensure safety, prevent human injury or procedure whereby all vessels entering advised to navigate with extra caution
loss of life, and to avoid damage to the Danish waters without ordering a through the entrances to the Baltic Sea,
environment, in particular the marine pilot in accordance with the IMO i.e. the Great Belt (Route T) and The
environment, and to ships and their recommendation will be contacted in Sound. A guide to navigation in Danish
cargoes. order to draw their attention to the waters can be found at: http://www.frv.
recommendations on the use of pilots. dk/en/ifm/navigation/navigation_ntdw.
In a letter to the International Group When a ship does not comply, the htm
of P&I Clubs, the Danish Maritime master will be informed that Denmark
Authority has drawn the shipping finds it inconsistent with safe navigation
Operations in extremely
Gard Loss Prevention Circular
No. 10-01
cold climates
Winter season in
Gard Loss Prevention Circular
No. 02-04
The 2002/2003 winter season was the Analysis of the collision cases shows of other means of communication
worst on record since the winter of that the vessels involved are very often Immediate engine manoeuvring
1987. Our statistics appear to indicate blamed for not complying with the Immediate rudder manoeuvring
that the preceding relatively mild applicable rules; The International
winters may have lulled seafarers into Regulations for Preventing Collisions Recommendation
a false sense of security. How this and at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 72), and the When navigating in ice or in the vicinity
future winters will unfold remains to be Finnish/Swedish Rules for Winter of ice, shipowners must ensure that
seen, but shipowners and operators Navigation. their onboard personnel are well
would be well advised to ensure that aware of the regulations governing
their seagoing personnel are well aware The Finnish/Swedish Rules for Winter such navigation. Furthermore, masters
of the planning, preparation and care Navigation are endorsed by Germany, must be advised of the requirement
required while navigating in ice. Denmark and the Baltic States. In to ensure proper compliance with
addition to directing navigation during the governing regulations and also of
Approximately 30% of all averages the winter period in Finland and the utmost care required in order to
which occurred in connection with Sweden, these Rules set the standard promote safe navigation.
navigation in ice in the Baltic Sea during for ice navigation in the Baltic, including
the past winter season, were collision navigation in ice in conjunction with This circular has been produced with
cases. This is a substantial number and icebreakers in the majority of the Baltic. the valuable assistance
leads us to again remind shipowners of of former Hull Claims Manager, Captain
the issues involved. For further details about the Rules John Hammarn in Finland.
for Winter Navigation please see the
The most common cause was collision Finnish Maritime Authoritys home
between vessels in an ice convoy. page at http://www.fma.fi/e/functions/
Under normal circumstances blame has icebreaking/
been apportioned equally between
the colliding vessels. Otherwise, in Navigation when the vessel is part
determining liability, emphasis was of a convoy is a risky operation, and
placed on: the crew must be alert and maintain
1. How the watch keeper had been a proper lookout at all times. It is
alerted by the vessels involved, essential that all relevant regulations
2. How vessels ahead and abaft had are properly complied with. Breach
been warned by the vessel which was of COLREGS 72, especially the below
stuck or slowed down in the ice, mentioned rules, appears to be the
3. Distances kept between the vessels, most common cause of collisions:
and of course Rule 5 Proper look out
4. The ice situation in general. Rule 6 Safe speed
Rule 7 Risk of collision
In some collision cases, and in particular Rule 8 Action to avoid collision
when an assisting icebreaker is Rule 13 Overtaking vessel
involved, the case may be settled on Rule 17 Action by stand-on vessel
a knock-for-knock basis. This means Rule 27 (a) (i) vessel not under
that both parties cover their own cost command (stopped) to show two red
of repairs. The same principle may also lights
be used or agreed upon between the
parties, when two merchant vessels, The Finnish/Swedish Rules for
assisting each other when navigating Winter Navigation require
in ice, are involved in a collision. (a) Strict watch keeping both visually
However, the above knock-for-knock and especially by radar and immediate
practice is only used in standard notification by VHF radio when loss of
cases caused by difficult ice conditions. speed is experienced.
If gross negligence or other similar
causes are involved, other methods of (b) In case of stoppage:
apportioning blame will be used. Immediate signalling in case of failure
Introduction BV Glace 11, DnV Ice B or Ice 1B, are made available to all vessels
Due to heavy ice conditions in the ABS BO 1B); and transiting the northern Baltic Sea. In
northern Baltic Sea, navigational all ships with main engines power addition, companies should ensure they
restrictions have been issued. This 3500 h.p. and less. are properly informed on the specifics
circular provides information on where of ice breaking assistance including the
to find up to date information on ice In certain cases, special ice pilotage Nordic Agreement for the territorial
conditions in the northern Baltic Sea. can be arranged with express the waters of all countries that the vessel
In addition, please refer to the Gard permission of the Harbour Master. will transit through.
Services Loss Prevention Circular 10-01, Shipowners, ship managers and
Operations in extremely cold climates. Nordic Agreement on ice breaking charterers should make every effort to
Copies of this circular can be found on the assistance for the Baltic Sea ensure that vessels trading in the Baltic
Gard Services website at www.gard.no. A Nordic Agreement exists between have the proper ice class as required by
Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the appropriate authorities. Although
Ice condition information Germany to co-ordinate their efforts to operating in some of the trading areas
The latest ice and navigational assist ships traffic and keep the vessels affected by this ice problem, does
information can be found on the moving during winter. However, this not represent a breach of trading
Internet at the following addresses: agreement does not set out in detail warranties, owners may not be covered
how and when assistance should be by insurance as this is an expected and
- Finnish Institute of Marine Research provided. The Swedish ice-breaking foreseeable risk. The consensus in
ice service (www.merentutkimuslaitos. operation is governed by law, including Sweden is that entering these waters
fi) provide daily ice reports in Finnish, their tariffs, and similar arrangements without sufficient ice-class (as defined
Swedish and English, ice charts, the may apply in other countries. by the Swedish Icebreaking Authority),
Baltic Sea ice code, and ice forecasts. constitutes a breach of the safety
Finnish Maritime Administration (www. The ice-breaking operation will assist regulations. If you have any questions
fma.fi) provides information on ice any vessel in an emergency situation. or doubts concerning insurance
breaking and restrictions to navigation. However, a vessel without sufficient cover, please contact your relevant
Swedish Meteorological and ice-class, experiencing main engine, underwriter or Club.
Hydrological Institute (www.smhi.se) propeller, rudder etc., damages may For vessels transiting through Finnish
provides information on ice charts, ice not receive immediate assistance waters inbound or outbound to
reports, fairway information and ice as long as the crew or ship is not in Russian ports in the Baltic Sea, please
forecasts. danger, or, alternatively, until such time note that the ice class requirements
Swedish Maritime Administration as the ice-breaking operation consider differ between Finnish and Russian
(www.sjofartsverket.se) provides they have the time to assist the vessel. authorities. For example, vessels
information on ice breaking. meeting the requirements inbound
In addition, Oy Gard Services (Baltic) Ice-breaking assistance is free of to or outbound from St. Petersburg
AB, Helsinki and Gard Services Sweden charge. Assistance beyond helping may not meet the requirements of the
AB, Gothenburg receives the latest vessels getting to and from ports will Finnish authorities, should the vessel be
Baltic Sea ice charts. They can provide be charged according to a tariff, which trapped in Finnish waters. In instances,
up to date navigational information, is considered a statute. These tariffs the vessel would be subject to the
restrictions on navigation, ice breaker are, as far as we have been able to multi-state agreement mentioned
positions and reporting points for those establish, more expensive in Finland above.
vessels bound for Finnish ports and than in Sweden. As all aspects of the Ice breaking assistance will be
requiring icebreaker assistance. The services by the ice-breaking operation available not only in an emergency, but
contact details for Oy Gard Services (tariffs, liability etc.) are considered also if required by ships. The following
(Baltic) AB, Helsinki are: tel. + 358 9 statues, Lloyds Open Form (LOF) is not instructions are currently in force:
6188 380, fax. +358 9 6121 000. applicable. ships requiring icebreaker assistance
Capt. Y.Nazarovs of Pandi Services in the Gulf of Finland, on their way to a
East has provided information on It is worth noting that ice-breakers Finnish port, shall report to Helsinki VTS
restrictions in St. Petersburg, Russia. will not assist in towage operations if on channel 67 when passing the Hanko
St. Petersburgs Harbour Masters another tug is already engaged. Where longitude.
order No.1, dated 5th January 2003, a vessel, incapable of manoeuvring out Vessels destined for harbours in
states that as of 13th January 2003, ice of the ice by its own power, needs to go the Sea of Bothnia and the Bay of
navigation is not permitted in the port to a repair yard, owners would first need Bothnia are requested to report name,
of St. Petersburg for the following types to contract the ice-breaking operation nationality, destination and speed to
of vessels: and then meet up with a commercial VTS Stockholm on VHF channel 84, via
all ships with ice class less than -3 tug in ice-free waters. coastal radio or telephone direct +46 8
of the Russian Maritime Register of 666 66 22 when passing the light house
Shipping classification or corresponding Recommendations Svenska Bjrn.
ice class by other Classification All efforts should be made to ensure
Societies (LR 1B, GL E2, E2K or E2m, that current up to date ice conditions
no return
Delaying action until it is too late may and the wind was increasing. A new Salvage
have disastrous consequences. estimate from the chief engineer When a vessel is undergoing repairs
indicated a further 8 hours of repair at sea, the need for external support
Rubicon, or the point of no return, may time, which again was accepted by the and/or salvage will always have to
be defined as a line that, when crossed, master. Again the repair time elapsed, be considered. If time permits, such
permits no return and typically results and again the engine was not repaired. support should always be required in
in irrevocable commitment, that is, one The chief engineer was still optimistic, close co-operation with the shipowner
can no longer physically turn back. The and gave a new indication of a further and his hull insurers. In many cases hull
expression has its origin in Caesars 6 to 8 hours of repair time. The ship insurers have standing agreements
crossing of the river Rubicon in 49 BC, had now drifted closer to the shoreline, with local towing companies and may
which at that time was the ancient the weather was getting worse and a also put the vessel in contact with
border between Italy and Gaul. rough calculation indicated that the local agents that may provide valuable
ship would ground in about 10 to 15 support.
Occasionally, we experience hours if the engine was not repaired.
groundings that include major damage The master started to look for potential Lloyds Open Form (LOF) is also a
to the vessel, total losses, major external assistance. It turned out that matter of consideration. As a rule,
environmental pollution, and in some there were no vessels or tugs available most cases of external assistance are
cases also loss of human lives. Such in the area that could possibly reach the settled at an early stage on a fixed-
accidents often have their origin in vessel in time. To cut a long story short, cost basis. However, if the situation
an engine failure, or failure of other the engine was never repaired, the is allowed to develop and the vessel
vital technical installations on board vessel grounded and became a total drifts beyond the point of no return,
the ship. Investigations that follow loss. Luckily, there was no loss of life. a LOF may be the only possible way
such accidents very often reveal that out of the situation. Early and correct
the vessels initial assessment of the The above situation is extreme, but assessment of the situation is therefore
situation was inadequate, and that from time to time Gard experiences very important.
this initial lack of risk assessment incidents in which a proper estimate
contributed to, or in some cases of worst-case scenario and point of no Summary
caused, the fatal outcome of the return would probably have reduced a 1. Establish worst-case scenario.
accident. A thorough assessment of the serious accident to a minor incident. 2. Inform shipowner and other relevant
worst-case scenario as well as a correct authorities.
estimate of the point of no return are Estimating point of no return 3. Locate available external resources.
therefore decisive for a satisfactory First of all, a worst-case scenario 4. Establish the latest point for requiring
outcome in a critical situation. should be established: what will be assistance.
the consequences if our estimates 5. Maintain close communication with
The human factor are wrong? Are spare parts and assisting parties.
It is part of human nature to look tools available, and does the crew
for and focus on the easiest way have the necessary competence to
out of a critical situation. One hopes complete their task? Then the point
for the best, and the solution causing of no return should be established. In
least worries and problems is often order to properly estimate the point
accepted without much reflection on of no return it should be kept in mind
what to do if it fails. Being unaware that vessels drift, so the time and
of this mechanism may prevent the distance to the nearest danger point
ship management team (SMT) from should be established. This includes
assessing the worst-case scenario in an assessment of weather conditions,
the situation, and valuable time and current and wave height. Further on,
information may be lost. one should locate the closest point
of assistance (normally tugs but in
In a recent case, the vessel had an some cases spare parts suppliers or
engine failure and the chief engineer special workers), and determine their
reported a repair time of 15 hours. The availability and transit time to the
incident happened in good weather vessel. The transit time will determine
and far away from the shoreline there time available for repair, and it is then
was no immediate danger. The chief possible to estimate the latest time
engineers solution was accepted for requiring assistance. This should
without further questions from the be clearly marked as a line in the
master because it fitted well with his vessels chart. When the line is crossed,
own perception of the situation. When assistance must be immediately
the estimated repair time had elapsed, requested, so that it can reach the
the engine had still not been repaired vessel in time.
Gard News looks at some aspects of contact damage (typically collisions with So in situations where the navigational
the relationship between pilots and piers, etc.). Despite more advanced risk exceeds a given limit, national
seafarers. technology, the implementation of authorities respond by sending a
STCW 95 and a strong focus on the pilot on board. This is where the
Areas of risk human element as well as fatigue, challenges start: to a large extent
Despite the pilots duties and the expected decline in number of bridge team management training
responsibilities, his presence on accidents per year has not taken focuses on co-operation among the
board does not exempt the Master place. In addition, the tendency is that bridge team and less emphasis is
and the OOW from their duties and accidents are more severe and more placed on situations where outsiders
responsibilities for the ships safety. expensive than ever before. are introduced. Bridge manuals refer
This is quoted from the IMO Code of to pilot to pilot navigation and
Nautical Procedures and Practices, and As indicated above, a pilot is sent on little or nothing is said about how to
should be well known to seafarers. It board because the national authorities act when the pilot has embarked. In
is, however, a fact that a large portion have assessed that there is an increased short, the pilot is expected to deliver
of navigation-related accidents occurs risk in the area. This risk can be related the service he is paid to deliver and
when a pilot is on board. The reason to navigational hazards, geographical limited consideration is given to his
for this is obvious: the pilot is sent on areas that are vulnerable to pollution, co-operation with the bridge team.
board because the national authorities there can be special regulations related For that reason in many situations one
consider the area an increased risk, to the cargo that the ship is carrying. In does not achieve the desired increased
and in increased risk situations there some countries the masters experience level of safety; on the contrary, the
will always be accidents. However, it is is assessed, after a number of pilot- responsibility for navigation is simply
Gards clear understanding that pilots assisted port calls the master may be transferred from one person to another.
prevent far more accidents than they approved for entry without pilot. There
cause, but the picture is complex, and can also be other reasons related to, Communication
there is reason to study this in more for instance, military installations in the In accidents where a pilot is involved
detail. area. It is also important to note that there is one factor that is frequently
pilot requirements are at each individual present: limited or no communication
Navigation-related accidents are countrys discretion. Rules may and will between the master and the pilot.
traditionally split into three main therefore vary from country to country. There may be language problems and
groups: collisions, groundings and misunderstandings, unclear instructions
OOW had time to plot the vessels Recommendations and Lessons planning stage. In addition, the Master
position on the chart, the pilot began a Learned and/or OOW should communicate
course alteration. The OOW returned to (1) The Master is in command of the ship manoeuvring capabilities during the
the conning position and ensured the at all times with only one exception: voyage, as necessary. The Master and
helmsman promptly executed the pilots when transiting through the Panama OOW should never feel hesitant to
orders. Canal. Therefore, it is always the duty discuss these matters with the pilot if
of the Master and OOW to keep a they feel it necessary to do so.
Shortly after reaching the new heading, situational awareness of all activities
the pilot realised that the vessel was of the pilot. Although the pilot is most (6) Ensure that the vessel is equipped
not on the proper course and ordered knowledgeable about local waters, it is with the necessary updated charts for
a hard-a-starboard helm in the hopes the responsibility of the Master/OOW the intended voyage. It is not sufficient
of bringing her around but this was to verify position through proper use of to rely on the pilot to provide this
unsuccessful and the vessel grounded charts, radars and other position fixing information.
at 0135 hrs. devices and follow local rules on speed
and routing.
Depth soundings were taken in the area (7) The OOW should always closely
of the grounding and it was determined monitor the activities of the pilot. Many
(2) Voyage planning is crucial in all times, the pilot will not necessarily
that the bow was firmly aground and the
situations including when pilots are on communicate with the OOW regarding
stern was afloat in deeper waters. The
board. Sufficient time should be allowed the vessel and/or voyage. The OOW
vessel sustained extensive damage to
for proper communication between the should not hesitate to communicate
shell plating and internals in way of stem
Master, pilots and OOWs. This voyage with the pilot on any relevant matters
to No. 3 double-bottom tanks.
plan should include every important regarding the vessel or the voyage.
activity starting from the embarkation
The following causes contributed to this
of the pilot, in and out of the berth, and
incident: (8) The OOW should not only be
finally the disembarkation of the pilot.
(1) There was a substantial lack of bridge diligent with regard to his duties to
resource management (BRM). The ensure the pilots orders are properly
OOW and/or the Master should have (3) If the pilot is to command tugs followed but also to monitor the pilots
been more diligent about ensuring and/or personnel at a berth in a activities. If the OOW has concerns
that the OOW was there to reconfirm language that is foreign to the crew, regarding the pilots activities, he should
decisions made by the pilot. This could the Master must demand that the pilot contact the Master immediately.
have been done through better verbal communicates with the Master and/or
communication between the pilot and OOW in a common language
the OOW. (9) The vessel should have clear
(2) The pilot did not reconfirm his procedures and instructions to Masters
(4) When the piloted voyage is taking and OOWs on what to do with a pilot
mental model of his position before the vessel through narrow waters, you
making the critical turn. The OOW, onboard. These should be included as
should mark wheel-over points either part of the ships safety management
did not have the proper situational on the chart or at the radar screen in
awareness with regard to the vessels system (SMS).
order to know when you are reaching
position. The pilot did not reconfirm points of no return. This helps to
the vessels position prior to the course allow the pilot, Master, and/or OOW to (10) BRM is an important activity to
alteration. When the pilot gave the keep a better situational awareness. ensure safety. Any BRM training should
order to turn, the OOW only focused include how to handle the change in
upon whether the helmsman made communication, command, and control
the turn. He didnt reconfirm that they (5) The ships crew is normally the when a pilot takes over navigation of
turned at the proper location. most knowledgeable regarding the the ship.
(3) The weather played a marginal manoeuvring capabilities of the ship.
role in the grounding. However, as Detailed descriptions of the ships
a precaution, the vessel may have manoeuvring characteristics should
considered placing a dedicated lookout. be communicated during the voyage
Useful lessons can be learned from the The voyage continues and the pilot He consults the radar and although it is
following incident, which could happen gives instructions regarding the many years since the last time he was in
anywhere, any time, with almost any necessary course alterations, as the this harbour, he feels somewhat uneasy
ship. fairway becomes gradually narrower. with our present speed, as we are
The ship is still at full speed. rapidly approaching the inner part of
The incident the harbour. The master is tempted to
Good afternoon, Mr Captain. Ill take The pilot calls the harbour master (in ask the pilot to reduce the speed, but
over. Starboard 10, come to two five six his native language) and tells him that for some odd reason he does not. The
degrees and full ahead. ETA (estimated time of arrival) will be pilot orders half ahead and continues
in half an hour. He also gives the three to talk in his mobile phone. We are
Starboard 10 to two five six degrees, tugs waiting to assist berthing the ship approaching the berth and the master
full ahead. She is all yours, Mr Pilot. an update on the situation (also in his is more and more anxious about the
native language). There is no request speed, so he politely suggests the pilot
We are on board an ordinary tanker, for translation from the second mate to reduce the speed. The pilot explains
on an ordinary day, approaching an and no information is volunteered by that there is another ship waiting to
ordinary terminal somewhere in the the pilot. leave the berth and he has to board it
Western Hemisphere. The weather is as soon as possible.
grey but the visibility is not too bad, We continue full ahead. Traffic
although it is early evening. The speed increases as we enter sheltered waters. The first tug is closing in on port bow
is slowly increasing and the last light The background lights from the and is ready to receive the heaving line
of day is rapidly disappearing. The harbour area make it difficult to see from the ship. The second mate, who
atmosphere on the bridge is relaxed. the difference between moving and has just left the bridge, is now on the
stationary objects. forecastle making his first attempt at
Full speed, Mr Pilot, 14 knots. the heaving line, but misses the tug.
Mr Mate, can you prepare to receive He sees that they are now alarmingly
Full speed. Thank you, Mr Captain. the first tug on port bow? We will have close to the berth and hurries to do his
starboard side alongside. (Two other second attempt. This time he succeeds
The pilot and the master continue tugs are also ordered but this is not and reports back to the bridge that
talking about everyday matters such as mentioned by the pilot). the line from the tug is on board and
the weather, how long they are staying secured. At the same time the pilot,
at the berth, etc. Aye-Aye, sir, says the mate. who has just finished his telephone call,
is at the bridge, hectically instructing
Im leaving the bridge, says the The pilot contacts the tugs on the VHF the tugs on how to berth the ship, still
master. I have to prepare some papers again (still in the local language) and, in the local language this time with a
before we berth. The second mate will as he is talking, his mobile phone rings. raised voice.
assist you. If you need me, just tell him The mate calls the master, who enters
and he will get hold of me. the bridge after a couple of minutes.
occur?
Claims analysis for a ten-year period The graph shows that 3 per cent (in
(1992/2002) indicates that only 3.1 per number) of all P&I claims in the period
cent of all P&I claims in number related 1992 to 2002 were related to collisions.
to collisions. However, 12 per cent of
total P&I claims in value for the same
ten-year period (1992/2002) related to
collisions.
just plain ignored and disregarded and efficient ship is a well-trained crew, 1 International Regulations for Preventing
on frequent occasions. Despite teamwork and resource management. Collisions at Sea 1972 (as amended).
2 Survey carried out by Captain Roger Syms, of
improvements in navigational aids and Most shipowners are taking steps to The Nautical Institute.
technology and of training through enhance bridge procedures by ensuring 3 Standards of training, certification and watch-
various STCW3 conventions, collisions their officers and crew receive on-going keeping for seafarers.
still occur. The general consensus is that training in the operation of their vessels
the Collision Regulations are not being as well as other industry platforms
adhered to and are disregarded all too such as Teamwork & Bridge Resource
frequently. Management courses. Training is
a proactive approach to safety. It
Conclusion requires the identification, analysis
Investigations of recent cases and mitigation of hazards before they
suggest that despite improvements can affect the safe operation of the
in technology and of training through vessel. In the years to come, maritime
various STCW conventions, ISM, etc., a technology development will require
majority of collisions continue to occur a blending of advanced computing
due to a failure of the bridge team in and simulation-based technology,
following simple principles of bridge concepts of dynamic analysis, of risk
watch-keeping and violations of the and reliability and of human capabilities
Collision Regulations. The key to a safe and behaviour.
interaction between
ships
The United Kingdom Maritime and contributory factor in marine casualties extremely helpful Marine Guidance
Coastguard Agency Marine Guidance and hazardous incidents. An awareness Note No. 199 (M), which provides
Note No. 199 (M) contains advice on of the nature of the pressure fields advice on the causes of hydrodynamic
the causes of hydrodynamic interaction round a vessel moving through the interaction and the measures that can
between ships and the measures that water and an appreciation of the effect be taken to reduce its effect. Gard
can be taken to reduce its effect. of speed and the importance of rudder recommends that owners bring the
action should enable a vessel handler to contents of Marine Guidance Note
When two ships operate in close foresee the possibility of an interaction No. 199 (M) to the attention of their
proximity, like for instance when situation arising and to be in a better navigators. The full text of the note is
performing ship-to-ship re-fuelling, position to deal with it when it does available from https://mcanet.mcga.
cargo transfer between moving ships, arise. During passage planning depth gov.uk/public/c4/mld/section03/
or when harbour tugs assist ships in contours and channel dimensions MGN199.pdf.
port, they will be attracted to each should be examined to identify areas
other and consequently collision might where interaction may be experienced.
happen. Hydrodynamic interaction The United Kingdom Maritime and
between ships continues to be a major Coastguard Agency has issued the
In October 2004 the last remains of on a parallel course on their port side. be activated and operative at very
TRICOLOR were removed from the Suddenly they became aware of the short notice. In a crisis like this it is also
seabed some 20 nautical miles north same vessel turning hard to starboard reassuring for a shipowner to receive a
of Dunkirk. With that one significant and witnessed the vessel abeam personal phone call from his P&I Clubs
chapter in the whole story following the on their port side steaming right at top management with a statement of
loss of TRICOLOR was brought to an TRICOLOR. The Captain immediately full dedication and attention as Wilh.
end. This article contains an account of put the rudder hard to starboard but Wilhelmsen did from Gard in the very
the ordeal from the shipowners point there was no way to avoid the other early hours of this case.
of view. vessel and KARIBA hit TRICOLOR
with its bow on TRICOLORs port side A very important task for the ERT was
A dark December night just aft of the bridge. The men on the to organise the landing and care of
The story starts with the collision bridge of TRICOLOR immediately the crew. Many people were engaged
between KARIBA and TRICOLOR in the sounded the general alarm to alert locally in France and Belgium to receive
early hours of 14th December 2002. The their resting companions and they also the crew and arrange for medical care
evening before, TRICOLOR, a 49,792 managed to send out distress signals and lodging. As they had lost all their
GT, 1987-built car-carrier laden with on the radio before the heavy list to belongings, there was a need to meet
a cargo of 2,871 luxury cars, had left port forced them off the bridge and the crews basic needs as well as to
Zeebrugge bound for Southampton, into the cold sea and the dark night. organise provisional identification and
which was the last port in Europe Luckily they were picked up by the travel documents for their repatriation.
before the Atlantic crossing to the US. KARIBAs crew, who managed to launch It was also necessary to shield the crew
The crew had routinely made the vessel a life boat very quickly and initiate a from the media, make them available
ready for sea and gone to rest for the search for the TRICOLORs crew. The for questioning by authorities and
night in their cabins, except for those crew in the life raft was picked up by giving statements to the shipowners
on watch. The two things that seafarers the tugboat BOXER that happened own lawyers.
probably dread the most are collisions to be in the vicinity. All 24 people on
and fire. Knowing, however, that board TRICOLOR were rescued without Another very important task for the ERT
they had duly and properly prepared any injuries other than the obviously was to make sure that all relatives of the
the vessel for sea for the voyage to horrific experience of suddenly finding crew members were properly informed
Southampton and also trusting their oneself in utter danger by being forced as soon as possible so that their first
shipmates on watch to navigate the to escape into the cold sea on a dark knowledge of the disaster would not be
vessel safely through the night in the December night. from the media. This was immediately
very busy English Channel, they could attended to by the crewing agent in the
go to sleep and rest before arrival in The emergency response Philippines.
the morning and another busy port stay. The shipowners Wilh. Wilhelmsens
Despite the crews efforts to prepare the emergency response team (ERT) was Pollution prevention and safety of
vessel for sea and the officers attention assembled two hours after the collision navigation
to safe navigation in busy waters, the at their headquarters in Lysaker, There were two major problems that
crews worst nightmare would become Oslo, Norway. The owners insurance needed the ERTs immediate attention.
a reality that night and TRICOLOR was partners, Norwegian Hull Club and Although there were no reports of
never to make it to the next port. Gard P&I, were involved from the very pollution from the sunken vessel, it was
beginning and supplemented the ERT considered that there was imminent
At about 0215 hrs everybody on from their locations. Their dedicated danger of pollution from the 2,155 cbm
board TRICOLOR was shaken by a assistance was of cardinal importance of bunker oil within the vessel.
sudden impact and a terrifying noise. in that they have highly professional
Immediately following the impact claims handlers, local representatives Regardless of whether there was a
the general alarm was sounded and and expert maritime lawyers who can possibility of salving the vessel for
everyone except those on the bridge
hurried from their cabins to the
mustering station. The third engineer in
the engine room miraculously managed
to evacuate through the elevator shaft Basic facts about the collision:
and accompanied the others on deck as On 14th December 2002 TRICOLOR was overtaking KARIBA on a parallel
TRICOLOR took on a rapidly increasing course on KARIBAs starboard side in the west-bound lane of the traffic
port list. They managed to launch an separation scheme out of Antwerp and Zeebrugge. KARIBA turned
inflatable life raft and all managed to starboard and her bow hit and penetrated TRICOLORs port side. The
escape the sinking vessel safely. collision damage to TRICOLOR breached the watertight integrity of the
hull and caused flooding of her holds to the extent that she rolled over to
On the bridge the Captain, the second rest port side down on the seabed at a depth of about 34 metres, about
mate and the lookout had observed the the same depth as her breadth.
vessel that they were about to overtake
repairs or whether she was a total loss room. The integrity of these tanks was, be transparent and open on facts and
beyond repair, it was established that however, not in danger. appreciate that good co-operation
the bunker oil had to be removed to with the media is an important way of
avert the danger of pollution. Unfortunately, the calculations showed communicating with the general public.
that about 490 cbm of heavy fuel oil As the case developed throughout
A further concern was the fact that were unaccounted for and thus might the winter and spring of 2003, Wilh.
the position of the sunken vessel have escaped to sea. Out of these Wilhelmsen, in co-operation with Gard
did constitute a severe danger to 490 cbm, it is thought that about 210 P&I, London Offshore Consultants and
navigation in one of the worlds busiest cbm escaped during one unfortunate later SMIT Salvage, arranged press
shipping lanes. Smit Salvage, who incident when a valve broke due to meetings in Rotterdam, Antwerp,
happened to have vessels in the vicinity, rough weather during the oil removal London and Dunkirk. In France, the
were contracted in the early hours of operation. press meetings were co-ordinated with
14th December 2002 to start preparing and included the French authorities.
for the oil removal immediately. Clean-up
They were also instructed to guard Clean-up operations at sea and on the Wreck removal
TRICOLOR temporarily, with special beaches were initiated as the oil started Shortly after the collision and sinking
regard to traffic in the vicinity and any to emerge at different locations in of TRICOLOR, it was agreed with the
possible escape of oil. The ERT also nearby waters and beaches. Extensive hull underwriters that the vessel was
co-ordinated with the French authorities sampling analysis later established to damaged beyond repair and should be
to have the position properly marked a certain extent what portion of the oil declared a total loss. Soon thereafter,
and issue navigational warnings. In spite had originated from TRICOLOR and the French authorities, through the
of that, the wreck was actually hit by what had not. It is clear that part of the Prfecture maritime de lAtlantique
other vessels on two occasions. Wilh. pollution originated from unidentified (Premar), issued an order addressed
Wilhelmsen and Gard then contracted sources and some from the tanker to the shipowners to have the wreck
two especially dedicated guard ships VICKY, which collided with the wreck on removed. The shipowners and Gard
to protect and secure the position of 1st January 2003. Some oil pollution in immediately went ahead with the
TRICOLOR. This proved to be a wise the area was also thought to be oil that necessary arrangements. After issuing
precautionary measure as later there had drifted from the tanker PRESTIGE, a tender and a thorough review of the
were several near-collisions that were which had sunk earlier off the coast of bids received, on 11th April 2003 the
averted by the interception of the guard Spain. wreck removal contract was signed with
vessels. a consortium formed by SMIT Salvage,
There was further speculation that Multraship, Scaldis and URS.
The actual pumping of the oil from some passing vessels may have
the hull started on 23rd December taken advantage of the situation and The consortium presented a feasible
2002 and was conducted under very discharged some of their slop in the plan for cutting the wreck in sections
difficult conditions due to strong tides vicinity of the wreck, but this has never which could be lifted and transported
and winter weather. The oil removal been proven to be true. to shore, a method with which they
operation was finished on 22nd had previous experience. The plan
February 2003. Out of a total of 2,155 Media management also included a strategy to deal with
cbm of bunkers, 1,455 cbm had then Another task for Wilh. Wilhelmsen to the cargo, environmental issues
been recovered and it was estimated deal with was the media attention that and media-handling, which was of
that about 100 cbm remained inside a spectacular case like this attracts. The vital importance. The operation as a
as clingage in the tanks. It was also information department is a vital part whole had to be conducted in strict
estimated that about 50 cbm were of the ERT and they had their hands conformity with local and international
trapped in slots from where pumping full responding to calls and requests environmental regulations. The salvors
was not possible. Sixty cbm remained in from media from the very beginning. also had resources to deal directly with
inaccessible settling tanks in the engine Wilh. Wilhelmsen consider it vital to the general publics great interest in
the wreck removal operation.
Wash damage
Gard News 142,
July 1996
During the last ten years the thousand dollars of damage to the the vessel to prove that he proceeded
Association has registered about 30 shore installation plus a claim for million with safe speed under the present
claims per year resulting from wash of dollars for pollution caused by the circumstances and without the risk of
damage. Vessels are frequently involved broken hoses. causing damage to other vessels or
in cases described as wash damage property in the area. A surge effect
when they are sailing in rivers and other High speed vessels like liners and between the vessels could also easily
narrow waters. The allegation is that a deep draft vessels are often involved in happen when vessels are passing in
vessel proceeded at too high speed wash or surge-damage claims. When a narrow waters. One of the vessels,
and that the displacement of water vessel is proceeding with high speed, usually the smallest, could be pushed
caused the waves to rise and fall which serious wave effects could cause away by the bow-wave and afterwards
had the effect of causing other vessels damage even if the vessel is relatively sucked against the hull of the other
started to move alongside the quay. far from the vessels moored alongside vessels, or the other vessels could lose
If the effect is too strong or a vessel or other objects ashore which could be steering and collide with a third vessel
not properly moored or if the mooring damaged. Damage could be caused or run aground.
facilities ashore not sufficiently strong, even if the vessel is proceeding with
the mooring lines will break or bollards a speed less than the prescribed limit When passing in waters where other
may be pulled out of their bases. within the river or port area. There vessels could be exposed to the wave
Damage may also be caused to fenders are many factors which may affect effect it is always of importance to
and to the quays when the vessel is the creation of waves or the extent notice whether the vessels alongside
pressed against the quay or dolphins. of damage caused. There is often an are moving and whether their mooring
allegation that the vessel causing the lines were properly attended to or slack.
Gangways connected to the vessel can damage passed too close to the other It is also important to record the speed
easily be damaged or pushed against vessel or vessels moored alongside. If of ones own vessel, as well as the time
loading or discharging equipment the river is narrow and the vessel deep and approximate distance to the object
ashore which, as a consequence, also drafted the effect of the displaced if something unusual is observed or
may sustain damage. In a situation water will increase. notice of damage received from other
where a tanker connected to loading or vessels. The wave effect of ones own
discharging hoses or chicksan arms is What is considered safe speed for vessel could also be influenced by other
affected by wash from a passing vessel, the vessel to steer and manoeuvre vessels passing or ones own vessel
the loading arms may be pulled out of can, under certain circumstances, could be held liable for wash caused by
position and break. The consequences be found excessive when looking at another vessel.
could be a claim for several hundred the consequences vis--vis the other
vessels. It will be up to the master of
incident - Consequences
of a blackout
this particular design, which is very
common.
casualties through
awareness of nautical safety
By Knut Svein Ording, Nautical Safety & Communications Systems, DNV,
A new interpretation of SOLAS has recently published a unified making full appraisal of the situation
requirements relating to safety interpretation of SOLAS Chapter and in navigating the ship safely under
of navigation, which applies to V Regulation 15. IACS Unified all operational conditions;
ships contracted for construction Interpretation for Bridge Design, promoting effective and safe bridge
on or after 1st January 2005, may Equipment, Arrangement and resource management;
enable a significant reduction of Procedures (UI SC181) sets forth a set of enabling the bridge team and the
maritime accidents through detailed requirements for compliance with the pilot to have convenient and continuous
requirements applicable to the total principles and aims of SOLAS Chapter V access to essential information which is
bridge arrangement on board SOLAS Regulation 15 relating to bridge design, presented in a clear and unambiguous
ships. design and arrangement of navigational manner, using standardised symbols
systems and equipment and bridge and coding systems for controls and
Unified interpretation procedures when applying the displays;
The SOLAS Amendments 2000, requirements of Regulations 19, 22, 24, indicating the operational status of
Chapter V, Regulation 15 contain a set 25, 27 and 28, and taking Regulations automated functions and integrated
of principles relating to bridge design, 18 and 20 into consideration.1 components, systems and/or sub-
design and arrangement of navigational systems;
systems and equipment and bridge The requirements of the above- allowing for expeditious, continuous
procedures that have not previously mentioned Regulations are harmonised and effective information processing
been explicitly covered by SOLAS. The with IMO guidelines MSC/Circ. 982 and decision-making by the bridge
present international understanding (Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria team and the pilot;
and application of Regulation 15 is for Bridge Equipment and Layout) preventing or minimising excessive
diversified and the handling of the and relevant ISO (International or unnecessary work and any condition
Regulation is in many ways left to the Organization for Standardization) and or distraction on the bridge which
subjective interpretation of the different IEC (International Electrotechnical may cause fatigue or interfere with the
flag states. Commission) standards for application vigilance of the bridge team and the
of the Regulations with the aim of: pilot;
The International Association of facilitating the tasks to be performed minimising the risk of human error
Classification Societies (IACS) by the bridge team and the pilot in and detecting such error if it occurs
1 UI SC181 can be found at www.iacs.org.uk/interpretations/UISC.pdf on page 156.
Ship simulators -
Gard News 172, November 2003/
January 2004
Todays advanced maritime simulators 5,000 square metres and offers a tailor-made for the Evergreen fleet and
can be more than just training tools. wide range of crew training facilities also for vessels under development.
operated by a staff of 19 people, The following programmes are available
Introduction including 13 instructors. Captain Lin at the Training Centre:
As in the airline industry, simulator Ting-shyang, Junior Vice President Standard ship bridge simulator
training offers an important contribution of the Training Centre, explains that training for deck officers;
to the education and in-service their main piece of equipment is a Standard propulsion plant simulator
training of crew, with one of the main Polaris bridge simulator manufactured training for engine officers;
advantages being that a modern by Kongsberg Maritime Ship Systems Hazardous cargo handling training;
simulator makes it possible to create in Norway, but that they also have GMDSS training station drills;
and streamline realistic exercises which several other training tools, such as a CBT training course modules;
would be difficult, expensive and GMDSS simulator room, smaller bridge Deck and engine officer refresher
potentially dangerous to carry out in simulators, Nabco main engine control training and updating;
real life. It is therefore reasonable to simulators and a propulsion plant Bridge resource management training
expect that simulator equipment and training room with real-size engine courses;
technology should have the potential components, to mention some. The Basic Electric, Electronic and
to improve the competence of vessel training centre was ISO-certified in June Automation control training course.
crews and thereby prevent accidents 2001. The main simulator is equipped
from happening. Whereas only a with a 360-degree projection screen Evergreen received the Lloyds List
limited range of simulator training and the simulator produces rolling Commitment to Training and Education
and assessment is mandatory under and pitching effects as well as sound award at the 2003 Lloyds List Maritime
the STCW-95,1 in recent years Gard effects to increase the sense of being Excellence Awards.
Services has seen ship operators on board a ship. The bridge has a full
who have made major investments range of navigational and vessel control Star Cruises
in developing their own training equipment copied from the various The Star Cruises Ship Simulator (SCSS)
facilities and simulators with a level types of vessels from the Evergreen is located in Port Klang, Malaysia. The
of sophistication high above the fleet. The simulator software presently SCSS is the centre of a wide range of
prescribed standards. In this issue Gard covers 16 ports in nine countries and training activities such as ship handling
News visits two members of Gard P&I together this gives the crew a chance courses, human factor and crew
who are among those. to familiarise themselves with different resource management and emergency
vessel types under various port management. It is a full mission bridge
Evergreen Group - Evergreen situations. A system is also in place to simulator where the bridge is copied
Marine Corporation evaluate the training performance and from Star Cruises twin mega-ships,
The Evergreen Seafarer Training Centre to continuously improve the education. SuperStar Leo and SuperStar Virgo.
in Taoyuan outside Taipei, occupies The training programmes offered are The simulator was delivered by STN
1 See article EU vessel traffic monitoring and information system in Gard News issue No. 171.
Computerisation of
Gard News 166,
May/July 2002
Summary of conditions for collision and FFO cover under main hull and machinery terms available
English ITC Hull 834 German D.T.V.5 Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan
(and other Scandinavian hull terms)
4 The Institute Time Clauses, Hulls, 1.10.83 (ITCH 83) remain the most widely-used version of English conditions. Under their latest version
(International Hull Clauses 2003) four-fourths RDC and FFO are optional.
5 Deutschen Transportversicherungs Verband; DTV Hull Clauses 1978, revised in 1982, 1984,1992 and 1994.
6 Rule 71 Other insurance
The Association shall not cover:
Liabilities, losses, costs or expenses which are covered by the Hull Policies or would have been covered by the Hull Policies had the Ship been fully
insured on standard terms ().
7 Rule 36 Collision with other ships
The Association shall cover liability to pay damages to any other person incurred as a result of a collision with another ship, if and to the extent that
such liability is not covered under the Hull policies on the Ship, including:
one fourth of the liability incurred by the member; or
four fourths of such liability; or
such other fraction of such liability as may be applicable and have been agreed with the Association ().
8 Rule 37 Damage to fixed or floating objects
The Association shall cover:
(a) liability for loss or damage to any fixed or floating object by reason of contact between the Ship and such object, when not covered under the Hull
Policies ().
9 Rule 39 Loss or damage to property
The Association shall cover liability for loss of or damage to property not specified elsewhere in Part II of these Rules.
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