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INTRODUCTION
There are two ways (at least) in which we might think of introducingthe
body into feminist theory.The firstpossibilitymight be understoodby reflect-
ing upon the standardschema of the history of feminist thought. While first
wave feminismdemandedequality,and second wave feminismdemandeddif-
ference, the body emergedin the third wave as a means of deconstructingthis
sameness/differenceopposition. The appeal to equality assumesthat gender
differencesare imposedon otherwise equal beings, and therebyprecludesthe
possibility that different types of bodies might demand differentformsof po-
litical recognition. In the second wave assertionof difference and specificity,
the body is still seen as that which precedessocial construction. But for fem-
inists of the second wave, differentbodies demanddifferentformsof articula-
tion. In the third wave, both these argumentsare attacked for having an un-
problematicappeal to the pre-representationalbody.Women are neither the
same nor essentially different;to decide such an argumentone would have to
appealto a body fromwhich social representationderivesor upon which rep-
resentation is imposed.But if we were to arguethat the very notion of the pre-
representationalbody is effected through representation,we would have to
FEMINISM
THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST OFJUDITHBUTLER
"whatis"cannotbereduced
narcissism; to itsrepresentation,
butis stillknown
as
only pre-representational.
CONTEMPORARYAUSTRALIANFEMINISM:
GATENS,GROSZ,AND LLOYD
It ispreciselythisstrictdistinctionbetween"whatis"anditsrepresentation
that waschallengedby Gatens'sground-breaking critiqueof the sex/gender
distinction(Gatens1996).5This critiquedidnot justhave the ideaof an es-
sentialfemalenatureasitstarget.On the contrary, bythe timeGatens'sarticle
firstappearedin 1983,the appealto femalenaturehad been dismissedas a
naiveessentialism, andthe sex/genderdistinctionhadbeenintensifiedbysub-
suming the entirefeminist problematicwithinthe domainof genderor rep-
resentationalone.In so doing,thosethirdwavefeminismsthatrejectedbotha
femalenatureandthe conventionalrepresentation of thatnature(asgender)
didso in thenameof a radicalrepresentationalism. Anyessence,it wasargued,
wasthoroughly withinrepresentation andcouldnot beappealedto asa critical
leverin orderto establisha morelegitimaterepresentation. However,asGat-
ens'sarticlemadeclear,the ideaof genderas an arbitrary culturaloverlaynot
only assumedthe existence of sex as some pure thing in itself, it alsomadethe
mistakeof seeinggenderas a formof pureideality.The critiqueof the sex/gender
distinctionundertaken byGatensoughtthereforeto bedistinguished
fromthe
host of similarcritiquesthatfollowedin its wake.Gatens'sargumentwas(at
least)double-edged. It wasnot only sex as somepure,meaningless,andpre-
linguisticrealthatwasexposedas criticallyuntenable.The ideaof genderas
representation,social construction, or significationpresentedthe same politi-
cal andontologicalproblemsas its naivelymaterialistcounterpart.
Politically,the sex/genderdistinctionreinforceda hierarchicalopposition
that had underpinned philosophy's sexism.The distinctionbetweena brute
materialrealityanditspurelyidealrepresentation, alongwiththe ideaof phi-
losophyas properlyconcernedonly with ideality,rehearsedandrepeatedan
oppositiontraditionally associatedwith the male/femalebinary.It shouldbe
noted, then, that any "bracketing" of sex or insistenceon sex as an effectof
representationalsopartakesin a representationalist refusalto question,orthink
of awayofquestioning,whatitisthatgenderre-presents. It isnotjustthatthere
is no sex in itself(no simpleessentialism),or that any suchpre-representa-
tionalsex woulditselfalwaysbe represented. Gatens'sargumentsuggeststhat
the representational sideof the sex/genderdivideis no lessproblematicthan
the putativebrutegivennessof sex.The ideaof a strictboundary betweenthe
real (natureor sex) and its representation or
(language gender)is precisely
whatneedsto be rethought,andnot justforpoliticalreasons.
As I will arguebelow,it is preciselythe question of the originandeffectof
sucha boundary(betweenthe realandthe representational) whichmarksthe
thinking power beyond the logic of subjectivityand in terms other than that
of prohibition, negation, and exclusion. Foucaultwas, therefore,highly criti-
cal of the structuralistattention to linguistic boundariesand conditions. For
Foucault,structuralism,the human sciences, and even attention to the "trace"
were ways in which thought recuperateditself (Foucault 1972, 121). To think
power as immanent would precludea logic of negation and exclusion (such as
Butler's),for if power were immanent it would not be the power of a certain
force (language/discourse).It is not that there arebeingswho then have power
or who are limited by power; there is the event of power, and it is from this
multiplicityof events that beings and identities areeffected. This "immanent"
way of thinking power was put forwardby Groszin her early work on corpor-
eality, where she links Foucaultwith Benedictus de Spinoza, Gottfried Leib-
niz, and FriedrichNietzsche, "who have proposed a unified or monistrather
than a dichotomized or dualistunderstandingof corporeality"(Grosz 1987,
8-9). If being is not a substance or ground but only the active becoming of
qualities, then being might be interpretedpositively as the assertionof force,
a force not in opposition to (or in negation of) some posited other, but posi-
tive force. Foucault'sattempt to rethink power might also then be tied to a
rethinkingof corporeality.If there is not a single location of power,nor a priv-
ileged site for its origin or explanation, then power will not be an imposed
system,but will be a multiplicity of effects (Grosz 1995, 215). In termsof sex-
ual difference,power might be renderedas, in Gatens'sterms,expressive:the
becoming of a certain quality,its development throughregulation,cultivation
and relation to other powers (Gatens 1996, 149).
The uptake of Irigaray'scritique of philosophy in Australianfeminismhas,
similarly,focused on that aspect of Irigaray'swork critical of the idea of an
essential sexuality which is thenre-presented.Indeed, as I have alreadysug-
gested, it is the questionof the inaugurationof the distinction between the real
body and its meaningfulsexuality that characterizesthe questionof the body.
This is seen most clearly,perhaps,in Grosz'sVolatileBodies(1994) and the the-
orization of the relationship between interiority and exteriority.While the
phenomenological paradigmof intentionality sees the subjectas an effect of a
"directedness-towards" or "going-beyond,"Grosz arguesfor a convolution of
outside-in and inside-out approaches.While Irigaray'sworksought to redefine
intentionality awayfroma subject/objectrelation to a subject/subjectrelation
of sexual difference (Irigaray1996), Grosz'sworkon corporealityrepresentsa
strongerchallenge to the paradigmof subjectivity.But in so doing, her work
does not merely locate the corporeal as a materialityor simple other of the
supposedidealityof thought. Rather,as with Gatens'semphasison bodyimage,
the corporealfor Groszis not a given or origin to which thought needs to re-
turn;the body is precisely thatpeculiargiven which is idealized,imagined,or
em-bodiedin orderfor any given as such to emerge. As such, then, the body
marksthat peculiar site of transformationwhereby the human becomes hu-
man, the body becomes sexed, and the subjectemergesas its own. But this be-
coming is neithera manifestation of an alreadypresent sexuality nor an arbi-
traryoverlay.The body "becomes"in orderfor becoming in general to emerge.
The body is the very passagefrom being to becoming. Cashed out in psycho-
analytic terms, termswhich are both crucial and problematicfor this project,
we might say that the human is nothingotherthanan interpretationof its own
body (a becoming-otherthan the body);at the same time this becoming-other
is also alwaysa becoming-otherof thebody.The human is a becoming other of
the body and a becoming other thanthe body.The body is, if you like, the type
of being that, being essentially dispossessedof an essence, essentializesitself.
It is the very characterof the human body to render itself meaningful,or
other than corporeal.The body is that materialbeing which transformsitself
immaterially,throughits significanceas a subject(Gatens 1996, 13). It wasthis
corporealdialectic in Lacan'swork, the passageto the imaginary,which moti-
vated much of the early work of Groszand Gatens. But the thinking through
of the becoming-corporealin Australianfeminism also led to a move beyond
Lacan and Irigaray.Grosz'swork typically sees sense not as a bounded system
of signification or as a representationalnetwork, but locates sense and the
emergenceof meaning at the level of the corporeal.The body is not that which
resistsmeaning, nor is it a constitutive outsideto the structuresof meaning;the
body is a becoming meaningful. Similarly,for Gatens the body is neither a
mental representationof some pre-semanticmatter,nor is the body a sexual
realbelied by subsequentimagesor stereotypes.Using the workof Spinozaand
modalities, Gatens arguesthat the body is not a materialitythat is then ren-
dered meaningful. A Spinozist ontology thinks being as becoming.The body
is in its modes of practice, self-representation,and engagement.The body is a
becoming-meaningful.But meaning, here, is not a systemof signs or significa-
tion, not a symbolicoverlay,but "animmanentpowerof active nature"(1996,
148).
Once the notion of the subject is refiguredin this way, new openings are
possible for political theory and ethics. Gatens sees the Deleuzian-Spinozist
emphasis on thought as the realizationof the bodyas enabling the reformula-
tion of society'spredominantlymasculinebody-image.Gatens'sfocus on body-
imagesets itself againstthe idea that genderis merelyan effect of culturalcon-
structionor representation(1996, 41). She sees the sexual subjectas an effect
of doubling,wherebythe subjectoccursas a relation to its image (1996, 35). But
this doubling is neither material nor ideal; it is the doubling of the material
body as an ideal body. It is the materialbecoming other than itself; and this
becoming also occurs in relation to an other body (1996, 37). Lloyd also uses
the Spinozist idea of the mind as an idea of the body to argueboth for sexual
specificity and for the dynamic characterof the body'ssense:
The body is not the underlyingcause of the mind'sawareness
and knowledge, but rather the mind'sobject-what it knows.
CONCLUSION
NOTES
effectof the prohibitive characterof power), Foucault sees desire as irreducibleto its
intersections with power.
4. According to Gatens, "The question that needs to be asked concerns not the
referent(the male body or the female body) but the conditions of referentialityfor the
utterance of meaningful statements about sexual relations (in their broadestsense)"
(1996, 85).
5. See: "A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction" (Gatens 1996). An earlier
version of this article was first published in "Beyond Marxism?Interventions after
Marx,"Intervention,no. 17 (1983).
6. This point is emphasizedin Space,TimeandPerversion,where Groszassertsthat
female sexuality cannot be reduced to representationand that the unrepresentableis
more than an effect of the referentiallogic of discourse:"Femalesexuality,lesbian de-
sire, is that which eludes and escapes, that which functions as an excess, a remainder
uncontained by and unrepresentablewithin the terms provided by a sexuality that
takes itself as straightforwardlybeing what it is" (Grosz 1995, 222).
7. In Grosz'srecent work on Bergsonthis idea of positive and infinite difference
is fleshed out in a theory of becoming. The future is not some ideal point addedon to
the being of the present;the present is just that active anticipation of a future, and so
the future is alwaysan event of quite specific becomings (Grosz 1999).
REFERENCES