MODES OF DISCOVERY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 188881 April 21, 2014

FACTS:
Private respondents motions for discovery proceedings were granted by the
Sandiganbayan.

Pre-trial commenced and the PCGG produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit A to

LLL before repondents consel.

After the Pre-Trial was closed, the PCGG caused the pre-marking of additional
documents, Exhibits MMM to AAAAAAAA, over the objections of respondents. Trial
proceeded and additional documents not shown in the discovery were still marked.

Sandiganbayan denied the admission of Exhibits MMM to AAAAAAA in the Formal

Offer of Evidence filed by the Republic. PCGG filed a petition for review on certiorari to
assail the denial.
ISSUE: WoN documents not produced in the discovery proceedings during Pre-Trial may be
denied admission in the formal offer of evidence
HELD: YES, the additional documents may be denied admission
"Evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it
is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before
the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not
only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make
this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it was clearly ordered
by both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to do so, petitioner repeatedly failed to prove
the due execution and authenticity of the documents. Having failed in its belated attempts to
assuage the Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary evidence, petitioner may not
use the present forum to gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.
AFULUGENCIA v MBTC
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Motion for the issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/ ad Testificandum
after pre-trial to call Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as their initial and main
witnesses,

And to present documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their principal

documentary evidence.

The motion was denied due to their failure to observe the rules on notice and hearing and
for failure to send the adverse party written interrogatories.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners may compel the bank officers to appear and testify without sending
written interrogatories
HELD: NO, petitioners cannot compel the bank officers to testify for them due to their failure to
send written interrogatories
Unless allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not
served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony
in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
Thus, in this case, petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of
their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse
parties (based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents), as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to
Metrobanks documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to
building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence
falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own
evidence, then the adverse party may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.
DEMURRER

CAPITOL SAWMILL CORP. v GAW, et al

G.R. No. 187843
June 9, 2014
Facts:
Sps. Gaw filed an action for Determination of Shares in and Partition of the Estate of
Deceased Parents against their siblings and petitioner corporations, alleging that their
parents wholly-owned the entire assets of or the outstanding investments in Capitol
Sawmill Corp. and Columbia Wood Industries Corp.

Therefore, the two corporations should constitute part of the estate of the deceased, which
in turn must be divided among the heirs.

Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence based on a court ruling that the properties of the
corporations cannot be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person.
ISSUE: WoN the Demurrer to Evidence will prosper
HELD: NO, the Demurrer to Evidence must be denied.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides that after the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
In this case, petitioners are pushing the case too far ahead of its limits. They are themselves
determining that the issue is whether the properties of the corporation can be included in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent when the only question to be resolved in a demurrer to
evidence is whether based on the evidence, respondents, as already well put in the prior Chua
Suy Phen have a right to share in the ownership of the corporation. The question of whether the
properties of the corporation can be included in the inventory of the estate will be threshed out
and resolved during trial.
LOURDES SUITES v BINARAO
G.R. No. 204729
August 6, 2014
Petitioner filed a Statement of Claim for collection of sum of money plus damages before
the MeTC for an unpaid balance amounting to arising from damages to the furniture, a
lost key and excess guests for room accommodations contracted by Binarao.

In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not obliged to pay the claimed amount
because petitioner billed the charges twice.

The MeTC ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case with prejudice for lack
of cause of action.
ISSUE: WoN when there was a failure to prove a cause of action, the only remedy available
would be a demurrer filed by the defendant
HELD: No, the court may, motu propio dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.
Macaslang case stated that: Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a
cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the
remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been
eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a
cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to
evidence, if such motion is warranted.
The basis of the MeTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the failure of
petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim against the private respondent by clear and
convincing evidence. Hence, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action, as he referred to the evidence presented and
not to the allegations in the Complaint.
METROBANK v LEY CONTRSUCTION AND DEVT. CORP.
G.R. No. 185590
December 3, 2014

Facsts:
The Bank filed an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages with a prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants, LCDC and Sps.
Ley for an unpaid letter or credit obtained by LCDC guaranteed by the spouses under a
continuing surety agreement.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
plaintiffs witness was incompetent to testify with respect to the transaction, that the
plaintiffs documentary exhibits were not properly identified and authenticated, and that
the bank failed to establish a cause of action.

The Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the dismissal.
ISSUE: WoN a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail a
Demurrer to Evidence
HELD: NO, petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Evidence is the means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding
the truth respecting a matter of fact. As such, the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence, the basic issue presented by the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the factual
matters alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such, not proper
subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was
incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell under any of the exceptions to this
rule but it failed to do so.
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v SANNAEDLE
CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 181676
June 11, 2014

Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against the petitioner under a
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) wherein respondent agreed to supply and erect
insulated panel systems for US$3,745,287.94.
Thereafter, petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Respondent then moved for
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Answer admitted all material
allegations of the Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue.
Respondent deems that petitioners Answer, in effect, admitted the existence of the MoA
and its failure to pay the balance despite repeated demands.
ISSUE: WoN judgment on the pleadings is proper
HELD: YES, judgment on the pleadings is proper
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it
does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10,Rule 8
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleadings.
In this case, while petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification
of non-forum shopping, no legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar
respondent from seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative
defenses, petitioners denial neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum of Agreement
was perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said agreement.
MONGAO v PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 156474.
August 16, 2005

Facts:
Spouses Mongao filed a complaint for rescission and damages against the corporation
due to the continuous refusal of the corporation to heed petitioners written and oral
demands to pay the balance solely to her.
The respondent filed an Answer, alleging that petitioner Mongao and Pedro Animas, Jr.,
are the registered owners of the subject properties and they executed a Deed of Sale and
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), that Mongao demanded that payment be made to her
alone to the exclusion of the rest of the Animas family, and that it has issued a check
payable to the order of petitioner Mongao and her mother, Nellie Animas, which the
former refused.
Petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer admitted
the material allegations of the complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue.

ISSUE: WoN judgment on the pleadings is proper

HELD: YES, the judgment on the pleadings is proper
There is joinder of issues when the answer makes a specific denial of the material allegations in
the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses which would bar recovery by the plaintiff. Where
there is proper joinder of issues, the trial court is barred from rendering judgment based only on
the pleadings filed by the parties and must conduct proceedings for the reception of evidence. On
the other hand, an answer fails to tender an issue where the allegations admit the allegations in
support of the plaintiffs cause of action or fail to address them at all. In either case, there is no
genuine issue and judgment on the pleadings is proper.
Nothing from the allegations in the corporations answer makes out a proper joinder of issues.
Petitioners cause of action for rescission is founded mainly on a perfected contract of sale
allegedly entered into between petitioners and respondent corporation as embodied in the
Memorandum of Agreement attached to the complaint.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION INC. (COCOFED) vs

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR Nos 177857-58 & 178193 January 24, 2012

FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Fund (CIF) to be administered by the Philippine Coconut Administration
(PCA).Its source was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kilos of copra, P0.02
of which is to be placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized
national association of coconut producers declared by PCA.
Later on, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decrees (PDs)
which allowed the funds to be used for acquiring commercial banks and
distributing its shares for free to coconut farmers. Thus, the PCA acquired the
First United Bank, later renamed United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary
Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that
Section 2 of PD No. 755 was unconstitutional. The COCOFED representing the
over a million coconut farmers via Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the
reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration amounted to
the taking of private property without just compensation and impairment of
vested right of ownership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the summary judgment issued is valid.

HELD:
"Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as
shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue, as distinguished
from one that is fictitious, contrived and set up in bad faith, means an issue of fact that calls for
the presentation of evidence. Summary or accelerated judgment, therefore, is a procedural
technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation."
As a procedural issue, the petitioners contend that they have repeatedly tried "to adduce
evidence to prove the coco farmers actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares.
This contention is untenable, their demand to adduce evidence being disallowable on the ground
of prematurity" prohibited by section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The parties already had
the right to move for a partial summary judgment in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court.
Villuga vs Kelly Hardware and Construction Supply Inc.
G.R. No. 176570 July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Kelly filed with the RTC a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against Villuga.
Villuga filed his Answer to the Complaint. Kelly filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings which the RTC denied.
Kelly filed an Amended Complaint with leave of court which the court granted. Villuga
filed his Answer to the Amended Complain reiterating his allegations in his Answer to the
Complaint. Kelly filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of court. Villuga
filed his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint denying the allegations therein.
The RTC ruled in favor of Kelly. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE: WON the grant for summary Judgment by the RTC is proper.

HELD: The Court finds that the RTC was correct in granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Section 3 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In the present case, Kelly did not allege as to how Villugas partial payments were
applied to the latter's obligations. In fact, there is no allegation or admission whatsoever in the
said Complaint and Amended Complaint that such partial payments were made. Villuga, on the
other hand, were consistent in raising their affirmative defense of partial payment. Having
pleaded a valid defense, Villuga, at this point, were deemed to have raised genuine issues of fact.
On the basis of the foregoing, Villugas defense of partial payment, in effect, no longer
raised genuine issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the
summary judgment of the RTC in favor of Kelly is proper.

First Leverage and Services Group, Inc., vs. Solid Builders, Inc.
G.R. No. 155680 July 2, 2012
FACTS:
The instant petition arose from a Complaint for Annulment of Promise to Sell filed with
the RTC by First Leverage against PNB.
In its Amended Complaint, it impleaded Solid Builders as additional defendant. In its
Answer to the Amended Complaint, PNB denied the material allegations in the said
Amended Complaint and contended that the Complaint states no cause of action.
On the other hand, Solid Builders filed its Amended Answer asserting the same matter as
PNB.
After Pre-Trial Conference was concluded, First Leverage filed a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings and/or Resolution of Case Based on Admissions and Stipulations of
Facts of the Parties.

ISSUE: WON the RTC conducted a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment. WON
the judgment of the RTC is valid and binding to the case.

HELD: What has been rendered by the RTC is not a judgment on the pleadings. Rather, it is a
summary judgment.
In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e., facts are asserted in
the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or
specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus
arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits,
depositions, or admissions.
It must be stressed that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments
and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. The burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact rests upon the movant, in this case
First Leverage, and not upon Solid Builders who opposed the motion for summary judgment.
Any doubt as to the propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must thus be resolved
against First Leverage.Hence, the case is properly remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Soller vs. Heirs Of Jeremias Ulayao

G.R. No. 175552 July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Spouses Soller are allegedly the registered owners of a parcel of land. However, the
original defendant, now-deceased Jeremias Ulayao (Jeremias), entered into the
possession of the land.
The Spouses instituted a complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the
MCTC.
In Jeremias' Answer, he denied petitioners' allegations and raised the special and
affirmative defense of acquisitive prescription and claimed that his house and other
permanent improvements are still existing on the property.
Upon motion of petitioners, the MCTC rendered a Summary Judgment in favor of Soller.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MCTC. On Appeal, the CA found merit in
respondents' petition and vacated the summary judgments rendered by the RTC and
MCTC

ISSUE: WON the MCTC is correct in rendering a Summary Judgment.

HELD: Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the
court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any
material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In this case, records show that the original defendant, Jeremias, raised the special and
affirmative defense of acquisitive prescription in his answer, claiming that he was in open,
continuous and notorious possession or the disputed property as, in fact, his house and other
permanent improvements are still existing thereon.
. The existence of this issue therefore necessitates, for its proper resolution, the
presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which can only be done in the course of a full-
blown trial.

JUDGMENT
Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo
729 SCRA 544 G.R. No. 196251 July 9, 2014
FACTS:
Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner parcel of land. Castillo and Olivarez Realty
Corporation (ORC) entered into a contract of conditional sale over the property.
Arguing that ORC committed substantial breach of the contract of conditional sale and
that the deed of conditional sale was a contract of adhesion, Castillo prayed for rescission
of contract.
In its answer, ORC interposed compulsory counterclaim.
Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
The RTC granted the motion and rendered a summary judgment finding that there was no
genuine controversy. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in rendering summary judgment.

HELD: The trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there were no genuine issues of
material facts in this case.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations in the complaint. On the other hand, in a summary
judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific denials and affirmative defenses are
pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise not genuine.
In this case, ORC admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in
the deed of conditional sale, and set up affirmative defenses. The trial court did not err in
rendering summary judgment.

Manzanilla vs. Waterfields Industries Corporation

730 SCRA 104 G.R. No.177484 July 18, 2014
FACTS:
 The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of parcel of land. They leased a portion of the
property to Waterfields.
The parties executed later on, an Amendment to the Contract of Lease. However,
Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental.
Hence, the spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against
Waterfields. In its Answer, Waterfields admitted some of the allegations in the Complaint.
The MTC ruled in favor of the Spouses which the RTC affirmed. On appeal, the CA
concluded that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against Waterfields, and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer in favour of
Waterfields.
HELD: The CA has confused itself in resolving the basic issue involved in this case.
Surprisingly, the CA in resolving the Petition for Review before it, veered from the
incisive approach by which the trial courts determined if there exists a cause of action. It gave
credit to the spouses Manzanillas allegation in the Complaint that they terminated the contract of
lease, without first finding for itself whether there is a violation of the contract through non-
payment of rent as to justify the alleged termination, the CA impliedly considered the contract
validly terminated. The CA should not have immediately assumed as true the spouses
Manzanillas allegation that the contract was already terminated.
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to non-payment of
rent. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the contract, the CA went a bit too far in its
resolution of this case

Pestilos vs. Generoso

739 SCRA 337 G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
FACTS:
 At around 3:15am, an altercation ensued between the Pestilos and Atty. Generoso at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station)
to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPO1 Monsalve dispatched
SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.
SPO2 Javier arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed Pestilos as the who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the Pestilos to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
In an Information, Pestilos was indicted for attempted murder.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.
HELD: The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside
from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the
matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the
case."
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a
motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary
system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of
the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC

Sofio vs. Valenzuela G.R. No. 157810 February 15, 2012
FACTS:
 Valenzuela, filed a complaint against Sofio, seeking the cancellation of the emancipation
patents (EPs).
The PARAD favored Valenzuela. DARAB reversed the decision of PARAD.
CA reinstated PARADs decision, and such became final and executory.
Sofio later filed an ex parte motion for execution, which the PARAD granted.
The petitioners then filed in the CA a motion to recall entry of judgment with motion for
leave of court to file a motion for reconsideration
CA denied the motion to recall entry of judgment.

ISSUE: WON pursuant to Ramos v. Court of Appeals, a final and executory judgment may be
amended under compelling circumstances,

HELD: The case of Ramos v. Court of Appeals, which the petitioners cited to buttress their plea
for the grant of their motion to recall entry of judgment, is not pertinent.
In this regard, we stress that a judgment nunc pro tunc has been defined and characterized
thuswise:
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment
and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in
proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really
was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court
ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to
supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been.
(Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)
Based on such definition and characterization, the petitioners situation did not fall within
the scope of a nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not mere
clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the reinstatement
of the DARAB decision. SO ORDERED.

CIR vs. Fortune Tabacco Corp.

G.R. Nos. 167274-75 & G.R. No. 192576 September 11, 2013
FACTS:
 Fortune Tobacco Corporation (FTC) filed before the CTA three (3) separate petitions for
tax refund covering three different periods involving varying amounts.
In the three (3) separate decisions/resolutions, the CTA found the claims for tax refund
valid and thus ordered the payment thereof.
FTC filed for a motion for additional writ of execution before the CTA which covers the
3rd tax refund contending that the body of the Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos.
167274-75 encompasses all the 3 tax refund cases.
FTC has come to this Court via a petition for review praying that an order be issued
directing the CTA to issue an additional writ of execution against the BIR to pay FTC the
amount of tax refund in the 3rd case as adjudged, and clarify the Courts Decision in the
1st and 2nd tax refund case to apply to the affirmatory ruling of the CA in the 3rd tax refund
case which has all become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the 3rd tax refund case is covered by the Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos.
167274-75 which may warrant the issuance of additional writ of execution.

HELD: The BIR cannot plausibly, in all good faith, seek refuge on the basis of slip on the
formulation of the fallo of a decision to evade a duty. The successive favorable rulings of the tax
court, the appellate court and finally this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 say as much.
Accordingly, the Court, in the higher interest of justice and orderly proceedings should make the
corresponding clarification on the fallo of its July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Case Nos.162274
-75. It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has
meanwhile become final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from an
inadvertent omission, such error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the
decision itself.
After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid Decision, the Court finds it necessary to
render a judgment nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision. The Court
would thus have the record reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this
particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The body of the decision in
question is clear proof that the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this
Court.

JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS

G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014

CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA)
G.R. NO. 187583
PROVINCE OF BATAAN, v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA)

FACTS:
The Province of Bataan (The province) demanded real property taxes against PEZA. The
latter, however, claimed to be exempt from payment of taxes.
RTC declared that PEZA is liable to the Province of Bataan for real property taxes.
However, PEZA filed a petition for certiorari against the RTCs decision. The Province
contended, that the RTC's decision is only an error of judgment appealable to the higher
level court and may not be corrected by filing a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC's decision is judgement on the merits subject to appeal

HELD: Yes. Appeal is the remedy to obtain a reversal or modification of a judgment on the
merits. And judgment on the merits is one which determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of the formal, technical or dilatory objections. It
is not even necessary that the case proceeded to trial. So long as the judgment is general and the
parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective claims and contentions, the
judgment is on the merits.

Here, RTC declared PEZA liable. Thus, PEZAs proper remedy against the trial courts decision,
therefore, is appeal filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed resolution.

G. R. No. 181962, January 16, 2002

CEFERINO S. CABREZA, JR. (Ceferino), BJD HOLDINGS CORP vs. AMPARO
ROBLES CABREZA (Amparo)

FACTS:
RTC of Pasig declared void ab initio the marriage between Ceferino and Amparo and
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
Ceferino thereafter sold their conjugal home with a granted Omnibus Motion. Amparo,
then, filed a complaint to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being void due to lack of
her consent thereto.
RTC dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis pendentia and forum
shopping. Amparo appealed to the CA, which reversed the Resolution of RTC.
Ceferino moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. When his Motion was denied, he
filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment is on the merits

HELD No, it was not a judgment on the merits of the case. A judgment may be considered as
one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections or when the judgment is
rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.

Here, the SC's decision shows that the Petition was dismissed upon a procedural inability to
consider the case, based on the principle of finality of judgments. The Courts reason for denying
Amparos Petition seeking to nullify the Writ of Possession was that the said writ was merely a
subsequent Order implementing that which was issued on by RTC authorizing the sale of the
family home. Meanwhile, the latter Order can no longer be modified, as it has long become final.
G.R. NO. 187317, April 11, 2013
CARLITO C. ENCINAS (Encinas) v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S.
CAUBANG

FACTS:
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint)
for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act No. 6975 against Encinas. The BFP
complaint was dismissed.
The respondents, then, filed with the CSC Regional Office a joint affidavit/complaint
(CSCRO Complaint) for violation of R.A. No. 6713. However, Encinas argues that
respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two allegedly identical Complaints in
violation of the rules on forum-shopping and be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
He explains that charges included in the CSCRO Complaint were charges that were
equivalent to the BFP Complaint.
The CSCRO argued that there was no forum-shopping, since the complaints were based
on a different cause of action and there could be no res judicata, since the dismissal of the
BFP Complaint was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is s judgment on the merits

HELD: No, there is no judgment on the merits. A judgment may be considered as one rendered
on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed
facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections or when the judgment is rendered
after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.

Here, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The
dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution was the result of a fact-finding investigation
for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
JUDGMENT IN COMPROMISE
G.R. No. 194560 June 11, 2014
NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner,
vs.
NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings and heirs
of the late Spouses Talao.
The Spouses Talao died intestate, leaving a parcel of land. The parties entered into a
compromise agreement. The Regional Trial Court approved the compromise agreement.
Based on the entry of judgment, the case became final and executory.
Nestor and Francisco opposed the motion. They contended that the judgment on the
compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had the effect of res
judicata. The RTC granted the motion for physical partition.
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision allowing the physical partition of
the property despite finality of a previous judgment on compromise agreement involving the
division of the same property.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTCs decision allowing the
physical partition of the property.
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res
judicata, and is immediately final and executory and not appealable unless set aside because of
falsity or vices of consent (by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity
of documents that vitiated the compromise agreement). The doctrine of immutability of
judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
In the said compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "[A] judgment based
on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits" of the case. It has the effect of res
judicata.

G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014

VILMA QUINTOS et al., Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Quintos et al and respondents Nicolas et al are siblings. Their deceased
parents were the owners of the subject property.
Respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners.
However, the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the parties and their counsels to
appear despite due notice. As neither set of parties appealed, the said ruling became final.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents.
Respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property. The trial court
dismissed the case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is already barred by res
judicata
RULING: No, the counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.
The dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right
of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. In this case,
wherein the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying
for the partition of the property through counterclaim.

RES JUDICATA
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ANGEL
MIGUEL, Respondents. G.R. NO. 158916 19 March 2014
FACTS:

The petitioners are the surviving children of the deceased Cornelio Miguel, while the
respondents are the widow and the children of the petitioners own brother, Angel.
The spouses Cornelio and Nieves were the registered owners of a property which was
subsequently subdivided into smaller lots. The spouses Cornelio and Nieves donated two
lots to Angel.
Cornelio filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation on the ground that
one of the properties subject of the donation, Lot 2J, was given the technical description
of Lot J.
The petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angels TC and its
derivative titles. The trial court dismissed the complaint for having been barred by a prior
judgment. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that Civil
Case No. 1185 and Spl. Civil Action No. 1950 all dealt with the question of ownership
over Lot J and they have all been adjudged with finality.

ISUUE: WON the Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment

RULING: Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment precludes the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2735. Civil Case No. 2735 is barred by the conclusiveness of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 1185.Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of
judgment. So long as the parties or their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same.

For res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action
is not required but merely identity of issue. For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity
of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in issue has previously been either directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action by a competent court. In
this case, the issue of the transfer pursuant to the deed of donation to Angel of Lot J and,
corollarily, his right over the said property has been necessarily involved in Civil Case No. 1185.

STARE DECISIS

RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, ET. AL respondents.

G.R. No. 167120. April 23, 2014.
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner applied for registration of a portion of a track of land. After declaring the
Franciscos to be the true and absolute owners of the subject land, the RTC directed the
Register of Deeds to issue certificate of title in favor of the applicant Francisco.
The herein respondents the Rojases filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA, claiming that they are the true owners of the subject lots and that they
only came to know of the existence of Franciscos land registration case.
The CA granted the petition of the Rojases and set aside the decision of the RTC for want
of jurisdiction,
The CAs decision prompted the petitioner to elevate the case to the
Supreme Court,
ISSUE: Is the petitioners invocation of stare decisis proper?
RULING:

No. The Supreme Court explained that the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the
decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
the Supreme Court in its final decisions.

Thus, a ruling of a particular division of the CA, while may be taken cognizance of in some
cases, cannot prejudice a ruling of another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinate
authority and, relative to the Supreme Court, is still considered as a lower court although
empowered with an appellate jurisdiction.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd.
G.R. No. 179192
June 4, 2014

FACTS:
 The respondent received an Assessment Notice with Formal Letter of Demand for
deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax (DST).
Respondent filed its protest letter but was denied by the CIR, hence, the former
filed a Petition for Review before the CTA. The CTAs 2nd Division ruled that
respondent sufficiently established that it is exempted from paying DST.
The CIR filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). In resolving the CIRs MR, the
CTA held that the Supreme Court, in the case of Republic vs. Sunlife Assurance,
already laid down the rule that registration with the Cooperative Development
Authority is not essential before respondent may avail of the exemptions granted
under the NIRC.

ISSUE:
Whether the CTA erred in ruling that respondent is exempted from DST.

HELD:
No. Since, the CTA observed that the factual circumstances in Sunlife and the present
case are substantially the same, basing its assailed decision on the doctrine enunciated by the
Court in Sunlife is correct.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the
rule of stare decisis a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS

SAMSON vs. GABOR

G.R. No. 182970
July 23, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Gabor executed a Deed of Assignment transferring a portion
of their land to petitioner Samson.
Thereafter, petitioner also executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same
undivided portion to Remedios Ramos. Upon learning the sale, respondent filed
an action for Legal Redemption with the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the suit but the CA upheld the respondents right of legal
redemption.
The Petitioner, instead of filing an appeal, filed an action for partition of real
property but it was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the finality of CAs
decision effectively barred the action for partition.
The CA likewise dismissed its appeal, hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
the causes of action in both cases differ inasmuch as in the prior case, the cause of
action is partition while in the case at hand is the recovery of property of property
or its value.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners complaint is barred by res judicata.

HELD:
Yes. The Court found that all the elements of res judicata are present; hence, the instant
suit is barred by said principle. As the SC consistently held, a judgment which has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect
except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed
resolved and laid to rest. It is a fundamental principle in our judicial system that every litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Exceptions to the Immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most
extraordinary circumstances.
MICHELIN ASIA PACIFIC APPLICATION SUPPORT CENTER, INC. vs. ORTIZ
G.R. No. 189861
November 19 2014

FACTS:
Respondent Ortiz, the Personnel Manager of petitioner, was terminated on the ground of
redundancy. Notwithstanding his acceptance of separation package, he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal but the Labor Arbiter dismissed it holding that petitioner complied with the
requirements of a valid redundancy program. Unconvinced, respondent appealed before the
NLRC, which dismissed the appeal for failure to attach a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the NLRC, on March 24, 2008, dismissed it for
because it was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period. Undeterred, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA ruled that there was a prima facie merit in
respondents contention and found it fitting to relax the procedural rules.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in granting respondents petition, hence, annulling the NLRC
Resolution.

HELD:
No. The court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion that could justify the grant
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The respondents violation of the mandatory
requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration rendered the NLRCs March 24,
2008 Resolution final and executory.
A definitive final judgment such as the NLRCs Resolution, however erroneous, is no
longer subject to change or revision. Settled is the rule that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a
final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT
City of Cebu v Dedamo
GR No. 172852, January 30, 2013

Facts: This is an offshoot of an expropriation case. After receiving the payment of the just
compensation, respondent Dedamo was still insisting on the payment of legal interest reckoned
from the date of the taking. The Supreme Court has already resolved the petition, deciding that
the legal interest should be reckoned only from the date of the finality of the judgment of the
Court, on the amount of just compensation.

The case at bar, on the other hand, is petitioners action challenging the right of Dedamo to the
legal interest.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners action should be given due course

Held: No. Res judicata, in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment, has already set in.

When SC resolved the respondents petition finally determining the reckoning time for the
computation of the legal interest (i.e., from the finality of judgment, and not from the time of
taking), its decision carried the implication that the respondent is entitled to the legal interest.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer question the respondents right to the legal interest in this
petition.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them.
FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT
Bank of Commerce v Radio Philippines Network, Inc.
GR No. 195615, April 21, 2014

Facts: Traders Royal Bank (TRB) and petitioner Bank of Commerce (Bancommerce) entered
into a purchase and assumption (P&A) agreement for the sale of TRBs banking business
consisting of specific assets and liabilities.

In another case, herein respondent RPN obtained judgment ordering TRB to pay RPN damages
of close to Php10 million. Upon learning of the P&A agreement between TRB and
Bancommerce, RPN, filed a motion for execution where TRB was described as now Bank of
Commerce based on the assumption that TRB had been merged with Bancommerce.

The RTC eventually issued an Order granting and issuing the writ of execution on the assets that
Bancommerce acquired from TRB under the P&A agreement.

Issue: Whether or not Bancommerce should be made liable under the judgment obtained by RPN
against TRB, following the P&A agreement

Held:
No. What had attained finality and had been rendered executory is the judgment declaring TRB
liable to RPN. By the principle of the finality of judgment, that is what the trial court should
have executed, nothing more. Thus, to order the execution against a non-party (i.e.,
Bancommerce) to an already concluded action is beyond the powers of the trial court and ergo
illegal. It should be noted that Bancommerce was dragged into this dispute only because RPN,
in its motion for execution, inserted the phrase now Bank of Commerce after TRBs name.
Jurisdiction over the person of Bancommerce was never acquired.

The generally-accepted principle is that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he
is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court.
Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not
against one who, not being a party in this case, did not have his day in court.

Heirs of Francisco Bihag v Heirs of Nicasio Bathan

GR No. 181949, April 23, 2014

Facts:
In an action for quieting of title filed by petitioners against respondents, the RTC ruled in favor
of respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) eight days after receipt of the
RTC decision, which RTC denied.

Petitioners did not take any action following the denial of the Notice of Appeal by the RTC, till
nine months later, when they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, which the CA dismissed.

Petitioner contends that RTC was wrong in in disapproving the Notice of Appeal for being
beyond the 15-day reglementary period. CA, in dismissing the petition, found that no MR was
taken, following the denial of the Notice of Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petition has merit

Held: The petition has no merit. RTC was indeed wrong in disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
An aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial or reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC.

Even so, the RTC Order denying the Notice of Appeal in this case has attained finality. It is
settled that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal
or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from receipt of the courts decision or order
disposing of the action or proceeding. Once it becomes final and executory, it may no longer be
modified, altered, disturbed, even if the modification seeks to correct an erroneous conclusion by
the court that rendered it.

Mendez vs. People

June 11, 2014; G.R. No. 179962; 726 SCRA 203
J. Brion

FACTS
Petitioner has been operating, as single proprietor, a salon and spa business under
different trade names at different places, i.e. Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan, and San Fernando.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint against petitioner for the latters failure
to file income tax returns in those places.
Respondent claims that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy because under Rule 9,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the proper remedy is appeal to the CTA En Banc by
filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of a petition for review is
available only against a judgment or final order.

ISSUE
Whether the CTA resolution is a final order.

HELD
The CTA Resolution is not a final order.
A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available
to an aggrieved party is appeal.
If the order or resolution, however, merely resolved incidental matters and leaves
something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the present case, the order is
interlocutory and the aggrieved partys only remedy after failing to obtain a reconsideration of
the ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Therefore, petitioner availed of the correct
remedy.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

GUZMAN vs. GUZMAN
March 13, 2013; G.R. No. 172588; 693 SCRA 318
J. Brion

FACTS
Petitioner Isabel Guzman filed an ejectment case against her children, respondents
Aniano Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the RTC
ruled against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of the required notice of
hearing. Petitioner again filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied for having been filed
out of time. And for the third time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied
with finality. Petitioner then filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA assigning grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC in denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration on a mere
technicality.
The CA however dismissed the petition because of improper remedy. The CA noted that a Rule
42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an
RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It found that petitioner lost her
chance to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under
Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner lost her right to appeal because of the second motion for
reconsideration.

HELD
Yes, she did.
The RTC decision became final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of
the first motion for reconsideration.
When the RTC issued its decision, it did so in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the
proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. Instead, the petitioner filed a second
motion for reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal; a second motion for
reconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners subsequent motions for reconsideration should be considered as mere scraps of
paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal.

McBurnie vs. Ganzon

October 17, 2013; G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117; 707 SCRA 646
J. Reyes (En Banc)

Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS
Petitioner Andrew McBurnie, an Australian national without a work permit, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents. The third Division of SC ruled in favor of
McBurnie.
Respondents filed its first Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit. Undaunted, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to Submit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Leave was granted.
The Court however issued a Resolution denying the second Motion for Reconsideration for
being a prohibited pleading.
The Courts decision then became final and executory and entry of judgment was made.
Respondents however, filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Motion for
Reconsideration with an attached Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether a second and/or third Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in this case.

HELD
Yes, the third motion is allowed.
It is true that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a general rule,
prohibited. There are, however, exceptions specifically found in the Internal Rules of Supreme
Court, Section 3, Rule 15 thereof:
...any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice
by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration in the higher interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties....
It is also recognized that in some instances, the prudent action towards a just resolution of
a case is for the Court to suspend its rules of procedure. This power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which the Court has already
declared to be final.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Baldado vs. Mejica
A.C. No. 9120
March 11, 2013

FACTS: On July 17, 2006 complainant sued the respondent alleging that the respondent
committed a serious errors. one of the error is that the respondent improperly filed a Motion to
dismiss eventhough an answer is already filed
In his position paper, respondent explained that a motion to dismiss was filed after the
answer was filed because he found out that Nival failed to pay the filing fees.
Respondent claimed that the Trial Court failed to understand that Sec 1 rule 18 of the
Rules of Court is the general rule while the exceptions are found in Sec 1 , rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is defense that is not
deemed waived even if it is not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed an error in the previous case.
HELD: YES. Panganiban v. Plipinas Shell Pretroleum Corporation held that even after an
answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following ground; (1)
lack of jurisdiction; (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) discovery during trial
of evidece that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
In this case respondent sought the dismissal of quo warranto case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiciton. Even if the Trial Court denied the Motion to dismiss, respondent could still have
raised the alleged lack of jurisdiction in the appeal of the Trial Court's decion to Comelec;
however no such appeal was filed.

Tumpag vs. Tumpag

G.R. No. 199133
September 29, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Sued the respondent alleging that he is the absolute owner of a parcel of land
which portion of it is occupied by respondent ; that despite the repeated demand to return such
land, the respondent refuse to return it
The respondent moved to dimiss the complaint of the petitioner on the following
grounds: failure to state cause of action; res judicata; and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied
the motion but the CA reversed the Trial Court's decision.
The CA granted the Motion to dismiss on the Ground of lack of jurisdiction filed by the
respondent because the petitioner failed to attach the assessed value of the disputed property and
according to the CA, the Court's jurisdiction over the case should be determined by the material
allegation of the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error
HELD: It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law , not by the
parties action or conduct and is, likewise determined from the allegation in the complaint.
Here the petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possesson of real property. in the
said complaint a declaration of real property is attached which shows the assessed value of the
disputed property amounting to 20,790. the CA was fully aware of this attacment but still
proceed to dismiss the petitioner's complaint
In the comment to the present petition, the respondent contend that the assesed value of
the property subject of the case is actually much below than the value stated in the attached
Declaration of Real Property.

Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation vs Ting Guan Trading Corporation

G.R. No. 182153
April 7, 2014
FACTS: Tung ho is a foreign Corporation while Ting Guan is a domestic Corporation. On
January, 2002 Ting Guan obligated itself to deliver heavy scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho.
Subsequently Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC after Ting Guan failed to
deliver the full quantity of the promise heavy metal scrap iron and steel. The ICC ruled in favor
of Tungho.
On october 24, 2004 Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award before the RTC of Makati. Ting guan Moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of tung ho's lack of capacity to sue and for prematurity. Ting Guan
subsequently filed supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper venue. The RTC denied
Ting Guan's Motion. Ting Guan moved to reconsider the order and raised the RTC's alleged lack
of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The RTC
denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily submitted to the court's Jurisdiction
when it raised the arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss

ISSUE: Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial court.

HELD: As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions filed
by the parties. Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available. The purpose of this rule isto obviate
multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatorymotions and pleadings. Party litigants should
not be allowed toreiterate identical motions, speculating on the possible change of opinion of the
courts or of the judges thereof.
We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guans blatant disregard of the rules
of procedure in the present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filing of a motion to dismiss
once. Ting Guans filing of successive motions to dismiss, under the guise of supplemental
motion to dismiss or motion for reconsideration, is not only improper butalso dilatory. Ting
Guans belated reliance on the improper service of summons was a mere afterthought, if not a
bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign arbitral awards enforcement which is still at its preliminary
stage after the lapse of almost a decadesince the filing of the complaint.

MOTIONS
Saint Louis University vs. Olairez G.R. No. 162299 and G.R. No. 174758
March 26, 2014

Facts:
 The respondents are 4th year graduating medical students of the petitioner who sought for
the prevention of the implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and
Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for graduation from SLUs medicine course. The
RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondents.
On July 17,2003, the respondent went to the SLU and insisted on immediate compliance
the RTC decision.Unable to get a favorable reply from SLU, the respondents filed, on the same
day, a "Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt" setting the hearing of the motion
for July 18, 2003.
The RTC found SLU guilty of indiect contempt. SLU appeal the decision and the CA
reversed the decision stating it violates the due process of law when the petitioner was deprive of
opportunity to explain his side due to failure of the respondent to observe the three-day notice
rule on hearing of motions.

Issue: Whether the respondents violate the threes-day notice rule on hearing of motions?

Ruling:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court Rule 15 Section 4 xxx Every written motion required to
be heard and the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three(3) days before the date of hearing unless the court for
good cause sets hearing on shorter notice. In this case the respondents scheduled the hearing on
their "Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt" on July 18, 2003 or just one day
after they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that does not comply
with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to
judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance.

Resurreccion vs. People

G.R. No 192866
July 9, 2014
Facts:
The petitioner is convicted of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
was also convicted of malversation of public funds as defined under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) of the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which read as follows : xxx submit the
foregoing Motion for Reconsideration of Decision for the immediate consideration and approval
by this Honorable Division as soon as receipt is made hereof.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the motion did not contain a notice of hearing?

Ruling:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court the motion must meet the requirements of section 4 and 5
of Rule 15 for the hearing of motion which states that every written motion must heard and
notice of hearing must be served to the other party three days before the date of hearing and
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion.
In this case the notification prays only for the submission of the motion for reconsideration and
approval of the court, without stating the time, date and place of the hearing of the motion. It
was, therefore, not the notice of hearing contemplated by the rules as the same has not been set
for hearing.

Republic vs. Diaz-Enriquez

G.R. No. 181458
March 20, 2013

Facts:
The Republic was represented by the PCCG counsel (Falcon) and OSG (Puertollano) that
handles two cases wherein each one of them was assigned against the respondents. The contract
between the PCCG and Falcon has been terminated that leads to the failure of the Republic to
attend the hearing.
The case was dismissed with prejudice. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration
with a notice for hearing on 7 December 2007. This motion was served on the Sandiganbayan
and respondents on 29 November 2007 via registered mail. Unfortunately, the court received the
motion only on 10 December 2007.
The Sandiganbayan issued its 25 January 2008 Resolution denying it on the ground of
failure to observe the three-day notice requirement. In effect, it considered the motion as a
worthless piece of paper.

Issue: Whether the petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule?
Ruling:
No.
The Sandiganbayan is incorrect. Undet Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the moving
party is required to serve motions in such a manner as to ensure the receipt thereof by the other
party at least three days before the date of hearing. The purpose of the rule is to prevent a
surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the
trial court. Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to
the hearing date. Petitioner mailed the motion to the Sandiganbayan on 29 November 2007.
Since Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, states that the date of the mailing of motions
through registered mail shall be considered the date of their filing in court, it follows that
petitioner filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing date. In so doing, it
observed the 10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that the time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of the motion.

Cabrera vs Ng

G.R. No. 201601. March 12, 2014

Facts:

Felix Ng filed a collection suit against Spouses Cabrera alleging that they issued him 3
checks which when presented were dishonored because the accounts were closed. The Spouses
received the decision of the RTC on August 8, 2007 and filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
August 14, 2007. It was set for hearing on August 17.

A copy of the MR was sent to Ng thru registered mail and was received on August 21-
four days after scheduled hearing. On the second rescheduled hearing, the parties were directed
to file additional pleadings and after which, the MR would be submitted for resolution.

The RTC denied the MR because the Spouses failed to comply with the three-day notice
rule. The CA denied the petition on certiorari of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration

Held: YES. Petition granted.

The threeday notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process. It is to avoid surprises upon
the adverse party and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the
arguments interposed therein. A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and
does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

The hearing of the Spouses MR was twice rescheduled. Respondent already received the notice
of the MR and was able to opposed such two months before the actual hearing of the motion. He
was given the right to be heard and argue his position notwithstanding the initial scheduled
hearing was notified to him 4 days late. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the MR based merely
on the noncompliance with the three day notice rule.

NEW TRIAL

Castro vs Ng

G.R. No. 192737. April 25, 2012

Facts: Castro filed a complaint for cancellation of an undated check and slander against Spouses
Guevarra alleging that it paid in full the amount and in fact overpaid. Spouses requested issuance
of a subpoena to require the bank manager to testify.

But it was denied. Their MR was likewise denied. The CA denied the petition for TRO and
preliminary injunction.

They also filed a Motion to Defer Action (MTDA). RTC rendered decision December 22, 2003
in favor of Castro.

. The RTC thru Judge Mangrobang granted the MTDA and MR, on the ground that the judgment
was promulgated after Judge Espaol retired from the service. Spouses filed a motion for new
trial to complete presentation of evidence and it was granted.
CA denied the certiorari of Castro questioning the New Trial.

Issue: Whether RTC erred in granting a new trial of the case.

Held: YES. The grant was without legal basis.

New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of
justice. The effect is to wipe out the previous adjudication so that the case may be tried de novo
for the purpose of rendering a judgment in accordance with law, taking into consideration the
evidence to be presented during the second trial. It is available when the decision is not yet final.

In the case, the filing by Spouses Guevarra of a motion for new trial was premature and uncalled
for because a decision has yet to be rendered by the trial court. The December 22, 2003 Decision
of Judge Espaol was effectively set aside by the December 15, 2004 Omnibus Order of Judge
Mangrobang. Hence, there is technically no judgment which can be the subject of a motion for
new trial.
Heirs of Pacencia Racaza vs Spouses Florencio Abay-Abay
G.R. No. 198402. June 13, 2012

Facts:
Spouses Abay-abay filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and
damages against the Miels (including Racaza-Miel) alleging that the latter built their house
without the knowledge and consent of the Spouses.
The Miels refused to vacate despite a Writ of Execution by the RTC, which later issued
an Order of Demlition. The petitioners also filed same complaint against the Spouses Abay-abay
as surving heirs of Pacencia Racaza.
The RTC favored the Spuses Abay-abay. CA affirmed. In their petition to the court they
ask to admit the newly-discovered evidence

Issue: Whether the Court may adduce the newly-discovered evidence

Held: NO. Petition denied.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and
substantiation of factual issues. While the Rules of Court allows the introduction by parties of
newly discovered evidence, as in motions for new trial under Rule 37, these are not to be
presented for the first time during an appeal.

The requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) it is material and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment. However, in case it was admitted, it will only negate their claim of ownership because
the Certificate only shows that the subject land is a foreshore land. Hence it is the Republic
which is the real party-in-interest.

DISMISSAL OF ACTION
1. HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. V. GONZALES
G.R. No. 185922 January 15, 2014
FACTS:
The Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. filed an action for annulment of Deed of Donation
against Dr. Faviss second family. The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
failure of the heirs to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
The appellate court justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review
rulings of the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal motu propio by the CA is proper.
RULING:
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the
claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription of action. The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to
instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff
did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any
motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action
is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.

2. QUINTOS V. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
FACTS:
The case docketed as Civil Case No. 0252 was raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling,
Tarlac. In an Order dated March 22, 2004,
 The trial court dismissed the case disposing as follows: For failure of the parties, as well
as their counsels, to appear despite due notice, this case is hereby DISMISSED. Such decision
was questioned by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the case operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the
requirements of res judicata.
RULING:
The dismissal was with prejudice and on the merits.
The rule enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiffs fault:
(1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint;
(2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to
comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to
the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In the case at
bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say that the dismissal is without
prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is present.

3. AZUELO V. ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

G.R. No. 192573 October 22, 2014
FACTS:
Azuelos first complaint for illegal dismissal against ZAMECO was filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA). The same was dismissed on the ground of lack of interest on his part to prosecute.
The LA did not qualify the nature of the dismissal of the first complaint. Azuelo filed a
second complaint on the Regional Arbitration Board of the NLRC.
The second complaint was dismissed for res judicata. The NLRC, on appeal, opined that
the dismissal on the first complaint was on the merits and with prejudice, and the
dismissal on the second complaint was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal due to the unreasonable failure of the
complainant to submit his position paper amounts to a dismissal with prejudice.
RULING:
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as a dismissal with
prejudice.
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the
merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal
of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. Thus, in arbitration
proceedings before the LA, the dismissal of a complaint on account of the unreasonable failure
of the complainant to submit his position paper is likewise regarded as an adjudication on the
merits and with prejudice to the filing of another complaint, except when the LAs order of
dismissal expressly states otherwise.

PRE-TRIAL
G.R. No. 181368 February 22, 2012
GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, et.al. Petitioners,
vs.
PACIFICO S. LAUREL, et. al. Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent, in his complaint, alleged to be the owner of a parcel of land. He also alleged
that petitioners were possessing the western portion of it hence, upon failure of petitioners to
abide his demand for them to vacate said property, he filed this case.
On the other hand petitioners claimed that the land belongs to the State and they
possessed it by virtue of a fishpond lease agreement with the State.
In the RTC, the petitioners were first declared in default. However, the default order was
subsequently set aside and the pre-trial conference was moved to different date. However despite
several resetting of pre trial conference with notification to the petitioners they failed to appear
hence respondents were allowed to present their evidence ex parte upon which the decision was
based.
Petitioners appeal was also dismissed hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were denied their day in court?
RULING:
Failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party
is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the
plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the
basis thereof.
In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even
reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and their
counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal processes, by
continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause. Clearly,
when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex partedue to the continued
failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due
process.

G.R. No. 192716 June 13, 2012

ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. and TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK and ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, JR., in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Makati City, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Eloisa merchandising EMI obtained a loan from respondent BDO secured by a
real estate mortgage (REM).
The REM was further amended to secure additional loan obtained by EMI and loan
obtained by its affiliate, the other petitioner, treble international. Petitioners failed to pay hence
foreclosure proceeding was conducted.
Petitioner EMI then filed this complaint to annul the REM. The case was set for pre trial
conference. At first it was the BDO who failed to appear but upon resetting of the date for pre
trial it was the counsel of petitioner EMI who failed to appear due to accident which required
him to undergo hilot.
For this the case was dismissed but after the court reconsidered, the case was again set for
pre trial but EMIs counsel again failed to appear saying that he needed to appear before MTC
for a case set earlier than this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the case was proper?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the
failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the
court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the
dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant.
In this case, despite the trial courts leniency and admonition, petitioners continued to
exhibit laxity and inattention in attending to their case. Petitioners themselves did nothing to get
the case moving for nine months and set the case anew for pre-trial.

G.R. No. 192108 November 21, 2012

SPOUSES SOCRATES SY AND CELY SY, Petitioner,
vs.
ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a land which was leased by the respondent for its business
operations. However before respondent started to occupy the same, they discovered that
petitioner has not paid their balance on their electricity billings.
Petitioners further failed to do their obligation under the lease agreement. With these
respondent filed this case for rescission of the lease contract with damages.
The case was set for pre trial but the petitioners counsel moved to set it on another date
because he needs to appear in a case previously set. Nonetheless the pre trial was held. Petitioner
and his counsel failed to appear hence, respondent was allowed to present their evidence ex
parte.
The court decided in respondents favor. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due process when the court did not
allowed them to present their evidence?
RULING:
No. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. That is why the court is
allowed by the rules to allow the plaintiff to present its evidence ex parte upon defendants
failure to appear in the pre trial because the due process is deemed satisfied.
Further, what constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels from
appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is subject to the sound
discretion of a judge. In this case, while Sy filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-trial, she cannot
assume that her motion would be automatically granted.

Suico Indistrial Corp. v. Lagura-Yap

G.R. No. 177711 680 SCRA 145
05 September 2012
Facts:
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) foreclosed two real estate
properties owned by the Spouses Suico pursuant to a loan obtained by Suico Industrial Corp.
(SIC).
PDCP emerged as the highest bidder and the ownership over the lots was consolidated in
its favor.
A writ of possession secured by the latter was enjoined by an injunctive writ obtained by
SIC when it filed an action for specific performance, injunction and damges.
PDCP questioned the issuance of the writ which appellate court and the Court ruled to
have been issued in excess of jurisdiction, the same interfering with the proceedings of a court of
concurrent jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules is a fatal error
Ruling:
Yes, the failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules is a fatal error.
Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that The failure of the plaintiff to appear when
so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
Section 6 of the same Rule provides that the failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
As a rule, the negligence of a counsel binds his clients. It is absurd for SICs counsel to
emphasize the gravity of his inaction and then invoke the same misfeasance to evade the
consequences of his act. Furthermore, the claim that the same is an excusable negligence is
inconsistent with his plea for the Court to consider the fact that he attended the scheduled pre-
trial conference only that he needed more time to file the pre-trial brief.
INTERVENTION
Pulgar v. Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64
G.R. No. 157583 734 SCRA 527
10 September 2014
Facts:
The Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued tax declarations on the buildings and
machineries of the Mauban Plant of Quezon Power Limited, Co. (QPL). QPL tendered payment
for first quarter instalment of realty which the Assessor rejected. The former filed a complaint for
consignation and damages.
Pulgar filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that as a resident and taxpayer of Quezon
Province, he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL.
By way of counterclaim, he prayed for moral damages and attorneys fees, anchoring the
same on the disturbance of the forest and marine environment where QPLs power plant stands.
Pulgars motion was initially granted.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Pulgars Motion for Intervention was proper
Ruling:
Yes, the dismissal of Pulgars Motion for Intervention was proper.
Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly,
intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Pulgar does not contest the RTCs dismissal of QPLs complaint but oddly maintains his
intervention by asking for a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. The
right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of
the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for, hence, the right of the intervenor
ceases.
Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. v. Tito
G.R. No. 197442 739 SCRA 217
22 October 2013
Facts:
Majestic was a judgment obligee in a case for rescission of contract. To satisfy said
obligation, the Sheriff levied upon the property of the judgment obligor, Cort, and sold the same
in a public auction.
Tito filed a petition to declare the proceedings and the decision in the rescission case void
on the ground that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over Cort as he had died five years prior
to the filing of the rescission case. Tito had allegedly inherited the property from Cort and had
transferred his interest over the property to the Spouses Nazal, who then joined the case as
intervenors
The RTC dismissed the case with prejudice for failure of Tito and the Spouses Nazal to
prosecute their claim for an unreasonable amount of time. The Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC, holding that since the Spouses were duly allowed to intervene in the annulment case, they
are entitled to proceed with the prosecution of their cause of action.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Nazal may still prosecute their claims against Majestic.
Ruling:
No, the Spouses Nazal may not prosecute their claim against Majestic.
The Spouses Nazal, who were joined as intervenors in the proceedings had already lost their
right to participate therein, in view of the RTCs dismissal of the main action for failure of Tito to
prosecute the action for an unjustified and unreasonable length of time. Intervention is never an
independent action, but is merely ancilliary and supplemental to an existing litigation
Thus, where a transfer of interest was effected before the commencement of the suit, the
transferee must necessarily be the plaintiff. On the supposition that they were the plaintiffs,
however, they should bear the obligation of Tito to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the
action within a reasonable length of time, but has failed on this regard on account of their failure
to take action within a reasonable length of time.

ALFARO v DUMALAGAN
G.R. No. 186622
January 22, 2014
Facts:
In a previous case (the Bagano case) involving the alleged forgery of the Sps. Alfaro of
the Deed of Sale between them and the Bagano, which has long been final, the SC upheld the
ownership of the Sps. Alfaro over the lot.
In the present case, the Sps Alfaro wants to annul the title issued to Sps Dumalagan over
a portion of the subject lot. Petitioners allege that the Sps Dumalagan, should have intervened in
the Bagano case; for failure to intervene, the latter are bound by the judgment for bad faith
and/or laches.
ISSUE: WoN the Sps Dumalagan should have interevened in the Bagano case
HELD: NO, intervention was not proper
An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such
intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the
scope of the remedies.
The present case which concerns the issue of double sale cannot be injected into the Bagano
case, which is based on facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners. For one,
herein respondents claim ownership of only a portion of the property litigated in the Bagano
case, and the basis of respondents claim is a prior sale to them by Bagano, whose authority as a
seller was an unquestioned fact. Neither of the parties in the second Bagano sale made any
mention of the first sale of a part of the property to respondents.

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY v OSOP

G.R. No. 172448
February 22, 2012
Facts:
Osop, a faculty member of MSU, a state university, filed a case for illegal dismissal with
the RTC against the Chancellor and the Dean of the College of Engineering of MSU.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Osop. MSU intervened in the case with the
RTC but it did not file an appeal nor a Petition for Certiorari before the CA to challenge the
adverse RTC Orders.
Thereafter, while the case was on appeal, after the case was deemed submitted for
decision, MSU filed a Motion to Intervene with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WoN the Motion to Intervene filed by MSU was a stray pleading
HELD: YES, the Motion to Intervene was improvidenty filed
Intervention shall be allowed when a person has
(1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
(2) or in the success of any of the parties;
(3) or an interest against the parties;
(4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
Jurisprudence describes intervention as "a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings." "The right to intervene
is not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it."
While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
itself of the remedy of intervention in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 simply because MSU is not a
third party in the proceedings herein.

Ongco vs. Dalisay

677 SCRA 467 G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Dalisay applied for registration of a parcel of land before the MTC. At the hearings, no
oppositor aside from the Republic came. The court decided in favor of Dalisay.
The Republic filed an appeal with the CA. While the case was pending appeal, Ongco
filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" with an attached Answer-in-Intervention praying the
dismissal of Dalisay's Application for Land Registration.
The CA denied the Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the period
allowed by law.

ISSUE: WON the CA committed reversible error in denying the Motion for Intervention of
petitioner.

HELD: Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect
or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy, however,
is not a right, it is a matter left to the trial court's sound discretion.
In the case at bar, Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is
indirect and contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in
fact admits being only in the process of applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate.
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
Serrano vs. Ambassador Hotel, Inc.
690 SCRA 226 G.R. No. 197003 February 11, 2013
FACTS:
Serrano filed a complaint against AHI for the non-payment of salaries and other benefits
before the labor arbiter. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed
the decision of LA but reduced the amount.
Both parties appealed to the CA, the CA set aside the decision of NLRC in reducing the
amount, and reinstated the original decision of the LA. On appeal to SC, the Resolution of this
Court affirmed the decision of the CA, and such became final and executory,

ISSUE: WON the Decision of the Special 4th Division may be declared without legal effect for
effectively contradicting a final and executory Decision of this Court in a previous similar case
with the similar parties.

HELD: This Courts Decision of the previous case should have immediately written finis to the
controversy between the parties regarding the benefits of petitioner Serrano.
It is suggested that the CA consider the procedure in this Court that the duty to determine
whether consolidation is necessary or mandatory falls on the shoulders of the Clerk of Court
(COC) and the Division Clerks of Courts. Rather than rely on the interested party to register a
motion to consolidate or the Justice to whom the case is assigned, it is best that it should be the
Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of Court of the CA who should be responsible for the
review and consolidation of similarly intertwined cases.
This will hopefully prevent a Division from deciding a case which has already been
decided by another division.

G.R. No. 199501 March 6, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF OLONGAPO CITY

FACTS:

The complaint for reversion filed by petitioner was consolidated with the complaint for
recovery of possession filed by Oribello before the RTC against Apog and San Juan. However,
RTC dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non-substitution of the deceased
plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the Order applied exclusively to
civil case for recovery of possession and did not affect civil Case for reversion of property.
 On appeal, Court of Appeals held that the remedy of appeal is no longer available" to
petitioner since it failed to question the RTC's decision, declaring it to have abandoned the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consolidated cases subject to appeal

HELD: There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment in one case which is
consolidated with other cases. Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding
how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.
The term "consolidation" is used in three different senses: (1) Where all except one of
several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is
conclusive as to the others. (2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate
identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. (3) Where several
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment.

G.R. No. 192073, September 11, 2013

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J. MARTINEZ vs.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., vs. HON. MARISSA
MACARAIG-GUILLEN

FACTS:
Consing filed a complaint, based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and
defamation against Unicapital and PBI. However, Unicapital and PBI filed a complaint for
collection and damages suit based on actionable documents against Consing.
 Later on, Consing filed a Motion for Consolidation before the RTC, which denied his
motion since the cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of action;
contending that the reliefs sought for by Consing will not bar Unicapital from pursuing its money
claims against him.
He filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, with grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC, refusing to consolidate cases. CA uphold such RTC's decision.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati Citys denial of Consings
motion for consolidation.

HELD: The CAs ruling is proper. It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated
and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between
them promptly.

However, in this case, the Court observes although it involved same parties and proceeding from
a similar factual milieu, it should remain unconsolidated since they proceed from different
sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. A resolution in one
case would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate
and distinct from the other. Thus, the consolidation of cases would be contrary to its objective
and may only delay the proceedings and entail unnecessary costs.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

G.R. No. 199283. June 9, 2014.
JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES, respondents.
LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
 The Spouses Morales alleged that the Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome loaned
P500,000.00 from them and mortgaged the Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales as
security. The Spouses Bartolome died without paying the loan. The Spouses Morales then filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against the herein petitioners.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Morales in its decision dated December 22,
2009, which the defendants received on January 29, 2010.
The Court of Appeals denied outright the petitioners petition for certiorari. The
petitioners then filed the present petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the
trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Was the petition for relief from judgment filed out of time?

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the
date of finality of the trial courts decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment
or final order.
Here, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010.
Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition
for relief from judgment. Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on
September 24, 2010, the petition for relief judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from
finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on
this ground.

G.R. No. 207443. July 23, 2014.

GENATO INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE OSCAR P. BARRIENTOS, ET. AL, respondents.

FACTS:
TCT No. 33341 is registered under the name of petitioner and covers two (2) adjacent
parcels of land, Lots Nos. 1A and 13B1 situated in Caloocan City. Due to alleged deficiency in
real property taxes due on Lot No. 13B1, the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan City sold
the said lot at public auction on Oct. 14, 2009, in which private respondent Laverne Realty
emerged as the highest bidder.
Petitioner learned of the auction sale only on May 9, 2012, when the Sheriff of RTC
Caloocan left a Notice to Vacate in the subject premises. Petitioner claimed that he had been
religiously paying the real property taxes on the subject properties, evidenced by a Certification
issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan.
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
that petitioner filed is not the proper remedy, as it had other available remedies to question the
Orders of the RTC Caloocan.

ISSUE: Is a Petition for Relief or a Petition to Annul proper in this case?

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition for annulment of judgment.

The Order of the RTC Caloocan dated 31 August 2011 became final and executory on 11
October 2011, when the latter issued an Entry of Judgment for the same. The general rule is that
a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect,
and that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executor decision may,
however, be invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition to Annul the same under Rules 38
or 47, respectively, of the Rules of Court.
Under Rule 38, when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside.
Thus, the only remedy left to petitioner in this case is a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47, which it, in fact, filed. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed
to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies.

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS

GOLEZ vs. NAVARRO

G.R. No. 192532
January 30, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner appointed the respondent as exclusive agent in the sale of a property.
Respondent found a buyer but it was the petitioner who successfully sold the property to the said
buyer without notifying the respondent. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for a collection of
sum of money for its commission, breach of contract and damages.
The RTC rendered judgment ordering the petitioner to pay agents commission of
280,000 with 12% interest rate p.a. The CA modified the amount to 180,000 without declaring an
interest.
Petitioner filed a Petition for review on certiorari but it was denied with finality.
Consequently, the respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution with the
RTC. The order of the RTC included the 12% interest originally provided in its decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in ordering the payment of interest when none is so decreed in the
modified decision of the CA.

HELD:
Yes. The dispositive portion of the CA is clear. What was merely ordered was the
payment of 180,000, nothing more. The RTC cannot, therefore, without committing grave abuse
of discretion, direct the petitioner to pay interest. To do so would be to vary the tenor of the
judgement against the latter and increase its liability, thereby rendering nugatory the proviso. It is
a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of
validity. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion
of the decision.

Berenguer-Landers vs Florin
A.C. No. 5119
April 17, 2013

FACTS:
The Dept. of Agrarian Reform Secretary cancelled the petitioners certificate of title over
their land and issued a Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in favor of the members
of Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (Baribag).
 The DAR Regional Director, in an Order, eventually denied their application from
exclusion from CARPs coverage finding that the land was devoted to coconuts and not in
raising livestock.
Baribag filed a petition for the implementation of the Order and was granted by Florin as
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Petitioner appealed to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) but Florin issued a Resolution and ordered the issuance of the
Writ of Possession in favor of Baribag.
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the Resolution arguing that DARAB already
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that Florin should have waited until DARAB has decided
the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Florin has the authority to grant a writ of execution without certification of
finality issued by the DAR Secretary.

HELD:
Florin, as RARAD, has no authority. The fact that petitioners appeal to the DAR
Secretary from the order dismissing their application for exclusion clearly established that such
Order was not yet final and executory. Pursuant to the DAR Administrative Order No, 06-00, it is
the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Hence, the issuance
of the writ of execution and possession are void and should be set aside.
Moreover, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution
may be had, namely, (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory, (2) pending
appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing, and (3)
execution of several, separate, or partial judgments. There is no showing that any of the three is
present in the case.

Abrigo v Flores
GR No. 160786, June 17, 2013

Facts:
Following the judgment on the action for judicial partition, the western portion of the
subject parcel of land was adjudicated to herein respondents Flores, et al, and the eastern portion,
to petitioners Abrigo, et al.
 To implement the said final and executory judgment, respondents moved for the issuance
of a special order of demolition to compel petitioners to remove the structures that they had built
in the western portion of the lot.

To this, the petitioners opposed, alleging that by virtue of a sale between petitioners and
one of the herein respondents, petitioners became a co-owner of the western portion. Therefore,
execution cannot be had until a partition of the western portion is made.

Issue: Whether or not the alleged sale of a portion of the western portion of the property
constitutes a supervening event, making execution of the judgment inequitable and unjust

Held: No. A supervening event is allowed as an exception to the execution, as a matter of right,
of a final and immutable judgment rule only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and
settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the
execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.

In the case at bar, the alleged sale does not affect nor alter the apportionment made as to the
subject lot, dividing it into the western and eastern portions. The correct course of action for the
herein petitioners is to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western
portion based on the alleged sale.

RCBC v Serra
GR No. 203241, July 10, 2013

Facts:
In 1994, RCBC obtained a final and executory judgment in its favor, compelling Serra to
execute a deed of sale of his land to RCBC (specific performance case). However, RCBC did
not move to execute the judgment because of a separate pending action (annulment case)
instituted by RCBC seeking to annul Serras donation and subsequent sale of the same land in
1992.

In 2009, RCBC obtained a final and executory judgment declaring the donation and sale null and
void.

Thereafter, in 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the 1994 judgment in the specific
performance case. Serra objected, insisting that the motion for execution is already barred by
prescription and laches.

Issue: Whether or not RCBCs motion is already barred by prescription and laches

Held: No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by
motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and
before prescription sets in. Exception to this rule is allowed when the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In the present case, RCBC pursued persistently its action in accord with law. Therefore, the
pendency of the annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce, through a
motion, the decision in the specific performance case. Since the decision in the annulment case
attained finality in 2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed in 2011, RCBCs motion is
deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

Esguerra vs. Holcim Philippines, Inc.

September 2, 2013; G.R. No. 182571; 704 SCRA 490
J. Reyes
FACTS
Esguerra obtained a final and executory judgment declaring him to be the lawful owner
of a land from which the respondent used to quarry for limestone. The judgment orders the
respondent to make an accounting of the royalty it paid to Esguerras opponent (de Guzman).
Thereafter, Esguerras heirs, petitioners herein, filed an Omnibus Motion manifesting that
the above judgment has yet to be executed and that the amount of royalty has not been
determined yet.
The RTC ordered Holcim to be examined. Respondent however was not examined,
instead petitioners presented an Engineer who testified the estimated volume of limestone hauled
and quarried amounting to P91M royalty. Based on that, petitioners filed for an Alias Writ of
Execution. The Motion was granted by the RTC and ordered respondent to pay petitioners.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.

ISSUES
Whether appeal is the proper remedy.
Whether the order of execution issued by the RTC was proper.
HELD
 Appeal is not the proper remedy. It is explicit under Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court that an order of execution is not appealable. The aggrieved party may file a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 when the order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Thus Holcim did not err in the remedy it availed.
The order was improper and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. At the execution
stage, the only thing left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory
judgment. In this case, what was required from Holcim to do was merely to account for
the payments it made to de Guzman. It is settled that execution of judgment can only be
issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party
thereto, did not have his day in court.

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation vs. Tan
February 20, 2013; G.R. No. 180325; 691 SCRA 410
J. Peralta

FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint against responded for termination of lease. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioner and ordered Tan to pay rent plus interest, exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees. Tan appealed the decision to the CA, while petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal. The Motion for Execution was granted by the RTC.
Tan then paid petitioner the amount provided in the RTC decision. The CA, acting on
Tans appeal, deleted the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. This decision became
final and executory. Tan now filed for a Motion for Execution praying that the excess amounts
she previously paid be refunded.
Petitioner opposes, contending that Tans prior payment means that the parties have
arrived at a compromise settlement which should have terminated the case between them.
Petitioner also contends that there is a substantial variance between the writ of execution and the
CA decision, as the latter did not mention of petitioner having to make a refund.
ISSUES
Whether the payment based on writ of execution pending appeal means that there has
already been a compromise settlement and thus the appeal has been mooted.
 Whether the order of refund makes the writ in conflict with the decision.
HELD
No. Execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits
for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the
executed judgment is reversed on appeal. Also, respondent merely paid the amount in
compliance with the writ of execution, and not by reason of a compromise agreement. No
such compromise appears on record.
No, it does not. Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the effect of
reversal of judgment which is that the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the
circumstances.

Carpio v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 183102
Feb 27, 2013

FACTS:
Carpio sued spouse Oria with unlawful detainer for refusing to return the land they
encroached which allegedly owned by Carpio. such case was dismissed by MTC for lack of
jurisdiction which affirmed by RTC but the CA set aside the decion of lower court and held that
RTC should have decided the case pursuant to Sec 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC decided the case in favor of Carpio. 13 days after the decision, Carpio filed a
Motion for Immediate Execution. thereafter, Spouses Oria file an Motion for reconsideration.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying the MR and granting the Motion of Carpio. Spouses filed
a notice of appeal and Petition for Certiorari. On Certiorari Spouses contended that the RTC
committed Grave abuse of Discretion for granting the Motion for Immediate Execution.

The CA ruled in favor of the Spouses. Carpio filed a motion to dimiss the appeal of
spouses arguing that the sheriff, whose duty was merely ministerial, properly implemented the
writ of execution issued by the RTC. Thus, the implementation of the writ should be respected.

ISSUE : Whether the case for accion publiciana on appeal has been rendered moot and academic
by intervening Implementation of writ of execution of the RTC

Held: In any case, we proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and
proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. We affirmed the CA
Decision because of the RTCs failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the
issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its
discretionary power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict
compliance with the requirement for the statement of a good reason, because execution pending
appeal is the exception rather than the rule.
Government Service Insurance System v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc.
G.R No. 165585 and G.R No. 176982
November 20, 2013

FACTS:
NEA entered into a MOA with GSIS insuring all real and personal properties mortgaged
to it by electrical cooperatives under IAR policy. The total sum insured was reinsured by GSIS
with PGIA.
While the GSIS pay the first 3 quaters however, it failed to pay the 4th and last
reinsurance due on Dec, 1999 despite demands. PGAI sued GSIS for collection of sum of money.
after exchange of pleadings, the PGAI filed a motion for judgment on pleadings averring that
GSIS essentially admitted the material allegations of the complaint.
The RTC granted the Motion rendering judgement in favor of the PGAI. GSIS filed a
notice of appeal. PGAI filed a Motion for execution pending appeal based on the following
reasons : (a) GSIS appeal was patently dilatory since it already acknowledged the validity of
PGAIs claim; (b) GSIS posted no valid defenseas its Answer raised no genuine issues; and (c)
PGAI would suffer serious and irreparable injury as it may be blacklisted as a consequence of the
non payment of premiums due. T
he RTC granted the Motion of PGAI. GSIS filed a petiton for certiorari against RTC and
PGAI arguing that none of the grounds proffered by PGAI justifies the issuance of writ of
execution pending appeal but the CA dismissed the petition of GSIS and upheld the validity of
the execution pending appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC's Order authorizing execution
pending appeal.

HELD:
In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, granted PGAIs motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that the impending sanctions against it by foreign
underwriters/reinsurers constitute good reasons therefor.
It must, however, be observed that PGAI has not proffered any evidence to substantiate
its claim, as it merely presented bare allegations thereon. It is hornbook doctrine that mere
allegations do not constitute proof.Hence, without any sufficient basis to support the existence of
its alleged good reasons, it cannot be said that the second requisite to allow an execution
pending appeal exists. To reiterate, the requirement of good reasons must be premised on solid
footing so as to ensure that the superior circumstance which would impel immediate execution
is not merely contrived or based on speculation.

APPEALS
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Lepanto Capataz Union G.R. No. 157086
February 18 , 2013
Facts:

Respondent Lepanto Capataz Union (Union), filed a petition for consent election.
Petitioner Lepanto opposed the petition. Lepanto pointed out that the capatazes were already
members of LEU, the exclusive representative of all rank-and-file employees of its Mine
Division. Med-Arbiter issued a ruling to the effect that the capatazes could form a separate
bargaining unit.
On appeal, the then DOLE Undersecretary affirmed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter.
On November 28, 2000, the certification of election ensued however, Lepanto filed a
protest. A hearing was held but Lepanto did not submit its position paper. Thus, Med-Arbiter
rendered a decision certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
Capatazes of Lepanto. Lepanto appealed such decision but the the DOLE Secretary denied it.
Lepanto, without first filing a motion for reconsideration, filed a petition for certiorari to
the CA. CA dismissed Lepantos petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to file a prior
motion for reconsideration. Lepanto moved to reconsider the dismissal, but the CA denied it.

Issue: Whether the findings of the Med-Arbiter affirmed by DOLE Secretary can be the subject
of judicial review under Rule 45?
Ruling:
No. The office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies,
such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are
entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective field. Judicial review of
labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials
findings rest. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision of errors of law and
not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over
again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the
Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45.

Villamar-Sandoval vs Cailipan
G.R. No. 200727
March 4, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages before the RTC against the respondent. The
respondent filed its answer one day late prompting petitioner to move to declare respondents in
default. The RTC denied the motion of the petitioner and admitting the answer of the respondent.
The respondent failed to appear as well as file a pre-trial brief despite due notice on pre-trial
hearing.
 The petitioner prayed to declare the defendant in default. The RTC granted the motion
and petitioner proceeded with the presentation of evidence ex parte. The case was submitted for
resolution. The respondent filed before the CA petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
On even date, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner; respondents filed a
Notice of Appeal with the CA, while its initially filed certiorari petition was still pending
resolution before the same appellate court. The CA granted the respondent petition grounded on
the impropriety of the order of default.
Issue: Whether respondents petition for certiorari was an improper remedy and/or had been
rendered moot and academic?
Ruling:
Yes. It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be
allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other.
Although respondents did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on January
11, 2011 as they only received the RTCs Decision three days after the said date and therefore
could not have availed of the remedy of an appeal at that time
Prudence should have guided them to pursue either course of action considering the well-
entrenched conflict between the remedies of an appeal and a petition for certiorari, of which they
should have been well aware of.

Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 194247. June 19, 2013.

Facts:
 In 3 different petitions, Bases Conversion seeks to expropriate the parcels of land of
Rosa, Cenando and Carlos Reyes before the RTC for the construction of the Subic Clark Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEx).

It claimed that the said properties are irrigated riceland with a zonal value of P20.00 per
square meter and paid Reyes accordingly.

The respondents opposed the just compensation being ridiculously low considering that
the subject properties were already reclassified into residential lots with P3,000-6,000 per sqm
zonal valuation.

RTC granted the Summary Judgment and decided in favor the respondents. Petitioner
filed MR, it was denied and it filed an appeal. CA denied the appeal for improper recourse and it
has no jurisdiction for being a pure question of law.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal

SC: No. Petition has merit and remand it to RTC.

There are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment of the RTC: a) Rule 41 of ROC, ordinary
appeal If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; and b) If
the issues raised involve only questions of law, petition for review on certiorari, Rule 45.

The test is: whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the
evidence, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.

On the 4 issues raised, 2 of those were not raised by petitioner in its opposition to respondents
motion for summary judgment but only in its MR. Appellate courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below.. But in the interest
of substantial justice, the Court relaxed the rules of procedure and remand the case to the RTC
for further determination of just compensation.

Dycoco vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 147257. July 31, 2013

Facts:

Spouses Dycoco filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land

transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Siapno-Sanchez and Berma in the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) alleging that they are the registered owner of a lot which the respondents occupied
registering themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes without paying.

The provincial adjudicator found that the respondents are not worthy to become
beneficiaries under PD No. 27 which decision was later on reversed. Spouses received a copy of
the decision. They asked for 30 days extension to file Appeal, they were given 15 days.

They shall file until May 3, 2000 but filed it on May 8. Hence, CA denied it. MR is
likewise denied. They filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

Issue: Whether the Court shall apply liberality in taking due course of a belatedly filed Appeal

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

1. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment is appeal. Hence, petitioner should have
filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.

2. The issue of nonpayment of just compensation is the alleged compelling reason that was only
raised on appeal to the CA. The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the issue of payment of just
compensation should be before the jurisdiction of DARAB, not the CA. They are not denied due
process because they were given ample time to file an appeal. They again disregarded the rules in
various ways absent any compelling reason when they filed this petition

5. FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., INC. V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 170618 November 20, 2013
FACTS:
 Far Eastern Surety and Insurance (FESI) assails five orders all issued by (RTC), Branch
64, Tarlac City in Criminal Case No. 12408, entitled: The People of the Philippines v. Celo
Tuazon.
It claims that it should not be held liable for a bail bond that it did not issue (i.e., such bail
bond was falsified and the RTC failed to observe the mandate of A.M. No. 04702SC when it did
not verify the signatures authenticity and confirm the FESIs authorized signatories in the
Secretarys Certificate before approving the bond).
FESI directly comes to the SC via a Rule 45 petition, in relation with Rule 41 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, on alleged pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal taken was proper.
RULING:
The petitioner used the wrong mode of appeal.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTCs decision may be undertaken in three (3)
ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an
ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with
the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third
mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of
law. It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

MODES OF APPEAL

1. TZE SUN WONG V. WONG

G.R. No. 180364 December 3, 2014
FACTS:
The petitioner, issued a warrant of deportation, instituted an administrative appeal before
the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari.
 The petitioner leapfrogged other available remedies, the first being a subsequent
administrative appeal to the Office of the President (OP) and, eventually, an appeal of the OP
decision to the CA via Rule 43.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal taken was proper.
RULING:
The appeal taken was proper.
The petitioner has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43
provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent
any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive
machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter,
appeal the OPs decisions via Rule 43; 51 or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the CA
strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned
remedies cannot be taken as adequate and speedy.
The SC deems that the remedies leapfrogged would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in
view of the plain imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of
deportation. The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition on substantive grounds.

G.R. No. 204589 November 19, 2014

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with violation of RA 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
He was then convicted by RTC which was affirmed by CA both sustaining the validity of
warrantless arrest made upon the petitioner for being allegedly caught in flagrante delicto.
Petitioner then filed this instant action for petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail
his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether the action filed by petitioner to assail his conviction was proper?
RULING:
No. The Court noted that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. However, the
Court reconsidered the case.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA
judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
However the Court added that, be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the
liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred;
and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.

G.R. No. 197590 November 24, 2014

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, as represented by the COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO VILLAN MANLY, and RUBY ONG
MANLY, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
 Respondent spouses was charged by petitioner BIR of alleged tax evasion. This charge
was recommended by the State Prosecutor.
On a petition for review to Secretary of Justice, the recommendation was reversed when
the Secretary found out that there was no willful intent on the part of the spouses to evade their
taxes.
Unfazed petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Secretary.
However the petition was dismissed hence, this instant petition for certiorari assailing
now CAs grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the proper remedy was availed?
RULING:
Yes. The court said, indeed, the remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision, final order, or
resolution of the CA is to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. And as a rule, if
the remedy of an appeal is available, an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, will not prosper because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
However in this case, after considering the arguments raised by the parties, we find that
there is reason to give due course to the instant Petition for Certiorari as petitioner was able to
convincingly show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
dismissal of the criminal charges against respondent spouses despite the fact that there is
probable cause to indict them.

Zapanta v. Co King Ki
G.R. No. 191694 743 SCRA 657
03 December 2014
Facts:
On 07 September 2000, Co King Ki filed a complaint for ejectment against De Guzman,
Martin and Smith, before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) alleging his
ownership over the subject land.
 On 27 December 2007, the Regional Agragrian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) ruled in
favor of Ki. Said decision was received by Zapanta, et als former counsel, Atty. Miranda on 15
February 2008. Zapanta, et al. moved for the reconsideration of the decision but was denied by
the RARAD in an Order dated 05 June 2008, which was received by Atty. Miranda on 18 June
2008.
On 30 June 2008, Zapanta, et als new counsel, Atty. Perez filed a Notice of Appeal and
Formal Entry of Appearance, attaching the Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty.
Invoking the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of
Procedure, the PARAD opined that the period that Zapanta, et al. should have interposed their
appeal expired on 23 June 2008.
Issue:
Whether the notice of appeal was filed out of time
Ruling:
Yes, the notice of appeal was filed out of time.
Section 1, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure provides that an appeal may
be perfected within fifteen days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed
from. However, Zapanta failed to consider the effect on their appeal of the motion for
reconsideration they filed. Section 12 of the same provides that if the motion for reconsideration
is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect an appeal during the remainder of the period
for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of the denial.
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial
duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the decision, it is required, however, that said appeal
must have been filed on time.

Philippine Electric Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 168692 744 SCRA 361
10 December 2014
Facts:
From 01 June 1989 to 31 May 1997, Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) and its
rank and file employees were governed by collective bargaining agreements (CBA) that
regulated the step increases in an employees basic salary in case of promotion.
In August 1997, with the previous CBAs expired, PHILEC selected Lipio and Ignacio,
Sr. for promotion.
 On 17 September 1997, PHILEC and the PHILEC Workers Union (PWU) entered into a
new CBA, retroactively effective on 01 June 1997 and expiring on 31 May 1999.
Claiming that the schedule of training allowance served on Lipio and Ignacio did not
conform to the 01 June 1997 CBA, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance machinery.
Having failed to settle amicably, the parties filed a submission agreement with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Issue:
Whether the appeal was file out of time.
Ruling:
Yes, the appeal was filed out of time. Despite Section 4, Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to
appeal, the Voluntary Arbitrators decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within
10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. Appeal is a
"statutory privilege," which may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal.
Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered by Voluntary
Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrators decision "shall be final and executory
after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties."
Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, the Court "shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day
period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be
diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court.