WILLS

3-D 2016 DIGEST GROUP (FIRST BATCH)

 INHERITANCE RATIO: NO. Respondent Japitana has no cause of action against
petitioner Nacar. A cause of action is an act or omission of one
Case No. 1 party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential
Nicanor Nacar (Petitioner) vs. Claudio Nistal, Municipal Judge, elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the
Agusan del Sur; Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Sur, Ildefonso plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an
Japitana, and Antonio Doloricon (Respondents) act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right
G.R. No. L-33006 with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he
December 8, 1982 may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. appropriate relief.

FACTS: Sometime in 1968 Petitioners stepfather, Isabelo Nacar, Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to
incurred an indebtedness against the Respondent amounting to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no
P2,791.00. Despite repeated demands by the respondent, Isabelo correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that
was not able to pay. Thus, prompting the respondent to file a civil there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt
action for the collection of money against Isabelo. In the year or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the
1970, Isabelo died. Respondent then filed a complaint in Civil Case debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the
and entitled it "Claim Against the Estate Nicanor Nacar the Late petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with
Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment". consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a
cause of action against the former.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary
attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. In his motion The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained to his
to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and estate upon his death. The claim of the private respondents may
absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the heirs of
indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have Isabelo Nacar, or pursued in the appropriate settlement
been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. proceedings. A municipal court may not entertain such a
There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. proceeding, it not being vested, under the law then in force, with
probate jurisdiction.
Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion
while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in
intervention asserting that he was the owner of the attached
carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were
in his name. The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.
Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint against an heir of a decedent,
who incurred the indebtedness, is the correct action for the
collection of money.

 Case No. 2 belonging to the estate had been made. because it was perishable
Dora Perkins Anderson (Petitioner-Appellee) vs. Idonah Slade in nature.
Perkins (Oppositor-Appellant)
GR L-15388 Lower courts decision: The lower court approved the proposed
January 31, 1961 sale and also authorized the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same.
REYES, J.B.L., J. Despite of the defendants Motion for Reconsideration, the lower
court denies such MR. (Motion for Reconsideration)
FACTS: On May 10, 1956, Dora Perkins Anderson filed a petition
for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late ISSUE: Whether or not the special administrator may sell the
Eugene Arthur Perkins who allegedly possessed of personal and properties of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins
real properties with a probate value of P5,000.00 and Dora also
filed an urgent petition for the estate. On the same day, the court RATIO: NO. The Supreme Court held that the special
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator can not sell the property of the late Arthur Perkins.
administrator. It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased, opposed administrator is appointed. Both the estate and and its value
to the said probate and the special administrator submitted an should be preserved.
inventory of the assets of the deceased at the time of his death.
Records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for
Two years later, the special administrator submitted to the court a and judicially approved, no proceeding has yet been taken or even
petition seeking authority to sell or give away to some charitable started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the
institution/s certain personal properties. Court required the defendant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the
administrator to submit an inventory of the properties and thus, deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property.
he likewise submitted it. Idonah Perkins opposed to the said
proposed sale. It does not appear that defendant was given a reasonable
opportunity to point out in which items in the inventory she did
Plaintiffs contention: The special administrator has the not want to sold. Also, it did not even show that an inquiry was
authority to sell the properties of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins. made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition. Lower
That the special administrator claims that oppositor/defendant courts decision was set aside and with costs against the special
should allege on the properties which she did not want to sell and administrator.
that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious
claim.

Defendants contention: Idorah Perkins contention was that the
special administrator has no legal authority to sell the properties
because it was perishable in nature. That such properties sought
to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased
husband and the unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture
 RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE and petitioners are barred by prescription/laches. The RTC ruled
in favor of the petitioners.
TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF
DEATH CA reversed the ruling of the RTC stating that there was a valid
oral partition of the lot wherein the questioned Lot No. 1-A-14 is a
Case No. 3 part thereof and such lot was owned by Rafael Reyes Sr and validly
Maria Vda. De Reyes et al. (Petitioner) vs. CA and Sps. sold to Gardiola.
Dalmacio Gardiola (Respondents)
GR No. 92436 ISSUE: Whether or not Rafael Reyes Jr.s successors-in-interest is
July 26, 1991 the lawful owner of Lot No. 1-A-14.
Davide, Jr., J.
RATIO: NO. According to the Supreme Court, the rights to the
FACTS: Gavino Reyes was the owner of a more or less 70 hectares succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
parcel of land located in Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona Cavite. decedent. Rafael Reyes Jr. never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-
When he died in 1921, the said land was never been registered 14 because it was sold by his father, Rafael Reyes Sr. during his
under Torrens System. Gavinos son, Marcelo Reyes became the lifetime. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in
administrator of the said land and applied for registration. When favor of an heir. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of
the lot was surveyed and subdivided by the heirs of Gavino. Few Rafael Reyes, Jr., the son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that
years after, Rafael Reyes, Sr. another son of Gavino sold a parcel of which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death.
land with an area of 23,431 square meters to the private
respondents, Gardiola. However, the said land with Lot No. 1-A-14
was never been indicated in the deed of sale. After the fulfillment
of the sale, private respondents immediately took possession of
the property and started paying the land taxes.

On October 21, 1967, the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Rafael Reyes Sr. and Marta
Reyes, children of Gavino both deceased, represented by their
children Rafael Reyes, Jr only son of Rafael Reyes Sr. and Rosario
Martillano for Marta Reyes. This was the time when Rafael Reyes,
Jr. discovered that they are the lawful owner of Lot No. 1-A-14.
Rafael Jr. filed a case against the private respondent for recovery
of possession or in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting
and damages. Private respondents deny the material averments in
the complaint and assert that they are the lawful owner of the lot
in question, which they bought the same lot from Rafael Reyes Sr.
and such sale was known to Rafael Reyes Jr. that they have been in
possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes
 Case No. 4 ground of failure to prosecute. However it was subsequently lifted
Danilo I. Suarez, et al. (Petitioners) vs. CA, et al. by the same court. The Court of Appeals then granted Raymundo's
(Respondents) appeal seeking to annul the order of the lower court. Hence, this
G.R. No. 94918 appeal.
September 2, 1992
Nocon, J. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents can validly acquire all the five
(5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the
FACTS: In 1995, petitioners father died and since then his estate name of petitioners' deceased father, Marcelo Suarez.
consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro
Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners' RATIO: NO. Only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have
widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the been the subject of the auction sale. The legitime of the surviving
consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary
were ordered by RTC of Pasig to pay, jointly and severally, herein interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
damages. became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their deceased father.
The judgment against petitioners' mother and Rizal Realty Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting
Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, were levied and sold on
execution in favor of the Private respondents Raymundo as the NOTES:
highest bidder.
Article 777: The law applicable at the time of the institution of the
Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which case. "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
was subsequently registered. Before the expiration of the moment of the death of the decedent."
redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action
alleging, among others, that being strangers to the case decided Article 888: "The legitime of the legitimate children and
against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the
neither be levied nor sold on execution. The Provincial Sheriff of remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of
Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale over the the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
properties.
Article 892, par. 2: "If there are two or more legitimate children or
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion
respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned descendants."
by petitioners.

The RTC granted the respondent's motion to dismiss on the
 INTESTATE
Petitioner on the other hand, interpose a defense that the real
Case No. 5 intent of the parties was to make the entire lot the subject matter
Nelia A. Constantino (Petitioner) vs. CA, Aurora S. Roque, of the sale.
Priscilla S. Luna, and Josefina S. Austria (Respondents)
G.R. No. 116018 RTC: Annul and cancel the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
November 13, 1996 Estate with Sale and Subdivision Plan.
Bellosillo, J.
CA: Sustained.
FACTS: Josefa Torres died intestate leaving a parcel of land located
at Balagtas, Bulacan. In 1984, the heirs (respondents in this case) ISSUE: Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
and respondents, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land Sale is valid.
with a total land area of 250 sq./m and pursuant to their
agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the RATIO: NO. When respondents affixed their signatures on the
necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale. deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be
prepared left the spaces as regards the dimensions of the property
After having the document drafted with several spaces left to be sold blank and that the heirs were persuaded to sign the
blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent
land petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the Roque, would be present when the property would be surveyed.
document which the heirs signed with the understanding that As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of
respondent Roque, would be present when the latter would seek petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed. Apparently,
permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed. petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces, having
the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less
property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and 2 TCTs were consent.
issued. When respondent was able to secure a copy of the deed,
they learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to NOTES:
petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties.
[This case is primarily about the validity of the contract. However,
Respondents then sent a letter to petitioner demanding the this is listed under the topic of Intestate. Perhaps, Atty. wanted this
surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the case to be an example of the definition of intestate.]
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. This
prompted the respondents to file with the RTC an action for Intestate is a decedent who left no will.
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title
interposing that all the heirs signed the document before the land Settlement of an estate need not undergo judicial proceedings all the
was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was yet no definite time. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the extrajudicial
area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of settlement of estate by agreement among the heirs.
the signing.
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do
so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed
in the office of the register of deeds
 HEIRS the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and
simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.
Case No. 6
Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (Petitioners) vs. Court of ISSUE: Should the respondent court have proceed with the trial
Appeals et al. (Respondents) and simultaneously resolve the issue of heirship in the same case?
G.R. No. 124320
March 2, 1999 RATIO: NO. The Court ruled that the trial court cannot make a
Purisima, J. declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioners are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 situated in Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. Petitioners discovered that a portion, if action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the
not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by
(GoldenBay) under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 225254 and which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or particular fact."
225255.
The Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in
They filed a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners in the case at bar
of TCT Nos. 493363-67 and its derivatives and as alternative are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
reconveyance of realty with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order with damages with the In Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera, this court opined that the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite. declaration of heirship must be made in an administration
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
Private respondents presented a motion to dismiss on the grounds was reiterated in Solivio vs. Court of Appeals, where the court held:
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that
petitioners did not have a right of action, that they have not "In Litam, et al. vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the
established their status as heirs and that the land being claimed is pendency of the special proceedings for the
different from that of the private respondents. The said motion to settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael
dismiss was granted by the respondent court holding that Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which
petitioners have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it they claimed that they were the children by a previous
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the deceased marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
couple. entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera,
Petitioners interposed a motion for reconsideration but it was the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
denied. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners contended that the appellants were not children of the deceased, that the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling properties in question were paraphernal properties of his
that the issue of heirship should first be determined before the wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir.
trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners' submission that On appeal to this Court, we ruled that 'such declarations
 (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No.
1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the
project of partition.' (p. 378)."

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the
declaration ofheirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

NOTES:

Intestate the description of a person who dies without making a
valid will

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is
"a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact."
 Case No. 7 LOWER COURT: Ruled in favor of petitioner Raymundo. Issued an
Valente Raymundo (Petitioner) vs. Teofista Isagon Vda. De Order directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject properties, (2)
Suarez , Danilo I. Suarez, Eufrocina Suarez, Marcelo I. Suarez, to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or alienating the
Jr., Evelyn Suarez, et al. (Respondents) improvements thereon, and (4) to surrender to them the ownerss
G.R. No. 149017 duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
November 28, 2008
Nachura, J. Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders.
FACTS: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez marriage was blessed
with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, COURT OF APPEALS: dismissed Teofistas and herein
namely, Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo, all respondents petition.
surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents must first be declared heirs of
Marcelo Sr. before they can file action to annul the judicial sale of
In 1955, Marcelo Sr. died, and Teofista, herein respondents, as well what is the conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo, Sr.
as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
partitioning Marcelo Sr.s estate. Curiously, despite the partition, RATIO: NO, it is no longer needed. SC reversed the decision of RTC
title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the and Court of Appeals.
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelos and
Isagons property regime, remained in the couples name. In Heirs of Yaptichay, the complaint for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of certain TCTs was dismissed for failure of
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, were the petitioners to demonstrate any proof or even a semblance of
sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, and it that they had been declaredthe legal heirs of the deceased
Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito in consolidated cases for couple, the spouses Yaptinchay.
Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos.
21736 to 21739. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.s estate, which
Petitioners contention: Petitioner Valente insists that, following explicitlyrecognizes herein respondentsas Marcelo Sr.s legitimate
our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the
must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofistas paraphernal properties,
action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputably, conjugal and separates the properties she owns in common with her
property of Teofista ad Marcelo Sr. childrem, herein respondents. There is no need to re-declare
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
Respondents contention: Article 777 of the Civil Code, tha law interminably.
applicable at the time of the institution of the case: The rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria
the decedent. Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by
virtue of an exception sale to recover Teofistas judgment
obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofistas, and
payment cannot be made through an execution sale of properties
not absolutely owned by her. The subject properties were conjugal
properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr/
married to Teofista.

Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s death, by virtue of compulsory
succession, Marcelo Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership was
transmitted by operation of law to his complusory heirs.

 Case No. 8 new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the property
Development Bank of the Philippines (Petitioner) vs. Ella mortgaged to it was no longer covered by a free patent but by a
Gagarani, Isagani, Adrian, Nathaniel, Nieva, Jonathan, TCT. DBP also argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of
Dionesio, Florence, and Jeremias, all surnamed Asok the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-
(Respondents) law and grandchildren.
G.R. No. 172248
September 17, 2008 ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are the legal heirs of the
Corona, J. patentees.

FACTS: Spouses Dionesio and Matea Asok owned several parcels RATIO: YES. It was held in the case of Madarcos vs. de la Merced
of land. Upon the Spouses death, their eleven children inherited that, the term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic
the properties. One of the lands inherited was covered by a free sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the
patent. The children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.
Estate with Quitclaim. Denison Asok (Asok) inherited the subject Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs
property. As a result, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator
in Asoks name. or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but
they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, borrowed
P100,000 from petitioner DBP. They mortgaged the subject lot as Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and
collateral to guarantee payment of the loan. On due date, Asok and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella
Ella failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be
foreclosed. DBP was the highest bidder. considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land.

A certificate of sale was issued in favor of DBP. DBPs ownership
over the property was consolidated and a TCT was issued in its
name. Asok died. He was succeeded by his surviving spouse and
children, the respondents. Respondents filed a Complaint for
repurchase against DBP. They invoked their right to repurchase
the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141, as amended:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent
or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from date of the conveyance.

DBP contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec.
119 which covers homesteads and free patents because the free
patent issued to Asok's parents had already been cancelled and a
 REQUISITES OF A FORMAL WILL pages A, B, and C of the will were not the same. This, to the
Petitioner, indicated that they were not signed on the same day.
Case No. 9
Samaniego-Celada (Petitioner) vs. Abena (Respondent) For her part, Respondent counters that the Petitioner raises
G.R. No. 145545 questions of fact which were already settled by the CA, and such
June 30, 2008 finding by the CA were final and conclusive thus not subject to
Quisimbing, J. review on appeal with the SC.

FACTS: Margarita S. Mayores died on April 27 1987, leaving no ISSUE: Whether or not Margaritas will complied with the
ascending nor descending heirs. She was survived only by her first formalities required by Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego
Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada. RATIO: YES, the will complied the formalities required by Art.
Respondent Lucia D. Abena, who was the decedents lifelong 805. The Court, citing the ruling of the RTC as affirmed by the CA,
companion since 1929, was the recipient of not only all the held that the Petitioner had no basis with which to anchor her
personal property belonging to the decedent but also one-half of arguments. Citing Art. 809 of the Civil Code, absent a showing of
her undivided share in real properties located in Singalong, Manila bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
and San Antonio Village, Makati. Aside from this, she was also influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in
made the sole executor of the will which was executed by the the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
decedent on February 2, 1987. proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
On August 11, 1987, Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Margarita Thus, even if the attestation clause stated that the will was
before the 66th Branch of the RTC of Makati. Two months after, on composed of three pages when in fact it was only composed of
October 27, 1987, Respondent Lucia D. Abena then filed a Petition two, since the page where the attestation was found does not form
for Probate of the Will of Margarita before the same court. Both part of the will, such an irregularity, to the Courts considered
petitions were consolidated. By March 2, 1993 however, the RTC view, was not material enough to invalidate the will. Even the
rendered a decision favorable to the Respondent, declaring the last difference in size, texture, and appearance of the testators
will and testament of Margarita probated, with the Respondent as signature did not convince the Court that the same indicated that
the sole executor. the signatures were obtained on different occasions. A picture
submitted as evidence before the RTC as Exhibit H-3 readily
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA but the latter showed the testator affixing her signature in the presence of the
affirmed the decision in toto hence this case. Petitioner contends instrumental witnesses and the notary. Most glaringly, the Court
that the decedents will failed to comply with the formalities noted that the Petitioner did not present any evidence which
required by Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Specifically, she points at would substantiate her claim.
the fact that the subject will was not signed by the testator in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one Finding no valid ground with which to disturb the findings of the
another. She also contends that the signature of the testator on RTC, as well as the CA, the Court maintained the validity of the will
in question.

 Case No. 10 or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
Manuel L. Lee (Complainant) vs. Atty. Regino B. Tambago one another.
(Respondent)
A.C. No. 5281 Only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo, attested the will in
February 12, 2008 question. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered
Corona, J. void. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
FACTS: Complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. witnesses.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the
ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
testament. In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. his act or deed. In examining the acknowledgement in the will, the
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Supreme Court found that there was the conspicuous absence of a
Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
execution. Noynay and Grajo.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in
respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the omissions by respondent invalidated the will. As the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
signature as donor in a deed of donation, which contained his notarization. The Supreme Court found that he acted very
purported genuine signature. Complainant averred that the irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were, in all aspects, different from each other.

Respondent in his comment alleged that the last will and
testament was validly executed and actually notarized by
respondent per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit of the
children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N.
Lee, Jr.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tambago violated the Notarial Law.

RATIO: YES. A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is
required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three
 Case No. 11 Possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and Damages against
Danilo ALuad, Leonora ALuad, Divina ALuad, Prospero Aluad, Respondent.
and Connie Aluad (Petitioners) vs. Zenaido Aluad
(Respondent) In the Complaint, they alleged that they were in prior possession
G.R. No. 176943 of the two parcels of land given and sold to Respondent until
October 17, 2008 January 1991 when Respondent entered and possessed the two
Carpio-Morales, J. parcels of land, claiming that he was the adopted son of Crispin
Aluad. Respondent refused to give back possession until Matilde
FACTS: Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and Respondent Aluad died in 1994 and then retained possession thereof up to and
Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad until the present time, thus, depriving them of the enjoyment of
and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as said parcels of land. They claimed that with the death of Matilde,
Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, the Petitioners succeeded by inheritance by right of
Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who was
herself. the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Respondent countered by stating that he was the owner of Lot No.
Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation) 674, claiming that the lot in question was adjudicated to him in the
in favor of petitioners mother Maria covering all the six lots which Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad. Lot No. 676, on the
Matilde inherited from her late husband Crispin. other hand, was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. He claimed
that these two lots were in his possession as true owners thereof.
The Deed of Donation provided that it would become effective
upon the death of the DONOR (Matilde), but should the DONEE On September 20, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision ruling in
(Maria) die before the DONOR, the said donation shall be deemed favor of the Petitioners. It held that Matilde could not have
rescinded. The Deed also provided that anytime during the transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent,
lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of
could use, encumber, or even dispose of any or even all of the Donation inter vivos. The Petitioners were therefore the rightful
parcels of land herein donated. owners of the subject lots.

On August 26, 1991, Matilde then sold Lot No. 676 to Respondent On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs Decision, holding that the
by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter
January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her formalities of a will. With their MR, denied the Petitioners filed a
remaining properties including Lot No. 674 to Respondent. Petition for Review with the SC, hence this case.

Matilde died on January 25, 1994 while Maria died on September Petitioners contend that the CA was in error when it held that the
24 of the same year. After Matilde and Maria's death, Maria's heirs, Deed of Donation executed by Matilde on November 14, 1981 was
herein Petitioners, filed before the 15th Branch of the RTC of Roxas a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos
City a Complaint for Declaration and Recovery of Ownership and
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis The Deed of Donation, which is one of mortis causa, not having
causa. followed the formalities of a will, is void and transmitted no right
to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the
RATIO: YES. The Supreme Court found the donation to formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to
Petitioners mother one of mortis causa, since: Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.

1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her
death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676,
naked) and control of the property while alive; the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to
respondent on August 26, 1991.
2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should
be revocable by the transferor at will, but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
finally,

3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.

The phrase in the Deed of Donation to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.

As such, the formalities of a will should have been observed but
they were not, as, first, it was witnessed by only two, not three or
more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. Second, the
witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of
the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of
the pages of the will. Third, the witnesses did not acknowledge the
will before the notary public, which is not in accordance with the
requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. And fourth, the requirement that all the pages of the
will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page was not also followed.
 TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY sign as one of the witnesses. Ira also did not sign as a witness. In
the end three persons served as witnesses, all of whom were in
Case No. 12 friendly relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife.
Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda. Eusebia The intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the
(Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Juliana Chinco (Oppositor- document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
Appellee)
G.R. No. 33592 The trial court disallowed the will on the ground that Villaranda
March 31, 1931 did not have testamentary capacity at the time the instrument was
Street, J. to have been executed by her.

FACTS: On the morning of June 2, 1929, Victoria Villaranda, a ISSUE: Whether or not Victoria Villaranda has the testamentary
resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan was afflicted with apoplexy, capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed
incident to cerebral hemorrhage and was unconscious, seated in a
chair and was taken to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Ganaan, a RATIO: NO. At the time the will was made, the proof showed that
local physician, visited Villaranda, whom he knew very well. His Villaranda was in a comatose condition and devoid of the power of
first visit occurred between 6 and 7 pm of June 3, and he found her articulate speech. She was incapable of performing any conscious
insensible and incapable of talking or controlling her movements. and valid act and thus, lacking testamentary capacity.

On the same day, the parish priest called for the purpose of The first of these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the
administering the last rights of the church, but was unable to take deceased during her last illness in Meycauayan until she was
her confession. He performed the office of extreme unction only. carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second was a
Another doctor, Doctor Isidoro Lim, was called to visit and neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first
examine Villaranda, and it was upon his approval that she was occurred and who visited the patient daily until she was removed
taken to the hospital of San Juan De Dios Manila on the morning of from Meycauayan.
June 5, 1929. She died four days later at the age of 80.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that
The purported will subject of this proceeding was prepared by an the patient was in a continuous state of coma during the entire
attorney of Manila, Perfecto Gabriel, whose wife appears to be period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and
related to the beneficiaries named in the will. Gabriel arrived at that on the forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient
9oclock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. He went into a room command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act.
adjacent to that occupied by the patient and, taking a sheet from
an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. Gabriel
suggested to Doctor Lopez del Castillo that he wanted Doctor
Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter refused because he
considered Villaranda lacking testamentary capacity.

Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the deceased, was also present, and
attorney Gabriel asked him also whether or not he was willing to
 Case No. 13 right to make a will provided conditions are met) to execute her
Agustin Barrera et al. (Proponents-Appellants) vs. Tampoco will.
et al. (Oppositors-Appellees)
G.R. No. L-5263 RATIO: YES. The argument that the will was not read to Oliva was
February 17, 1954 premised on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Lacson
Paras, J. regarding the sequence of the reading of the will and the placing of
lines for signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or
FACTS: Oliva Villapena died in 1948 leaving properties worth Php the original was handed to the testatrix. As already observed, the
94, 852.96 and a will instituting nephews and nieces and discrepancy pertained to an insignificant matter which could
grandchildren in the collateral line as heirs. Jose Tampoco et al., overcome the credibility of Atty. Punos testimony that he read the
alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, opposed will to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable
the probate proceeding in the CFI Tarlac claiming that the will was thereto. It was not necessary that said will be read upon its signing
not executed in accordance with law, that Oliva lacked and in the presence of the witnesses.
testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence, and that
Olivas signature was obtained through fraud and trickery. The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have
Consortia Lintang et al., alleged nephews and niece, also filed the furnished the names of the heirs instituted under the will because
same opposition based essentially on the mentioned grounds. (1) Salvador Taedo, one of such heirs, was long dead and (2)
Marcelo Villapaa, another instituted heir, was non- existent, since
The CFI rendered a decision disallowing the will. The trial court Oliva did not have a grandson by such name. Salvador Taedo was
held that the will was not Olivas because it was not read to her, already dead, and the testatrix knew about it, but it was common
and she did not institute any specific names as heirs (resulting to for a woman of old age, confused by the big number of her
lack of testamentary capacity); that attesting witness Laureano relatives, to commit the mistake of unwittingly mentioning a dead
Antonio was not present when Oliva and attesting witness one.
Honorio Lacson signed the will; and that Antonio only partially
saw the signing by attesting witness Atty. Modesto Puno. Moreover, with respect to the instituted heir, Marcelo Villapaa,
while it appeared that Oliva did not have a grandson answering to
Barrera et al. appealed and narrated this version: Atty. Puno, a that name, there was evidence tending to show that Pioquinto
justice of the peace in Tarlac, went to Olivas residence in Manila to Villapaa, a child of Ruperta Pineda, must have been referred to
prepare the latters will. Upon approval, Atty. Puno asked the because Oliva, who was the child's god- mother, originally wanted
presence of Lacson and Antonio to become attesting witnesses. said child to be baptized as Marcelo, after his father.

The lawyer again read the will aloud; Oliva, Lacson, Atty. Puno, and
Antonio subsequently and successively signed the document. They
even ate merienda afterwards. On October 17, Oliva delivered
the will to Barrera for safekeeping, and on November 7, Oliva
passed away.

ISSUE: Whether or not Oliva had the testamentary capacity (the
 Case No. 14 already become final and executory, it is not longer within the
The Heirs of the late Matilde Montinola-Sanson (Petitioner) province of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of
vs. Court of Appeals and Eduardo F. Hernandez (Respondents) the probate court as to the due execution of the will and the
G.R. No. 76648 testamentary capacity of the testatrix are now conclusive.
February 16, 1988
Gancayco, J. During the hearing before the probate court, not only were there
three close relatives of the testatrix presented but also two expert
FACTS: A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Hernandez witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are
with the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the probate of in the handwriting of the testatrix. These satisfy the requirements
the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on of Art. 811 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Sec. 11 of Rule 76
January 28, 1980. The testatrix died single, parentless and for the probate of holographic wills.
childless on March 29, 1981 at the age of 70 years old, and devised
several of her real properties to specified persons. In addition, by virtue of Art. 841, the fact that in the testatrix
holographic will, she disposed only eleven of her real properties
Matilde Sanson, petitioner, the only surviving sister of the does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix
deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of
Opposition to Probate of the Will alleging that the subject will was shall pass on the heirs of the deceased in intestate successor.
not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and Neither is there undue influence present just because blood
the same was falsely dated or antedated, that the testatrix was not relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, because
in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary it is the testators rights to disregard non-compulsory heirs.
dispositions, that undue influence was exerted upon the person
and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will,
and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder
of the estate.

The probate court allowed the probate of the disputed will, which
caused the petitioner to appeal this decision to the Court of
Appeals who affirmed the decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
new trial, attached thereto was an affidavit of merit alleging that
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as
to the ill health of the testator as well as undue influence exerted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to move for a
new trial for the probate of the holographic will.

RATIO: NO. The evidence sought to be presented by the
petitioner, having only been discovered after the trial, is not
sufficient ground for a new trial. Since the questioned decision has
 HOLOGRAPHIC WILL On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for probate
on the ground that the will failed to meet the requirements for
Case No. 15 validity, as it did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero (Petitioners) vs. CA and Civil Code. As a result, an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of
Clemente Sand (Respondents) the Court of Appeals was filed.
G.R. No. 106720
September 15, 1994 ISSUE: Whether the holographic will may be admitted to probate.
Puno, J.
RATIO: YES. Sec. 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of
FACTS: In the holographic will executed by the late Annie Sand, the New Civil Code provide the grounds for disallowance of wills.
the following were named as devisees: petitioners Roberto and These lists are exclusive and no other grounds can serve to
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to
Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (a) whether the
Ajero, Sr., and their children. Almost two months after the instrument is indeed the decedents last will and testament; (b)
decedents death, petitioners instituted a special proceeding for whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
the allowance of decedents holographic will alleging that at the prescribed by law; (c) whether the decedent had the necessary
time of execution, the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and (d)
not acting duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every whether execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. acts of the decedent.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: (1) In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
neither the testaments body nor the signature therein were in the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by
decendents handwriting; (2) it contained alterations and the testator himself, as provided under Article 810.
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and (3) the
will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and Article 813 and 814 are requirements that affect the validity of the
undue influence. dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate
these requirements of changes and signing and dating of
The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero, who dispositions are separate form that which provides for the
contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (in Art.
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, claiming that the property could 810). If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions,
not be conveyed in its entirety as decedent was not the sole owner these dispositions cannot be effectuated, but such failure does not
thereof. The RTC admitted the holographic will in question to render the whole testament void. Furthermore, unless
probate on the ground that (1) three witnesses convincingly unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
showed knowledge of and identified the handwriting and made on the date of the holographic will or on the testators
signature of the testatrix to be genuine, and (2) no evidence was signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The
presented to show that the will in question is different from the lack of authentication will only result in the disallowance of such
will actually executed by the testatrix. changes.

Re: Cabadbaran property As a general rule, courts in probate Art. 813, NCC When a number of dispositions appearing in a
proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at dispositions.
bench, decedent herself stated in the will that the property is in
the name of her late father, John Sand. Thus, she cannot validly Art. 814, NCC In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her fathers alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
other heirs. same by his full signature.

NOTES:

Sec. 9, Rule 76, ROC Wills shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as required by
law; (b) If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable
to make a will at time of execution; (c) If it was executed under
duress, or the influence of fear or threats; (d) If it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the
signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did
not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of
fixing his signature thereto.

Art. 839, NCC The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases: (a) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (c)
If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;

Art. 810, NCC "A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."

 INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC VALIDITY
RATIO: YES. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic
Case No. 16 validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national
In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E. Christensen, law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in
Deceased. Adolfo C. Aznar, Executor, and Lucy Christinsen, the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in
Heir of Deceased. (Appellees) vs. Helen Christensen Garcia disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to
(Oppositor-Appellant) persons domiciled within the said estate.
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963 On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating
Labrador, J. that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of
its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not
FACTS: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, domicile in the said state.
migrated to California where he resided and consequently was
considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is
He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must
the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his be respected.
residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a
citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme
Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of
his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code,
California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the
law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that
the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights
of illegitimate children under Philippine laws.

On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria, in as much that it is
clear under Art, 16 (2) of the New Civil Code, the national of the
deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of
California on the matter. Under California law, there are no
compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

ISSUE: Whether or not succession is governed by Philippine laws.
 Case No. 17 MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS however
Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis, Deceased. opposed the project of partition on the ground that they were
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., Executor, Maria Cristina Bellis and deprived of their legitime as illegitimate children and, therefore,
Miriam Palma Bellis (Oppositors-Appellants) vs. Edward A. compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Bellis, et al. (Heirs-Appellees)
G.R. No. L-23678 On April 30, 1964, the CFI of Manila issued the now assailed Order,
June 6, 1967 overruling the opposition of both Maria and Miriam Bellis and
Bengzon, J.P., J. approving the executors final account, report and administration,
and project of partition. Relying upon Article 16 of the Civil Code,
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
time of his death. He executed a will in the Philippines, in which he which did not provide for legitimes.
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be With their MR denied on June 11, 1964, Appellants appealed to the
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: SC hence this case. They insist that the Philippine law on legitimes
must be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. They rely on Art.
a) $240,000.00 to his first wife MARY E. MALLEN 17, par. 3 as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 which holds that the
national law of the decedent prevails in intestate or testamentary
b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children AMOS succession.
BELLIS, JR., MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS, MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, or $40,000.00 each, and ISSUE: Whether or not the law on legitimes as provided for in
Philippine law can be applied to Amos G. Bellis will.
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his RATIO: NO, Art. 17, par. 3 is not an exception to Art. 16, paragraph
first and second wives EDWARD A. BELLIS, HENRY A. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code. The Court, in ruling that the
BELLIS, ALEXANDER BELLIS, and ANNA BELLIS-ALLSMAN, Appellants are not entitled to their legitime since the national law
EDWARD G. BELLIS, WA LTER S. BELLIS, and DOROTHY E. of Amos G. Bellis does not provide for one, held that, pursuant to
BELLIS in equal shares. the legislative intent of Congress, the national law of the decedent
controls in both intestate and testamentary succession with
Subsequently, sometime in July, 1958, Amos died while residing in regard to:
San Antonio Texas, U.S. His will was later admitted to probate by
the CFI of Manila on September 15, 1958. 1) The order of succession;

Prior to closing its administration, the executor, herein Peoples 2) The amount of successional rights;
Bank & Trust Co., filed its Executors Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition wherein it reported the 3) The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
satisfaction of the disposition of the late Amos G. Bellis property in
accordance with the will. 4) The capacity to succeed.

Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039, being specific provisions regarding
succession, prevail over general provisions such as Art. 17 of the
Civil Code.

Thus, by admitting that Amos G. Bellis himself was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., what governs the disposition of his will
therefore is his national law. With Texas law silent on the matter
of forced heirs or legitimes, Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
made to apply.
 Case No. 18 fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and
Lourdes L. Dorotheo (Petitioner) vs. CA, Nilda D. Quintana, for not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that
Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of Vicente Dorotheo and Jose he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
Dorotheo (Respondents) On the other hand, the questions regarding the intrinsic validity of
G.R. No. 108581 a will may still be raised even after the will has been
December 8, 1999 authenticated. Even the will was validly executed but the
Ynares-Santiago, J. dispositions in the will deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of the
legitimate or rightful inheritance, the unlawful disposition cannot
FACTS: Private Respondents were the legitimate children of be given any effect, specially when the court had already
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. When Aniceta died in 1960 determined a final and executory decision that the will is
her estate were not settled. Thereafter, Alejandro died. Petitioner, intrinsically void.
Lourdes Dorotheo, who claimed that she took care of the decedent
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of Also, the court finds that decedents disposition on his will includes
Alejandros last will and testament. The will was admitted for the alleged share in the conjugal properties. Testamentary
probate, private respondents did not appeal until 2 years after, dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator
they filed a "Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void". or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be
given effect. The properties owned by the decedent and his spouse
RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. The trial court must be properly ventilated and determined.
declared that Petitioner is not the wife of the decedent, the
provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as Therefore, the will is extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
intrinsically void and declaring the only heirs are the legitimate were void.
children of the decedent. The estates of the decedent will be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled
to some compensation because she took care of Alejandro prior to
his death. The MR was denied.

CA dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner for failure to file
appellants brief within the extended period granted. Hence, the
decision on probate became final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of the decedent
is intrinsically valid.

RATIO: NO, the will is not intrinsically valid. Under the Civil Code,
due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that
he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress,
 NOTARIAL WILL The CA reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation
Case No. 19 clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus
Felix Azuela (Petitioner) vs. CA, Geralda Aida Castillo rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
substituted by Ernesto G. Castillo (Respondents)
G.R. No. 122880 Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the
April 12, 2006 Civil Code that the number of pages used in a notarial will be
Tinga, J. stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the
FACTS: Petitioner Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for substantial compliance rule.
the probate of a notarial will executed by Igsolo and notarized on
the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will complied with the
in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of requirements of the law and, hence, should be admitted to
pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the probate.
bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the
left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. RATIO: NO. The failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal
Geralda Castillo, attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs, flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the
opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also will against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
argued that the will was not executed and attested to in its pages and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the
accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents pages.
signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the
will was not properly acknowledged. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin,
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered
executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities
in the execution of a willwith the end in view of giving the In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes. According to pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing
the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub- at the so-called "logical end" of the will on its first page. Also, the
title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but
the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought
the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the construed as mandatory.
will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment,
instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will
purpose of identification and attestation of the will. states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of. In
this case, however, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil
Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply
with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of
the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was
never filled in.

The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested
to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will,
they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if
the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the
signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a
wholly different avowal.
 BLIND TESTATOR ISSUES:
- Whether or not the decedent was blind for purposes of Art.
Case No. 20 808 at the time his will and its codicil were executed.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, Cesar Alvarado (Petitioner) - Whether or not the double-reading requirement of said
vs. Hon. Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Presiding Justice, Hon. Ma. article complied with.
Rosario Quetulio Losa, and Hon. Leonor Ines Luciano,
Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First RATIO: As to the first issue, YES. Garcia vs. Vasquez, provides the
Division (Civil Cases), and Bayani Ma. Rino (Respondents) rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
G.R. No. 74695 testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as
September 14, 1993 when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
Bellosillo, J. him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes . . ." From the foregoing, Art. 808 applies not only
FACTS: Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will wherein he to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another,
disinherited an illegitimate son (Petitioner) and expressly revoked are "incapable of reading their will." Since Brigido Alvarado was
a previously executed holographic will. After which, a codicil was incapable of reading his will and codicil due to his "poor,"
executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to "defective," or "blurred" vision, Brigido Alvarado comes within the
generate cash for the testator's eye operation, who was then scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
suffering from glaucoma but the disinheritance and revocatory
clauses were unchanged. As testified to by the three instrumental As to the second issue, YES. Art. 808 provides that If the testator
witnesses, the notary public and by Private Respondent, the is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. subscribing, witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged." This Court has held that
Instead, Private-Respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law
document, read the same aloud in the presence all of them which has been satisfied.
they followed the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. A petition for the probate of the In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and
notarial will and codicil was filed by Private-Respondent as codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
executor. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition interposing the witnesses, and the notary public, the latter four persons following
defense that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law the reading word for word with their own copies. Prior and
at the time his will and the codicil were executed and that since subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that
the reading required by Art. 808 was not complied with, probate the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then
of the will and codicil should have been denied. did the signing and acknowledgement take place. It can be
concluded that the testator was assured that what was read to him
RTC: Allowed the will. were the terms actually appearing on the documents.

CA: Affirm.

The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they
do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator's will.
 HEIRS reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills
Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the
Case No. 21 law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the
Salud Teodo Vda. De Perez (Petitioner) vs. Hon. Zotico Tolete, court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC of Bulacan accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such
(Respondent) evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the
G.R. No. 76714 foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However,
June 2,1994 he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the
Quiason, J. Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses
and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, requirement of the Philippine law.
who became American citizens and residents of New York, each
executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on Petitioner filed MR of the Order where she had sufficiently proven
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed wills and testaments.
to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in
a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee Judge de la Llana denied the motion of petitioner for the
in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills in suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival
NYC which was admitted to probate and letters testamentary were in the country within which to act on the other order issued that
issued in his favor. same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order
left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
in Bulacan of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform
New York and asked that she be appointed the special with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan to which RTC ruled
in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The Judge of Branch 18 of RTC Malolos, to which the reprobate
case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last
Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was
New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be
New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by given finality.
New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs
and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
Salud failed to give. motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted
by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled
Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess
the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued;
she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs
taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and Philippines. . . . Thus, proof that both wills conform with the
circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
admitting to probate the wills in question. "However, respondent imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance
Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
York on the procedure and allowance of wills. follows:

Petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence 1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
on the foreign law. However, without waiting for petitioner to laws;
adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his
order that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of 2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not
March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the in the Philippines;
appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator".
3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
Second MR praying that she be granted "the opportunity to
present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on 4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
the probate and allowance of wills" but respondent Judge denied
the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a 5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance
single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and of wills.
established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one
will." Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted
all the needed evidence.
Respondent Judge denied the MR filed by petitioner on the
grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a
different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the
undertaken in a single petition" sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even
evidence offered at the hearing sufficiently proved the laws of the in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge,
State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate nominal or formal party.
proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
allowed. will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
RATIO: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon that is presented for probate for the first time.
compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary
to petitioner's claim are entitled to notices of the time and place
for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . ."

In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills.
Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and
pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature,
practical considerations dictate their joint probate.

As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root
or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. Respondent Judge's
view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular
terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there
should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach.

Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be
"liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." A literal
application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice.

 EXTRINSIC VALIDITY CA: Reversed the judgment of CFI of Ilocos Norte. Ruled that
attestation clause failed:
Case No. 22 (1) To certify That said testator has written a cross at the
In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, Deceased. end of his name; and
Rosario Garcia (Petitioner) vs. Juliana Lacuesta, et al.
(Respondents) (2) To certify that the will was signed on all the left margins
G.R. No. L-4067 of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty.
November 29, 1951 Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator
Paras, C.J. in the presence of the testator and each and every one
of the witnesses.
FACTS: The will of Antonio Mercado (testator), dated January 3,
1943, is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains in the Petitioner Garcia appealed to the SC by way of certiorari from the
attestation clause: Decision of CA.
(1) Declaration that the testament of Antero Mercado was
signed by himself and by the witnesses below the Petitioners contention: There is no need for such recital because
attestation clause; the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient
signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a
(2) That the signing is in the presence of the testator and surplusage. That the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark.
witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and each other; ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is fatally defective for
failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier
(3) That it was signed at the left margin of the 3 pages of to write the testator's name under his express direction
the will;
RATIO: YES, attestation clause is fatally defective.
(4) That the will is written in the Ilocano dialect, which is
spoken and understood by the testator; and As to the cross - It cannot be shown that the cross appearing on
the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of
(5) That it bears the corresponding number in letter which the ways by which he signed his name. Also, it cannot be likened to
compose of the 3 pages of the will. a thumbmark, because the cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark
The will likewise appears to be signed by Atty. Florentino Javier
who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by A As to the signing of Atty. Florentino - When the testator expressly
ruego del testador (to beg the testator) and the name of caused another to sign the former's name, this fact must be recited
Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a in the attestation clause.
cross immediately after his name.

CFI: Allowed the will

 Case No. 23 "(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed
Yap Tua (Petitioner-Appellee) vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu by the witnesses as the law prescribes.
(Objectors-Appellants)
G.R. No. 6845 "(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said
September 1, 1914 Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally
JOHNSON, J. capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness.

FACTS: One Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, "(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained
presented a petition in the CFI of the city of Manila, asking that the through fraud and illegal influence upon the part of persons
will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate. It who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because
appears that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of
Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said executing the same."
petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased.
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they
It appears that the will was signed by deceased, as well as Anselmo alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed
Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. After hearing the another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th
foregoing witnesses, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, ordered day of August, 1909.
that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
allowed and admitted to probate. The court further ordered that Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set
one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will. aside the order of the 29th day of September, 1909, and to grant to
said minors an opportunity to present new proof relating to the
On the 28th of February, 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu due execution of said will.
appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were
interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene The Judge granted the motion for rehearing. At the rehearing, a
asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represented them number of witnesses were examined. At the close of the rehearing,
in the cause. the court reached the conclusion that the will was the last will and
testament of Tomasa and admitted it to probate.
The court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said
parties. Gabriel La O accepted said appointment, took the oath of ISSUES:
office and entered upon the performance of his duties as - Whether or not the will was duly executed in accordance
guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O appeared in court with law.
and presented a motion in which he alleged, in substance:
- Whether or not the will was executed in the presence.
First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and
admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of RATIO: As to the first issue, YES. Several witnesses testified that
September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses
testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion,
and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name in the will, with are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if
the intention to sign the same, that it will amount to a signature. It they so desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will.
has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may
sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by
others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication
of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then
certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will.

It has been held time again that one who makes a will may sign the
same by the use of a mark, the name having been written by
others. If the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient
indication of the intention of the person to make and execute it,
then certainly the writing of a portion or all of the name ought to
be accepted as a clear indication of intention to execute it. The
man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark
simply therefore upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if
he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be
sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person
making a will to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any
part of his name thereon.

As to the second issue, YES. An effort was made to show that the
will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in
another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed
was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one
room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the
floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the
will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also
shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was
possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the
will.

While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the
same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must
sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the
one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the
signature made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures
 Case No. 24 Applying the foregoing to the will in question, where the latter
Gestrudis Abangan (Executrix-Appellee) vs. Anastacia consists entirely of two sheets, the first containing all of the
Abangan et al. (Opponents-Appellant) disposition of the testatrix duly signed at the bottom by a certain
G.R. No. 13431 Martin Montalban, in the name and under the direction of the
November 12, 1919 testatrix, and by three witnesses, and the second containing only
Avancena, J. the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses, the Court concluded that:
FACTS: On September 19, 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to
probate Ana Abangans will duly executed sometime in July, 1916. 1) The signature of the testatrix and the instrumental
Appellants however contend that such will had defects which witnesses need not appear on the margins since the
would necessarily prevent the will from being probated. signature found in the first page already guarantees its
Specifically, appellants contend that the two sheets consisting of authenticity;
the will were neither signed on the left margin by the testatrix and
the three witnesses nor numbered by letters. 2) The numbering of the pages may be dispensed with since
all the dispositive parts of the will are found on one
ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the signature of the sheet only, the objective of the numbering therefore
testatrix and the three witnesses on the left margin is fatal to the disappears since the removal of that singular sheet,
validity of the will. although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

RATIO: NO, the omission of the signature as well as the failure to The Court therefore sustained the decision of the CFI of Cebu in
number each page was not fatal to the validity of the will. Under favor of the appellee.
R.A. 2645, the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, thereby: 1)
avoiding substitution of wills and testaments; and 2) guarantee
their truth and authenticity. Thus, when an interpretation of the
law already assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrates the exercise of the
right to make a will, such an interpretation must be discarded.

The Court noted that the law, in requiring the signature on the
margin, took into consideration the case of a will written on
several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the
testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom.
Further, the object of the law in requiring that each and every page
of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters was to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed.

 Case No. 25 While another in testator's place might have directed someone
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. Jose S. Lopez (Petitioner-Appellee) vs. else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done,
Agustin Liboro (Oppositor-Appellant) there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator
G.R. No. L-1787 chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It
August 27, 1948 was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute
Tuason, J. requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made
by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil.,
FACTS: The appellant opposed unsuccessfully in the Court of First 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)
Instance of Batangas the probate of what purports to be the last
will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the As to the second issue, NO. The purpose of the law in prescribing
age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
months after the document in question was executed. preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its
pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case,
The present appellant specified grounds (pertinent to the case the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be
topic) for his opposition, to wit: necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters.
1) That his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the
internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents
2) That the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and
trick. second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of
the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause,
In addition, the appellant believes that there is a fatal defect which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
because the two-paged will in question, each of which is written
on one side of a separate sheet, but the first sheet is not paged Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
either in letters or in Arabic numerals. "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that
the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of
ISSUES: which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for
- Whether or not the use of a thumbmark in signing the will the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two
is already substantial compliance. contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation
clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the
- Whether or not the will not paged in letters or in Arabic witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for
numerals is a fatal defect other than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan,supra, and Fernandez vs.
Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.
RATIO: As to the first issue, YES. The testator affixed his
thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The
reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial
paralysis."

 Case No. 26 Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, Deceased. direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Rosario Garcia (Petitioner) vs. Juliana Lacuesta, et al. Procedure.
(Respondents)
G.R. No. L-4067 The herein petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for
November 29, 1951 such recital because the cross written by the testator after his
Paras, C.J. name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino
Javier is a surplusage.
FACTS: The will of Antero Mercado is written in the Ilocano
dialect. It appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a
who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by the Court in
reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero several cases. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on
Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of
name. the ways by which he signed his name.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First After examination, the Court stated that the mere sign of the cross
Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed to: is not similar to a thumbmark since the cross cannot and does not
have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. With this, it is
1) First, to certify that the will was signed on all the left unnecessary to determine if there is a sufficient recital in the
margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the
Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the
in the presence of the testator and each and every one of testator and of each other.
the witnesses;

2) Second, to certify that after the signing of the name of the
testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator
has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left
margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at
the end thereof; and

3) Third, to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in
all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of
each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is valid.

RATIO: YES, The Court held that the attestation clause is fatally
defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
 Case No. 27 still pending resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal
In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent court.
Dorotea Perez, Deceased. Apolonia Taboada (Petitioner) vs.
Hon. Avelino S. Rosal, Judge of the Third Branch of the CFI of Subsequently, the new judge denied the motion for
Maasin, Southern Leyte (Respondent) reconsideration, the manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte
G.R. No. L-36033 because of the petitioners failure to comply with the order
November 5, 1982 requiring him to submit the names of the intestate heirs and their
addresses.
FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed with the respondent
Court a petition for probate of the will of Dorotea Perez, attaching The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of
the alleged last will and testament of the latter. It was written in law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough
the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and consisted of two pages, the first that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three
of which contained the entire testamentary dispositions and was subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the
signed at the end of the page by the testator alone and at the left end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the
hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but
page contained the attestation clause by the three attesting also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to
witnesses and was signed at the left hand margin by the testatrix. sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand
margin of that page.
No opposition was filed after the publication, and the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's The petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not
evidence. Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for
will, testified on the genuineness and due execution of the will. the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
The trial court denied the probate of the will for lack of a formality subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of
in its execution, and petitioner was ordered to submit the names the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it
of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an
they could be properly notified and could intervene in the import on the space or particular location where the signatures
summary settlement of the estate. are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein
the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the
Petitioner instead filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex parte honest frailties of human nature.
praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any
step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will. He also ISSUE: Whether or not Article 805 of the Civil Code requires that
asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses
names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance. sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of one another.
denying the probate of the will. However, the motion together
with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted RATIO: NO. The law is to be liberally construed. According to the
upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to Code Commission, "the underlying and fundamental objective
his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages
the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.
his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at
is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left
in the execution of a will." margin.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment
especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two
(Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449). pages including this page".

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and
subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that
those things are, done which the statute requires for the execution
of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On
the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such
paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v.
Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our
considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a
manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification. The
objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and
satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was
properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of
fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

The Supreme Court have examined the will in question and
noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect
were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the
 Case No. 28 witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time
Beatriz Nera, et al. (Plaintiff-Appellees) vs. Narcisa Rimando when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached
(Defendant-Appellant) their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have
G.R. No. L-5971 been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
February 27, 1911 circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in
Carson, J. the outer room. This because the line of vision from this witness to
the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily
FACTS: The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the
the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each signature."
court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was
present in the small room where it was executed at the time when In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses
signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw
ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by each other sign, but whether they might have been seen
a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their
impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the mental and physical condition and position with relation to
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
to the instrument.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this relation to each otherat the moment of the subscription of each
subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they
the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached choose to do so.
their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course,
disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the
decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the
testament of the deceased. instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they
would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment,
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the without changing their relative positions or existing conditions.
determination of this question of fact of vital importance in the
determination of this case, as he was of opinion that under the The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses
doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., that "at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
541) the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in document he was actually and physically present and in such
the outer room when the testator and the other describing position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that
witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and
proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so."
of the will.
And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question
But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged
will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not
depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them,
but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with
relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in
the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the
possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and
would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is
prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a
will.

The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument
propounded therein to probate as the last will and testament of
Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with costs of this instance
against the appellant.
 SUBSTANTIVE OR INTRINSIC VALIDITY Regional Trial Court, a petition for probate and allowance of his
own will and testament, wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
Case No. 29 appointed Special Administratix of his estate. The trial court
Paula T. Llorente (Petitioner) vs. Court of Appeals and Alicia admitted the will to probate and subsequently Lorenzo died.
F. Llorente (Respondents)
G.R. No. 124371 Paula Llorente filed with the same court a petition for letters of
November 23, 2000 administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that
Pardo, J. she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, and that Lorenzos will
FACTS: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children
serviceman of the United States Navy. He was married to encroaching on their legitime. Alicia also filed a petition for letters
petitioner Paula Llorente in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of testamentary.
the war, Lorenzo departed for the United States while Paula stayed
in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Subsequently, Lorenzo RTC: Denied Alicias petition and ruled that the divorce decree
was admitted as an American citizen. Upon the liberation of the granted to Lorenzo was void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo came home therefore, her marriage to Lorenzo was likewise void.
to find out that Paula has been living in with his brother, CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared Alicia as
Ceferino Llorente and were expecting a baby. co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased acquired
during their marriage.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her so they entered
into a written agreement to the effect that, (1) all the family ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente is entitiled to inherit from
allowances allotted by the United States Navy would be the late Lorenzo Llorente.
suspended, (2) that they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings, (3) they would make a RATIO: YES. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired of the trial court and recognized as valid as a matter of comity the
during their marital life, and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased by the Supreme
Paula for her adulterous life. Court of the State of California.

Lorenzo returned back to the United States and filed for divorce The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to Paula and
with the Superior Court of the State of California and subsequently their children together is shown in the will executed. Whether the
became final. will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proven by foreign law which must be pleaded and
Lorenzo came back to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente, proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
and lived together as husband and wife for twenty-five years and formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In
produced three children, Raul, Luz, and Beverly Llorente. fact, the will was duly probated.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament bequeathing all his Given this ruling, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the
property to Alicia and their three children. He filed with the other issues raised.
 Case No. 30 Over a week later, two of his illegitimate children, Maria Cristina
Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis, Deceased. and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective oppositions to the
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., Executor, Maria Cristina Bellis and project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
Miriam Palma Bellis (Oppositors-Appellants) vs. Edward A. legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs
Bellis, et al. (Heirs-Appellees) of deceased.
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967 The Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order overruling
Bengzon, J.P., J. the oppostions and approving the executors final account, report
and administration and project of partition. The oppositors-
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the appellants filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but
United States, who died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. By the lower court denied the same.
his first wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children. By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who They subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the
survived him, he had three legitimate children; and he also had issue of which law is to be applied, on the ground that the case
three illegitimate children. allegedly falls under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 17 in
relation to Art. 16 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed national law of the decedent is applicable in intestate or
that after all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are testamentary succession with regard to: (1) the order of
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the succession; (2) amount of successional rights; (3) intrinsic validity
following manner and order: (1) USD 240,000 to his 1st wife; (2) of the provisions of the will; and (4) capacity to succeed.
PHP 120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children; (3) the remainder, to be
divided in equal shares, and given to his 7 surviving children. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law, the national law of decedent, which
does not provide for legitimes, applies to the case at bar
Following Amos death, his will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., as RULING: YES. Despite the fact that two wills were executed by the
executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein, including: (1) decedent (Texas will, Philippine will), assuming that his intention
USD 240,000 to the 1st wife in the form of shares of stock; (2) was for Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate, it would not
Amounts totaling PHP40,000 each / a total of PHP 120,000 to the 3 alter the law, because a provision in a foreigners will to the effect
illegitimate children. Preparatory to closing its administration, the that his properties are to be distributed in accordance with
executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report Philippine law and not his national law, is illegal and void, for his
of Administration and Project of Partition wherein it reported national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters wherein
satisfaction of the legacies of the 1st wife and 3 illegitimate Art. 16 states that national law should govern.
children. In the project of partition, the executor, pursuant to the
will, divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the The doctrine of renvoi does not apply, because such doctrine is
benefit of the testators legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd usually pertinent where decedent is a national of one country and
marriages. a domicile of another. In the present case, the decedent was both a
national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death. So even
assuming that Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back to Philippine law (renvoi), but would still refer to
Texas law.

Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos Bellis.
















 Case No. 31 admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the
Polly Cayetano (Petitioner) vs. Hon. Tomas T. Leonidas, in his forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession.
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Thirty Eighth Branch of
the CFI of Manila, and Nenita Campos Paguia (Respondents) ISSUE: Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in
G.R. No. 54919 case the testator was a citizen of another country.
May 30, 1984
Gutierrez, Jr., J. RATIO: As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos was a citizen of the United States of the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
America and a permanent resident of Philadelphia. She executed a requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
in the United States of America.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an
The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. It is a
the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.
and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J.
McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia,
daughter or the testator, was appointed Administratrix of the
estate of said decedent.

This was opposed by Adoracions father, Hermogenes Campos,
who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-adjudication not being aware
that Adoracion had left a will. He later died and was substituted by
Polly Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of
the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with
the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining
children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right
of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
 JOINT WILLS Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his
Case No. 32 lawyer to draft a new will. This was a notarial will and testament
Francisca Alsua-Betts, Joseph O. Betts, Jose Madareta, Esteban of 3 essential features as follows;
P. Ramirez, and the Register of Deeds for Albay Province 1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions
(Petitioners) vs. CA, Amparo Alsua-Buenviaje, Fernando of his holographic will and codicil.
Buenviaje, Fernando Alsua, represented by his guardian, 2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his
Clotilde S. Alsua and Pablo Alsua (Respondents) four living children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition Extra
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 judicial.
July 30, 1979 3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific
Guerrero, J. properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may
be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to
FACTS: Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with be given to Francisca and Pablo naming Francisca as executor to
all their living children, entered into a duly notarized agreement, serve without a bond.
(escritura de particion extrajudicial/extra judicial partition) for
the inventory and partition of all the spouses present and existing
properties. In the provision of said extra judicial partition, each of ISSUES:
the four children was allotted with the properties considered as - Whether or not oppositors to the probate of the will, are in
their share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus
where they will be the absolute owner of the properties assigned Alsua.
in case of death of one of the spouses.
- Whether testator Don Jesus can revoke his previous will.
Don Jesus and Doa Tinay also separately executed holographic
will with exactly the same terms and conditions in conformity with RATIO: As to the first issue, NO. The principle of estoppel is not
the executed extra judicial partition naming each other as an applicable in probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve
executor without having to post any bond. That in case new public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel,
properties be acquired same shall be partitioned one half to the when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the
surviving spouse and the other half to children of equal parts. circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would
seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of
Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the private parties is that of the state to see that testamentary
same terms and conditions, amending and supplementing their dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to
holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the law.
other half not disposed of to their legitimate heirs under the
agreement of partition and mutually and reciprocally bequeathed As to the second issue, YES. The court ruled that Don Jesus was
each other their participation as well all properties which might be not forever bound of his previous holographic will and codicil as
acquired subsequently. Doa Tinay died in effect Don Jesus by such, would remain revocable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new
order of the probate court was name as executor. Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the testator at any
time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is
void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his
absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil
previously made.

This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the
case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil.
739). For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and
does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And
secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil
Code).

In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property
before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of
the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for
it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate
is being contested.

 WITNESSES TO WILLS RATIO: NO. Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement
that the witnesses testify initially at any time during the trial as to
Case No. 33 whether they are of good standing of reputation in the community
Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales (Petitioner) vs. CA and Lutgarda for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his
Santiago (Respondents) testimony is believed and accepted in court. It is enough that the
G.R. No. L-37453 qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
May 25, 1979 complied with. The attestation clause where the attesting
Guerrero, J. witnesses signed is the best evidence as to date of signing because
it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts
FACTS: Isabel Gabriel a widow executed a 5 page will two months attending the execution of the will.
prior to her death. Both petitioner, Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales and
private respondents are nieces of the deceased. Private
respondent were named as universal heir and executor while the
petitioner and certain persons were named as legacies. The will
was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed in Manila.

The signatures of the testator appear at the end of the will on page
4 and at the left margin of all the pages while the three witnesses
signatures appeared at the bottom of the attestation clause and on
the left margin of all the other pages.

Private-Respondents filed a petition for the probate of the will but
it was opposed by the petitioner stating that the will is not
genuine, was not executed and attested as required by the law, the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to her old age and
sickness and lastly the will was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
beneficiary.

RTC rendered its judgment to disallow the last will and testament
of Isabel Gabriel. CA reversed the decision of the RTC. They find
that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased
in the presence of three attesting witnesses. Hence allowed the
probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses
is material in the validity of a will.

 REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY proven.

DISPOSITION ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will.

Case No. 34 RATIO: NO. Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction of a
Testate Estate Of The Late Adriana Maloto, et al. (Petitioners) will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
vs. CA, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto (Respondents) effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
G.R. No. 76464 revocandi on the part of the testator.
February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. It is not imperative
FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and that the testator himself does the physical destruction. It may be
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio performed by another person but under the express direction and
Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
Maloto. Believing that Adriana not leave behind a will, these four that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of
their aunt's estate. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke,
may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite
While the case was still in progress, the 4 heirs executed an alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate dividing necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
the estate into four equal parts which the trial court testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the
approved.Atty. Palma discovered a Will dated January 3,1940. overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
While Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
Aldina and Constancio have much bigger and more valuable shares presence and under his express direction.
than in the extrajudicial settlement. The will also gives devises and
legacies to Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other petitioners named in
the will, filed motion for reconsideration and annulment of the
previous proceedings and for allowance of the will. The trial court
denied their motion, Significantly, the appellate court (CA) while
finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document
or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana,
Guadalupe, upon instructions of the testatrix was indeed the
contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The
respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in
the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently
 Case No. 35 the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary,
Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Deceased. expert testimony may be resorted to.
Fausto E. Gan (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Ildefonso Yap
(Oppositor-Appellee) And the court, may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face
G.R. No. L-12190 of the document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been
August 30, 1958 written by the testator. When the will itself is not submitted, these
Bengzon, J. means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not
available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the
FACTS: Fausto Gan, nephew of the decedent, initiated the petition testator's handwriting has disappeared.
of the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased. Opposing the petition, the deceased surviving husband,
herein Oppositor-Appellee, asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament.

The will itself was not presented but Petitioner presented
testimonies of alleged witnesses. Felina Esguerra, niece of the
deceased, alleged that she witnessed the execution of the will and
that when the deceased was confined for her last illness, she
entrusted said will, which was contained in a purse, to her. But a
few hours later, Oppositor-Appellee, asked for the purse and being
afraid of him because of his well-known violent temper, she
delivered it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the
toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time.

RTC: Denied probate.

CA: Affirm RTC.

ISSUE: WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
in the handwriting of the testator.

RATIO: NO. Article 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it
shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that
the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If
the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.I n the absence of any competent witness referred to in
 Case No. 36 Following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ricardo B. again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They
Bonilla, Deceased. Marcela Rodelas (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. argued that:
Amparo Aranza , et al. (Oppositors-Appellees), Atty. Lorenzo
Sumulong (Intervenor) 1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
G.R. No. L-58509 instruction as to the management and improvement of the
December 7, 1982 schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B.
Relova, J. Bonilla; and

FACTS: Appellant filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the 2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was
Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the denied by the court.
following grounds:
The appellees then filed a MR on the ground that the order was
1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition.
within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court; The court set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the
probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla ruling that:
2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did '. . . It is our considered opinion that once the original copy
not contain a disposition of property after death and of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand
was not intended to take effect after death, and in lieu of the original.
therefore it was not a will; 'In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it
3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would material proof of authenticity of said wills. The Court notes
produce no effect, as held in Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; that the alleged holographic will was executed on January
and 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In
view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
4) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. that the original of the will could not be located shows to
our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
with another case Their motion was granted by the court.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an
appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the
dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled The law regards the document itself as material proof of
jurisprudence. authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Hence this petition. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means,
if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or can may be exhibited and tested before the probate court." Evidently,
not be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic
will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court, in setting aside the lower court's handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate
order of dismissal, held that a photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or court.
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can he determined
by the probate court, as comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. Assailed order of dismissal, set
aside.

Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic
wills is the allowance of the will by the Court after its due
execution has been proved. The probate of holographic wills may
be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three identifying witnesses are
required.

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509,
the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The
will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.

 Case No. 37 ISSUE: W/N there was a valid revocation of the will.
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, Deceased. Francisco Gago
(Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Cornelio Mamuyac, et al. HELD: Yes, there was a valid revocation of the will. The will was
(Opponent-Appellees) already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due
G.R. No. 26317 search, the original will cannot be found.
January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to be in the
possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that
FACTS: The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed
last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on January 2, cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
1922 shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no
longer be found after his death.
On July 27, 1918, Miguel Mamuyac (deceased) executed a last will
and testament. On January 1922, Mamuyac died and Francisco NOTES:
Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
Province of La Union for the probation of that will. This was cancellation of the will to be preserved. It therefore becomes
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana difficult at times to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills.
Bauzon and Catalina Mamuyac. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that
CFI: Denied the petition for probation on the ground that the after due search the original will cannot be found.
deceased executed a new will and testament on April 16, 1919
(second will)

On February 1925, another petition was filed to seek the probate
of the second will executed on April 16, 1919. The oppositors,
however, alleged that the presented will: (a) is a mere copy of the
actual second will and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac ; (b) that the actual second will had been cancelled and
revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac; and (c) that such
second will was not even the last will and testament of the
deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

CFI: Again denied the probation on the ground that it had been
cancelled and revoked in 1920. This is evidenced by testimonies of
Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document, and
Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1922 the will actually
cancelled by the testator.

 ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS Due to the destruction of the court and property record of Iloilo as
a result of the last war, as attested by the Clerk of Court, no will or
Case No. 38 probate order was produce and neither were attested copies
Romulo Lopez, et al. (Plaintiffs-Appellants) vs. Luis Gonzaga registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Negros
and Asuncion Gonzaga (Defendants-Appellees). Occidental leave little room for doubt that Doa Soledad Gonzaga
G.R. No. L-18788 died leaving a will instituting her nephew the appellee Luis
January 31, 1964 Gonzaga y Jesena, as her sole testamentary heir. A certain Atty.
Reyes, J.B.L., J. Hortillas testified twice that deceased Dona Soledad made Luis the
sole heir.
FACTS: Herein Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Partition and
Cancellation of Titles of Registered Lands before the CFI of Negros The lower court denied the petition hence this case. There was a
Occidental on October 6, 1958. In it they alleged the following: joint appeal by both the plaintiffs and the defendants straight to
the SC because the properties involved was valued at more than
1) That Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer died intestate without P200,000.
any issue and leaving real and personal properties worth
P400,000.00; ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Gonzaga may be declared as the sole
testamentary heir despite the absence of a will.
2) That she was survived by the Plaintiffs, who are her nearest
of kin, being her brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces; RATIO: YES. the deceased Doa Soledad, in her probated will,
made Luis Gonzaga y Jesena the sole heir to her properties. These
3) That during the lifetime of the deceased, she expressed the manifestations are nigh conclusive, for the reason that attorney
wish that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga, the Principal Hortillas was himself married to Monserrat Gonzaga, a sister of
Defendant, was engaged in his coconut oil experimentation Soledad, who would have been one of the latter's intestate heirs
he could use the products and rentals of her properties in had it not been for the testament in favor of the appellee. The
furtherance of his experiments; authenticity of the sworn petitions of the late attorney Hortillas
are not impugned, and they were actually acted upon and granted
4) That the said scientific venture by the said Defendant was by the two CFI to which he addressed his petitions.
discontinued when he became totally blind, in view of
which the plaintiffs now ask a partition of the estate and Coupled with his undoubted possession as owner and with his
the cancellation of titles of lands allegedly fraudulently own dominical acts exercised over the former properties of Doa
transferred by, and in the name of, the Defendant. Soledad Gonzaga for 22 yrs., the exhibits constitute practically
conclusive proof of the truth of appellee's defenses, as found by
Defendants filed their answer repleading a denial as to the the court below, despite the destruction of the original will and
intestacy of the deceased, and alleging, among others, that a will of decree of probate.
Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer instituted Luis Gonzaga as the sole
heir to her entire estate, and that the will was duly allowed and
probated.

 Case No. 39 will cannot be the basis of the Private-Respondents claim to the
The Incompetent, Carmen Caniza, represented by her legal property unless and until it has been probated, it is still indicative
guardian, Amparo Evangelista (Petitioner) vs. CA, Spouses of the intent and desire of Petitioner to have Private-Respondents
Pedro and Leonora Estrada (Respondents) to remain and to continue in their occupancy and possession of the
G.R. No. 110427 subject house.
February 24, 1997
Narvasa, CJ. Hence, this case before the Supreme Court. Before finding any
resolution on the matter however, Petitioner Carmen Caniza died
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, Carmen Caniza, judicially and was subsequently substituted by her guardian Amparo A.
declared incompetent by the 107th Branch of the RTC of Quezon Evangelista
City and placed under the guardianship of her niece Amparo A.
Evangelista, instituted with the help of her guardian an ejectment Petitioner maintains that the supposed holographic will cannot be
suit against Spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada before the 35th given weight and is irrelevant to the case. Private-Respondents
Branch of the MetroTC of Quezon City. maintain however that the devise of the house to them by
Petitioner Caniza, as evidenced by the holographic will, denotes
In the complaint, Petitioner Caniza alleged that as the absolute her intention that they remain in possession thereof. This, Private-
owner of a house and lot located at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City, Respondents maintain, effectively bars Petitioners judicial
she allowed Private-Respondent Spouses Estrada to occupy the guardian from evicting them since that would run counter to
said home along with their family rent-free. But because of her Petitioner Canizas will.
advanced age and medical needs, Petitioner requested the Private-
Respondent to vacate the same so that she could then rent out the ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Caniza, as represented and
house to fund her expenses. This request, Petitioner contends, was substituted by her legal guardian, can recover the subject house
unheeded by the Private-Respondents and by their repeated and lot
refusal enriched themselves at the expense of Petitioner.
RATIO: YES, Petitioner Caniza, as represented and substituted by
Private-Respondent Spouses however denied the allegations, her legal guardian can recover the subject house and lot. Under
claiming that the Petitioner bequeathed to them in a holographic Art. 838 of the Civil Code, no will shall pass either real or personal
will executed on September 4, 1988 the house and lot in question. property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
While the MetTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Petitioner on
April 13, 1992, said Decision was reversed by the 96th Branch of Noting the abovementioned provision, the Court noted that a will
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October 21, 1992. is essentially ambulatorythat is, it can be altered at any time
prior to the testators death. Further, the Court added that until
On appeal with the CA, the Respondent Court affirmed the RTC the same is admitted in probate, it has no effect whatever and no
decision holding that: 1) the proper remedy was an accion right can be claimed thereunder.
publiciana before the RTC since the Respondent Spouses have
been in the subject premises as a sort of adopted family of Noting that the holographic will presented had not yet been
Petitioner as evidenced by the holographic will; and 2) while the probated even during the proceedings before the lower courts, the
Court held that the Private-Respondent Spouses cannot claim
ownership under the same. Therefore Petitioner, through her legal
guardian, can take back the subject house and lot.
 Case No. 40 Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
Spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson (Petitioners) REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E
vs. CA and Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino (Respondents) because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA's last
G.R. No. 115925 will and testament ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS
August 15, 2003 added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through
Carpio, J. fraudulent means since the area covered is twice the size of
CANUTO's share in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of
FACTS: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson ("CONSOLACION") and CONSOLACION's title, the issuance of another title in her name,
respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino ("REMEDIOS") are the niece and the payment to her of damages.
and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson
("CANUTO"). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his Petitioners' Contention: Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
sister Catalina Sioson ("CATALINA") and his brother Victoriano prescription. The basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS
Sioson ("VICTORIANO"), were co-owners of a parcel of land in should have filed the action within four years from the registration
Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila with an area of 9,347 sq.m (Lot 2). of CONSOLACION's title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19
CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot years later on 4 February 1988.
10/70 share or 1,335 sq.m. of the lot.
Respondent's Contention: She became aware of CONSOLACION's
In 1951, CANUTO had the lot surveyed and subdivided into eight adverse title only in February 1987. She maintained that she had
lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H.) Lot No. 2-A, with an area of 670 sq.m., timely filed her complaint within the four-year prescriptive on 4
and Lot No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000 sq.m, were placed under February 1988.
CANUTO's name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed. The action filed by REMEDIOS is based on
In 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng fraud, covered by the four-year prescriptive period. The trial court
Bilihang Tuluyan ("KASULATAN"). Under the KASULATAN, also held that REMEDIOS knew of petitioners' adverse title on 19
CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION November 1982 when REMEDIOS testified against petitioners in
for P2,250.00. CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot an ejectment suit petitioners had filed against their tenants in Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the complaint of REMEDIOS had already
and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. prescribed when she filed it on 4 February 1988.

In 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action
Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming against petitioners because CATALINA's LAST WILL from which
the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. CONSOLACION then REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted to
registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. RD issued titles under the personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance
name of CONSOLACION. with the Rules of Court.

In 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and CA Ruling: Reversed. The appellate court held that what
her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the RTC for "Annulment or REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly
created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable
her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four
period for filing the complaint is ten years, not four. The CA years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
counted this ten-year period from 19 November 1982. Thus, when
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988, the ten-year REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than
prescriptive period had not yet expired. 19 years after CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E on 28 October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the
The appellate court held that CATALINA's unprobated LAST WILL complaint late thus warranting its dismissal.
does not preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted
to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not REMEDIOS has a right over the land.

RATIO: NO. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This provision
means, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever
and no right can be claimed thereunder." REMEDIOS anchors her
right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINA's LAST
WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted
CATALINA's LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right
under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of
action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to
enforce an implied trust over these lots.

The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering
the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her
capacity as executrix of CATALINA's LAST WILL. This is
inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such
capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots.

On the issue of prescription: REMEDIOS' action is based on an
implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the
inclusion of the additional 1,335 sq.m. was without basis. In effect,
REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional
1,335 sq.m. through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION
should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
 Case No. 41 Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties
Spuses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de Pastor payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada
(Petitioners) vs. CA, Juan Y. Reyes, Judge of the First Branch of was not inofficious.
the CFI of Cebu and Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (Respondents)
G.R. No. L-56340 The Spouses Pastor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
June 24, 1983 certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the Order and the writ of
Plana, J. execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition
was denied as well as the motion for reconsideration holding that
FACTS: Alvaro Pastor Sr., a Spanish citizen, has two legitimate the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of the ownership
children with his wife Sofia Bossio, who died months after his over the mining claims had been finally adjudicated by final and
death, and one illegitimate child named Lewellyn Barlito Quemada executory order of the lower court.
(Quemada).
ISSUE: Whether the Probate Order resolved with finality the
Four years after Pastor S.'s death, Quemada filed a petition for the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr.
with the RTC. The will contained only one testamentary RATIO: NO. The question of ownership is an extraneous matter
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
Pastor Sr.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu. Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
The probate court appointed her as the special administrator of final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Also, nowhere in
the entire estate of Pastor Sr, whether it was covered by the the dispositive portion of the assailed order is there a declaration
holographic will or not. As special administrator, Quemada of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest
instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names propriety of appointing a special administrator.
of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, As to the intrinsic validity of the will, when Pastor, Sr. died, he was
and not by inheritance. survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate children and
one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the
The RTC allowed the will to probate and it was affirmed by the CA. conjugal partnership and set apart the share of Pastor Sr.'s wife in
On petition for review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and
in a minute resolution and remanded the same to the PROBATE liquidation of the estate of Pastor Sr. When the disputed Probate
COURT after denying reconsideration. order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no
liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in the RTC, wife, there had been no prior definitive determination of the
the Probate court issued the assailed Order of Execution and assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR., there was no appropriate
determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent
and his estate nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or
at least provided for. The net assets of the estate not having been
determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures
could not be ascertained. All the foregoing deficiencies considered,
it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of Quemada -
a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of
the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an
impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. There actually
was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other
respects. It was obviously for this reason that more than 7 years
after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled a
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.

Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
properties compose the estate of Pastor, Sr. in the face of
conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir involving
properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a
resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question,
there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate
Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled
to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of
Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing
orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged
implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis. The ordered payment
of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation
of the estate of the deceased.

 Case No. 42 first marriage of the deceased, who allegedly have the document
In Re: Testate Estate of the Deceased Jose B. Suntay. Silvino contained in the envelope which is the will of the deceased, be
SUntay (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Federico C. Suntay ordered to present it in court, that a day be set for the reception of
(Administrator-Appellee) evidence on the will, and that the Petitioner be appointed
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 executrix pursuant to the designation made by the deceased in the
November 5, 1954 will.
Padilla, J.
In answer to the court's order to present the alleged will, the
FACTS: On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay stated that they
China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz with did not have the said will and denied having snatched it from Go
whom he had several children now residing in the Philippines, and Toh.
the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had
a son. In view of the allegations of the petition and the answer of the
brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, the questions
On the same date, May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the raised herein are: The loss of the alleged will of the deceased,
deceased by his first marriage, filed the latter's intestate in the whether Exhibit B accompanying the petition is an authentic copy
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 4892). thereof, and whether it has been executed with all the essential
and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
On October 15, 1934, and in the same court, Maria Natividad Lim
Billian also instituted the present proceedings for the probate of a At the trial of the case on March 26, 1934, the Petitioner put two
will allegedly left by the deceased. witnesses upon the stand, Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong, who
corroborated the allegation that the brothers Apolonio and Angel
According to the Petitioner, before the deceased died in China he appropriated the envelope in the circumstances above-mentioned.
left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing his will and,
also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a The oppositors have not adduced any evidence counter to the
true copy of the original contained in the envelope. The will in the testimony of these two witnesses. The court, while making no
envelope was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go Toh, express finding on this fact, dismissed the petition believing that
Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. the evidence is insufficient to establish that the envelope seized
from Go Toh contained the will of the deceased, and that the said
On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the Petitioner, will was executed with all the essential and necessary formalities
arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its required by law for its probate.
copy Exhibit B. While Go Toh was showing this envelope to
Apolonio Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of On June 18, 1947, Silvino Suntay, the herein petitioner, filed a
the deceased, they snatched and opened it and, after getting its petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan praying, among
contents and throwing away the envelope, they fled. others:"(c) that such other necessary and proper orders be issued
which this Honorable Court deems appropriate in the premises."
Upon this allegation, the Petitioner asks in this case that the
brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, children by the
While this petition was opposed by Federico C. Suntay, son of the In the pleading copied in the dissent, which the appellant has
deceased Jose B. Suntay with his first wife, Manuela T. Cruz, the owned and used as argument in the motion for reconsideration,
other children of the first marriage, namely, Ana Suntay, Aurora there is nothing that may bolster up his contention. Even if all the
Suntay, Concepcion Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, children were agreeable to the probate of said lost will, still the
Manuel Suntay and Emiliano Suntay, filed the following answer due execution of the lost will must be established and the
stating that they had no opposition thereto; provisions thereof proved clearly and distinctly by at least two
"Come now the heirs Concepcion Suntay, Ana Suntay, credible witnesses, as provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The
Aurora Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, Manuel appellant's effort failed to prove what is required by the rule.
Suntay, and Emiliano Suntay, through their undersigned
attorney, and, in answer to the alternative petition filed in Even if the children of the deceased by the first marriage, out of
these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through counsel, generosity, were willing to donate their shares in the estate of
dated June 18, 1947, to this Honorable Court respectfully their deceased father or parts thereof to their step mother and her
state that, since said alternative petition seeks only to put only child, the herein appellant, still the donation, if validly made,
into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their would not dispense with the proceedings for the probate of the
late father, they have no opposition thereto." will in accordance with Section 6, Rule 77, because the former may
convey by way of donation their shares in the state of their
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on September 29, 1948, deceased father or parts thereof to the latter only after the decree
promulgated the following resolution disallowing the wills sought disallowing the will shall have been rendered and shall have
to be probated by the petitioner in his alternative petition filed on become final.
June 18, 1947.
If the lost will is allowed to probate there would be no room for
Issue: Whether or not the lack of opposition to the will relieve the such donation except of their respective shares in the probated
party interested in its probate from establishing its due execution will.

RATIO: NO. As Justice Padilla states, Does that mean that they NOTES:
were consenting to the probate of the lost will? Of course not. If
the lost will sought to be probated in the alternative petition was According to Justice Parass dissenting opinion, it is very
really the will of their late father, they, as good children, naturally noteworthy that out of the nine children of the first marriage, only
had, could have, no objection to its probate. That is all that their Angel, Jose and Federico Suntay had opposed the probate of the
answer implies and means. will in question; the rest, namely, Ana, Aurora, Concepcion,
Lourdes, Manuel and Emiliano Suntay, having expressly
But such lack of objection to the probate of the lost will does not manifested in their answer that they had no opposition thereto,
relieve the proponent thereof or the party interested in its probate since the petitioner's alternative petition "seeks only to put into
from establishing its due execution and proving clearly and effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father."
distinctly the provisions thereof at least two credible witnesses. It
does not mean that they accept the draft Exhibit B as an exact and This attitude is significantly an indication of the justness of
true copy of the lost will and consent to its probate. Far from it. petitioner's claim, because it would have been to their greater
advantage if they had sided with oppositor Federico Suntay in his
theory of equal inheritance for all the children of Jose B. Suntay.
Under the lost will or its draft Exhibit "B", each of the Suntay
children would receive only some P 25,000.00, whereas in case of
intestacy or under the alleged will providing for equal shares, each
of them would receive some P100,000.00. And yet the Suntay
children other than Angel, Jose and Federico had chosen to give
their conformity to the alternative petition in this case.
 Case No. 43 ground that to be appointed they must first prove their respective
In the Matter of the Estate of the Deceased Chung Liu, Ngo The relationship to the deceased Chung Li and prayed that he be
Hua (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Chung Kiat Kung, Lily Chung appointed administrator.
Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Ka Bio
(Oppositors-Appellee). Chung Kiat Kang (Oppositor- RTC Ruling: Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced
Appellant). Philippine Trust Co. (Special Administrator) by the aforementioned Taipei District Court, and that Chung Kiat
G.R. No. L-17091 Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat
September 30, 1963 Bio are children of the deceased. So it issued the order appointing
Labrador, J. Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of Chung Liu.

FACTS: On December 7, 1957, Ngo The Hua, claiming to be From this order, both the petitioner and Chung Kiat Kang
surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be appealed. However, petitioner Ngo The Hua filed a petition to
appointed administratrix of the estate of aforementioned withdraw her appeal stating that she had entered into an amicable
deceased. Her petition was opposed Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung settlement with the oppositors-appellees. Her petition was
Cho, Bonifacio Chung Sio Pek and Chung Ka Bio, all claiming to be granted by this Court.
children of the deceased Chung Liu by his first wife, Tan Hua.
Hence only the appeal of oppositor Chung Kiat Kang remains for
The petition was heard and evidence presented by both petitioner the consideration of this Court.
Ngo The Hua and Chung Kiat Hua, et al. When Chung Kiat Kang's
turn to present his evidence came, he manifested, through his ISSUE: Whether or not Chung Kiat Kang may intervene on the
counsel, that he was waiving his right to present evidence in so far administration proceeding.
as the appointment of administrator of the estate is concerned.
RATIO: NO. It is well-settled that for a person to be able to
Oppositors-Appellees Contention: They claim that Ngo The intervene in an administration proceeding concerning the estate of
Hua is morally and physically unfit to execute the duties of the a deceased, it is necessary for him to have interest in such estate.
trust as administratrix, and that she and the deceased have An interested party has been defined in this connection as one
secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan, both being Chinese who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who
citizens, confirmed a legalized by the Taipei District Court, Taipei, has a certain claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Appellant
Taiwan. In this same opposition they prayed the Chung Kiat Hua, Chung Kiat Kang does not claim of to be a creditor of Chung Liu's
allegedly the eldest child of the deceased, be appointed estate. Neither is he an heir in accordance with the Civil Code of
administrator instead. the Republic of China, the law that applies in this case, Chung Liu
being a Chinese citizen. The appellant not having any interest in
Petitioner-Appellants Contention: Ngo The Hua who claim that Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be
the oppositors are not children of Chung Liu. appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as he now prays.

Oppositor-Appellants Contention: Chung Kiat Kang, claiming WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
be a nephew of the deceased, filed his opposition to the costs against appellants.
appointment of either Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hu on the
 Case No. 44 testamentary disposition of the property of Isabel Cuntapay
Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and should be respected, and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a
Atty. Edward Llonillo (Petitioners) vs. Vicenta Umengan better right to possess the subject lot.
(Respondent)
G.R. No. 168156 However, the CA declared that then RTC erred in ruling that, by
December 6, 2006 virtue of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay,
Callejo, Sr., J. heirs of Rosendo Lasam ave a better right to the subject lot over
Vicenta Umangan, explaining that the said last will and testament
FACTS: The lot subject of this case is located in Tuguegarao City, did not comply with the formal requirements of the law on wills.
Cagayan, originally owned by spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leon
Bunagan. The heirs of the said spouses conveyed the ownership of ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a better right to the subject
the lots to their two children Irene Cuntapay and Isabel Cuntapay. property.

The heirs of petitioner, Rosendo Lasam, who was the son of Isabel RATIO: NO. The purported last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer Cuntapay could not be properly relied upon to establish
against respondent, Vicenta Umengan, who is likewise an heir of petitioners right to possess the subject lot, because, without
Isabel Cuntapay by another marriage, was then occupying the having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be
subject lot. In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged the source of any right.
that they are the owners of the subject lot. During his lifetime,
Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to
occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955 allegedly promising that
they would vacate the subject lot upon demand. However, despite
written notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta
Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot and
continued to possess the same. Thus, instituting the action for
ejectment.

In contrast, Vicenta Umengan denied the material allegations
stating that the subject lot was inherited by her children through
intestate sucession, and further, her father purchased shares in the
subject lot as evidenced by Deeds of Sale.

The MTCC rendered judgement in favor of the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam and directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umangan giving
credence to the newly discovered last will and testament
purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay, as opposed to Vicenta
Umengans contention on intestate succession and legal
conveyances. The RTC echoed the reasoning of the MTCC that the
 Case No. 45 Subsequently, a petition for probate of the holographic will of
Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virgina D. Seangio Segundo was filed by petitioners before the RTC. Upon petitioners
(Petitioners) vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes, in her capacity as motion, the probate proceedings and testate proceedings were
Presiding Judge, RTC, NCR, Branch 21, Manila et al. consolidated.
(Respondents)
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 Private respondents later moved for the dismissal of the probate
November 27, 2006 proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the
Azcuna, J. holographic will of Segundo does not meet the definition of a will
under Article 783 of the Civil Code, as it only shows an alleged act
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio @ the RTC, an nothing else.
prayed for the appointment of private respondent Elisa Seangio-
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Petitioners, on the other hand, filed their motion to dismiss,
Dy Yieng Seangio. contending that:

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia Seangio opposed the 1) The authority of the probate court is limited only to a
petition on the ff. grounds: determination of extrinsic validity of the will;

1) Dy Yieng is in full command of her faculties; 2) Disinheritance constitutes a disposition on the estate of the
decedent; and
2) Deceased executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia, giving her the power to manage and exercise 3) The rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos
control and supervision over his business in the will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
Philippines; exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.

3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate
administrator of the estate because she is a certified public proceedings because of preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
accountant; and thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. The other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as
4) Segundo left a holographic will executed in 1995, the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Seangio, for cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs in the direct line
In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that were preterited in the will.
in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by RATIO: NO. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
proceedings for the probate of the will. preterited in the will. According to the SC, it was Segundos last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs with
the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir.
Her name was included only as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
 Case No. 46 acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain
Ernesto M. Guevara (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Rosario legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171
Guevara and her husband Pedro Buison (Respondents- hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little
Appellees) over four years after the testator's demise, she commenced the
G.R. No. 48840 present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose
December 29, 1943 hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case
Ozaeta, J. that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of
having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L.
FACTS: Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter.
made various bequests to his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd
marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he
daughter. died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which
reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator
Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto M. in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be
Guevara conveying to him the southern half of a large parcel of disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
land in consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable sustained that theory.
considerations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with
Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and testament, however,
was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any RATIO: NO. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and
administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of
of his estate. the decedent. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with
Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees
their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the of the testator.
execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their
favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Although not contested, the due execution of the will and the fact
that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and
Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue
son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court,
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means
disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by
debts left by his father. the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property,
attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be
Rosario Guevara, who had her father's last will and testament in recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land
her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary lies.
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator
The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory
and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of a will, the law
punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court.

If the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees
desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must
first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate
in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions
of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither
may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy.

The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires
it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the
instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might
agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the
exclusion of others.
 Case No. 47
Octavio S. Maloles II, (Petitioner) vs. CA, Hon. Fernando V. ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to
Gorospe, J.r, in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC- intervene in the probate proceeding.
Makati, Branch 61, and Pacita Phillips as the alleged executrix
of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, RATIO: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of
(Respondents) will filed in Branch 61 has already terminated upon the allowance
G.R. No. 133359 of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with Branch 65, the
January 31, 2000 same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of
Mendoza, J. the now concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no
reason for Branch 65 to refer back the case to Branch 61 as it
FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under
probate of his will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of
and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de estates, it is provided that when a case is filed in one branch,
Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge
Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.
Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of
sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no
will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and merit. He is not an heir. Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only
testament on February 16, 1996. inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo left a valid will
which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as of his estate.
executrix, filed a motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary
with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later on
refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.

Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention with Branch 61 claiming that as a next of kin (him
being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed
as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.

Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the
motion filed by Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that
since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should
be the same court which should hear Pacitas motion. Branch 61
however refused to consolidate and referred the case back to
Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per
refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for
intervention filed by Octavio.
 GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS was dismissed because if failed to meet the requirements under
Article 813 and 814 of the NCC and the house and lot located in
Case No. 48 Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte could not validly dispose.
Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero (Petitioners) vs. CA and
Clemente Sand (Respondents) ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
G.R. No. 106720
September 15, 1994 RATIO: YES, it is valid. According to the Supreme Court, in the
Puno, J. case of holographic wills, it must be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself as provided under Article 810
FACTS: Decedent Annie Sand executed a holographic will and of the NCC. On the other hand, if the testator fails to sign and date
named the petitioners and private respondents as devisees. some of the dispositions, such dispositions cannot be effectuated
Petitioners instituted a special proceedings for allowance of but does not render the whole testament void. In this case, the
decedents holographic will. Petitioners alleged that the decedent holographic will can still be admitted to probate. Unless the
was of sound mind and disposing mind during the time of its authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made
execution and not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their
and was in capacity to dispose her estate by will. presence does not invalidate the will itself. It will only result in
disallowance of those changes due to lack of authentication.
However, private respondents opposed the petition on the
grounds that the testaments body and signature was not in In the case of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
decedents handwriting and it contained alterations, corrections Norte, it cannot be validly dispose of the whole property because
which were not duly signed by the decedent and lastly the will was such property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand which
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue means that other heirs of her father has also rights over the said
influence. house and lot.

On the other hand, the petition was opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero in
regard to the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. Such property cannot be conveyed
because she was not the sole owner.

RTC admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. The
court finds that theres no evidence to show that the will in
question is different from the will actually executed by Sand. Also,
the decedent is of sound mind during the execution of the will.
There were three (3) witnesses presented and were able to
identify the handwriting of the decedent and it was written to be
the genuine handwriting and signature.

CA reversed the decision of the RTC and the petition for probate
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
 CASE NO. 50 ISSUE: Whether or not there is preterition in this case.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.
TEVES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA RATIO: NO. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission
CADAYDAY, respondents. of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
G.R. NO. 141882 whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
MARCH 11, 2005 the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
J. TINGA devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir
FACTS: Decedent, Don Julian L. Teves, contracted two marriages, in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning
first, with Antonia which they had two children, Josefa and Emilio. him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
After Antonias death, he married Milagros Donio which he had 4 disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
children, Maria Evelyn, Jose, Milagros Reyes and Pedro. Upon the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the
death of Antonia, the conjugal properties of her and Don Julian direct line from inheritance.
was partitioned. Thereafter, the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
properties of Don Juan. On the basis of the agreement, Hacienda resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
Madalla Milagrosa was owned in common by Don Julian, Josefa evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it
and Emilio. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
Julian, including Lot. No. 63. Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa then death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of
executed a Supplemental Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs
which transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 among other from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
properties and thereafter, petitioner caused a TCT be issued in its death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are
name. Meanwhile, unaware that Lot. No. 63 was already in the indicative of Don Julian's desire along this line. Hence, the total
name of the petitioner, respondents bought the same from omission from inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second
Milagros Donio. Hence, the seek the annulment of TCT issued in marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is not present.
favor of petitioner.

RTC: Denied annulment of title. There is a valid transfer of
ownership.

At the time of Don Julian's death, Lot No. 63 was no longer a
part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
petitioner by virtue of the Supplemental Deed of
Assignment. Consequently, Milagros Donio and not being
the owners they could not have sold it.

CA: Petitioners title null and void. There is preterition.

 Case No. 51 RATIO: YES. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court's
Remedios Nuguid (Petitioner-Appellant) vs. Felix Nuguid and area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on,
Paz Salonga Nuguid (Oppositors-Appellee) the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the
G.R. No. L-23445 testatrix's testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the
June 23, 1966 requisites or solemnities prescribed the by law.
Sanchez, J.
In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will.
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters. has been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded
for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In the event of
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid, one of Rosarios sisters, filed in the probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly case will come up once again before this Court on the same issue
executed by Rosario Nuguid. Petitioner prayed that said will be of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result would be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical
will annexed be issued to her. considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the
nullity of the provisions of the will in question, there being a
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate justiciable controversy awaiting solution.
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending time her parents.
Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors names altogether. Said will rather than he labelled ineffective
who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the from preterition.
institution is void.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in forced heirs or anyone of them, either because the are not
question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri, et al. vs.
petition. Akutin, at al., 72 Phil., p. 325.) Disinheritance; in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of heir
The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L.
Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law," 1956 ed.,
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of Remedios as the sole and Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases.) Disinheritance is always "voluntary";
universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary."

(Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volume reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
20, p. 1131.) surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817 of the
same Code.
The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code "shall annul the institution of heir. "This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance
under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted
in the case of preterition. (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1961. Edition, p. 172.) Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 of the Civil
Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will
void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted
a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There
must he, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition
granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir.

Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively
disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of
the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code.

If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the
concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution would be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the
 SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
ISSUE: Whether the testatrix's will orders a simple substitution.
Case No. 52
Carmen G. de Perez, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria RATIO: NO, the will provides for a fideicommissary substitution
Alcantara (Plaintiff-Appellee) vs. Mariano Garchitorena, and of heirs.
Jose Casimiro, Sheriff of the CFI of Manila (Defendants-
Appellants) Requirement of a fideicommissary substitution according to
G.R. No. 31703 Manresa:
February 13, 1930 1) A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate;
Romualdez, J.
2) An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
FACTS: Ana Maria Alcantara, prior to her death, executed a will transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate;

instituting her niece-in-law, plaintiff Carmen De Perez, as sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of her estate. 3) A second heir; and

P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with an association 4) That the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from
called La Urbana as the final payment of the liquidated credit of the time thetestator dies, since he is to inherit from the
Ana Maria Alcantara against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, latter and not from the fiduciary"
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
All of such requirements were present in the will of Ana Maria
As said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 Alcantara which states that:
against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, Carmens husband, the sheriff
pursuant to a writ of execution levied an attachment on the said "IXI institute Carmen Garchitorena as my sole and
deposited amount. universal heiress to the remainder of my estate she will
receive from my executrix the properties composing my
The plaintiff secured a preliminary injunction restraining the hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's
execution, alleging that said deposit belongs to the blessing and my own."
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, and
cannot be subject to a levy on attachment "X. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that
my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
LOWER COURT: held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and
Alcantara sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never
pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far
Defendant's contention: That lower court erred in their as it is legally possible."
declaration. That as per the clauses of the Ana Maria's will, what is
ordered by Ana Maria Alcantara is a simple substitution, not a
fideicommissary substitution
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion, based on Manresa's
quotation:

1. A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate.
- In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to
the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the
will.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
estate.
- Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides
that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the
heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of
leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate,
said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the
heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition
thereof in case she could die after the testatrix. Note also
that clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy
and not the right to dispose of the state.

3. A second heir.
- Such are the children of the heiress instituted.

4. That the Fideicommissarius or second heir should be
entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death.
- In this case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary
consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir
does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the
testator

 Case No. 53 obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, Administrator or any part thereof for anyone else.
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Petitioner) vs. The Hon. Venicio Escolin, Presiding Judge The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for C.N.
of the CFI of Iloilo, 2nd Branch, and Avelina A. Magno Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
(Respondents) Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would
G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896 not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also
March 29, 1974 heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to
Barredo, J. certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will. She brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeathed all of her properties to her husband, Charles Newton bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and
Hodges, during his natural lifetime. She also gave her husband the enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate. However, her over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he
husband cannot sell or otherwise dispose their property in Texas. could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof
There is also a provision in her will that upon death of her inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so
husband, her brothers and sisters shall have the rest or remainder mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
of her estate. C.N. Hodges died. Magno was appointed as the death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that
administratix of both spouses estate, later she was replaced by contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-
PCIB for Charles estate. There was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
estate so when Mr. Hodges died, the brothers and sisters of the Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
former wanted to determine the extent of their sisters estate that occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
they can inherit. of any remainder of her estate then.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fideicommissary substitution.

RATIO: NO. There are generally only two kinds of substitution
provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870),
namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a
simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code
nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof.
There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to
accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is
there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
 CONDITIONS, MODES, AND TERMS testators wish to have his property disposed of in accordance with
Philippine laws and not by the law of his nationality is void.
Case No. 54
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo. Juan Miciano, Under Art. 792 of the Civil Code, impossible conditions as well as
Administrator(Petitioner-Appellee) vs. Andre Brimo those contrary to law or good customs, such as the condition
(Respondent-Appellant) imposed by the will, are considered not imposed and not
G.R. No. 22595 prejudicial to legatees.
November 1, 1924
Romualdez, J. The condition in question, found in the second clause of the will of
Joseph Brimo, requests his heirs to respect his decision to have his
FACTS: Upon the death of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, Juan property disposed of in accordance with Philippine laws or else be
Miciano, the administrator of the formers estate, filed a scheme of prevented from claiming their inheritancea condition which the
partition before the lower court. Andre Brimo, the brother of the Appellant could not abide by. This condition is contrary to law
deceased, subsequently opposed this. The lower court however because Art. 10 of the Civil Code provides that, testamentary
approved of the same. successions shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question and is therefore deemed
Aggrieved, Andre Brimo then appealed the ruling before the Court. written in every will.
Aside from opposing the approval of the scheme of partition by the
court as well as its declaration that Turkish laws cannot be made Based on the above findings of the Court, it moved to modify the
to apply in the case of Joseph Brimos estate, Respondent- ruling of the lower court, directing that the distribution of the
Appellant Brimo also opposed the denial of his participation in the estate of Joseph Brimo be made in such a manner as to include
inheritance. Appellant Andre Brimo.

Appellee on the otherhand based the exclusion of Andre Brimo, as
legatee in the will, on the second clause found in Joseph Brimos
will expressing his wish to have his property disposed of in
accordance with Philippine laws and not Turkish laws thereby
annulling any favorable disposition to such a person who refuses
to honor his wish.

Hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Andre Brimo can be excluded from the
estate partition.

RATIO: NO, Andre Brimo cannot be excluded from the estate
partition. Applying Art. 792 (now Art. 873) along with Art. 10 of
the Civil Code, the condition requiring legatees to respect the