CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

Interpretation of statutes and

principles of law PROJECT ON-
Remedial & penal statutes

SUBMITTED BY:-
SUPERVISED BY:-
Vishesh kr. choudhary prof. Ali
muhammed
ROLL NUMBER 9836 ispl
4th YEAR 7TH SEMESTER

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 Acknowledgement

I am highly elated to work on my project topic Remedial & Penal Statutes under the
guidelines of my teacher. I am very grateful to his proper guidance. I would like to enlighten
my readers with my efforts and just hope that I have tries my best for bringing luminosity to
this topic.

I would also like to thank all my friends and my sister and apart from all these I would like to
give special regard to the librarian of my university who made a relevant effort regarding to
provide the materials to my topic and also assisting me.

And finally and most importantly I would like to thank my parents for providing me financial
and mental support and providing me necessary and important tips whenever need so.

Thanking you

VISHESH KR. CHOUDHARY

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 CONTENTS:

CHAPTER: 1 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER: 2 REMEDIAL APPROACH

CHAPTER 3 PENAL APPROACH

CHAPTER :4 STATUTES FOR METHODS

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the researcher is to highlight the REMEDIAL & PENAL STATUTES.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of study is to enable the judges make use of different approaches of interpretation..

HYPOTHESIS

The concept of interpretation of a statute cannot be a static one. Interpretation of statute

becomes an ongoing exercise as newer facts and conditions continue to arise.

RESEARCH METHODOLGY

The researcher has adopted doctrinal method of study.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying legislation to decide cases.
Interpretation is necessary when case involves suble or ambiguous aspects of a statute.
Generally, the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. But in some
cases, there may be ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must be resolved
by the judge. The reason for ambiguity or vagueness of a legislation is the fundamental nature
of language. It is not always possible to precisely transform the intention of the legislature
into written words. Interpreting a statute to determine whether it applies to a given set of facts
often boils down to analyzing whether a single word or short phrase covers some element of
the factual situation before the judge. The expansiveness of language necessarily means that
there will often be equally good or equally unconvincing arguments for two competing
interpretations. A judge is then forced to resort to documentation of legislative intent, which
may also be unhelpful, and then finally to his or her own judgment of what outcome is
ultimately fair and logical under the totality of the circumstances. 1 To find the meanings of
statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional
canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common law
jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation to legislation enacted by
the legislature or to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations. There
are various methods and tools for judges to interpret the statute.

There are two ways in which judges can approach a statute and interpret it this includes
the literal approach and the purposive approach. The literal approach is where the
judge should take the literal meaning of the legislation and not go beyond or behind the
legislation to find the meaning of that law.

The purposive approach does not limit the judge in going beyond and behind the
legislation to find a meaning of that law. This is usually done to ultimately follow the
main reason for that law being created.

There are also rules on interpreting statutes, they are described below.

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The Literal Rule is where judges take the literal meaning of statute and apply this to the case
at hand. An example of this can be seen in Whiteley v Chappell [1868] L.R. 4 Q.B. 147

The Golden Rule allows judges again to take the literal meaning of the statute but if the
decision will lead to an absurd outcome then the judge will intervene and use their
common sense to make a judgment.

There can be two types of the Golden Rule, the wider meaning and the narrow meaning.

The narrow meaning is used when there are two contradictory meanings to a word in
the statute. If this occurs the court will take the meaning which doesn't create an
absurdity.

The wider meaning is used when the legislation only has one meaning and where
applying this meaning will cause an absurd, inconsistent and inconvenient outcome.
An example of this can be seen in R v Sigsworth [1935] All ER Rep 113.

The Mischief Rule is usually used to determine what parliament actually meant by
creating the act. An example of this can be seen in Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.

There also aids available to the judiciary. There are two types of aids available intrinsic and
extrinsic.2 The intrinsic aids allow the court to find the meaning within the statutes, i.e. judges
can look at the detailed title and the explanatory notes of the statute. The Ejusdem Generis
rule can also be used.

Extrinsic aids again allow the judiciary to find the meaning of the statute. Judges can look at
things outside to understand a statute completely i.e. they can look at Dictionaries, reports
from the Royal Commissions. Sometimes Hansard is used to find the meaning of a statute but
not the reason for the law being created, Hansard is used very rarely.

The literal approach does help to establish to find the true intentions of parliament as the
parliament wouldn't purposely create legislation which would cause absurd outcomes within
court. The purposive approach still is important to interpret statutes as some cases can be very

2 http://hanumant.com/IOS-Unit4-RulesOfInterpretation.html accessed on 9th

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unique and the literal meaning of a statute does not always cover what the law was set out to
do.

Ultimately statutory interpretation is important to the English legal system as without being
able interpret the law there would be a vast amount of injustice due to laws not being written
properly.

CHAPTER 2

PURPOSIVE APPROACH

The purposive approach sometimes referred to as purposive construction, purposive

interpretation, or the "modern principle in construction" is an approach to statutory
and constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an
enactment (that is, a statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of
the purpose for which it was enacted.

The historical source of purposive interpretation is the mischief rule established in

Heydon's Case. Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for
the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases. 3
Purposive interpretation is exercised when the courts utilize extraneous materials from
the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including early drafts, committee reports, etc.
The purposive interpretation involves a rejection of the exclusionary rule.

Critics of purposivism argue it fails to recognize the separation of powers between the
legislator and the judiciary. The legislator is responsible for the creating the law, while the
judiciary is responsible for interpreting law. As purposive interpretation goes beyond the
words within the statute, considerable power is bestowed upon the judges as they look to
extraneous materials for aid in interpreting the law.

Aids To Interpretation:

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Generally, prima facie must be given as a general rule of statutory interpretation. If the words
are clear and free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation.
However, if the words in the statute are vague and ambiguous, then internal aid may be
consulted for interpretation. This means the statute should be read in whole, what is not clear
in one section may be explained in another section.

Internal aids include the following:

Context

Title

Long Title

Short Title

Preamble

Headings

Proviso

Definition/interpretation Clause

Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words

Punctuation

External aids include the following:

Historical Settings

Objects and Reason

Text Books and Dictionaries

International Convention

Government Publications

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 Bill4

Committee Report

Debate and Proceedings of the Legislature

State of Things at the Time of the Passing of the Bill

History of Legislation

Extemporaneous Exposition

Judicial Interpretation of Words

Principles Of Interpretation - Purposive Approach

In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 44(1), fourth reissue, para 1474, pp 906-07, it is
stated:

"Parliament intends that an 'enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore
presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of
the instant case,5 which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its
legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a
way as to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon's case where the Barons
of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be
discerned and considered:

1. what was the common law before the making of the Act;

2. what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;

3. what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth; and

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4. the true reason of the remedy, end then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall

a. suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and

b. suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro private-
commode (for private benefit); and

c. add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act pro publico (for the public good)."

The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled. Where the words of the statute are
clear and unambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and normal meaning, without
adding or rejecting any words. Departure from the literal rule, by making structural changes
or substituting words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of interpretation will pose
a great risk as the changes may not be what the 6Legislature intended or desired. Legislative
wisdom cannot be replaced by the Judge's views. As observed by the Supreme Court in
somewhat different context: "When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for
the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the Legislature
has spoken, the Judges cannot afford to be wiser." There is however an exception to this
general rule. Where the words used in the statutory provision are vague and ambiguous or
where the plain and normal meaning of its words or grammatical construction thereof would
lead to confusion, absurdity, repugnancy with other provisions, the courts may, instead of
adopting the plain and grammatical construction, use the interpretative tools to set right the
situation, by adding or omitting or substituting the words in the Statute. When faced with an
apparently defective provision in a statute, courts prefer to assume that the draftsman had
committed a mistake rather than concluding that the Legislature has deliberately introduced
an absurd or irrational statutory provision. Departure from the literal rule of plain and straight
reading can however be only in exceptional cases, where the anomalies make the literal
compliance of a provision impossible, or absurd or so impractical as to defeat the very object
of the provision.

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Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes under the caption 'modification of the language to meet
the intention' in the chapter dealing with 'Exceptional Construction' states the position
succinctly:

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which can hardly have been intended, a
construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by
giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground
that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the
modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true
meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to
a nullity by the draftsmans unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of
necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.

Indian Approach

Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh approved and adopted the said approach. In
Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay the Court reiterated the principle
from Maxwell:

if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what
commonsense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the
ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even
the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require
the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by
doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.

In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. Court while reiterating that courts will have to
follow the rule of literal construction, which enjoins the court to take the words as used by the
Legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies, held that there is an exception
to that rule. This Court observed:

That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the
statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which
the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning.

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In Mangin v. Inland Revenue Commission the Privy Council held:

The object of the construction of a statute, be it to ascertain the will of the legislature, it may
be presumed that neither injustice7 nor absurdity was intended. If, therefore a literal
interpretation would produce such a result, and the language admits of an interpretation
which would avoid it, then such an interpretation may be adopted.

A classic example of correcting an error committed by the draftsman in legislative drafting is

the substitution of the words 'defendant's witnesses' by this Court for the words 'plaintiff's
witnesses' occurring in Order VII Rule 14(4) of the Code, in Salem Bar-II:

Order VII relates to the production of documents by the plaintiff whereas Order VIII relates
to production of documents by the defendant.8 Under Order VIII Rule 1A(4) a document not
produced by defendant can be confronted to the plaintiff's witness during cross-examination.
Similarly, the plaintiff can also confront the defendant's witness with a document during
cross-examination. By mistake, instead of 'defendant's witnesses', the words 'plaintiff's
witnesses' have been mentioned in Order VII Rule (4). To avoid any confusion, it was
directed that till the legislature corrects the mistake, the words 'plaintiff's witnesses, would be
read as 'defendant's witnesses' in Order VII Rule 4.

Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions that should be present to justify departure from the
plain words of the Statute, in his treatise "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" from the
decision of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.:

...a court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute when it is
satisfied that (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly; (2) Parliament, the legislative
promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such anomaly and could not have been
prepared to accept it in the interest of a supervening legislative objective; (3) the anomaly can

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be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective; and (4) the language of the
statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate the anomaly.

It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute the same has to be in its
entirety. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, principles of purposive construction must come
into play.

CHAPTER 3

LITERAL APPROACH

The literal rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by judges.
Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or ordinary
meaning and applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss on the words or seek to
make sense of the statute. A statues often contains a "definitions" section, which
explicitly defines the most important terms used in that statute. However, some statutes
omit a definitions section entirely, or fail to define a particular term.9 The literal rule,
which is also known as the plain meaning rule, attempts to guide courts faced with
litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a
word found within a definition itself. According to this rule, when a word does not
contain any definition in a statute, it must be given its plain, ordinary, and literal
meaning. If the word is clear, it must be applied, even though the intention of the
legislature may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule
is what the law says instead of what the law means. This is the oldest of the rules of
construction and is still used today, primarily because judges are not supposed to
legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the
equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal wording.

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When the words of a Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning
irrespective of consequences. In J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003, SC observed that
the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which
means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said.
As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition, substitution, or
removal of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
This is accordance with the case of Crawford vs Spooner, 1846, where privy council noted
that the courts cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, they cannot add or
mend, and by construction make up for deficiencies which are left there.

In Kannailala Sur vs Parammindhi Sadhu Khan 1957, J Gajendragadkar says that if the
words used in statute are capable of only one construction then it is not open to the courts to
adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more
consistent with the alleged objective and policy of the act..

In M V Joshi vs M V Shimpi, AIR 1961, relating to Food and Adulteration Act, it was
contented that the act does not apply to butter made from curd. However, SC held that the
word butter in the said act is plain and clear and there is no need to interpret it differently.
Butter is butter whether made from milk or curd.

Thus, when the language of a provision is plain and clear, court cannot enlarge the scope of
the provision by interpretive process. Further, a construction which requires for its support
addition of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided

Advantages

1. Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in
legislative or political issues.

2. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive access to
secondary sources and thus depending on the ordinary meaning of the words is the
safest route.

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 3. It encourages precision in drafting.

Disadvantages

1. Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous
assumption that words have a fixed meaning. Words are imprecise, leading justices to
impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since
little else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning
survives.

2. Sometimes the use of the literal rule may defeat the intention of Parliament. For
instance,10 in the case of Whiteley vs Chappel (1868; LR 4 QB 147), the court came
to the reluctant conclusion that Whiteley could not be convicted of impersonating
"any person entitled to vote" at an election, because the person he impersonated was
dead. Using a literal construction of the relevant statutory provision, the deceased was
not "a person entitled to vote." This, surely, could not have been the intention of
Parliament. However, the literal rule does not take into account the consequences of a
literal interpretation, only whether words have a clear meaning that makes sense
within that context. If Parliament does not like the literal interpretation, then it must
amend the legislation.

3. It obliges the courts to fall back on standard common law principles of statutory
interpretation. Legislation is drawn up with these principles in mind. However, these
principles may not be appropriate to constitutional interpretation, which by its nature
tends to lay down general principles. It is said that it seems wrong to parcel the
Constitution as if it were a Finance Act.

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4. Clearly, the literal approach has another disadvantage in that one judges literal
interpretation might be very different from anothers. Casey says: What may seem
plain to one judge may seem perverse and unreal to another.

5. It ignores the limitations of language.

6. To place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words is to assume an

unattainable perfection in draftsmanship.

7. Judges have tended excessively to emphasise the literal meaning of statutory

provisions without giving due weight to their meaning in wider contexts.

CHAPTER 4

RULES OF INTERPRETATION

The Mischief Rule is used by judges in statutory interpretation in order to discover

legislature's intention. It essentially asks the question: By creating an Act of Parliament what
was the "mischief" that the previous or existing law did not cover and this act covers. This
rule was developed by Lord Coke in Sir John Heydon's Case, 1584, where it was stated
that there were four points to be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:

1. What was the common law before the making of the act?

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 2. What was the "mischief or defect" for which the common law did not provide?

3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?

4. What is the true reason of the remedy?

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule
as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. Legislative intent is determined
by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and
corresponding statutes.12 The rule was further illustrated in the case of Smith v Hughes,
1960, where under the Street Offences Act 1959, it was a crime for prostitutes to "loiter or
solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution". The defendants were calling to men in
the street from balconies and tapping on windows. They claimed they were not guilty as they
were not in the "street." The judge applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that
they were guilty as the intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from
prostitutes.

This rule is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in that it
can only be used to interpret a statute and only when the statute was passed to remedy a
defect in the common law. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in
which the literal rule cannot be applied. As seen In Smith v Hughes, the mischief approach
gave a more sensible outcome than that of the literal approach.

Advantages

1. The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as
opposed to the Golden or Literal rules.

2. It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing

Disadvantages

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 1. It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common
law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.

2. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be

undemocratic.

3. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were
therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy, however, such
is not the case any more.

Golden Rule
This rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if the
overall content of the document demands it. This rule is a modification of the literal rule. It
states that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, then the court should look for another
meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The rule was evolved by Parke B (who later
became Lord Wensleydale) in Becke v Smith, 1836 and in Grey v Pearson, 1857, who
stated,13 "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that
would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified
so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther."

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute as it allows to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance
with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case it allows the language to be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience.

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where
there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves. For example, imagine there
may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under the literal interpretation of this
sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be an absurd
result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from

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using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby. This was illustrated in the case of Lee vs
Knapp 1967 QB where the interpretation of the word "stop" was involved. Under Road
Traffic Act, 1960, a person causing an accident "shall stop" after the accident. In this case,
the driver stopped after causing the accident and then drove off. It was held that the literal
interpretation of the word stop is absurd and that the requirement under the act was not
fulfilled because the driver did not stop for a reasonable time so that interested parties can
make inquiries from him about the accident.

The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to
principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Bedford vs Bedford,
1935, is another interesting case that highlighted the use of this rule. It concerned a case
where a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on
who then 14inherited the estate, the mother's family, or the son's descendants. The mother had
not made a will and under the Administration of Justice Act 1925 her estate would be
inherited by her next of kin, i.e. her son. There was no ambiguity in the words of the Act, but
the court was not prepared to let the son who had murdered his mother benefit from his
crime. It was held that the literal rule should not apply and that the golden rule should be used
to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. The court held that if the son inherits
the estate that would amount to profiting from a crime and that would be repugnant to the
act.

Thus, the Golden rule implies that if a strict interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd
result then the meaning of the words should be so construed so as to lead to the avoidance of
such absurdity. A further corollary to this rule is that in case there are multiple constructions
to effect the Golden rule the one which favors the assessee should always be taken. This rule
is also known as the Rule of Reasonable Construction.

Advantages

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 1. This rule prevents absurd results in some cases containing situations that are
completely unimagined by the law makers.

2. It focuses on imparting justice instead of blindly enforcing the law.

Disadvantages

1. The golden rule provides no clear means to test the existence or extent of an
absurdity.15 It seems to depend on the result of each individual case. Whilst the golden
rule has the advantage of avoiding absurdities, it therefore has the disadvantage that
no test exists to determine what is an absurdity.

2. This rule tends to let the judiciary overpower the legislature by applying its own
standards of what is absurd and what it not.

CONCLUSION

To ensure that justice is made available to all, the judicial system has been evolved in all
nations. It is extremely important and infact necessary also that the Courts interpret the law in
such a manner that ensures access to justice to the maximum. For this purpose, the concept
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of Canons of Interpretation has been expounded. The Canons are those rules that have been
evolved by the Judiciary to help Courts determine the meaning and the intent of legislation.

SALMOND has defined it as the process by which the Courts seek to ascertain the meaning
of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.

A Statute is an edict of the Legislature and it must be construed to the intent of them who
make it and duty of the judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature- the
mens or sententia legis.

The conjunction and or or can never be given a definite and dogmatic interpretation and
the entire interpretation would depend on the intention of the maker laws or bye-laws using
such conjunction.

In a latest case of 2011, Union of India v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd.the Apex Court has once
again laid emphasis on the need to interpret and and or in a manner that ensures the
manifest intent of the Legislature is giving effect to.

It is essential to understand the need for correct interpretation of and and or as this can at
times, change the entire meaning of the relevant statutory provision. The Judicature should
expound the law in a manner that suppresses the evil and the wrong and advances the true
meaning and scope of the Statute. The Legislature cannot predict the myriad possible future
situations that might arise and it is impossible to draft a law perfect to meet all situations in
future. This conflict is inevitable and thus it is the duty of the Judges to use the techniques of
Interpretation to give most desired and required meaning to ensure justice prevails.

Bibliography

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