VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE
SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
x---------------------------------------------------x
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died and it was
alleged that he owned property in Calamba,
Laguna.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI
Laguna a petition for letters of administration and
ex parte appointment as special administratix over
the estate. Motion was granted.
there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina
Carpio
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf
of their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which
was denied by CFI.
Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the
estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the
deceased is not entitled to succeed from him
CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule.
Preciosa became special administratrix upon a
bond of P30k.
ISSUES:
Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be
determined in the present case?
What does the word resides in Revised Rules of
Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
Who is entitled as special administratix of the
estate?
HELD/RATIO:
Under RULE 73, SECTION 1. if the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled at the CFI in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death,
And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
CFI of any province in which he had estate.
The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that
the deceased resided in QC at the time of his
death, therefore the venue of Laguna was
improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but
Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse.
However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which
is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended
to be with CFIs independently from the place of
residence of the deceased.
RULE 79, SECTION 2, demands that the petition
should show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last
residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy,
right of person who seeks administration as next of
kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
The doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment
of special administratrix.
The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the
basis for appointment of special administrator
(temporarily) to take possession and charge of the
estates of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and (regular) executors or
administrators appointed.
Old rules basis ay: appeal of allowance of
disallowance of a will;
New: added - xxx delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause
(includes parties cannot agree among themselves)
including an appeal of allowance of disallowance of
a will, the court may appoint a xxx
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or
not is with the probate court, the paramount
consideration is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent.
In re: Fule, it is not required that the administratrix
be entitled to share in the estate of the decedent
only that one is entitled to the administration;
but the preference of Preciosa is with sufficient
reason the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property
of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin.
DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES,
and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
respondents
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the
Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived
by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two
(2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador Cuenco, all residing at Quezon City, and
by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco
Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu, alleging that the Senator died intestate in
Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in
Cebu and Quezon City.
While the petition was still pending with CFI
Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife,
filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the
last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion
to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering
that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and
motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA
ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Issues: 1.)Whether the appellate court erred in law
in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions
2.) Whether the Quezon City court acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings
in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of
probate over intestate proceedings.
Held:
1.) The Court ruled in the affirmative.
According to the Court, Rule 73 specifies that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is
equally conceded that the residence of the
deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue.
A court may, upon learning that a petition for
probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided
with his surviving widow and their minor children,
and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This is exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon
petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it declined to take
cognizance of the case and deferred it to the
Quezon City court.
2.) The Court ruled in the negative.
The Quezon City court can not be deemed to
have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court
must first take cognizance over the estate of the
decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude
all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to
do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only
lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City
court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance
over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case, respondents
submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition
to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon
City court cannot be declared, as the appellate
court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator's testamentary
disposition.
With more reason should the Quezon City
proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that
the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts"
in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in
Fernando vs. Crisostomo" are the death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having
left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept
as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is
a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when
probate is granted, the judgment of the court is
binding upon everybody, even against the State.
The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity."
It should be noted that in the Supreme Court's
exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in
the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed
by and transferred to the Quezon City court and
that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of
the decedent (with the due deference and consent
of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of
his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix.
IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION
GERONA, FRANClSCO GERONA and DELFIN
GERONA v. CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE
GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE
GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN, and VICTORIA
DE GUZMAN
Facts: In the complaint, filed with the latter court
on September 4, 1958, petitioners allege that they
are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on
August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of
Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la
Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo
de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him
several children, who are the respondents.
Marcelo de Guzman died September 11, 1945; that
subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman",
fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they
were the only surviving heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that
petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that
respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in
causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7)
parcels of land, issued in the name of said
deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer
certificates of title to be issued in their own name,
in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for
each; that such fraud was discovered by the
petitioners only the year before the institution of
this case.
The petitioners demanded from respondents their
share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th
interest thereon; and that the respondents refused
to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to
the petitioners.
Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be
rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial
settlement, as it deprives them of their
participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation;
ordering the respondents to reconvey to
petitioners their share in said properties; ordering
the register of deeds to cancel the transfer
certificates of title secured by respondents as
above stated and to issue new certificates of title
in the name of both the petitioners and the
respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the
former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the
respondents to render accounts of the income of
said properties and to deliver to petitioners their
lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents
to pay damages and attorneys fees.Respondents
maintained that petitioners mother, the deceased
Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the
estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a
spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners
action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Issue: 1) Whether or not the present action for
partition of the latters estate is not subject to the
statute of limitations of action
2) If affected by said statute, the period of four (4)
years therein prescribed did not begin to run until
actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by
respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in
1956 or 1957; and that, accordingly, said period
had not expired when the present action was
commenced on November 4, 1958.
Ruling: RTC - petitioners mother was a legitimate
child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that
the properties described in the complaint belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman
and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that
petitioners action has already prescribed, and,
accordingly, dismissing the complaint without
costsCA RTC decision affirmed
SC CA decision affirmedRation: As a general rule,
an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in question
under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates, as in other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property.
When respondents executed the aforementioned
deed of extra- judicial settlement stating therein
that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of
title in their own name, they thereby excluded the
petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And
this is why petitioners have brought this action for
the annulment of said deed upon the ground that
the same is tainted with fraud.Although, there are
some decisions to the contrary, it is already settled
in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance
of real property based upon a constructive or
implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred
by the statute of limitations.The action therefor
may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud, such discovery is deemed to
have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25,
1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for
the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitutes constructive notice to whole
world.
Balanay Vs. Martinez
Facts: Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her
husband and six children as their heirs. Felix
Balanay Jr., her son, filed a petition for the probate
of her will containing declarations of her ownership
of the southern half of their conjugal properties
and that her properties be left undivided during her
husband's lifetime and the heirs' legitimes be
satisfied from the fruits of the properties.Felix
Balanay Sr., though initially opposed to the probate
for he was preterited, later on relented, and
renounced his share in her estate. The CFI gave
effect to the widower's conformity and appointed
its Clerk of Courts as special administrator. When a
purported lawyer for Felix Balanay Jr. came and
filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw
probate of the will, the CFI declared the will void
and converted the testate proceedings into
intestate proceedings and ordered the issuance of
notice to creditors. Felix Balanay Jr. asked that the
probate was unauthorized. When this was denide,
the recourse was to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing
upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling
on its formal validity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in view of certain
unusual provisions in the will, which are dubious
legality and because of the motion t owithdraw
assumed to have been filed with authorization, the
trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity before formal validity can be
established. The probate of the will might become
an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue.
But the probate court erred when it converted the
proceedings from testate to intestate despite the
fact that it gave effect to the conformity of the
widower. The rule is that the invalidity of some of
the dispositions will not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions unless it is presumed that
the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not
been made. The illegal dispositions such as the
statement of the testatrix claiming ownership of
the southern part of the conjugal lands and the
provision that her properties be left undivided
contrary to law does not nullify the entire will. Such
may be disregarded. But by reason of the
widower's conformity, it had the effect of validating
the partition in the will without prejudice to the
rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs. Hence, the lower court really
really really erred when it did not proceed the
probate. Except in extreme cases where the will on
its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's
duty to pass first upon the validity of the will.
Casiano vs Maloto
G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977
Facts: Adriana Malolo died on oct 20, 1963, her
estate was extrajudicially partitioned between her
nephews and nieces in SP no. 1736.
On April 1, 1967 a newly discovered will was
delivered to the court where the intestate
proceedings were held, in the said will Aldina
Casiano, Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino
Maloto were named as heirs but Maloto Casiano
and Constancio Maloto allegedly could have had a
bigger share than what was given to them via the
intestate proceeding, as well as dispositions to
certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom
being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic
Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina and Constancio filed in SP No. 1736 a

motion for recon, the annulment of the previous
proceedings; and the allowance of the last will
found. The churches filed their respective petitions.

The CFI of Iloilo denied the motion to reopen on the

ground that it was not filed in time. The appellants
filed for certiorari and mandamus with the SC to
which the SC dismissed the petition on the grounds
that the appellants should have initiated a
separate proceeding for the probate of the will.
The court likewise declared that Res Judicata may
be raised in the proceedings for the probate of the
will.

The appellants filed a separate proceeding for the

probate of the will to which the appellees opposed
on the grounds that the will was destroyed, and
that the action was barred by res judicata. The
probate court ruled in favor of the appellees.

Issue: Do judges in intestate proceeding have any

jurisdiction to disqualify a will?

Held: NO. An intestate proceedings finding that a

will is lost, destroyed or revoked is not a bar for the
probation of the will. An intestate proceeding
purpose is to partition the estate of deceased
without a will not to declare the authenticity or the
legitimacy of a will.