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[1972]UKHL1(16February1972)
URL:http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1972/1.html
Citeas:[1972]2WLR537,[1972]UKHL1,[1972]AC877,[1972]1AllER749

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JISCBAILII_CASE_TORT

DieMercurii,16Februarii 1972

ParliamentaryArchives,

HL/PO/JU/4/3/1219

HOUSEOFLORDS

BRITISHRAILWAYSBOARD

v .

HERRINGTON (A.P.)(aninfantbyhisMotherandnextfriend)

LordReid
LordMorrisof
BorthyGest
Lord

Wilberforce
LordPearson
LordDiplock

LordReid

mylords,
On7thJune1965theRespondent,thenachildofsixyearsold,was
playingwithotherchildrenonNationalTrustpropertyatMitchamwhich
isopentothepublic.ImmediatelyadjoiningthispropertytheAppellants
haveanelectrified railway lineafewyardsfromtheboundary.Their
boundaryismarkedbyafencewhich,ifithadbeeningoodrepair,would
havesufficedtopreventtheRespondentfromreachingthe railway line.But
itwasinverybadrepairsothatwhentheRespondentstrayedawayfrom
hisplaymateshewasabletogetthroughoroverit.Hethenwentafew

yardsfartherandcameincontactwiththeliveelectrifiedrail.Fortunately
hewasrescuedbuthehadalreadysustainedsevereinjury.Hisagewas

suchthathewasunabletoappreciatethedangerofgoingontothe railway
lineandprobablyunabletoappreciatethathewasdoingwrongingetting
overthefence.
IhavenodoubtthatiftheAppellantsowedtopotentialchildtrespassers
anydutyofcaretotakestepsfortheirsafety,theywereinbreachofany
suchduty.Enquirysoonaftertheaccidentshowedthatthiswasbyno
meanstheonlyplacewheretheirfencewasdefectiveandawelltrodden
trackleadingtothepointwheretheRespondentgotontotheirproperty
showedthataconsiderablenumberoftrespassersmusthavecrossedtheline
atthispointtootherNationalTrustpropertyontheotherside.The
Appellantslednoevidenceatthetrialanditcannotbeinferredthatthey
knewaboutthesetrespassersbeforetheaccident.Theonlyevidenceof
theirknowledgewasareportproducedbythemwhichshowedthatthey
knewthatafewweeksbeforetheaccidentsomechildrenhadbeenseen
onthelineatsomepointnotveryfaraway.Butinmyviewtheevidence
wassufficienttoshoweitherthattherewasnosystematicinspectionoftheir
fenceorthatiftherewasanysystemitwasnotoperatedorenforced.
TheAppellants'maincontentionisthattheyowednodutytothischild.
TheyfoundontheleadingcaseofAddie&Sons v .Dumbreck[1929]A.C.
358.TheRespondentfoundsonlaterauthoritiesandasksustoreconsider
Addie'scaseifitcannotbedistinguished.HeisentitledtosaythatAddie's
casehasfrequentlybeencriticised.Iwellrememberthatthisdecision,which
reversedthedecisionoftheCourtofSession,wasmuchcriticisedinScotland
atthetime.Butnoonedoubtedthatithadsettledthelaw.Andithas
alwaysbeensaidtohavebeenfollowedbothinEnglandandinScotland,
althoughitisnoteasytoreconcilewithitmuchthathasbeensaidin
recentcases.
ThespeechesinAddie'scasemustbereadinthelightofthefactswhich
aresetoutin1928SessionCases.LordPresidentClydesaid,afterstating
thattheboywasatrespasser,"ontheotherhand,hewasamemberofa
"classofpersonstowit,thelocalcommunityofworkingclassresidents
"ofallageswho,totheknowledgeofthedefenders,wereinthehabitof
"resortingtothefield(1)asanopenspace(2)asaplayground(3)as
"ameansofaccesstochapeland railway stationand(4)asregardsthe
"lesswelldisposedmembersofthelocalcommunityasameansofapproach
"tothedefenders'coalbingandwooddepotforpurposesofdepredation.
"Againstthelatterclassthedefenderstooktheusualmeansoflegalpro
"tectionbyfrequentprosecutionsfortheft.Againsttheformerclassthey
"tooknomeasuresofakindcalculatedtobeeffectiveandtheyknewthat
"suchmeasuresastheydidtakewerequiteineffectualtocheckthehabitual

"resortofbothadultsandchildrentothefieldandtotheimmediateneigh
"bourhoodofthehaulagesystem."(page553).Then,havingsaidthatifthe
presenceofatrespassernearadangerousmachineisknowntotheproprietor
hecannotdisregardthat,hewenton:"Iamunabletodistinguishthat
"casefromthecaseinwhichtheproprietorknowsofthehabitualresort
"ofadultsorchildren,orboth,tothenearneighbourhoodofthedangerous
"machineahabitofresortwhichmakesittohisknowledgelikelythatone
"ormoreofsuchpersonsmaybeatthemachinewhenheappliesthe
"motivepower."(page554).Laterhesaid:"Theintrusionofthelocal
"publicuponthedefenders'fieldandthesiteoftheirhaulagesystemin
"thepresentcaseseemstometohavebeenverysimilartotheusebythe
"localpublicofanunauthorisedshortcutinLowery v .Walker[1911]
"A.C.10."(page555).
ThespeechesinthisHouseinAddie'scaseappeartometobeintended
tolaydownageneralrulethatnooccupierisunderanydutytopotential
trespassers,whetheradultsorchildren,todoanythingtoprotectthemfrom
dangeronhislandhoweverlikelyitmaybethattheywillcomeandrun
intodangerandhoweverlethalthedangermaybe.Ifinditimpossibleto
reconcilethesespeecheswithanyideathattheoccupierwillincuranyduty
ofcaretotrespassersbycarryingoutdangerousoperationsonhislandeven
whenheknowsthattrespassersareverylikelytocomeontohislandand
thatiftheycometheseoperationsmaycausetheminjury.Ifheknowsthat
trespassersarealreadyonhislandthenforthefirsttimehedoesincura
dutybutitisadutyofaverylimitedkindadutynottoactwithreckless
disregardoftheirsafety.
Therewasnothingnowinthat.Buttherulewaslaiddownwithstark
simplicityandthespeechesmusthavebeenintendedtocheckagrowing
tendencyofcourtsbothinEnglandandScotlandtotrytosoftenitsimpact.
Nobleandlearnedlordsappeartohavehadinmindthatoccupiersare
entitledtoknowpreciselywhattheirdutiesareandnothingcouldbesimpler
thantheanswerwhichtheygave.
Buttherewerealreadytwoexceptionstothisrule.Thefirstwaswhere
theoccupierhadputonhislandsomethingwhichwasdangerousandwas
anallurementtochildren.Thatseemstometobeeasytoexplain.He
oughttoknowthatbyputtingthatallurementtherehewasinasense
invitingchildrentomeddlewiththedangerousthing,andthelawwouldnot
permithimtodothatwithoutimposingadutyonhim.Hisliabilityarose
fromhisownchoicetoendangerchildreninthatway.
Thesecondexceptionisnotsoeasytoexplain.If,afteracertainpoint
noteasytodefine,theoccupiercontinuedtostandbyandacquiesceinthe
comingoftrespassershewasheldtohavegivenageneralpermissionor
licencetotrespasserstocontinuetodowhatthosetrespassershadbeendoing.
Any"licence"ofthiskindwaspurelyfictitious.Therewasnoneedtofind
anyevidencethathehadinfactconsentedtothecomingofthetrespassers
ortothecontinuanceofthetrespassing.Hisinactioninsufferingthe
trespassingmighthavebeenduetomanyotherreasonsthanhisbeingwilling
toallowit.Hemightprovethattherewassomeotherreasonbutthat
wouldnotavailhim.
TheCourtofSessiondecidedAddie'scaseonthegroundthatthechild
wasalicensee.On(hethencurrenttrendofauthorityIthinktheywere
wellentitledtodoso.ButthisHousethoughtotherwiseanditappears
tomethattheirdecisionmustberegardedasanattempttoconfinethe
doctrineoflicencewithinmuchnarrowerlimitsthanhadbeencustomary.

LatercasescanhardlybesaidtoexhibitloyalacceptanceoftheAddie
doctrine.InExcelsiorWireRopeCo. v .Callan[1930]A.C.404thisHouse
givingextemporejudgmentsdismissedanappealbytheoccupierwithout
hearingtheRespondent.Therecannothavebeenanyintentiontomodify
theconsideredjudgmentsinAddie'scase,anditisperhapsalittlesurprising
thattheHousewasablesoeasilytoreachadifferentconclusion.Icanonly
regardthedecisioninCallan'scaseasfounded,rightlyorwronglyonthe
particularfactsofthecase.EncouragedbythedecisioninCallan'scase
 3

theCourtofAppealwereabletodecideagainsttheoccupierinMourton v .
Poulter[1930]2K.B.183.InAdams v .Naylor[1944]K.B.750therewas
adifferenceofopinionintheCourtofAppeal.ScottL.J.decidedagainst
theoccupierongroundsthatarenoteasytostatesuccinctly.MackinnonL.J.
andMortonJ.reluctantlyfollowedAddie.
IneednotnoticeanyothercasesuntilEdwards v . Railway Executive
[1952]A.C.737.Therepersistenttrespassingbychildrenimposednoduty
onthe Railway tokeepthemoutorprotectthem.IthinkLordGoddard
accuratelystatedthelawwhenhesaid"repeatedtrespassofitselfconfersno
"licence...tofindalicencetheremustbeevidenceeitherofexpress
"permissionorthatthelandownerhassoconductedhimselfthathecannot
"beheardtosaythathedidnotgiveit"
SofarAddiestood,dislikedbutessentiallyunshaken.Anewchapter
openedwithVidean v . British TransportCommission[1963]2Q.B.650.A
stationmaster'schildstrayedontothe railway andwasrunover.Itwas
rightlyheldthatthechildwasatrespasserandthattheauthoritywerenot
liable.ButsomeobiterdictaofLordDenningM.R.appeartometobe
directlycontrarytothedecisionofthisHouseinAddie'scase.Neverthe
less,theyhaveattractedmuchsupportinsubsequentcases.Havingpointed
outthatforchildtrespassersinnocentofanywickedintenttherulein
Addie'scaseworksmostunfairly,hesaid:"Hencetheshiftstowhich
"generationsofjudgeshavebeenputtoescapetherule.Theyhavetime
"andagainturnedatrespasserintoalicenseesoastogivehimaremedy
"fornegligencewhenotherwisehewouldhavenone."SofarItakeno
exception.Butthenhewentontodiscuss"anewwaytomitigatethe
"harshnessoftheoldrule",byconfiningtheoldruletotheresponsibility
oftheoccupierfortheconditionofhispremisesandinventinganewduty
towardstrespasserstoconducthisactivitiesonhispropertywithreasonable
care.ButinAddie'scasethedangerwasnotintheconditionofthepro
pertythemechanismwhenatrestwasquitesafe.Thedangerarosewhen
Addie'sservantbegantheoperationofsettingthemechanisminmotion.
IfthisnewtheorywererightAddie'scasemusthavegonetheotherway.
LordDenningfoundedthenewviewonforeseeability.Hesaid:"The
"trueprincipleisthis.Intheordinarywaythedutytousereasonable
"careextendstoallpersonslawfullyontheland,butitdoesnotextend
"totrespassers,forthesimplereasonthathecannotordinarilybeexpected
"toforeseethepresenceofatrespasser.Butthecircumstancesmaybesuch
"thatheoughttoforeseeeventhepresenceofatrespasser:andthenthe
"dutyofcareextendstothetrespasseralso."ButinAddie'scasethe
presenceofthechildrenwasnotonlyforeseeable,itwasveryprobable.
Nevertheless,thisHouseheldtherewasnoduty.
ThisHouseinAddieheldthatnodutyatallaroseuntilthetrespassers
wereknowntobeontheland.Itiseasytoextendthattoacasewhenthe
occupierasgoodasknows,whereheshutshiseyes:hewillnotthenbe
heardtosaythathedidnotknow.Buthehasnodutytodoanything
beforethetrespasserarrives.If,ontheotherhand,adutyweretoarise
beforethetrespassers'arrival,whenthatarrivalismerelyforeseeableor
probable,thesituationwouldbeverydifferent.Theoccupierwouldhave
todowhatthatdutyrequiredhimtodotoprepareforthetrespassers'
arrival.ButthatispreciselywhatAddie'scasesaysheneednotdo.1
canseenowayofbringinginthatforeseeabilitytestwithoutreconsidering
andoverrulingatleastthatpartofthedecisioninAddie.Adutytoact
withhumanitytowardsatrespasserknowntobethereisonething.Aduty
ofcaretowardsprobabletrespassersisofadifferentorder.Itwouldcom
pletelytransformthewholepictureand,sofarasIcansee,completely
supersedetheAddiedutyinallcaseswherethearrivaloftheinjured
trespasserhadbeenprobableorforeseeable.
ItfollowsthatIcannotacceptallthatwassaidinthejudgmentofthe
PrivyCouncilinCommissionerfor Railways v .Quinlan[1964]AC1054
asbeingconsistentwiththedecisioninAddie'scase.Onpage1076itis
said,Ithinkrightly."Aperson'sknowledgeisaquestionoffact:sucha
factisaverydifferentthingfromtheobjectivequestionwhetherthere

"wasareasonablelikelihoodofsomeonebeingpresentattherelevanttime
"andplaceandwhetherapersonoughttohaveforeseenthatlikelihood
"Giventhefactoftheknowledge,theoccupiercomesundertheobligation
"nottoinflictintentionalorrecklessinjuryuponthepersonofwhose
"presenceheisaware.Thisagainisaverydifferentthingfromanobliga
"tiontotakeprecautionsinadvanceagainstthelikelihoodofatrespasser
"beingpresent."Andthenthereisareferencetotheoccupierbeingina
positioninwhichheasgoodasknowsthattheotheristhere.Sofarthat
ispureAddie.Butthepassageonpage1077appearstometobeincon
sistentwiththis.Itwouldseemtosaythatitissufficientifthepresence
ofthetrespasserisextremelylikelyorveryprobable.
Soweareconfrontedwiththepositionthatpersistentattemptshavebeen
madetoconferonchildtrespassersgreaterrightsandtoimposeonoccupiers
greaterobligationsthanaretomymindconsistentwiththedecisionofthis
HouseinAddie'scase.IshallnotdealwiththeforthrightAustralian
authoritiesfartherthantosaythatthoseattemptsareevenmorepersuasive
andfarreachingthanthoseinthiscountry.Soitappearstomethatno
satisfactorysolutioncanbefoundwithoutareexaminationofthewhole
problemandareconsiderationbythisHouseofitsdecisioninAddie'scase.
ChildtrespassershaveforaverylongtimepresentedtotheCourtsan
almostinsolubleproblem.Theycouldonlybecompletelysafeguardedin
oneorotheroftwoways.Eitherparentsmustberequiredalwaystocon
trolandsupervisethemovementsoftheiryoungchildren,oroccupiersof
premiseswheretheyarelikelytotrespassmustberequiredtotakeeffective
stepstokeepthemoutorelsetomaketheirpremisessafeforthemifthey
come.Neitheroftheseispracticable.Theformercoursewaspracticable
atonetimeforalimitednumberofwelltodayparentsbutthatnumber
isnowsmall.Thelatter,ifpracticableatall,wouldinmostcasesimpose
onoccupiersanimpossiblefinancialburden.
Legalprinciplescannotsolvetheproblem.Howfaroccupiersaretobe
requiredbylawtotakestepstosafeguardsuchchildrenmustbeamatter
ofpublicpolicy.ThelawwasuncertainwhenAddie'scasewasdecided.
Thatdecisionwasintendedtomakethelawcertain.Itdidso.ThisHouse
musthavetakentheviewthatasamatterofpublicpolicyoccupiersshould
havenodutyatalltokeepoutsuchchildrenortomaketheirpremisessafe
forthem.Theironlydutywasahumanitariandutynottoactrecklessly
withregardtochildrenwhomtheyknewtobethere.
Itmayhavebeenarguablefortyyearsagothatthatwasgoodpublic
policy.ButforonefactIwouldthinkitunarguabletoday.Thatisthe
factthatonlyfourteenyearsagoParliamentwhenithadanobviousoppor
tunitytoalterthatpolicyfailedtodoso.Thelawwithregardtooccupiers'
liabilitytopersonscomingontotheirlandwasthensounsatisfactorythat
ParliamentfounditnecessarytopassforEnglandandWalestheOccupiers'
LiabilityAct,1957.Itimposeda"commondutyofcare"onoccupiers
towardsallpersonswhomightlawfullycomeontotheirland.Butit
pointedlyomittedtoaltertheexistinglawastotrespassers.Atthattime
therewasnodoubtthatAddie'scasehadsettledthelaw,andunderthe
practicethenprevailingthisHousecouldnotalterthatdecision.TheCourt
ofAppealhadnotyetbeguntotrytomodifyAddie'scase.AsIhave
alreadysaid,theyhadnorighttodothatandIdonotthinkthatin1957
theiractioncouldreasonablyhavebeenforeseen.
SoIfinditexceedinglydifficulttointerpretthesilenceofParliament
inthe1957Actwithregardtotrespassersinanyotherwaythanasan
approvaloftheexistinglawwithregardtothem.Andthatmeansan
approvalofthedecisioninAddie'scase.
Itis,however,IthinkjustpossibletoattributethatsilencetoParliament
(orthosewhothenadvisedParliament)beingunabletomakeuptheirminds
astowhattoputinplaceofAddie.Isaythatbecausewhenthelawof
Scotlandonthismatterwasamendedin1960Parliament(nodoubtacting
onmorerobustadvicefromScotland)didaltertheScotslawwithregard
totrespassers.ItseemsunlikelythatonamatterofthiskindParliament
woulddeliberatelyadoptquitedifferentpoliciesforthetwocountries.So

5
IthinkImaybejustifiedinattributingtoindecisionthesilenceofParliament
in1957withregardtotrespassersinEngland.
Thequestion,then,istowhatextentthisHousesittinginitsjudicial
capacitycandowhatParliamentfailedtodoin1957.Idislikeusurping
thefunctionsofParliament.Butitappearstomethatweareconfronted
withthechoiceoffollowingAddieandputtingtheclockbackordrastically
modifytheAddierules.Itissuggestedthatsuchamodificationcanbe
achievedbydevelopingthelawaslaiddowninAddie'scasewithoutactually
overrulinganypartofthedecision.Idonotthinkthatthatispossible.It
canproperlybesaidthatoneisdevelopingthelawlaiddowninaleading
casesolongbutonlysolongasthe"development"doesnotrequireus
tosaythattheoriginalcasewaswronglydecided.Butitappearstomethat
anyacceptable"development"ofAddie'scasemustmeanthatAddie'scase
ifitarosetodaywouldbedecidedtheotherway.Thecaseforthepursuer
inAddie'scasewasstrongeronthefactsthanthecaseforthepresent
RespondentandIdonotthinkthatwecoulddismissthisappealwithout
holdingoratleastnecessarilyimplyingthatAddie'scasewaswronglydecided.
1donotthinkthatitwouldbesatisfactorymerelytofollowthescheme
oftheScottishAct.ThatActprovidesbysection2thatthecarewhich
anoccupierisrequiredtoshowtoapersonenteringhisland(whichincludes
atrespasser)inrespecteitherofitsdangerousstateorofdangerousactivities
onitshallbe"suchcareasinallthecircumstancesofthecaseisreasonable
"toseethatthepersonwillnotsufferinjuryordamagebyreasonofany"suchdanger".Thatmay
worksatisfactorilywhereactionsfordamages
forfailuretoexercisesuchcarearegenerallydecidedbyjuries.Juriesdo
notgivereasonsandsonoverdictofajurycanestablishaprecedent.
ButinEnglandsuchactionsaredecidedbyjudgeswhomustgivereasons
andwhosedecisionscanbethesubjectofappeal.Nodoubtifthematter
wereleftatlargeinthiswayabodyofcaselawwithregardtotheposition
oftrespasserswoulddevelopovertheyears.Thematterwouldinoneform
oranothercomebeforethisHousebeforeverylongandsomeauthoritative
guidancewouldthenemerge.ButIwouldnotcreatesuchaperiodof
uncertaintyifthatcanbeavoided,andIthinkitcanbeavoided.
Thefirstmattertobedeterminedisthenatureofthedutyowedby
occupierstotrespassers.HereIthinkwecangetgoodguidancefrom
Addie'scase.Thedutytherelaiddownwasadutynottoactrecklessly.
Recklessnesshas,inmyopinion,asubjectivemeaning:itimpliesculpability.
Anactionwhichwouldberecklessifdonebyamanwithadequateknowledge,
skillorresourcesmightnotberecklessifdonebyamanwithlessappreciation
oforabilitytodealwiththesituation.Onewouldbeculpable,theothernot.
Recklessisadifficultword.Iwouldsubstituteculpable.
ThedutylaiddowninAddie'scasewasahumanitarianduty.Normally
thecommonlawappliesanobjectivetest.Ifapersonchoosestoassume
arelationshipwithmembersofthepublic,saybysettingouttodriveacar
ortoerectabuildingfrontingahighway,thelawrequireshimtoconduct
himselfasareasonablemanwithadequateskill,knowledgeandresources
woulddo.Hewillnotbeheardtosaythatinfacthecouldnotattain
thatstandard.Ifhecannotattainthatstandardheoughtnottoassume
theresponsibilitywhichthatrelationshipinvolves.Butanoccupierdoes
notvoluntarilyassumearelationshipwithtrespassers.Bytrespassingthey
forcea"neighbour"relationshiponhim.Whentheydosohemustact
inahumanemannerthatisnotaskingtoomuchofhimbutIdonot
seewhyheshouldberequiredtodomore.
Soitappearstomethatanoccupier'sdutytotrespassersmustvary
accordingtohisknowledge,abilityandresources.Ithasoftenbeensaid
thattrespassersmusttakethelandastheyfindit.Iwouldrathersaythat
theymusttaketheoccupierastheyfindhim.
Sothequestionwhetheranoccupierisliableinrespectofanaccident
toatrespasseronhislandwoulddependonwhetheraconscientioushumane
manwithhisknowledge,skillandresourcescouldreasonablyhavebeen
expectedtohavedoneorrefrainedfromdoingbeforetheaccidentsome
thingwhichwouldhaveavoidedit.Ifheknewbeforetheaccidentthat

therewasasubstantialprobabilitythattrespasserswouldcomeIthinkthat
mostpeoplewouldregardasculpablefailuretogiveanythoughttotheir
safety.Hemightoftenreasonablythink,weighingtheseriousnessofthe
dangerandthedegreeoflikelihoodoftrespasserscomingagainsttheburden
hewouldhavetoincurinpreventingtheirentryormakinghispremises
safe,orcurtailinghisownactivitiesonhisland,thathecouldnotfairly
beexpectedtodoanything.Butifhecouldatsmalltroubleandexpense
takesomeeffectiveactionagainIthinkthatmostpeoplewouldthinkit
inhumaneandculpablenottodothat.Ifsomesuchprincipleisadopted
therewillnolongerbeanyneedtostrivetoimplyafictitiouslicence.
Itwouldfollowthatanimpecuniousoccupierwithlittleassistanceat
handwouldoftenbeexcusedfromdoingsomethingwhichalargeorganise
tionwithamplestaffwouldbeexpectedtodo.
Itisalwayseasytobewiseaftertheeventandinjudgingwhatought
tohavebeendoneonewouldhavetoputoutofone'smindthefactthat
anaccidenthadoccurredandvisualisethepositionoftheoccupierbefore
ithadhappened.Quiteprobablythiswouldnotbetheonlypointonhis
landwheretrespasswaslikely.Onewouldhavetolookathisproblem
asawholeandaskwhetherifhehadthoughtaboutthematteritwould
havebeenhumaneordecentofhimtodonothing.Thatmaysoundalow
standardbutinfactIbelievethatanoccupier'sfailuretotakeanypreventive
stepsismoreoftencausedbythoughtlessnessthanbyanyshirkingofhis
moralresponsibility.Ithinkthatcurrentconceptionsofsocialdutydo
requireoccupierstogivereasonableattentiontotheirresponsibilitiesas
occupiers,andIseenothinginlegalprinciplestopreventthelawfrom
requiringthemtodothat.
IfIapplythattesttothepresentcaseIthinkthattheAppellantsmust
beheldresponsibleforthisaccident.Theybroughtontotheirlandin
theliverailalethalandtoayoungchildaconcealeddanger.Itwould
havebeenveryeasyforthemtohaveandenforceareasonablesystemof
inspectionandrepairoftheirboundaryfence.Theyknewthatchildren
wereentitledandaccustomedtoplayontheothersideofthefenceand
musthaveknown,hadanyoftheirofficersgiventhematterathought,
thatayoungchildmighteasilycrossadefectivefenceandrunintograve
danger.Yettheydidnothing.Idonotthinkthatalargeorganisation
isactingwithdueregardtohumaneconsiderationifitsofficersdonotpay
moreattentiontosafety.Iwouldnotsingleoutthestationmasterfor
blame.Thetroubleappearstohavebeengeneralslacknessintheorganic
station.ForthattheAppellantsareresponsibleandIthinkinthecircum
stancesculpable.IwouldthereforeholdthemliabletotheRespondent
anddismissthisappeal.

LordMorrisofBorthyGest
mylords,
Onthe7thJune(WhitMonday)intheyear1965asmallboyagedsix
wenttoplayinafieldnearMitchamcalledBuncesMeadow.Hewas
withhistwobrotherswhowerealittleolderthanhewas.BuncesMeadow
isNationalTrustpropertywhichisfreelyopentothepublic.Throughit
thererunsapublicpath.Forapartofitsdistancethepathisamadeup
pathhavingatarmacadamsurface.Itcontinuesasatroddenpathwhich
makesaturntotheright.Thereasonforthisisthatstraightaheadofthe
paththereisasingleline railway track,whichrunsbetweenMitcham
JunctionandMordenRoadHalt.Bythesideofthetrackthereisa"live"
railcarryingthenecessaryelectriccurrentfortrainswhicharedrivenalong
thetrack.Thepathtotherightleadstoafootbridgeoverthe railway
track.Bycrossingthe railway anotherNationalTrustpropertyMorden
HallPark,isreached.
Thetroddenpathturnedtotherightneartobutbeforereachingtheline
ofthefencewhichhadbeenerectedtoborderthe railway track.There

wasafurthershortstretchoftroddenpath(whichshouldhavebeenaculde
sac)reachinguptothefence.Thefencewasachainlinkfencefourfeet
highsupportedbyconcretepostseightfeetsixinchesapart.Butatthe
veryplacewherethefencingshouldhavedebarredapersonfromgoing
straightonifhehadnotpreviouslyturnedtotherightitwasdefective.
Thefencewasdetachedfromoneofthepostsandhadbeenpresseddown
sothatitstopcurveddowntowithinaboutteninchesoftheground.The
lowerpartofthechainlink,whichwasrusty,waslyingontheground.
Thestateofaffairswas,asthelearnedjudgefound,thatforsometime
beforethe7thJunepeoplegoingtoMordenHallParkhadbeentaking
ashortcut.Theyproceededstraightonandcrossedthe railway track.
Thefencewasinsodilapidatedaconditionthatanybody,adultorchild,
"couldquiteeasilygetacrossontotheline".
ThethreeboysplayedinBuncesMeadowbutshortlyafternoonthe
twoelderonesmissedtheiryoungbrother.Hehadwanderedoff.They
wentinsearchofhim.Onebrotherwentthroughwhatwasvirtuallythegap
inthefencingandthenfoundhisyoungbrotheronthe railway track.Hewas
betweentheconductorrailandtherunningrail.Hewaslyingunconscious.
Afterhelphadbeensecured,arescuewaseffected:butthatwasonlyafter
theboyhadbeenmostgravelyinjured.Hesufferedverysevereburns.
Certainadditionalfactscallformention.Thelearnedjudgewassatisfied
bytheevidencegivenbytwoyouthswhohadvisitedBuncesMeadowa
numberoftimesinthesixweeksprevioustothe7thJunethatthefence
hadbeeninitsdilapidatedconditionforatleastseveralweeksbeforethat
date.Thestateofthefenceandofthepathleadthelearnedjudgeto
thinkthatthedescribedconditionofthefencehadprobablyexistedfor
months.The RailwaysBoard madenoattempttocontravertanyofthese
conclusions.Theythoughtitprudentnottoputanywitnessinthebox.
Theydecidedtogivenoexplanationsinregardtoanyofthedocuments
whichdiscoverydisclosed.Thus,therewasamemorandumdatedthe17th
April,1965(somesevenweeksbeforetheaccident)fromtheStationMaster's
office,MitchamJunction,tothe"LineManager"statingthattheguardof
anafternoontraintwodayspreviouslyhadreportedtothesignalmanat
MitchamonarrivalatMertonParkthatchildrenwereonthelinebetween
MitchamandMordenRoadHalt:thememorandumstatedthattheMitcham
Policewererequestedtoinvestigate.Therewerevariousmemoranda

writtenonthedateoftheaccident:theyrecordedthatat3.10p.m.,there
wasanexaminationofthefencesinthevicinityofBuncesMeadow:three
placesinthevicinitywerediscoveredwherechildrencouldgetontothe
linethroughthefences.Onememorandumwastothe"LineManager":
anotherwastothe"Ganger"atMitcham."Control"hadorderedthe

StationMaster(ofMitchamJunction)toexaminethefencesandtoreportand
alsotoinformthe"Ganger"togetthefencesrepairedimmediately.The
"Engineer'sDepartment"wereinstructedtomakerepairsinthreeplaces.
Aletterofthe11thJunefromthe"DivisionalManager"recordedthat
hewasadvisedthatthefenceatthesiteoftheaccidentwas"inrathera
"badstate"andthattherewerethreedifferentplaceswherechildrencould
getontothelinethroughthefences:thewriteraskedthatheshould
beinformedwhentherepairworkwascompleted:theletterwenttothe
"LineManager"withacopytotheStationMaster.Amemorandumfrom
theStationMastertotheDivisionalManagerreportedthattheEngineers
Departmentwerecalledoutandthatthefenceswererepairedontheday
oftheaccident.
Inviewoftheevidencewhichwasbeforethelearnedjudgeandinthelight
ofthedocumentsreferredto,itisamatterofsomesurprisethatwhena
claimwasmadeitwasstatedonbehalfofthe RailwaysBoard thattheir
engineerhadmadeaninspectionofthefenceinquestiononthemorning
oftheaccidentandfounditinorder."Ourevidencequiteclearlyestablishes
"thatthefencewasfoundingoodorderearlieronthedayinquestion,
"butwasfounddamagedaftertheaccident.Temporaryrepairswere
"carriedoutimmediatelyafterwards,followedlaterbypermanentrepairs."
Havingregardtotheevidencebeforethelearnedjudgeandtotheterms

ofthevariousinternalmemorandaitisdifficulttounderstandhowtheletter
cametobewritten.Therewasnoevidenceeithertosupportitorto
explainit.Iftherewasasystemofinspectiontheremusthavebeena
lamentablefailureinitsoperation.Thefactremainsthatforweeksor
monthsthefencingwassobrokendownatapointaheadofapublicpath
thatapersoncouldeasilygetacrosstotheline:anadultwoulddoubtless
appreciatetherisksorperilsinsoproceeding:aboyagedsixwouldnot.
IfthefactswhichIhaveoutlinedwereputtoanywelldisposedbutfair
mindedmemberofthepublic,whetheraparentornot,Iventuretothink
thattheresponseguidedbythepromptingsofcommonsensewouldbethat
havingregardtothedangerousnatureoftheliverailanditsperilsfora
smallchild,the RailwaysBoard weregrievouslyatfaultinallowingafence
attheparticularplaceinquestiontoremainforalongtimeinabroken
downcondition.Itmustatanytimebeamatterofregretandofconcern
iftheanswerofthelawdoesnotaccordwiththeanswerthatcommonsense
wouldsuggest.Butthe RailwaysBoard assertthatthelawmustrefusethe
infant'sclaim.Ineffecttheysaythathewasalegaloutcast.Inshorthe
wasatrespasser.Andtheysay,"Towardsthetrespassertheoccupierhas
"nodutytotakereasonablecareforhisprotectionoreventoprotecthim
"fromconcealeddanger.Thetrespassercomesontothepremisesathis
"ownrisk."(Addie v .Dumbreck[1929]AC358.)Ontheauthorityof
thesamecasetheysaythatanoccupierisonlyliabletoatrespasserwhere
theinjuryisduetosomewilfulactinvolvingsomethingmorethanthe
absenceofreasonablecare."Theremustbesomeactdonewiththe
"deliberateintentionofdoingharmtothetrespasser,oratleastsomeact
"donewithrecklessdisregardofthepresenceofthetrespasser."Sothey
saythatinthepresentcasetherewasnowilfulactdoneagainsttheinfant:
the RailwaysBoard didnotknowofhispresenceanddidnothingin
disregardofhispresence.
Thereisalwaysperilintreatingthewordsofaspeechorajudgment
asthoughtheywerewordsinalegislativeenactment,anditistobe
rememberedthatjudicialutterancesaremadeinthesettingofthefacts
ofaparticularcase.ThefactsinthepresentcasedifferfromthoseinAddie's
case.Inthepresentcaseaquestionariseswhethersomedutymaybe
owedtoapersonbeforehebecomesatrespasser.Inthatcaseaquestion
arosewhetheradutywasowedtosomeonewhowasalreadyatrespasser.
Inthatcasebothadultsandchildrenoftenwentontothelandinquestion
thoughitwasmadeplaintothemthattheyhadnorighttodoso.There
weremanygapsinthehedgethatsurroundedtheland.Childrendidin
tactgoandplayontheland(inspiteoftheirbeingperiodicallydrivenoff):
theyplayedbothnearthewheelwhichwasthereandelsewhere.The
wheelwasaboutonehundredyardswithintheboundaryoftheland.The
wheelwasnotsomethingasinherentlydangerousasaliverailwhichitis
highlyperiloustotouch.Thosewhosetthewheelinmotiondidnotknow
thatafouryearoldboyhadgonetositonit.Hewasatrespasserand
hehadbeenwarnednottogotothelandortogoneartothewheel.But
asthoseoperatingthewheelmusthaveknownthatitwasatleastapossibility
ifnotalikelihoodthatachildwouldbeonorneartothewheelitmight
havebeenheldthattherewasadutytogivesomewarningortoexercise
somemeasureofcaretoseethatnoonewasgoingtobeinjuredbefore
themachinewassuddenlysetinmotion.Butitwasheldthattherewas
noliabilityforthedeathoftheboy.Thelawwaslaiddownintheterms
thatIhavequoted.Therehavebeenmanyexpressionsoflamentthatthe
claimshouldnothavesucceededasdidtheclaiminExcelsiorWireRope
Co.Ltd. v .Callan|1930]A.C.404.

Inthepresentcasetheboywasinjuredbycomingintocontactwith
somethingonthelandtheliverail.Theliverailwasplacedwhereit
wasforthelegitimatepurposeofsupplyingpowerfortherunningoftrains.
Therewasnoquestionofintendingtodoharmtoatrespasser.Ifthe
questionisaskedWhatdidthe RailwaysBoard dowrong?theanswer
mustIthinkbethattheyallowedthefencetoremainforalongtimein
suchastatethatachildwhodidnotsensedangercouldquiteeasilyget

ontothelineandtheliverail.Anyonewhogaveanythoughttothematter
wouldatonceappreciatethatthepurposeofhavingafencebordering
ona railway trackwithaliverailistowarnpeoplethattheymustproceed
nofurtherandtobetosomeextentanobstacletopreventthemfromso
doing.Anyonewouldfurtherappreciatethatifthefencinghadagapin
itandagapneartoapublicpathachildmightgothroughthegapandbe
inapositionofgreatdanger.Notonlymightachildcomeintocontact
withtheliverail:hemightbestruckbyapassingtrain.Sothequestion
ariseswhetherthe RailwaysBoard hadanyobligationtotakethoughtand
havingtakenthoughttotakesomeaction.Isitenoughforthemtosay
truewecouldappreciatethatifachildsteppedoverthebrokenfencehe
mightgetontothe railway trackwithitsliverailandbekilledorgravely
hurtbutthemomenthesteppedoverthebrokenfencehewouldbea
trespasserand"towardsthetrespassertheoccupierhasnodutytotake
"reasonablecareforhisprotectionoreventoprotecthimfromconcealed
"danger"?Though,generallyspeaking,anoccupierisnotobligedtofence
hislandandthough,generallyspeaking,thereisnoobligationtoprevent
somebodyfrombecomingatrespasseraretheresomecircumstancesin
whichadutyarisestotakesomeactiontolessentheriskofperilboth
inthecaseofapotentialorprospectivetrespasserandinthecaseofsomeone
whohasbecomeatrespasser?
HavingposedthisquestionitistoberememberedthatinAddie'scase
considerationwasgiventosuchcasesasCooke v .MidlandGreatWestern
Railway ofIreland[1909]A.C.229andLowery v .Walker[1911]AC10
andLatham v .R.Johnson&NephewLtd.[191311K.B.398andtomany
othercasesandIthinkthatitmustberecognisedthatitwasimplicitly
laiddowninallthespeechesthatapartfromcaseswhereanoccupier
intendstoinjureatrespasser(asbylayingaspringgun)heowesnoduty
toapotentialorprospectivetrespasserandthatitwasexpresslyandindeed
inexorablylaiddownthattowardsanactualtrespasserheowesnoduty
apartfromthedutynotmaliciouslytocausehiminjury.
Thequestionnowariseswhetherweshoulddepart,aswewereinvited
todo,fromwhatwaslaiddowninAddlescaseorwhetherinthelightof
developmentsinthelawsince1929therearesomemodificationswhich
permissiblycanbeaccepted.
Inapproachingthisquestionregardmustbehadtothefactoftheenact
mentofandtotheprovisionsoftheOccupiers'LiabilityActof1957.It
seemstomethatParliamentmusthavedecidedthatproblemsrelatingto
trespassersshouldbelefttobedecidedaccordingtocommonlawprinciples.
BytheActthe"rules"enactedbysections2and3aretohaveeffect"in
"placeoftherulesofthecommonlaw,toregulatethedutywhichan
"occupierofpremisesowestohisvisitorsinrespectofdangersduetothe
"stateofthepremisesortothingsdoneoromittedtobedoneonthem".
Tosuch"visitors"(subjecttoexceptions)thereisadutytotakesuchcare
asinallthecircumstancesofthecaseisreasonabletoseethatthevisitor
willbereasonablysafeinusingthepremisesforthepurposeforwhichhe
isinvitedorpermittedbytheoccupiertobethere.Butatrespasserisnot
a"visitor".Thetermtrespasserisacomprehensiveword:itcoversthe
wickedandtheinnocent:theburglar,thearrogantinvaderofanother's
land,thewalkerblithelyunawarethatheissteppingwherehehasno
righttowalk,orthewanderingchildallmaybedubbedastrespassers.
Whenin1960theOccupiers'Liability(Scotland)Actwaspasseditwas
intermswhichcreatedacertaindutyofcaretotrespassers.TheEnglish
Actwas.however,leftasitwas.Itwasnotamended.Itwouldnot,in
myview,befittingforustomakefundamentalchangesinthelaw,according
toourviewastowhatitstermsandpolicyshouldbe,whenParliament,
apparentlydeliberately,hasrefrainedfrommakingsuchchanges.Wecan.
however,ensurethatthetideofdevelopmentofthecommonlawisnot
unwarrantablyimpeded.
Ifachildisavisitoranoccupiermust"bepreparedforchildrentobe
"lesscarefulthanadults"(seesection2subsection(3)oftheEnglishAct).
Butapartfromanystatutoryprovisionsitisamatterofordinarycommon

10

knowledgethatchildrenwillroamandwillexplore.Ifafencemarksa
boundaryanadultwhoclimbsoveritwillappreciatewhatheisdoing.
Asmallboywhofindsapartofafencesodilapidatedthatthereisno
realobstacletohisprogresswillnotormaynotknowthatheisatonce
a"trespasser"ifhegoeson.Sotheproblemraisedinthiscaseiswhether,
ifanoccupierhasforlegitimatereasons(andwithnoobjectofhurting
anyone)placedsomethinghighlydangerousonhisland,heowesanyand
whatdutytotakesomestepstolessentheriskthatawanderingchildmay
runintothedanger.Thoughthepresentcaserelatestoayoungchild
whoobviouslymaybelessperceptivethananadultthekindredquestion
israisedwhethertheremaybecircumstances,ifasituationofdangerhas
beencreatedonland,inwhichsomemeasureofdutywouldbeowedto
anadulttrespasser.Furthermore,thoughinthepresentcasetheplaceof
realdangerwasquiteclosetotheboundaryoftheprivatelandthe

questionofprinciplemightequallyariseiftheplaceofgreatdangerwas
notclosetosuchboundary.Ifaminefieldhadforlegitimatereasonsbeen
createdandifitcontinuedinexistenceIshouldbesorrytothinkthatan
occupierowednodutytowarnapotentialoractualtrespasser.Inhis

powerfuldissentingjudgmentinAdams v .Naylor[1944|1K.B.750ScottL.J.
sawnoreasoninprinciplewhyanoccupiershouldnotbecalledonto
takeallreasonableprecautionstokeeptrespassingchildrenoutofaplace
whereheknowstheywillbeblownup.
Intheearlypartofthelastcentury,occupiersoflandsometimesplaced
springgunsontheirland:ifatrespasserwalkedagainstawirehewould
causeaguntohefiredandhemightbeinjured.Ifanoccupiercould
doashelikedonandwithintheconfinesofhisownlandwhyshouldhe
notplacesuchguns?Yetcertaintrespasserswhosufferedinjurybrought
claims.Couldsuchatrespasserrecoverdamages?TheCourtsheldthat
hecould.Thereweretworeasons.Onewasthatanoccupiercouldnot
doindirectlywhathecouldnotdodirectly:ifhehadbeenpresentonhis
landandhadseenatrespasserhewouldnothavebeenentitledtofirea
gunathim.Soheoughtnottocauseaguntobefiredindiscriminately
andautomaticallyifandwhenanintruderwalkedontheland.The
otherreasonwasthatitwascontrarytoprinciplesofhumanitytoplacea
springgunofwhichatrespasserwasunaware.
Thus,in1807(inJay v .Whitfield3B.&A.308)aboywhoenteredthe
defendant'spremisesforthepurposeofcuttingastickwasshotbyaspring
gun:herecovered120damages(beforeRichardsC.B.)forhisinjury.
Itisrecordedinoneofthecasesthatitwasformerlythepracticetogive
publicnoticeinmarkettownsifsuchmeansofprotectionasspringguns
hadbeenresortedto.Itwasthe"commonunderstandingofmankind"
thatsuchnoticeoughttobegiven.Thatwasbeforetherewasanystatutory
provisioninregardtothem.

InIlon v .Wilkeswhichwasin1820(3B.&Ald.304)atrespasserwho
knewthattherewerespringgunsinawood(withoutknowingtheactual
particularspotswheretheywereplaced)wasinjuredwhenhetrodonalatent
wireandcausedaguntobefired.Ontheprinciplevolentinonfitinjuria
hefailedinhisclaimfordamages.Butthedutytowarnwasrecognised.
ThusBayleyJ.said:"Althoughitmaybelawfultoputtheseinstruments
"onaman'sownground,yetastheyarecalculatedtoproducegreatbodily
"injurytoinnocentpersons(formanytrespassersarecomparativelyinnocent)
"itisnecessarytogiveasmuchnoticetothepublicasyoucan,soastoput
"peopleontheirguardagainstthedanger."BestJ.spokewithnouncertain
voicewhenheproclaimed:"Humanityrequiresthatthefullestnotice
"possibleshouldbegiven,andthelawofEnglandwillnotsanctionwhat
"isinconsistentwithhumanity."BayleyJ.recognisedthattheremaybe
circumstancesinwhichthereisadutytopreventinjurytoatrespasser.
Heinstancedasituationinwhichafuriousdogwaslooseinayardbut
wheretherewasnoticeovertheentranceofthepresenceofthedog.He
saidthatifawrongdoerreadthenoticebutthenintheabsenceofthe
ownerenteredtheyardhewasvoluntarilyincurringtheriskofbeinginjured.
Butheexpressedafurtherviewforhesaid:"If,indeed,themasterhad
beenuponthespotatthetime,andhadseenthedogrunningtowardsthe

11
"man,itwouldhavebeenhisdutytohavedoneallinhispowertoprevent
"theanimalfromworryinghim,andifhehadnotsodone,theparty
"injuredmighthavehadarightofaction."Thepassageisofinterestas
showingthatthelearnedjudgethoughtthateveninaction,whenhumanitarian
showingthatthelearnedjudgethoughtthateveninaction,whenhumanitarian
impulseswouldpromptaction,mightamounttoabreachofadutyowed
toatrespasser.
Inthelatercase,in1828,ofBird v .Holbrook4Bingham628ayoung
man,inordertocatchastrayfowl(soastohelptheservantofitsowner),
wentoverawallintothedefendant'sgardenwherehecameintocontact
withawirewhichdischargedagun.Herecovereddamagesinrespect
oftheinjurywhichhesustained.BestC.J.stoutlyproclaimed:"Butwe
"wantnoauthorityinacaselikethepresentweputitontheprinciple
"thatitisinhumantocatchamanbymeanswhichmaymaimhimor
"endangerhislife,and,asfarashumanmeanscango,itistheobjectof
"Englishlawtoupholdhumanity,andthesanctionsofreligion."
BurroughJ.said"ThePlaintiffwasonlyatrespasser:iftheDefendant
"hadbeenpresent,hewouldnothavebeenauthorisedevenintakinghim
"intocustody,andnomancandoindirectlythatwhichheisforbidden
"tododirectly."ThatapproachwouldIthinkbringthecasewithinthe
categoryofactsdonewitha"deliberateintentionofdoingharmtoa
"trespasser".Thespringgunwouldbedeliberatelyplacedsothatitwould
causeinjurytoanytrespasserwhomightarrive.AsViscountDunedin
said(atpage376)inAddie'scase"hemaynotsetaspringgunforthatis
"justtoarrangetoshoothimwithoutpersonallyfiringtheshot."Alter
nativelytheplacingofthespringgunmightamounttoa"recklessdisregard
"ofthepresenceofthetrespasser".ItistobeobservedthatDixonC.J.
saidinCommissionerfor Railways (N.S.W.) v .Cardy104C.L.R.274,285
"Thefixedrulethatatrespassercomesathisownriskandthatonlya
"wilfulinjurytohimisactionableismodifiedbytheassimilationof
"'recklessdisregardofthepresenceofthetrespasser'towilfulness.It
"needsnoargumenttoshowthatrecklessdisregardtothepresenceofa
"manmustincludenotonlythecaseofamanwhoistherebutalsoofone
"whosecomingisexpectedorforeseen."
Thespringgunwouldbeplacedonlandbecausethepossiblepresenceof
atrespasserwouldeitherbeexpectedorforeseenandtherewouldbethe
circumstancethatinjurywasintended.Thoughtheconditionsofdanger
onthe railway trackinthepresentcasewerenotcreatedwithanyintention
ofdoinginjurytoanyone,ifitcouldbeexpectedorforeseenthatsome
trespasser(suchasayoungchild)mightrunintothedangerunawares,was
theresomeand,ifso,whatdutytotakesomeandwhatstepstoseekto
avertsuchanoccurrence?Ifhumanityistobeaguideshoulditnotoperate
tolessentheriskofforeseeableinjuryfromadangerwhichhasbeencreated
eventhoughsuchinjuryisnotintended?
IfthepassagestowhichIhavereferredshowthatevenindayswhen
propertyrightswerejealouslysafeguardeditwasfirmlyrecognisedthat
thedictatesofhumanitymustguideconducteventowardstrespasserssuch
recognitionmustsurelybenolessfirmtoday.Indeed,itshouldbefirmer.
Itistodaybasictoourlegalthinkingthateverymemberofacommunity
musthaveregardtotheeffectuponothersofhisactionsorhisinactions.

Ifinallprobabilitytheboyinthepresentcasewouldnothavesufferedinjury
hadthefencebeeninordinaryrepairinsteadofbeingleftdilapidatedfor
weeksonendthequestionmightbeaskedevensoastheboywouldbe
atrespasserthemomenthecrossedthelineofthefencewhyandforwhat
reasonshouldthe RailwaysBoard owehimanydutyatallbeyondthat
ofnotdeliberatelyharminghimthereafterorofactingwithrecklessdisregard
ofhispresenceontheirland?Iwouldanswerforreasonsofcommonsense
andcommonhumanity.Thenatureandextentofanydutyowedwillcall
forseparateconsideration.Buttheremustbesomecircumstancesinwhich,
byreasonofthem,adutyisowedbyanoccupieroflandtopotential
trespassersaswellastoactualtrespassersofwhomheispositivelyaware.
Asmynobleandlearnedfriend.LordPearson,saidinVidean v . British
 12

TransportCommission([1963]2Q.B.650)itisaheresytosuggestthat
occupationoflandisagroundofexemptionfromliability:onthecontrary
(hesaid)occupationoflandisapossiblegroundofliabilityandifaduty
ofcareisowedthenanypersontowhomitisowedisaneighbourthough
thecontentofthedutywillvaryaccordingtothecircumstances.
Ifitisaskedwhyneedthe RailwaysBoard giveanythoughttothe
questionwhetheratrespassermightcometoharmbytrespassingontheir
landtheanswermustIthinkagainbethatcommonsenseandcommon
intelligencesodirect.Whathasbeencalledordinarycivilisedbehaviour
wouldsoprompt.ThewordsofLordMacnaghteninCooke v .Midland
GreatWesternofIreland[1909]A.C.229(whilerememberingthatitwas
heldthatthechildreninthatcasewerelicensees)areapposite"Would
"notaprivateindividualofcommonsenseandordinaryintelligence,placed
"inthepositioninwhichthecompanywereplaced,andpossessingthe
"knowledgewhichmustbeattributedtothem,haveseenthattherewasa
"likelihoodofsomeinjuryhappeningtochildrenresortingtotheplace
"andplayingwiththeturntable,andwouldhenothavethoughtithisplain
"dutyeithertoputastoptothepracticealtogether,oratleasttotake
"ordinaryprecautionstopreventsuchanaccidentasthatwhichoccurred?"
Bytakingordinarythoughtandexercising"commonsenseandordinary
"intelligence"evenapartfromtheguidanceofcommonhumanity1think
thatthe RailwaysBoard wouldseethatinthecircumstancesofthiscase
therewasalikelihoodthatsomechildmightpassoverthebrokendown
fenceandgetontothetrackwithitsliverailandbeinperilofserious
injury.Eventhoughthechildwouldbeatrespasseroughtitnottobe
their"plainduty"torepairthefence?Thatwouldbearelativelysimple
operationnotinvolvinganyunreasonabledemandsoftimeorlabouror
expense.
Intheclassicdefinitionofnegligencein1856inBlyth v .Birmingham
WaterworksCo.(11Ex.781,784)AldersonB.saidthatnegligencewas"the
"omissiontodosomethingwhichareasonablemanguideduponthose
"considerationswhichordinarilyregulatetheconductofhumanaffairswould
"do,ordoingsomethingwhichaprudentandreasonablemanwouldnot
"do."Oughtnotthe"considerationswhichordinarilyregulatetheconduct
"ofhumanaffairs"undersomecircumstances(andIwouldincludethose
ofthepresentcase)producetheresultthatsomedulyisowedbyan
occupieroflandtowardsthosewhoiftheyproceedfurthermaysuffer
injuryatatimewhentheyaretrespassing?
Thatinacivilisedcommunitythereisneedtotakethoughtastothe
resultofactsoromissionshaslongbeenrecognised.ThoughinHeaven v .
Penderin1883(11Q.B.D.503)thecolleaguesofBrettM.R.wereunwilling
toconcurin"layingdownunnecessarilythelargerprinciple"whichhe
entertainedhiswordsmayberecalled.Heconsideredthatfromdecided
casesthepropositionwastobededuced"thatwheneveronepersonisby
"circumstancesplacedinsuchapositionwithregardtoanotherthatevery
"oneofordinarysensewhodidthinkwouldatoncerecognisethatifhe
"didnotuseordinarycareandskillinhisownconductwithregardtothose
"circumstanceshewouldcausedangerofinjurytothepersonorproperty
"oftheother,adutyarisestouseordinarycareandskilltoavoidsuch
"danger."TheMasteroftheRollswasofcoursenotconsideringany
questioninregardtotrespassers,butthequestionnowariseswhetherthere
arenotsometrespassersforwhomthoughtmustbetaken.Thestress
placedonthetakingofthoughtbypersonsof"ordinarysense"istoday
constantlyreflectedindecisionsinthecourts.LordAtkininDonoghue v .
Stevenson[1932]AC562,580saidthat"Youmusttakereasonablecare
"toavoidactsoromissionswhichyoucanreasonablyforeseewouldbe
"likelytoinjureyourneighbour."TheCorporationinGlasgowCorpora
 tion v .Taylor[1922]1AC44oughtbytakingthoughttohaverealised
thatthepoisonousberriesdeceptivelypresentedatemptingandharmless
appearancetoayoungboywhowasentitledtobewherehewastherewas
acasefortrialastowhethertheCorporationhadfailedtotakecertain
precautionsthattheyoughttohavetaken.InHaley v .LondonElectricity13
Board [1965]AC778itwasheldthatthoseengagedinoperationsonthe
pavementofahighwayoughttohaveforeseenthatblindpersonsmight
walkalongthepavement.So,bytakingthought,shouldthedangerhave
beenappreciatedofallowingthesmallchildinCarmarthenshireCounty
Council v .Lewis[1955]AC549tobeoutofcare.So,bytakingthought,
shouldtheconsequenceshavebeenrealisedoffailingtoexercisereasonable
controlinthecaseHomeOffice v .DorsetYachtCo.[1970]A.C.1004.
Iconsiderthatitisabundantlyclearthatthe RailwaysBoard ,iftheyhad
takenthought,musthaverealisedthatiftheyallowedthefencetobebroken
downattheparticularplaceinquestiontherewasaconsiderableriskthat
asmallchildwouldpassthroughitandmightasaresulteitherbekilled
orcometoseriousharm.Thiswasnotacaseinwhichachildcouldbe
saidtohavebeeninvitedorpermittedtoproceedwiththeresultthathe
wouldasaninviteeorlicenseebeproceedingtowardswhatcouldbecalled
atrap:nordoIthinkthatanytemptationtoproceedcouldbesaidtohave
beeninresponsetoanallurement.
ThepresentcaseistobedistinguishedonitsfactsfromEdwards v .
Railway Executive[1952]A.C.737wherethemainissuewaswhetherthe
boycouldbesaidtohavebeenalicensee.Thelayoutofthelandwasin
thatcasequitedifferentfromthatinthepresentcaseandthefenceinthat
casewasrepairedwheneveritwasobservedtohavesufferedinterference.
Therewasevidenceinthatcasethatonthemorningoftheaccidentthe
fencewasinproperrepair.
Couldachildsuchastheboyinthepresentcaseberegardedasa
"neighbour"?WhenLordAtkinposedthequestionWhotheninlawis
myneighbour?hesaidthattheanswerseemedtobe"personswhoare
"socloselyanddirectlyaffectedbymyactthatIoughtreasonablytohave
"themincontemplationasbeingsoaffectedwhenIamdirectingmymind
"totheactsoromissionswhicharecalledinquestion."Noonewould
suggestthateverytrespasserisa"neighbour"butwithinthesewordswas
notthesmallboyinthepresentcaseaneighbour?Whenthe railway track
anditselectrifiedrailwerelaidandatalltimeswhentheyweremaintained
therisksofinjuryresultingiftherewasneitherwarningnorimpediment
suchasafencewouldprovidewouldbecleartoanyonewhogavethe
mutteramoment'sthought.Yetwhentheboywentontothetrackhe
undoubtedlybecameatrespasser.Doesthismeanthatthestrictedictof
Addie'scasepreventsanykindofdutyfromarisingtowardssuchaneighbour,
especiallyasParliamenthasnotlegislatedintermswhichcovertrespassers?
Inmyview,whileitcannotbesaidthatthe RailwaysBoard owedacommon
dutyofcaretotheyoungboyinthepresentcasetheydidowetohimat
leastthedutyofactingwithcommonhumanitytowardshim.Inregard
tothewordsthatIhavequotedfromAddie'scaseIdonotthinkthatthe
RailwaysBoard (throughtheirservants)didanyactwiththedeliberate
intentionofdoingharmtotheboy:theiromissionforalongtimetorepair
thefenceandtheircontinuingdistributionofelectricpoweralongtheirlive
raildidnot,inmyview,amounttoa"recklessdisregardofthepresenceof
"ofatrespasser".Ifthoselastquotedwordscanbesaidtocoverthe
likelyorexpectedoranticipatedpresenceofatrespasserthenthequestion
ariseswhetherthelamentableinactionofthe RailwaysBoard istobecharac
terisedas"reckless".AstothisIhavedoubt.Theword"reckless"
seemsmoreappositeinreferencetopositiveconductthantoinaction.
Thedutythatlayuponthe RailwaysBoard wasalimitedone.There
wasnodutytoensurethatnotrespassercouldenterupontheland.And
certainlyanoccupierowesnodutytomakehislandfitfortrespassersto
trespassin.Norneedhemakesurveysofhislandinordertodecide

whetherdangersexistofwhichheisunaware.Thegenerallawremainsthat
onewhotrespassesdoessoathisperil.Butinthepresentcasetherewere
anumberofspecialcircumstances(a)theplacewherethefencewasfaulty
wasneartoapublicpathandpublicground(b)achildmighteasilypass
throughthefence(c)ifachilddidpassthroughandgoontothetrack
hewouldbeingravedangerofdeathorseriousbodilyharm(d)achild

14
mightnotrealisetheriskinvolvedintouchingtheliverailorbeingina.
placewhereatrainmightpassatspeed.Becauseofthesecircumstances
(allofthemwellknownandobvious)therewas,inmyview,adutywhich.
whilenotamountingtothedutyofcarewhichanoccupierowestoa
visitor,wouldbeadutytotakesuchstepsascommonsenseorcommon.
humanitywoulddictate:theywouldbestepscalculatedtoexcludeorto.
warnorotherwisewithinreasonableandpracticablelimitstoreduceor
avertdanger.
Iwouldadopttheapproachofmynobleandlearnedfriend,LordPearson.
inhisjudgmentintheCourtofAppealinVidean'scase.Inagreementwith
him,Idonotthinkthatthereisanysoundbasisofprinciplefordifferentiating
sharplybetweenliabilityforthestaticconditionoflandandliabilityfor
currentoperationsonland.Ingeneral,therefore,atrespasserhasnot
onlytotakethelandashefindsitbutthecurrentoperationsonlandashe
findsthem.Yetapotentialoractualtrespassermayonoccasionbea
neighbourand,asmynobleandlearnedfriendsaid(atpage678),the
expression"dutytoaneighbour"ismoreappropriatelyusedasanaid
toascertainingwhetherornotthereisadutyofcareowingbyoneperson
toanotherratherthanasadefinitionofthecontentofsuchaduty.So
(atpage680)"Ifthepersonconcerneddoesnotknowoforhavegood
"reasontoanticipatethepresenceofthetrespasser,thatpersonowesto
"himnodutyofcarebecauseheisnotwithinthe'zoneofreasonable
"'contemplation'andisnota'neighbour'.Ifthepersonconcernedknows
"oforhasgoodreasontoanticipatethepresenceofthetrespasser,that
"personowestothetrespasseradutyofcarewhichissubstantiallyless
"thanthedutyofcarewhichisowingtoalawfulvisitor,becausetheduty
"toatrespasserisonlyadutytotreathimwithcommonhumanityand
"notadutytomakethelandandoperationsthereonsafeforthetrespasser
"inhistrespassing."
ThecaseofCommissionerfor Railways (N.S.W.) v .Cardy104C.L.R.274
amplyrepaysstudy.Thoughtheboywhowasinjuredwasatrespasserhe
recovereddamages.InthecourseofhisjudgmentDixonC.L.said
"Inprincipleadutyofcareshouldrestonamantosafeguardothersfrom
"agravedangerofseriousharm,ifknowinglyhehascreatedthedanger
"orisresponsibleforitscontinuedexistenceandisawareofthelikelihood
"ofotherscomingintoproximityofthedangerandhasthemeansofpre
"ventingitorofavertingthedangerorofbringingittotheirknowledge."
WindeyerJ.expressedtheviewthatthedutyofanoccupierisrootedat
bottominhisdutytohisneighbourinLordAtkin'ssenseandhesaid
(atpage321)"Nomanhasadutytomakehislandsafefortrespassers.
"But,ifhehasmadeitdangerousandthedangerhehascreatedisnot
"apparent,hemayhaveadutytowarnpeoplewhomightcomethereof
"thedangerofdoingso.Whethertherebesuchadutyinaparticular
"casemustdependuponthecircumstances,includingthelikelihoodof
"peoplecomingthere.Butiftheywouldbelikelytocome,thedutydoes
"not,inmyview,disappearbecauseincomingtheywouldbetrespassing.
"Itisadutyowedtolikelycomers,tothosewhowouldbeintrudersas
"tothosewhowouldbewelcome."Hefurthersaid(atpage322)"Ido
"notseehow,speakinggenerally,therecanbeadutyeithertoprevent
"peopletrespassingortomakethepremisessafeforthosewhodo.But
"thedutythatIthinkcan,inappropriatecircumstances,existisadutyto
"warnpersonscominguponpremisesofhiddendangerstheymayencounter
"there,whenthosedangersarenotnaturalfeaturesofthelandbutarise
"fromconditionscreatedbytheoccupier.Suchadutyisnotnecessarily
"dischargedbypostingnoticessuchas'Trespasserswillbeprosecuted'
"forthewarningrequiredisnotthattrespassingisnottoleratedbutthat
"entrymaybedangerous."

ForthereasonswhichIhavegivenIconsiderthatthelearnedjudge
waswarrantedindecidingthattheplaintiffwasentitledtorecover.My
approachinvolvessomedeparturefromsomeofwhatwassaidinQuinlan's
case.Itinvolvesalsothat,onitsfacts,thedecisioninAddie'scaseshould
inmyviewhavebeentheotherway.TheCollieryCompanyknewthat

15

youngchildrenwereinthehabitofplayingonthegroundneartothewheel
inquestionandknewthat,thoughattimestherewerewarnings,children
continuedtofrequenttheplace.Theyknewthatchildrenmightbeor
werelikelytobethere.Iconsiderthatwithsuchknowledgetheyshould
havetakenreasonablecaretoavoidtheriskofachildtrespasserbeing
killedorinjuredbyreasonofthewheelbeingsuddenlyandblindlyputto
work.ItfollowsthatIconsiderthatthecasewaswronglydecided.
Iwoulddismisstheappeal.

LordWilberforce

mylords,

Thisis,unusually,astraightcaseofaninfanttrespasser.Thesixyear
oldboywastrespassingonthe railway whenhecameintocontactwitha
liveelectricrail,wasfortunatelynotkilled,butwasseverelyinjured.There
wasnoallurementontothedefendant'slandthereisnobasis,inreality
orfiction,bywhichthechildcanbetreatedasalicensee.Therewasno
wilfulintentiontoinjurehimnor(Ishallreturntothis)recklessdisregard
ofhispresence.Atmost(andthishasbeenfound)therewasalackof
carebythe Board asregardsthemaintenanceofitsfences.
Wehavenot,inEngland,anygenerallawastopublicenterpriseliability.
Asregardsfencing,suchdutyasthe Board has( Railway Clauses(Con
solidation)Act,1845,section68,which,itseemsprotectscattlebutnot
children)datesfrom1845sincewhen,evenafterelectrification,Parliament
hasnotthoughtitnecessarytoimposenewobligationson railway com
panies.Soiftheplaintiffistorecover,hemustrelyonouroutdatedlaw
offaultliabilitywhichinvolvestheneedtoestablishadutyofcaretowards
himandabreachofit.Atonceheisfacedbytheformidableauthority
ofRobertAddie&Sons(Collieries)Ltd. v .Dumbreck[1929]AC358.
ThereareperhapstwothingsaboutAddie'scasewhich,outofmany
commentsthathavebeenmadeovertheyears,arerelevanthere.
First,thebulkofthecriticismhasbeenofitasadecisiononitsfacts.
Itisclaimedthatitshouldhavebeendecidedtheotherway,infavourof
thechild,asitwasdecidedintheCourtofSession,as,onverysimilarfacts,
Callan'scasethreeyearslaterwasdecidedintheplaintiff'sfavour(Excelsior
WireRopeCo. v .Callan[1930]A.C.404).Thedifferenceofopinion
betweentheInnerHouseandthisHousewasessentiallyastowhetherthe
childshouldhavebeenregardedasalicensee.TheLordPresidentsaid
heshouldhecomparedhimwiththeplaintiffinLowery v .Walker([1911]
A.C.10)andsaid,astotheuserofthecompany'spremises,thatitwas
substantiallyacquiescedinandacquiescenceisoftenaformofwhatmay
becalledanunwillingconsent(l.c.p.555).ThisHousetookadifferent
view:hewas,ontheSheriffSubstitute'sfinding,atrespasserandnothing
else.Thewheelhadbeentherelongbeforethehouseinwhichhelived
wasbuilt,sothattherewasnoquestionofadangerousthinghavingbeen
placedinhisproximity:theonlyrelevantrelationshipwastheoccupier/
trespasserrelationship.IhavereferredtothesefactualpointsbecauseI
donotthinkthatweshoulddecidethiscasebymeticulouslycomparingthe
factsherewiththefactsthere.Whatweareconcernedwithistheprinciple
oflawwhichAddieestablishedtoseewhatitisandwhatcasesitgoverns.
ThesecondthingtobesaidaboutAddleisthatitisacasetobecon
sideredinacontext,thecontextofpreviousandsubsequentcasesof
commonlaw,andthecontextofborderingbutnotidenticaltypicalsitua
tions.Thishasoftenbeenforgotten.Theprestigeofthelearnedlaw

Lordswhogavetheopinionsinthatcase,andtheclarityandemphasisof
thoseopinionshasledtoitsrulesbeingtreatedasacodeoflawtobe
scrupulouslyappliedtoeverysituationwherethedefendantisanoccupier
oflandwhatevermaybethesetoffactsoutofwhichtheinjury,and

theclaimfordamages,mayhavearisen.Itisoftenthefateofclearpro
nouncementsinlawasinsciencetobetreatedinthisway,withcon
sequencesmoreandmorestrainedasdifferentcasesareforcedwithinthem

16

bytheuseoffictionsandotherdevicesuntilthereisaburstingoftheseams
andacrythatthiscaseasastatementofthelawmustbeoverruled.That
iswhatweareaskedtodohere.
Ishouldsayatoncethat,evenapartfromtheargumentagainstthiswhich
theOccupiersLiabilityAct,1957,provides,Ishouldhesitatetosupport
thiscourse.Weshouldfirstseewhetherwecanmoveonfromtheposition
takenin1929byclassicalmethodsofexperience,analogyandlogic.We
shouldapproachthiswithoutthetoocomplacentassumptionthatourpresent
ageishumanerthanwasthatof40yearsago:butwemaytakethebenefit
ofexperienceandrecognisefreshsituationsespeciallythoseofextreme
danger,whichhavebecometypical.
Therecanbenodoubtthatthelawregardingoccupiers'liabilityforms
partofthegenerallawofnegligence.Theearlier19thcenturycaseswere
actionsonThecase(Deane v .Clayton(1817)7Taunt489.4.,Lynch v .
Nurdin(1841)1Q.B.29)andthoughattemptsweremadetotreatsome
ofthemasbasedonnuisancethiswasnotatendencywhichprevailed.
Sincethesewerewhatwenowcallactionsinnegligence,itwasnecessary
todefinethedegreeofcareowedtopersonscomingonlandinparticular
circumstances,andthisledtotheemergence,inprogressivelysegregated
divisionsofthefamiliartripartiteclassificationwhichinAddiewasstated
tobeexhaustive,andthelineseparatingthemanabsolutelyrigidline([1929]
A.Cp.371perViscountDunedin).Thefirstdutyofthecourt,itwassaid,
wastofixonceandforallintowhichclasstheplaintifffalls.TheScottish
Courtsavoidedthisrigidityandproceededuponthegeneralprinciples
governingthelawofnegligence(Addie'scase1928S.C.547,551perLord
PresidentClyde).TheformulationbythisHouseinAddiegaverisenot
onlytodissatisfactioninScotlandbuttodifficultysincehumanconductcan
rarelybesqueezedneatlyintoapredeterminedslotandifthisiswhat
courtsaretoldtodo,theywillfindways,accordingtotheirviewsofthe
merits,ofcrossingthelines.Sotheyhavefoundmeansofconverting
trespassersintolicenseesbyimputinglicences,andinthecaseofchildren
theyhaveimprovedtheirstatusbyafindingofallurementorbystraining
thefacts.
Weoughtnowtoaskthequestiondirectly,what,inrelationparticularlyto
infanttrespassers,isthedutyofcare(SeeCommissionerof Railways (N.S.W.)
 v .Cardy104,C.L.R.274)fortherecognitionofsomedutyofcare,even
towardstrespassers,incertainlimitedcases,iswhattheimputationofa
licencereallymeans.Wemay,thoughherewearegettingnearthedangerous
groundoflegislation,bereadierthanourpredecessorstoseeliabilityfor
injuriestoindividualsplaceduponsocietygenerally,ofwhichthe Railways
Board effectivelyformspart.Andifwedonotgosofarastorecognise
thatspecialrulesoughttobedevisedforchildtrespassers(c.f.American
Restatement,Torts(2nd)section339),wecanatleastacceptthatfreshand
morelethaldangerstotheirsafetyhaveappeared,andcomenearertothem,
andthatsomewheremorecarehastobeusedtopreventthembeinghurt.
Isay"somewhere"becausetheoccupierofadjoininglandisnottheonly,
orindeedthefirst,personinthelineofresponsibility.Eventodayparents
havesomecontrolandresponsibility,andifchildrenareonaplayground
whichsomeonehasprovidedforthepurpose,thatpersonhasaresponsibility
toseethatitissafe.

Does,then,Addiecontainanexhaustivedefinitionofanoccupier'sduties
topersonsonhisland?Onedoesnotseewhy,inprinciple,thisshould
beso.Itcouldbesoifthefactofoccupationoflandweretobethebasis
ofexemptionfromanygreaterliabilitythantherelevantruleprescribes.
Butthisideahasbeenrefutedmorethanonce(seeCommissionerforRail
ways(N.S.W.) v .McDermott[1967]AC169,186).Thecorrectconception
isthatstatedbythePrivyCouncilwhenthroughViscountRadcliffethe
Board saidthattheAddieruleswereexpressiveofcertainconsequences
asregardsproximityandforeseeabilitywhichflowfromthegivenrelationship
(occupierandinviteelicenseetrespasser).(Commissionerfor Railways
(N.S.W.) v .Quinlan[1964]AC1054,1072.)Or,aswasputbyBarwick
C.J.thereis"aquantitativeelementbothintheextentoftheforeseeability

17

"andofthereasonablestepsrequiredtofulfilanyresultantdutyarising
"fromthecircumstancesinwhichtheinjuredpersoncameonthescene".
(Munnings v .HydroelectricCommissionofTasmania[1971]AJ.L.R.378,
382.)Ifthisisgenerallyso,itmustfollowthatthelawcan,particularly,
takeintoaccountotherrelevantfactors,iftheyexist,whichbearuponthese
mattersofforesightandprudence.Itdoessowheninthegeneralcaseit
considersitrelevanttoknowwhetherthepresenceoftherelevantperson
wasknown,"asgoodasknown"Commissionerfor Railways v .Quinlan
[1964]AC1054and1076,or"extremelylikely"ExcelsiorWireRopeCo. v .
Gallon[1930]A.C.404,410,anditseemsanecessarystepfromthistosay
thatparticularcircumstancesmayexistinwhichanincreaseddutyof
"foreseeability"mayarise.
Thereareotherindications,inthelawasitstands,oftherelevanceof
particularfactorsasmodifyingthegeneralrules.Firstthereisthedoctrine
ofallurements.Ithasbeencriticised,asadevice,likeimputedlicenses,for
escapingfromtheAddierules.ButitisolderthanAddieandreflectsthe
perfectlysoundconceptionthatasparticularthingsare("foreseeably")
likelytobeattractivetochildren,theoccupierowesaduty,iftheyare
dangerous,nottoputtheminthechildren'sway.Theclassiccaseisthat
oftheberriesintheparkGlasgowCorporation v .Taylor[1922]1AC44.
Secondly,thereisthelawastofencing.Ingeneralanoccupierisunder
nodutytofencehislandsoastoexcludetrespassers,aruleofimportance
to Railway CompaniesandofvalidityasthisHousehasdecided(Edwards v .
Railway Executive[1952]A.C.737).Thefact,thatParliamenthasnot
imposedadutysecurelytofencechildrenorothersout,isarecognition
thatacompromisemustbestruckbetweenthedesiretosaveeveryone
fromeverydangerandthecosttothecommunityofdoingso.Itmeansthat
therearesituationswhereevenchildrenwillnotrecover.Butthecourts
havequalifiedthisexemptionbyreferencetoparticularcircumstancesas,
forexample,thatpersonsareknownfrequentlytohaveaccessalongatrack
Cooke v .MidlandG.W. Railway ofIreland[1909]A.C.229,Lowery v .
Walker[1911]AC10which,thoughputupontheimputationofalicence,
reallyreflectthefactthatsomeelementarydutyisowed.Similarly,there
arethecasesofpitfallswhereanoccupiermakesanexcavationneara
highway(cf.Prentice v .AssetsCo.17R.484)(thesamewouldsurelybe
trueofotherhazards,e.g.anelectricwire):heisunderaduty,evento
trespassers,totakesomestepstokeepthemoff.
Thirdly,thereisthepositionofcontractorscarryingoutworkonland.
AnumberofcasesDavis v .St.Mary'sDemolition&ExcavationCo.Ltd.
[1954]1W.L.R.592,Morney v .LanarkshireCountyCouncil[1954]S.C.245.
A.G.Billings&SonsLtd. v .Riden[1958]AC240,whichIneednot
examineindetail(someofthemIthinkputthedutytoohigh),have
establishedtheirresponsibilityinprinciple,throughadutyofcare,toward
trespassers,includinginfanttrespassers.Theirliabilityshouldnotdepend
solelyuponwhethertheywere,orwerenot,themselvesoccupiersofthe
land,anditwouldbeabsurdiftherewereonelawforcontractorsdoing
workandanotherlawiftheoccupierdidthesameworkhimselfcf.Buckland
v .GuildfordGasLight&CokeCo.[1949]1K.B.410,Creed v .McGeogh
&Sons[1955]1W.L.R.1005bothperfectlysounddecisionsinthemselves.
Thisisnottosaythatthecontractor'sdutyistobeimposedormeasured
regardlessofthefactthatthevictimmayhavebeenatrespasser,butit
istosaythattheremaybecircumstancesinwhichcontractorsandoccupiers
alikemayhavesome(Iamnotsayingthesame)responsibilityfortrespassers'
safety,outsidethebareAddieprinciple.Itiscurious,infact,thatthispoint
escapedattentionsolongafterCallan'scase(ExcelsiorWireRopeCo. v .
Callan[1930]A.C.405)hadshownhoweasyitistoreachajustandsensible
conclusiononceoneescapesfromanarcoticpreoccupationwiththe
occupier/trespasserrelationship.
ThesearemerelyexamplestoillustratethepropositionthatAddieisnot
anallembracingcode,butapieceinthelargerwholeofaman'sdutyof
caretothosewhomaycomeintohisproximity,andmaybeinjuredby
actionsoreventsoccurringonhisland.

18

Ihavealreadyreferredbrieflytothehistoricalantecedentsofthelaw
ofoccupiers'liability.Itwouldbepossibletoshow,inmybelief,thatAddie
tosomeextentrepresentedastepbackinthedirectionofcategorisation
fromanearliermoregeneralattitudetothedutyofcare.Itismore
significantforthepresentcasetorecallthatitoccurredprecisely
atatimewhenthelawofnegligencewasbeingputonageneralisedbasis
andthatmanyoftheeminentlegalauthoritiesofthistimewereparties,
indifferingcombinations,toAddie,Callan'scase(ExcelsiorWireRopeCo.
v .Callan[1930]A.S.405)andDonoghue v .Stevenson[1932]AC562.
Itishardtobelievethattheyregardedthesecasesasinconsistent,oras
separatingoccupiers'cases,assuch,fromallothersituationswherecare
mightbeneeded.
IpassoverforthemomenttheOccupiersLiabilityAct,1957,inorder
torefertofourAustraliancases,decidedintheHighCourt,whichgive
usvaluableguidanceinthesearchforamoderndefinition,oratleast
outlineofthedutyofcarewhichmaybeowedtotrespassersincasessuch
asthepresent.Itwillbenecessarytosupplementthisbyconsiderationof
Quinlan'scaseinwhichthePrivyCouncil,onaNewSouthWalesAppeal,
mayappeartohavetakenastepback.TheHighCourtcasesareThompson
v .BankstownCorporation(1953)87C.L.R.619,Rich v .Commissionerfor
 Railways (N.S.W.)(1959)101C.L.R.135,Commissionerfor Railways

(N.S.W.) v .Cardey(195960)104C.L.R.274andMunnings v .HydroElectric
Commission(1971)A.J.L.R.378.
Richwasalevelcrossingcase,Cardeyoneofachildstrayingontoan
attractiverubbishdumpwithhotashesunderthesurface:Thompsonand
Munningsarenearerthesubjectmatterofthiscasebeingconcernedwithhigh
tensionelectricwiresplacedinproximitytoplaceswherechildrenmightbe.
Althougheachcaseisdifficultinitsfactsandrequiredextensivelegal
argument,theycanfairlybesummarisedintothegeneralisationthatthey
reflectatendencytowardtherecognitionofadutyofcare,appropriate
tothecircumstances,extractedfromthesituationandshapedbyit,
independentofsuchliabilityasmightarisefromtherelationofoccupier
andlicenseeortrespasser.Icitesomepassageswhichclearlyreflectthis.
InThompsonthejudgmentofDixonC.J.andWilliamsJ.containedthis:
"Amanorchildmaybeinfringinguponanother'spossessionoflandor
"goodsatthetimeheisinjuredanditwillbenobartohisrecoveryif
"otherwisehecanmakeouttheconstituentelementsofacauseofaction."
TheycitedinsupportofthisGallonscase,Mourton v .Poulter[1932]K.B.
183,Buckland v .GuildfordGasLight&CokeCo.[1949]1K.B.410and
GlasgowCorporation v .Taylor[1922]1AC44.Inthesamecasethe
judgmentofKittoJ.containedanevenmoreexplicitpassage.After
mentioning,intermsofacceptance,thecaseofAddieandEdwardshesaid:
"Therespondent'scontentionappearstoassumethattheruleoflawwhich
"definesthelimitsofthedutyowedbyanoccupiertoatrespassergoes
''sofarastoprovidetheoccupierwithaneffectiveanswertoanyassertion
"bythetrespasserthatduringtheperiodofthetrespasstheoccupierowed
"himadutyofcare.Theassumptionisunwarranted,fortheruleiscon
"cernedonlywiththeincidentswhichthelawattachestothespecificrelation
"ofoccupierandtrespasser.Itdemands,asLordUthwattsaidinRead
" v .J.Lyons&Co.Ltd.astandardofconductwhichareasonablyminded
"occupierwithdueregardtohisowninterestsmightwellagreetobefair
"andatrespassermightinacivilisedcommunityreasonablyexpect.Itwould
"beamisconceptionoftheruletoregarditasprecludingtheapplication
"ofthegeneralprincipleofM'Alister(orDonoghue) v .Stevenson,toa
"casewhereanoccupier,inadditiontobeinganoccupier,standsinsome
"otherrelationtoatrespassersothatthelatterisnotonlyatrespasserbut
"isalsotheoccupier'sneighbour,inLordAtkin'ssenseoftheword:see
"TransportCommissionersofNewSouthWales v .Barton."Theclarity
ofthispassagehascausedittobefollowed,inanalogoussituations,in
Australia,butitreceivedsomecriticismbasedIthinkuponsomemisunder
standinginQuinlan'scase(seebelow).

19

Thesameconceptionofadutyofcare,coexistingwiththespecialduties
arisingfromoccupationisdevelopedinhisjudgmentofFullagarJ.in
Rich,andagainbyDixonC.J.inCardey.Iquotetwopassages:"Therule
"remainsthatamantrespassesathisownriskandtheoccupierisunder
"nodutytohimexcepttorefrainfromintentionalorwantonharmtohim.
"Butitrecognisesthatneverthelessadutyexistswheretotheknowledge
"oftheoccupierpremisesarefrequentedbystrangersorareopenlyused
"byotherpeopleandtheoccupieractivelycreatesaspecificperilseriously
"menacingtheirsafetyorcontinuesitinexistence.Thedutymaybe
"limitedtoperilsofwhichthepersonsousingthepremisesareunaware
"andwhichtheyareunlikelytoexpectandguardagainst.Thedutyis
"measuredbythenatureofthedangerorperilbutitmay,accordingto
"circumstances,besufficientlydischargedbywarningofthedanger,bytaking
"stepstoexcludetheintruderorbyremovalorreductionofthedanger."
Andlater:"Inprincipleadutyofcareshouldrestonamantosafeguard
"othersfromagravedangerofseriousharmisknowinglyhehascreated
"thedangerorisresponsibleforitscontinuedexistenceandisawareofthe
"likelihoodofotherscomingintoproximityofthedangerandhasthe

"meansofpreventingitorofavertingthedangerorofbringingittotheir
"knowledge."Therearenodoubtwordsandexpressionsherewhichcanbe
discussed,Idonotsayimprovedon,fortheformerChiefJusticeisamaster
oflanguagebuthewouldhimselfneverclaimthateverypossiblecase
canbeincludedinaformula.TheprincipleisonewhichIamhappyto
adopt:Addie'scaseastheplaingeneralruleroom,incircumstancestobe
carefullydefined,foraspecialdutyofcare.Theotherjudgments,particu
larlythatofFullagarJ.repaystudy:Itakemytwoshortexcerptsfrom
thatofWindeyerJ.Ofatrespasserhesays:"Thetrespasserinrelation
"totheoccupierthusreallystandsoutsidethelawofnegligence,forto
"him,consideredsimplyasanentrantupontheland,theoccupierhasno
"dutyofcare.Suchadutymay,however,arisefromsomecircumstances
"beyondthemerefactofentry,asforexamplefromtheoccupier'sknow
"ledgeofthetrespasser'spresenceandofhisproximitytodangerousopera
"tions.Itarisesthennotasadutytohimasatrespasser,buttohimas
"anindividualwhoserelationtotheoccupierhasbecomethatofa
"'neighbour'."Andlater:"Nomanhasadutytomakehislandsafe

"fortrespassers.But,ifhehasmadeitdangerousandthedangerhehas
"createdisnotapparent,hemayhaveadutytowarnpeoplewhomight
"comethereofthedangerofdoingso.Whethertherebesuchaduty
"inaparticularcasemustdependuponthecircumstances,includingthe
"likelihoodofpeoplecomingthere.Butiftheywouldbelikelytocome,
"thedutydoesnot,inmyview,disappearbecauseincomingtheywould
"betrespassing.Itisadutyowedtolikelycomers,tothosewhowould
"beintrudersaswellastothosewhowouldbewelcome."Therecognition
ofalargerareasurroundingAddie'scase,whichIfavour,iswellsummedup
inthefirsttwosentencesofthelattercitation.
Quinlan'scase(Commissionersfor Railways (N.S.W.) v .Quinlan[1964]
A.C.1054)hasbeenthoughtbylaterAustraliancases,andsomeEnglish
authorities,toconstituteanobstacletoawiderviewofthelawasregards
trespassers.Itwasdifficultandunusualinitsfacts,beingconcernedwitha
private railway crossingusedbytheRespondentinconditionshardto
define.Nodiscussionofitwouldbefairunlessitweresquarelyrecognised
thatitcamedownfirmlyagainsttheviewthatadutyofcare(calledin
thejudgmenta"generaldutyofcare")cancoexistwiththeverylimited
dutytoatrespasserstatedinAddie'scase.Butitisimportanttoseewhat
wasmeantbythisdisclaimer.
Theprevioushistoryofthecaseandtheformofthedirectiontothejury
showveryclearly,andimportantly,thatwhatthecourtshadtoconsider
waswhetherQuinlan,thoughatrespasser,mightsucceedinnegligenceunder
"thedutyofgeneralcare".Thisthe Board rejectedonabasisappearing
earlyinthejudgment.Thereisnoprinciple,itissaid,tobededuced
fromDonoghue v .Stevensonwhichthrowsanyparticularlightuponthe
legalrightsanddutiesthatarisewhenatrespasserisinjuredona railway

20

levelcrossingwherehehasnorighttobe.Moreparticularlythelikelihood
ofatrespasserbeingpresentatsometimeoranotherisnotsufficientto
imposeupontheoccupieranygeneraldutyofcaretowardssuchatrespasser.
Itisthispropositionwhichthe Board isconcernedtojustifyfromthe
authorities.WiththispropositionIhavenodesiretodisagree.Iwould
acceptthatinsuchacasetherulesofAddie'scasemayadequatelygovern
thesituation.Thetrespasserisjustatrespasserandthereisnorelevantset
ofcircumstancesinvolvingseriousriskandproximitysufficienttocallin
playadutyofcareindependentoftheoccupiertrespasserrelationship.Indeed
thepropositionitself,byreferringto"thegeneraldutyofcare"carriesits
ownaffirmation.Ageneralduty,withoutsupportingcircumstancesgiving
risetothisdutyandmeasuringitsextent,isameaninglessidea.Donoghue
v .Stevensondoesnotevokeit,Addie'scasedeniesit.Butitisavery

differentmatterwhenprovedcircumstancesexistsufficienttoplaceadefinable
duty(howeverslightforexampletowarn)uponthepersonwhoisrespon
siblefortheexistenceofthosecircumstances,occupierornot,andIthink
thatthejudgmentinQuinlanrecognisedthiswhenitwas,perhapsrather
cryptically,said"thatsolongastherelationshipofoccupierandtrespasser
"isorcontinuestobearelevantdescriptionoftherelationshipbetweenthe
"personwhoinjures...andthepersonwhoisinjuredanimportant

"qualificationtheoccupier'sdutyislimitedintheacceptedterms".(Can
"arelevant"herebereadas"therelevant"?)Whethersufficientcircum
stancesofthiskindweretobefoundinQuinlan'scaseisnotamatterwhich
needsconcernus.Itisonlywhenthejudgmentisinvokedasadenialofthe
possibilityofsuchcircumstancesandthecorrelativedutythatImustpart
companywithitsinterpreters.
Furtherextensivecitationisundesirable,butImustmentiononepassage
wherereferenceismadetotheextractfromthejudgmentofKittoJ.in
Thompson'scasecitedabove.Thecriticismmadeisagainthatthelimited
dutyofanoccupiertoatrespassercannotcoexistwith"thewidegeneral
"dutyofcareappropriatetotheDonoghue v .Stevensonformula":if
thereistobeanotherrelationthegroundsofitmustadmitofreasonably
precisedefinitionotherwiseitwillbeimpossibletodirectjuriesinan
adequatemanner.
1thinkthatKittoJ.hasherebeenmisunderstood.Idonotunderstand
him(orthosewhohavefollowedhim)tobearguingforageneraldutyof
care:nordoIthinkthathewoulddisagreewiththenecessityforreason
ablyprecisedefinitioncertainlyIwouldnot,andIfullyrecognisethat,
unlessthatispossible,plaintiffssuchasthepresentplaintiffcannot,ifthey
areoutsidetheAddierules,succeed.AswaswellsaidintheHighCourt,
weshouldnotbetooreadytoerodethegeneralruleofAddie'scaseby
discoveringlooeasilyspecialdutiesofcare.(Munning'scase(u.s.)per
WalshJ.atp.394.)
Thereisoneotherpointdiscussedinthejudgment,uponwhichIfind
myselfinagreementwiththe Board thatisthediscussionofthe(then)
recentCourtofAppealcaseofVidean v . British TransportCommission
[196312Q.B.650.This,too,wasacaseofaninfanttrespassingona
railway andofarescuer.Theinfant'sclaimfailedbutthemajorityinthe
CourtofAppealmade(obiter)adistinctionbetweensimpleoccupationof
landandthecarryingonofoperationsofland,andheldthatasregards
thelattertheoccupier'sdutyasregardsatrespasserwas"thecommon
"dutyofcare"oradutytotake"reasonablecare".Thisdutyarose
wheneverhe"oughttoforesee"theirpresence.The Board criticisedthis
intworespects:first,asregardsthewords"oughttoforesee"whichit
pointedoutbegsthewholequestionatissuenamely,whetherthereisa
dutytowardstrespassersatall,andimposesfartoowideadutyupon
occupiers.Secondlyandthisisconsistentwiththe Board 'sgeneral
approachitrejectedtheimpositionofageneralorcommondutyofcare
inthisIwouldagreewithitbutinafullstatementofthelawitwould,
inmyopinion,benecessarytorecognisethepossibilitybothofadutyto
foreseeandofaspecialandlimiteddutyofcarearisingoutofandquan
titativelymeasuredbyparticularcircumstances<seecitationsabovefrom

21

Quinlan'scaseandMunning'scase).IthinkthatthejudgmentofPearson
L.J.inVideanendorsesthisapproach.
Howdoesthematterrest?Itisoftensaidthatthelawonthistopic
isinconfusion,butthisistodoitlessthanjustice.Whenonehaselimi
natedfromitcomplexitiesoffactsituation(werethepedestriansinLowery
v .Walkertrespassersorlicenseesaccordingtothejudge'snotes,howdid
thewheelinAddiedifferfromthatinCallan,werethechildreninCooke
licenseesortrespassers?)andwhenonceonehasdiscardedfictions,rules
canbeseentoemergefromthemistswithreasonableclarity,butIemphasise
nogreaterclarity,thanweoughttoexpectfromthecommonlaw,which
alwaysleavesaresiduetobecompletedbycommonsense.
Ingeneral,anoccupieroflandowesnodutytotrespassers,orintending
trespassers:heisnotobligedtomakehislandsafefortheirtrespassing.
Ifheknows,or"asgoodasknows"(Quinlanatp.1070)oftheactual
presenceofatrespasser,heisunderadutyasdefinedinAddie'scase
nottoactwiththedeliberateintentionofdoingharmtohimortoactwith
recklessdisregardofhispresence.Imustreturntothismatterofreckless
ness,butatpresentitisenoughtosaythatrecklessdisregardasusedby
ViscountHailshamsurelybearsitsnormalmeaninginthelawasakin
tointentionalinjury,butinsteadofintention,notcaringwhetherhedoes
soornot.Andthisinvolvesknowledgeofthetrespasser'spresence.
Iseenoreasontodiscardthealternativetestof"extremelylikely"(Lord
BuckmasterinCallan[1930]A.C.404,410),inrelationtothetrespasser's
presence.ApartfromitsoriginithasreceivedsupportfromDixonC.J.
andWindeyerJ.(104C.L.R.274,286,320)andotherjudgesaswellasthe
PrivyCouncilinQuinlan.Itexcludesnecessarilyanylowerdutyoffore
seeabilityinthegeneralcasebyanoccupieroftrespassers'presence(see
Quinlanl.c.p.1072,1074).
ThisisthegeneralruleasstatedbyViscountHailshamL.C.Ithinkit
isstillasoundruleandIthinkthatwemustsupportit.
Thequestionremainswhether,inparticularcircumstances,amanmaybe
undersomedutyofaparticularkind,otherthantoabstainfromwilful
injury,orrecklessdisregard.Atestmorespecificthanthatof"foresight
oflikelihoodoftrespass"andadefinitionofdutymorelimitedthanthatof
"thecommondutyofcare"isrequired.
Thedangersoftooprecise,orexhaustiveorcodified,adefinitionare
exemplifiedbyAddie'scaseitself.Ontheotherhand,toadopttheexpedient
ofrecoilinguponthecomfortableconceptofthereasonablemanishardly
goodenough.Itevadestheproblembythrowingitintothelapofthejudge.
Wemusttryatleasttosetupsomeboundarymarks.Ithinkitissaferto
proceedbyexclusion,andthentothefactsofthiscase.Anoccupieris
notunderanygeneraldutytoforeseethepossibilityorlikelihoodoftrespass
onhisland,ortocarryoutinspectiontoseewhethertrespassisoccurring
orlikely.Tosupposeotherwisewouldimposeimpossibleburdens.Nor
canatrespasserbygivingnoticetotheoccupierthathemaytrespassata
particularplaceortime,bythatfactcreateadutytowardshim.
Anoccupierisundernogeneraldutytofencehislandagainsttrespassers,
orevenagainstchildtrespassers:andinmyopinion,inprinciple,this
exclusionisvalidwhetherornottheoccupieriscarryingonoperationson
thelandorwhethersomedangerexiststhroughastaticcondition(e.g.a
quarryHolland v .LanarkshireMiddleWardDistrictCommittee[1909]S.C.
1142).Apoisonedpool(258U.S.268)maygiverisetoaspecialduty.
Exceptionsmaybefound(theseareonlyexamples)(a)inthecaseof
pitfallsandanalogoussituationsofdangerscreatednearaplacewherethe
victimhadarighttogo,(b)inthecaseofallurementstochildren.The
principlebehindthelatteris.inmyopinion,notoneofimputingalicence,
butthatofadutytotakereasonablestepsnottoplaceinthewayofsmall
childrenpotentiallyhurtfulandattractiveobjects.

Intheparticularcaseof railway companies,thereisnogeneraldutyto

erectormaintainfencessufficienttoexcludeadultsorchildrenthecaseof
 EdwardsisclearonthispointandIrespectfullythinkright:theonlyduty

22

istomarkoffthe railway property.Ifmoreprecautionsareneededbecause

oftheproximityofaplaygroundtheymayhavetobetakenbythosein
controloftheplayground,fencingin,ratherthanfencingout.
ThenonthepositivesideIthinkthatwecanbestservethedevelopment
ofthelawbyconcentratingontheparticulartypeofcasewhichhasengaged
thecourts,andonwhichthelawhasbeentestedbyexperience.Justasin
the19thcenturytheintroductionofturntables,attractivetochildren,
accessibleanddangerous,gaverisetoajurisprudenceknownbytheirname.
sowemusttakeaccountoftheplacingofelectricalconductorsaboveoron
thegroundalloverourovercrowdedislandandseewherethisleadsas
regardsforesightandcare.Theingredientsofsuchdutyasmayarise
muststemfromtheinevitableproximitytoplacesofaccess,including
highways,fromthecontinuousnatureofthedanger,fromthelethaldanger
ofcontactandfromthefactthattochildrenthedangermaynotbeapparent.
Thereisnodutytomaketheplacesafe,butadutydoesarisebecauseof
theexistence,neartothepublic,ofadangeroussituation.Thegreater
theproximity,thegreatertherisk,andcorrespondinglytheneedofforesight
andadutyofcare.
Whatisthenatureofthisdutyofcare?Again,itmustberemembered
thatweareconcernedwithtrespassers,andacompromisemustbereached
betweenthedemandsofhumanityandthenecessitytoavoidplacingundue
burdensonoccupiers.Whatisreasonabledependsonthenatureanddegree
ofthedanger.Italsodependsonthedifficultyandexpenseofguarding
againstit.Thelaw,inthiscontext,takesaccountofthemeansandresources
oftheoccupierorotherpersonincontrolwhatisreasonablefora railway
companymaybeveryunreasonableforafarmer,or(ifthisisrelevant)
asmallcontractor.Ifaprecedentisneededforthisconceptofrelative
responsibilityImayventuretorefertothePrivyCounciljudgmentin
Goldman v .Hargrave[1967]AC645,663whereinrelationtoanother
commonlawdutyitwassaid(interalia)"thestandardoughttobetorequire
"oftheoccupierwhatitisreasonabletoexpectofhiminhisindividual
"circumstances."
MyLords,inmyopinion,ifthelawissuchasIhavesuggested,thelaw
asstatedinAddie'scaseisdevelopedbutnotdeniednot,Iventureto
think,developedbeyondwhatispermissibleandindeedrequiredofthis
Houseinitsjudicialcapacity.Itwassuggestedthatsomedifficultyarose
fromthepassingoftheOccupiersLiabilityAct,1957,theargumentbeing
that,asParliamentdeliberatelychangedthelawaboutinviteesandlicensees
butnotthatconcerningtrespassers,theHousewasboundhandandfootby
Addie'scaseatitsnarrowest.Idonotfollowthis.Theremightbesome
forceinanargumentthatforthisHousetodepartfrom(i.e.overrule)Addie's
casewould,ineffect,betolegislatewhereParliamenthasabstained,butI
canseenosenseinsupposingthatwhenParliamentleftthelawaloneas
regardstrespasserstheintentionwastofreezethelawasorasitwastaken
tobein1929.AsthisActitselfshows,whatParliamentleftaloneinthe
caseoftrespassers,whiledisplacingtheminthecasesofinviteesorlicensees,
weretherulesofcommonlaw.Butthecommonlawisadevelopingentity
asthejudgesdevelopit,andsolongaswefollowthewelltriedmethod
ofmovingforwardinaccordancewithprincipleasfreshfactsemergeand
changesinsocietyoccur,wearesurelydoingwhatParliamentintendswe
shoulddo.Solongasliabilitycontinuestobebaseduponfaultwemay,
indeedmust,adjustittoreasonandexperience.Idonotthinkthatany
argumentcanbedrawnfromthepassingbythesameParliamentthreeyears
lateroftheOccupiers'Liability(Scotland)Act,1961,which(section2)
definedtheoccupiers'dutytowardstrespassersasthatofsuchcareasin
allthecircumstancesofhiscaseisreasonable.Butitisinterestingtosee
that,inacaseuponthatsectionwhichreachedthisHouse,recognitionwas
giventothedifferingstandardofcarewhichmayberequiredtowards
invitees,licenseesortrespassers.Mynobleandlearnedfriend,LordReid,
expressedthisstandardinwordsveryappropriatetotheissueinthisappeal
(M'Glone v . BritishRailwaysBoard [1966]SC1.11).

23

Dealingnowwiththecaseoftheinfantplaintiff.IntheCourtofAppeal
hesucceededonabasisofrecklessnessthatofthestationmasteratthe
neareststationwhosometimebeforehadbeeninformedsomesixweeks
earlierthatononeoccasionchildrenhadbeenseensomewhereontheline.
Astothis,unless"recklessness"means"grosscarelessness"andinmy
opinionnoteventhen,thereisnobasisonwhichtheAppellantscanbe
liableforthisinjury.ButIagreewithSalmonL.J.andnotwiththemajority
intheCourtofAppealthatrecklessness,inthiscontext,hasitsclassical
meaning.
InQuinlan'scasethePrivyCouncilsuggestedthatthewayaheadlay
throughanextendedscopeofwantonandrecklessconduct.Thismaybe
enoughinsomecases,butinothers,andinacasesuchasthepresent,I
preferadirectacceptanceofanappropriatedutyofcare.Theuseof
"recklessness"orimputedrecklessnessseemstometoolikeanotherfiction
ofthekinditisbettertodiscard.However,iftheapproachIhavesuggested
iscorrect,itwillfollowthatabasisexistshereuponwhich,givensatisfactory
proof,anactioninnegligencecouldlie.
IfeelboundtosaythatIhavelessconfidencethanyourLordshipsor
thetrialjudgethattheprovedfactsmakethecasegood.Theevidenceas
totheconditionofthefenceattherelevanttime,themeansofaccesstoit
andtheuseoftheopenspacesoneithersideoftheline("themeadowwas
'notmuchusedbychildren"saidtheonlywitness)isexiguous.Conclusion
uponitcanhardlybereachedwithoutadegreeofstrain.Evidenceasto
theknowledgeorlackofitastotheconditionofthefenceorthesocalled
pathtothefencebythe RailwayBoard (muchlessconspicuousthanthe
officialpathleadingtoafootbridgeoverthe railway closeby,whose
existenceseemslargelytobeforgotten)orastothesystemofmaintenance,
orlackofit,hardlyexists.Thatitwasnecessarytocallinaidthefact
thatsixweeksbeforetheaccidentthepresencehadbeenreportedofsome
childrenofunspecifiedage,somewhereonthetwomilestretchoftheline
betweenMordenandMitcham(thefactreliedonasshowing"recklessness")
doesnotreassuremeastothesolidityofthecase.Butthereremainsthe
factofthiselectrifiedlinelyingbetweentwoopenspacesalbeitlinkedby
abridgeandofthebrokendownchainlinkfenceatapointneartowhere
childrenmightplayandIthinkthatthereisforceinthepointthatthe
Board ,oncetheyknewofthegap,tookimmediatestepstorepairitand
indeedcontendedatonetimethatitwasinrepairatthecriticaltime.The
caseisnottherefore(asinEdwards'case)oneofabarriererectedinaccord
ancewithstatutebutinfactinadequatetokeepchildrenout,butofa
barrierdesignedtobeadequate,inviewoftheexistingrisk,andbecome
inadequatethroughlackofmaintenance.Thedistinctionis,Ithink,areal.
aswellasafineone.Iamnotprepared,especiallyinviewofthejudge's
finding,todifferfromyourLordships'viewthat,inrelationtothespecial
dutyofcareincumbentonthe Board intherelevantplace,therewasa
breachofthatdutyamountingtolegalnegligence,butIamleftwiththe
feelingthatcasessuchasthesewouldbemoresatisfactorilydealtwithby
amodernsystemofpublicenterpriseliabilitydevisedbyParliament.
Iwoulddismisstheappeal.

LordPearson
mylords,

Inrelationtoanoccupierofpremisesthepositionofatrespassermust
beradicallydifferentfromthatofalawfulvisitor.Thebroadeffectof
section2oftheOccupiers'LiabilityAct,1957,isthatanoccupierof
premisesowestohislawfulvisitors,i.e.thepersonswhocomeonthe
premisesathisinvitationorwithhispermission,thecommondutyofcare
andthatisadutytotakesuchcareasinallthecircumstancesofthecase
isreasonabletoseethatthevisitorwillbereasonablysafeinusingthe
premisesforthepurposesforwhichheisinvitedorpermittedtobethere.

24

Inmyopinion,theoccupierofpremisesdoesnotoweanysuchdutytoa
trespasser:hedoesnotowetothetrespasseradutytotakesuchcareasin
allthecircumstancesofthecaseisreasonabletoseethatthetrespasser
willbereasonablysafeinusingthepremisesforthepurposesforwhichheis
trespassing.Thatseemstometobethefundamentaldistinction,andit
shouldbefullypreserved.

Itdoesnotfollowthattheoccupierneverowesanydutytothetrespasser.
Ifthepresenceofthetrespasserisknowntoorreasonablytobeanticipated
bytheoccupier,thentheoccupierhasadulytothetrespasser,butitisa
lowerandlessonerousdutythantheonewhichtheoccupierowestoa
lawfulvisitor.Verybroadlystated,itisadutytotreatthetrespasserwith
ordinaryhumanity.Bird v .Holbrook(1828)2Bing.628,641Grand
Trunk Railway CompanyofCanada v .Barnett[1911]A.C.(J.C)361,369
Latham v .Johnson[1913]1K.B.398,411.Butthatisavaguephrase.
Whatisthecontentofthedutytotreatthetrespasserwithordinary
humanity?Theauthoritativeformulationoftheduty,asgiveninRobert
AcidicandSons(Collieries) v .Dumbreck[1929]AC358isseverely
restrictiveandis,Ithink,nowinadequate.Subjecttothedifficultycreated
bythatformulation,Ithinkonecandeducefromdecidedcasesthat,
normallyatanyrate,theoccupierisnotatfault,hehasdoneasmuchas
isrequiredofhim,ifhehastakenreasonablestepstodeterthetrespasser
fromenteringorremainingonthepremises,orthepartofthepremises,
inwhichhewillencounteradangeroussituation.Insimplelanguage,itis
normallysufficientfortheoccupiertomakereasonableendeavourstokeep
outorchaseoffthepotentialoractualintruderwhoislikelytobeoris
inadangeroussituation.Theerectionandmaintenanceofsuitablenotice
boards orfencingorboth,orthegivingofsuitableoralwarning,ora
practiceofchasingawaytrespassingchildren,willusuallyconstitutereason
ableendeavoursforthispurpose.Ilott v .Wilkes(1820)2B.andAld.304
Bird v .Holbrook(1828)2Bing628Morran v .Waddell(1883)11R.44
Ross v .Keith(1888)16R.56Cooke v .MidlandGreatWestern Railway
[1909]A.C.229Lowery v .Walker[1911]AC10,1314Hardy v .Central
London Railway Co.[192013K.B.459C.A.Mourton v .Poulter[1930]
2K.B.183ExcelsiorWireRopeCo. v .Callan[1930]A.C.404Edwards
v . Railway Executive[1952]A.C.737atpage744(whereLordPortersaid:
"InanycaseIcannotseethattherespondentswereunderanyobligation
"todomorethankeeptheirpremisesshutoffbyafencewhichwasduly
"repairedwhenbrokenandobviouslyintendedtokeepintrudersout.")
 Perry v .ThomasWrigley[1955]1W.L.R.1164M'Glone v . British Rail
ways Board [1966]S.C.(H.L.)l.Ifthetrespasser,inspiteoftheoccupier's
reasonableendeavourstodeterhim,insistsontrespassingorcontinuinghis
trespass,hemusttaketheconditionofthelandandtheoperationsonthe
landashefindsthemandcannotnormallyholdtheoccupieroftheland
oranyonebuthimselfresponsibleforinjuriesresultingfromthetrespass,
whichishisownwrongdoing.Butthatstatementissubjecttothispro
viso:iftheoccupierknowsorasgoodasknowsthatsomeemergency
hasarisenwherebythetrespasserhasbeenplacedinapositionofimminent
peril,ordinaryhumanityrequiresfurtherstepstobetaken:theveryobvious
exampleisthat,ifthedriverofatrainseesatrespasserfallenontheline
infrontofhim,hemusttrytostopthetrain.Thevarietyofpossible

situationsissogreatthatonecannotsafelytrytoformulateforallcases
whatstepsanoccupierisrequiredtotakefortheprotectionorrescueof
atrespasser,butthedecidedcasesshowwhatisrequiredintypicalsituations,
andthatIhaveendeavouredtosummarise.InCommissionerforRail
ways(N.S.W.) v .Cardy(195960)104C.L.R.274atpage286,DixonC.J.
said"Thedutyismeasuredbythenatureofthedangerorperilbutitmay,
"accordingtocircumstances,besufficientlydischargedbywarningofthe
"danger,bytakingstepstoexcludetheintruderorbyremovalorreduction
"ofthedanger."Inthecaseofthepoisonousberriesinthepublicpark
(GlasgowCorporation v .Taylor[1922]2A.C.44)thesimplestandcheapest
andmosteffectivewayofprotectingchildrenwhomightbetemptedto
eatthemwouldhavebeen,nottheerectionofafenceorwarningnotices,
buttodigupandremovethetreeorshrubonwhichthepoisonousberries

25

grew.Butasanillustrationofthedutytotrespassersnormallybeingsuffi
cientlydischargedbyreasonablemeasuresdesignedtoexcludethemfrom
thesituationofdanger,Iwillciteapassagefromthejudgmentof
WindeyerJ.inMunnings v .HydroElectricCommission(1971)45A.L.J.R.
378atpage389.Hesaid"ThedutyofcarethattheCommissionowed
"totheplaintiffwasnotadutytohaveitspolesafefortrespassers.It
"wasadutywhicharosefromtheveryfactthatitwasdangeroustotres
"passers.Highvoltageelectricityisahighlydangerousthing.Tobring
"suchadangerousthingtoalocalityfrequentedbymembersofthepublic
"imposedadutyofcare.Thatdutycouldbedischargedbyputtinglive
"wiresbeyondeasyreachandnotenablingunauthorisedpersonstocome
"tothem."
Thereareseveralreasonswhyanoccupiershouldnothaveimposedupon
himonerousobligationstoatrespasser
(1)Thereistheunpredictabilityofthepossibletrespasserbothasto
whetherhewillcomeonthelandatallandalsoastowherehewillgo
andwhathewilldoifhedoescomeontheland.Ienlargedonthispoint
inVidean v . British TransportCommission[1963]2Q.B.650,679,andI
willonlysummariseitshortlyhere.Asthetrespasser'spresenceandmove
mentsareunpredictable,heisnotwithinthezoneofreasonablecontempla
tion(HayorBourhill v .Young)andheisnota"neighbour"(Donoghue v .
Stevenson)totheoccupier,andtheoccupiercannotreasonablyberequired
totakeprecautionsforhissafety.Occupiersareentitledtofarmlands,
operatequarriesandfactories,runexpresstrainsatfullspeedthrough
stations,felltreesandfireshotswithoutregardtothemeregeneralpossibility
thattheremighthappentobeinthevicinityatrespasserwhomightbe
injured.Theoccupiersdonothavetoceaseorrestricttheiractivitiesin
viewofthatpossibility,whichistooremotetobetakenintoaccountand
couldnotfairlybeallowedtocurtailtheirfreedomofaction.
(2)Evenwhenhispresenceisknownorreasonablytobeanticipated,so
thathebecomesaneighbour,thetrespasserisrightlytoberegardedasan
underprivilegedneighbour.Thereasonforthisappears,Ithink,most
clearlyfromaconsiderationoftheanalogouspositionofalawfulvisitorwho
exceedshisauthority,goingoutsidethescopeofhislicenceorpermission.
InHillenandPettigrew v .I.C.I.(Alkali)Ltd.(1936]A.C.65atpages6970
LordAtkinsaid:"Thisdutytoaninviteeonlyextendssolongasandsofar
"astheinviteeismakingwhatcanreasonablybecontemplatedasanordinary
"andreasonableuseofthepremisesbytheinviteeforthepurposesfor
"whichhehasbeeninvited.Heisnotinvitedtouseanypartofthepremises
"forpurposeswhichheknowsarewrongfullydangerousandconstitutean
"improperuse.AsScruttonL.J.haspointedlysaid:'Whenyouinvitea
'personintoyourhousetousethestaircaseyoudonotinvitehimtoslide
"'downthebannisters'.TheCalgarth[1926]P.93,110.Sofarashesets
"footonsomuchofthepremisesaslieoutsidetheinvitationorusesthem
"forpurposeswhicharealientotheinvitationheisnotaninviteebuta
"trespasser,andhisrightsmustbedeterminedaccordingly.Inthepresent
"casethestevedoresknewthattheyoughtnottousethecoveredhatchin
"ordertoloadcargofromit:forthemforsuchapurposeitwasoutof
"bounds.Theyweretrespassers.Thedefendantshadnoreasontocon
"templatesuchausetheyhadnodutytotakeanycarethatthehatch
"whencoveredwassafeforsuchausetheyhadnodutytowarnanyone
"thatitwasnotfitforsuchuse."

InMunningsandAnother v .HydroElectricCommission(1971)45
AustralianLawJournalReportsp.378atp.382BarwickC.J.said"Of
"courseindeterminingwhatoughttohavebeenforeseen,aswellasin
"decidingwhatstepsoughttohavebeentakenoromittedintheparticular
"case,theright,orabsenceofright,oftheinjuredpersontohavebeenat
"theplacewherehewasinjured,oratthepointfromwhichhisinjuries
"stemmed,wouldbematerialfactors.Thoughtherigidcategoriesofinvitee,
"licenseeandtrespassermaynotbeapplicableassuch,theremustremain
"aquantativeelementbothintheextentoftheforeseeabilityandofthe

26

"reasonablestepsrequiredtofulfilanyresultantdutyarisingfromthe
"circumstancesinwhichtheinjuredpersoncameuponthescene."
3.Itwouldinmany,ifnotmost,casesbeimpracticabletotakeeffective
stepstoprevent(insteadofmerelyendeavouringtodeter)trespassersfrom
goingintoorremaininginsituationsofdanger.Thecostoferectingand
maintaininganimpenetrableandunclimbableor,asithasbeenput,"boy
"proof"fencewouldbeprohibitive,ifitcouldbedoneatall.Thecases
ofM'Glone v . BritishRailwaysBoard (supra.),McCarthy v .WellingtonCity
[1966]N.Z.L.R.481andMunningsandAnother v .HydroElectricCom
mission(supra.)illustratetheagility,ingenuityandpersistenceofboy
trespassers.AsLordGoddardsaidinEdwards v . Railway Executive[1952]
A.C.737atp.747,referringtothe Railway Executive:"Hadtheyto
"providewatchmentoguardeveryplaceonthe railways oftheSouthern
"Regionwherechildrenmayanddogetontoembankmentsandlines,
" railway fareswouldbeagreatdealhigherthantheyarealready."
4.Thereisalsoamoralaspect.Apartfromtrespasseswhichare
inadvertentormoreorlessexcusable,trespassingisaformofmisbehaviour,
showinglackofconsiderationfortherightsofothers.Itwouldbeunfair
iftrespasserscouldbytheirmisbehaviourimposeonerousobligationson
others.Onecantakethecaseofafarmer.Hemayknowwellfrompast
 experiencethatpersonsarelikelytotrespassonhislandforthepurpose
oftearinguphisprimrosesandbluebells,orpickinghismushroomsor

stealinghisturkeys,orforthepurposeoftakingcountrywalksinthecourse
ofwhichtheywilltreaddownhisgrassandleavegatesopenandwatch
theirdogschasingthefarmer'scattleandsheep.Itwouldbeintolerable
ifafarmerhadtotakeexpensiveprecautionsfortheprotectionofsuch
personsinsuchactivities.
Ihavesaidthatanoccupierdoesnotowetoatrespasserthe"common
"dutyofcare",whichisnowtherelevantstatutoryexpressionforthe
occupier'sdutytolawfulvisitors.Itcanalsobesaidthattheoccupierdoes
notowetothetrespasseranygeneraldutyofcare.Thisquestionwasfully
consideredanddecidedinthecaseofCommissionerfor Railways v .Quinlan
[1964]AC1054J.C.Thequestionwasdirectlyraisedbythetrialjudge's
directionstothejury.ViscountRadcliffesaidatpp.206970"Their
"Lordshipsthinkthatthereisnodoubtthatthejurymusthavereceived
"thedefiniteimpressionthatthelawthattheyweretoapplytothefacts
"wasthat,oncetheythoughtthattherewasa'likelihood'ofpeople
"comingtothecrossingandthattheappellantwasawareofsuchalikeli
"hood,theappellantowedageneraldutytotherespondentas'amember

'ofthepublic'totakereasonableprecautionstosecurehissafety,and
"thatthisdutywasnotaffectedbythefactthattherespondentwasa
"trespasser.IntheirLordships'opinionthisdirectionwasnotinaccordance
"withlaw....TheCourt...hadorderedanewtrial,becauseintheir
"viewthecase,ifretried,mightshowthattherespondent,thoughatres
"passer,wasneverthelessentitledtoclaimfromtheappellantthedutyof
"generalcareandaliabilityinnegligenceforabreachofit:suchaduty,
"itwassuggested,mightbefoundedonageneralprinciplederivedfrom
"theHouseofLords'decisioninDonoghue v .Stevenson[1932]AC562.
"TheirLordshipsthinkthisviewmistaken.Theycannotseethatthere
"isanygeneralprincipletobededucedfromthatdecisionwhichthrows
"anyparticularlightuponthelegalrightsanddutiesthatarisewhena
"trespasserisinjuredona railway levelcrossingwherehehasnoright
"tobe:moreparticularly,theyconsiderthatitisnotcorrectinprinciple
"tosupposethatthemerefactthattherewasalikelihood,apparenttothe
"occupier,ofatrespasserbeingpresentonthecrossingatsometimeor
"anotherissufficienttoimposeupontheoccupieranygeneraldutyofcare
"towardssuchatrespasser.Theconsequencesofsuchasuppositionwould
"befarreachingindeed."Irespectfullyagreewiththatpassage.

ViscountRadcliffealsosaid,referringtowhathedescribedas"the
"acceptedformulationoftheoccupier'sdutytoatrespasser",that"What
"isintendedisanexclusiveorcomprehensivedefinitionoftheduty.Indeed
"therewouldbenopointinitifitwerenot.Itfollowsthenthatsolong

27

"astherelationshipofoccupierandtrespasserisorcontinuestobea
"relevantdescriptionoftherelationshipbetweenthepersonwhoinjures
"orbringsaboutinjuryandthepersonwhoisinjuredanimportantquali
"ficationtheoccupier'sdutyislimitedintheacceptedterms."
Thereiseconomyofdoctrine,simplicityofprinciple,inhavingone
exclusiveandcomprehensiveformuladefiningthedutyofoccupierto
trespasser.Buttheformulaitselfhascreateddifficultiesandarousedcriti
cism,andIthinkitisnotnowadequateordefensibleasapplyingtomodern
conditions.Beforecomingtotheformula,Iwillattemptasummaryofthe
principlessofardealtwith.
Itseemstomethatthereisrationaljustificationforthecommonlaw
attitudetowardstrespassers,insofarasithasrecognisedthat
1.inrelationtoanoccupierthepositionofatrespasserisradically
differentfromthatofalawfulvisitor
2.theunknownandmerelypossibletrespasserisnota"neighbour"
inthesenseinwhichthatword"neighbour"wasusedbyLord
AtkininDonoghue v .Stevenson,andtheoccupierowestosucha
trespassernodutytotakeprecautionsforhissafetyand
3.ifthepresenceofthetrespasserisknowntoorreasonablytobe
anticipatedbytheoccupier,thentheoccupier
(i)doesnotowetothetrespasserthecommondutyofcare
(whichisthesinglestatutorysubstituteforthedifferentduties
formerlyowingtoinviteesandlicensees)
(ii)doesnotowetothetrespasserageneraldutyofcarebut
(iii)doesowetothetrespasseralowerandlessonerousduty,
whichhasbeendescribedasadutytotreathimwithordinary
humanity.
Sofarsogood.Insofarasthosearetherulesofthecommonlawonthis
subject,theyseemtobefullyacceptable.Thedifficulty,however,arises
fromthenarrowformulationofthedutytotrespassersinRobertAddie&
Sons(Collieries) v .Dumbreck[1929]AC358.Atpage365LordHailsham
L.C.,afterstatingthedutiesofoccupierstowardsinviteesandlicensees,
said:"Towardsthetrespassertheoccupierhasnodutytotakereasonable
"careforhisprotectionoreventoprotecthimfromconcealeddanger.
"Thetrespassercomesontothepremisesathisownrisk.Anoccupier
"isinsuchacaseliableonlywheretheinjuryisduetosomewilfulact
"involvingsomethingmorethantheabsenceofreasonablecare.There
"mustbesomeactdonewiththedeliberateintentionofdoingharmto
"thetrespasser,oratleastsomeactdonewithrecklessdisregardofthe
"presenceofthetrespasser."
LordDunedinsaidatpages3767:"Inthepresentcase,hadthechild
"beenalicenseeIwouldhaveheldthedefendersliable:secusifthecom
"plainerhadbeenanadult.Butifthepersonisatrespasser,thenthe
"onlydutytheproprietorhastowardshimisnotmaliciouslytoinjure
"him:hemaynotshoothimhemaynotsetaspringgun,forthatis
"justtoarrangetoshoothimwithoutpersonallyfiringtheshot.Other
"illustrationsofwhathemaynotdomightbefound,buttheyallcome
"underthesameheadinjuryeitherdirectlymaliciousoranactingso
"recklessastobetantamounttomaliciousacting."
Theformulationistoonarrowandinadequateinatleastthreerespects.
First,itappearstoholdtheoccupierliableonlyforpositiveactsandnot
inrespectofomissions.Supposethattheoccupierisrunninganelectrified
railway ,withanexposedliverail,inthevicinityofapublicplayground,
andthathehasnotprovidedanywarningnoticeorfencetodeterchildren
fromstrayingontothe railway ,andinconsequenceachildstraysonto
theliverailandisseriouslyinjured.Surelycommonsenseandjustice
requirethattheoccupiermustbeheldliableinsuchacaseforhisnon
feasance.Idoubt,however,whetheritwasintendedtoconfineliabilityto
positiveacts.Perhapsthewords"act"and"acting"inAddie v .Dumbreck
canbeinterpretedasincludingomissions.

28

Secondly,theformulationappearstosaythattheoccupierhasnoduty
todoanythingfortheprotectionoftrespassersuntilthereisatrespasser
actuallyonthelandandtheoccupierknowsheisthere.Butagainthecase
ofachildstrayingontheliverailofanelectrified railway showsthatthere
mustbeadutyontheoccupiertotakesomestepsinadvancetodeter
childrenfromtrespassingonthe railway .
Thirdly,theformulationmakestheoccupierliableonlyinrespectof
deliberateorrecklessacts.Ithinktheword"reckless"inthecontextdoes
notmeangrosslynegligentbutmeansthattheremustbeaconsciousdisregard
oftheconsequencesineffectdecidingnottobotherabouttheconsequences.
Thusasubjective,mentalelement,asortofmensrea,isrequiredasa
conditionofliability.Merenegligencewouldnotbeenoughtocreate
liability,accordingtothisformulation.Therewouldbenodutytotake
care,butonlyadutytoabstainfromdeliberatelyorrecklesslycausinginjury.
Thatisplainlyinadequate.
ItmustbeconcededthatAddie v .Dumbreckdoesnotstandalone.There
isotherauthoritytotheeffectthatamantrespassesathisownriskand
musttakethelandashefindsit.HamiltonL.J.saidinLatham v .Johnson
[191311K.B.398atpage411:"Theruleastotrespassersismostrecently
"indicatedinLowery v .WalkerandisstatedanddiscussedinGrandTrunk
" Railway ofCanada v .Barnett.Theownerofthepropertyisunderaduty
"nottoinjurethetrespasserwilfully:'nottodoawilfulactinreckless
"'disregardofordinaryhumanitytowardshim'butotherwiseaman
"'trespassesathisownrisk'.OnthispointScotslawisthesame.In
"EnglishandScottishlawalike,whenpeoplecomeonthelandsofothers
"fortheirownpurposeswithoutrightorinvitation,theymusttakethelands
"astheyfindthem,andcannotthrowanyresponsibilityupontheperson
"uponwhoselandstheyhavetrespassed:perLordKinnear,Devlin v .
"Jeffray'sTrustees."TherulewasappliedtochildtrespassersinHardy v .
CentralLondon Railway Company[1920]13K.B.459C.A.

Neverthelesstherulewasevidentlyfoundtobeunsatisfactoryincases
bothbeforeandafterAddie v .Dumbreck(supra.)especiallyincaseswhere
childtrespasserswereconcerned.Wheretherehadbeenfrequenttrespassing
andnoeffectivepreventionofit,alicencewasheldtobeimplied,although
therewasnovoluntarygrantofpermission.InstancesareCooke v .Midland
Railway Co.[1909]A.C.229Lowery v .Walker[1911]AC10Excelsoir
WireRopeCo. v .Callan[1930]A.C.404.Insuchcasesthelicencewasa
legalfictionbywhichtheharshruleoflawwascircumventedand,onemay
say,eroded.SeeperLordDunedininExcelsiorWireRope v .Callan(supra.)
atpage411andperLordDenninginMiller v .SouthofScotlandElectricity
Board 1958S.C.(H.L.)20andinVidean'scase(supra.)atpage663.As
DixonC.J.pointedoutinCommissionerfor Railways (N.S.W.) v .Cardy
(195960)104C.L.R.274,285,thatishowthecommonlawdevelops.See
alsoQuinlan'scase[1964]AC1054,10834.Alsoinmorerecenttimes
therehasbeenanotherdevelopmentorattempteddevelopmentofthelaw
tocircumventtheharshruleinAddie v .Dumbreck.Distinctionshavebeen
made(a)betweentheliabilityoftheoccupierandtheliabilityofotherpersons
whocarryoutactiveoperationsontheland(b)betweentheliabilityof
theoccupierquaoccupierandhisliabilityquaoperatorhimselfcarrying
outactiveoperationsontheland.Thetheoryisthat,whereastheoccupier
quaoccupierhasalargemeasureofexemptionfromliabilityinrespectof
thestaticconditionoftheland,theoccupieroranyotherpersoncarrying
outactiveoperationsonthelandhasthefulldutyofcareeventowards
atrespasserunderthe"neighbour"principleofDonoghue v .Stevenson
(supra.).PerLordDenninginMiller'scase(supra.)Dunster v .Abbott
[1953]2AllE.R.1572,1574andVidean'scase(supra.)atpage664.See
alsoBuckland v .Guildford[1949]1K.B.410,Davis v .St.Mary'sDemolition
Co.Ltd.[1954]1W.L.R.592andCreed v .McGeogh[1955]1W.L.R.1005.
ReservationsordoubtsaboutthistheorywereexpressedinMiller'scase
(supra.)atpages35and36,inPerry v .ThomasWrigley(supra.)atpage1166
andinVidean'scase(supra.)atpage678.Insofarasthetheoryhasgained
 29

acceptance,itconstitutesanothercircumventionanderosionoftherulein
Addie v .Dumbreck.
Ishould,however,makeitplainthatIdonotacceptthetheory.Idoubt
whetherthereisanymajordistinctionforthepresentpurpose(i)between
thestaticconditionofthelandandactiveoperationsontheland(ii)
betweentheoccupierandotherpersons(suchashisservantsoragentsor
independentcontractorsoremployeesofpublicauthorities)lawfullycarry
ingoutoperationsonthelandandhavingcontroloftheoperationsand
perhapsofthelandaswellforthetimebeing(iii)betweentrespassonland
andtrespassoninstallationsor railway vehicles.Occupationisassociated
withcontrolandisagroundofliability,notofexemptionfromliability.
Thetrespasser'smovementsareunpredictableandhegoesintoplaceswhere
hehasnobusinesstobeandimposeshisunwantedpresence:thesecon
siderationsaffectwhatcanreasonablyberequirednotonlyinthecaseof
theoccupierbutalsointhecaseofsuchotherpersons.
ItseemstomethattheruleinAddie v .Dumbreckhasbeenrendered
obsoletebychangesinphysicalandsocialconditionsandhasbecomean
incumbranceimpedingtheproperdevelopmentofthelaw.Withthein
creaseofthepopulationandthelargerproportionlivingincitiesandtowns
andtheextensivesubstitutionofblocksofflatsforrowsofhouseswith
gardensorbackyardsandquietstreets,thereislessplayingspacefor
childrenandsoagreatertemptationtotrespass.Thereislesssupervision
ofchildren,sothattheyaremorelikelytotrespass.Alsowiththeprogress
oftechnologytherearemoreandgreaterdangersforthemtoencounterby
reasonoftheincreaseduseof,forinstance,electricity,gas,fastmoving
vehicles,heavymachineryandpoisonouschemicals.Thereisconsiderably
moreneedthanthereusedtobeforoccupierstotakereasonablestepswith
aviewtodeterringpersons,especiallychildren,fromtrespassinginplaces
thataredangerousforthem.
InmyopiniontheAddie v .Dumbreckformulationofthedulyofoccupier
totrespasserisplainlyinadequateformodernconditions,anditsrigidand
restrictivecharacterhasimpededtheproperdevelopmentofthecommon
lawinthisfield.Ithasbecomeananomalyandshouldbediscarded.But
inmyopinionthedutyofoccupiertotrespassershouldremainlimitedin
thewaysthatIhaveendeavouredtoindicate.
Ineednotlengthenthisalreadylongopinionbydescribingagainthe
factsofthepresentcasewhichhavebeendescribedbymynobleand
learnedfriends.The RailwayBoard inthecircumstanceshadadutyto
takereasonablestepstodeterchildrenfromstrayingfromthepublicspace
ontotheelectrified railway line.Obviously,reasonablestepsforthispur
poseincludedpropermaintenanceofthefence.Butthe RailwaysBoard
tailedtorepairthebrokendownfenceevenaftertheyhadbeennotified
thatchildrenhadbeenseenontheline.Therewasaclearbreachofthe
duty.
Iwoulddismisstheappeal.

LordDiplock
mylords,

InaheavilypopulatedsuburbanareaofLondontherearetwopublic
openspacesinwhichchildrenofallagesareaccustomedtoplay.Between
themrunsalineoftheAppellants' railway equippedwithliveelectricrail
 whichwouldcauseseriousinjuryorevendeathtoanyonewhocameinto
contactwithit.Itsdangerouscharacterwouldnotbeappreciatedbylittle
children.Itiswithinafewyardsoftheboundarybetweenthe railway and
oneoftheopenspacesBunce'sMeadow.Alongtheboundaryisachain
linkfencefourfeethigh.Butatonepoint,approachedbyawelltrodden
pathacrossthemeadowithad,forseveralweeksbefore7thJune,1965,
beenpresseddowntoaheightofnomorethanteninchesfromtheground
Itpresentednoobstacletoaccesstotheliverailbychildrentooyoungto

30

appreciatethedanger.On7thJune,1965,theRespondent,achildaged
sixyears,crossedthefenceatthispoint,cameintocontactwiththeliverail
andsustainedveryseriousinjuries.
Ifthefactsastotheuseofthemeadowandtheconditionofthefence
whichIhavejustrecitedwereknowntothoseresponsibleforrunning
the railway ,Ibelievethatanyoneendowedwithcommonhumanitywould
saythatthecommonlawoughttoaffordtotheinjuredchildalegalright
tocompensationagainstthe railway authoritiesandthatifitdidnot
therewassomethingwrongwiththecommonlaw.
TheAppellants,whoareapubliccorporation,electedtocallnowitnesses,
thusdeprivingthecourtofanypositiveevidenceastowhetherthecondition
ofthefenceandtheadjacentterrainhadbeennoticedbyanyparticular
servantoftheirsorastowhatheoranyotheroftheirservantseither
thoughtordidaboutit.Thisisalegitimatetacticalmoveunderour
adversarialsystemoflitigation.Butadefendantwhoadoptsitcannot
complainifthecourtdrawsfromthefactswhichhavebeendisclosedall
reasonableinferencesastowhatarethefactswhichthedefendanthaschosen
towithhold.
Acourtmaylakejudicialnoticethat railway linesareregularlypatrolled
bylinesmenandgangers.Intheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary,itis
entitledtoinferthatoneormoreoftheminthecourseofseveralweeks
noticedwhatwasplainforalltosee.Anyoneofcommonsensewould
realisethedangerthatthestateofthefencesoclosetotheliverailcreated
forlittlechildrencomingtothemeadowtoplay.AstheAppellantselected
tocallnoneofthepersonswhopatrolledthelinethereisnothingtorebut
theinferencethattheydidnotlackthecommonsensetorealisethedanger.
AcourtisaccordinglyentitledtoinferfromtheinactionoftheAppellants
thatoneormoreoftheiremployeesdecidedtoallowtherisktocontinue
ofsomechildcrossingtheboundaryandbeinginjuredorkilledbythe
liverailratherthantoincurthetrivialtroubleandexpenseofrepairing
thegapinthefence.
Eveniftheseinferencesaredrawn,itisthesubmissionoftheAppellants
thatthecommonlawaffordsnoremedytotheinjured.Suchissaidtobe
theineluctableconsequenceofthedecisionofthisHouseoverfortyyears
agoinAddie v .Dumbreck([1929]AC358)and,inparticular,issaidto
followfromthelapidarystatementinthespeechofViscountHailsham
"Towardsthetrespassertheoccupierhasnodutytotakereasonable
"careforhisprotectionoreventoprotecthimfromconcealeddanger.
"Thetrespassercomesontothepremisesathisownrisk.An
"occupierisinsuchacaseliableonlywheretheinjuryisduetosome
"wilfulactinvolvingsomethingmorethantheabsenceofreasonable
"care.Theremustbesomeactdonewiththedeliberateintentionof
"doingharmtothetrespasser,oratleastsomeactdonewithreckless
"disregardofthepresenceofthetrespasser."
Addie v .Dumbreckwasacaseoftrespassbyachildagedfourandahalf
years.ItwasdecidedintheyearthatIstartedtoreadfortheBar.Even
atthattimeitoffendedagainstwhatLordAtkin,onlythreeyearslater,was
tocall"ageneralpublicsentimentofmoralwrongdoingforwhichthe
"offendermustpay,"Donoghue v .Stevenson([1932]AC562atp.580)
Iwellrecallthedisappointmentwithwhichitwasreceivedbythosewho
thoughtthatpreviouscasesinthisHousehadshownthecommonlawas

movingtowardsalessdraconiantreatmentofthosewhotrespassedinnocently
uponotherpeople'sland.
IfthefactsintheinstantappealarecomparedwiththoseinAddie v .
DumbreckasstatedbytheLordChancellor(pp.35960)Idonotthinkit
possibletosaythat,judgedbycurrentstandardsofbehaviour,theconduct
ofthoseengagedinoperatingtheappellants' railway intheinstantcase
wasanymoreblameworthythantheconductofthoseengagedinrunning
thecollieryofthesuccessfulappellantinAddie v .DumbreckYetallnine
judgeswhohavebeenconcernedwiththeinstantcaseinitsvariousstages
areconvincedthattheplaintiff'sclaimoughttosucceedand,ifImay
bepermittedtobecandid,aredeterminedthatitshall.Theproblemof

31

judicialtechniqueishowbesttosurmountortocircumventtheobstacle
presentedbythespeechesoftheLordChancellorandViscountDunedin
inAddie v .Dumbreck,andthewayinwhichthosespeechesweredealtwith
inthePrivyCouncilinthecomparativelyrecentAustralianappealof
Commissionerof Railwaysv .Quinlan([1964]AC1054).
BythetimethatAddie v .Dumbreckwasdecidedthelawastoanoccu
pier'sdutytowardstrespassershadmadesomeadvancesinceBestCJ.in
Bird v .Holbrook([1828]4Bing.628)hadlaiditdownthatanoccupier
wasnotentitledintentionallyandmaliciouslytoinjureatrespasser.For
presentpurposesthesignificanceofthatcase,whicharoseoutofsetting
ofspringgunstoinjuretrespassers,istwofold.First,itisrecognisedthat
theduty,whateveritscontent,wasownedbytheoccupiertoanunknown
butexpectedtrespasseraswellastoatrespasseractuallyknowntothe
occupiertobetrespassingonhisland.Secondly,BestC.J.basedtheduty
uponitsbeingtheobjectofEnglishlawtoupholdhumanity.Thisexpression
founditsechoinLordRobson'sreferenceinGrandTrunk Railwayv .
Burnett([1911]AC361atp.370)to"awilfulorrecklessdisregardof
ordinaryhumanity,whichwasadoptedbyLordSumner,thenHamilton
L.J.,asthedefinitionofthedutyofanoccupiertoatrespasser,inhis
judgmentinLatham v .R.Johnson&NephewLtd.([I913]1K.B.398at
p.341)ajudgmentwhichwasexpresslyapprovedbyboththeLord
ChancellorandViscountDunedininAddie v .Dumbreck.
Butattentionhadbeendivertedfromthedevelopmentofthecontentof
anoccupier'sdutytowardstrespassersbytheadoptionofthetechniqueof
reclassifyingas"licensees"personswhomtheoccupierhadnotmade
sufficientlyeffectiveeffortstoexcludefromhisland,soastogivethemthe
benefitofthereadymadedutyofcarefortheirsafetyowedatcommon
lawbyanoccupiertothosewho,inreality,entereduponhislandbyhis
permissionandnotagainsthiswill.Thistechniquehadbeenaccepted
withoutadversecommentincasesinthisHouseitself.Cooke v .Midland
(GreatWestern Railway ofIreland([1909]A.C.229)andLowery v .Walker
([1911]AC10)arenoteworthyexamples.Theresultingdutymaybe
brieflysummarisedasadutytotakereasonablestepstoenablethelicensee
toavoidadangerknowntotheoccupier.
InAddie v .DumbrecktheFirstDivisionoftheCourtofSessionhad
departedfromthistechniqueandsoughttorecogniseasaseparatecategory
ofpersonstowhomadutywasowed,membersofaclasswhomtheoccupier
knewtobeinthehabitofresortingtohislandwithouthispermission.The
majorityhadheldthatsuchtrespasserstheoccupierowedadutytotake
reasonablestepstodetertheirintrusionifitwaslikelytoresultinserious
injurytothem.ThedecisionofthisHouseinAddie v .Dumbreckwas
primarilydirectedtoassertingthepropositions:thatpersonspresentupon
anoccupier'slandcouldbeassignedtooneofthreemutuallyexclusive
categoriesonly,viz.invitees,licenseesandtrespassers:thattherewasno
subdivisionofthecategoryoftrespassersandthatthedutyowedbyan
occupiertoapersononhislandwasdeterminedsolelybythecategoryinto
whichthatpersonfell.Inordertodecidetheappeal,however,itwasalso
necessarytostatethecontentofthedutytowardstrespassersthecategory
intowhichitwasheldthattherespondentfellinordertodeterminewhether
theappellantwasinbreachofit.ThistheLordChancellordidinthepassage
thatIhavecited.
InAddie v .DumbreckthechildhadnotbeenfoundbytheCourtof
Sessiontobealicensee.ThedecisionofthisHousedidnotthereforedirectly
impugnthetechniqueofinferringthetacitpermissionoftheoccupiertoan
intruder'spresenceonhislandfromhisfailuretotakeeffectivestepsto
manifesttotheintruderhisobjectiontoit.IndeedAddie v .Dumbreck
appearedtoconfirmthisastheonlywayofmitigatingthelotofmeritorious
trespassersthoughtheactualdecisiononthefactsshowedagreater
reluctancetomakeuseofitthanhadbeenevincedbythemembersofthis
HousewhohaddecidedLowery v .Walker.
Thetechniqueaccordinglycontinuedtobeused.Appellatecourtscon
finedthemselvestopreventingwhatwasfelttobeitsmisuseasthisHouse

32

didinEdwards v . Railway Executive([1952]A.C.787).LordPorterthere

referstoitintermsas"thedoctrineofimpliedlicence"andsaysthat"where
"theowner(sc.occupier)ofthepremisesknowsthatthepublicorsome
"portionofitisaccustomedtotrespassoverhislandhemusttakesteps
"toshowthatheresentsandwilltrytopreventtheinvasion"ifheisto
avoidtheimplication.LordGoddard,withwhosespeechmynobleand
learnedfriendLordReidagreed,basedtheimpliedlicenceonestoppel:
theoccupiermusthave"soconductedhimselfthathecannotbeheard
"tosaythathedidnotgiveit"(sc.permissiontogouponhisland),Lord
Oakseysaid"Thecircumstancesmustbesuchthatthesuggestedlicensee
"couldhavethoughtanddidthinkthathewasnottrespassingbutwason
"thepropertyinquestionwiththeleaveandlicenceoftheowner".
Itisimplicitineachofthesestatementsthatevenwhenthereisnoreal
consentbytheoccupiertoaperson'sentryonhisland,theremaybecircum
stancesinwhichamerefailuretotakereasonablestepstodeterentrywill
conferuponapersonentering,thesamecommonlawrightsasrespectshis
personalsafetyasifhehadbeentheoccupier'slicensee.
Thatthe"licence"treatedashavingbeengrantedinsuchcaseswasa
legalfictionemployedtojustifyextendingtomeritorioustrespassers,particu
larlyiftheywerechildren,thebenefitofthedutywhichatcommonlawan
occupierowedtohislicensees,wasexplicitlyacknowledgedbyDixonC.J.
inCommissionerfor Railways v .Cardy([I960]104C.L.R.274).Whathe
saidonthistopicwasapprovedbythePrivyCouncilinQuinlan v .Com
missionerfor Railways (1964AC1054atp.1083)whoadded"those
"conceptionsoflicenceor"permission...arevirtuallywithoutmeaning
"atanyrateasappliedtochildren".ThefactsinLowery v .Walker
(ubi.sup.)statedatthebeginningofthereportshowthatinthecaseofadults
thesocalled"licence''couldbeequallyfictitious.
Byuseofthefictionofa"licence"topersonswhowouldotherwise
betrespassersthecourtswereenabledtorecognisethattherewerecircum
stanceswhichimposeduponanoccupieradutyeither(a)totakereasonable
stepstodetersuchpersonsfromenteringuponapartofhislandwherehe
knewtheywouldbeexposedtoseriousriskofpersonalinjuryor,ifhe
didnotdoso,(b)totakereasonablestepstoenablethemtoavoidthe
danger.Breachoftheformerdutyentitledthemtothestatusof

"licensees"theacquisitionofthatstatusentitledthemtothebenefitof
thelatterduty.Oncethecircumstanceswhichimposethesedutieshave
beenidentifiedinasufficientnumberofcasestoformabodyofprecedent
upontheirown.thefictionhasserveditspurposeinthedevelopmentof
thecommonlawandisripefordiscard.ThemisfortuneofAddie\.
DumbreckwasthatthemajorityoftheCourtofSessiontriedtodiscard
thefictionbeforethetimewasripetodoso.Theneedtoretainitpersisted
solongasitcontinuedtobeaccepteddoctrinethatadutytoregulate

one'sconducttowardsone'sneighboursoastoreducetheriskofinjuring
him,couldonlyariseifthereweresomepreexistinglegalrelationships
betweenthepartieswhichfellwithinsomecategoryalreadyrecognised
atcommonlaw.Thisobstacletotherationaldevelopmentof:anoccu
pier'sdutytowardstrespasserswaspenetratedbythedecisionofthisHouse
inDonoghue v .Stevenson([1932]AC562)andbrokendownbyBourhill
v .Young([1943]AC92).Thesignificanceofthesetwocasesforpresent
purposesisnotthecontentofthedutytherediscussedbuttherecognition
thatconductlikelytocauseinjurytoanotherpersoncouldinitselfcreate
thelegalrelationshipbetweenthepartiestowhichthedutyattached.
ItissurelytimenowforthisHousetofollowtheexampleofDixonC.J.
andofthePrivyCouncilinQuinlan'scaseandtodiscardthefictionofa
"licence"tomeritorioustrespassers.Oncetheconductoftheoccupieris
recognisedasbeingcapableinitselfofcreatingalegalrelationshipto
anotherpersonwhichattractsdutiesowedtothatpersoninrespectofhis
safety,itisnolongernecessaryincaseswherethatconductattractsaduty
totakereasonablestepstodeteranotherpersonfromenteringadangerous
partoftheoccupier'sland,tosubdividehisdutiestothatpersonintoa
dutytodeterhisentry,abreachofwhichgivesrisetoasubsequentduty
totakereasonablestepstoenablehimtoavoidthedanger.Todeterhis

33

entrytomerelyonewayofenablinghimtoavoidthedanger.The
wholedutycanbedescribedasadutytotakereasonablestepstoenable
himtoavoidthedanger.
MyLords,thisapproachclearlyrunscountertothatofthisHousein
Addie v .Dumbreck.Itrejectscategorisationoftheinjuredpersonasa
trespasserorlicenseeasthesourceofanydutyowedtohimbytheoccupier
totakestepsforhissafetyandlooksinsteadtotheconductoftheoccupier
ascreatingtherelevantrelationship.Addie v .Dumbreckassertstheneces
sityforsuchcategorisationbutbyleavingintactthetechniqueofinferring
alicencebytheoccupiertoapersontowhosepresenceonhislandhedoes
notreallyconsent,ittransfersfromthecategoryoftrespasserstothatof
licenseespersonswhoforthepurposesofallotherincidentsofthelegal
relationshipbetweenthemandtheoccupier,excepthisdutytotakesteps
fortheirsafety,wouldremaininthecategoryoftrespassers.But,aseach
ofthepreviouscitationsfromthespeechesinEdward'scaseconfirms,the
criteriaforeligibilityfortransferfromonecategorytotheotherdepended
upontheconductoftheoccupier.So,evenuponthisapproach,theinquiry
necessarilystartedwithanexaminationoftheoccupier'sconductbefore
thepersonsubsequentlyinjuredentersuponhisland.Thesecriteriawere
notdefinedoranalysedinthespeechesinthisHouseinAddie v .Dumbreck.
Itsimplyheldthattheparticularfactsfoundinthatcasedidnotjustify
treatingthetrespassingchildasifshewerealicensee.
MyLords,thisHousehassince1966abandoneditsformerpracticeof
adheringrigidlytotheratiodecidendiofitspreviousdecisions.Thereis
nolongeranyneedtodiscusswhethertodiscardthefictionofasocalled
"licence"toentergrantedbytheoccupieroflandtothepersonwho

sufferspersonalinjuryonit,shouldbecharacterisedasoverrulingAddie
v .Dumbreckorasdoingnomorethanexplainingitsreasoninginterms
whichareinharmonywiththegeneraldevelopmentoflegalconceptssince
1929astothesourceofoneman'sdutytotakestepsforthesafetyof
another.FormypartIwouldrejectthefictionanddirectattentionto

thekindofconductofanoccupieroflandwhichattractsthedutytotake

reasonablestepstoenableapersonwhoentersonhislandwithouthisactual
consent,toavoidadangerofwhichtheoccupierknows.
1comenowtoQuinlan'scase.Owingtothewayinwhichithadpro
ceededinthecourtsofNewSouthWales,noquestionaroseinthePrivy
CouncilastothestatusofMr.Quinlanasa"trespasser"uponthelevel
crossingwherehewasinjuredThejudgmentofthe Board wasmainly
directedtorejectingthepropositionthattherewerecircumstancesinwhich
apersonentitledonlytothestatusof"trespasser"mightbeowedbythe
occupieruponwhoselandhewastrespassingthecommondutyofcare
laiddowninDonoghue v .Stevensonwhichwashigherdutythanthat
whichisowedbyanoccupieroflandtohislicenseesinAustraliawhere
thecommonlawhasnotbeenreplacedbystatutoryprovisionssuchasthose
tobefoundintheEnglishOccupier'sLiabilityAct.1957.Inthecourse
ofexaminingthreerecentdecisionsoftheHighCourtofAustraliaonwhich
therejectedpropositionwassaidtobebased,thePrivyCouncilexpressly
approvedtheactualdecisioninCardy'scaseuponthegroundthat"the
"circumstancesseemedtoplacethecasesquarelyamongthose'children's

"cases'inwhichanoccupierwhohadplacedadangerous'allurement'on
"hislandisliableforinjurycausedbyittoastrayingchild".Itwasin
thecontextofsuchcasesthatthePrivyCouncilrecognisedtheunreality
ofthe"licence"tothestrayingchild.Butalthoughrecognisingthe
"licence"asafiction,theyacceptedthecorrectnessoftheconclusionsasto
thelegalconsequencesoftheconductoftheoccupierwhichhadhitherto
previouslybeenacceptedasconstitutinganimplied"licence"totheperson
trespassingandsoentitlinghimtothebenefitofthehigherdutyowedby
anoccupiertotakestepsforthesafetyofhislicensees.
MyLords,Quinlan'scaseisauthorityforthepropositionthatanoccupier
doesnotowetoapersonwhoisunlawfullyuponhislandthecommonduty
ofcareandforesightasrespectsdangerousactivitieswhichhecarriesout
there,thatheowestopersonswhoarelawfullypresentthere,aswasthe

34

successfulplaintiffinthecontrastingAustralianlevelcrossingcase(Com
missionerof Railwaysv .McDermott[1967]AC169)whichcametothe
PrivyCouncilafewyearslater.
IhavenoquarrelwithQuinlan'scaseasanauthorityforthisproposition.
WhatIregardasdefectiveinitsreasoningisthat,althoughitisrecognised
that,inthecaseofchildrenatanyrate,theircategorisationas"licensees"
insteadof"trespassers"wasamerelegalfiction,itfailedtorecognisethat
itwasanecessarycorollarythat"thegeneralformulaaslaiddownin
"Addie'scase"wasnot,ashadbeenstatedearlierintheJudgment,"an
"exclusiveorcomprehensive"statementofthedutyowedbyanoccupier
tothosewhoenteredonhisland,otherwisethanintheexerciseofalegal
rightorwithhisactualconsent.
ButalthoughtheAddietest(theremustbesomeactdonewiththe
deliberateintentionofdoingharmtothetrespasseroratleastsomeactdone
withrecklessdisregardofthepresenceofthetrespasser)wasacceptedas
beingexclusiveorcomprehensive,thePrivyCouncilwentontosay"That
"formulamayembraceanextensiveand,itmaybe,anexpansiveinter
"pretationofwhatiswantonorrecklessconducttowardsatrespasserin
"anygivensituationandinthecaseofchildrenitwillnotprecludefull

"weightbeinggiventoanyrecklesslackofcareinallowingthingsnaturally
"dangeroustothemtobeaccessibleintheirvicinity".
Aformulawhichisbothexclusiveandexpansiveseemstome,asamatter
oflinguistics,tobeacontradictioninterms.FormypartIwouldnot
followthealternativeroutethushintedatbywhichanameliorationofthe
lawinfavourofmeritorioustrespassersmightbeattained.Ithinkitprefer
abletoseektoidentifytheunderlyingprincipleswhichhadbeentacitly
acceptedinAddie v .Dumbreckasjustifyingexclusionfromthecategoryof
intruderstowhomtheAddietestapplies,thosepersonstowhomjudges
havehithertomanagedtoascribethestatusoflicenseewithoutacknowledging
thefictitiouscharacteroftheirimputed"licence"fromtheoccupier.
Anydutyimposedbycommonlawupononepersontotakestepsto
avoidharminganotherarisesoutofsomerelationshiprecognisedbythe
commonlawassubsistingbetweenthetwopersons.Wheretheharmtobe
avoidedispersonalinjuryanecessarycharacteristicoftherelationshipis
oneofphysicalproximitybetweenthepersontowhomthedutyisowed
andthepersonbywhomthedutyisowedorsomethingwhosedangerous
conditionthatpersonhasplayedapartincreatingorcontinuing.Where
thedangerousthingissituateuponlandinprivateoccupationandis
dangerousonlytopersonswhocomeontotheland,thenecessarycharac
teristicofproximitybetweentheoccupierofthelandandapersonwho
sustainsharmfromthedangerousthingiscreatedbythatperson'sownact
incomingontotheland.
Thereisthusarelevantdistinctionbetweenapersonwhoislawfully
upontheoccupier'slandwiththeoccupier'sconsentandatrespasser.In
thecaseoftheformertheoccupierhasconsentedtothecreationofthe
relationshipfromwhichthedutyflowsinthecaseofthetrespasserthe
relationshiphasbeenforcedupontheoccupieragainsthiswillandasthe
resultofalegalwronginflictedonhimbythetrespasserhimself.
Thisdistinction,asitseemstome,suppliesthejurisprudentialbasisfor
theproposition,implicitintheScotscasesaboutfencinglandagainsttres
passers,whichwerecitedwiththeapprovalbyViscountDunedininAddie
v .Dumbreck(ubi.sup.atpp.3746),andexplicitinQuinlan'scase(ubi.
sup.atp.1076),thattheoccupierisnotunderanydutytotakeanypre
cautionsinadvancetoacquainthimselfastothelikelihoodorotherwise
oftrespasserscomingontoanypartofhisland.Heisentitledtoassume
thatpersonswillnotinflictawronguponhimunlesshehasactualknowledge
ofthelikelihoodthattheywilldoso.Itwouldbeanunjustifiableburden
forthelawtoimposeuponanoccupierforthebenefitofwrongdoers,a
dutytomakeinspectionsandinquiriesinordertoascertainwhetheror
nottrespasserswerelikelytocomeontohisland.Sointheordinarycase
ofapersontowhomtheoccupierhasnotgivenpermissiontocomeupon
hisland,keepingthedangerwithintheboundariesofhisownlandisitself

35

afulfilmentofanydutyhemayowetosuchapersontotakereasonable
stepstoenablehimtoavoidsuchdanger.Thetestofwhetheranoccupier
isunderanydutytoatrespassertodomorethantokeepthedangerwithin
theboundariesofhislandiswhetherheisactuallyawareoffactswhich
makeitlikelythatsometrespasserwillcomeontothatpartofhisland
wherethedangeris.Itisnotwhattheoccupierwouldhavebeenaware
ofifhehadexercisedmorediligenceorforesightthanhedid.
MyLords,thedegreeofexpectationthatatrespasserwillcomeupon
hislandthatissufficienttoimposeuponhimadutytotakeanyadditional
stepstoenablesuchatrespassertoavoidthedangerandwhetherthereare
anyelementsinitwhichrequirerecoursetothestandardsofareasonable
man,canbestbediscussedafterconsideringwhatisthecontentofthatduty
whenitarises.
Thedutyatcommonlawowedbyanoccupiertoalicenseeasitwas
explainedahundredyearsagobyWillisJ.inthetwoleadingcasesof
Indermaur v .Dames(L.R.1C.P.274)andGautret v .Egerton(L.R.2
C.P.371)wasrestrictedtoadutytowarnthelicenseeoftrapsorconcealed
dangersactuallyknowntotheoccupierbutnottothelicensee.What
constitutedanadequatewarningdependedonthecircumstances,including
theageandunderstandingofthelicensee.Sincethelicensee,unlikethe
invitee,cameontothepremisesforhisownpurposesitwashisown
responsibilitytoavoiddangersofwhichhekneworcouldhaveknownby
theexerciseofreasonablecarehimself.ItisforthisreasonthatIhave
summarisedthedutyasadutytotakereasonablestepstoenablealicensee
toavoidadangerknownbytheoccupiertoexistuponhisland.
Theresultofthetechniqueofimputinga"licence"totrespassersofa
classwhomtheoccupierknewwereinthehabitofcomingontohisland
wastoextendtothemthebenefitofthisduty.Incontrasttothecommon
lawdutyowedbyanoccupiertoaninviteethetestofabreachoftheduty
wasinmodernlegalparlance"subjective"ratherthan"objective".The
dutytowarnextendedtoconcealeddangersofwhichtheoccupieractually
knewandnottothoseofwhichhedidnotknow,althoughhewouldhave
doneifhehadexercisedmorediligenceininspectinghislandthanhedid.
This"subjective"dutywasowedbyanoccupiertolicenseesofwhose
actualpresenceonthelandandconsequentexposuretodangerhewas
unawarebutoughttohaveforeseenbecausehehadgiventhempermission
togothere.Asrespectslicenseesofwhosepresenceandexposuretodanger
hewasactuallyawarethecontentofhisdutyasIhavesummariseditdiffers
verylittleinsubstancefromViscountHailsham'sdescriptioninAddie v .
Dumbreckofconductofanoccupierwhichrendershimliabletoatrespasser
heavingasideintentionalinjury.Hestatedtheoccupier'sdutytoatrespasser
whomheknewtobepresent,inthenegativeformofadutytorefrain
fromdoinganact"withrecklessdisregardofthepresenceofthetrespasser",
whereasIhavesummarisedtheoccupier'sdutytoatrespasserwhomhe
knowstobeexposedtodanger,inthepositiveformofadutytotake
reasonablestepstoenablethetrespassertoavoidthedanger.Butpositive
andnegativedescriptionsofdutiesofthiskindmaybewaysofdescribing
thetwosidesofthesamecoin.Inthepassageimmediatelybeforethat
whichIhavequotedViscountHailshamhadstatedtheoccupier'sdutyto
hislicenseeinthenegativeform:"Heisboundnottocreateatraporto
"allowaconcealeddangertoexistuponthesaidpremiseswhichisknown
"oroughttobeknowntotheoccupier"thoughtheinclusionofthe
words"oroughttobeknown"does,Ithink,overstatetheaccepteddefinition
ofthecommonlawdutytolicensees.

Itispossibletoconceiveofcircumstanceswheretheconcealeddanger
isduetothenaturalconditionoftheland,butalltheactualcasesinthe
booksareaboutmanmadedangersanditistothesethatthelanguageof
thejudgmentsisdirected.Manmadedangermaybetheresultofanact
donewhilethetrespasserisactuallypresentontheland,aswasthecasein
Addie v .Dumbreckitself,oranactdonebeforethetrespassercameonto
theland.ItcanhardlybesupposedthatViscountHailshamintendedto
drawadistinctionbetweentheliabilityoftheoccupierforsettingthehaulage

36
machineryinmotionwhenthechildwasknowntobeclosetothepulley
wheelandallowingittocontinueinmotionafterthechildwasknownto
haveapproachedthewheel.Ineithercasehisconductwouldmanifest
"arecklessdiregardofordinaryhumanity".Inthecontextofrecklessness
ofconductthereisnorationaldistinctionbetweenactivityandinactivity.
Thepracticaleffectofthetechniqueofimputinga"licence"totrespassers
ofwhoseactualpresenceonthelandtheoccupierwasnotawarewasthus
toputtheminthesamepositionvisavistheoccupierasifhehadactually
knownoftheirpresenceandconsequentexposuretoaconcealeddangerof
whichhehadactualknowledge.
Actualknowledgeofaconcealeddanger,however,mayinvolvetwo
differentmentalelements:actualknowledgeofanactivitycarriedoutupon
thelandorofitsphysicalcondition,whichconstitutesaconcealeddanger
toapersononthelandandactualappreciationthattheknownactivity
orconditiondoesconstituteaconcealeddanger.Therelevanceofthis
analysis,particularlyincasesinwhichanyactivitiesonthelandarecarried
outbyservantsoftheoccupierforwhosefaultheisvicariouslyliable,does
notappeartohavebeenappreciateduntilcomparativelyrecently,when
thecurrentvogueforclassifyingthetestsoflegaldutiesaseither"subjective"
or"objective"madeitdesirabletoidentifywhotherelevant"subject"
was.ItplayednopartinjudicialreasoningatthetimeofAddie v .
Dumbreck.Thepossibilityofdrawingadistinctionbetweenknowledgeof
physicalfactsandappreciationofdangerwasfirstsuggestedinargumentin
Baker v .BethnalGreenBoroughCouncil([1945]1AllE.R.135).Itwas
eventuallyacceptedbytheCourtofAppealinHawkins v .Purleyand
CoulsdonU.D.C.([1954]1Q.B.349)inordertoimposeuponacorporation
asoccupierliabilitybasedupontheactualknowledgeofthephysicalfacts
fromwhichthedangerarose.Itwasheldthatalthoughthetestofknowledge
ofthephysicalfactswhichconstitutedtheconcealeddangerwassubjective
(didtheoccupiereitherpersonallyorvicariouslybyhisservantsactually
knowthem?),thelestofappreciationofthedangerresultingfromthe
knownfactswasobjective(wouldareasonablemanpossessedofthat
knowledgeofthephysicalfactsappreciatethedanger?).
Ifthiscanbecharacterisedasanenlargementratherthanamereexplana
tionbyjudicialdecisionofanoccupier'sdutytohislicenseesitwasa
developmentwhichhadtakenplacebeforetheOccupiersLiabilityAct,1957,
hadsubstitutedastatutorydutyofcareforthecommonlawdutypreviously
owedtolicensees.ThatActdidnottouchtheoccupier'sdutytotrespassers
atcommonlaw.Itleftittocontinuetobedevelopedbyjudicialdecision.
Actualknowledgeofconcealeddangerisafactorcommontotheduty
previouslyowedatcommonlawbyanoccupiertohislicenseesandtothe
dutystillowedbyanoccupiertotrespassers.

Thereis,inanyevent,acertainartificialityinascribinganappreciation
ofrisktoafictitiousperson,acorporationasthisdefendantisandas
nowadaysmostdefendantsare.Knowledgeoffactscallsfortheuseofeyes
andearsandtheseacorporationhasthroughitsemployees,eventhe
humblest.Ifanyofthemlearnsofthefacts,inthecourseofhisemployment
hisknowledgeistheknowledgeofthecorporation.Butappreciationof
riskofdangercallsfortheexerciseofintelligentjudgmentanditisthe
judgmentofthecorporationitselfwhichisrelevant.Whathumanmindsare
tobetreatedasthoseofthecorporationforthepurposeofexercisingthat
judgment?Totakeanexampleofwhatmayhavebeenthefactsofthe
presentcaseiftheAppellantshadchosentodisclosethem.Thelinesman
whenhesawthebrokenfencemayhaveappreciatedtheriskofdanger
totrespassingchildrenbuthavefailedtoreportthestateofthefenceoutof
lazinessorforgetfulness.Or,whetherornothehimselfappreciatedtherisk,
hemayhavereportedthestateofthefenceintermswhichdidnotdrawthe
attentionoftherecipientofhisreporttothedangerinvolved.Orthe
 recipientmayhimselfhaveappreciatedtheriskbuttosavehimselftrouble
decidedtodonothingaboutit.Andsoonupthechainofresponsibility
totheemployeeofthecorporationendowedwithauthoritytoorderthe

37

fencetoberepaired.Isappreciationoftheriskbyanyoneemployeein
thischaintobetreatedasappreciationofriskbythecorporationitself?
Onepossiblesolutioninthecaseofacorporationistoapplytheobjective
standardofthereasonableman.byattributingtothefictitiousperson,the
fictitiousmindandjudgmentofareasonableman.Itwould,however,be
moreconsistentwiththewayinwhichEnglishlawdevelops,toapplyto
"actualknowledgeofadanger"asafactorinthedutyofanoccupierto
trespassersthesameanalysisaswasadoptedinrelationtotheoccupier's
dutyatcommonlawtohislicensees.Thisavoidsdifferentiatingbetween
therealandthefictitiouspersonasoccupierandsolvesthemetaphysical
difficultiesofascribingtothelatteranactualappreciationoftherisk.To
seethedangersignalyetnottotakethetroubletogivesomethoughttoitis
conductwhichthelawoughttocondemn.
MyLords,Iconcludethereforethatthereisnodutyowedbyanoccupier
toanytrespasserunlessheactuallyknowsofthephysicalfactsinrelation
tothestateofhislandorsomeactivitycarriedoutuponit.whichconstitute
aseriousdangertopersonsonthelandwhoareunawareofthosefacts.
Heisundernodutytoanytrespassertomakeinspectionsorinquiriesto
ascertainwhetherthereisanysuchdanger.Wherehedoesknowofphysical
factswhichareasonablemanwouldappreciateinvolveddangerofserious
injurytothetrespasserhisdutyistotakereasonablestepstoenablethe
trespassertoavoidthedanger.Whatconstitutereasonablestepswilldepend
uponthekindoftrespassertowhomthedutyisowed.Ifthedutyowed
tosmallchildrentooyoungtounderstandawarningnoticethedutymay
requiretheprovisionofanobstacletotheirapproachtothedangersufficiently
difficulttosurmountastomakeitcleartotheyoungestunaccompanied
childlikelytoapproachthedanger,thatbeyondtheobstacleisforbidden
territory.
Suchbeing,asIwouldhold,thecontentoftheoccupier'sdutytoa
trespasser,Ireturntotheconsiderationoftheclassoftrespasserstowhom
thedutyisowedand,inparticular,tothedegreeofexpectationonthe
partoftheoccupierthatthetrespasserswillcomeontohislandwhich,in
theabsenceofactualknowledgeofhispresence,issufficienttogiveriseto
theduty.Itisaproblemwhichdoesnotariseinthecaseoflicenseesto
whomhehasgivenpermissiontocomethere.
InQuinlan'scaseavarietyofexpressionswereusedtodescribethe
necessarydegreeofexpectation.Theoccupiermust"asgoodasknow"
thatthetrespasserispresentatthetimeoftheinjury.Hispresencemust
befairlydescribedas"extremelylikely"or"veryprobable".Idonot
findtheselatterphraseshelpfulsaveasawarningthatthepresenceof
trespassersbeingunpredictableascomparedwiththatoflicensees,thisun
predictabilitymustnotbeallowedtoimposeupontheoccupieraduty
togivehismindtoallthepossiblecircumstancesinwhichatrespasser
mightcomeontohisland.Ifthisbranchofthelawisbasedupon
"ordinaryhumanity"itwouldseemevidentthattheremustbearelation
shipbetweenthedegreeofexpectationandthedegreeofdanger.Inthe
caseofaminefield,asinAdams v .Naylor([1944]1K.B.750),oralive
electricrail,anordinarilyhumanemanwouldregarditasincumbentupon
himtotakeprecautionstoprotectintrudersagainstthemortaldangerwhich
theseobjectspresentalthoughthelikelihoodoftherebeingintruderswas
muchlessthanthatwhichwouldcausehimtotakeprecautionstoprotect
intrudersagainstmoreinnocuousperils.Furthermore,therelevantlikeli
hoodisthatofthetrespasser'spresenceattheplaceandtimeofdanger.
Ifthedangeriscreatedbyanoccasionalorintermittentactivityuponthe
land,suchasputtingmachinesorvehiclesinmotion,thetestofthecreation
oftheoccupier'sliabilitytotheinjuredtrespasserishisexpectationofa
trespasser'spresenceatthepointofdangeratthatmomentofactivity.
Whereasifthedangerliesinsomepermanentconditionoftheland,such
asaliverail,thetestishisexpectationofsometrespasser'spresenceat
thepointofdangeratanytimewhilethatconditioncontinuestoexist.

Thirdly,inthecaseofchildren,thedegreeofattractivenesstochildrenof

38

somethingpresentontheland,isrelevanttotheoccupier'sexpectationthat
childtrespasserswillcomeontohislandandwillapproachthepointof
danger,aswellasbeingrelevanttothekindofprecautionhemusttaketo
protectthemfromthedanger.
MyLords,anoccupier'sexpectationofatrespasser'spresence,likehis
knowledgeofaconcealeddanger,alsoinvolvestwomentalelements:actual
knowledgeofphysicalfactswhichindicatethattrespassersarelikelyto
comeontothelandandappreciationoftheresultinglikelihood.For
reasonssimilartothosewhichIhaveindicatedIthinkthat,asthelawhas
nowdeveloped,thetestofappreciationofthelikelihoodoftrespassis
whetherareasonablemanknowingonlythephysicalfactswhichtheoccupier
actuallyknew,wouldappreciatethatatrespasser'spresenceatthepointand
timeofdangerwassolikelythatinallthecircumstancesitwouldbe
inhumanenottogivetohimeffectivewarningofthedangeror,inthecase
ofachildtooyoungtounderstandawarning,nottotakestepstoconvey
tohisinfantintelligencethathemustkeepaway.Idonotthinkthata
judgeorjurywouldfindanydifficultyinapplyingthistest.
Iwouldthenseektosummarisethecharacteristicsofanoccupier'sduty
totrespassersonhislandwhichdistinguishesitfromthestatutory"common
"dutyofcare"owedtopersonslawfullyonhislandundertheOccupier's
LiabilityAct,1957,andfromthecommonlawdutyofcareowedbyone
mantohis"neighbour",intheAtkiniansense,wheretherelationship
ofoccupierandtrespasserdoesnotsubsistbetweenthem.Todosodoes
involverejectingViscountHailsham'sformulationofthedutyinAddie v .
Dumbreckasamountingtoanexclusiveorcomprehensivestatementofit
asitexiststoday.Ittakesaccount,asthisHouseasthefinalexpositor
ofthecommonlawshouldalwaysdo,ofchangesinsocialattitudesand
circumstancesandgiveseffecttothegeneralpublicsentimentofwhatis
"reckless"conductasithasexpandedoverthefortyyearswhichhave
elapsedsincethedecisioninthatcase.
First:Thedutydoesnotariseuntiltheoccupierhasactualknowledge
eitherofthepresenceofthetrespasseruponhislandoroffactswhichmake
itlikelythatthetrespasserwillcomeontohislandandhasalsoactual
knowledgeoffactsastotheconditionofhislandorofactivitiescarried
outuponitwhicharelikelytocausepersonalinjurytoatrespasserwho
isunawareofthedanger.Heisundernodutytothetrespassertomake
anyinquiryorinspectiontoascertainwhetherornotsuchfactsdoexist.
Hisliabilitydoesnotariseuntilheactuallyknowsofthem.
Secondly:Oncetheoccupierhasactualknowledgeofsuchfacts,hisown
failuretoappreciatethelikelihoodofthetrespasser'spresenceortherisk
tohiminvolved,doesnotabsolvetheoccupierfromhisdutytothetrespasser
ifareasonablemanpossessedoftheactualknowledgeoftheoccupierwould
recognisethatlikelihoodandthatrisk.
Thirdly:Thedutywhenitarisesislimitedtotakingreasonablestepsto
enablethetrespassertoavoidthedanger.Wherethelikelytrespasser
isachildtooyoungtounderstandorheedawrittenorapreviousoral
warning,thismayinvolveprovidingreasonablephysicalobstaclestokeep
thechildawayfromthedanger.
Fourthly:Therelevantlikelihoodtobeconsideredisofthetrespasser's
presenceattheactualtimeandplaceofdangertohim.Thedegreeof
likelihoodneededtogiverisetothedutycannot,Ithink,bemoreclosely
definedthanasbeingsuchaswouldimpelamanofordinaryhumane
feelingstotakesomestepstomitigatetheriskofinjurytothetrespasser
towhichtheparticulardangerexposeshim.Itwillthusdependonall
thecircumstancesofthecase:thepermanentorintermittentcharacterof
thedangertheseverityoftheinjurieswhichitislikelytocauseinthe
caseofchildren,theattractivenesstothemofthatwhichconstitutesthe
dangerousobjectorconditionofthelandtheexpenseinvolvedingiving
effectivewarningofittothekindoftrespasserlikelytobeinjured,in
relationtotheoccupier'sresourcesinmoneyorinlabour.
MyLords,uponthefindingsofthetrialjudgeintheinstantappeal.1
findnodifficultyininferringthatthroughtheeyesorearsofoneorother

39

oftheirservantstheAppellant Board didknowthephysicalfactsthatmade

itlikelythatlittlechildrenplayinginBunce'sMeadowwouldtrespasson
theirlineandthatiftheydidsowouldrunaseriousriskofgraveifnot
mortalinjuryfromtheelectricrail.Breachoftheothercharacteristicsof
thedutywhichthenarose,isinmyview,established.Iwould,therefore,
dismissthisappeal.
Itmight,however,leavethisbranchofthecommonlawofEnglandstill
inconfusionifthisHousedidnotstatecategoricallytherespectsinwhich
thetestofanoccupier'sdutytoatrespasserdiffersfromthatstatedbythe
majorityoftheCourtofAppealinVidean v . British TransportCommission
(19632Q.B.650)andreiteratedbythewholecourtinKingzett v . British
RailwaysBoard ((1968)112Sol.J.625)despitetheinterveningadverse
commentbythePrivyCouncilinQuinlan'scase.
Intheinstantcasethetrialjudgefeltthathewasboundtofollowthe
reasoningofVidean'scaseandKingzett'scase.TheCourtofAppealfelt
abletodecideitwithoutrecoursetoVidean'scase,bytreatingthestation
master'sfailuretodoanythingexcepttowarnthepolicewhenchildren
hadtrespassedonthelandtwomonthsbefore,asfallingwithinViscount
Hailsham'sformulainAddie v .Dumbreckas"anactdonewithreckless
"disregardofthepresenceofatrespasser".Thiswas,Ithink,unduly
censoriousofthestationmasterasanindividual.Itwasunnecessaryto
apportionamongitsindividualservantstheblamewhichlayuponthe
incorporated Board .Therecklessactwasthatofthefictitiousperson,the
Board itself,inallowingthedeadlycurrenttoflowthroughtheliverailwhen,
throughoneormoreofitsservantsitknewthephysicalfactswhichmade
itlikelythatalittlechildwouldstrayfromBunce'sMeadowandcome
incontactwiththerail.
ThetestpropoundedbythemajorityoftheCourtofAppealinVidean's
caseis,inmyview,wronginthreerespects.
1.Itdrawsanunwarrantabledistinctionbetweena"static"condition
oftheoccupier'slandandan"activity"whichtheoccupiercarriesouton
it.Inrespectofactivitiesoftheoccupieronthelanditaccordsthe
trespasserthestatusof"neighbour"visavistheoccupierdespitethefact
thathehasforcedthisrelationshipupontheoccupieragainstthelatter'swill
andbyawrongfulactdonetotheoccupier.
2.Ittreatsthesourceoftherelationshipwhichgivesrisetotheoccupier's
dutytowardsatrespasserinrespectof"activities"asmereforeseeability
ofthetrespasser'spresence,justasinthecaseofsomeonelawfullyonhis
 ofthetrespasser'spresence,justasinthecaseofsomeonelawfullyonhis
land.Thissuggeststhatthereissomedutyontheoccupiertomake

inspectionsorinquiriesinordertoacquainthimselfofthelikelihoodofa
trespasser'scomingontohisland.Thereisnosuchduty.
3.Ittreatsthedutyoftheoccupiertothetrespasserinrespectof
"activities"asidenticalwithhisdutytopersonslawfullyonhisland
insteadofthemorerestricteddutytotakereasonablestepstoenablethe
trespassertoavoidconcealeddangersresultingfromtheexistenceoffacts
actuallyknowntotheoccupier.
IntheinstantappealYourLordshipsareconcernedonlywiththeliability
ofanoccupieroflandtowardsatrespasserwhosepresenceonthelandisa
legalwrongcommittedbythetrespasserupontheoccupierhimself.This
isnotnecessarilythesameastheliabilityofsomeotherperson,whocarries
onanactivityonthelandwiththepermissionoftheoccupier,towards
apersonwho,thoughatrespasservisavistheoccupier,commitsnolegal
wronguponhimwhocarriesontheactivity.Therearethreecasesat
firstinstanceinwhichithasbeenheldbyjudgesofgreateminencethata
contractor,whoisnottheoccupierofland,owestotrespassersontheland
theordinarycommonlawdutyofcareowedbyonemantohisneighbour.
Thatheisatrespasservisavistheoccupierwastreatedasrelevantonly
totheforeseeabilityofhispresence.(See:Buckland v .GuildfordGasLight
&CokeCo.[1949]1W.L.R.410Davies v .St.Mary'sDemolitionCo.
[1954]1W.L.R.392Creed v.McGeogh&Sons(1955]1W.L.R.1005.)
InVidean'scase(ubi.sup.atp.604)itwasassertedbaldlythattherewas

40

neitherrhymenorreasonwhytheoccupier'sliabilitytoatrespassershould
differfromthatofacontractor.Thereisatleastonepossiblereasonin
logicandinlaw.DisapprovaloftheratiodecidendiofVidean'scasedoes
notnecessarilyinvolveanyconflictwiththedecisionsinthethreecontractor's
casestowhichIhavereferred.Theinstantcaseisnotanappropriateone
inwhichtodealwiththeliabilitytotrespasserofpersonswhoarenot
theoccupiersofthelandonwhichthetrespassiscommitted.

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