9) STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, (1972)
In contrast, an unwed father is uniquely subject
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant had an ongoing
relationship with a woman with whom he sired
and raised three children. Upon the death of the
mother the children were deemed wards of the
State under an Illinois law that did not place
children in the custody of unwed fathers.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The statute violated
appellants equal protection under the laws by
depriving him of custody of his children when
married fathers and unwed mothers could not be
deprived of custody without being shown to be
unfit parents.
Facts. Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley,
appellant, intermittently for 18 years, during
which time they had three children. Under
Illinois law the children of unwed fathers
became wards of the State upon death of the
mother. When Joan died a dependency
proceeding was instituted by the State and
appellants children were declared wards of the
State and placed with court-appointed guardians.
Appellant appealed upon the fact that he had
never been shown to be an unfit parent and that
since married fathers and unwed mothers could
not be deprived of their children without such a
showing, he had been deprived of the equal
protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Issue. Does the Illinois statute violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by distinguishing against and
burdening unwed fathers?
Held. As a matter of due process of law,
appellant was entitled to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent before his children were taken from
him. By denying him a hearing when all other
parents whose custody of their children is
challenged are permitted one, the State denied
appellant the equal protection of laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Illinois law, children of all parents can be
taken from them in a neglect proceeding, but
only after notice, hearing, and proof of unfitness.
to the more simplistic dependency proceeding.
The private interest of a man and the children he
has sired and raised warrants deference and
protection. In comparison, previous case law has
not refused to recognize those family
relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony.
The State claims that the interest furthered by
the statue is to protect the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and
the best interests of the community. In support of
this interest, the State asserts that most
unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful
parents. However, the State registers no gain
toward its goals when it separates children from
the custody of fit parents. The States insistence
on presuming rather than proving appellants
unfitness solely on the basis of convenience is
unconstitutional.
Discussion. The Court acknowledges that the
State has a legitimate interest in prompt
efficacious procedures furthered by the
presumption that unwed fathers are unfit.
However, such an interest is outweighed by the
fathers right to demonstrate that he is fit when
the right taken away from the father would be
the right to raise his child.
FULL TEXT: STANLEY VS. ILLINOIS
Argued: October 19, 1971 Decided: April 3,
1972
Petitioner, an unwed father whose children, on
the mother's death, were declared state wards
and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois
statutory scheme as violative of equal
protection. Under that scheme the children of
unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother,
are declared dependents without any hearing on
parental fitness and without proof of neglect,
though such hearing and proof are required
before the State assumes custody of children of
married or divorced parents and unmarried
mothers. The Illinois Supreme Court, holding
that petitioner could properly be separated from
his children upon mere proof that he and the
dead mother had not been married and that
petitioner's fitness as a father was irrelevant,
rejected petitioner's claim.
Held:
1. Under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to
a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his
children were taken from him.
(a) The fact that petitioner can apply for
adoption or for custody and control of his
children does not bar his attack on the
dependency proceeding.
(b) The State cannot, consistently with due
process requirements, merely presume that
unmarried fathers in general and petitioner in
particular are unsuitable and neglectful parents.
Parental unfitness must be established on the
basis of individualized proof. See Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 .
2. The denial to unwed fathers of the hearing on
fitness accorded to all other parents whose
custody of their children is challenged by the
State constitutes a denial of equal protection of
the laws
Patrick T. Murphy argued the cause and filed a
brief for petitioner.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley
intermittently for 18 years, during which time
they had three children. When Joan Stanley died,
Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his
children. Under Illinois law, the children of
unwed fathers become wards of the State upon
the death of the mother.
Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley's death, in a
dependency proceeding instituted by the State of
Illinois, Stanley's children 2 were declared
wards of the State and placed with court-
appointed guardians. Stanley appealed, claiming
that he had never been shown to be an unfit
parent and that since married fathers and unwed
mothers could not be deprived of their children
without such a showing, he had been deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact
that Stanley's own unfitness had not been
established but rejected the equal protection
claim, holding that Stanley could properly be
separated from his children upon proof of the
single fact that he and the dead mother had not
been married. Stanley's actual fitness as a father
was irrelevant.
Stanley presses his equal protection claim here.
The State continues to respond that unwed
fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children
and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized
hearings to determine whether particular fathers
are in fact unfit parents before they are separated
from their children. We granted certiorari to
determine whether this method of procedure by
presumption could be allowed to stand in light
of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers -
whether divorced, widowed, or separated - and
mothers - even if unwed - the benefit of the
presumption that they are fit to raise their
children.
III
The State of Illinois assumes custody of the
children of married parents, divorced parents,
and unmarried mothers only after a hearing and
proof of neglect. The children of unmarried
fathers, however, are declared dependent
children without a hearing on parental fitness
and without proof of neglect. Stanley's claim in
the state courts and here is that failure to afford
him a hearing on his parental qualifications
while extending it to other parents denied him
equal protection of the laws. We have concluded
that all Illinois parents are constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody. It
follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley
and those like him while granting it to other
Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the
Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is
reversed and the case is remanded to that court
for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
FOOTNOTES:
[ Footnote 10 ] Predicating a finding of
constitutional invalidity under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the observation that a State has accorded
bedrock procedural rights to some, but not to all
similarly situated, is not contradictory to our
holding in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270
(1971). In that case a due process, rather than an
equal protection, claim was raised in the state
courts.
The federal courts were, in our opinion, barred
from reversing the state conviction on grounds
of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause
when that clause had not been referred to for
consideration by the state authorities. Here, in
contrast, we dispose of the case on the
constitutional premise raised below, reaching the
result by a method of analysis readily available
to the state court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs,
dissenting.
The only constitutional issue raised and decided
in the courts of Illinois in this case was whether
the Illinois statute that omits unwed fathers from
the definition of "parents" violates the Equal
Protection Clause. We granted certiorari to
consider whether the Illinois Supreme Court
properly resolved that equal protection issue
when it unanimously upheld the statute against
petitioner Stanley's attack
In regard to the only issue that I consider
properly before the Court, I agree with the
State's argument that the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated when Illinois gives full
recognition only to those father-child
relationships that arise in the context of family
units bound together by legal obligations arising
from marriage or from adoption proceedings.
Quite apart from the religious or quasi-religious
connotations that marriage has - and has
historically enjoyed - for a large proportion of
this Nation's citizens, it is in law an essentially
contractual relationship, the parties to which
have legally enforceable rights and duties, with
respect both to each other and to any children
born to them. Stanley and the mother of these
children never entered such a relationship. The
record is silent as to whether they ever privately
exchanged such promises as would have bound
them in marriage under the common law. any
event, Illinois has not recognized common-law
marriages since 1905. Stanley did not seek the
burdens when he could have freely assumed
them.
Where there is a valid contract of marriage, the
law of Illinois presumes that the husband is the
father of any child born to the wife during the
marriage; as the father, he has legally
enforceable rights and duties with respect to that
child. When a child is born to an unmarried
woman, Illinois recognizes the readily
identifiable mother, but makes no presumption
as to the identity of the biological father.
It does, however, provide two ways, one
voluntary and one involuntary, in which that
father may be identified. First, he may marry the
mother and acknowledge the child as his own;
this has the legal effect of legitimating the child
and gaining for the father full recognition as a
parent.
Second, a man may be found to be the biological
father of the child pursuant to a paternity suit
initiated by the mother; in this case, the child
remains illegitimate, but the adjudicated father is
made liable for the support of the child until the
latter attains age 18 or is legally adopted by
another. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 106 3/4, 52.
Stanley argued before the Supreme Court of
Illinois that the definition of "parents," set out in
Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, 701-14, as including "the
father and mother of a legitimate child, or the
survivor of them, or the natural mother of an
illegitimate child, [or] . . . any adoptive parent,"
3 violates the Equal Protection Clause in that it
treats unwed mothers and unwed fathers
differently. Stanley then enlarged upon his equal
protection argument when he brought the case
here; he argued before this Court that Illinois is
not permitted by the Equal Protection Clause to
distinguish between unwed fathers and any of
the other biological parents included in the
statutory definition of legal "parents."
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that
the State may constitutionally distinguish
between unwed fathers and unwed mothers.
Here, Illinois' different treatment of the two is
part of that State's statutory scheme for
protecting the welfare of illegitimate children. In
almost all cases, the unwed mother is readily
identifiable, generally from hospital records, and
alternatively by physicians or others attending
the child's birth. Unwed fathers, as a class, are
not traditionally quite so easy to identify and
locate. Many of them either deny all
responsibility or exhibit no interest in the child
or its welfare; and, of course, many unwed
fathers are simply not aware of their parenthood.
10) TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO,
MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S.
LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of
applicants for admission into the Medical
Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and
future years who have not taken or successfully
hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT). petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S.
GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region with seat at
Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as
Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM),
respondents.
FACTS:
- The petitioners sought admission into colleges
or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988.
- However, the petitioners either did not take or
did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board
of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
- On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
- The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring
the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26
April 1987 and in the future.
- After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied
said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.
- Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil
Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside
the Order of the respondent judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
-Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic
Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for
and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and
(c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines.
- The statute, among other things, created a
Board of Medical Education
- Section 7 prescribes certain minimum
requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical
college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction
of any offense involving moral turpitude and
who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical
school from the Board of Medical Education; (c)
a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act
shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may
be deemed admissible.
- MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the
then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports
and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year
1986-1987.
- 8. No applicant shall be issued the
requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission
(CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year
student in any medical college, beginning the
school year, 1986-87, without the required
NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)
- Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the
private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school
year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs
for admission to medical colleges during the
school year 1987.1988.
ISSUES:
- Petitioners raise the question of whether or not
a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending
resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. The
fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
RULING:
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions
of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked
read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect of human rights. "
(b) Article II, Section l3: "The State recognizes
the vital role of the youth in nation building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give
priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress and to
promote total human liberation and
development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has
a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in
its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote.
The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in
what manner the statute and the administrative
order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of
proof which lies upon them.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987
Constitution, we note that once more petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and
regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note-in
anticipation of discussion infra that the
statute and the regulation which petitioners
attack are in fact designed to promote "quality
education" at the level of professional schools.
When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section
5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but
note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to
be read with absolute literalness. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education accessible to all who might
for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify
under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements. "
ABOUT EQUAL PROTECTION
2. Petitioners have contended, finally, that
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
More specifically, petitioners assert that that
portion of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants,
based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical
11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
"infringes the requirements of equal protection."
They assert, in other words, that students
seeking admission during a given school year,
e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different
cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and
that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and
capricious."
Different cutoff scores for different school years
may be dictated by differing conditions
obtaining during those years. Thus, the
appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be
a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score
established the preceding year; the number of
places available in medical schools during the
current year; the average score attained during
the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth.
To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff
score regardless of changes in circumstances
from year to year, may wen result in an
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in
MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical
Education with the measure of flexibility needed
to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and
requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in
the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent
trial court denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
11) SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT
AGENCY INC. VS. CABILES
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT
AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
FACTS:
"This case involves an overseas Filipino worker
with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the
facts and the law, to approximate justice for her."
-Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Responding to an ad it published, respondent,
Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan.
- Joys application was accepted. Joy was later
asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged
that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to
pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she
signed the employment contract.
- Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal,
Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to
work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims
that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang
from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare
for immediate repatriation."
- Joy claims that she was told that from June 26
to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.16
- On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint
with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that
she was illegally dismissed.
- She asked for the return of her placement fee,
the withheld amount for repatriation costs,
payment of her salary for 23 months as well as
moral and exemplary damages. She identified
Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys
foreign principal.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged
that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her
"failure to comply with the work requirements
[of] her foreign [employer]." The agency also
claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee.
- Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation
with petitioner had already been transferred to
the (Pacific), Thus, petitioner asserts that it was
already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
- On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
Joys complaint. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Pedro C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was
based on mere allegations.
- Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
- In a resolution dated March 31, 2004, the
National Labor Relations Commission declared
that Joy was illegally dismissed. It found that
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to
prove that there were just causes for termination.
Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not
observed in terminating respondent.
- NLRC refused to entertain the issue of the
alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. It did
not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to
appeal the Labor Arbiters decision not to rule
on the matter.
- The National Labor Relations Commission
awarded respondent only three (3) months worth
of salary in the amount of NT$46,080, the
reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from
her, and attorneys fees of NT$300.46
- Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing
the National Labor Relations Commissions
resolutions
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission with
respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys
entitlement to the equivalent of three months
worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld
repatriation expense, and attorneys fees.
- Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to
the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.
RULING: (CASE DIGEST)
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-
month equivalent of respondents salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that the
clause or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010.
RULING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of
the existence of any law that supports such
exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by
any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as
such unless circumstances have so changed as to
warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause,
this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well
as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or
for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
RULING: (ABT EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE) (FULL TEXT)
- The Office of the Solicitor General also argued
that the clause was valid and constitutional.
However, since the parties never raised the issue
of the constitutionality of the clause as reinstated
in Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that
it is beyond judicial review.
On the other hand, respondent argued that the
clause was unconstitutional because it infringed
on workers right to contract.
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time
as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas
worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that
persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms
of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."
It is a guarantee against "undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality."
The equal protection clause does not infringe on
this legislative power. A law is void on this
basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.
There is no violation of the equal protection
clause if the law applies equally to persons
within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling
within the class and those who do not fall within
the class. A law that does not violate the equal
protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification.
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class."
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the
requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications
made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished
between fixed-period overseas workers and
fixed period local workers.
It also distinguished between overseas workers
with employment contracts of less than one year
and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.
The Congress classification may be subjected to
judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class."
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded
special protection. Thus, this court in
Serrano, "[i]mbued with the same sense of
obligation to afford protection to labor, . . .
employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs."
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage
of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of
illegally terminated overseas and local workers
with fixed-term employment were computed in
the same manner.
Their money claims were computed based on
the "unexpired portions of their contracts." The
adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act
No. 8042 subjected the money claims of
illegally dismissed overseas workers with an
unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three
months worth of their salary.
There was no such limitation on the money
claims of illegally terminated local workers with
fixed-term employment.
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas
workers whose employment contracts had a term
of less than one year were granted the amount
equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas
workers with employment terms of at least a
year were granted a cap equivalent to three
months of their salary for the unexpired portions
of their contracts.
Observing the terminologies used in the clause,
we also found that "the subject clause creates a
sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose
contract periods are for more than one year:
those who are illegally dismissed with less than
one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion
thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed
with one year or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the reinstated
clause, and their monetary benefits limited to
their salaries for three months only.
Overseas workers regardless of their
classifications are entitled to security of tenure,
at least for the period agreed upon in their
contracts. This means that they cannot be
dismissed before the end of their contract terms
without due process. If they were illegally
dismissed, the workers right to security of
tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period
local worker is illegally terminated are neither
greater than nor less than the rights violated
when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally
terminated.
It is state policy to protect the rights of workers
without qualification as to the place of
employment. In both cases, the workers are
deprived of their expected salary, which they
could have earned had they not been illegally
dismissed.
For both workers, this deprivation translates to
economic insecurity and disparity.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the
argument that "[overseas workers] are
contractual employees who can never acquire
regular employment status, unlike local
workers" because it already justifies
differentiated treatment in terms of the
computation of money claims.
We also find that the classifications are not
relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to
"establish a higher standard of protection
and promotion of the welfare of migrant
workers, their families and overseas Filipinos
in distress, and for other purposes."
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain
overseas workers does not increase the standard
of protection afforded to them.
Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job
overseas for the longer contract period disregard
other opportunities only to be terminated earlier.
They are left with claims that are less than what
others in the same situation would receive. The
reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation
where the law meant to protect them makes
violation of rights easier and simply benign to
the violator.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay
respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent
to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this judgment.
Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse
respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and
pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at
an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
12) ALMARIO VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Art has traditionally been viewed as the
expression of everything that is true, good and
beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and
produce a spirit of harmony. Art is also
considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of
nation-building. The notion of art and artists as
privileged expressions of national culture helped
shape the grand narratives of the nation and
shared symbols of the people. The artist does not
simply express his/her own individual
inspiration but articulates the deeper aspirations
of history and the soul of the people.
The law recognizes this role and views art as
something that "reflects and shapes values,
beliefs, aspirations, thereby defining a peoples
national identity." If unduly politicized,
however, art and artists could stir controversy
and may even cause discord, as what happened
in this case.
FACTS:
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 10014 and,
upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees
of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP),
created the category of Award and Decoration of
National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who
have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters. In the same issuance, Fernando
Amorsolo was declared as the first National
Artist.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356,
otherwise known as the Law Creating the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts,
was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA)
and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the
Filipino national culture and arts and the
Filipino cultural heritage.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA
under Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend
recognition of artistic achievement through
awards, grants and services to artists and cultural
groups which contribute significantly to the
Filipinos cultural legacy."
In connection with this mandate, the NCCA is
vested with the power to "advise the President
on matters pertaining to culture and the arts,
including the creation of a special decoration or
award, for persons who have significantly
contributed to the development and promotion
of Philippine culture and arts."
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been
mandated by law to promote, develop and
protect the Philippine national culture and the
arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving
Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team
up and jointly administer the National Artists
Award.9 Thereafter, they reviewed the
guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artists Award.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors
Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of
Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other
Purposes, was issued.
The National Artists Award was renamed the
Order of National Artists and raised to the level
of a Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among
the orders and decorations that comprise the
Honors of the Philippines. Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital role of the
NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who
have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters and states that the National Artist
recognition is conferred "upon the
recommendation of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines and the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts." Executive Order No. 236,
s. 2003, further created a Committee on Honors
to "assist the President in evaluating
nominations for recipients of Honors," including
the Order of National Artists, and presidential
awards.
The Committee on Honors has been allowed to
"authorize relevant department or government
agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards
Committees to process nominations for Honors
and/or Presidential Awards."14 In this
connection, Section 2.4(A) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations 15 of Executive Order
No. 236, s. 2003, states:
All nominations from the various awards
committees must be submitted to the Committee
on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine
Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery
shall process nominations for the consideration
of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on
Honors shall screen and recommend these
nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general
rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
that nominations received from the various
awards committees meet two tests: that there has
not been an abuse of discretion in making the
nomination, and that the nominee is in good
standing. Should a nomination meet these
criteria, a recommendation to the President for
conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the
recommendations of the Committee on Honors
in the highest consideration when making the
final decision on the conferment of awards.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled
Amending Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No.
236 Entitled "Establishing the Honors Code of
the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence
of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes"
was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It
amended the wording of Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists
and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall
advise the President on the conferment of the
Order of National Artists."
Controversy Surrounding the 2009
Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a
joint meeting of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees
was held to discuss, among others, the
evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists
and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat. The nomination period was set for
September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which
was later extended to February 28, 2008. The
pre-screening of nominations was held from
January to March 2008.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel
met.17 A total of 87 nominees18 were
considered during the deliberation and a
preliminary shortlist 19 of 32 names was
compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation
Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the
preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final
deliberation was conducted by the 30-member
Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National
Artists.From the 13 names in the second
shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed
upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos,
Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation
to the President. According to respondents, the
aforementioned letter was referred by the Office
of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors,
cultural groups and individuals strongly
endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on
Honors purportedly processed these nominations
and invited resource persons to validate the
qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation
No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National
Artist was issued on June 30, 2009.
Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation
Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro
Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
This was subsequently announced to the public
by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on
July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive
province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those
who will be conferred the Order of National
Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
select group, petitioners instituted this petition
for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with
prayer for restraining order) praying that the
Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr.
Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be enjoined
and declared to have been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion
in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
According to petitioners, the Presidents
discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion
on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence
of or against the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP.
Contention of the Parties
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the
petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation
of at least three groups, the National Artists,
cultural workers and academics, and the
Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP).
The National Artists assert an "actual as well as
legal interest in maintaining the reputation of the
Order of National Artists."
In particular, they invoke their right to due
process not to have the honor they have been
conferred with diminished by the irregular and
questionable conferment of the award on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. For petitioners, this would
adversely affect their right to live a meaningful
life as it detracts not only from their right to
enjoy their honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor
but also from the respect of their peers.
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim
to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned with
the preservation of the countrys rich cultural
and artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they are
concerned about the use of public monies for
illegal appointments or spurious acts of
discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion
in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
According to petitioners, the Presidents
discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion
on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence
of or against the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP.
In adding the names of respondents Caparas,
Guidote-Alvarez, Maosa and Moreno while
dropping Dr. Santos from the list of conferees,
the Presidents own choices constituted the
majority of the awardees in utter disregard of the
choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the arts
and culture community which were arrived at
after a long and rigorous process of screening
and deliberation. Moreover, the name of Dr.
Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted
from the final list submitted by the NCCA and
the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the
basis thereof.
For petitioners, the Presidents discretion to
name National Artists cannot be exercised to
defeat the recommendations made by the CCP
and NCCA Boards after a long and rigorous
screening process and with the benefit of
expertise and experience. The addition of four
names to the final list submitted by the Boards
of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of
one name from the said list constituted a
substitution of judgment by the President and a
unilateral reconsideration without clear
justification of the decision of the First, Second
and Final Deliberation Panels composed of
experts.
Petitioners further argue that the choice of
respondent Guidote Alvarez was illegal and
unethical because, as the then Executive
Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser
on culture and arts, she was disqualified from
even being nominated. Moreover, such action on
the part of the former President constituted
grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential
treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by
naming the latter a National Artist despite her
not having been nominated and, thus, not
subjected to the screening process provided by
the rules for selection to the Order of National
Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President
represented a clear and manifest favor given by
the President in that she was exempted from the
process that all other artists have to undergo.
According to petitioners, it may be said that the
President used a different procedure to qualify
respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly
grave abuse of discretion for being manifest and
undue bias violative of the equal protection
clause.
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of
the petitioning National Artists and insists that
there could be no prejudice to the latter. They
remain to be National Artists and continue to
receive the emoluments, benefits and other
privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that
honor. On the other hand, all the other
petitioners failed to show any material and
personal injury or harm caused to them by the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be
relaxed in favor of the petitioners as no question
of constitutionality has been raised and no issue
of transcendental importance is involved.
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that
no grave abuse of discretion attended his
proclamation as National Artist. The former
President considered the respective
recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards and of the Committee on Honors in
eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National
Artist.
The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards
is simply to advise the President. The award of
the Order of National Artists is the exclusive
prerogative of the President who is not bound in
any way by the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules
and regulations or guidelines of the NCCA
cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of
the President to select the recipients of the Order
of National Artists.
The original position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was similar to that of
respondent Caparas.
The OSG argued that, while the President
exercises control over the NCCA and the CCP,
the President has the duty to faithfully execute
the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines
for selection of National Artists and the
implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236,
s. 2003.
Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of
the NCCA and the CCP in the arts and tasked
them to screen and select the artists to be
conferred the Order of National Artists. Their
mandate is clear and exclusive as no other
agency possesses such expertise.
The OSG also assailed the former Presidents
choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being
contrary to Republic Act No. 7356.54 Section 11
of the said law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. During
his/her term as member of the Commission, a
Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant,
or such other financial aid from the Commission
as an individual: Provided, however, That he/she
may compete for grants and awards on the same
level as other artists one (1) year after his/her
term shall have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first
portion of the above provision appears to be
unintentional as shown by the proviso which
states that a member may compete for grants and
awards only one year after his or her term shall
have expired. As such, respondent Guidote-
Alvarez is restricted and disqualified from being
conferred the 2009 Order of National Artists
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse
of discretion committed by former President
Arroyo
RULING: YES.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists
on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno was an entirely different
matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias.86
There was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution when the former
President gave preferential treatment to
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno.1wphi1 The former Presidents
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws
and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of
the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of
National Artists proscribed her from having a
free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of
the said award. The manifest disregard of the
rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and
the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of
National Artists on said respondents was
therefore made with grave abuse of discretion
and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the
proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National
Artists, such action should not be taken as a
pronouncement on whether they are worthy to
be conferred that honor. Only the President,
upon the advise of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards, may determine that. The Court simply
declares that, as the former President committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6,
2009, the said proclamations are invalid.
However, nothing in this Decision should be
read as a disqualification on the part of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno to be considered for the honor of
National Artist in the future, subject to
compliance with the laws, rules and regulations
governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to
1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa, and
Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists
are declared INVALID and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
FOOTNOTE: (EQUAL PROTECTION)
The rational basis scrutiny is one of three tests
used by the Court to test compliance with the
equal protection clause. It is the minimal level of
scrutiny which requires that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a
legitimate State interest. It is used when the
government action is a type of discrimination
that does not warrant the intermediate and strict
levels of scrutiny. The intermediate or middle-
tier test requires the government to show that (1)
the challenged classification serves an important
State interest, and (2) the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest. It is
applied to suspect classifications like gender or
illegitimacy.
The most demanding is the strict scrutiny test
which requires the government to show that (1)
the challenged classification serves a compelling
State interest, and (2) the classification is
necessary to serve that interest. It is used in
classifications based on race, national origin,
religion alienage, denial of the right to vote,
access to courts and other rights recognized as
fundamental. (Bernas, Joaquin S.J., THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY [2009
edition], pp. 139-140).
RULING: (CASE DIGEST)
Political Law- equal protection
It should be recalled too that respondent
Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be
nominated for being the Executive Director of
the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa
and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary
shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of
them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno
fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and
established procedures, and placing respondents
in an exceptional position. The undue
classification was not germane to the purpose of
the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and
well-established guidelines, rules and
regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement
to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to
be given an equal opportunity to vie for that
honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a
violation of petitioner Abads right to equal
protection, an interest that is substantial enough
to confer him standing in this case.