[G.R. No. 102998.

July 5, 1996]
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO M.
REYES, respondents.

The case at bar is a suit for replevin and damages. The petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] in CA- G.R. CV No. 23605 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX,
[2]
which has disposed of its Civil Case No. 87-42270 in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the case against defendant-spouses (sic) Reynaldo Manahan is hereby dismissed without prejudice,
for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff having failed to show the liability of defendant John Doe in the person of Roberto M.
Reyes, the case against the latter should likewise be dismissed. Moreover, plaintiff is hereby directed to return the vehicle
seized by virtue of the order of seizure issued by this Court with all its accessories to the said Roberto M. Reyes." [3]

The decisions of both the appellate court and the court a quo are based on a like finding of the facts hereinafter
briefly narrated.

The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed, on 15 May 1980, a promissory note [4] binding themselves
to pay Carmasters, Inc., the amount of P83,080.00 in thirty-six monthly installments commencing 01 July 1980. To
secure payment, the Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage [5] over a motor vehicle, a Ford Cortina 1.6
GL, with motor and serial number CUBFWE-801010. Carmasters later assigned[6] the promissory note and the chattel
mortgage to petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the Manahans.When the latter failed to pay the
due installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands not having been heeded, petitioner, on 02 October 1987,
filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe, praying for the recovery
of the vehicle with an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be returned. Upon
petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the amount of P169,161.00, the lower court issued a writ of replevin. The
court, however, cautioned petitioner that should summons be not served on the defendants within thirty (30) days from
the writ's issuance, the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. [7] The warning was based on what the court
perceived to be the deplorable practice of some mortgagees of "freezing (the) foreclosure or replevin cases" which they
would so "conveniently utilize as a leverage for the collection of unpaid installments on mortgaged chattels." [8]

The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan was caused to be served by petitioner at No. 35 Lantana St.,
Cubao, Quezon City. The original of the summons had the name and the signature of private respondent Roberto M.
Reyes indicating that he received, on 14 October 1987, a copy of the summons and the complaint. [9] Forthwith,
petitioner, through its Legal Assistant, Danilo E. Solano, issued a certification to the effect that it had received from
Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, the Ford Cortina seized from
private respondent Roberto M. Reyes, the John Doe referred to in the complaint, [10] in Sorsogon, Sorsogon.[11] On 20
October 1987, the lower court came out with an order of seizure.

Alleging possession in good faith, private respondent filed, on 26 October 1987, a motion for an extension of time
within which to file his answer and/or a motion for intervention. The court granted the motion.

A few months later, or on 18 February 1988, the court issued an order which, in part, stated:

"Perusal of the record shows that an order for the seizure of personal property was issued on October 20, 1987 in
pursuance to a previous order of the Court dated October 13, 1987. However, to date, there is no showing that the
principal defendants were served with summons inspite of the lapse of four (4) months.

"Considering, this is a replevin case and to forestall the evils that arise from this practice, plaintiff failing to heed the
Order dated October 13, 1987, particularly second paragraph thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for failure to prosecute and further ordering the plaintiff to return the property seized with all its
accessories to defendant John Doe in the person of Roberto M. Reyes.

"SO ORDERED."[12]

On 26 February 1988, petitioner filed a notice of dismissal of the case "without prejudice and without
pronouncement as to costs, before service of Summons and Answer, under Section 1, Rule 17, of the Rules of
Court."[13] It also sought in another motion the withdrawal of the replevin bond. In view of the earlier dismissal of the
case (for petitioner's failure to prosecute), the court, on 02 March 1988, merely noted the notice of dismissal and
denied the motion to withdraw the replevin bond considering that the writ of replevin had meanwhile been
implemented.[14]

On 09 March 1988, private respondent filed a motion praying that petitioner be directed to comply with the court
order requiring petitioner to return the vehicle to him. In turn, petitioner filed, on 14 March 1988, a motion for the
reconsideration of the orders of 18 February 1988 and 02 March 1988 contending that: (a) the dismissal of the case was
tantamount to adjudication on the merits that thereby deprived it with the remedy to enforce the promissory note, the
chattel mortgage and the deed of assignment, under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court; (b) the order to return
the vehicle to private respondent was a departure from jurisprudence recognizing the right of the mortgagor to
foreclose the property to respond to the unpaid obligation secured by the chattel mortgage, and (c) there were no legal
and factual bases for the court's view that the filing of the replevin case was "characterized (by) evil practices." [15]
 On 20 April 1988, the court granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration and accordingly recalled the order
directing the return of the vehicle to private respondent, set aside the order dismissing the case, directed petitioner "to
cause the service of summons together with a copy of the complaint on the principal defendants within five (5) days
from receipt"[16]thereof at petitioner's expense, and ordered private respondent to answer the complaint.

A few months later, or on 02 August 1988, petitioner filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The
court granted the motion on that same day and declared private respondent "in default for his failure to file the x x x
answer within the reglementary period."[17] The court likewise granted petitioner's motion to set the case for the
presentation, ex parte, of evidence. Petitioner, thereupon, submitted the promissory note, the deed of chattel mortgage,
the deed of assignment, a statement of account in the name of Florencia Manahan and two demand letters.

On 27 February 1989, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against the Manahans for
failure of petitioner to prosecute the case against them. It also dismissed the case against private respondent for failure
of petitioner to show any legal basis for said respondent's liability. The court ratiocinated:

"x x x. Roberto M. Reyes is merely ancillary debtor in this case. The defendant spouses Manahan being the principal
debtor(s) and as there is no showing that the latter has been brought before the jurisdiction of this court, it must
necessarily follow that the plaintiff has no cause of action against said Roberto M. Reyes herein before referred to as
defendant John Doe. Under the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to return the seized vehicle unto the
said Roberto M. Reyes."[18]

In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner has asserted that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure of the
chattel is an action quasi in rem which does not necessitate the presence of the principal obligors as long as the court
does not render any personal judgment against them. This argument did not persuade the appellate court, the latter
holding that-

"x x x. In action quasi in rem an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property, such as proceedings having for their sole object the sale
or disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy (Sandejas
vs. Robles, 81 Phil. 421). In the case at bar, the court cannot render any judgment binding on the defendants spouses
for having allegedly violated the terms and conditions of the promissory note and the contract of chattel mortgage on
the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over their persons, no summons having been served on them. That
judgment, if rendered, is void for having denied the defendants spouses due process of law which contemplates notice
and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person or property (Macabingkil vs. Yatco, 26
SCRA 150, 157).

"It is next contended by appellant that as between appellant, as mortgagee, and John Doe, whose right to possession is
dubious if not totally non-existent, it is the former which has the superior right of possession.

"We cannot agree.

"It is an undisputed fact that the subject motor vehicle was taken from the possession of said Roberto M. Reyes, a third
person with respect to the contract of chattel mortgage between the appellant and the defendants spouses Manahan.

"The Civil Code expressly provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession (Art. 539, New
Civil Code); that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof (Art. 527, ibid.); and that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title; nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same (Art. 559, ibid.). Thus, it has been held that a possessor in good faith is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise
(Chus Hai vs. Kapunan, 104 Phil. 110; Yu, et al. vs. Hon. Honrado, etc., et al., 99 SCRA 237). In the case at bar, the
trial court did not err in holding that the complaint does not state any cause of action against Roberto M. Reyes, and in
ordering the return of the subject chattel to him." [19]

The appellate court, subsequently, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In the instant appeal, petitioner insists that a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor
of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage.

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to
the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by
another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action
and hold it pendente lite.[20] The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than
the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-
in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As
an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal
property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. [21] Consequently, the person in
possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the
plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession
thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the
plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession.

Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded or evident, the action need only
be maintained against him who so possesses the property. In rem actio est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur
petimus, et semper adversus eum est qui rem possidet. In Northern Motors, Inc. vs. Herrera,[22] the Court has said:

"There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought,
such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the
mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the
mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them." [23]

In effect then, the mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's default, is constituted an attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor enabling such
mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner. Accordingly, that the defendant is not privy to the chattel mortgage should
be inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin is traced to his possession, one properly can be a defendant in an
action for replevin. It is here assumed that the plaintiff's right to possess the thing is not or cannot be disputed.

In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of his
principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party might contest the legal bases for plaintiff's cause of action or an
adverse and independent claim of ownership or right of possession is raised by that party), it could become essential to
have other persons involved and accordingly impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the
controversy. For instance, in Servicewide Specialists, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103301, 08 December
1995, this Court ruled:

"While, in its present petition for review on certiorari, Servicewide has raised a number of points, the crucial issue still
remains, however, to be whether or not an action filed by the mortgagee for replevin to effect a foreclosure of the property
covered by the chattel mortgage would require that the mortgagor be so impleaded as an indispensable party thereto.

"Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to
apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is `the owner of the property claimed x x x or is entitled to the
possession thereof. The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the
property and his legal basis therefor. The question then, insofar as the matter finds relation to the instant case, is
whether or not the plaintiff (herein petitioner) who has predicated his right on being the mortgagee of a chattel
mortgage should implead the mortgagor in his complaint that seeks to recover possession of the encumbered property
in order to effect its foreclosure.

"The answer has to be in the affirmative. In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A
foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the
mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in the instant case has been sought to pave the way
for the foreclosure of the object covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for that foreclosure would be
to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements
must be established since the validity of the plaintiff's exercise of the right of foreclosure are inevitably dependent
thereon. It would thus seem, considering particularly an adverse and independent claim of ownership by private
respondent, that the lower court acted improvidently when it granted the dismissal of the complaint against
Dollente, albeit on petitioner's (then plaintiff) plea, on the ground that the non-service of summons upon Ernesto
Dollente (would) only delay the determination of the merits of the case, to the prejudice of the parties' In Imson v.
Court of Appeals, we have explained:

x x x. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.

`Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.'

"Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of a court cannot attain real finality."

A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to, the possession of the property unless and
until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of
possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other
parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination
of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not
only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly
uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action lies with the
plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound
by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

The appellate court, accordingly, acted well in arriving at its now questioned judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 NICANOR. B. PAGKALINAWAN vs. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ

FACTS:

Respondent Norberto L. Dayrit filed a complaint for Replevin in the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Gomez, against petitioner, Nicanor Pagkalinawan, Supervising Agent, National Bureau of
Investigation, Cebu City, and two members of the Manila Police Department for the recovery of possession of the
aforementioned car alleging that it is wrongfully detained by the herein petitioner. The respondent Judge issued an
order directing the Sheriff of Cebu City or any proper officer of the court, to take the car into his custody and the order
was implemented by the Clerk of Court by issuing on the same date a writ of replevin.

The petitioner contend that he could not possibly comply with said order to deliver the aforementioned car to the
sheriff because he was holding the same in 'custodia legis' for the Court of First Instance of Manila, the court that
issued the search warrant under which the said car was seized and held in custody; . .

The respondent Judge issued an order directing the petitioner to immediately comply with the order of the court and to
turn over to the sheriff the car in question upon receipt of a copy of this order.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order and setting aside the writ of replevin, but respondent
Judge after hearing on said motion denied the same in its order.

It was then alleged by petitioner that the aforesaid orders issued by the respondent Judge were made without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; that said orders would likewise "nullify the purpose and
defeat the force and validity of the search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance, a competent court of equal
category;" and "would then cause confusion in the enforcement and implementation of lawful orders issued by other
courts thereby causing embarrassment in the proper administration of justice.

The prayer was for respondent Judge being declared as having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in thus proceeding in the replevin action and that pending the final hearing and determination of
this petition, an order of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued directing the respondent Judge to order the return
of said car to petitioner, desisting and refraining until further orders of this Court from acting on the matter.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent Judge act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the replevin action.

RULING:

Petitioner is entitled to the remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for; the writ must be granted. It would
be to ignore a principle to which this Court has been firmly committed if under the circumstances disclosed, respondent
Judge would be sustained.

It is settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance belongs solely to the very
same branch which rendered the judgment." As aptly stated, any other branch "even it be in the same judicial district"
that would attempt to do so "either excess its jurisdiction", 9 or "acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction

The moment a court of first instance has been informed through the filing of an appropriate pleading that a search
warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if the literal language of the Rules of
Court7 yield a contrary impression which in this case demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for acting as he
did, require a sheriff or any proper officer of the Court to take the property subject of the replevin action if theretofore
it came into the custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that
issued such a search warrant may order its release. Any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been
steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to
avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each
other's lawful orders.

The writ prayed for is granted, and the mandatory preliminary injunction issued made permanent. With costs against
respondent Dayrit.
 ALIBSAR ADOMA vs. ROMEO GATCHECO,
[A.M. No. P-05-1942. January 17, 2005]

FACTS:
Alibsar Adoma filed an administrative complaint against respondent Romeo Gatcheco for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee which arose from the execution of a
writ of replevin in Adoma v. Spouses Edmundo Andres and Luzviminda Andres for recovery of possession of motor vehicle
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City.
Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that on August 16, 2003 a writ of replevin for the recovery of an L-300 van was
issued in his favor which, on the same day was implemented by respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco accompanied and
assisted by respondent Eugenio Taguba, a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago City. After the two
respondents seized the vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00, allegedly promised by complainant but the latter
was able to give only P1,000.00 and another P1,000.00 the following day.
The vehicle is still undelivered on the 7th day despite the fact that the writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be
delivered to complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof. With this, complainant threatened to file an
administrative case against respondent sheriff. Finally, on August 29, 2003, the latter was forced to release the vehicle
to complainant. Respondents, however, continued to demand P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant
administrative case.[3]
COMPLAINANTS CONTENTION: Respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the
vehicle after five days from the implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: We did not solicit and receive any amount from the complainant but instead it is
the complainant who promised to give us P10,000.00 if the vehicle will be sold. Further, the vehicles were not released
to complainant after 5 days from the implementation of the writ on August 16, 2003, because he was awaiting
instructions from Judge.
In her investigation report, Judge Madrid, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, found the
testimony of complainant which was corroborated by two witnesses, to be more credible. She refused to believe the
claim of respondent sheriff that he did not release the vehicle to complainant after 5 days from the implementation of
the writ on August 16, 2003, because he was awaiting instructions from Judge Plata. However, she found that
respondent sheriff did not actually demand money for the implementation of the writ because it was complainant who
promised to give money in exchange for the implementation of the writ of replevin. Nevertheless, she concluded that
respondent sheriff is guilty of misconduct considering that he accepted partial payment and insisted on its full payment.
As to respondent Taguba, Judge Madrid recommended that he be reprimanded for trying to abet the misconduct of
respondent sheriff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure for execution of writ of replevin has been properly followed by the respondents.
HELD: No. Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provided the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes
as follows: first, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; second, he must obtain court
approval for such estimated expenses; third, the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with
the Clerk of Court and ex-officio sheriff; fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff;
and fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any
amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which
renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited procedure because a) he failed to make and submit
estimate of the sheriffs expenses; b) amounts received and demanded by him are therefore unauthorized fees; c) his acts of
accepting and soliciting said monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee
but also for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Moreso, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the
implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised. Section 6, Rule 60 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the
adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so
objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the
property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must
return it to the adverse party.

Since the adverse party did not object to the complainants bond nor posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the
vehicle taken under the writ of replevin, respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it
took respondent sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation above cited provisions.
ADVENT vs. YOUNG

FACTS:
1. Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with RTC ofMakati, the court issued an order which states that
"theenforcement of all claims whether such enforcement isby court action or otherwise, against Advent, itsguarantors
and sureties not solidarily liable with it, isstayed";
2. Young filed a petition for rehabilitation, claiming thatseveral employee benefits allegedly due him as Advent's
former president and chief executive officer;
3. Rehabilitation court approved the rehab plan,included in the inventory of Advent's assets was the subject car which
is in the possession of Young;
4. Young refused to return the car (benz e230), hencethe replevin case;
5. Advent posted a 3M replevin bond, throungh Stronghold Insurance Company Inc.,TC issued a writ ofreplevin hence
Young turned over the car;
6. Young filed an answer, stating that as a formeremployee of Advent, he had the option to purchase thesubject car and
to offset the value of the car with theproceeds of his retirement pay and stock option plan;
7. TC ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for Advent's failure to execute and dismissed Young'scounterclaim for
lack of jurisdiction;
8. Young filed M for partial recon of the dismissal order with respect of his counterclaim and filed an omnibusmotiom
that Advent return the car and pay him 1.2M indamages for improper and irregular seizure;
9. TC denied both motion;
10. CA ruled in favor of Young, the writ of seizureissued as an incident of the main action (for replevin)became functus
officio and should have been recalledor lifted.

ISSUE: 1. WON, CA committed an error in directingthe return of the car to Young.

2. WON, CA erred in ordering the TC to set a hearingfor the determination of damages against the replevin.

HELD: Partly meritorious

1. No. Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure toprosecute, the writ of seizure became functus officioand
should have been lifted. there was no adjudicationon the merits, which means that there were nodetermination of the
issue of who has the better rightof possession to the car.In the replevin case, Young cannot demand that Advent pay
him money because such payment, even if valid, has been "stayed" by order of the rehabilitationcourt. However in the
same case, Young can raise Advent's car plan, coupled with his retirement pay andstock option plan, as giving him a
better right ofpossession of the car.

2. YesSec 10, Rule 60 of the ROC, provides that in replevincases, the damages to be awarded upon the bond"shall be
claimed, ascertained and granted" inaccordance with Sec.20, Rule 57, which allows theapplication to be filed at any
time before the judgmentbecomes executory. It should be filed in the same casethat is the main action and with the
court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application.In this case, there was no application for
damagesagainst Stronghold resulting from the issuance of thewrit of seizure before the finality of the dismissal of
thecomplaint for failure to prosecute. It appears thatYoung filed his omnibus motion claiming damagesagainst
Stronghold after the dismissal order issued byTC had attained finality. Thus, Young is barred fromclaiming damages
against the replevin bond. With thisthe CA erred in ordering the trial court to set a hearingfor the determination of
damages against the replevinbond
 G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982
BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, petitioner, vs.
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and DOROTEA
MEJIA, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in Civil Case No.
8874-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, dated December 24, 1981, ordering petitioner
Buenaventura San Juan to give support pendente lite to respondent Dorotea Mejia and her minor children.
It appears that on September 16, 1981, the marriage between respondent Mejia and petitioner San Juan, solemnized on
October 2, 1973, was declared null and void by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on the ground of a prior and
subsisting marriage between petitioner and one Isabel Bandin. On February 25, 1981, respondent Mejia instituted the
instance action against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 8874- P, seeking support for herself and her two minor
children.

After issues were joined, the respondent judge, on motion of Mejia, entered the challenged order granting
support pendente lite as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 61 of the New Rules of Court and after
giving due regard to the necessities of the plaintiff Dorotea Mejia and her children, Rachel San Juan
and Jeffrey San Juan, the application for support pendente lite is hereby granted, and the same is fixed
at P2,500.00 a month commencing from January 1, 1982 to be paid to the plaintiff on or the 5th day of
each month until this case is finally adjudicated. This is without prejudice to any judgment for support
in arrears due the plaintiff if the evidence will so warrant after trial.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above order on the grounds that (1) the amount is grossly disproportionate
to petitioner's means; (2) petitioner is not obliged to support respondent Mejia as their marriage is null and void; and
(3) no evidence was presented as to petitioner's present resources, was denied.
Hence, on March 16, 1982, petitioner instituted this petition.

It appears that pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a manifestation, dated June 17,
1982, proposing to settle his obligation of P15,000.00, representing the amount of support which accrued from January
to June, 1982, and to pay the same in three equal installments, the first to be paid upon approval by the court of his
scheme of payment, and the balance within a period of two (2) months thereafter. This proposal was approved by the
court. In the same manifestation, petitioner sought the reduction of the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000.00 a
month on the ground that the sum of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is now beyond his means to pay.
According to private respondent, the court had not yet acted on petitioner's request for reduction of the monthly support
because the respondent judge left for abroad. 1

Unquestionably, the petitioner's willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the mariner indicated in his
manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered this petition moot and academic.
As to the factual issue of whether the amount of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is now beyond the
means of petitioner, the same should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the
proper hearing. The order of December 24 fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the
sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the
obligor to pay the amount fixed for support. 2

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for being moot and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-48219 July 25, 1979
MANUEL J.C. REYES, Petitioner, vs. HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, Respondents.

This is a motion for reconsideration filed on April 26, 1979 by the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, asking that
the decision be modified by making the payment of the support pendente lite of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) a
month retroact to June 1976, on the following grounds:
(1) There is ample evidence that the business of the petitioner, Manuel J. C. Reyes, can very easily bear the burden of
support; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) The petition for support pendente lite is directed mainly on the private respondent's share in the conjugal
partnership; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Full support may be taken from the private respondent's share of the conjugal properties; chanrobles virtual law
library
(4) The private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, has incurred obligations during the three (3) years period that she was
not given any actual support and she also has to pay attorney's fees; chanrobles virtual law library
(5) The corporation, Development and Technology Consultants, Inc., of which the petitioner is the controlling
stockholder, in addition to four (4) cars in its name, has acquired two (2) new Opel Record sedan cars, each worth One
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00), and the petitioner lives in an expensive condominium and maintains
business offices in different buildings in Makati and Manila; and chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Finally, on April 20, 1979, the petitioner and his three (3) children went abroad on a two-month pleasure trip, while
the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, lives in a difficult and penurious situation, deeply in debt and caught in the
web of high prices and current inflation.

The petitioner has also filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the grounds that (1) the trial court should
be ordered to receive evidence on the issue of whether or not the private respondent is entitled to support pendente lite;
and (2) assuming, arguendo, that the private respondent is entitled to support pendente lite, the amount of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) is not only excessive for the needs of private respondent but beyond the means of the
petitioner herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court has gone over the different exhibits attached by the parties to their respective motions. The Development
and Technology Consultants, Inc. has multi-Million construction projects with gross receipts of several million
pesos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner cannot seriously complain that the amount of support pendente lite he is ordered to pay will ruin him. He
has not denied the allegations of the private respondent that the Development and Technology Consultants, Inc. has
acquired two (2) new automobiles and that the petitioner maintains expensive offices and resides in an expensive
condominium. It is not also denied that he and his three (3) children had recently traveled abroad for two (2)
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The support pendente lite in the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) is reasonable. Hence, the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner has no merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, the Court has taken into
consideration the fact that in view of the issuance of the restraining order by the Court of Appeals she had not received
any support at all until this Court issued a resolution allowing her only One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a
month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Obviously, during the period that she was not receiving any support she incurred debts. She must also pay attorney's
fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Considering that whatever support the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, might now be receiving will be
deducted from her share of the conjugal properties, the Court finds that under the equities and circumstances of the
case, the decision should be modified so as to make the support pendente lite of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) a
month retroact to November 1, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 28, 1979 is hereby modified in the sense that the
support pendente lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) a month should commence from November 1,
1977.

SO ORDERED.
 CASE TITLE: PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DISON REALTY G.R. No. 136409; March 14, 2008

DOCTRINE: An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above
remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments

FACTS:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former, as lessor,
agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa
cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals. Petitioners were, likewise,
required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.

The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the
lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager
of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid
the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay
the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final
demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58. Because petitioners still refused to
comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November
1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person
authorized to receive payment. To further justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented
from using the units (rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners eventually paid their monthly
rent for December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the rents for the
months of July to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34. However, they
again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because of respondents refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. To
show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly
rentals from January 1993 to January 1994. Petitioners further averred in their Amended Answer that the complaint for
ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation.

For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. the MeTC rendered
a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment. Regional Trial Court reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision.
Aggrieved, elevated the case to the CA which affirmed RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of an action for interpleader is proper

HELD:
We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. Although the SEC
suspended and eventually revoked respondent's certificate of registration on 16 February 1995, records show that it instituted
the action for ejectment on 15 December 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet
revoked. Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and
revocation of respondent's certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic.

It is undisputed that petitioners and respondents entered into 2 separate contracts of lease involving 9 rooms. Records
likewise show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the
demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises.

What was clearly established by the evidence was petitioners' non-payment of rentals because ostensibly, they did not know
to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were
not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code on consignation of payment and of the
Rules of Court on interpleader.

CONSIGNATION shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authority, before whom the
tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation on other cases.

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for
consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not
imputable to him. Tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation on order that the effect of payment may be
produced.

INTERPLEADER is proper whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest in whole or in part is not disputed by
claimants, he may bring an action against conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to
protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably,
instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.
 G.R. No. L-26443 March 25, 1969
MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.

Appeal by plaintiff Makati Development Corporation from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig), predicated upon lack of jurisdiction.

On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter
bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at
Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of
the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid
bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete
Aggregates, Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Supplier made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the
cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from
the final payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, on
September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and
the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."

On October 4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. 1 Finding this motion "to be
well-taken", the lower court granted the same, over plaintiffs opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order,
dated November 16, 1965, dismissing the case, without costs. Hence, this appeal, in which plaintiff maintains that the
subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to
litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to one liability."

We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to
interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the
defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the
lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the
Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the
question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.lawphi1.et

The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and
section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on
Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion
drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable
controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on
interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing
with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in
said courts.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff Makati
Development Corporation. It is so ordered.