STATCON (finals) - 1E We cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 on preventive suspension is not a
CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR STATUTES
People v. Temporada
G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008
While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in
construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable but contradictory
constructions, the one more favorable to the accused should be upheld, which in
this case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on
statutory construction in this wise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly
construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties
and in favor of the persons on whom that words are given their ordinary meaning
and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone
subjected to a criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the
status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not subject to
abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several justifications
based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused individuals. Strict
construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to mean that penal
statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in language people generally
understand, about actions that would result in liability and the nature of potential
penalties. A number of courts have said:
the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is a fundamental
principle which in our judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the
lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of making unmistakably
clear those acts for the commission of which the citizen may lose his life or liberty.
Therefore, all the canons of interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to
criminal statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction]
The burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is
their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts x x x x
Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary discretion
by officials and judges. As one judge noted: the courts should be particularly
careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not overthrown, in order to reach an
offender who is, but perhaps ought not to be, sheltered behind them.
Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180700, 04 March 2008
It is petitioners contention that as a penal statute, the provision on preventive
suspension should be strictly construed against the State and liberally in their
favor.
penal provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule finds
no application. The Court expounded on this point in Buenaseda v. Flavier:
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally
construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461;
Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is
penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public
or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658;
Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497).
A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to
be interpreted liberally [People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644). [35]
As we have already established, preventive suspension is not, in actual fact, a
penalty at all. It is a procedural rule.
Provincial Chapter of Laguna, NP v. COMELEC
It is finally contended by petitioner that private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis
is guilty of turncoatism in violation of Section 10, Article XII (C) of the 1973
Constitution in relation to Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 and P.D. No.
1661, as amended by P.D. No. 1661-A.
No elective public officer may charge his political party affiliation during
his terms of office, and no candidate for any elective public organization
may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately
preceding or following an election (Section 10, Art. XII [C]).
Finally, to make the constitutional prohibition, applicable to the period beyond the
frame up, term to which public officials were elected in the 1971 local elections
under their respective political parties would work manifest injustice and unduly
impinge on the freedom of association guaranteed to all individuals, incumbent
public officials who ran during the last election (1971 elections) prior to the 1973
Constitution which embodies the said novel provision, would be undoubtedly
unjustifiably prejudiced if the party under the banner of which they ran and won,
would no longer participate in the succeeding elections after the effectivity of the
new Constitution, such as the Liberal Party in the case at bar which boycotted all
elections during and after the lifting of martial law. In the present case, it appears
that most of the prominent LP leaders who participated in the elections held after
the effectivity of new Constitution, campaigned and ran under new opposition
groups such as the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), National Union for Liberation (NUI),
Mindanao Alliance (MA), Pusyon Bisaya, Bicol Saro and other new political
aggrupations. This we believe was not the manifest intention of the framers.\
Indeed, of two reasonably possible constructions, one of which would diminish or
restrict fundamental right of of people and the other of which would not do so,
latter construction must be adopted (16 C.J.S 69 footnote).
Hence, the more logical interpretation is that which gives effect to Section 10 of
Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution and does not violate the individuals basic
right to association.
Genaro Reyes Construction v. CA
G.R. No. 108718 July 14, 1994
The discretion, therefore, of the DPWH to terminate or rescind contract comes into
play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of
15% or more. In the instant case, the negative slippage of petitioners at the time
they were served the notice of termination was only 9. 86%. Hence, respondents
violated the law and committed an illegal act and abused their discretion when
they terminated petitioners contract based in negative slippage of only 9.86%.
Such wrongful and illegal act is in derogation of petitioners right not to be
deprived of property without due process of law. Petitioners contract with the
DPWH covering the project in question is a proprietary right within the meaning of
the Constitution and can only be rescinded strictly in accordance with the
governing law, Presidential Decree No. 1870, as implemented by DPWH Circular
No. 102.
RULES OF COURT
Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. (2a)
Vette Industrial Sales v. Cheng
G.R. No. 170232, 05 December 2006
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due
process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a
motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is
permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied
procedural due process and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been
served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion
for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the
motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it.
These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the
notice of hearing rule. In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks
such notice, the prompt resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is
held to have cured the defect.
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due
process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders
any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to
promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action and proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, we believe
that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper.
PNB v. Deang Marketing
G.R. No. 17793, 08 December 2008
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
(12) The courts discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon
such motions timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to
entertain or grant it, [13] Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of
the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare
invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this court to suspend procedural rules.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction
of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.
This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained
at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in
the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement
of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsically in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other,
or as often suggested that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedures must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain
his failure to abide by the rules.
Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner
G.R. No. L-25602 February 18, 1970
It is true that in construction of tax statutes, tax exemptions (and deductions are of
this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer.
However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is
clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the courts seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction. In this case, we find the provision of Section 186-A
Whenever a tax free product is utilized, etc.all encompassing to
comprehend tax-free raw materials, even if imported. Where the law
provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court is not
at liberty to supply any.
Serfino v. CA
G.R. No. L-40858, 15 September 1987
The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed
procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of
property rights should be follower punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes
governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but
also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public
officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land
owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement
of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale.
People v. Castaeda
G.R. No. L-46881, September 15, 1988
Accused Valencia argued that the People were estopped from questioning his
entitlement to the benefits of the tax amnesty, considering that agents of the BIR
had already accepted his application for tax amnesty and his payment of the
required fifteen percent (15%) special tax.
This contention does not persuade. At the time he paid the special fifteen percent
(15%) tax under P.D. No. 370, accused Francisco Valencia had in fact already
been subjected by the BIR to extensive investigation such that the criminal
charges against him could not be condoned under the provisions of the amnesty
statute. Further, acceptance by the BIR agents of accused Valencias application
for tax amnesty and payment of the fifteen percent (15%) special tax was no more
than a ministerial duty on the part of such agents. Accused Valencia does not
pretend that the BIR had actually ruled that he was entitled to the benefits of the
tax amnesty statute. In any case, even assuming, though only arguendo, that the
BIR had so ruled, there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and
enforcement of law by public officers do not block, subsequent correct application
of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its agent, which finds application in the case at bar.
Still further, a tax amnesty, much like to a tax exemption, is never favored not
presumed in law and it granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a
tax exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority. Valencias payment of the special fifteen percent (15%) tax
must be regarded as legally ineffective.
CIR v. BF Goodrich Phil. and CA
G.R. No. 104171, February 24, 1999
For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any unreasonable examination,
investigation or assessment, our tax law provides a statute of limitations in the
collection of taxes. Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure,
should be liberally construed in order to afford such protection.
As a corollary, the exceptions to the law on the prescription should perforce be
strictly construed.
Villavert v. ECC
G.R. No. L-48605, 14 December 1981
The Medical Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that the
exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite extensive
researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and
mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated
by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of
the Philippine Constabulary, there is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert
had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died. Neither is there a
showing that he used drugs.
It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
provided that All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.
Abella v. NLRC
G.R. No. 71813, 20 July 1987
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to
fill in the details. The prohibition is not to read with the literal exactness like a
mathematical formula for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest
may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws
read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as
a postulate of the legal order.
All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under
the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible
exercise of that power. Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be
precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing
that which otherwise may be prohibited.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as amended refers to
employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioners lease
contract with the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have
the effect of annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of
working class.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code
which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to
a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which
is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection to labor.
Vicente v. ECC
G.R. No. 85024, 23 January 1991
The question is on whether the petitioner suffers from permanent total disability as
he claims, or from permanent partial disability as held by the respondent
Commission.
In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is established beyond
doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that from all
available indications, it appears that the petitioner's application for optional
retirement on the basis of his ailments had been approved. The decision of the
respondent Commission even admits that the petitioner "retired from government
service at the age of 45."
Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer, the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center, categorically certified that the petitioner was classified
under permanent total disability. On this score, "the doctor's certification as to the
nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not
make a false certification."
Amora v. Loong
G.R. No. 192280, 25 January 2011
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitutio, the power to prescribe
additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification from
office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an
office is a valuable one.
We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a candidate has received
popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.
Loong v. Comelec
G.R. No. 133676, 14 April 1999
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where
the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from
levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives
the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have COMELEC
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only
reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6)
municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is
that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly
determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal
interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to
be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot
count the result of an election.
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the
COMELEC in order that it can more effectively perform its duty of safeguarding
the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, we laid down this liberal
approach, viz:
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections
and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters.
The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular
government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the
elections.
Home Insurance v, Eastern Shipping Lines
G.R. No. L-34382, July 20, 1983
To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an
unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade
relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.
Alpha Insurance v. Castos
G.R. No. 198174, 02 September 2003
In denying respondents claim, petitioner takes exception by arguing that the word
"damage," under paragraph 4 of "Exceptions to Section III," means loss due to
injury or harm to person, property or reputation, and should be construed to cover
malicious "loss" as in "theft." Thus, it asserts that the loss of respondents vehicle
as a result of it being stolen by the latters driver is excluded from the policy.
We do not agree.
True, it is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the terms of a contract
are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the
parties thereto have used. In the case of property insurance policies, the evident
intention of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the assured, determine the
import of the various terms and provisions embodied in the policy. However, when
the terms of the insurance policy are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain, such that
the parties themselves disagree about the meaning of particular provisions, the
policy will be construed by the courts liberally in favor of the assured and strictly
against the insurer.
Fieldmens Insurance v. Vda de Songco
This is a case where the doctrine of estoppel undeniably calls for application. After
petitioner Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. had led the insured Federico Songco to
believe that he could qualify under the common carrier liability insurance policy,
and to enter into contract of insurance paying the premiums due, it could not,
thereafter, in any litigation arising out of such representation, be permitted to
change its stand to the detriment of the heirs of the insured. As estoppel is
primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will
befall the innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in this
case would result in a gross travesty of justice.
That is all that needs be said insofar as the first alleged error of respondent Court
of Appeals is concerned, petitioner being adamant in its far-from-reasonable plea
that estoppel could not be invoked by the heirs of the insured as a bar to the
alleged breach of warranty and condition in the policy. lt would now rely on the fact
that the insured owned a private vehicle, not a common carrier, something which it
knew all along when not once but twice its agent, no doubt without any objection
in its part, exerted the utmost pressure on the insured, a man of scant education,
to enter into such a contract.
GSIS v. De Leon
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally
construed in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally
construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the
retirees sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being
of government employees may be enhanced.
Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the
retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
RE: Application for retirement benefits of Britanico
Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the persons
intended to be benefitted thereby, for, as we again held in the Ortiz case:
". . . . To a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred
compensation for services performed and his right thereto commences to vest
upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation
in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly,
retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public employment. They serve
a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce able
persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and
efficient service while so employed."
Tantuico v. Domingo
Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be
discovered from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA
Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under
the retirement laws.
In Romana Cruz v. Hon. Francisco Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670 (1988), the National
Treasurer withheld the retirement benefits of an employee because of his finding
that she negligently allowed the anomalous encashment of falsified treasury
warrants.
In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that
the employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and
property responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public officer
may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign ruling in
favor of the retired employees, thus:
. . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide
the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless
otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved
was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial
process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view
of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by
administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and
enable the respondent to do indirectly what they cannot do directly under Section
3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on
February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies
Section 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that
year. Considering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general
authority granted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between
the two provisions is avoided (Hunt v. Hernandez, 64 Phil. 753 [1937]).
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant" (Co Quing y
Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court
did not err in denying the petition for naturalization.

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the
benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment,
levy or execution.

Estolas v. Mabalot

Agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantee, in order to give
full force and effect to their clear intent, which is to achieve a dignified existence
for the small farmers and to make them more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

Republic v. Ong

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued
with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.

Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs,
but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable
margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income
over his familys expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his
family with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work.

Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the

qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.

Velasco v. Republic

We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that
petitioner was employed at the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a
salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant petition,
and that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth capital
investment therein. This leads one to believe that petitioner's employment, even if
true, is but a convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to
show a token compliance with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino
citizen one must a lucrative income or occupation.
CONFLICTING STATUTES
Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
G.R. No. 152613, 30 November 2009
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No.
297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present:
(1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily
clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised
in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
It was only after the assailed Decision was promulgated -- i.e., in SEMs Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed on 13 July 2006 and its Motion
for Referral of the Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments filed on 22
August 2006 -- that it assailed the validity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing
the question on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
It is a rudimentary principle in legal hermeneutics that where there are two acts or
provisions, one of which is special and particular and certainly involves the matter
in question, the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the matter
and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special act must as
intended be taken as constituting an exception to the general act or provision,
especially when such general and special acts or provisions are
contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a
conflict.
Hence, it has become an established rule of statutory construction that where one
statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the
same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible;
but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was
passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or
of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail over the other.
It must be observed that Republic Act No. 3092, An Act to Amend Certain
Sections of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, and the Administrative
Code of 1987, are general laws. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092 and Section
14 of the Administrative Code of 1987 require the concurrence of Congress before
any portion of a forest reserve can be validly excluded therefrom. These
provisions are broad since they deal with all kinds of exclusion or reclassification
relative to forest reserves, i.e., forest reserve areas can be transformed into all
kinds of public purposes, not only the establishment of a mineral reservation.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 is a special provision, as it specifically treats of
the establishment of mineral reservations only. Said provision grants the
President the power to proclaim a mineral land as a mineral reservation,
regardless of whether such land is also an existing forest reservation.
Sec. 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586 provides:
Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System. The establishment and
operationalization of the System shall involve the following:
(a) All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside,
pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive
order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness
area, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural
and historical landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as
identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as
initial components of the System. The initial components of the System shall be
governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act.
Furthermore, the settled rule of statutory construction is that if two or more laws of
different dates and of contrary tenors are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of
legislative will.
City of Manila v. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January 1968
The issue is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 reads:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines reads:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It
is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409
is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions."
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for
the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Nuez v. GSIS Family Bank
G.R. No. 163988, 17 November 2005
In justifying its failure to file a collection suit, the bank contended that it would have
amounted to a waiver of its right to foreclose. But if early on it opted to foreclose
the mortgages, why it waited until 1997 and 1999, more than nineteen years after
the right to do so arose, the bank is glaringly mute.
Clutching at straws, the bank argues that the applicable provision is Article 1141,
not Article 1142 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code speaks of real actions over immovables or rights.
Article 1142 of the Civil Code speaks of a mortgage action which prescribes in ten
years. The strategic location of Article 1142 immediately right after Article 1141 of
the same Code, which speaks of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to
the rule in the previous article.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid
down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games
of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners
are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games
of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D.
1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an
ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also
enacted by the national lawmaking authority.
In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely
"modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change
or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the
decree has only been "modified protanto," they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the
Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol, this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect;
but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has
become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two
statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each
other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to
reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the
handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a
conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This
is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and
indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws
equally effective and mutually complementary.
Construction of the Constitution
Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
G.R. No. 152613, 30 November 2009
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No.
297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present:
(1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily
clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised
in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
It was only after the assailed Decision was promulgated -- i.e., in SEMs Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed on 13 July 2006 and its Motion
for Referral of the Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments filed on 22
August 2006 -- that it assailed the validity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing
the question on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
Nitafan v. Commissioner
The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the
deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of
the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987. Although the intent
may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a
proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has
authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the
salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all
other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then
discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the
income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by
Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed
that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that
intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it
should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the
alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they
have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants
are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted
anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which
the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
What is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already
contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far
as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII
with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public
officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under Section
13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article
XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even
Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other
office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which
states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter
provision, the disqualificationis absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions
imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed
forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and
his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President
and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz
after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be
stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise
more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain
parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the
Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office
or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective
public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act
as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall
not have been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be
avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e.,
Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner
must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article
VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.
Co v. HRET
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1. the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or
after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it
to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot
be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born
of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but
not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof,
must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result
in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the
provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103
U.S. 580)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend
on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of
essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy
this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The
enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time
had it not been for the curative provisions.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious.
He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
Heirs of Gamboa v. Finance Secretary
G.R. No. 176579, 09 October 2012
The use of the term capital was intended to replace the word stock because
associations without stocks can operate public utilities as long as they meet the
60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens prescribed in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. However, this did not change the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to reserve exclusively to Philippine nationals the
controlling interest in public utilities.
During the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, economic protectionism was the
battle-cry of the nationalists in the Convention. The same battlecry resulted in the
nationalization of the public utilities. This is also the same intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution who adopted the exact formulation embodied in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions on foreign equity limitations in partially nationalized
industries.
As we held in our 28 June 2011 Decision, to construe broadly the term capital as
the total outstanding capital stock, treated as a single class regardless of the
actual classification of shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the
Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Further, even if foreigners who own more than forty percent of the voting shares
elect an all-Filipino board of directors, this situation does not guarantee Filipino
control and does not in any way cure the violation of the Constitution. The
independence of the Filipino board members so elected by such foreign
shareholders is highly doubtful.
As the OSG pointed out, quoting Justice George Sutherlands words in
Humphreys Executor v. US,44 x x x it is quite evident that one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain
an attitude of independence against the latters will. Allowing foreign shareholders
to elect a controlling majority of the board, even if all the directors are Filipinos,
grossly circumvents the letter and intent of the Constitution and defeats the very
purpose of our nationalization laws.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D.
No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes
is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes
of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
 to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from
a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The
rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the
mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,
it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in
the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does
not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No.
3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and
reinforces it.
It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not
to affiliate, with labor unions.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference
and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and
neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic
Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.

Manila Trading v. Reyes
Three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on the
installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact the fulfillment of the obligation.
(Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan, supra.) (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay
two or more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall
have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the
mortgage, if one has been given on the property. The basis of the first option is the
Civil Code. The basis of the last two options is Act No. 4112, amendatory of the
Civil Code. And the proviso to the right to foreclose is, that if the vendor has
chosen this remedy, he shall have no further action againstthe purchaser for the
recovery of any unpaid balance owing by the same. In other words, as we see it,
the Act does no more than qualify the remedy.
We are of the opinion that the Legislature may change judicial methods and
remedies for the enforcement of contracts, as it has done by the enactment of Act
No. 4122, without unduly interfering with the obligation of the contracts, without
sanctioning class legislation, and without a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. We rule that Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable.
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them. The
proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions
in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and
the constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.
The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to
abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when
sales were payable in installments. That public policy, obvious from the statute,
was defined and established by legislative authority. It is for the courts to
perpetuate it.
Yee Cong Eng v. Trinindad
The purpose of the Legislature in enacting Act No. 2972 is disclosed by the
decision of this court in Young vs. Rafferty, supra, by the messages of the
Governor-General, by the hearings before the committees of the Philippine
Legislature, and by other sources. All these indicate that the Act is a fiscal
measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents and to prevent
fraud in the returns of merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income
tax. For instance, in the decision in Young vs. Rafferty, supra, it was stated: "... It
need hardly be said that the record which merchants are required to keep of their
daily sales under the provisions of the circular letter of the Collector set out in the
complaint is simplicity itself, and that it will, if honestly and faithfully kept, enable
theGovernment to collect the percentage tax exactly due it. ..."
Conceded that the Chinese handle sixty per cent of the aggregate business of the
Philippines, approximate equality in taxation demands that they pay something
like the same proportion in taxes for the support of the State.
Yee Cong Eng v. Trinindad
It may be said to be an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of
construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is
susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain and the other destroy
it, the courts will always adopt the former. Whenever a law can be so construed as
to uphold it, it will be so construed although the construction which is adopted
does not appear to be as natural as another construction. But where the meaning
of the Act is plain, words cannot be read into it or out of it in order to save the law.
Yee Cong Eng v. Trinindad
Identical canons of statutory construction have often been invoked in the
Philippines to enable the courts to avoid declaring a law unconstitutional. For
instance, the decision in the well known case of In re Guaria ( [1913], 24 Phil. 37,
46), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 87, 93, and 94, is authority for this
statement of the rule: "It is the duty of the courts in construing a statute enacted by
the Philippine Commission (Legislature), not to give it a construction which would
be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law; and in doing
so, contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator will be disregarded
which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in
violation of an Act of Congress." Not long since, this court, in the case of Fuentes
vs. Director of Prisons, No. 22449,1 saved Act No. 3104 relating to the death
penalty, from a fate similar to its subject by refusing to give a literal meaning to the
phraseology of the law.
Yee Cong Eng v. Trinindad
A third construction which is permissible in view of the history of the legislation and
the wording of the statute, is, that the law only intended to require the keeping of
such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for
tax purposes. It has not escaped our notice that the law does not specify what
books shall be kept. It is stated by competent witnesses that a cash book, a
journal, and a ledger are indispensable books of account for an efficient system of
accounting, and that, in the smaller shops, even simpler entries showing merely
the daily record of sales and record of purchases of merchandise would be
sufficient. The keeping of records of sales and possibly further records of
purchases, in English Spanish, or native dialect, and the filling out of the
necessary forms would serve the purpose of the Government while not being
oppressive. Actually, notations in English, Spanish, or a dialect of all sales in sales
books, and of data in other specified forms are insisted upon by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, although as appears from Exhibit 2, it is doubtful is all Chinese
merchants have complied with these regulations. The faithful observance of such
rules by the Chinese is not far removed from the offer of cooperation oft made for
them by the petitioners or the "translation of the account books" oft mentioned and
explained by the respondents.
Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons
On the other hand, this court has adopted the healthy principle that in these
matters we must be tolerant, the object being correction, not retaliation. (In re
Torres, supra.) Representatives of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Lawyer's Guild, appearing as amici curiae, pleaded for a liberal attitude, assuring
us the publication had not in the least affected the court's prestige and standing,
albeit manifesting anxious concern over individual freedom of speech and of the
press. There should be no apprehension in that regard because this court believes
That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be
protected in its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and
of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense; that as
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary.
Garcia v. Comelec
The essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is
the proper subject of an initiative.
Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They
rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of
1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal
process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."
Garcia v. Comelec
We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will
collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in
enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and
referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . . An act includes
a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . .
it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical
acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and
determinations . . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with
and not in violation of the constitution. 21
In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even
though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used."
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate
subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act
No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes
resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations.
Ferrer v. City Mayor Bautista
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not
contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not
partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like
the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy).
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is void. Ordinance should uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.
As to conformity with existing statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals has this to say: It is a fundamental principle that municipal
ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in
the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot
adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the
general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent
with the general law.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or
city to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and
special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays,
on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and
segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of
barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing
that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable
wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-
recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the
municipality or city.

In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage
fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City,
which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of
waste generation for the past three years.
Respondents did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect
thepecific types of wastes generated whether residential, market,
commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-
industrial, institutional, etc.
It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to
the totality of wastes, without any
distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the
authority of a municipality or city to impose fees extends only to those related to
the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day
refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the
validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable
and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor
area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing
project or apartment.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does
not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident
of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay
twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Belgica v. The Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 20856, 19 November 2013
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in
the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Araullo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 209287, 03 February 2015
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it
the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will
result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling,
the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the
country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of
the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic
services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of
nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and
practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded
projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.