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TODD MAY
Department of Philosophy, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-0528, USA
(E-mail: mayt@clemson.edu)
Abstract. Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most
of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with
Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently
across the trajectory of Deleuzes work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead
one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuzes work, and specifi-
cally in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings
that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of
the concept in general.
clearly the philosophical strides that his use of the term in the later works
makes.
What I propose to do is this. I will start by spending a moment on what
Deleuze takes philosophy in general and philosophical concepts in particular
to be about. The reason for this is that the role that concepts play for him is
linked to his general and idiosyncratic view of what philosophy is about,
so it is worth considering it, even if briefly, before turning to a particular con-
cept. Then I will discuss the notion of becoming in the earlier works. There,
it will become clear why I have asked the question when is a becoming?
rather than what is a becoming? Finally, I will turn to the later works, among
them the tenth of the thousand plateaus, in order to see how the concept of
becoming functions.
Although many readers of Deleuze are at least broadly familiar with his
view of philosophy as laid out in What is Philosophy? it is worth recalling it
at the outset of any discussion of a Deleuzian concept. This is because what
Deleuze is doing when he does philosophy, and creates concepts, is so differ-
ent from what most philosophers do, that without his metaphilosophy in
hand, it is easy to become disoriented. For Deleuze (and Guattari), then, phi-
losophy is not a matter of description or explanation. Philosophy does not
consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like
Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine its success or failure.2
Philosophy is, in a word, practical and normative. It is a practice whose point
is not that of getting the right take on things but of making a contribution to
our living. Specifically, that contribution is made in the areas of the interest-
ing, the remarkable and the important.
It may seem as though the ideas of the interesting and the remarkable have
more in common with each other than either does with the important. This is
because the interesting and the remarkable are bound up with novelty and
difference, whereas the important is not. While this may be true in general,
that distinction is insignificant for Deleuze, since he thinks it is of central
philosophical importance both to recognize and to create novelty and differ-
ence. The history of philosophy and of philosophical activity has been tied too
closely to a project of promoting identity and sameness and of marginalizing
difference. The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in
philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the repressors role. . . . Phi-
losophy is shot through with the project of becoming the official language of a
Pure State. The exercise of thought thus conforms to the goals of the real State,
to the dominant meanings and to the requirements of the established order.3
Thus, if philosophy is to do anything of real importance, it will have to cut loose
from its history and align itself with the interesting and the remarkable.
WHEN IS A DELEUZIAN BECOMING? 141
How is philosophy to align itself with the interesting, the remarkable, and
the important? According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy does that sim-
ply by doing philosophy. And what is it to do philosophy? To create concepts
on planes of immanence. Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism
has two qualitatively different aspects: the creation of concepts and the lay-
ing out of a plane (WP, pp. 3536).4 Understanding what a concept is and
what a plane is will allow us to understand what it is to do philosophy, and
how it is that philosophy embraces the interesting, the remarkable, and the
important. In addition, it will allow us to return to the concept of becoming
with the appropriate background, having in hand both what it is for something
to be a Deleuzian concept and what it is he is trying to do by creating them.
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari isolate three central features
of concepts: relatedness to other concepts, internal consistency, and conden-
sation of its internal components (WP, pp. 1921). Let me take these in re-
verse order. For Deleuze and Guattari, a concept is composed of components,
which they call intensities or singularities. These intensities are, of course,
pre-conceptual, since they form concepts rather than being formed by them.
A relevant example of an intensity is offered by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense.
If we consider language in a Saussurean terms, in which its components terms
are defined by their differences from one another, we can think of these dif-
ferences not merely as oppositions but as positive differences, as pre-con-
ceptual differences that are constitutive of the content of the terms. These
differences are pre-conceptual components of the terms they constitute; they
are intensities. The role of concepts is to condense these intensities together
in a particular way, to make them circulate after a particular fashion.
In condensing intensities, concepts bring them together into a certain kind
of unity. When separate intensities come together as components of a concept,
they lose their character as separate intensities and merge into the unity of the
concept. For example, in the concept of the other person, the possible world
does not exist outside the face that expresses it, although it is distinguished
from it as expressed and expression; and the face in turn is the vicinity of the
words for which it is already the megaphone (WP, p. 19).
Finally, at the level of concepts rather than their pre-conceptual components,
concepts are related to other concepts just as linguistic units are related to other
linguistic units in the Saussurean view of language. Concepts are not formed
and do not exist on their own. They are part of a system, and in two senses.
First, new concepts are molded from already existing ones. One does not cre-
ate a concept out of nothing, but out of a context of concepts which (a) forms
the soil from which a new concept emerges and (b) is the foil with and against
which the new concept takes its significance. Second, in the formation of a
142 TODD MAY
In this passage, Deleuze presents four ideas which remain at the heart of his
articulation of becoming that becoming is the final reality (there is no be-
ing beyond becoming); that becoming is aligned with multiplicity (. . . noth-
ing beyond multiplicity); that becoming, although the final reality, is not a
transcendent reality (neither are there . . . realities..beyond appearance); and
that becoming is the affirmation of being.
The first idea is that becoming is the final reality. Traditionally, philoso-
phers, particularly philosophers of a metaphysical bent, have sought some-
thing stable as the bedrock of philosophical reflection. Platos Good, Descartes
God (or is it his I?), Kants transcendental unity of apperception, Hegels Ab-
solute are all examples of concepts where philosophical reflection seeks to
come to rest in a stable unity. Deleuzes term being refers at least in the
first of the two Heraclitean thoughts he is developing to these stable uni-
ties. And he rejects the traditional philosophical commitment to them. How-
ever, this rejection is not a straightforward one. He substitutes another concept
becoming which in one sense must occupy the role that being used to
play and in another sense must play a very different role. The reason for the
former is that becoming is, as being was, that reality behind which there is no
other reality. The reason for the latter is that he is clearly rejecting the philo-
sophical use to which that final reality has been put. The way in which be-
coming occupies the place of being is given in the second idea in the passage
we are discussing; the way in which it subverts it is given in both the second
and third ideas.
The affinity of becoming and multiplicity is developed in Difference and
Repetition and The Logic of Sense. It leads directly into some of the most
important and difficult thoughts in Deleuzian ontology, and would take an
entire book to explicate adequately. I can here only present Deleuzes ontol-
ogy enough to highlight the central aspects of the concept of becoming, those
144 TODD MAY
ing its point in the present the entirety of the past exists, but in more or less
contracted state.
On this view, time is not a psychological matter that belongs to a single
individual. Rather, it is an ontological matter that lives itself through individu-
als psychologically. Deleuze summarizes the moments of this time: There is
only one time (monism), although there is an infinity of actual fluxes (gener-
alized pluralism), that necessarily participates in the same virtual whole (lim-
ited pluralism) (B, p. 82).
The content of the past, which exists virtually in the present, is difference
in itself. It is not difficult to see why, for Deleuze at least, this must be so. If
the content of the past were to consist in certain identities, then their nature as
identities would have to be modeled on some original form from which they
would draw their character as identities. (An insult in the past would be so in
virtue of displaying insultness, which would imply an insultness apart
from the specific insult in question the Platonic move.) These original forms
would not themselves be in time, since the contents in time would be copies
of them; rather, they would be the model for the content of what is in time.
This would imply that the content of time is doubled in a transcendent non-
time that forms the model for times content. These moves identities as copies
modeled on an original, existence doubled in a founding transcendent reality
are central to the type of philosophy Deleuze is trying to overcome. They
form the basis for stabilizing reality so that stranger and more compromis-
ing adventures do not take place. They are Platos Forms, Descartes God,
Kants transcendental I. Thus the content of time, since it cannot come in the
form of identities or samenesses, must be difference. Moreover, that differ-
ence is not a difference that occurs negatively as a not-sameness or not-iden-
tity, since identities and sameness do not exist in the pure duration of time.
So it must be difference in itself. And since every moment contains all of the
past, every moment repeats this difference in itself, even while stable identi-
ties are being produced within it.
What does this discussion of difference and time have to do with becom-
ing and its affinity with multiplicity? Everything. First, if we think of being
in the first Heraclitean sense, as opposed to becoming, then the above sum-
mary shows how, for Deleuze, there is no being that can serve as the stable
model or unity founding what exists. There is only the unfolding of differ-
ence in time. Difference lies beneath and within the passing identities to which
it gives rise. Being in the first Heraclitean sense stands for everything which
plays the role of a stabilizing identity. Deleuzes analysis of difference and
time undercuts that role. Second, if we equate multiplicity and difference
and Deleuzes texts do so constantly then we can say that what exists is the
WHEN IS A DELEUZIAN BECOMING? 147
unfolding of difference or multiplicity. What shall we call this unfolding?
Becoming. Becoming is the unfolding of difference in time and as time. In
the second Heraclitean sense of being, becoming is the being of being. It is
what occupies the place that is occupied in traditional philosophies by being
in the first Heraclitean sense, although that place now plays a different role,
one of instability and play rather than stability and sameness. Deleuze indi-
cates as much in Difference and Repetition, when, in the course of a discus-
sion of how simulacra always threaten to disrupt the stability of Platonic
models, he says:
At this point, it should be clear why the question I have posed here is not what
is a becoming? but when is a becoming? Although in some sense I have
given a preliminary characterization of becoming as the unfolding of differ-
ence in time, to think of a becoming as a what threatens to reduce it to the
stability of an identity. That is precisely the kind of move Deleuze is trying to
avoid. Being as difference is a virtually existent pure duration whose unfold-
ing we can call becoming, but only on the understanding that the difference
which becomes is not specific something or set of somethings, but the chaos
which produces all somethings.
We have spent the last several pages considering the second idea articu-
lated in the passage on Heraclitus. In doing so, the basis has been laid for an
articulation of the third idea: that there is nothing beyond appearance, no tran-
scendent reality. It might seem, at first glance, that since becoming occupies
the role allotted to being in traditional philosophy, that becoming might pos-
sess the transcendent status that being possesses in many traditional philoso-
phies. However, for Deleuze both difference and becoming are immanent to
our reality. They do not lie elsewhere, but here. Deleuze writes of his posi-
tion, which he calls transcendental empiricism, Empiricism truly becomes
transcendental . . . only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which
can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential dif-
ference, and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity
(DR, pp. 5657). The difference that produces qualitative diversity the dif-
ferent stable identities of conscious experience lies within the sensible, within
148 TODD MAY
appearance, not outside of it. This is because the present carries the past and
its difference within it, as a constitutive moment, rather than existing sepa-
rately.
Deleuze marks this immanence with his use of the term virtual to describe
differences mode of existing. The virtual is not the possible. The possible is
that which does not exist but might; it is modeled on the real, parasitic upon
it, but is not real. It is the real minus existence. If I think of a fence that I want
to build, a white picket fence, that fence is possible, although not real. (One
might say that it is a real thought; fair enough, but its only a possible fence.)
In contrast, the virtual is real, it exists (sometimes Deleuze uses the term sub-
sists), but has a wholely different character from that which we consciously
experience, which Deleuze calls the actual. The virtual is opposed not to
the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real insofar as it is virtual (DR,
p. 208). The movement of becoming, then, is not a movement from a tran-
scendent reality (one that is merely possible in terms of our own reality) to its
realization, but a movement from the virtual to its actualization.13 Descartes
God as creator and sustainer of the earth and its beings is an example of the
first; Spinozas God as the substance which expresses itself in its modes and
attributes is an example of the second.14
We can now see more clearly how becoming, although in some sense oc-
cupying the place of being, also plays a very different role. In discussing the
second idea from the passage on Heraclitus, I pointed out that becoming con-
trasts with being in its founding instability and play. Now we can see as well
that that instability and play is not given to us from outside our own reality
but is constitutive of that reality. It works from the inside, producing reality
from within reality, rather than creating it from elsewhere.
The fourth idea in the passage on Heraclitus is that becoming is the affir-
mation of being. Here again, we need to take the term being in the second
Heraclitean sense, not as a matter of stable identities but as a matter of what-
ever it is that founds those identities. If becoming is the affirmation of being,
it is the affirmation of difference in itself, of a pure difference that is not re-
ducible to the identities, the actualities, that present themselves to us.15
We have arrived at an understanding of the concept of becoming as it ap-
pears in Deleuzes philosophy before the collaborative works with Guattari.
It is a concept that brings together difference in itself, time, and virtuality. It
is a concept by means of which one jettisons traditional philosophys search
for stable identities and allows oneself to see things by means of instability,
play, and ceaseless creativity.
Before discussing becoming in Deleuzes later work with Guattari, let me
pause a moment over how the concept becoming fulfills the role of philoso-
WHEN IS A DELEUZIAN BECOMING? 149
phy in a Deleuzian sense. Recall that the philosopher, for Deleuze, is the one
who creates concepts on a plane of immanence in order to embrace or pro-
mote or create the remarkable, the interesting, and the important. The crea-
tion of the concept of becoming fulfills this role. First, it is a concept: it brings
together the preconceptual singularities or intensities of difference in itself
into a (partial) whole that articulates in a specific way these singularities or
intensities. It occurs on a plane of immanence that is also populated by other
concepts to which it is related virtuality, difference in itself, etc. And it pro-
motes a way of seeing reality that diverges from the traditional view, and, in
the form of specific becomings that will be discussed briefly below, opens onto
other ways of seeing, thinking, and acting in the world.
In turning to the collaborative works, we may notice a difference in the way
the term becoming is used. My discussion so far has focussed on becoming
simpliciter, whereas in the later works there are mostly various becomings of
specific types: becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible.
Part of the reason for this seeming difference has been the focus of my own
articulation. In fact, the earlier works do refer to specific becomings: becom-
ing-mad, for instance, appears in both Difference and Repetition and The Logic
of Sense. However, the specific becomings of these works are grounded in the
general concept of becoming, with all of the conceptual implications I have
been discussing.
This is also true, although less obviously, of the collaborative works with
Guattari. Although I do not want to discuss specific becomings in detail, I do
want to say enough about them to cite the continuity between becomings and
the concept of becoming.
The most important point of connection is that specific becomings affirm
the nature of becoming. They are affirmations in the sense that they call us
back to the becoming of difference as the fundamental non-ground of specific
identities. In order to see how this is so, I want to focus on a specific aspect of
becoming, becoming-minor.
The concept of a minority, and thus becoming-minor is a complex one, since
the term minority invites a misunderstanding. Minorities, as Deleuze and
Guattari use the term, are not specific groups of people. Rather, they are fluid
movements of creativity that subvert the dominant, i.e., majoritarian, identi-
ties our current arrangements bestow upon us. When we say majority, we
are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the determination of a
state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest,
can be said to be minoritarian. . .Majority implies a state of domination, not
the reverse.16 Minority, in turn, implies a subversion of the domination of the
majority by a creation that explodes it from within. Kafkas literature is, in
150 TODD MAY
One is then like grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything, into
a becoming, because one has made a necessarily communicating world, be-
cause one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us from slip-
ping in between things and growing in the midst of things. One has combined
everything: the indefinite article, the infinitive-becoming, and the proper
name to which one is reduced. Saturate, eliminate, put everything in (ATP,
p. 280).
Notes