The Hard Problem & Its Explanatory Targets

C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
V doi: 10.1111/rati.12103
Ratio (new series) XXIX 3 September 2016 0034-0006
THE HARD PROBLEM & ITS EXPLANATORY TARGETS
Raamy Majeed
Abstract
Two decades in, whether we are making any progress towards
solving, or even explaining away, what David Chalmers calls (1995)
the hard problem of consciousness is as controversial as ever. This
paper aims to argue that there are, in actual fact, two explanatory
targets associated with the hard problem. Moreover, this in turn
has repercussions for how we assess the explanatory merits of any
proposed solution to the problem. The paper ends with a brief
exposition of how the present distinction goes beyond similar ones
already made by respondents to Joseph Levines (1983) explana-
tory gap.
1. Explananda
This paper aims to highlight a distinction between two explana-

tory targets associated with Chalmerss (1995) hard problem of
consciousness. I argue that the first concerns explaining the rela-
tionship between physical processing and phenomenally con-
scious experiences, whereas the second involves explaining the
very nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Whilst explaining
the two targets need not always be separate, I aim to explain how
they can, and sometimes do, come apart; and with considerable
consequences for how we assess the merits of responses to the
hard problem.
The success of this endeavour will depend, partly, on drawing a
distinction between the aforementioned explanatory targets.
Since the original exposition of the hard problem is presented in
terms of facts, I will employ the following facts as the relevant
explananda:
[PQ] Physical processing gives rise to experiences with a phe-
nomenal character.
[Q] Our phenomenal qualities are thus-and-so.
According to Chalmers, solving the hard problem, as opposed
to the easy problem(s), involves not just identifying which physical
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2 THE HARD PROBLEM & ITSMAJEED
RAAMY EXPLANATORY TARGETS 299
processes are the correlates of our phenomenally conscious
experiences, but explaining how and why they result in such
experiences. Hence, it will be assumed that explaining [PQ],
within the context of the hard problem, goes above and beyond
any easy problems, such as identifying the neural, functional,
or computational correlates of our conscious experiences.
Rather, it involves explaining the precise nature of the relation-
ship between such processes and our phenomenally conscious
experiences.
By contrast, explaining [Q] is equivalent to explaining the very
thing, phenomenal character, itself. This in turn is to be under-
stood as explaining not just individual phenomenal qualities, e.g.
the way red seems to us, but the nature of phenomenal character in
general as well. What is important for present purposes is that [Q]
and [PQ] are distinct, and given this distinction, one could
provide an explanation of the former without the latter, and vice
versa. The following examples are illustrative.
Non-reductive explanations of consciousness, contra the reduc-
tive ones, deny that phenomenal states can be identified with
non-phenomenal states, e.g. physical states, or that phenomenal
truths can be reductively explained purely in terms of non-
phenomenal truths, such as physical truths. Whilst there are dis-
tinct versions of non-reductive explanation, which correspond to
denials of different conceptions of reductive explanation, non-
reductive accounts of consciousness tend to be unanimous in
taking phenomenal qualities as explanatorily primitive. That is,
they suppose that truths about such qualities cannot exhaustively
be explained via truths concerning the non-phenomenal. Such
non-reductive accounts can provide reasonable explanations of
[PQ], but not [Q], as it is in the aforementioned nature of these
responses that they leave [Q] unexplained. We can see this
by noting that non-reductive physicalists, e.g. Levine (1993),
Kim (2005) and Wilson (2010), as well as property dualists, e.g.
Jackson (1982), Forest (1993) and Chalmers (1996), suppose that
the physical gives rise to the phenomenal in virtue of the phe-
nomenal supervening on the physical due to psychophysical laws.
Positing these laws provides an explanation for [PQ], but leaves
[Q] unexplained.
Note, this is not to disavow any dissimilarity between non-
reductive physicalism and property dualism, but to draw attention
to what they have in common with regards to the explanatory
primitiveness of the phenomenal. The difference between the
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THE HARD PROBLEM MAJEED
& ITS EXPLANATORY TARGETS 3
dualist and the non-reductive physicalist rests not on whether the
phenomenal is explanatorily primitive, but on whether it is fun-
damental. Understanding fundamentality is fraught with difficul-
ties, however, for present purposes, we can presuppose that the
phenomenal is fundamental insofar as it is not dependent on, or
grounded in, anything else. In contrast, to construe it as explana-
torily primitive is to suppose that we cannot explain all truths
about the phenomenal via truths about the non-phenomenal. The
former entails the latter: if the phenomenal were fundamental,
no truths about the non-phenomenal would fully explain their
nature. But the reverse does not hold: as Levine (1983) points out,
there might be an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and
the physical, but this by itself does not entail an ontological gap,
the upshot of which would be that the phenomenal is either
fundamental or at least metaphysically distinct from the physical.
Back to our example, dualists claim that the phenomenal is
fundamental and ergo explanatorily primitive, whereas non-
reductive physicalists insist that they are explanatorily primitive
whilst not being fundamental. In both cases the upshot is the
same: we get an explanation of [PQ], but not [Q]. That is, we
explain why physical processing gives rise to experiences with a
phenomenal character without explaining the nature of the phe-
nomenal character itself.
Contemporary panpsychists, or panphenomenalists, e.g.
Whitehead (1933), Maxwell (2002) and Rosenberg (2004), on the
other hand suppose that the physical seems to give rise to the
phenomenal because the phenomenal qualities are what ulti-
mately occupy the causal roles we identify as physical processing.
This view provides an explanation of [PQ], albeit in a deflationary
sense: the phenomenal grounds the physical, as opposed to the
other way around, but this suffices to explain the connection
between physical processing and our phenomenal experiences.
Nonetheless, it does not explain [Q] because, like dualism, it
takes phenomenal qualities as fundamental, and explanatorily
primitive ipso facto.
As for explanations of [Q], most explanations on offer also
explain [PQ]. Reductive physicalist explanations, which target
[Q], end up providing relatively easy explanations of [PQ]. These
views, e.g. those endorsed by Armstrong (1968), Lewis (1994) and
Jackson (1998), typically define phenomenal concepts function-
ally, and then identify phenomenal properties with whatever
physical properties that occupy the relevant functional roles.
V
Note, the orthodox view is that this confers type-identities
between the phenomenal and the relevant functional roles, and
token-identities between the phenomenal and the physical occu-
pants of these roles. However, based on additional considerations,
Lewis and Jackson take this to confer type-identities between the
phenomenal and the physical occupants themselves. Either way,
this gives reductive physicalists an explanation of [Q]: the nature
of the phenomenal is physical, for they are one and the same
where same picks out your preferred kind of identity. Further-
more, it also gives them one for [PQ]: physical processing gives
rise to phenomenal experiences because all there is to such
experiences is certain types of physical processing. This ought to
be evident given that the functional roles relevant for phenom-
enal consciousness, in our world, are taken to be all realized by
physical properties.
While most explanations in the literature that explain [Q] also
explain [PQ], it is not hard to see how an explanation of [Q]
could fail to address [PQ]. Panprotophenomenalism, as formu-
lated by Chalmers (1996), is the view that phenomenal qualities
supervene on protophenomenal properties: properties that are
not phenomenal themselves, but when jointly instantiated, instan-
tiate phenomenally conscious experiences. This view, as it stands,
provides an explanation of [Q] without an explanation of [PQ],
for it explains why phenomenal properties are instantiated
without any recourse to the physical.
Panprotophenomenalists, of course, can go further. Like the
panphenomenalists, they can explain [PQ] by claiming that the
phenomenal qualities occupy the causal roles we identify as physi-
cal. Nevertheless, by omitting this additional step, we see how one
can provide an explanation of [Q] sans an explanation of [PQ].
2. Explanation
The facts [Q] and [PQ] are distinct, and subsequently, it should
be possible to explain the one without the other. This I take to be
true regardless of whether the aforementioned examples hold
true. Whether they in fact hold true, however, is contentious, and
partly dependent on what we mean by explanation. An interlocu-
tor could, for instance, object that non-reductive explanations of
consciousness can explain [Q] in addition to [PQ], as whatever
explanans invoked to explain [PQ] entail [Q] as well. If we
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presuppose that entailment be it a priori or a posteriori suffices
for explanation, this objection has some traction. Property dualist
explanations of [PQ], for example, will also explain [Q] because
they include brute phenomenal facts in the set of base facts, which
entail facts about why the physical gives rise to the phenomenal.
The distinction I am concerned with in this paper is to be
carved out in terms of the target explananda, as opposed to the
type of explanation on offer. Accordingly, for the large part, I
want to sidestep general issues to do with conceptualizing expla-
nation, as well as specific ones concerning what it would take
to adequately explain consciousness. Nevertheless, in order to
address objections such as the one mentioned above, a minimum
requirement for explanation needs to be spelt out.
Physicalists are committed to the physicalist entailment thesis,
which holds that the physical truths at our world entail all the
phenomenal truths at our world. They just disagree amongst
themselves as to whether this entailment is a priori or a posteriori.
Dualists, by contrast, deny that either kind of entailment holds,
and take this to be indicative of an ontological gap between the
physical and the phenomenal. What is relevant for us is that all
sides of the debate here presuppose that entailment is a
metaphysical-cum-modal notion, as opposed to a logical one. For
instance, Stoljar (2006) understands entailment in this context as
the model notion, according to which, where Q is a phenomenal
truth and P is a physical truth, P entails Q just in case, if P is true,
Q is true; equivalently, P entails Q just in case if P is true, it is
impossible that Q is false.1
This type of entailment tends to be regarded as a necessary
condition for the physical to explain the phenomenal. For
instance, Chalmers regards it as a necessary but not sufficient
condition because he agrees with a priori physicalists to the extent
that he thinks an adequate explanation of consciousness must
show how the physical entails the phenomenal a priori.2 It just so
happens that he is convinced by modal arguments against physi-
calism, like the conceivability argument, that there is no a priori
entailment of the phenomenal from the physical. Be that as it
1
Entailment relations are typically understood as obtaining between truths, i.e. true
propositions, whereas Chalmers (1996) talks about facts about physical processing entail-
ing facts about consciousness. Facts, unlike propositions, are not bearers of truth-value and
so cannot entail other facts in the sense of making them true. Nonetheless, we can
harmlessly talk about facts entailing other facts provided we take this to mean that truths
about certain facts entail truths about certain other facts.
2
See Chalmers and Jackson (2001).
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may, but we need not be committed to explanation as a form of a
priori conceptual analysis to view entailment as not being sufficient
for explanation. This has to do with the nature of entailment
itself.
Entailment relations are reflexive. Any given truth will entail
itself, e.g. P entails P; Q entails Q, and so on. Entailment relations
are also monotonic. Any given truth in conjunction with other
truths will still entail itself, e.g. P&Q entails Q. When we seek
explanations, however, those that propose the explanandum itself
as the explanans, or even as part of it, are not typically regarded as
counting as explanations. For instance, while Q entails Q, Q itself
does not count as an explanation for Q. Similarly, while P&Q
entails Q, the conjunction is not typically regarded as an adequate
explanation of Q, as it includes Q itself as part of the explanans. So
when seek explanations, we tend to seek something else: some
non-trivial form of entailment, which does not rely solely on the
reflexive and monotonic qualities of entailment. Consequently,
for the purposes of this paper, let it be a minimum requirement
for an entailment relation to count as an explanation that it be
non-trivial: that the explanandum itself is not invoked as the
explanans itself or as part of the explanans.
Once we grant this requirement for explanation, we see that
neither non-reductive physicalism nor property dualism can be
seen as providing explanations for [Q]. This is bound to be con-
troversial in the case non-reductive physicalism. But this really
depends on what we mean by non-reductive physicalism. Some
take non-reductive physicalism to be the view that the phenom-
enal is token-identical, although not type-identical, with the physi-
cal.3 Based on this conception, a physicalist-cum-functionalist
account of consciousness, of the sort mentioned in 1, will count
as non-reductive and can be seen to provide an explanation of
[Q]. Nevertheless, non-reductive physicalism is presently under-
stood as a view that ends up being committed to explanatory
primitivism with regards to the phenomenal. Subsequently, such a
view cannot give an explanation of [Q]. Note, as stressed earlier,
this is not to deny that such versions of physicalism, or property
dualism for that matter, can provide explanations for [PQ]. In
3
This goes against certain contemporary ways of classifying reductive physcialism. On
such accounts, reductive physicalists need not be committed to the reduction of the phe-
nomenal to the physical under certain conceptions of reduction, e.g. type-identities.
Rather, all they need to claim is that the phenomenal is reductively explained by the physical.
See Chalmers (1996: 43) and Kim (2005: 95) for more detail.
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fact, they give quite plausible explanations for [PQ]. I will have
more to say about this, as well as explanation more generally, in
4. The present point is just that they cannot provide (non-trivial)
explanations of [Q].
3. The Hard Problem
The hard problem of consciousness, as originally formulated by

Chalmers (1995), is the problem of explaining how and why
physical processing gives rise to experiences with a phenomenal
character. Thus construed, it is the problem of explaining [PQ],
not [Q]. This should be evident from responses to the problem,
including Chalmerss own, namely the aforementioned property
dualism, which (non-trivially) explains [PQ] but not [Q]. In fact,
property dualism, non-reductive physicalism and panpheno-
menalism are just a handful of views, which are viewed as potential
responses to the problem qua [PQ].
Not all responses to the hard problem, however, take [PQ] as
their sole explanandum. Reductive physicalist responses have
focused on [Q], in addition to [PQ], which would explain why
such physicalists feel so cheated by non-reductive solutions to the
hard problem. These solutions, from their viewpoint, appear to
explain consciousness in a way that makes phenomenal character
itself explanatorily primitive, which is to leave one of the target
explananda unexplained. Solutions to the hard problem from neu-
roscientists and cognitive scientists are varied, as some, e.g.
MacLennan (1996), take phenomenal consciousness as explana-
torily primitive, which in turn makes their explanatory target
[PQ]. Nevertheless, the significant portion of scientific responses,
e.g. Lamme (2006) and ORegan (2011), have been attempts to
explain both [Q] and [PQ].
When we look at responses to the hard problem, we see, then,
that some in the literature take [Q] as part of the explananda for
adequately explaining how and why physical processing gives rise
to experiences with a phenomenal character, whereas others do
not. This difference may be due to several factors, some of which
are external to the hard problem itself. For instance, reductive
physicalist and scientific responses to the problem tend to be
moved by considerations of ontological parsimony, and optimism
about what a future science can explain, such that they may
be presupposing that any explanation of [PQ] will deliver an
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explanation of [Q] as well. Proponents of reductive explanation
might also expect such a result on methodological grounds. For
example, since reductive physicalists tend to explain [PQ] by
identifying phenomenal states with the physical occupiers of
certain functional roles, any explanation on offer for [PQ] would,
consequently, be an explanation for [Q] as well.
Nonetheless, there are also reasons, which are directly related
to the hard problem, for viewing [Q] as part of its explananda. This
has to do with the constraints any given solution to the problem
ought to meet, were it to prove adequate. Chalmers (1996: xii-iii)
outlines three, the first of which is to take consciousness seri-
ously. This constraint can be interpreted in two ways: (1a) grant-
ing that our experiences have a phenomenal character, and (1b)
explaining the phenomenal character of our experiences. The
former reading construes it as a constraint on the explanans,
whereas the latter construes it as one on the explananda. Depend-
ing on how you understand this constraint, then, you may very
well suppose that an adequate explanation of how and why physi-
cal processing gives rise to experience ought to also explain the
nature of phenomenal experiences themselves.
In all likelihood, there are other reasons as well. What is appar-
ent, regardless, is that different responses to the hard problem
take different facts as their explananda.4 The lesson from this is
that in treating these responses as part of a unified project, viz.
solving the hard problem, we have been equivocating explanatory
targets. There are two explanatory targets associated with the hard
problem, i.e. [PQ] and [Q]. Subsequently, responses to the
problem may explain one whilst forgoing the other, which is what
we saw with non-reductive accounts of consciousness. Nonethe-
less, they may also explain both, which is what find with reductive
views.
Note, my claim here is not that philosophers of mind are
generally mistaken about their target explananda. The aforemen-
tioned distinction should come across as obvious to those well-
versed in the literature, and respondents to the hard problem, I
take it, are fully aware of which fact(s) can be explicated by their
proposed theory. Still, I think the distinction is worth making for
the following reasons. First, as far as I can tell, there is no explicit
mention of the distinction, which proves confusing to those
4
One might even associate the hard problem with projects aimed at explaining [Q] in
the absence of [PQ]. These projects are explored in 4.
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outside the field who attempt to get to grips with the hard
problem. Second, while experts are most likely aware of the dis-
tinction, at least tacitly, there is no consensus as to which explana-
tory target(s) is to be identified with attempts to solve the hard
problem of consciousness. Anecdotally, some have dismissed the
significance of the distinction on grounds that the hard problem
obviously concerns the first explanandum, while others do so
because it similarly concerns the second. It is not my place to
comment on which of these is the legitimate explanatory target(s)
of the hard problem.5 Both, I think, deserve our attention. Finally,
by making a distinction between the two, we are better able to
articulate the constraints that need to be met for the targets to be
explained sufficiently; and we are thereby better able to assess the
merits of the distinct responses to the hard problem, on their own
terms.
4. The Explanatory Gap
The present distinction between the explanatory targets can be

brought out, partially, by considering the hard problem in the
context of Levines explanatory gap. In this final section, I shall
explain how this turns out to be so, and why the present distinc-
tion is still worth making separately.
The explanatory gap results from the following question: why
given that a certain type of physical processing is the case, is a
specific type of phenomenal character, or even any phenomenal
character at all, the case? Thus construed, the explanatory gap,
like certain interpretations of the hard problem, concerns [PQ].
It concerns the relationship between the physical and the phe-
nomenal, as opposed to the nature of the phenomenal itself.
However, attempts to close the gap tend to also explain [Q]. For
example, as we saw in 1, reductive physicalist accounts, which
identify phenomenal properties with the physical occupiers of the
relevant functional roles, can explain the nature of phenomenal
experiences themselves, as well as why certain types of physical
processing gives rise to such experiences.
What this tells us is that there are two ways of responding to the
hard problem, qua explaining [PQ] vs. explaining [PQ] & [Q],
5
This will depend partly on how you understand Chalmerss constraints, and partly on
your methodological assumptions and prior commitments.
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which correspond to two distinct ways of responding to the
explanatory gap. Namely, explaining how physicalism is compat-
ible with an explanatory gap vs. explaining how a certain type of
physicalism bridges the gap. It is responses that do the former,
which help bring out the present distinction. This needs some
spelling out.
All physicalists are committed to the physicalist entailment
thesis, while they differ over the epistemology. A priori physicalists
(type-A materialists) claim that the entailment relations are know-
able a priori, whereas a posteriori physicalists (type-B materialists)
claim that they are only knowable a posteriori. The former deny the
explanatory gap on grounds that ideal rational agents can a priori
deduce the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. The latter,
by contrast, deny this a priori deducibility, and are thereby viewed
as accepting the explanatory gap, even though they deny the
ontological one.
This way of carving up versions of physicalism, however,
obscures the distinction between the two explanatory targets asso-
ciated with the hard problem. To bring this out, we need to
distinguish between reductive and non-reductive versions of a
posteriori physicalism. Prominent a posteriori physicalists, e.g. Block
and Stalnaker (1999), as well as Hill and McLaughlin (1999),
argue that the phenomenal is type-identical with the physical.
More precisely, they argue that these identities are grounded in
Kripkean a posteriori necessities; and that since these identities are
only knowable a posteriori, they allow for the failure of a priori
deducibility of the phenomenal truths from the physical. Kim
(2005) complains that these identities do not close the gap, but
rather show that no such gap ever existed. What is relevant for us,
regardless, is that on account of the identity relations, these ver-
sions of a posteriori physicalism turn out to be reductive: there is
nothing more to phenomenal experiences, on these versions,
than certain types of physical processing. As we have seen, such
reductionism has the consequence of blurring the distinction
between explaining [PQ] and explaining it in conjunction with
[Q].
Not so with non-reductive versions of a posteriori physicalism.
Proponents of this view, e.g. Loar (1990), Levine (1993) and Kim
(2005), deny that the phenomenal is identical with the physical,
or that phenomenal truths can be explained purely in terms of
physical truths. This results in a commitment to the explanatory
primitiveness of the phenomenal, which is characteristic of
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non-reductive accounts of consciousness. Nevertheless, it need
not result in a denial of physicalism, for such physicalists can still
posit psychophysical laws to explain the connection between the
physical and the phenomenal. The difference here is that, since
identities of any kind are denied, any laws posited would have to
be strong metaphysical laws, which are brute and inexplicable.6
The point that concerns us is that since the phenomenal is
regarded as explanatorily primitive and the laws are brute, we can
arguably accommodate the explanatory gap: for whatever kind of
physical processing is deemed relevant for a particular type of
phenomenal state, we would not be able to a priori deduce truths
about this phenomenal state, or any phenomenal state for that
matter, from the relevant physical ones. Yet, we still save physical-
ism, as the psychophysical laws ensure that the physicalist entail-
ment thesis holds true.
This helps to partially draw out the distinction in the explana-
tory targets concerning the hard problem. By providing a story
about how physicalism is compatible with the existence of an
explanatory gap, we are able to see exactly how we could explain
[PQ] without explaining [Q] itself. That is, since psychophysical
laws are posited, we can explain the truth of physicalism, as
well as [PQ]. Furthermore, since there is a commitment to the
explanatory primitiveness of both the phenomenal and the
psychophysical laws, we do so without explaining [Q]. Why then
make a separate distinction in terms of distinct explanatory
targets? This distinction is still worth making, as the above
response to the explanatory gap only takes us halfway, for it is
lacking in an explanation of how we could explain [Q] without
[PQ]. It is in making this evident that our distinction proves
advantageous.
By way of example, consider Tononis (2004) information inte-
gration theory of consciousness. This is a highly detailed, empiri-
cally informed account of consciousness, but for present
purposes, it will suffice to focus on just two of its key claims:
(i) that phenomenal consciousness is one and the same thing as
the capacity of a system to integrate information, and (ii) that
information integration itself, and ergo consciousness, is a funda-
mental quantity. While Tononi takes physical processing of the
brain to provide the conditions that determine consciousness,
6
As Chalmers (1996: 371) notes, a commitment to strong metaphysical necessities is
only implicit in these theories. No one appears to endorse them explicitly.
V
(ii) ensures that this account would not bridge the explanatory
gap. In fact, if consciousness were genuinely taken to be funda-
mental, the account would be committed to an explanatory gap
grounded in an ontological one.7
Respondents to the explanatory gap appear to assume, albeit
tacitly, that any explanation of [PQ], which would bridge the gap,
would also offer an explanation of [Q], and leave the issue at that.
Our distinction, however, lets us see that while the information
integration theory may not have any bearing on [PQ], it provides
a perfectly reasonable explanation of [Q]. Furthermore, it does so
regardless of whether we bridge the gap. This in turn shows that,
provided we identify the hard problem as the project of explain-
ing [Q], or even both [PQ] and [Q], we can make some headway
in our attempts to solve it, despite our accounts coming short
when it comes to bridging the gap, or in explaining its existence
in a way that is compatible with physicalism.
The general point is not that the distinctions made by respond-
ents to the explanatory gap rival that which I have made concern-
ing the different explanatory targets associated with the hard
problem. Proponents of the latter can help themselves to the
wealth of material on the former.8 What I have been stressing is
that the present discussion is still worth making, as it helps us
focus on features of responding to the hard problem not available
when we simply focus on this problem in the framework set out
with regards to the explanatory gap.
5. Conclusion
Views about the nature of the mental are legion. Most of these
views have preceded the hard problem. Nevertheless, they or
rather their contemporary counterparts, which specifically focus
on mental states that are phenomenal, have all been used as ways
7
While Tononi states that the phenomenal is fundamental, it is unclear whether this is
entailed by his theory. As far as I can tell, the theory can be understood as a non-reductive
account of consciousness, which takes information integration itself as explanatorily primi-
tive though not fundamental, or as a reductive account that allows for a non-chronic
explanatory gap between information integration and various types of physical processing
in the brain. In both cases, we get an explanatory gap, but not an ontological one.
8
As an anonymous referee points out, respondents to the explanatory gap are much
more precise about what they mean by explanation than I have been here. For example,
they make distinctions in explanation in terms of nomic, logical and metaphysical neces-
sities. Anyone who accepts my distinction can help themselves to these accounts to explain
the connection between the phenomenal and their reductive bases.
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of responding to the problem. In this paper, I argued that there
are two explanatory targets associated with the hard problem.
This, I argued, helps us see that whether a given view can help
solve the hard problem will depend on the specific target(s) in
question.
We saw, for instance, that only reductive accounts of conscious-
ness, be it physicalist or otherwise, can provide explanations of
phenomenal consciousness itself. Moreover, only reductive physi-
calist accounts can provide explanations of phenomenal con-
sciousness, as well as how and why physical processing gives rise to
such conscious experiences. In a similar fashion, we also saw that
whilst non-reductive accounts cannot help explain the former,
some versions, e.g. non-reductive physicalism and panpheno-
menalism, provide plausible explanations of the latter. If I am
right, when considering views about phenomenal consciousness
as solutions to the hard problem, we should specify which
explanatory target(s) we have in mind. Only then can we assess
the merits of these views, qua solutions, on their own terms.9
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DA, UK
Raamy@yahoo.com
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9
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal, as well as Ricki Bliss and
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