#20 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 146195. November 18, 2004

AVELINA ZAMORA, ET. AL., petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, ANITA F. PUNZALAN, respondents.
PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts:
In 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into
contract of lease verbally whereby the former leased to the
latter one of her apartment units with the following
stipulations: (1) monthly rental is P3K; (2) for residence
purpose only; and (3) only a single family is allowed to occupy.
In 1996 (after death of Carmen), respondents increased the
monthly rental from P3K to P3.6K but petitioners refused to
sign the new contract.

Petitioners continued to reside without paying the increased

rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in
the unit. When petitioner applied with MWSS for a water line
connection, consent to which was declined by respondent for
petitioners failure to pay the proper rental and violation of
lease stipulations. After several barangay conciliation
sessions, the parties failed to settle amicably thus, on 14
Septembe4 1997, the Barangay Chairman certified to File an
Action.

On 2 October 1997, respondents filed with MTC Caloocan a

complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. Petitioners
moved to dismiss on the ground that the alleged
barangay certification is defective because it pertains to
another dispute, and the Punong Barangay did not constitute
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, in violation of Sec 410(b),
Ch 7, Title I, Book III of RA 7160. On 26 August 1998, the MTC
rendered a judgment in favor of respondents.
On appeal, the RTC Caloocan on 15 February 1999 affirmed
MTC Judgment. Upon appeal to CA, on 12 September 2000, it
affirmed RTC decision. A motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have sufficiently complied
with the Barangay Conciliation requirement as a condition sine
quanon prior to filing or institution of actions in court.

Ruling:

YES. Petition is Denied. CA Decision is Affirmed.

I
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508
(the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought
about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.[19] To
attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires
the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing
a complaint in court, thus:

SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in

Court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in
court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by
the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of

the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation
proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint does not
only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents
attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water
facilities in the premises, but also petitioners violation of the
terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for
their photocopying business and their failure to pay the
increased rental. As correctly found by the RTC:

The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman

were held on January 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997,
February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3, 1997, August 10, 1997,
August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only the issue of
water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the
proposed execution of a written contract relative thereto. It appears,
however, that no settlement was reached despite a total of nine meetings
at the barangay level.

It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by

defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because herein
plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the
authority to bring her grievance to the Court for resolution.
While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14,
1997 is entitled Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa
Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig, this title must not prevail over the
actual issues discussed in the proceedings.

Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level

as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not
serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would
be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times
in the past that they cannot get to settle their differences
amicably.[20]

We cannot sustain petitioners contention that

the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo,contravenes the law
on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No.
7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition
to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as
what happened in the present case), orthe Pangkat.

Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,[21] we held that

notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No.
7160 that the BarangayChairman shall constitute a Pangkat if
he fails in his mediation efforts, the same Section 410(b)
should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same
law (quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in
and peculiar to the case. Here, while the Pangkat was not
constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the
Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not
only the issue of water installation was discussed but also
petitioners violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest
that there was substantial compliance with the law which does
not require strict adherence thereto.[22]

II
We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint
for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section 19(a) of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted earlier.
Section 19(a) permits the filing of such pleading only when the
ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the
complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her
complaint to the Lupon for conciliation prior to its filing
with the court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18
of the same Rule, which reads:

SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to

the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was
arrested without a warrant. (Underscoring supplied)
 As discussed earlier, the case was referred to
the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Obviously, petitioners
motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.

- Digested [22 November 2016, 9:44]

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