Supreme Steel v.

Nagkakaisang Manggagawa

G.R. No. 185556 : March 28, 2011.

SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NAGKAKAISANG

MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-IND-
APL), Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

On July 27, 2005, respondent filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground that petitioner
violated certain provisions of the CBA. The parties failed to settle their dispute.
Consequently, the Secretary of Labor certified the case to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.

Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations, enumerated as follows: (1) denial to

four employees of the CBA- provided wage increase, (2) contracting-out labor,
(3) failure to provide shuttle service, (4) refusal to answer for medical expenses
incurred by three employees, (5) failure to comply with time-off provision, (6)
visitors free access to company premises, (7) failure to comply with reporting
time-off provision, (8) dismissal of an employee supposedly due to disease, (9)
denial of paternity leave benefit to two employees, (10) discrimination and
harassment, and (11) non-implementation of COLA in Wage Order Nos. RBIII-
10 and 11.

Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent, eight were decided in its favor;
two (denial of paternity leave benefit and discrimination of union members)
were decided in favor of petitioner; while the issue on visitors free access to
company premises was deemed settled during the mandatory conference.
Petitioners appeal to the CA was dismissed.

According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding that it violated certain provisions of the
CBA.With regard to wage increase, The CA concluded that, based on the
wording of the CBA, which uses the words "general increase" and "over and
above," it cannot be said that the parties have intended the anniversary increase
to be given in lieu of the CBA wage increase. The CA declared that the
withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the employees
who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits
because such grant has already ripened into a company practice. Based on the
principle of liberal construction of the CBA, the CA likewise sustained the
NLRCs rulings on theissues pertaining to medical expenses, the shuttle service,
time-off for attendance in grievance meetings/hearings, and time-off due to
brownouts. Finally, the CA affirmed the NLRCs finding that Madayags
dismissal was illegal. It emphasized that the burden to prove that the employees
disease is of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within a period
of six months rests on the employer, who failed to prove such.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC

HELD:

The petition is partially granted.

LABOR LAW: Construing CBA provisions; diminution of benefits.

It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law
between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy
of the law. If the terms of aCBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
prevail. Moreover, the CBA must be construed liberally rather than narrowly
and technically and the Court must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it. Any doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor
should be resolved in favor of labor. Upon these well-established precepts, the
CAs findings and conclusions on all the issues are sustained, except the issue
pertaining to the denial of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 and 11 to
the employees who are not minimum wage earners, which respondent avers as a
diminution of benefits.
Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits
already enjoyed by the employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is
shown that:

(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice
over a long period of time;
(2) the practice is consistent and deliberate;
(3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law; and
(4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.

The implementation of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 across the
board, which only lasted for less than a year, cannot be considered as having
been practiced "over a long period of time."

While it is true that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a
specific minimum number of years in order for a practice to be considered as a
voluntary act of the employer, under existing jurisprudence on this matter, an
act carried out within less than a year would certainly not qualify as such.
Hence, the withdrawal of the COLA Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the
salaries of non-minimum wage earners did not amount to a "diminution of
benefits" under the law.
 GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs GMI

G.R. No. 183122, June 15, 2011

FACTS:

On 28 April 1989, GMC and the Union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which provided, among other terms, the latters
representation of the collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to
retroact to 1 December 1988.

On 29 November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA, the
Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for counter-proposals
from the latter.

In view of GMCs failure to comply with said request, the Union commenced
the complaint for unfair labor practice which was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal, said dismissal was reversed and set aside in the 30 January 1998
decision rendered by the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision dated December 21, 1993 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE
and a new one issued ordering the imposition upon the respondent company of
the complainant union[s] draft CBA proposal for the remaining two years
duration of the original CBA which is from December 1, 1991 to November 30,
1993
SO ORDERED.

Since the abovementioned decision was reconsidered and set aside by the
NLRC, the Union filed the petitions for certiorari before the CA, which in turn
reversed and set aside the NLRCs resolution and reinstated the aforesaid 30
January 1998 decision. Aggrieved by the CAs resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, GMC elevated the case to this Court via the petition for review
on certiorari. In a decision dated 11 February 2004 rendered by the Courts then
Second Division, the CAs 30 January 1998 decision and 26 October 2000
resolution were affirmed,12 upon the following findings and conclusions, to
wit:

GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the

union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union.
Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the worker, was
mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.

We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter proposal to the unions proposal
for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did
not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union,
there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the

unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it
liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of
unfair labor practice.

(I)t would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions
contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs employees
for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not inclined to
gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying
tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to
bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the
terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
xxxx
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor
controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an
erring party should not be allowed with impunity to schemes feigning
negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposing on GMC the
provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of
equity and fair play were properly served and both the parties regained equal
footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic
terms of the CBA.
With the ensuing finality of the foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution dated 21 March 2005, to enforce the claims of
the covered employees which it computed in the sum of P433,786,786.36 and to
require GMC to produce said employees time cards for the purpose of
computing their overtime pay, night shift differentials and labor standard
benefits for work rendered on rest days, legal holidays and special holidays.
GMC filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the imposed CBA has full force and effect considering that it was
not agreed upon by the Union and GMC.

HELD:

Concerning its period of effectivity

Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that "this Agreement shall be in full
force and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December 1991, provided
that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third year of effectivity hereof, the
parties shall open negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth years
effectivity of this Agreement."

Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by
GMC and the Union, we find that the CA correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 02226 that, pursuant to

Article 253 of the Labor Code, the provisions of the imposed CBA
continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA has been entered
into by the parties.

Article 253 mandates the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. In the same manner that it does not
provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of
the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect, the law does not
distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed
CBA like the one under consideration.