1, [No. 1051. May 19, 1903.
] are imposed upon the people
THE UNITED STATES, complainant
and appellee, vs. FRED L. DORR ET
AL., defendants and appellants.
Facts:
The defendants have been
convicted upon a with the offense
of writing, publishing, and
circulating a scurrilous libel against
the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands.
The complaint appears to be
framed upon the theory that a
writing, in order to be punishable
as a libel under this section, must
be of a scurrilous nature and
directed against the Government of
the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine
Islands, and must, in addition, tend
to some one of the results
enumerated in section 8 of Act No.
292.
Issue:
What is meant in section 8 of Act
No. 292 by the expression "the
Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands?
Held:
"We understand, in modern
political science, * * * by the term
government, that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action
which are necessary to enable men
to live in a social state, or which
forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of
prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of
authorities which rule a society.
Administration is the aggregate of
those persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the
time being (the chief ministers or
heads of departments)." (Bouvier,
Law Dictionary, 891.)
But the terms "government" and
"administration" are not always
used in their strictness, and that
"government" is often used for
"administration"
The term "government" as
employed in Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine
Commission is used in the abstract
sense of the existing political
system as distinguished from the
concrete organism of the
Government.
2. G.R. No. 103982.December 11,
1992.*
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
Facts:
 Petitioner is a Director of NBI. He
was hospitalized for cholecystitis
the expenses of which he is
claiming from the COA. He
requested the reimbursement of
his expenses on the ground that he
is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the RAC.
COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo
denied petitioners claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC
has been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely
for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-
enacted in the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not the Administrative
Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
Held:
No. The non-restatement of the
same section mentioned according
to the Chairman is in the nature of
implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal
by implication.
1. Where provisions in the two acts on
the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act
to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it
will operate to repeal the earlier
law.
Implied repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency takes place when the
two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with
each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that
one law cannot be enforced
without nullifying the other.
Comparing the two Codes, it is
apparent that the new Code does
not cover nor attempt to cover the
entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters
treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, among
others is the claim for sickness
benefits under Section 699.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not
favored.
3. No. L-66614. January 25, 1988.*
PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA,
PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO,
petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Facts:
This case stemmed from 3
contracts of lease involving the
Civil Aeronautics Administration,
(public respondent-lessor)
representing the RP, Rosario
Leveriza, (petitioner-lessee) and
Mobil Oil Ph, private (respondent
sub-lessee). The subject matter of
the contracts is the same parcel of
land at the MIA area and such was
leased to two lessees for durations
of time which overlapped.
Contract A a lease contract of
April 2, 1965 between CAA and
Leveriza over the land for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract of
May 21, 1965 between Leveriza
and Mobil for the 25 years.
Contract C a lease contact of June
1, 1968 between CAA and Mobil for
25 years.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas
(lessees) entered into a contract of
sublease (Contract B) with Mobil
Oil Philippines without the consent
of CAA (lessor). Airport General
Manager, with the ratification of
the Director, cancelled contracts A
and B.
Petitioners Leverizas assailed the
validity of such cancellation,
claiming that the Airport General
Manager had no legal authority to
make the cancellation even if it has
been ratified by the Director.
Petitioners also contend that the
administrator of CAA cannot
execute without approval of the
President or the Department
Secretary of Public Works, a valid
contract of lease over real property
owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, citing Sections 567 and
568 of the Revised Administrative
Code
The Trial court declared the
cancellations were valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrator of
CAA can execute/cancel without
the approval of the Department
Secretary a valid contract of lease
over real property owned by the RP
as supported by Section 32 (par.
24) of the Republic Act 776.
Held:
Yes. The Director of the CAA does
not need the prior approval of the
President or the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications in the
execution of the Contracts of lease.
Under 567 of the Revised
Administrative Code, such contract
of lease must be executed:
(1) By the President of the
Philippines, or
(2) By an officer duly designated by
him or
(3) BY AN OFFICER EXPRESSLY
VESTED BY LAW.
As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the CAA has the power to
execute the deed or contract
involving leases of real properties
belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not because it is an
entity duly designated by the
President but because the said
authority to execute the same is,
by law expressly vested in it under
RA 776. The exception, however, is
the sale of properties acquired by
CAA or any other real properties of
the same which must have the
approval of the President of the
Philippines.
There is no dispute that the
Revised Administrative Code is a
general law while Republic Act 776
is a special law nor in the fact that
the real property subject of the
lease in Contract C is real
property belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines. General
legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject.
4. Luzon Development Bank vs.
Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees
G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995.*
Facts:
From a submission agreement of
the Luzon Development Bank (LDB)
and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case
of whether or not the company has
violated the CBA. The parties
agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers to a
Voluntary Arbitrator.
Without LDBs Position Paper, the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
decision in favor of ALDBE.
Hence, this petition seeking to set
aside the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.
Issue:
What is the nature of a voluntary
arbitrator and where should the
appeals from a voluntary arbitrator
be filed?
Held:
Quasi-judicial Nature
A voluntary arbitrator by the
nature of her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity. Under
these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys
in law the status of a quasi-judicial
agency but independent of, and
apart from, the NLRC since his
decisions are not appealable to the
latter.
An instrumentality such as a
Voluntary Arbitrator, is anything
used as a means or agency. The
terms governmental agency or
instrumentality are means by
which a government acts, or by
which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word
instrumentality, with respect to a
state contemplates an authority to
which the state delegates
governmental power for the
performance of a state function.
The voluntary arbitrator no less
performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated
to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he
falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term
instrumentality in the
aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The
fact that his functions and powers
are provided for in the Labor Code
does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he
is a quasi-judicial instrumentality
as contemplated therein.
The Decision or Award of
voluntary arbitrator should be
appealed with the CA.
Presently, Labor Arbiters decisions
are appealed to the NLRC,
however, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal
from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator. Past practice shows that
a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is elevated to the
Supreme Court itself on a petition
for certiorari, in effect equating the
voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC
or the Court of Appeals.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals
shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities
5. G.R. No. 102976. October 25,
1995.*
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA
FERTILIZER CORPORATION,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority
(ISA) was created by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 272 in order to
develop and promote the iron and
steel industry in the Philippines.
That among others, it has the
power to initiate expropriation
proceedings.
Petitioner ISA commenced eminent
domain proceedings against
private respondent Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), the
occupant of certain portions of
public land in Iligan.
The case proceeded to trial. While
the trial was ongoing, however, the
statutory existence of petitioner
ISA expired on 11 August 1988.
MCFC then filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered
against ISA which had ceased to be
a juridical person. Petitioner ISA
filed its opposition to this motion.
In the alternative, petitioner ISA
urged that the Republic of the
Philippines, being the real party-in-
interest, should be allowed to be
substituted for petitioner ISA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be
substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISAs term.
Held:
Yes. The expiration of ISAs
statutory term did not by itself
require or justify the dismissal of
the eminent domain proceedings. It
should also be noted that the
enabling statute of ISA expressly
authorized it to enter into certain
kinds of contracts for and in behalf
of the Government
We consider that the ISA is properly
regarded as an agent or delegate
of the Republic of the Philippines.
The Republic itself is a body
corporate and juridical person
vested with the full panoply of
powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as legal
personality.
When the statutory term of a non-
incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of
that agency revert back to, and are
re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof to
some other identified successor
agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The Republic may initiate or
participate in actions involving its
agents
6. G.R. No. 145972. March 23,
2004.*
IGNACIA BALICAS, petitioner, vs.
FACT-FINDING & INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Balicas a senior
environmental management
specialist (SEMS) of the DENR,
together with several officials from
HLURB and DENR, was charged
with gross negligence with the
Ombudsman after a tragic
landslide happened in Cherry Hills
Subdivision (CHS). The charge
against petitioner involved a
supposed failure on her part to
monitor and inspect the
development of CHS, which was
assumed to be her duty as DENR
SEMS assigned in the province of
Rizal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner
should be held liable.
Held:
No. In order to ascertain if there
had been gross neglect of duty, we
have to look at the lawfully
prescribed duties of petitioner.
Unfortunately, DENR regulations
are silent on the specific duties of a
senior environmental management
specialist. Internal regulations
merely speak of the functions of
the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
to which petitioner directly reports.
Based from the letter of the Chief
of Personnel which defines the
duties of a SEMS, the monitoring
duties mainly deal with broad
environmental concerns,
particularly pollution abatement.
This general monitoring duty is
applicable to all types of physical
developments that may adversely
impact on the environment,
whether housing projects,
industrial sites, recreational
facilities, or scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific
monitoring duty is imposed on the
HLURB as the sole regulatory body
for housing and land development.
It is mandated to encourage
greater private sector participation
in low-cost housing through (1)
liberalization of development
standards, (2) simplification of
regulations and (3) decentralization
of approvals for permits and
licenses.
The legal duty to monitor housing
projects, like the Cherry Hills
Subdivision, against calamities Issue:
such as landslides due to
continuous rain, is clearly placed Whether or not the restraining
on the HLURB, not on the petitioner order and injunctions issued by the
as PENRO senior environmental court bind the defendant.
management specialist. In fact, the Held:
law imposes no clear and direct
duty on petitioner to perform such Yes. P.D. 1818 was not intended to
narrowly defined monitoring shield from judicial scrutiny
function. irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as
the anomalies committed in the
case at bar. Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not
improperly issued by the
respondent judge and the writ of
7. Malagas vs. Penachos, Jr. preliminary injunction should not
have been denied.
G.R. No. 86695. September 3,
1992.* The 1987 Administrative Code
defines a government
Facts:
instrumentality as follows:
The petitioners filed a complaint
Instrumentality refers to any
against the chairman and members
agency of the National
of PBAC on the ground that they
Government, not integrated within
refused without just cause their
the department framework, vested
requirements for bidding. As a
with special functions or
result, they were not included in
jurisdiction by law, endowed with
the list of prequalified bidders,
some if not all corporate powers,
could not secure the needed plans
administering special funds, and
and other documents, and were
enjoying operational autonomy,
unable to participate in the
usually through a charter.
scheduled bidding. A restraining
order prohibiting PBAC from Chartered institutionrefers to any
conducting the bidding and agency organized or operating
awarding the project was then under a special charter, and vested
issued. by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or
The defendants filed a motion to lift
objectives. This term includes the
the restraining order on the ground
state universities and colleges, and
that the Court was prohibited from
the monetary authority of the
issuing restraining orders,
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
preliminary injunctions and
Provisions). It is clear from the
preliminary mandatory injunctions
above definitions that ISCOF is a
by P.D. 1818.
chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
What is involved here is non-
compliance with the procedural
rules on bidding which required
strict observance. The purpose of
the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is
to secure competitive bidding and
to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these
contracts to the detriment of the
public. This purpose was defeated
by the irregularities committed by
PBAC.
8. Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 111091. August 21, 1995.*
Facts:
On 1 October 1989, the Chemical
Mineral Division of the Industrial
Technology Development Institute
(ITDI), a component of the
Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) employed
Petitioner under a written contract
of services as Project Manager to
supervise the construction of the
ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the
DOST Compound in Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. The contract
was from October 1, 1989 up to the
end of the construction period
unless sooner terminated.
Petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with a violation of
Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019 as
amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. After trial on the merits, the
Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present petition, the
petitioner insisted that
Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to
his person as he is not a public
officer because he was neither
elected nor appointed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner
should be deemed as a public
officer.
Held:
Yes. Petitioner misconstrues the
definition of public officer in R.A.
No. 3019 which, according to Sec.
2(b) thereof includes elective and
appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether
in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from
the government. . . . The word
includes used in defining a public
officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that
the definition is not restrictive. The
terms classified, unclassified or
exemption service were the old
categories of positions in the civil
service which have been
reclassified into Career Service and
Non-Career Service by PD 807
providing for the organization of
the Civil Service Commission and
by the Administrative Code of
1987.
From the foregoing classification, it
is quite evident that petitioner falls
under the non-career service
category (formerly termed the
unclassified or exemption service)
of the Civil Service and thus is a
public officer as defined by Sec.
2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).a