DISPUTABLE

PRESUMPTIONS

LOZANO v. DELOS SANTOS

Case: P filed a complaint against R to restrain the latter from collecting dies and to order him to pay damages

Lozano (P) and Anda (R) agreed to consolidate their respective associations and form UMAJODA. They also agreed to elect one set fo officers who shall
be given the sole authority to collect daily dues from members. Both P and R ran for president.

P won, and R protested, alleging fraud, refused to recognize the results of the election. R also refused to abide by their agreement and continued
collecting dues from the members of his association despite several demands to desist.

P filed a complaint against R.

R moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the jurisdiction was lodged with SEC.

MCTC: Denied Rs motion
RTC: Found the dispute to be intracorporate, hence the subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and ordered MCTC to dismiss the case

SC:

There is no intracorporate nor partnership relation between petitioner and private respondent. The controversy between them arose out of their plan
to consolidate their respective jeepney drivers' and operators' associations into a single common association. This unified association was, however,
still a proposal. It had not been approved by the SEC, neither had its officers and members submitted their articles of consolidation in accordance with
Sections 78 and 79 of the Corporation Code. Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon issuance of the
certificate of consolidation by the SEC. When the SEC, upon processing and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the consolidation of
the corporations is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code and existing laws, it issues a certificate of consolidation which makes
the reorganization official. The new consolidated corporation comes into existence and the constituent corporations dissolve and cease to exist.

The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner and private respondent belong are duly registered with the SEC, but these associations are two
separate entities. The dispute between petitioner and private respondent is not within the KAMAJDA nor the SAMAJODA. It is between members of
separate and distinct associations. Petitioner and private respondent have no intracorporate relation much less do they have an intracorporate dispute.
The SEC therefore has no jurisdiction over the complaint.

The doctrine of corporation by estoppel advanced by private respondent cannot override jurisdictional requirements. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and is
not subject to the agreement of the parties. It cannot be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties,
neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court.


LRTA & RODOLFO ROMAN v. MARJORIE NATIVIDAN, heir of the NICANOR NATIVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY

About half an hour past 7 oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.

Marjorie, widow of Nicanor, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit, and Prudent for the
death of her husband.

LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim vs. Natividad, and a cross-claim vs. Escartin and Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

TC:
Prudent & Escartin to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs
LRTA and Roman are dismissed for lack of merit

CA: Exonerated Prudent from any liability, holding LRTA and Roman jointly liable
While the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.
In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that
Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.
CA faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train.

LRTA: CA ignored the evidence of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the
part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks,
was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the CAs conclusion on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
not of the LRTA.

Respondents: contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the
latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the CA had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the
death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

SC: Petitioners are liable

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due
to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners,
according to the CA have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must
be proved.

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case,
the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.


DELSAN TRANPORT LINES v. C & A CONSTRUCTION

M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by Delsan, anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing
the cargo oil tank. At around 12 midnight Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that
a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about (8) hours. At approximately 8:35 in the morning of the next day, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the
North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas
mouth, miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go
full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the
vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by respondent.

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay, claiming that the damage was caused by a fortuitous
event.

TC: Delson is not guilty of negligence because he has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident.
CA: Reversed - Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. and thus held petitioner liable for
damages.

DELSAN: Capt was not negligent in waiting until 8:35.
It was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought shelter. It further claimed that it cannot be held
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner was negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees.16 Granting that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not liable because it
exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner.

SC: Guilty
W/N Capt is negligent
Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 am of the next day. As early as 12:00 midnight, he received a report
from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35
am, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be
rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier.
Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port
where they docked was very near North Harbor.
W/N P is is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep
Yes liable.
 CC - Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In Fabre, Jr. v. CA, it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
Corollarily, in Ramos v. CA, the Court stressed that once negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he
observed the diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of
its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should
therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, it was held that it is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or
selection of its employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law.


PEOPLE v. DE GUZMAN

rd
Accused has been in the watch list of the police as a prohibited drug peddler. On the 3 try to entrap him, he was finally apprehended.

Consequently, an Information was filed against Carlos de Guzman y Panaligan for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425.

TC: Guilty

W/N TC erred in upholding the credibility of the policemen witnesses for the prosecution and in convicting the accused on the basis thereof

Accused: faults the TC for favoring the arresting officers with the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duty. He urges that this presumption no longer subsist for certain irregularities were committed by the two officers in the discharge of their
duty, i.e.,
(1) Chiapoco did not read the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension before signing it; and
(2) the police bungled its two (2) previous operations against him.

SC: NO

A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the
contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or
duty has been regularly performed. Presumption of this nature is indulged by the law for the following fundamental reasons:
(1) first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed;
(2) second, an official oath will not be violated; and
(3) third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and confidence
reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption.
Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress would spring in the affairs of
men.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

TC correctly gave the apprehending officers the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The failure of Pat. Chiapoco to read the
joint Affidavit of Apprehension before signing it is of de minimis importance. This irregularity happened after the buy-bust operation has already been
concluded and where accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. On the other hand, the two (2) failed attempts of the police authorities to
arrest accused-appellant happened long before the September 23, 1991 buy-bust operation. Evidently, they do not provide any evidence that any
irregularity was committed by the police authorities while conducting the September 23, 1991 buy-bust operation against the accused-appellant.
Moreover, the record is not clear that the two (2) previous attempts to bag the accused-appellant floundered because the police blundered.

These temporary setbacks of the police authorities, however, do not provide any justification to deprive them of the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.

In the case at bench, what is clearly established is that the drug pushing activities of the accused-appellant have long before been brought to the
attention of the police authorities and that accused-appellant had been the subject of a continuing surveillance. There is not an iota of evidence that
the police authorities who apprehended accused-appellant had any ill-motive against him. The records clearly show that accused-appellant was finally
caught in flagrante delicto selling "shabu", a regulated drug, without authority. He was rightfully convicted.


PEOPLE v. NAVAJA

Accused was the object of a buy-bust operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section (ANDDRUS) of Cebu.

Navaja successfully evaded arrest after the consummation of the sale and just as the members of the buy-bust team were about to pounce on him.
ANDDRUS filed a complaint against the accused for the violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425. A preliminary investigation was conducted by
the latter without any controverting evidence having been offered by the accused because of the non-submission of counter-affidavits. Office of the
Prosecution prepared an Information against the accused, and filed w/ the RTC

TC archived the case, as the accused had not yet been arrested, and decreed the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest.

Accused was finally apprehended while attending the hearing of a habeas corpus case filed by his mother against the police officers in connection with
a case of illegal possession of firearms filed against him. So the case archived was revived.

During the trial, the prosecution presented Pfc. Ranulfo Espina, a member of the team which conducted the buy-bust operation; Cesar Cagalawan,
Regional Chemist of the NBI; and Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry and Physical Identification Section of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory Service, Cebu
City. The last two testified that the pieces of evidence submitted to were positive for marijuana.

The defense, on the other hand, presented Seno Caedo, Joaquina Navaja (mother of the accused) and the accused himself.

TC: Guilty
Relied on the testimony of Espina who made a positive identification of the accused to be the same person who sold and delivered 100 grams
of dried marijuana leaves, etc.
Although the testimony of Pfc. Espina has not been corroborated by any of his companions during the buy-bust operation, he made a positive
and affirmative testimony how the operation was conducted, where and when, and the identity of the person who sold to the poseur-buyers
the said marijuana leaves. The defense have not produced any single evidence of any improper motive on the part of Pfc. Espina and other
prosecution witnesses to prevaricate and testify falsely against the accused. Accused admitted that he had no misunderstanding with Pfc.
Espina and anyone of his companions in the buy-bust operation.

Accused Contention: while prosecution witness Ranulfo Espina had five (5) other companions, none of them was presented as a witness; moreover,
their non-presentation was not sufficiently explained. He concludes that the companions' testimonies would have been adverse if they had been
presented in court. He also faults the trial court for relying on People vs. Ardiza; he claims that the said case is not applicable because two (2) peace
officers had testified therein. Besides, he argues that Ranulfo Espina, who was eight (8) to ten (10) meters away, could not have fully seen the accused
and the poseur-buyers because the accused's house is surrounded by a fence and chicken pens which supposedly obstructed Espina's line of sight.

SC: Disagree.
There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific or minimum number of witnesses to sustain a conviction for any of the
offenses described in the Dangerous Drugs Act. It is the prosecuting fiscal's prerogative to determine who or how many witnesses are to be presented
in order to establish the quantum of proof necessary for conviction. In this case, the prosecution deemed it sufficient to present Pfc. Espina alone since
any other testimony which would have been given by the other members of the buy-bust team would be merely corroborative in nature. The non-
presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is
no showing that the other peace officers were not available to the accused for the latter to present as his own witnesses. The rule is settled that the
adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful, (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld
is merely corroborative or cumulative, (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

The court, for its part, is not precluded from rendering a judgment of conviction based solely on the testimony of a single witness as long as such
testimony is found to be credible and satisfies the court that the accused is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The accused was seen not caught as he had escaped in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation. In such an operation, what is important is
the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused and that the same was presented as evidence in court. This Court has
consistently held in drug cases that absent any proof to the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty. In the instant
case, there exists no such contrary proof. Accused has not presented evidence of any ulterior motive that could have moved Ranulfo Espina to testify
against him. The rule is also settled that in the absence of evidence that would show why the prosecution witness would testify falsely, the logical
conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that such testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.


PEOPLE v. CASTANEDA

Crime: Robbery with rape
She was hanging the last bundle when she noticed, at a distance of five (5) meters, a person walking towards her house. She shouted. In no
time, the intruder grabbed private complainant, pulled back her hair with his left hand, and poked a knife at her neck with his right hand. He
demanded money. She told him there was none. He reiterated his demand and out of fear, private respondent indicated that her money was
inside the "aparador" in her house. The man forcibly dragged her to the house.
With the light of the three (3) lamps, she clearly saw the face of the man through the mirror of the "aparador's" upper portion. She handed
her money to him, two hundred pesos (P200.00) in all. The measly amount disappointed the man. He led her outside the house and at knife
 point, ordered her to pull down her pants. She refused and pleaded. The man responded by pressing harder the knife at her throat, and
ordering her to perform sexually perverted acts. After a while, the man was able to penetrate her womanhood.

She sought help from her neighbors + brgy officials. The barangay officials walked with private complainant to the police headquarters in Concepcion,
Tarlac. On their way, she saw a man wearing red shorts and white striped shirt passing in front of a lighted house near the boundary of barangays San
Jose and Sta. Maria. She recognized the man as the one who robbed and raped her. She pointed him to Mariano Apolinar. They confronted the man
who turned out to be accused-appellant. He was invited to the police station and clamped in jail.

During the hearing, Rodolfo David, a barangay tanod at Barangay Sta. Maria, was one of those who responded to the private respondent. He claimed
that private complainant told him that she could not identify the person who robbed and molested her. She described the criminal to be tall, thin, with
a tie around his head, and that the suspect belonged to the Llarves family.

TC: Guilty

Accused: his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that private complainant did not
immediately point to him as the culprit upon seeing him at the bridge dividing barangays San Jose and Sta. Maria. She let him passed by and it was only
as he was twenty (20) meters away, that she looked back at him and said, "It seems that is the person who raped me."
he was misidentified as barangay tanod David testified that the culprit was described by private complainant as tall, slim, and a Llarves.
Allegedly, this description was given in the presence of barangay officials who were not called as witnesses by the prosecution. He charges the
prosecution with suppression of evidence.

SC: Affirmed conviction

The contention cannot succeed. The rule on suppression of evidence cannot be invoked by accused-appellant where the same evidence is available to
him. In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have subpoenaed the barangay officials who allegedly heard the description of the culprit given by the
private complainant. These barangay officials were not under the control of private complainant, a lowly housewife in barangay Sta. Maria, Concepcion,
Tarlac. It is far fetched to accuse her and the prosecution of suppressing their testimonies.

Moreover, their testimonies could only be corroborative. In People v. Lorenzo, we held that the presumption laid down in Section 5(e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply when the testimony of the witness not produced
would only be corroborative.


PEOPLE v. SIMBULAN and SUGUI

The criminal prosecution in this case was initiated by an information, charging herein accused-appellants Irene D. Simbulan, alias "Nene," and Elvira S.
Sugui alias "Elvie," as conspirators in the sale and delivery of .17 gram of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, "shabu" in common parlance, which is a
regulated drug, 1 in violation or Section 21(b), Article IV, in relation to Section 15, Article III of RA 6425.

The 2 were arrested during a buy-bust operation.

TC: Guilty

Accused: failure of the prosecution to present the civilian informer was a fatal omission.

SC: disagree

The poseur-buyer, S/Sgt. Directo, who dealt directly with appellants in the purchase of the regulated drug was presented in the trial. Hence, the
testimony of the informer, if it were given, would at best be corroborative or cumulative. The rule is well settled that each party has the prerogative to
determine which witnesses to present and to dispense with the testimony of persons who will only give corroboration. The non-presentation of a mere
corroborative witness does not amount to suppression of evidence.

Moreover, if the defense believed that the testimony of the informer was important to their case, there was nothing to prevent them from compelling
the latter's presence and availing of his testimony in court by Compulsory process. The informer was known to the defense. It would have been simple
enough to have him produced by a subpoena for examination as a defense witness. This, appellants inexplicably failed or declined to do.

Also, appellants did not impute, much less prove, any ill motive on the part of the NARCOM agents that would impel them to involve appellants in a
serious criminal charge. There is nothing in the records of the case suggesting that the testimonies of the NARCOM agents were motivated by any
reason other than their mission to curb drug abuse. Hence, the prosecution's narration, of facts and identification of the accused-appellants should be
given weight.


PEOPLE v. BALLUDA

CAFGU received information about people passing by the area carrying huge quantities of marijuana. The CAFGU unit's Commanding Officer, First
Lieutenant Manuel de Vera, immediately ordered Camat and his companions to patrol the area.

Camat and his companions encountered appellant together with Maximo Baludda, Domingo Atebew and Ben Baristo carrying sacks on their backs. The
encounter with appellant and his companions took place in a forested area on the mountain of Sitio Dangdangla and it was noticed that the sacks they
were carrying were bulging. Camat halted them (appellant and his companions) and introduced themselves as CAFGUs. However, upon being told that
the CAFGU unit merely wanted to see what was in the sacks they were carrying, appellant and his companions ran away except for Maximo Baludda
who stayed behind. Although Ben Baristo and Domingo Atebew were able to elude arrest, appellant and Maximo Baludda were apprehended. The
sacks carried by appellant and his companions were opened and found to contain marijuana leaves.

TC: Guilty

Accused: he merely acceded to the request of Maximo Baludda, his uncle, to carry the sack without knowing that it contained marijuana.

SC: Affirmed conviction

Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership, are owned
by him. In U.S. vs. Bandoc, 10 the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The constitutional
presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on
the possessor of the dangerous drug to explain absence of animus possidendi.

In the case under consideration, it is not disputed that appellant was apprehended while carrying a sack containing marijuana. Consequently, to
warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was innocent and done without intent to possess, i.e. without knowledge that what he possessed was a
prohibited drug.

It is contrary to human experience that a man, 32 years of age, would readily agree to carry the load of his uncle, without even knowing the place
where to deliver such load, and without asking, while negotiating a forested area, how far is their destination and how long it would take them to reach
the place, especially so because when they were apprehended at around 5:00 in the afternoon, they had already been walking for around three (3)
hours. Indeed, the tale of appellant, too trite and hackneyed to be believed, does not suffice to overcome the prima facie evidence of appellants
awareness of his possession of prohibited drugs. Worse still for appellant is the undeniable fact that he and his companions, except Maximo Baludda,
fled towards different directions after the police authorities announced their presence. If appellant had nothing to do with the transporting of subject
prohibited drugs, or if he really had no knowledge that the sack he carried contained marijuana, there would have been no cause for him to flee. If he
had to run at all, it would have been more consistent with his protestation of innocence if he ran towards, and not away from, the police officers.
Obviously, what appellant did removed any shred of doubt over his guilt; exemplifying the biblical adage: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but
the righteous are as bold as a lion."



RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

PEOPLE v. HENRY SALVERON

Gloria de Felipe allegedly robbed and raped by Raul Salveron, Jesus Dalida, Mauricio Dumangas

Raul shot to death by a passenger who escaped and has not been arrested
Jesus killed in his house under mysterious circumstances
Mauricio luckier; he survived the intent to kill

Mauricio = the attackers were Rosibal (Glorias husband), Billones, Vito, etc.
Said attackers were later on charged with frustrated homicide

During the pendency of the f.homicide case, Rocibal was gunned down, and Henry Salveron (son of Raul) and Federico were charged of murder.

Prosecution presented:
(1) Victoriano Gregorio as its star witness.
Accdg to Gregorio he heard gunshots + saw Henry (at the bridge with a long firearm after talking to Rocibal)
(2) Capt. Nicanorito Gomez police commander; the 2 accused went willingly with them to the HQ after being found + the 2 accused were tested
positive (paraffin test)

Defense pleaded alibi:
Henry was fetched by his uncle to work in his farm + went hunting w/ .22 caliber rifle
While resting at his uncles house, he was picked up by the authority and was taken to the HQ

RTC: Henry guilty (acquitted Federico lack of conspiracy)

DEFENSE: TC erred in assuming that he had a motive in killing Rosibal de Felipe; that he fled to Anilao after the killing; and that the nitrate burns
pointed to his guilt.

SC: Guilty
Salveron misses the point completely. The assumptions he protests are merely corroborative of the principal evidence of the prosecution,
which is the testimony of Gregorio. (Henry was positively idenitified by Gregorio)
The nitrate burns on Salveron's hands only affirmed that conclusion. The claim that he had gone hunting was too pat for the trial judge,
who understandably felt that the story had been concocted to explain the nitrate burns.
o The paraffin test did not violate the appellant's right against self-incrimination as it involved only an examination of a part of his
body.
o [T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. (Justice
Holmes)
The record shows that the uncle did not really need his nephew because he had from six to ten hired laborers who were then helping him.
Vengeance may take its time aborning; four years may not be long enough to appease the vengeful heart. In any event, we have repeatedly
held that proof of motive is not essential where the culprit has been positively identified, as in the case at bar.
The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the information was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution -
because his sworn statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was merely copied when the information was prepared
by the provincial prosecutor.
o The prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a
criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he entitled to
know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if such
right be granted to an accused for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the
accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.


ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITNESS

BACHRACH v. CIR and RURAL TRANSIT EE ASSOCIATION

Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations
for compulsory arbitration.

CIR immediately issued an order by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose.

While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service" alleged
violation of the Motor vehicle law

Answer & Counter-Petition filed in behalf of Jacob by the EE association due to mechanical defect, which is beyond the control of the driver.

While the labor dispute is pending, petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and various
documents.
After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the
witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad.

EEs associated filed a motion praying that the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records.

CIR dismissed the companys petition.

Company argued CIR erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the
record, notwithstanding the fact that the service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted by it.

SC: CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to
prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that
he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross- examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the
direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings
before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due process.
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross- examined by the adverse
party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot
be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the
accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties
in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such
 cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to
form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case.

In the case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was
ready and available for cross-examination. Motions for postponement of the cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel from time
to time until one day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross-examination having been accomplished. On motion of the
respondents the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record. On a petition for certiorari by Savory
Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own actuations, respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and
thereupon lost their right to cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant through his own conduct.

Here, petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to Identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but
it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that
he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was
the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on
the matters written on Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom they were being
presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin,
the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of the
documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences.


PEOPLE v. PADERO

Crime: RAPE
Victim: Jocelyn Cadelia, a 16 yr old lass

TC: convicted
gave full faith and credit to the version of the complainant who it said testified "with sincerity, honesty and andidness, and with answers
direct to the point, in a logical and straightforward manner, and free from inconsistencies
characterized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as "laden with inconsistencies" and described their manner of testifying as "clearly
wanting of candor, honesty, and elements of straightforward manner of delivery" and "fraught with hesitations.

The accused:
1. admits having carnal knowledge of the complainant not only on the date alleged in the information but for (15) more times thereafter but
maintains that he and the complainant are lovers and that the complainant voluntarily had sex with him.
2. maintains that an analysis of the complainants testimony discloses other signs of the absence of force or intimidation: she manifested no
form of resistance; she made no outcry at the start of the sexual assault nor did she plead with the accused; she shed not a single drop of tear
at her defloration; and after the sexual act, instead of crying or cursing the accused for his dastardly act, she nonchalantly sat down with the
accused.
3. points out that although the alleged rape took place on 31 August 1991, it was only about three months later, upon learning that she was
pregnant, that the complainant revealed the alleged rape to her mother; her explanation for the delay that the accused threatened to kill
her if she reported the incident is unacceptable because the threat, if any, was not continuing.

SC: Acquitted

In rape cases, the complainants testimony should not be received with precipitate credulity, especially when the conviction depends at any vital point
upon her uncorroborated testimony; it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. Such testimony must be
impeccable and ring true throughout, or credible and positive.

The core issue here is whether the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant through the use of force or intimidation, or whether the
complainant willingly consented to the sexual intercourse.

Despite the positive testimony of the accused which squarely traversed the complainants version of force or intimidation by stating that he and the
complainant had an intimate relationship, with the latter as the more aggressive partner, and that their first sexual encounter was followed by fifteen
more encounters at the same place during weekends when the complainant was alone, all of which were new facts, the complainant was never
recalled to the witness stand to rebut these obviously damaging revelations of the accused. The prosecution was simply contented with the
presentation of Clara Cadelia, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadelia to rebut some less important, if not minor or trivial, matters brought out in
the testimonies of Loreta Samane and Macrina Padero. Why the complainant herself was not made to rebut the damaging evidence against her is
beyond us. After the second rebuttal witness, Rev. Felecio, had finished his testimony, the prosecutor simply announced to the court that the last
rebuttal witness would be Damiana Cadelia.

The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary. Its office is "to meet the new facts put in by
the opponent in his case in reply" and is "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because,
on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponents witnesses
have been offered." 26 While the presentation of rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action, 27 in the instant case, the
overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the complainants version made it imperative for the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial
matters brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story.

For another, we find enough evidence of the intimate relationship between the complainant and the accused. On cross-examination, she admitted that
the accused used to sleep in the unit of the house which she rented from his mother.

In one salient portion of the cross-examination, we find her totally submissive in the face of the assault against her most prized possession and
unusually observant of the preparatory acts of the accused and his eventual physiological and emotional transformation in fulfilled libido.

From then on she was silent about the knife. Although she distinctly remembered that the accused did not stand up immediately after the sexual act,
that thereafter both of them sat down for a while, and that later the accused went down to the ground floor to sleep, she did not mention anything
more about the knife.