Professional Documents
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169
MANFRED S. FRINGS
LIFETIME
Editorial Board:
Director: R. Bernet (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) Secretary: J. Taminiaux (Centre
d'etudes phenomenologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) Members: S. IJsseling (Husserl-
Archief, Leuven), H. Leonardy (Centre d'etudes phenomenologiques, Louvain-la-
Neuve), U. Melle (Husserl-Archief, Leuven), B. Stevens (Centre d'etudes pheno-
menologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve)
Advisory Board:
R. Bernasconi (Memphis State University), D. Carr (Emory University, Atlanta),
E.S. Casey (State University of New York at Stony Brook), R. Cobb-Stevens
(Boston College), J.F. Courtine (Archives-Husser!, Paris), F. Dastur (Universite de
Nice), K. Dusing (Husserl-Archiv, Koln), J. Hart (Indiana University, Bloomington),
K. Held (Bergische Universitat Wuppertal), K.E. Kaehler (Husserl-Archiv, Koln),
D. Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv, Koln), W.R. McKenna (Miami University, Oxford,
USA), J.N. Mohanty (Temple University, Philadelphia), E.W. Orth (Universitlit Trier),
P. Ricreur (Paris), K. Schuhmannt (University of Utrecht), C. Sini (Universita degli
Studi di Milano), R. Sokolowski (Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.),
B. Waldenfels (Ruhr-Universitlit, Bochum)
LIFETIME
MAX SCHELER'S PHILOSOPHY OF TIME
A First Inquiry and Presentation
by
MANFRED S. FRINGS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
CHAPTER I
4. Society ............................................................................... 57
a. The Argument against Society as a Social Form of
Mental Values ................................................................ 59
b. The Argument for Society as a Social Form of
Mental Values ................................................................ 59
5. The Encompassing Person ................................................. 61
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
INDEX
1 The distinction made in Formalism between a lived body (Leib) and an object bo-
dy (Korper) (II 461 IF 466) was elaborated on later by Merleau-Ponty who was at
least aware of Scheler's Formalism. Whether M. Merleau-Ponty borrowed the dis-
tinction from Scheler, we do not know. Concerning a more recent, detailed compa-
rison between the two thinkers, see: Christian Bermes: "Geist und Leib.
Phiinomenologie der Person bei Scheler und Merleau-Ponty." In: Person und Wert.
Schelers "Formalismus" - Perspektiven und Wirkungen. Christian Bermes,
Wolfhart Henckmann, Heinz Leonardy (Eds.), Mlinchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 2000
(p.l39-l6l ).
VALUES AND TIME 3
kind of food. No matter what such individual cases tell us, Scheler
pointedly stated that animals and human life are ultimately "fated" by
experiences of sensible comfort or discomfort.
c) There is also already in this lowest rank of values a char-
acter that suffuses all other value ranks. It is impossible that an organ-
ism or the lived body itself could prefer discomfort over the positive
value of comfort. An organism does not prefer pain and aching over
having no pain and aching. The lived body's factual preferring the
physical well-being of its local organs over local pain in the lived
body is no result, however, of the person's will this to be the case.
Rather, the preference lies in the feelings themselves that, hori-
zontally, bespeak this preference in this value rank. Said sensible
value preference is prior to acts of the will and of judgments and, as
we shall see, it is also valid in the nature of the vertical structure of
value ranks. Also the heights and levels of the value ranks are
independent of judgment and willing. Furthermore, the verticality of
the rungs of the ladder of value ranks, as it were, will show us also
that each rung has its own temporality.
This does not mean that willing and making judgments play
no role at all in this matter. Indeed, lower values let themselves be
handled willfully much more than the values of all the higher ranks.
Higher values are immune, so to speak, to be handled willfully. One
can will to have one's tooth-ache cured, but one cannot will to treat
the value of holiness in such a fashion. In addition, the lower values
are manageable by all kinds of devices, for instance, by those used in
medical treatment and cosmetic techniques. The manageability of
sensible feelings and values betrays yet another character: Sensible
values are divisible values because they are felt in specific extended
areas in and on the lived body. Their manageability, divisibility, and
the role of the will, are variable factors. These characters diminish to
a point zero during the series of steps we now take by ascending
toward the higher value ranks. And while we take these steps, we will
also see that there is an increasing temporality up to the higher and
highest value ranks.
Concerning the factor of time in the lowest rank of sensible
values, the following holds: Objective measurable time is manifested
in the human body when the body is taken as an object. Birthdays are
a case in point.
On the other hand, our bodies are also experienced as lived
bodies characterized by a constant duration of the feeling of life in
4 LIFETIME
them. Hence, the lived body is also imbued with the feelings of life-
values that we will discuss below. The lived body and the constant
feeling of it spans the uninterrupted time between one's birth and
death upon which we, more often than not, can take a look at, and
make observations of them as objects. The nature of this "lived" time
will be explored in Chapter II.
Let us add a cultural point to the experience of sensible values
of the pleasant and unpleasant in our own times. The consideration
pertains to Scheler's claim that modem human beings are losing the
sense of shame. He calls this "the decline of the feeling of shame in
modem times" (X 131 I PV 69). There is no question that the modem
cultivation of the object body as in sports activities, in cosmetics, etc,
takes the body as an objectified thing. Modem society's tendency to
objectively cultivate sensible feelings of comfort and good-looking
body expressions among others contribute to a reduction of possible
shame experiences of the self-value of the individual person. The
decrease of shame is a result of a myriad of productions of things and
gadgets designed to attain whatever physical satisfaction in the object
body. Among them are chemical and technical devices for arousing
the sexual drive, or temporary comfort attained by excessive drinking,
eating, and smoking. These and other factors in society bring with
them a general "degeneration" of the self-value of the individual
person in the presence of overwhelming needs of the object body that
are in conflict with the personal self-value of relevant individuals.
The disharmony between these two poles becomes numbed, and with
it, the value of the self, which would make it impossible to be
ashamed of unorthodox bodily practices. Said degeneration consists
in an increasing loss of the experience of the personal self-value in
favor of increasing attention to bodily needs and interests.
2. Pragmatic Values
Pragmatic values, for which Scheler also uses the term "values of
usefulness," are those values whose intrinsic meaning is to be useful,
or not useful (nutzlich, nutzlos), for something. In the main, these
values occur with the use of things and tools.
Already the ancient Greeks called things "pragmata" from
which such words as "pragmatic" and "practice" are derived. Still, the
meaning of usefulness can also play a role in a mentality, among
VALUES AND TIME 5
3I have tried to explain the value of at-handedness in Heidegger and Scheler in:
Person und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins. Den Haag: Martinus
Nijhoff(Phaenomenologica 32), 1969, # 9 and# 10.
8 LIFETIME
All things that are sought for their potentially sensible and
sensuous enjoyment are looked for in objective time. In this search,
time is not filled with personal enjoyment but with a lack of it. For,
the very antagonist of enjoyment is the will to "strive" for enjoy-
ment. Enjoyment and happiness set in only when we do not seek the
VALUES AND TIME 9
3. Life-Values
The values of life suffuse the whole of live nature and all individual
organisms. This rank spans the values of "noble" and of "common"
(edel, gemein). 4
Life-values do not occur in the locally sensible areas of the
body as was the case with the first rank of sensible values. Hence,
life-values are not localizable but are clearly feelable in the whole of
the lived body as, for instance, health, fatigue, illness, exhaustion,
decline of the body's energy, aging and oncoming death, of growing
pains, and of youth. Again, we share these values also with animals.
In addition, we do not experience life-values only in ourselves, but
also experience them in the perception of other live objects. The
positive life-values of nobleness and of nobility may address us in
looking at an old, majestic and fully grown oak tree, in looking at a
well grown horse, in seeing an eagle in flight; nobleness may be
4 The German word "gemein" is translated here as "common," rather than as the
more usual translations of it as "ignoble" or "bad," which I have also used in the
past. The word "common," however, also shares with the German "gemein" the
sense of "commonplace" or sometimes the sense of "inferior" implicit in Scheler's
intention when using the term.
10 LIFETIME
In general, both the values ofthe mind (geistige Werte) and the values
of the holy are fundamentally different from the preceding three value
ranks. They are not relative to life and constitute entirely new ranks.
These values bear upon the human person only.
The temporal character of the values of the mind is to be seen
in their capacity to last for generations and ages, while the goods they
pertain to, such as cultures, can change or even disappear. Scheler's
occasional references to time in Formalism are phenomenological
ones. Among them are the references to what he called the absolute
character of time. We wish to keep in mind here that the mental
values are "able-to-exist-through-time," no matter how long their
bearers may live. Hence all values that are not relative to life are
values of duration, or enduring values. This duration has no relation
to the succession of points or of events in objective time, and is a
qualitative and absolute phenomenon of time. The duration is "filled"
with the contents of the mental or sacred values. It is precisely such
contents that determine the "higher" and "lower" ranks among values
as they are described in the section on "Formalism and Apriorism" in
Formalism.
There are three kinds of mental values to be distinguished:
5 During my thirty years of reading Scheler's manuscripts, I never came across any
racial or ethnic bias. Faschism and Marxism known already at his time for said
selective politics, were publicly denounced by Scheler in a speech delivered in
Berlin early 1927 (XII 95 I ID [1976] 164).
VALUES AND TIME 13
2. Feeling
It follows from what has been explained that a feeling is an act which
is correlated to a particular intentional referent called a value, as the
thinking acts are correlated to concepts, and volitional acts to pro-
jects.
Scheler appears to be the only phenomenologist of his time to
emphasize that acts of feeling precede all other acts, including acts of
an intellectual comprehension of "what" something is; and feelings
even precede sense perceptions in terms of what literally translates in
English as "value-ception" (Wertnehmung), and we are, indeed, told:
"Value-ception always precedes perception" (VIII 109-1 0 I PR 116).
From this follows that value-ception precedes also "die Vorstellung,"
i.e., representation (II 209 I F 201 ). Indeed, feelings and their value-
referents are part of the bottom of consciousness.
Again, looking at the works of the twentieth century thinkers
mentioned earlier, Scheler is furthermore distinguished from them by
making only a few references to the philosophy of Descartes ( 1596-
1650). Instead, he considered Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) of more
importance, at least in his non-formal ethics. He rejected Descartes'
dictum, cogito ergo sum as an ultimate and undeniable truth, because
it has a foundation in the first principle of metaphysics, namely, that
"there is something rather than nothing."
Why is the mathematician-philosopher Pascal so important for
an ethics of a priori contents of values and their ranks? It is because
Pascal saw that the reason's ordering, logic, and mathematics is
substantially different from the ordre, logique, or mathematique du
coeur (362 I PE 117). For instance, in the logic of reason n + n = 2n.
But in the logic of the heart this does not hold, because two values of
two positive moral deeds do not double the value of the person by a
multiplication by two of these values. After having done two good
deeds, the value of the person remains the same value of that person. 7
Hence, one good deed plus another does not add up or increase
goodness. I mentioned elsewhere that the syntax of the logic of the
heart appears to be analogous to G. Cantor's (1845-1918) transfinite
numbers among which traditional addition, multiplication, etc. do not
7 Fr.v.Brentano argues that values are subject to addition and substraction (II I 04 I
F87). Alois Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Den Haag: 1960
(Phaenomenologica, 7).
VALUES AND TIME 21
hold. If one adds the infinite series of all odd numbers, (1), 3, 5, 7,
9 ... n to the infinite series of all odd numbers plus all even numbers
( 1), 2, 3, 4, 5 ... n, the infinity of just all odd numbers remains the
same as the infinity of the odd plus the even numbers. Or, n + n = n.
The reason for this is that each number of one series can be paired off
with each number of the other series.
Pascal expressed the incongruence between the logic of reason
and that of the heart by his famous saying, "the heart has reasons of
its own" (le coeur a ses raisons). It is this point of the distinction to
be made between reason and the heart that Scheler explicitly "takes
up" with regard to value-ethics (II 261/ F 255).
Since Scheler's acceptance of Pascal's standpoint has been
sufficiently treated in secondary literature, we have decided here to
formulate the result of Scheler's extension of it in terms of his own
phenomenological explication.
There is an order of foundation in the emotive spheres of our
lives: (1) All feelings have a foundation in the acts of "preferring"
(vorziehen) or in the acts of placing higher values under lower ones
(nachsetzen); and (2) acts of preferring and placing-under have their
foundation in love and hate. Within this order of foundation some
principles should be mentioned for the purposes in our context.
To feel (juhlen) is an act to be distinguished from "a" feeling
(das Gefiihl). A feeling is expressed in terms of a noun or a gerund. It
stands for a state of feeling, a "feeling-state." Thus, a person may be
in a continuous feeling-state of suffering from something. But he or
she can feel suffering in different ways, e.g., as tolerating it, enduring
it, resigning to it, willfully resisting it, accepting it, or enjoying it as
in pathological cases. In each of these, the acts of feeling the feeling-
state of suffering vary, depending on the type of act through which
the feeling-state is felt. This shows that there are genuine emotive
intentionalities of "to feel" a particular feeling-state. The latter is a
content, in this case the content of "suffering;" the former can have
various forms of intending the content with an act. Variations of acts
directed to contents are common in consciousness. Let it be added
that Husserl refers to the act-side of consciousness with the Greek
word "noesis," and hence speaks of "noetic" variations that a content
can undergo; and he called a content of consciousness a "noema," and
speaks also of "noematic" variations in consciousness. The
relevance, however, of the mutual act-content relation in pre-rational
22 LIFETIME
3. Preferring
8 In German the use of the words "good" or "goods" is more common than it is in
English. Collective goods are mostly cultural goods, such as education,
government, art, laws, or all of them taken together as a unit. The opposite of
"goods" are "ills" that are sometimes related to nature, as earthquakes, hurricanes,
drought, floods, but also desease, suffering, and there are many other human
afflictions and misfortunes that belong to ills.
VALUES AND TIME 23
(a) When one speaks of good and evil as not existing, one
immediately recalls Nietzsche's confidence in the impending Over-
Man who is "beyond" good and evil. In the future, all absolutes of the
28 LIFETIME
past, including truth, will collapse. All absolutes of the past, including
good and evil, were nothing but perspectival and erroneous interpre-
tations of what is. The Over-Humanity will smash all absolutes and
will live "beyond good and evil" and beyond truth, God, and Satan.
(b) Over against Nietzsche's image, we find theories holding
that evil does exist, at least in human beings. In the Old Testament
evil has entered in the world by way of disobedience. Furthermore,
Dante's Inferno; Milton's Paradise Lost, Shakespeare's Macbeth,
Goethe's Faust, and in Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, evil exists as a
human category, and the possibility to do evil is inherent in the
human soul. Perhaps Dostoevski was most articulate in describing
evil as embedded in the humans soul when we read in his Diary of a
Writer (1876-1880):
In the recent past, good and evil have much been watered
down by substituting them with the legal concepts of what is "right"
or "wrong." In this more pragmatic and societal treatment of evil, it is
presupposed that the law is the foundation of ethics, or that ethics is at
least in part dependent on the law. Such a judgmental treatment,
especially of an evil as founded on what is wrong leads to a softening
of our experience of evil. A case in point may be the assessment of
some evil as banal, as "banality of evil," an expression used in the
subtitle of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). The
confusion between evil and wrong, good and right, might also be the
result of the "despair" of modem humans, that we will analyze later,
in that the dwindling of faith in God makes them incapable to
confront evil.
(c) Evil is expressed in human or semi-human personifications
and various forms of embodiment. Examples include those of Satan as
VALUES AND TIME 29
a humanized animal with a club foot, or the leper whose skin was
believed to be expressive of evil located in his body as an embodied
evil, he was buried alive or an outcast till death.
(d) In Ricoeur's Symbolism of Evil, symbolic surfaces of evil
are guilt, sin, wandering, decline, fall, blindness, and a servile will.
Animals symbolizing evil have long been seen in the dragon, a shiny
green snake, the unicorn, the pig's snout, or in a whale (Melville).
(e) It was probably Nicolai A. Berdyaev (1874-1941) whose
ontological vision of evil, developed on the background of the philo-
sophy of F.W.J. Schelling and J. Boehme's idea of the "un-ground,"
is the most challenging of all: Evil, Berdyaev endeavors to show,
stems from freedom. That is, it stems from the "freedom to do evil."
As uncreated and indeterminate non-being, freedom is also a
condition for God's creation. God presupposes the tragedy of the
freedom in the creation of evil, and in man's freedom to do evil. 10
11 For instance, The Lord's prayer, "Our Father Who art in Heaven ... " ends in
English with " ... but deliver us from evil [vom Bosen] whereas in German it ends
with "vom Uebel" [from ills], a difference in the two languages that is likely the
result of the only Latin word "malum" meaning both.
VALUES AND TIME 31
Let us first say what good and evil are not. While the moral
good is not originally correlated to acts of consciousness, evil can be
correlated to an act of willing. Good and evil by themselves are no
feelings, nor are they objects of perception. But the question is not
what good and evil are, but how they are and come into existence. It is
in this regard that Scheler's proposition is related to time in what we
referred to as a unique phenomenological breakthrough in pinpointing
the essence of good and evil.
Let us focus on the value of a moral good. The answer to the
question of how it comes into existence lies in the leaning toward the
non-moral values and their ranks. Whenever a human being leans
toward a higher value rank and whenever he or she realizes a higher
value in that rank, the act of realizing the higher non-moral value
makes the moral good come forth "on the back" of this realizing act.
Or, it rides, so to speak, on the back of the act of realizing a positive
non-moral value. In theory, many acts can realize values higher than
those given to us at any moment. Also an act of willing can and does
do this. In sharp contrast, however, to such cases, the moral value
"good" is not intended in the realizations of the higher non-moral
value. What is intended is the higher non-moral value and its rank (II
48 IF 27):
12For variant views of the above see Philip Blosser, "Six Questions Concerning
Scheler's Ethics." The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33: 211-225, 1999.
VALUES AND TIME 33
1. The Mass
The lowest social form humans can enter is that of the mass. Its main
inter-subjective experience lies in "psychic contagion."
During its short duration, the formation of a mass occurs
during protests, during the excesses of enthusiasm as in sports, during
rock concerts, during massive riots, revolts, or demonstrations. People
are glued together, as it were, in psychic contagion and begin, in
extreme cases, to temporarily lose their individuality in it. A human
mass of people resembles that of a herd of animals, as wild horses
and bulls running around aimlessly, say, when they are imbued with
fear, or like flocks of birds that all of a sudden take off and fly away
without obvious reason, but with psychic infection that suffuses them
while following their alpha bird(s).
What is most particular in the psychic contagion occurring
among humans is said temporary loss of personal identity which is
absorbed by the contagion. In extremely wild and ferocious cases,
individuals can even be trampled to death without rhyme or reason,
without sympathy or care. While people are running wildly and aim-
lessly, a fellow feeling for others disappears among them for the time
the accumulation of the mass lasts. For, the psychic contagion disint-
VALUES AND TIME 35
their goals, and knowing of each other. To each other, they remain
anonymous. Fifthly, the psychic contagion, nevertheless, glues them
together no matter how alien they were to each other before and
during the contagion. Finally, during periods of growing populations,
one can expect formations of masses and psychic contagion to be on
the increase. Since a mass is only short-lived, its relation to time is, in
the eyes of its outside beholders, measurable and objective time.
2. Utility Cooperatives
15 A few quotes from Scheler's critique of Being and Time may suffice to catch
Protestant-Puritan ethics turned man's occupations into the vocation of work that
would reveal one's positive predestination, and which was, in tum, responsible for
the ensuing "spirit" of capitalism.
The foregoing quotes from Scheler's Heidegger critique must be seen also
in light of Scheler's 1926 treatise "Cognition and Work" (Erkenntnis und Arbeit)
(VIII 191-382). On the first pages of the treatise, we read that a "pathos ofworR' is
spreading over the world, which pathos began when Europe distanced itself from
the Christian tradition and from the Antiquity. This pathos of work, says Scheler,
was pointedly articulated in the Comunist Manifesto (1848) proclaiming work to be
the sole creator of education and of culture (Bildung). And Scheler goes on to say
that Pragmatism is an excellent example of man's present self-understanding based
on the phenomenon of work. This self-understanding posed the alternative of
whether man is a rational being or a tool-man (homo faber).
I undertook to focus on the German work-mania of the twenties when Hei-
degger wrote Being and Time, in part 3 of my paper, "Is there Room for Evil in
Heidegger's Thought or Not" (Philosophy Today, Spring, 1988). It is quite obvious
that during the thirties and fourties of the past century, this work-mania played right
into the hands of Hitler's various schemes of firing up psychic contagion among the
masses, captivating them by such slogans as "Arbeit macht frei," (also used by
Stalin) and "Arbeit und Brot" when unemployment in Germany was reaching its
peak.
40 LIFETIME
3. The Life-Community
members share in fellow-feelings for and with each other that hold
them together in a lasting, solidary unit. For this reason, we say there
are "members" (die Mitglieder) living in a life-community, rather
than separated "individuals." As such, the members constitute more
of an organismic role they have in their community in which they
share in an uninterrupted, inter-subjective stream of experience with
the other members. This close-knit and mutual experience has, in
contrast to the individuals living in a society, laws of its own (II 515-
16 IF 526-7). For instance, there is a pecking order among elders and
other members that make them unequal. This order is not chosen, but
an order into which members are born and which they freely accept.
We should now furnish some examples concerning the genesis
of various streams of experience of time that humans have with one
another. In doing so, we take yet another look at the mass and the
utility cooperative to distinguish them from the life-community.
(1) As Scheler showed in The Nature of Sympathy, Part 3,
during infancy there is a neutral, inter-subjective stream of experience
in which experience the "mine" and "thine," the "I" and "thou," are
not yet distinguished. The infant has no experience yet of another as
a "different" thou (Latin, infans: not speaking).
This stream of co-experience resembles that of the social form
of a mass where, as we said, the "I" is not distinguished from another
"thou" either. Just as in the case of the infant, the indistinction
between I and thou is not produced by the infant who is not yet
endowed with a will either, so also the absence between "I" and the
"thou" in a mass is not produced, precisely because the individual
will-power is suspended by the force of the psychic contagion.
(2) In utility cooperatives, people are given to each other
through work and tasks. Exceptions granted, they cooperate under the
auspices of work and tasks that are to be accomplished. Whereas in a
mass experience there is temporarily no inter-personal experience at
all, individuals of utility cooperatives do share a low level of inter-
personal experience, yet this experience with others does not reach
intimate spheres of the persons involved as it does, on the other hand,
in the existential level of solidarity among the members of a life-
community. Nor does the inter-personal experience of utility coop-
eratives reach into the core of persons as it can and does in religious
communal experiences. The individuals who temporarily live in the
cooperatives are not united in solidarity as all the members of life-
communities are, unless a kind of solidarity among them is politically
VALUES AND TIME 45
expectations. The strong ties with tradition, and the continued absence
of something overwhelmingly new, makes the community, especially
in remote rural areas, look like having an unchanging, enduring and
conservative mind-set. The future is here replete with anticipations
linked to cyclic events of recurrences of feasts, of births, or of deaths.
In a life-community, anticipations are experienced in the lived present
tethered to past traditions. The future has no semblance to a box, as it
were, "into" which humans would make plans that are organized by
dates and periods of time, as is the case in society.
Concerning the philosophy of time in general, it is noteworthy
that both tradition and anticipation have a peculiar direction of the
time experienced in life-communities. The experience of the future is
not only linked to both an ancestral past and to the care, protection,
and preservation of future generations. Time-consciousness of the
future is not experienced in an open time-window through which the
members look into the future; rather, in their time-consciousness, the
future runs backward onto their lived present that itself is tethered to
the past, which simultaneously runs forward from behind into the
selfsame lived present. Past and future meet in an inverted duration of
the present. And so meet the contents and values. The contents keep
filling out all of the lived present from both directions. 16 Especially
time experiences among tribes are hardly successive or progressive.
The experience of time is inverted.
Let the graphic below illustrate the life-communal experience
of time as described here:
16 Life-communal time can be much more complex than we describe it here. See
Alfonso Ortiz, The Tewa World. Space, Time, Being & Becoming in a Pueblo
Society, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. See also M. S. Frings,
"Time Structure in Social Communality." In Philosophy and Science in Phenome-
nological Perspective. Kah Kyung Cho, (Ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984,
pp. 85-93; and the same author's "Zur Soziologie der Zeiterfahrung bei Max
Scheler. Mit einem Ruckblick auf Heraklit," Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Gorres-
Gesellschaft, 1984, pp. 118-130.
48 LIFETIME
in the duration of their present, and will also know that history is their
"tradition," and that the future is not a frame of time into which
members plan, make projections and intend to improve things and
states of affairs. The inverted time flows from the past to the present
and from the future back onto the same present where the flows of
time appear to come also to a standstill. This present reminds one
immediately of Parmenides, who lived in a Sicilian community, and
for whom there was "presence" only, saying that both past and future
are sensory illusions and deceptions of so-called changing things in a
changing time. The present as duration also reminds one of the Hopi
language that is devoid of past and future tenses.
The inverted flow of time is diametrically opposite to the
experience of time in society for which the experience of time is one
of successive time-points measurable with clocks and linked with
objective events. In society, the past resembles an irretrievable box
that contains countless events kept in recollection and studied in
general history. Both the past and the future are experienced "from"
the present, not "in" the present. This direction of societal time is one-
dimensional which is illustrated by the direction of the arrows in this
graphic:
There is, however, one point that sets Scheler even more off
from Husserl and Heidegger. It pertains to an argument that appears
to have been unnoticed in Husserl and Heidegger research.
There is a sociological factor that always plays a role in the
natural world-view. With Husserl, the life-world is unchanging and
reflected in a constant mode of consciousness; this constancy pertains
also to Heidegger's everydayness of Dasein. In this, Husserl and Hei-
degger presuppose that there is at all times one and the same structure
in the life-world and in everydayness. Scheler lets us know, however,
that such an unchangeable natural world-view requires the difficult
task of "peeling off' all the different traditions in it while keeping the
natural life-world constant (VI 15). He rejects explicitly the notion
that a constant world-view could at all times and for all people be
valid (VIII 61 ). In other words, Scheler does not allow the dynamics
of history and culture, even less the changing forms of ethos and
moralities be stripped from the natural world-view. Therefore, the
natural world-view must be relative to certain phenomena.
We made reference earlier to the "thou-1 relation," as the fun-
damental existential category of human thinking (VIII 57 I PR 71 ).
This makes the natural world-view sociologically relegated to variant
smaller and larger groups constituted by the thou-1 relation. Since
groups vary in kind, the natural world-view must be "relative" to each
of them. There can only be "relative" natural world-views. Or, natural
world-views are relative to sociologically different kinds of groups
and their times. The ever changing sociological factors are, from a
Schelerian view-point, missing in both Husserl and Heidegger. A
uniform natural view of the world appears to be, for this reason, an
abstraction, because phenomenological reduction has gone too far.
Scheler defines the relative natural world-view as follows.
Everything in it is taken for granted or "given without question" (VIII
61 I PR 74). This "given without question," i.e., without any need of
objective inquiry, is, however, different among the sociologically
different groups. For instance, high and low tides are experienced
"without question" by groups that live near an ocean; but this does
not necessarily hold for groups that live far away from an ocean, or
for groups that never saw one. Sunrise and sunset happen "without
question," but not so in every group. For both sunrise and sunset can
be experienced as a religious happening, as it was with ancient Maya
Indians for whom each dawn was, "without question" a dawn of a
new god and each sunset its disappearing. Such and other experiences
50 LIFETIME
being falsely felt as higher values than mental or even the religious
values. Present-day concerns about the environment, about clean
water and air, about the preservation of forests and atomic waste
management, about smoking, diet, and - we emphasize - about badly
needed international animal rights and firm legal action to protect
them-, the concerns about longevity, and more, are symptomatic for
an environment-conscious society as the one we live in. And equally
important are the concerns about life-values pertinent to health, about
cancer and the spreading of the HIV virus and other spreading fatal
diseases. A colossal medical industry based on modem technological
progress conjoined with admirable skills of physicians, are rapidly
producing new remedies for preserving and enhancing just about any
life-value ofthe human body.
In our context we wish to concern ourselves with one type of
life-values whose excessive cultivation, however, is quite obvious:
athletics and sports.
In the above analyses of utility and vital values the reader will
have noticed a difference between the lowest ranks of sensible and
utility values. Utility values can, as we saw, penetrate into all other
value ranks whereas sensible values do not. Life values, however,
also penetrate into other value ranks. For example, the preservation of
life-values may be of assistance to the production of useful things;
life-values may penetrate into mental values of art, justice, and the
cognition of truth; and they can even penetrate the value rank of the
holy. 17 The point of the spread of life-values throughout all value
ranks may also pertain to an exaggeration of their importance. This
appears to be the case when they are more than necessary practiced in
physical sports.
Often unnoticed excesses of the practice of athletics is so
rampant, however, that it has begun to affect the age-old tradition to
cultivate the mind, and not the body, first. Excessive sports activities
17 Briefly, the values of life are, for instance, represented in paintings, they can be
set to music (Beethoven's Eroica and Pastoral), and they play foremost roles in
literature, in dramas, and novels. Concerning the mental value of justice, life values
are a central issue in ongoing debates on capital punishment; the mental value of
cognition allows an exploration of the distinction to be made between live and
inanimate objects; and sacred values can pertain to gods of health, of the unborn
(Artemis) in mythology; they pertain to Zeus turning into an animal, or to using the
life-values of blood and bread in the Eucharist, water in baptism.
52 LIFETIME
18 In the following we make a distinction between "spirit" and "mind" for both of
which Scheler uses Geist. We will use mind when it refers to humans. The human
mind exists only in the form of "person" (II 389 I F 389 [sic]). We will refer to
"spirit" as that metaphysical principle which is the opposite of "impulsion," and
which spirit is said to be "impotent" or powerless without being tethered to impul-
sion, drives, and the sociologically realizing factors. (Scheler also uses "spirit" for
the sum total of human acts of consciousness, but this does not concern us here).
54 LIFETIME
said to have started in Elizabethan times when children kicked skulls down the
streets before something like a soccer ball was invented.
20 It is unfortunate that among the sixteen industrialized nations this obsession is so
rampant in American schools. Not infrequently it begins with excessive drilling of
children in little leagues, mostly unheard of abroad. In our schools, the desire for
athletic competition and of winning seems, by comparison, to be at the expense not
only of the three R's, but also of learning critical thinking, geography, history,
classical literature that, in contrast to sports and computer studies, provides students
with a moral compass, with a foreign language and, not least, with mathematics.
Excesses in sports competition may well be one reason why our high school grad-
uates, exceptions granted, rank in terms of knowledge, especially of the humanities,
last among high school graduates of the rest of industrialized nations.
56 LIFETIME
the human organism into the cortex of the brain. Its reversal, "retro-
sublimation," is an equally lopsided diversion of vital energy from the
cortex into the organism.
In this connection the term "vital energy" that we used several
times earlier must now be clarified. Vital energy is in all living
beings. It must be distinguished from physical energy and its forms of
heat, electrical, and kinetic motion energy, etc. Whereas the forms of
physical energy are measurable in time, vital energy is not. For this
reason, vital energy cannot be an object of the natural sciences. Vital
energy is that force behind the growth and development of an organ-
ism that feeds and sets into motion such growth and development
from the embryo on to all movements of organs and of the lived body
as a whole. It occurs in molecules, plants, animals, and in humans. It
also feeds all non-voluntary organic movements as heart beats and
those of the bowel track. Furthermore, it is distinguished from phy-
sical energy in that it reaches exhaustion in individual organisms by
itself. An organism ages and dies quickly, but not so the physical
energy of inanimate entities which keeps changing into the energy of
heat (second thermodynamic law). Inanimate matter does not "die."
Thus, the vital energy is also a driving force behind an organism's
five stages of its life: birth, growth, prime of life, decline, and death.
In addition, vital energy is not only working in individual organisms,
but it is also a quality of universal life or life in general, possibly to be
found also on other planets. Whether or not the vital energy in this
universe is "all-life," as Scheler called it, and will also reach universal
death and extinction, is a question Scheler discussed in his project of
showing that God, too, must have vital energy. He is no pure mind
and, as such, has to be the "Deity-in-becoming."
Scheler pinpoints the Western anti-intellectual attitude to the
lopsided distribution of vital energy that in other places he identifies
also with the Nietzschean "dionysian" man (IX 155 I P 107):
4. Society
First of all, society is mostly engaged with the two lowest ranks of
values: sensible values and utility values (II 519 I F 529). But saying
that the values of the two lowest ranks characterize society as a whole
VALUES AND TIME 59
With this argument, we may have found the right path toward
a solution of the problem mentioned. Our question was how a non-
spatial and non-durational society could be the place for spatial or
divisible values of the lower ranks to occur. Nevertheless, this lack of
society's spatiality and duration makes it also able to be the bearer of
the indivisible mental values. The bearer of mental and sacred values
is, however, the person. And as an embodied person, the person is
both the bearer of the lower value ranks and of mental and religious
values, because the latter are given only in "personal form" (X 302 I
PV 179). It is, therefore, the constitution of the embodied person that
allows society to be the bearer of both the lower divisible values and
of the higher indivisible values and their relevant ranks.
Let an inventory be made of the differences between the inter-
human experience in the life-community, on the one hand, and the
inter-human experiences in a society, on the other.
VALUES AND TIME 61
Life-Community Society
The highest form of all social units is the "encompassing person" (die
Gesamtperson). As a collective person, the term is applicable to reli-
gions, cultures, and nations.
As is known, during the first period of his thought, Scheler
was a convert to Catholicism, and for this reason he assumed there to
be only one encompassing person, Christianity, or "the Church." He
thought at the time that there could only be one encompassing person,
because there could be only one God. He abandoned this idea later on
and he added two more encompassing persons, namely, cultures and
nations.
We try to explain first what an encompassing person is. As is
the case with most concepts of general nature, there are obstacles to
describe them as objects to be understood clearly. One tends to think
that the general nature of ordinary beings and entities has a reality of
its own apart from the individual things or entities it pertains to. This
line of thinking comes to us, of course, from Plato. The argument that,
on the one hand, individual horses are different from each other but
that the general idea of what all horses have in common, namely, their
being horses or their "horseness," on the other hand, suggests that the
"idea" of horseness (and other ideas of classes of entities) has the
highest kind of reality, because all individual horses share what they
have in common with this idea. No individual horse can be a horse
62 LIFETIME
acts just as its individual subjects can be said to be responsible for it,
the nation.
Furthermore, an encompassing person is a collective unit of
individual persons comprising persons, not only of the present, but
also of the past and the future generations. Therefore, the time of an
encompassing person encompasses past, present, and future.
The encompassing person has, in addition, two other features.
An encompassing person is both a universal phenomenon that is
omnipresent throughout its past, present, and future generations, and
it is an individual phenomenon because it sets itself off from other
encompassing persons, say, from another religion or a nation. But the
meaning of an encompassing person pertains equally to different reli-
gions as Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam. And so it is with cultural
encompassing persons as the Western, Eastern, or American Indian
cultures, and this plurality among them holds for different nations as
well.
From the above it would follow that an encompassing person
is characterized either by faith (religion), by a world-view (of a
culture) or by nations that belong to a culture or a religion. Nations as
encompassing persons are, for instance, China, France, Russia,
Spain, the United States. They encompass their own past, present, and
future generations. Their cultural annexes belong to them also, say,
Quebec with regard to France. Annexes are part of the cultural
encompassing person but, as such, the political characteristics of
nations and annexes are not included in the encompassing person,
because politics is an instrument of the state which Scheler at times
regarded to be an encompassing person, but at other times did not.
Encompassing persons can also overlap. There are elements of
Christianity in Islam, and elements which cultures of the West and
East share; there are traces of American Indian mythology among
Christian American Indians. Nations can also overlap with different
cultural and religious encompassing persons. One can see that an
encompassing person has no defined political borders, which
indicates already that its form of time is not measurable objective
time.
There are some opposing components in an encompassing per-
son. The existence of an encompassing person is dependent on
individuals living it. But an encompassing person is not dependent on
this or that member that happens to live in it; nor is it dependent on
individuals who belong to two encompassing persons, for example,
64 LIFETIME
when they share the encompassing person of their religion but also
recognize the value of their nation. In such cases moral conflicts are
prone to happen. Christianity in France at Napoleon's time, the
Orthodoxy during Communist domination, Jewish religion in Nazi-
Germany, are just a few cases of such moral conflict. All individual
persons concerned have to face so-called either-or situations that they
must at times make hard decisions on. The individuals are subjected
to the laws of a state and to laws of their religion. For instance, in
Nazi-Germany, Jewish converts to Catholicism, as Edith Stein, were
considered to be Jews, not Catholics. But it can also be the case that
these individuals are constantly waiting for what will happen to them
as Palestinians do living today in Israel.
The twofold character of the dependence and independence of
encompassing persons makes it possible that it is experienced "in"
every individual's consciousness, and it makes also possible that each
individual person experiences the encompassing person in his or her
own individual way. This is the reason why no person can have a
complete experience of his or her encompassing person. Hence, there
are always open ends in experiencing one's encompassing person.
These open ends go "beyond" the individuals' limited experiences of
an encompassing person. And this is also why it survives its members
in the temporal form of historical duration in a way that leaves room
for ever more different experiences that individuals can and will have
of it.
The order of sequence of encompassing persons, a religion, a
culture, and a nation, possesses four elements:
(1) Their order corresponds to the order of values of the per-
son. The value of holiness has a sociological counterpart in a religion,
which is highest encompassing person. The mental values have as
their sociological counterpart the encompassing person of a culture;
and the values of life have as their sociological counterpart the nation
as their encompassing person.
(2) There is also a descending order among the encompassing
persons. a) Religions as such are "supra-national and supra-cultural."
b) The encompassing person of a religion encompasses both a culture
and a nation; and yet, religions are also "within" cultural and the
national encompassing persons. Moreover, the nation must be seen as
above the state. Although the state is, by and large, characterized by
divisible, controllable, and quantifiable values of the lower ranks, the
national encompassing person is, nevertheless, also immanent in a
VALUES AND TIME 65
During the past century, the word "ontology" had been used in
various meanings by authors of the phenomenological movement and
by scholars of different or independent orientations. For this reason,
we want to clarify first in which meaning the word is used in what
follows. 21
The Greek meaning of the word "onta" refers us to existing
entities. But the word can also be used in the sense of the essential
nature of Being itself, i.e., when it is associated with "to on," Being.
In the latter meaning, the word ontology is not much different from
the word "metaphysics," i.e., the study of what is the "essence" of
21 Almost diametrically opposed, for instance, is the use of the word "ontology" in
Heidegger and N. Hartmann. See Heidegger's pungent critique ofN. Hartmann in
Sein und Zeit, GA, Volume 2, p. 276. Heidegger's implicit critique there of Max
Scheler is, to say the least, misinformed (VIII 203).
66 LIFETIME
existing things (ta physica). The use of the word ontology can also be
referred to the question of the "meaning" of being. In this sense of on-
tology, Heidegger's question of the meaning of Being can also be a
metaphysical question. He would, of course, disagree with this be-
cause all traditional metaphysics failed, according to Heidegger, to
tackle the question of the meaning of Being in the first place. But this
can also show that the terms "ontology" and "metaphysics" can be,
and obviously are, debatable in each and every case when the terms
are used, and a clarification of their meanings used in any text should
be incumbent upon the authors dealing with them.
One could go on here and describe in detail the meanings of
"ontology" and of "metaphysics," including their overlapping. To
determine the various meanings of "ontology" as they have been used
in more recent times may be a beneficial undertaking, especially for
students of philosophy; but we must in our context restrict ourselves
to Scheler's philosophy of time and to the meaning of the word
"ontology" as it will be used.
The word "ontology" in our sense then pertains to the study of
the order of entities in contrast to what lies, or can lie, behind them;
that is, in contrast to the essence of what is, Being, das Sein, as the
gerunds of "to be" and of "sein," i.e., as verbs functioning as nouns.
Hence, our use of the word ontology pertains only to entities and their
order. We will not claim that we are anywhere near a general order of
entities comparable to, for example, a "chain of being;" nor will we
claim that we are explaining a general order of the foundation of what
is, as was done by N. Hartmann in his New Ways of Ontology (Neue
Wege der Ontologie).
Having this in mind, the present section, entitled, Ontology of
Values, indicates that we will confine ourselves to the ontology of
those entities called values. In this regard, we will concentrate on the
order of values alone. This order has already surfaced a number of
times in our preliminary inquiries of Scheler's philosophy of time, for
instance. when we discussed the "order" of the ranks of values.
VALUES AND TIME 67
Being
~
Existence
~-------------.
Whatness Value-being
Fourth. Love at the base of, and accompanied by, the interest-
taking, determines three factors in practical life:
a) It accounts for the drive-conditioned selections made of
objects of perception.
b) It sets directions toward what we take interest in, including
the directions of perception and representations.
c) All increases and concentrations of acts and their objects
that occur in representations, intuitions, perceptions are preceded by
increases of respective interest-taking and, ultimately, increases of
love, or hate. These three points imply much more than has been said
about them here (VI 96 I L 163):
The above section leads us to ask the question whether values, as such
and by themselves without reality as we quoted Scheler as saying, can
at all become real. Or, how can something that by itself does not exist
come into existence? Scheler's answer to the question refers to a key
feature contained in his metaphysics, sociology, and philosophical
anthropology: the process of "functionalization." What is the process
of functionalization?
The process of functionalization turns something not existing
into existence by way of a mediator. In other words, functionalization
is at hand whenever and wherever something not existing requires
something else for it to become existing. This process is a "process-
in-becoming" and, therefore, it is a process in time. Colors as such,
we said, do not exist. Colors must have material surfaces for them to
show up. A color exists when it "functionalizes" with something else
that allows it to become real. The principle of functionalization had
already been referred to in both Formalism and in On the Eternal in
Man (II 155-6 IF 141-2; V 198-200 IE 201-2). Values, too, have to
enter mediated functions with something else in order to become real.
Functionalization, however, does not only pertain to values
and colors. It equally pertains to anything that does not exist, but that
can exist when the need of something else is fulfilled to make it real.
In this meaning of it, functionalization reveals itself as an ontological
structure of time between non-existence and existence. In saying that
functionalization is a time-process going from non-existence to a
forthcoming existence, one must clarify what the non-existence of
entities means. The old saying that nothing comes from nothing con-
tradicts functionalization, which, indeed, implies that something can
come from nothing. The nothingness referred to in such propositions
must first be clarified. Not only with regard to the functionalization, a
VALUES AND TIME 73
clarification reveals that there are, ironically indeed, even three kinds
of nothingness X 204):
The first concept of nothingness is "absolute nothingness" in
the sense that there has never been, is, or will be, anything; no world,
no God, no atom, no creation, no evolution, etc. But the concept of
absolute nothingness is impossible, because in thinking about it, it is
already something in the thought of it. For this and other reasons,
already Parmenides saw that this is the case and concluded that there
is no nothingness but only "is."
The second meaning of nothing pertains to logical negations.
These two meanings of nothingness must sharply be dis-
tinguished from what Scheler calls, "relative" nothingness.
It is this third denotation of nothingness that pertains to func-
tionalization. An example provided by Scheler may show us that our
lives are imbued with relative nothingness. When we say, "there is
nothing on the table," this nothing is "relative" to what can be on the
table, as china and silverware. This "relative" amounts to a discord
between what is not on the table, and what could, should, can or will
be on a table.
With regardto functionalization, then, the meaning of the non-
existence of entities is relative nothingness; or in classical terms,
nothing has the "potency" to tum real, but in our case only in terms of
the process of functionalization "with" something that brings a reality
about or "actualizes" the potency.
We can now cast some light on what we heard from Scheler's
Dissertation, stating that values, as such, "are not." The quote implied
that values, by themselves, are not in terms of relative nothingness,
but that they can become real during the process of functionalization,
namely, on the basis of something that does already exist.
A further clarification of functionalization provides us with an
answer to the question: "What is functionalization with regard to the
primacy of the givenness of values?" There are two answers:
a) The question is pertinent to the moral values of good and
evil because whatever we ought to do is preceded by the experience
of the value of that which ought to be done (II 214 I F 206).
b) The question is pertinent to the act of preferring higher
values over lower ones.
ad a) Functionalization denotes that something not having
reality needs something else for it to become real. The moral values
74 LIFETIME
We ask: what has transpired for us from the inquiries into relations
existing between values and time?
A line is to be drawn between two modes of time that surfaced
in the above discussion: duration and succession. Duration is a quality
of time in which time is filled with contents and meanings, and it is
the form of time in which the whole of a process is given in its
duration. Duration can also be between an objective beginning and an
objective end of a process.
Duration is the foundation of a succession (X 486 I PE 266).
Succession is the quantifiable mode of time as used in measurements
of time (clocks). It pertains, therefore, to measurable, successive
points like seconds marked on the dial of a clock. The hands of a
clock move to indicate "clock-time." When we ask the question "what
time is it," we ask for a particular time in the succession of time
points progressing to the oncoming points in time. The mode of the
duration, however, does not allow of measurable points succeeding
one another. Therefore, we can describe duration, at this juncture, as a
continuous present of changing or unchanging contents.
VALUES AND TIME 75
Our pursuit in the following is to get into focus the direction that time
has toward the future as seen from the present. The undertaking is
complex.
We are first taking up a specific thread which runs through all
of Scheler's later writings. His well-substantiated conviction that
reality as such comes to us through resistance will in what follows be
highlighted as a starting point. 23 The concept of reality as resistance
has, we pointed out, a history of its own (IX 209 I PE 318-9), but a
focus on resistance in its relation to time deserves a coverage also of
its own. We will, therefore, address the subject of what is, or what can
be given, as reality qua resistance in regard to the phenomenon of
time. Resistance is the essence of how reality is given to humans.
We divide the presentation into a phenomenological and a
metaphysical part.
24 The rest of the spheres of consciousness in the order of foundation are: 7) The
sphere of the external world of other persons; 8) The sphere of what "I" can know
of the external world; 9) The sphere of the outer world of my own particular world
shared with others; I 0) The sphere of the interior world of my own particular world
shared with others, including past and future; II) The sphere of my own inner
world; 12) The sphere of our lived body as a field of expression, and 13) that ofthe
corporeity of the object-body. For this foundation, see also: M. Frings The Mind ol
Max Scheler. The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997, 2nd ed., 2001, p.l26-7.
25 Heidegger apparently did not know the role of resistance that
Scheler had
assigned to the processes of aging and to consciousness. Relevant marginals Scheler
entered in his copy of Being and Time, listed in Spate Schrifien (IX 305-340), are
self-explanatory.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 81
26 We make mention here of Fichte' s argument that the law of identity A = A is not
primarily constituted by logical reasoning as is sometimes assumed, but that it is
constituted in the selfsameness of the ego that sets itself off from its built-in alter-
ego. The ego curbs itself from what it is not: from its alter-ego. The alter-ego, i.e.,
the ego's own negation, is con-stituted in the ego's curbing. Were this not the case,
there could not be an ego because the human ego must have inclusive and
simultaneous alterity against which it sets itself off. Hence, the ego must contain
resistance against its own alter-ego by way of its curbing itself from otherness for it
to be the Fichtian "moral agent." This state of affairs may have been a reason why
Scheler mentions Fichte, among others, with regard to the role of "resistance" in
the history of philosophy (IX 210 I PE 319).
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 85
28 Concerning our explication below of realizing factors, I wish to recall with the
reader two more points concerning what had earlier been said about good and evil:
(1) Good and evil are in function with acts that realize values or, without the act of
realizing non-moral values, it was said, there are neither good nor evil. They
emerge "on the back" of these acts, Scheler told us. They escort the acts of non-
moral value-realizations in respective actions and deeds. This is in particular the
case when we recall the first two types of actions (Handlungen) out of the seven
that Scheler distinguishes (II 137 IF 121). (2) Good and evil are not objects, but
they were shown to be phenomena of self-temporalization. For good and evil occur
during the realizations of the non-moral values of the five ranks. In regard to the
requirement of a "realization" of non-moral values for good or evil to occur,
Formalism happens to foreshadow already the later sociology of knowledge in that
"realizing factors" are necessary for ideal factors of knowledge to occur. An
additional comment to this should be made. Mathematical functions are
distinguished by dependent and independent variables. In a mathematical format,
good and evil would appear as dependent variabls whereas acts and actions would
function as independent variables that are not "constant" independent variables,
because of the possibility of a free will in realizing or not realizing acts and actions.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 87
29This existential time is articulated by Heidegger also, when he states: "Man is he,
who he is, by not being who he is" (GA 55, p. 375).
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 93
1. Impulsion
30 We leave aside at this point Scheler's later disapproval of the notion of God as
creator, or as an Aristotelian "First Cause."
100 LIFETIME
2. Absolute Time
7. Absolute time underlies not only all living nature and the
becoming and unbecoming of the world, but it also underlies the
"Deity-in-becoming."
32 The immediate (die unmitte/baren) elongations are the same as the retentions and
protentions in Husserl's "time-consciousness," published in 1928. Scheler gave
details of the elongations already in Formalism (II 437-439 IF 441-443) whose
entire manuscripts were completed prior to 1913.
106 LIFETIME
resistance is effective not only in the aging of organic life, but in the
mind as well.
The resistance between the past and the future with regard to
the present is a key feature of Scheler's philosophy of time, because
resistance is not only effective during shifts in aging processes, but it
is also effective in the time shifts of consciousness and its dynamics
of the past and the future. The argument runs as follows.
Dividing individual life into the three main periods of youth,
middle-age, and old age, the time shifts take place as follows: During
childhood, puberty or the period of youth, the horizon of the future is
unlimited. It is an open domain of endless possibilities, whereas the
horizon of the past is still small and negligible, but the horizon of the
past does already begin to gradually grow. During middle-age
periods, there occur the first signs of the horizon of the future laying
bare that it is narrowing and beginning to move backward toward the
horizon of the present along with exercising initial pressures on the
present. But during middle-age, both the narrowing horizon of the
future and that ofthe growing horizon of the past are also more or less
in balance, both of them exercising increasing resistance on the
present which continues to be squeezed between the two. During this
period, a first awareness that "time flies by" or that we better "seize
the day" begins to dawn and stir in us. The present is "squeezed"
between the growing past and the diminishing future horizon. This
may well be a phenomenological trigger for the familiar mid-life-
crises filled with uncertainties, unfinished tasks, with the impatience
of "running against the clock," with seeking diversions and a
simultaneous escape from the self charged with a subliminal Angst.
With elderly people and in old age the time shifts in of three
horizons of past, present, and future, enter their final phases. The
future horizon keeps inexorably narrowing in the direction unto the
present, while the weight of the past keeps inexorably growing behind
the present like a burden until the present is swallowed up by it, and
all resistance between the life-time horizons collapses and, along with
it, all reality. During the shifts of time-horizons in consciousness,
there happen to be two kinds of effectiveness: (I) There is the
effectiveness coming from the past or from "behind" the present
(Nachwirksamkeit). (2) There is the effectiveness coming from the
future or from what lies ahead of the present ( Vorwirksamkeit). The
description of the time-shifts in con-sciousness implied that the
increase of the horizon of the past occurs at the expense of the
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 107
33 Later Scheler will tell us the opposite, however, because even an elec-tron is said
to have a "vital history" (Vitalgeschichte) (XIII 127).
108 LIFETIME
and it is "in" the measurable calendar time of the season as well. But
neither the ripening of the bud nor the process of the self-becoming of
the planning was in objective space or time as the finished fruit and
the plan are.
The difficulty in approaching the essence of transition lies in
there being two kinds of transitions to be distinguished. There is an
indigenous transition within transiting processes from an A to a B, on
the one hand, and there is a transition, on the other hand, going from
an object A to an object B. Concerning the objective transition, we
perceive the bud day by day transforming gradually into a fruit that
we expect to be ripe in Spring. Each time, there is the perceived bud
as an object, then the fruit perceived as an object. The objective
transition has taken place in objective clock-time in which an object is
perceived, say, for three months. But the indigenous transitions that
are going on in the budding from one phase of the budding to the next
phase are the condition for the objective and measurable transition.
This is because the vital force driving the process of transition
forward is, by itself, neither a perceivable nor a measurable process.
Which allows us to catch a first glimpse of the distinction to
be made between absolute time and objective time. Objective time has
its foundation in absolute time, and appears to occur to be given only
to humans. However, in practice, we take objective time to be as what
time is all about. It is calculable and manageable for whatever
practical purposes. Yet, its foundation, the absolute time, is not that
simple to understand because it cannot be calculated.
Objective time, however, is not so easy to understand either as
we said. First of all, and contrary to everyday belief, objective time
does not have the dimensions of present, past, and of the future (IX
234 I PE 347) that we take so much for granted in practical life.
Objective time is bare of an absolute "earlier" and "later." What is
earlier and later in objective time is relative to the location (Standort)
of an observer in a four-dimensional space-time system (XI 138).
Objective time is relative to reference points. The global time zones
are rela-tive to each other and to Greenwich Mean Time. They could
be made relative also to a meridian chosen for a Beijing-mean-time.
Objective time does not care, so to speak. Any of the time-zones can
be interpreted as earlier or later than other time-zones. Hence, it
would be going too far to simply state that objective time has no past,
no present, and no future unless one allows for their relativity to each
other.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 111
\
Temporalization
I
Spatialization
\
Modification
I
Movement
\
Irreversibility
I
Reversibility
\
Succesiveness
I
Apartness
\ I
IMPULSION
Self-Activating Four-Dimensional
Expanse. Self-Activating Pre-S patio-Temporal Expanse
of Pure Fluctuation in the Vital Energy of Pure Impulsion.
8. Irreversible Successiveness
38Concerning the relationship between effectiveness and resistance qua reality see,
X 483-485.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 123
39 In our context, the title "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit) would be misleading
because the two words should not be separated for the reason of their duration.
Heidegger left a short manuscript behind, entitled "Zein, " a contraction that ties the
two German words of Sein and Zeit into one. He told me, however, that the
manuscript was "unbrauchbar" (not usable). Yet, the tying together of the words
"Sein" and "Zeit" into Zein is to the point in regard to the Schelerian "unseparated"
spatio-temporal expanse.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 127
philosophy of time, then, both field forces and vital forces have in
common absolute time.
Since there are no separations of time and space in impulsion,
and since there is no separation between before and afterward,
between near and distant, and no separation either between inanimate
and animate, we can now draw the conclusion that there is also no
separation either between field forces and vital forces. According to
the nature of impulsion itself, both field forces and vital forces must
in their origin be one and the same. They must be united "in one"
before they separate.
There are two more links existing between impulsion and
science. We take only a quick notice of them, because Scheler did
not go into appropriate investigations.
The first relation is between the four-dimensional expanse in
the primordial impulsion and Einstein's Theory of Relativity. In the
Theory of Relativity the separation between space "and" time pre-
supposes four-dimensional space-time. The second relation pertains to
the Quantum Theory and the concept of reality qua resistance. The
quote below sounds like a conviction although its ramifications in the
surrounding text beckons for further research (VIII 146-7 I PR 148-9):
absolute time (XI 186-7; 189), and (4) these three characters are
complemented by saying (XI 161):
1. The Void
41 M.S.Frings, "Zum Problem der Technik bei Max Scheler. In: Studien zum
Problem der Technik. Phiinomenologische Forschungen, 15, 1983. E. W. Orth, Ed.,
p. 58.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 135
and defer them when we plan, say, to go and eat out later on. None of
this we find in the animal kingdom.
On the other hand, this does not mean that in indivi-dual cases
human drives cannot be naturally fulfilled at all. The sexual drive is a
case in point. A fulfillment of human sexual drives pertains to one of
the four types of intercourses we had distinguished earlier (VII 36 IN
25). This particular intercourse of the four types was described as
replete with the love of the other person, and results in a total
identification during the mutual climax of the partners. That is, the
love descends from the love of the person and his and her looks down
into their sensible lived bodies and the simultaneous climax. The
genuine love among partners does not, in this case, begin from
physical sex and pass from below up to a point of possible love of the
other person. By recognizing said exception of sexual fulfillment, the
difference between human and animal drives is that the drives in
animals are fulfilled through said self-timing that occurs "in" the
drives, whereas the human drives do not have such self-timing and
remain, for this reason, unfulfilled and hungering. Indeed, the
unfulfillable hunger in human drives of pining for fulfillment out-
weighs, as Scheler states, their mostly artificially or willfully
satisfiable zones.
The predominance of the unfulfillment of the drive-hunger over
against the smaller satisfiable zones in drives is quintessential for the
constitution of objective time and of objective space. The
constitution of objective time originates in the unfulfilled void of
drives. The void is the unfulfillment in drives. It is "transferred"
(iibertragen) (IX 2321 PE 345) into our perception or to the
perceivable void, and then into representation (die Vorstellung) or a
represented void. The void of objective time and of space is intuited
(angeschaut), but it is at the same time an intuited "fictum" of fantasy
(IX 219 I PE 331 ), because its origin lies in the unfulfillment of in the
drives which are constituted in impulsion. Whether this "fictum" can
determine the essence "of' something remains an open question. 42
Said transference of the void from unfulfilled drives to
representation lies well within the meaning of "transition," which is
one of the three characters of absolute time. The void constituted in
42Concerning "essence," see Eugene Kelly. Structure and Diversity. Studies in the
Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler. Chapter Four: The Concept of
Essence, pp. 53-65. Dordrecht I Boston I London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1997. Phaenomenologica, 141.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 137
2. Distance
granted in the natural view of the world, must also be the result of
resistance. The experience of resistance against the vital powers of
self-modification "forces" upon us objectifications of an external void
of time as the possibility of modifications occurring in real things.
The first stage of the objectification of temporality, however,
appears to be debatable at this stage. It was said that in order to
objectify the taken-for-granted character of empty time in the natural
view of the world, first reality should be objectified. But how can
reality qua resistance, be objectified in the first place? Scheler states
that the vital phenomenon of resistance which originates in impulsion
can, indeed, be objectified qua reality by the human mind. In other
words, it looks as if resistance remains the vital and irreducible
phenomenon to be found in impulsion whereas reality that is given at
the same time in, and with, resistance of impulsion, is torn off to
become a perceivable and also a conceptualizable reality bringing
about objective time and its void. There are three clues, however, for
a solution of this problem of the puzzle of the objectification of
temporality in the first stage.
The first clue had already been mentioned in Chapter II, A, 1
a.: Every sphere of consciousness contains resistance, including the
sphere of external perception. A second clue is contained in Man 's
Place in Nature (M): Since impulsion in the human being is, in
contrast to impulsion in the animals, suspendable because humans can
block both impulsion and drives, this capacity of blocking (hemmen)
impulsion and drives is an eminent ability of human existence. It is
called the ascetic part of human nature, and the human being is "the
ascetic of life" (IX 44 I M 54-5). To temporarily block both
impulsion and drives does not amount to a phenomenological
reduction, however, but is declared to be an "individual technique"
(IX 207 I PE 318). This blocking of the innermost zones in our life-
center and its drives can be accomplished by various techniques, for
instance, by fasting, restrammg, ignoring, abstaining, and
withholding. The third clue of what looks like a divider of reality in
external perceptions can be found in the treatise "Idealism-Realism,"
Section 3, entitled "The Problem of the Transcendence of the Object
and the Consciousness ofTranscendence" (IX 190-193 I PE 295-300).
The third clue amounts, as the first clue above, to a phenomenological
clarification of the complex problem of the objectification of the void
of time. Scheler draws on his distinction between ecstatic knowledge
and knowledge as such. The former is not related to an ego or a
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 141
But this much is not obscure: causality stems from our own
spontaneous acting. It originates in what took place "through me" and
results in an effectuation (die Auswirkung) which our vital center
exercises on the immediate, natural surroundings. As soon as a project
has been realized by one of our own actions, the origin of the
phenomenon of causality is at hand. That is, when we experience
something as having been realized by and through ourselves, the very
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 143
43 In literature, Asian cultures, fairy tales, mythology, etc., the "sage" represents
wisdom and maturity of mind.
146 LIFETIME
44 The translation here is close to literal. But in today's vocabulary, what is here
called "mechanization" would stand for "technology," and the expression "by
maschines" would stand for "technologically." Concerning keyboard techniques, I
provided in Person und Dasein, op.cit., pp 31-37 a phenomenologial analysis of the
act of hearing and of a violinist being "lost" in playing Bach's Chaconne, rather
than paying attention to finger techniques.
TIME AND CULTURE 147
the power- and nutritive drives. Mind, it was stated in Chapter II, 2,
has learned to "reckon" with realizing factors. The drama of drives
that in the past, beset with preposterous instances of social chaos and
cataclysmic wars, has begun, no matter how unnoticeable still, to give
way to a more peaceful existence. The distant future is going to be
"undramatic and unhistorical"(XIII 164; 152) and will have less wars.
An upcoming increase of attention to useabilities and utility-values
has two positive consequences: In terms of the era of economics we
have begun to live our lives in, the frame of mind will attain more of
economic attitudes, implying that wars just don't "pay," rather than
attain a moral attitude that wars ought not to be waged. In terms of the
age of technology one can say that the more there is technological
interest, activity, and progress, the less drive-conditioned hostility and
violent behavior.
These points made by Scheler some eighty years ago appear to
have had some consequences on todays' foreign policies. Although
over the past fifty years or so, numerous warnings had been launched
against possible abuses of atomic power, aggressive actions, and
threats that as a consequence of this power, international foreign
policies have seem to have gradually turned away from such warnings
in favor of economic and technological considerations, and they have
at the same time also turned slowly toward indefinite "globalization"
tendencies replacing the traditional cultivation of national interests.
Numerous inventions made in communication technology starting
with Marconi's first transatlantic phone call in 1901, for example,
were already instrumental in this development. As to the fast growing
communication technology itself, Scheler saw both a positive and a
negative aspect of it. On the one hand, communication technology is a
condition for fast and easier international understanding but, on the
other hand, communication technology can be used in particular cases
to increase feelings of alienation and even of intense hatred among
peoples. World War I is proof of these two sides of communication
technology (IV 402). Nine years after World War I, Scheler stressed
that it was the foremost task of politicians of the future to guide and
direct global adjustment with a "minimum of destruction, explosions,
blood, and tears" (IX 153 I P 104). But in that same year of 1927, he
had also already an inkling that Italy's Fascism could lead to World
War II (XIII 95-6 I ID 164 [1976]) while it was growing also in
Germany at the same time.
148 LIFETIME
This includes the thesis also that all predictions must first be
related to the human being. They are not to be made by first looking
into how things are going to be apart from the human being. Hence, if
historical predictions can be made with some success, they must be
made in terms of the inverse prolongation that spans the direction
from the human being as a starting point to being. We said predictions
TIME AND CULTURE 151
l
Power Drive
l
Power over Humans and
l
over Things
There are three shifts that lead from the predominance of absolute to
the predominance of objective time.
1. Absolute time is predominant in the life-community i.e.,
during the first era of history.
2. Absolute time has a diminished role during the second era
of the predominance of society, when measurements of objective time
play an essential role in the life of individuals.
3. In the era of adjustment, objective time will be even more
predominant. This is because there will be strong urges to bring under
control objective things through technology and economics. Clock-
154 LIFETIME
one can also substantiate the phrase when one lives with a tribe. It
denotes work not done within a period of a time-span pre-set by a
societal contract, or work is done "at a time" whenever, and outside
clock-time. It is done "as time comes."
One must not, however, separate so sharply as we just did the
experience of time in life-communities and societies. For the flow of
absolute time toward objective time is a transitional process that
involves simultaneous becoming and un-becoming. This means that
absolute time does not succumb entirely to objective time. Absolute
time does not succumb either to the three eras of history, nor does it
succumb to groups and individuals. And since the natural view of the
world is given in all sociological forms and their transitions, both
absolute and objective time must be dynamically present in those
transitions, or (X 452 I PE (226):
46 In his 1942-3 Lecture Parmenides (GA 54, p. 119), Heidegger recalls the time
when a letter written on a typewriter (qua a thing) was taken to be a little as an in-
sult. Yet, the typewriter did replace handwritten letters, because the latter obstructed
the fast pace of modem life. In this development, says Heidegger, a word has just
turned into a "means of transportation," which hides the character of the person
typing. Today, letters look alike, never mind fonts. In this also people typing letters
and messages look alike in them. The science of graphology that interprets both
character and personality by handwriten texts has no role in this anymore.
158 LIFETIME
heard, (3) whose essence is "future" (IX 224, 228; XI 160 I PE 337,
341).
Before we embark on the next section, let us gather the main
points about predictions made on the basis of some of the concepts we
came across in the text:
1. The near or distant future is relative nothingness. The future
is relative to the passing present, and it is relative to a near or distant
past.
2. Because the future is "relative nothingness," any present to
which the future is relative must contain clues for the future.
3. This relative nothingness enters into functionalization with
the possible contents of what, at that present moment or period, is
possible or probable. This is to say that what is possible or probable
in a prediction must belong to some specific historical period.
However, a present can contain also impossible ideas. The ancient
Greeks and Romans, for instance, could not, in the period of time they
lived in, make predictions saying that there will be airplanes,
although flight was as a possibility recorded in their mythologies. But
this was not even a remote and vague inkling of humans in actual
flight today.
4. There are two tools which one can use to make predictions.
We are able to "calculate" what will happen in the future, and we can
"reckon" with what will happen in the future (VIII 22-3 I PR 38). The
former relates to objective time. The latter relates to absolute time.
The former relates to calculative thinking, the latter to intuition.
5. Time-predictions are more difficult to make than spatial
predictions. Yet, all predictions remain difficult to be made, because
any realized moment of any historical past, present, or of the future, is
always "incomplete." (V 34 I E 40-1 ). Thus any prediction must by
necessity also be incomplete, because of any incomplete historical
present it is made in.
We add one more point.
6. Predictions become most certain when it is made in fantasy
whose origin, we saw, is in impulsion. There seems to be only one,
albeit a fragmentary note made by Scheler on this state of affaires. In
the manuscript "Metaphysics and Art" (Metaphysik und Kunst), there
is an incomplete sentence written in between the lines on the upper
part of a page. It runs: "He who would have told us in 1913 that there
would be a time coming when the dollar would be worth twelve
162 LIFETIME
billion marks ... " 48 In the context of the discussion about fantasy in
which this unfinished sentence appears, this particular human being
would have been extremely important, since his or her fantasy would
have hit the now historically more or less correct prediction of what
did happen among a myriad of possibilities. Had this prediction in
fact occurred, it would by necessity have been made in terms of a
coincidence of content and phase in absolute time, typical of fantasy.
Scheler's historical and long-term time-related predictions
allow at least some degrees of verification concerning the
development that goes on during the transitions from the genealogical
era of the life-community (drive if propagation) to the second world-
era of society (drive for power). During these eras, countless wars
have been waged. On a much smaller scale, Scheler offers a
prediction of a specific case of what is likely to happen in the
immediate future after a war has come to an end.
Concerning the predominance of the drive-objects pertaining
to propagation and power, one must realize that it was during the first
era and in part during the second period until to today that wars were
common by the very definition of the drive objects of propagation and
power. The drive-object of propagation was defined as "power over
humans," and the drive-object of power was defined as "power over
humans and things."
War was of growing interest to Scheler and war became an
ingredient in his vision of the three eras of history. He belonged to a
number of German thinkers, such as Kant and Hegel, who supported
the argument that culture is a product not of peace but of war. The
Heraclitean motto Scheler gave to his book, The Genius of War and
the German War. was taken from the German poet Fr.v.Schiller
(1759-1805) and runs: "But war, too, has its honor. [It is] the mover
of human destiny." Part of the book was published in 1914. The
whole of it was published in 1915, and appeared again in 1916 with a
some less passionate forms of diction .. The "war book," as it was then
called, was filled with a harsh critique of United Kingdom and loaded
with subjective expressions of anti-British feelings then rampant in
Germany. It was very likely motivated also by feelings of a pervasive
German resentment of envy of the expansion of the British Empire.
World War I was also the time when Scheler, still a Catholic convert,
Jehovah, Allah, Nirvana, etc., for the justice of their own cause, while
desires for sensible pleasures are fading. The emphasis on the value of
the community ("life values") characterizes periods of wars and after,
as also does the emphasis on art, national language and on national
spirit. In seeing ever so many cultural works destroyed during wars,
humans mourn their losses and move toward higher values as the
renovation and appreciation of cultural goods as architecture. Among
both "soldiers in the trenches and among the millions of people at
home" there are seeds growing for such a new appreciation of cultural
goods and values. A ''future" of new possible cultures begins to be
dreamed of, and designed in human fantasies. Yet, only a few of
thousands of individual fantasies will make it, perhaps one that was in
the mind of a soldier who returned home, argues Scheler.
Furthermore, war engenders a collective guilt after it has been
waged although this collected feelings is rather short-lived. Wars can
generate collective feelings of repentance over what had happened
but, again, also this feeling is short lived. 49
From among the positive effects that wars can have and were
specifically listed above, there appear to be two major effects that a
war can have. 1. A war unites people on either side and war is "the
great originator of unification" (der grosse Gemeinschaftsbildner).
Concerning this effect wars have, Scheler makes explicit mention of
the "American Union" as the result of the Civil War. 2. In The Genius
of War and the German War, a positive effect of wars is seen in the
moral effect they have when compared to peace-time when individual
and group-hates, envy, revenge, and anger, are on the increase. But
war has a morally purifying effect. It bears resemblance to the fresh
scent of air cleansed after a thunderstorm. "War is the thunderstorm
of the moral world" (IV 70).
In regard to positive effects that wars can have, and in regard
to the sometimes inexorable urge for power over human beings that
still exist both nationally and internationally today, there began a
tendency already after World War I to soften this urge and power
struggles by way of international debate, and by rethinking the future
in the light of what had happened in the past. This effort lead to the
League of Nations, and after World War II, it lead to the United
49 Concering individual and collective repentance and guilt, see M. S. Frings, Per-
son und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins, op.cit., pp. 68-87.
TIME AND CULTURE 165
Nations. In both cases the topic of food supply and health, of relief
organizations, and of international economics brought with them a
rather significant change of the global map and a second look on the
ethos of capitalism.
After World War II, the historical significance of the growth
of international diplomacy as a part of the role of the United Nations
achieved some success of peaceful settlement in cases of European
and Asian political border disagreements; none, however, in the Near
East. The peaceful agreements, however, found a match in the steady
growth of modem "economic borders." They are distinctly different
from political borders and not negotiated politically or legally, but the
economic borders are emergent by themselves on the basis of the
realizing factors of poor, average, or rich resources of a region, be it
the food and water supplies ever so relevant to the drive of nutrition,
or be it the vital material resources of energy relevant to the drive for
power to conquer nature and its entities. All of this is tied in with the
professional management of the resources. In short, economic borders
are not the borders staked out peacefully for political real estate. (The
word "peace" stems from Latin "pax" and its verb "pango," meaning
"to stake out"). Rather, economic borders form resource estates.
Whereas the influence of the economic borders of the United States
and of Europe extend far beyond their political borders, the Sudan's
economic borders do not appear anywhere close to the Sudan's
political borders, partly because it has until now been the battleground
of a twenty year civil war, in which an Islamic government keeps
crushing black Christian rebels.
If there is a minimum of economic borders but a maximum
urge for staking out political borders, power struggles are likely to
continue, as is the case with Israel and Palestine. This implies that
struggles for peace are more likely to succeed when economic borders
become subject to international diplomacy.
Scheler's projection of the future made during the nineteen-
twenties on the basis of the devolution of drive directions amounted
already at his time to the growth of an economic era with sociological
changes we touched upon. A formation of global togetherness will in
part supersede attention to political borders: There is going to happen
global trade and economics. In the World Era of Adjustment the urge
for power over whatever parts of world population, Scheler predicts,
will give way to the emerging urge for interests in and controls over
things in nature for the benefit of humankind. On the basis of his
166 LIFETIME
theory of the devolution of drives, one can say that Scheler caught at
least a glimpse of the direction of future events. He forecast that this
direction will be beset with values of life and pragmatic values - but
at an expense of a global diminution of faith.
What is in our times understood to be "globalization" differs
substantially from Scheler's vision of this with regard to the World
Age of Adjustment. The recent concept of globalization was a veiled
expression for an aggressive program that contained Western
conceptions of management, regulation, marketing, take-overs by
multinational companies, and the like, and it was thought up during
the first term of the Clinton administration. Understandably, it was
materialist. This globalization concept had mostly a cosmetic, perhaps
spurious consideration of the two highest value ranks of culture and
religion. Instead, it lent itself more to an investors' heaven. This kind
of globalization left little or no room for an inclusion of poor
countries like the Sudan. Characteristic for such a concept was the
President's Secretary of State M. Albright's view quoted in U.S. News
& World Report (vol.130, No.14) as saying that the issue ofthe Sudan
is "not marketable to the America people." That was one opinion. But
anti-globalization forces hastened to make their points also, as we
know. Among them were those who condemned the widening gap
between the rich and poor at home and abroad, and the exploitation
by foreign banks in Southeast Asia, and the idea that work is
tantamount to rewarding investors. That was another opinion.
This brings us to specific features of capitalism, unfortunately
rarely referred to and understood by politicians. These features had
intensely been investigated during the first quarter of the twentieth
century. We choose three major theoreticians on the subject: Max
Weber, Werner Sombart, and Max Scheler. Their analyses were as
relevant then as they are today for present-day issues of capitalism, be
they economical, political, or existential. In their researches they
struggled hard to uncover the very origins of capitalism, ( 1) the pre-
political, (2) the sociological, and (3) the philosophical-existential
origins of capitalism.
TIME AND CULTURE 167
1. Max Weber
Max Weber (1864-1920) is, of course, the most known among Ger-
man sociologists of the early twentieth century, whereas W. Sombart
(1863-1941), Max Scheler, and others like E. Troeltsch (1865-1923),
remained in his shadow. A reason for this is that Weber's work, The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, published in German in
1904-05, became available in English as early as 1930, translations
and slow rates of publication numbers at the time notwithstanding.
Weber, Sombart, and Scheler represent different views on the
origins of capitalism. But they also agreed on various issues, among
them their rejection of Marxist economic determinism. They also
agreed on a number of terms used in their writings, but they differed
on their meanings. For instance, Weber's useage of the term "Geist"
(Spirit) differs already in the title of his major work from Sombart's
and Scheler's use of the term. It goes without saying that Weber's
well known thesis concerning the origins of capitalism should, for our
purpose, just be summarized in the light of our subject.
Religious and ethical ideas are constitutive for the rise of
capitalism. Weber's research concerning profit-making in the ancient
world, such as in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism, showed that
profit-making as such has always been an activity of human routine.
But what is new about it today, is the new "spirit" that suffuses profit-
making in the West. What is this "spirit" and what, precisely, is the
spirit of capitalism?
The spirit is what Weber calls the "rationalization" of modem
life. This rationalization is expressed in many areas of human activity,
such as in the multitude of providing scientific proofs, in political
constitutions, in contracts, in legalism and officialdom all are based
on rationalization. It is easy to see that the new spirit implies that
irrational profit-seeking should be held back for the sake of rational
profitability. But Max Weber's rationalization-mind implies negative
elements, i.e., the Western world is locked up "in" the penchant for
rationalization in all walks of life. Western rationalization is an "iron
cage" (das stahlharte Gehause ), which is a symbol that reflects a
168 LIFETIME
2. Werner Sombart
domestic life during the 1430ies. Alberti was the illegitimate child of
a nobleman. In his works on architecture and studies on education and
ethics, he proved to be a prototype of Renaissance man. Werner
Sombart held that there were five sources of capitalism: a new type of
Western human beings, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, and the
central source being the sociological conditions at hand. He disagreed
with Weber's analysis of Calvinism and Puritanism. Rather, there was
a novel type of human being emerging at the end of the Middle Ages.
The social conditions of this new type of humans were those of the
rising "bourgeois," a middle class European person with traits of
inferiority because the bourgeois's constant desire and tendency to
compare himself with the upper classes and the nobility. He is imbued
with materialist interests and concerns about increasing his property
which he protects at any cost. He does not take risks, because he is
afraid of losses, especially those of the securities for which he can't
work enough. Today, one could perhaps compare the earlier
bourgeois as a person who can't find sleep when his bank's balance
statement differs by a cent or two from his entries in his checkbook,
and who can't exactly be the same as the people of the upper classes
either, but of whom he desires day and night to be a part.
The word "bourgeois' is, of course, French and refers to
French society and its past. The title of Moliere's 1670 comedy, Le
bourgeois gentilhomme (The Would-be Gentleman) already betokens
the pathological bourgeois attitude of comparing and competing with
others.
Sombart was interested also to look into a person type that is
opposite to a bourgeois. This other type of person does take risks,
and does enjoy taking them. He has a feeling of self-value and is
anything else but avaricious, envious, or jealous of those who do
better than he can. A person, that is, who does not need to compare
himself with other people's station, because he has strength of
personality enough to admit, when appropriate, his shortcomings
without losing strength ofhis self-value.
These two types of person are referred to also in Scheler's
essay on "Ressentiment" (III 114-122 I R 111-117). With regard to
ressentiment, one can argue that Scheler saw one source of capitalism
in the bourgeois's futile attempts to make up for his ineptitude by
trying to equal the personal strength and higher social stations and the
nobility. Said contrasting person-types had, by the way, been of a
general interest at the time and earlier. H. Bergson, the German
170 LIFETIME
3. Max Scheler
a. Despair
b. Angst
see that since Angst is the "pure correlate" of the experience of resis-
tance itself, the technique of suspending the resistance qua reality
amounting to "de-realization" (Ent-wirklichung) is tantamount to the
cancellation of Angst itself (IX 44, 269 I M 54).
Nevertheless, the cancellation of both drives and of Angst are
possible only for a limited amount of time. Indeed, the cancellation of
drives and of Angst takes place in objective time, because impulsion
must have been reflected upon prior to the cancellation of the drives
and of Angst by pure willing.
Scheler's example for this is by way of an order of foundation
that holds among relevant phenomena: Suffering is the foundation of
joy; a guilty conscience is the foundation of a good conscience; guilt
is the foundation of merit; injustice is the foundation of justice;
forbiddance is the foundation of permission and command; the
(mythological) "who is at the fault" is the foundation of the modem
"what" is at fault. The order of foundation shows that the negative
and non-affirmative bases are the foundation of their positive
counterpart.
Said order of foundation is relevant also to Angst (IX 269):
Angst is the foundation of courage and of the power drive (society).
This drive permeates the other two main drives as was implied by the
word "power" used in the drive objects shown in the graphic that
illustrated the three eras of history.
4. The direction of Angst has no determinable goal, because it
goes toward all possible resistance, i.e., the direction of Angst goes to
the totality of world-resistance. Nevertheless, there are specific cases
destination that Angst can have :
a) The destination of having Angst of ourselves and of our
internal life (including the Freud's Id) "with which we have to deal"
whether we want to or not.
b) The destination of Angst of outer nature to which humans,
by comparison to animals, are inadequately adjusted.
c) The destination of Angst of groups. Group-Angst or social
Angst includes Angst of an authority. In a mass, Angst has a
destination toward an alpha-animal or a leading person; in the utility
cooperative, Angst has a destination to administrators in charge of
individuals. In the life-community Angst is directed toward an elder,
and in society toward a leader, and the destination of Angst in the
encompassing person is a holy man. These destinations of Angst
TIME AND CULTURE 177
52 In Kant's eighteenth century German, the word "der lnstinkt" stands for "der
Trieb," meaning "drive;" whereas our English "drive" translates in eighteenth
century German as "passion." We continue to use the word drive, rather than
Kant's "Instinkt" to avoid possible confusion. As to Scheler and Kant, see also P.
Blosser, Scheler's Critique ofKant"s Ethics, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995.
TIME AND CULTURE 179
the right and the left, between conservatives and liberals, between
owners and employees. However, the political opponents concerned
are not that different from each other either as they often maintain by
charging each other with partisanship. No matter what partisanship,
the World Era of Adjustment is an inevitable era coming and will it
affect also capitalism and socialism, not necessarily to the liking of
present-day politicians and respective sympathizers. And this is why
(IX 165 I P 119. Tr. slightly altered.):
"The pathos that modem human beings connect with the label
of 'work' " (VIII 193), and the urge and will to work, are neither the
result alone of the Weberian theory of Calvinist motives to attain
predestination, nor can this will be regarded as a result of Sombart's
theory of the bourgeois. One can also argue with Scheler as we did
that the modem pathos to work stems, from a desperate, sub-
conscious hunger for a substitute to replace the dwindling of faith in
God and afterlife (X 11-15). This theory of the dwindling of faith
going hand in hand with an unbridled will to work for earthly
possessions and profit can stand on its own without a Calvinist
predestination and bourgeois class theory, when both despair and
Angst are seen as the source of capitalist extroversion. Moreover, the
dwindling of faith, the dwindling of the courage to face death, and the
modem bent to escape from one's self, are not only accompanied by
the overabundance of technological pursuits and industries that
produce countless objects designed to satisfy sensuous pleasures, but
they are also accompanied by the weakening of a capacity of genuine
"spiritual joy," especially among people living in gaudy cities of
society. Scheler mentions Berlin in this regard.
During the process of the preferring of the lower value-ranks
characteristic for the capitalist ethos, the word "world" lost much of
its spiritual connotations. In the West, the word "world" used to have
the meaning of a presumably created world, or of a transient abode
from which human beings could, perhaps, gain heaven. Whereas the
world had even been the abode of holy men of whatever religion, in
our times it is depreciated just as a technological and environmental
object in objective time that requires uninterrupted labor and work to,
allegedly, preserve it. Or: " ... only a depreciated world can release
boundless energy to work!" (Ill 375).
The experience of the world as a physical object being there to
be changed, worked and improved upon, obstructs the pursuit of the
realization of higher values of the person as those of culture and
religion. The experience of the world as an object encourages the will
to "conquer" and to control its objects in their status of being in ob-
jective time. What a vast difference this is from Weber's theory of
gaining, through work, predestination and heaven. It is, rather, the
TIME AND CULTURE 187
1. WORLD POPULATION
limits for this planet's inhabitants which will have to live on it in the
future. According to United Nations' figures, the present growth of
global population is an annual seventy-eight million people. There are
6.1 billion people presently living on our planet. One billion of them
are in the age group of fifteen to twenty-four. They will have to face
the threat of a spreading starvation occurring around 2070 when the
human population is likely to have reached nine billion people; they
will have to ponder how to achieve a balance of environmental
reserves and population growth, and how to avoid the devastation of
the environment through human activities, and how to avoid in the
future false predictions on devastations. Or they might have to check
their conscience and their value system. But population growth has
also natural limits as it does in the animal world; to exceed them may
be fatal but, as a rule, among all or most species a growing birth rate
appears to regulate itself when the rate approaches the dangers of
extinction.
Max Scheler made a contribution which is a rewarding study
toward understanding in more depths the changes of population rates.
He placed the issue in another context than in the more familiar ones
we just touched upon. He suggested the above mentioned difficult
route of examining population growth and decline in light of world-
views and religions which may or may not have an effect on the will
to propagate and to have children. There are two sides to the issue.
The world-views may have effects on curbing the growth of a
population, or they may have an effect on enhancing its growth.
His essay, "Problems of Population in Light of World-Views"
(Bevolkerungsprobleme als Weltanschauungsfragen) (VI 290-324),
goes into questions of the kind, and into some explorations also of the
psychological reasons that underlie both birth control and population
decline, seen in this connection which population dynamics has with
prevailing world-outlooks and religions.
Since Scheler puts the issue of population in light of "world-
views," a word more often in use in German than it is in English, the
meaning of "world-view" should again be taken up.
It is to be noted first that his use of the term "world-view" has
a meaning different from the term of a "natural world-view" or "the
natural view of the world." We recall that a natural world-view refers
to the way the world addresses itself as relative to the individuals of a
culture and historical epoch in terms of what is "without question" to
them. But in the essay, "Problems of Population" the term "world-
TIME AND CULTURE 195
the outbreak World War II in 1939. The racist doctrine was cultivated
further by specially chosen elite members of the SS who were to
produce the purest specimen of German blood to be born by specially
chosen elite Nazi-women in special camps provided for the purpose.
3. In 1913, there was a little-known socialist support for a
"pregnancy strike" (Gebiirstreik), which was initiated after its French
model (greve de ventre) and by the social-democrat and propagandist
E. Bernstein, himself influenced by Engels. It was maintained that
having children is, before anything else, a "social" accomplishment.
Still, birth control remained any woman's decision. Neither God nor
husband have a say in this. Socialists and the leftists alike saw in the
pregnancy strike a promising vehicle to eradicate the capitalist idea
that all work done by humans is tantamount to work done by humans
as merchandise. At this point, we can take a look at the world-view
of capitalism itself and the possible effects it may or does have on the
population dynamics.
First, we recall that the capitalist world-outlook has not been
formulated. It had its emergence around the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries and has ever since been growing. There has never been a
manifesto nor an agenda to be followed.
Second, there exist incompatibilities in the growth and decline
of populations among capitalist countries. The familiar belief that the
density and concurrent poverty of a population is a function of the
decline of a population can, for instance, at our time be disproved.
Industrialized Japan has more people living per square mile than does
poverty-stricken India. Or, the declining birthrates in industrialized
Germany are appalling despite her high standards of living, whereas
those in the United States compared to Germany's do not have a
function with a decline of birth rates. Birth rates keep rising. But one
can also maintain that the growth of the American population at
present may well be indicative of more religiosity among Americans
than among Germans. Church services in the United States are more
attended than they are Germany. There is even a high rate of Germans
leaving the churches today, because of the mandatory church taxes
(Kirchensteuer) they would otherwise have to pay. In our context,
church taxes are indicative of one of the main elements of capitalism:
taxes, and interests. Furthermore, Catholics in the Southern Sudan are
one of the poorest, if not the poorest population on earth. It shows no
noticeable population increase in the unending religious war waged
against the destitute population, whereas in capitalist countries higher
202 LIFETIME
The contentious topic of politics and morals has been debated for a
long time, especially, however, in modem times. 53 The treatment of
the issue spans Sophocles' Antigone, who was immured alive because
she placed the value of providing the funeral rites for her brother over
politics, and Shakespeare's Macbeth, the story of murder instigated
by Lady Macbeth's political ambition, and later versions of both
literary masterpieces. In recent times, financial, lustful, and immoral
scandals surrounding politicians at home, and abroad, have either
made the populace question politics in general, or led to efforts to
"clean up the house." For Max Scheler, the best of politics "honesty"
(XIII 67).
The topic of politics and morals was bound to be of interest to
Scheler in light of Formalism in which he had treated the subject of
moralities, and in light of also his continued interest in both domestic
and foreign politics as this is evidenced throughout his works. The
topic itselfbecame a salient one not only among Western populations,
but also with regard to specific moral issues emerging from new
technologies and growing economies. Atomic technology is as much
of a moral issue as is profit-making. This pertains also to certain
politicians who, as a rule, do not seem to be too familiar with moral
issues in the foundations of pure ethics. They sometimes assert having
"no recollection" of an issue presented in court or in government
investigations against them but, in fact, do have recollections. This
kind of convenient selective amnesia is, under the law, not really
contestable but, morally, it is mostly a lie.
The topic of the relation between politics and morals became
significant during the past century, because of many mass murders
sanctioned by whatever politicians, even up to present times, and
because of a number of wars, especially the war in Vietnam which
was sanctioned, rightly or wrongly, by large numbers of politicians
both at home and abroad.
Scheler took up the issue in the Winter of 1926/7 in a speech
entitled: "Politics and Morals" (XIII 7-74). It was prompted in early
1926 by the invitation of the then German Secretary of Defense
53 The term "morals" pertains to the morals characteristic of a certain period, say,
of the times we live in today. The German word "Moral" in the title of Scheler's
essay, "Politik und Moral" is in English equivalent to the term "morality" also
pertaining to a period. We use morality synonymously with morals. Scheler's small
distinction made in Formalism between "Moral" and "Moralitiit" does not appear
relevant in our context.
206 LIFETIME
plan on levels which are wider than the national scale would allow,
namely, toward the realization of vital goods and values for people in
general. He must do so not only for his or her own nation, but must
have all nations in mind when making decisions to this effect.
The diplomat, however, has to be clever (schlau) and able to
deal and negotiate behind the backs of people (hintenherum). He is
not quite trustworthy. But statesman is he or she, who at all times can
be trusted in his or her care for the salvation (das Heil) of his or her
people and the salvation of other peoples (XIII 44 I X 341-344). A
statesman is passionate. A statesman represents, as does a hero, the
values of life (X 341-344 ), but he must also, we add, be representative
of the mental value of justice.
These observations were necessary ( 1) because they provide a
background of the four types of relationship existing between politics
and morals, and (2) for the sake of the explanation later of Scheler's
own evaluation of these relationships. He presented and described the
four historical types of the relationship between politics and morals in
the following manner:
1. The first type of the relationship is at hand when a morality
is subordinated to politics. In this case, a morality of whatever norms
and rules has little influence on the politics pursued.
Historical representatives of this relationship between politics
and morality are said to be J.Bodinus, Duns Scotus, Th. Hobbes, B. de
Mandeville, K. Marx, F.La Rochefoucauld, W.I. Lenin, M. Luther, Fr.
Nietzsche and B. Spinoza. The more "democratic" representatives of
the relationship are J. Bentham, J.St. Mill, and H. Spencer. For them,
to be political means to be useful to the public community. In more
recent times, the subordination of morality to politics is substantiated
by various dictatorships and countries where no or only a few moral
precepts and rules are allowed to have an effect on a ruling political
government: China, Cuba, Nazi Germany, the past Soviet Union, and
a number of African, Asian and Latin American states.
Scheler's emphasis in the discussion of morals which are
subordinated to politics lies on the concept of power (die Macht). All
political comportment is based on the drive for power to find and
achieve deliberate means and ends. A group that lives under said
dominance is also believed to be only a good group when it is in the
possession of power (XIII 18-20), and when this group's morals are
within a smaller scope of judgment and scrutiny than that of politics.
Under such circumstances, the morality of groups remains secondary.
210 LIFETIME
54For varient views on this point consult Eugene Kelly, Structure and Diversity,
op.cit, pp. 216-26.
214 LIFETIME
We saw that there are three main drive-objects that typify three eras
of history: (1) The era beginning in the dark origins of history, (2)
The era that reaches into our own time and overlaps with (3) the era
of the future that has already begun..
Within this context, we listed the three devolving laws of the
changing predominance of drives that happened in those eras in which
three shifts in of the main human drives occurred. The first law of the
predominance pertained to the propagation drive. Its inherent object
was the "power and control over human beings." The second law
pertained to the predominance of the drive for power whose object
was said to be two-fold: "power over humans" and the "power over
entities in nature" (beginnings of technology). The third law pertained
to the third world-era when the predominance of the drive for power
begins to weaken, making room for the increase of the predominance
of the nutritive drive with its drive-object "power over entities."
In this third world-era, i.e., in the World Era of Adjustment,
the frequency of all belligerent activities will diminish in favor of the
slow but steady process of a convergence among peoples, cultures,
races, ethnic groups, genders, socialism and capitalism toward each
other. Both individual and social interests will yield to the increasing
interest in the conquest and controls over entities. (Also the "meaning
of being" may be fading away because of the strong urge for conquest
and controls over entities. The fading of being may in our context be
the coincidental with Heidegger' s "Forgetfulness of Being.")
A first impression of Scheler's law of shifts in the respective
predominances of the drives and their objects suggests it to be an
assumption. However, in pointing to the metaphysical method of the
transcendental elongation or the transcendental inference in Chapter
III, A, 2b, individual life is reflected in the historical law of said
shifts, or these shifts found in human individuals are passing on or
they "transfer" to the shifts of the three historical eras.
Given the Schelerian map of eras showing us three different
levels of effectiveness that drives and their objects have in each era,
we ask the question: "What does this have to do with politics and
morals?
On the basis of what has been said in the three Chapters of our
investigation of Time, an answer to the question can be given: The
evolving world-era of adjustment will result in a future solidarity
among humans. Solidarity is the mutual experience through which all
TIME AND CULTURE 217
people are co-responsible to realize the order of values and begin also
to feel this co-responsibility. Scheler calls the realization of solidarity
and the realization of the order of values: the "human destiny" (XIII
58). He offered a graphic for this (XIII 43):
Human Destiny
t
Order of Values
~~
Politics Morality
you are asking. Heidegger tackled the "question" of being and argued
that a response to a question is even prior to the question asked, 56 but
he stayed within the question of Being only. He did not deal with
social acts such as moral acts where the said mutuality also holds.
All acts of experiencing solidarity with others, past, present,
and in the future are equally based on mutuality: in co-responsibility.
Co-responsibility can be that of mutual merit and of guilt. That is,
solidarity can change. It becomes different when values are realized
or not realized. Phenomenologically, co-responsibility rests on the
nature of social acts, whether they are realized or not realized.
Scheler's argument for a general solidarity are hard to agree
with. If in our society today, someone would tell us that we are co-
responsible for the deeds done by others in which we had no part, is,
indeed, "incomprehensible" (III 120 I R 142). As one says, "this was
not my fault," or "I have nothing to do with this." After all, can I be
co-responsible for a child dying today of starvation in the Southern
Sudan? In moral solidarity with all others, I am. We are guilty of the
starvation of the child, no matter how far away the persons and the
political institutions may be who let this moral crime today happen.
Indeed, the cosmos of solidarity with others even extends to possible
persons living on other planets (II 523 IF 534).
Despite the above "incomprehensibility" of mutual solidarity
referred to by Scheler, the co-responsibility of solidarity is alive in the
genuine life-communities and in the encompassing persons. In this
regard, there is an abyss between politics and morality. Concerning
the highly litigious society we live in today, we may "legally" not be
co-responsible for the distant child dying of starvation. There is no
law under which a citizen living far away from the unknown child
could be indicted to be guilty. But any person who closes his or her
eyes from the moral crime that happened today in the southern Dinka
or Nuer tribes is, in terms of a universal solidarity, co-responsible.
The notion of a universal co-responsible solidarity, must be
incomprehensible with people living in a litigious system of society
was, apart from its religious formulations that all sinned in Adam,
articulated in Pascal's Pensee 505:
Publishers:
Vol. 3. Vom Umsturz der Werle. [The Tum-Over ofValues] pp. 450.
Ed.: Maria Scheler.
BOOKS
ESSAYS
Berrnes, Christian. "'Welt' als Ursprung und Ma/3 des Denkens und
Philosophierens. Weltkonzepte in Max Schelers Philosophie." In:
Denken des Ursprungs - Ursprung des Denkens. Schelers Philoso-
sophie und ihre Anfange in Jena. Eds.: Chr. Berrnes, W. Henckrnann,
H. Leonardy. Wtirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1998, pp. 54-67 .
----
."Schelers Idee von Europa im 'Welta1ter desAusgleichs'."
In: Zeitschriftfor Politik, 44, 1997, pp. 129-148 .
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. "Max Schelers These: Wirklichkeit ist Widerstandserleb-
nis." In Wirklichkeit und Sinnerfahrung. Grundfragen der Philoso-
phie im 20. Jahrhundert. Ed.: R. Hiintelmann. Dette1bach: 1998, pp.
140-173.
----
."De l'homme et de dieu dans la philosophie de Max
Scheler." In: Veritas, 45,2000, pp. 51-66.
Mader, Wilhelm. Die Leiden des Lebens und die Leidenschaft des
Denkens. Zur Dialektik von Leben und Werk eines Philosophen.
[Unpublished manuscript, 1983.]
Platter, Guntram. "Max Schelers Lehre von Politik und Moral." In:
Forum der Forschung (1995), Nr. 1, pp. 43-46.
Sepp, Hans Reiner."Max Schelers Begriff des Ethos." In: Person und
Wert. Schelers 'Formalismus' - Perspektiven und Wirkungen. Eds.:
Chr. Bermes, W. Henckrnann, H. Leonardy. Freiburg I Miinchen:
Verlag Karl Alber, 2000, pp. 89-99.
expanse; abs. time 124 life; values 9-14, 22, 26, 30, 36,
Einstein 133 39-40, 49-54, 167, 208, 214-
four dim. 118-119, 121-122 215
impuls. 117-118,123,134 phenomenon 95, 176
pre-spati o-temp. time 80-81,86-87,90,92,97,
functionalization; (impulsion, 100-108, 110-112, 115-120,
spirit, mind) 117-118 127, 129, 135, 140, 143-148,
154, 156, 158, 162, 177, 186,
field theory 119-120, 128, 130- 192-195, 197,201
133 spiritualization 92
Napoleon, 64
Newton, 1., xiv, 159
Nietzsche, Fr., xiv-xvii, 28, 209
Orsippos, 54
Ortiz, A., 47
Verducci, D., 37
Virgil, 202
Vreeland, R., 119
Zeus, 50-51
Phaenomenologica
I. E. Fink: Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phiinomen-Begriffs. 1958
ISBN 90-247-0234-8
2. H.L. van Breda and J. Taminiaux (eds.): Husser/ et Ia pensee moderne I Husser/ und das Denken
der Neuzeit. Actes du deuxieme Colloque International de Phenomeno1ogie I Akten des zweiten
Internationalen Phiinomenologischen Kolloquiums (Krefeld, 1.-3. Nov. 1956). 1959
ISBN 90-247-0235-8
3. J.-C. Piguet: De l'esthetique a Ia metaphysique. 1959 ISBN 90-247-0236-4
4. E. Husser/: 1850-1959. Recueil commemoratif publie a!'occasion du centenaire de Ia naissance
du philosophe. 1959 ISBN 90-247-0237-2
5/6. H. Spiegelberg: The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. 3rd revised ed. with
the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. 1982 ISBN Hb: 90-247-2577-1; Pb: 90-247-2535-6
7. A. Roth: Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Dargestellt anhand seiner Vorlesungs-
manuskripte. 1960 ISBN 90-247-0241-0
8. E. Levinas: Totalite et infini. Essai sur l'exteriorite. 4th ed., 4th printing 1984
ISBN Hb: 90-247-5105-5; Pb: 90-247-2971-8
9. A. de Wae1hens: La philosophie et les experiences naturelles. 1961 ISBN 90-247-0243-7
10. L. Eley: Die Krise des Apriori in der transzendentalen Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1962
ISBN 90-247-0244-5
11. A. Schutz: Collected Papers, I. The Problem of Social Reality. Edited and introduced by M.
Natanson. 1962; 5th printing: 1982 ISBN Hb: 90-247-5089-X; Pb: 90-247-3046-5
Collected Papers, II see below under Volume 15
Collected Papers, III see below under Volume 22
Collected Papers, IV see below under Volume 136
12. J.M. Broekman: Phiinomenologie und Egologie. Faktisches und transzendentales Ego bei Edmund
Husser!. 1963 ISBN 90-247-0245-3
13. W.J. Richardson: Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought. Preface by Martin Heidegger.
1963; 3rd printing: 1974 ISBN 90-24 7-02461-1
14. J.N. Mohanty: Edmund Husser/'s Theory of Meaning. 1964; reprint: 1969 ISBN 90-247-0247-X
15. A. Schutz: Collected Papers, 11. Studies in Social Theory. Edited and introduced by A. Brodersen.
1964; reprint: 1977 ISBN 90-247-0248-8
16. I. Kern: Husser/ und Kant. Eine Untersuchung iiber Husserls Verhaltnis zu Kant und zum Neu-
kantianismus. 1964; reprint: 1984 ISBN 90-247-0249-6
17. R.M. Zaner: The Problem of Embodiment. Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body.
1964; reprint: 1971 ISBN 90-247-5093-8
18. R. Sokolowski: The Formation of Husser/'s Concept of Constitution. 1964; reprint: 1970
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19. U. Claesges: Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution. 1964 ISBN 90-247-0251-8
20. M. Dufrenne: Jalons. 1966 ISBN 90-247-0252-6
21. E. Fink: Studien zur Phiinomenologie, 1930-1939. 1966 ISBN 90-247-0253-4
22. A. Schutz: Collected Papers, lll. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. Edited by I. Schutz.
With an introduction by Aaron Gurwitsch. 1966; reprint: 1975 ISBN 90-247-5090-3
23. K. Held: Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei
Edmund Husser!, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. 1966 ISBN 90-247-0254-2
24. 0. Laffoucriere: Le destin de Ia pensee et 'La Mort de Dieu' seton Heidegger. 1968
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25. E. Husser!: Briefe an Roman Jngarden. Mit Erlauterungen und Erinnerungen an Husser!. Hrsg. von
R. Ingarden. 1968 ISBN Hb: 90-247-0257-7; Pb: 90-247-0256-9
26. R. Boehm: Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phiinomenologie (I). Husserl-Studien. 1968
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For Band 11 see below under Volume 83
Phaenomenologica
27. T. Conrad: Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens. Mit einem Geleitwort von H.L.
van Breda. 1968 ISBN 90-247-0260-7
28. W. Biemel: Philosophische Analysen zur Kunst der Gegenwart. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0263-1; Pb: 90-247-0262-3
29. G. Thines: La problernatique de la psychologie. 1968
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0265-8; Pb: 90-247-0264-X
30. D. Sinha: Studies in Phenomenology. 1969 ISBN Hb: 90-247-0267-4; Pb: 90-247-0266-6
31. L. Eley: Metakritik der forma/en Logik. Sinnliche Gewissheit als Horizon! der Aussagenlogik und
elementaren Pradikatenlogik. 1969 ISBN Hb: 90-247-0269-0; Pb: 90-247-0268-2
32. M.S. Frings: Person und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0271-2; Pb: 90-247-0270-4
33. A. Rosales: Transzendenz und Differenz. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen Differenz
beim friihen Heidegger. 1970 ISBN 90-247-0272-0
34. M.M. Saraiva: L'imagination selon Husser/. 1970 ISBN 90-247-0273-9
35. P. Janssen: Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls Spatwerk. 1970
ISBN 90-247-0274-7
36. W. Marx: Vernunft und Welt. Zwischen Tradition und anderem Anfang. 1970
ISBN 90-247-5042-3
37. J.N. Mohanty: Phenomenology and Ontology. 1970 ISBN 90-247-5053-9
38. A. Aguirre: Genetische Phiinomenologie und Reduktion. Zur Letztbegriindung der Wissenschaft
aus der radikalen Skepsis im Denken E. Husserls. 1970 ISBN 90-247-5025-3
39. T.F. Geraets: Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendentale. La genese de Ia philosophie de
Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu'a Ia 'Phenomenologie de Ia perception.' Preface par E. Levinas.
1971 ISBN 90-247-5024-5
40. H. Decleve: Heidegger et Kant. 1970 ISBN 90-247-5016-4
41. B. Waldenfels: Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss
an Edmund Husser!. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5072-5
42. K. Schuhmann: Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phiinomenologie. Zum Weltproblem in der
Philosophie Edmund Husserls. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5121-7
43. K. Goldstein: Selected Papers/Ausgewiihlte Schriften. Edited by A. Gurwitsch, E.M. Goldstein
Haudek and W.E. Haudek. Introduction by A. Gurwitsch. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5047-4
44. E. Holenstein: Phiinomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips
der passiven Genesis bei E. Husser!. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1175-4
45. F. Hammer: Theonome Anthropologie? Max Schelers Menschenbild und seine Grenzen. 1972
ISBN 90-247-1186-X
46. A. Paianin: Wissenschaft und Geschichte in der Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1972
ISBN 90-247-1194-0
47. G.A. de Almeida: Sinn und Inhalt in der genetischen Phiinomenologie E. Husserls. 1972
ISBN 90-247-1318-8
48. J. Rolland de Reneville: Aventure de l'absolu. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1319-6
49. U. Claesges und K. Held (eds.): Perspektiven transzendental-phiinomenologischer Forschung. Fiir
Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seiner Kolner Schiilern. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1313-7
50. F. Kersten and R. Zaner (eds.): Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays in Memory
of Dorion Cairns. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1302-1
51. W. Biemel (ed.): Phiinomenologie Heute. Festschrift fiir Ludwig Landgrebe. 1972
ISBN 90-247-1336-6
52. D. Souche-Dagues: Le developpement de l'intentionnalite dans Ia phenomenologie husserlienne.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1354-4
53. B. Rang: Kausalitiit und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von Perspektivitat und
Objektivitiit in der Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1353-6
54. E. Levinas: Autrement qu'etre ou au-dela de /'essence. 2nd. ed.: 1978 ISBN 90-247-2030-3
55. D. Cairns: Guide for Translating Husser/. 1973 ISBN Pb: 90-247-1452-4
Phaenomenologica
56. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phiinomenologie, I. Husser! iiber Pfander. 1973
ISBN 90-247-1316-1
57. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phiinomenologie, II. Reine Phiinomenologie und phiinomeno-
logische Philosophie. Historisch-analytische Monographie iiber Husserls 'Ideen I'. 1973
ISBN 90-247-1307-2
58. R. Williame: Les fondements phenomenologiques de Ia sociologie comprehensive: Alfred Schutz
etMaxWeber.l973 ISBN90-247-1531-8
59. E. Marbach: Das Problem des Ich in der Phiinomenologie Husserls. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1587-3
60. R. Stevens: James and Husser!: The Foundations of Meaning. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1631-4
61. H.L. van Breda (ed.): Verite et Verification I Wahrheit und Verifikation. Actes du quatrieme
Colloque International de Phenomenologie I Akten des vierten Internationalen Kolloquiums fiir
Phiinomenologie (Schwabisch Hall, Baden-Wiirttemberg, 8.-11. September 1969). 1974
ISBN 90-247-1702-7
62. Ph.J. Bossert (ed.): Phenomenological Perspectives. Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of
Herbert Spiegelberg. 1975. ISBN 90-247-1701-9
63. H. Spiegelberg: Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology. 1975
ISBN 90-247-1725-6
64. R. Ingarden: On the Motives which Led Husser! to Transcendental Idealism. 1975
ISBN 90-247-1751-5
65. H. Kuhn, E. Ave-Lallemant and R. Gladiator (eds.): Die Miinchener Phiinomenologie. Vortriige
des Internationalen Kongresses in Miinchen (13.-18. Aprill971). 1975 ISBN 90-247-1740-X
66. D. Cairns: Conversations with Husser! and Fink. Edited by the Husserl-Archives in Lou vain. With
a foreword by R.M. Zaner. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1793-0
67. G. Hoyos Vasquez: Intentionalitiit als Verantwortung. Geschichtsteleologie und Teleologie der
Intentionalitiit bei Husser!. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1794-9
68. J. Patocka: Le monde nature! comme probleme philosophique. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1795-7
69. W.W. Fuchs: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence. An Essay in the Philosophy of
Edmund Husser!. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1822-8
70. S. Cunningham: Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husser!. 1976
ISBN 90-247-1823-6
71. G.C. Moneta: On Identity. A Study in Genetic Phenomenology. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1860-0
72. W. Biemel und das Husserl-Archiv zu Lowen (eds.): Die Welt des Menschen - Die Welt der
Philosophie. Festschrift fiir Jan Patocka. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1899-6
73. M. Richir: Au-dela du renversement copernicien. La question de Ia phenomenologie et son
fondement. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1903-8
74. H. Mongis: Heidegger et Ia critique de Ia notion de valeur. La destruction de Ia fondation
metaphysique. Lettre-preface de Martin Heidegger. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1904-6
75. J. Taminiaux: Le regard et l'excedent. 1977 ISBN 90-247-2028-1
76. Th. de Boer: The Development of Husser/'s Thought. 1978
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2039-7; Pb: 90-247-2124-5
77. R.R. Cox: Schutz's Theory of Relevance. A Phenomenological Critique. 1978
ISBN 90-247-2041-9
78. S. Strasser: Jenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine Einfiihrung in Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophie. 1978
ISBN 90-247-2068-0
79. R.T. Murphy: Hume and Husser!. Towards Radical Subjectivism. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2172-5
80. H. Spiegelberg: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2392-2
81. J.R. Mensch: The Question of Being in Husser/'s Lagical Investigations. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2413-9
82. J. Loscerbo: Being and Technology. A Study in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2411-2
83. R. Boehm: Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phiinomenologie II. Studien zur Phiinomenologie der Epoche.
1981 ISBN 90-247-2415-5
Phaenomenologica
84. H. Spiegelberg and E. Ave-Lallemant (eds.): Pfiinder-Studien. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2490-2
85. S. Valdinoci: Lesfondements de Ia phenomenologie husserlienne. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2504-6
86. I. Yamaguchi: Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivitiit bei Edmund Husser/. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2505-4
87. J. Libertson: Proximity. Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2506-2
88. D. Welton: The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomen-
ology. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2618-2
89. W.R. McKenna: Husser/'s 'Introductions to Phenomenology'. Interpretation and Critique. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2665-4
90. J.P. Miller: Numbers in Presence and Absence. A Study of Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematics.
1982 ISBN 90-247-2709-X
91. U. Melle: Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung inphiinomenologischer Einstellung.
Untersuchungen zu den phiinomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und
Merleau-Ponty. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2761-8
92. W.S. Hamrick (ed.): Phenomenology in Practice and Theory. Essays for Herbert Spiegelberg. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2926-2
93. H. Reiner: Duty and Inclination. The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with
Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. I983 ISBN 90-247-2818-6
94. M.J. Harney: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. I 984 ISBN 90-247-289I -6
95. Kah Kyung Cho (ed.): Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2922-X
96. A. Lingis: Phenomenological Explanations. 1986 ISBN Hb: 90-247-3332-4; Pb: 90-247-3333-2
97. N. Rotenstreich: Reflection and Action. 1985 ISBN Hb: 90-247 -2969-6; Pb: 90-247-3128-3
98. J.N. Mohanty: The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2991-2; Pb: 90-247-3146-1
99. J.J. Kockelmans: Heidegger on Art and Art Works. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3102-X
100. E. Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. 1987
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3272-7; Pb: 90-247-3395-2
101. R. Regvald: Heidegger et le probleme du neant. 1986 ISBN 90-247-3388-X
102. J.A. Barash: Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3493-2
103. J.J. Kockelmans (ed.): Phenomenological Psychology. The Dutch School. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3501-7
104. W.S. Hamrick: An Existential Phenomenology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3520-3
105. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux (eds.): The Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten
Years. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3709-5
106. D. Carr: Interpreting Husser/. Critical and Comparative Studies. 1987. ISBN 90-247-3505-X
107. G. Heffernan: Isagoge in die phiinomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einfiihrung in die
phiinomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der Forma/en und transzendenten
Logik von Edmund Husser!. 1989 ISBN 90-247-3710-9
108. F. Volpi, J.-F. Mattei, Th. Sheenan, J.-F. Courtine, J. Taminiaux, J. Sallis, D. Janicaud, A.L. Kelkel,
R. Bernet, R. Brisart, K. Held, M. Haar et S. Usseling: Heidegger et /'idee de Ia phenomenologie.
1988 ISBN 90-247-3586-6
109. C. Singevin: Dramaturgie de /'esprit. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3557-2
110. J. Patocka: Le monde nature/ et le mouvement de /'existence humaine. 1988ISBN 90-247-3577-7
Ill. K.-H. Lembeck: Gegenstand Geschichte. Geschichtswissenschaft in Husserls Phiinomenologie.
1988 ISBN 90-247-3635-8
112. J.K. Cooper-Wiele: The Totalizing Act. Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0077-7
Phaenomenologica
113. S. Valdinoci: Le principe d'existence. Un devenir psychiatrique de Ia phenomenologie. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0125-0
114. D. Lohmar: Phiinomenologie der Mathematik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0187-0
115. S. !Jsseling (Hrsgb.): Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0372-5
116. R. Cobb-Stevens: Husser! and Analytic Philosophy. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0467-5
117. R. Klockenbusch: Husser! und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in Phanomenologie und
Dialektik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0515-9
118. S. Vaitkus: How is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems of
the Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0820-4
119. C. Macann: Presence and Coincidence. The Transformation of Transcendental into Ontological
Phenomenology. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0923-5
120. G. Shpet: Appearance and Sense. Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its Problems.
Translated from Russian by Th. Nemeth. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1098-5
121. B. Stevens: L'apprentissage des signes. Lecture de Paul Ricceur. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1244-9
122. G. Soffer: Husser/ and the Question of Relativism. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1291-0
123. G. Riimpp: Husser/s Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit. Und Ihre Bedeutung fiir eine Theorie
intersubjektiver Objektivitat und die Konzeption einer phanomenologischen Philosophie. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1361-5
124. S. Strasser: Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phanomenologie als ethischer Fundamental-
philosophie. 1991 ISBN Hb: 0-7923-1404-2; Pb: 0-7923-1551-0
125. R.P. Buckley: Husser/, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility. 1992
ISBN 0-7923-1633-9
126. J.G. Hart: The Person and the Common Life. Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics. 1992
ISBN 0-7923-1724-6
127. P. van Tongeren, P. Sars, C. Bremmers and K. Boey (eds.): Eros and Eris. Contributions to a
Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Liber Amicorum for Adriaan Peperzak. 1992
ISBN 0-7923-1917-6
128. Nam-In Lee: Edmund Husserls Phiinomenologie der Instinkte. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2041-7
129. P. Burke and J. Vander Veken (eds.): Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2142-1
130. G. Haefliger: Uber Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman lngardens. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2227-4
131. J. Lampert: Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husser/'s Logical Investigations. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3105-2
132. J.M. DuBois: Judgment and Sachverhalt. An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenomenological
Realism. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3519-8
133. B.E. Babich (ed.): From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire. Essays in Honor of
William J. Richardson, S.J. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3567-8
134. M. Dupuis: Pronoms et visages. Lecture d'Emmanuel Levinas. 1996
ISBN Hb: 0-7923-3655-0; Pb 0-7923-3994-0
135. D. Zahavi: Husser/ und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitiit. Eine Antwort auf die sprachprag-
matische Kritik. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3 713-1
136. A. Schutz: Collected Papers, IV Edited with preface and notes by H. Wagner and G. Psathas, in
collaboration with F. Kersten. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3760-3
137. P. Kontos: D'une phenomenologie de Ia perception chez Heidegger. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3776-X
138. F. Kuster: Wege der Verantwortung. Husserls Phanomenologie als Gang durch die Faktizitat. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-3916-9
139. C. Beyer: Von Bo/zano zu Husser/. Eine Untersuchung iiber den Ursprung der phanomenologischen
Bedeutungslehre. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4050-7
140. J. Dodd: Idealism and Corporeity. An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's Phenomen-
ology. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4400-6
141. E. Kelly: Structure and Diversity. Studies in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler.
1997 ISBN 0-7923-4492-8
Phaenomenologica
142. J. Cavallin: Content and Object. Husser!, Twardowski and Psychologism. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4734-X
143. H.P. Steeves: Founding Community. A Phenomenological-Ethical Inquiry. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4 798-6
144. M. Sawicki: Body, Text, and Science. The Literacy oflnvestigative Practices and the Phenomeno-
logy of Edith Stein. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4759-5; Pb: 1-4020-0262-9
145. O.K. Wiegand: lnterpretationen der Modallogik. Ein Beitrag zur phiinomenologischen Wis-
senschaftstheorie. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4809-5
146. P. Marrati-Guenoun: La genese et Ia trace. Derrida lecteur de Husser! et Heidegger. 1998
ISBN 0-7923-4969-5
147. D. Lohmar: Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. I998 ISBN 0-7923-5117-7
148. N. Depraz and D. Zahavi (eds.): Alterity and Facticity. New Perspectives on Husser!. 1998
ISBN 0-7923-5187-8
149. E. 0verenget: Seeing the Self Heidegger on Subjectivity. 1998
ISBN Hb: 0-7923-5219-X; Pb: 1-4020-0259-9
150. R.D. Rollinger: Husserls Position in the School of Brentano. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5684-5
151. A. Chrudzimski: Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman lngarden. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5688-8
152. B. Bergo: Levinas Between Ethics and Politics. For the Beauty that Adorns the Earth. 1999
ISBN 0-7923-5694-2
153. L. Ni: Seinsglaube in der Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5779-5
154. E. Peron: Phenomenologie de Ia mort. Surles traces de Levinas. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5935-6
155. R. Visker: Truth and Singularity. Taking Foucault into Phenomenology. 1999
ISBN Hb: 0-7923-5985-2; Pb: 0-7923-6397-3
156. E.E. Kleist: Judging Appearances. A Phenomenological Study of the Kantian sensus communis.
2000 ISBN Hb: 0-7923-6310-8; Pb: 1-4020-0258-0
157. D. Pradelle: L'archeologie du monde. Constitution de l'espace, idealisme et intuitionnisme chez
Husser!. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6313-2
158. H.B. Schmid: Subjekt, System, Diskurs. Edmund Husserls Begriff transzendentaler Subjektivitiit
in sozia1theoretischen Beziigen. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6424-4
159. A. Chrudzimski: lntentionalitiitstheorie beim friihen Brentano. 200 I ISBN 0-7923-6860-6
160. N. Depraz: Luciditi du corps. De l'empirisme transcendantal en phenomenologie. 2001
ISBN 0-7923-6977-7
161. T. Kortooms: Phenomenology of Time. Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness. 2001
ISBN 1-4020-0121-5
162. R. Boehm: Topik. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0629-2
163. A. Chernyakov: The Ontology of Time. Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husser!
and Heidegger. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0682-9
164. D. Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt (eds.): One Hundred Years of Phenomenology. Husser!' Logical Invest-
igations Revisited. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0700-0
165. B. Ferreira: Stimmung bei Heidegger. Das Phiinomen der Stimmung im Kontext von Heideggers
Existenzialanalyse des Daseins. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0701-9
166. S. Luft: Phiinomenologie der Phiinomenologie. Systematik und Methodologie der Phiinomenologie
in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husser[ und Fink. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0901-1
167. M. Roesner: Metaphysica ludens. Das Spiel als phiinomenologische Grundfigur im Denken Martin
Heideggers. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1234-9
168. M.S. Frings: LifeTime. Max Scheler's Philosophy of Time. A First Inquiry and Presentation. 2003
ISBN 1-4020-1333-7