Hypatia, Inc.

Was George Herbert Mead a Feminist?

Author(s): Mitchell Aboulafia
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 8, No. 2, Feminism and Pragmatism (Spring, 1993), pp. 145-158
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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WasGeorgeHerbertMeada Feminist?
MITCHELLABOULAFIA

GeorgeHerbertMeadwasa dedicated andinternationalist

progressive whostrove
in numerouscivicorganiza-
to realizehispoliticalconvictionsthroughparticipation
tionsin Chicago.Theseconvictionsinformedandwereinformedby hisapproachto
philosophy.This articleaddressesthe bonds betweenMead'sphilosophy,social
psychology,andhissupportof women'srightsthroughan analysisof a letterhewrote
to hisdaughter-in-law herplansfor a career.
regarding

In 1920 George HerbertMead, while on vacation in Honolulu, received

word from his daughter-in-law,Irene TuftsMead, that she had been warned
againstbeginning her studies in medical school. The advice had come from
none other than her young son's pediatrician,who presumablyheld some
ratherclassicviews on maternity.The doctor'swords,arrivingas they did with
the birthof her firstchild, musthave given riseto a good deal of consternation.
Mead was not amused. He had long supportedand worked for numerous
progressivecauses(Shalin 1988). A close friendand colleagueof JaneAddams
(Deegan 1988, 118-21; Miller 1973, xxxi), he joined with her to oppose "the
segregationof the sexes at the Universityof Chicago in 1902"(Deegan 1988,
120). Meadhad marchedwith suffragistsand over the yearshad defendedthe
contributions of harassed female colleagues (Deegan 1988, 116, 210-11).
When the time came to respondto his daughter-in-law,he could drawon a
good deal of experience.
Firstof all, in regardto Dr.Hoffman'sviews. The fundamentals
in the matterI take to be the following:-for the most normal
situationa womanas well as a man shouldhave the trainingfor
a social calling apartfromthe familylife, this for the sakeof the
best family life but principallyfor the independence of mind
and self which every one legitimatelycraves.
Do not let the dependenceon otherswhich we all have forthose
whom we love carrywith it intellectual dependence and you

Hypatiavol. 8, no. 2 (Spring1993) by Mitchell Aboulafia

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146 Hypatia

cannot have real intellectual independence, that which gives

one the fundamentalself respecton which one builds,without
competence in some field of the society which is responsiblefor
the very existence of ourselves.Culturaltraining never gives
this-only trainingfor a practicalend. (Diner 1978, 408-09)
The specificadvice Meadgave to his daughter-in-lawwasto attend medical
school part-time. Although "society is not organizedfor this now . . . the
fortunatesituationin which you and Henry[Mead'sson]find yourselvesmakes
this morenormalexpressionfora womanpossibleforyou"(Diner 1978, 408).
The fortunatesituation seems to have been that they could affordservants.
Irene Tufts Mead did go to medical school, took nine years to become a
physician, and later studied with Jung and practicedpsychiatryin Chicago.
One of the obvious points to be made in Mead'sfavorin this instance is that
he wasnot engagingin an abstractdiscussionof women'srights;rather,he was
telling the wife of his only son, and the motherof his firstgrandchild,that she
should have a career.
As progressiveas Mead's solution may have been in his day, it would
obviouslynot appealto manycontemporaryfeminists,for it seems to presume
some link betweengenderand sex, at least to the extent that it does not appear
that Meadsuggestedthat his son stay home part-timeinsteadof his daughter-
in-law. But if one examines the languageof Mead'scomments in light of his
philosophyand social psychology,his responserevealsa radicallyprogressive
approachto social issues-an approachthat not only can be used to challenge
questionablelinkages between sex and gender but may very well have the
potential to make an importantcontributionto feminist literatureand prac-
tice.1
Mead did not write a treatiseon feminist theory,althoughhe was actively
involved in civic groupsthat sought to promotewomen'srights. In all proba-
bility he would not have thought it necessaryto devise categoriesoutside of
the ones he had developed in his philosophicaland social psychologicalwork
to address the plight of women. This was not because he thought their
domination unworthyof discussion.Quite the contrary.But he would have
arguedthat his categoriescould be used as conceptual and political tools to
help overcome domination. To do justice to the progressivepossibilitiesof
Mead'spositionwouldrequirecomingto termswith muchof his thought,since
so much of it is pertinent. One would also have to addresshow Mead might
respond to contemporary feminist literature, from the neo-Freudian
approachesto postmodem tracts.
In this paper I will suggest a number of avenues for considering Mead's
potential contributionsto feminism.His letter is an excellent point of entry
because it contains several of his key termsand ideas in a relevant context.
And while it is alwayspossiblethat he was employingthese termsin a merely

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 147

colloquialfashion,their juxtapositionand context suggestthat his philosoph-

ical understandingof them wasclose at hand. I will also introducea hypothesis
regardingcollective action that was not explicitly developed by Mead but
easily follows from many of his assumptionsand might be of some assistance
in answeringthe questionposed by the title of this article.

I.

Mead was a firm believer in what is often rather loosely described as

participatorydemocracy.Fordemocracyto flourish,Meadwouldtell us, society
must recognize that it has an obligation to assist in the actualizationof the
potentialitiesof its citizens.A society that preventsor does not assistin their
realizationis simply less than a just society. For Mead, it is also one that will
fail to realize a truly democraticorder,for such an orderrequiresan active,
flourishing,and engagedcitizenry.These are,of course,the verysortsof general
claims we might expect from many liberalswriting in the context of twenti-
eth-century U.S. politics. Mead, however, has an intersubjectivetheory of
mind and selfhood that can be employednot only to groundaspectsof liberal
theory in new ways but to radicalizeit as well. Yet he no doubt adheredto
certainbeliefs that we associatewith liberalism.Forexample,Meadwouldnot
have hesitated to use the presentlyunfashionableterm "progress"to describe
what he thought we shouldworkto achieve.
The obligation which the charitable individual feels is the
demandthat these restrictions["economic,feudal,and cultural
classdistinctions"]shouldbe removed.It is not a demandwhich
society as it is now organizedcan enforce againsthim. It is a
partof the growingconsciousnessthat society is responsiblefor
the orderingof its own processesand structureso that what are
common goods in their very nature should be accessible to
common enjoyment. We vaguely call it "progress."(Mead
1964b, 406-7)
In his letter to his daughter-in-lawMead asserts that there should be
"trainingfor a social calling apartfromthe familylife, this for the sake of the
best family life but principallyfor the independenceof mind and self which
everyone legitimatelycraves."The terms"mind"and "self"have veryspecific
and crucialmeaningsfor Mead.Beforeturningto them, however,I wouldlike
to call attention to the phrase "socialcalling." Mead was raised in a rather
puritanicalChristianhouseholdwith long-standingacademicaffiliations.His
fathertaught homiletics at OberlinTheological Seminary;his mother served
as presidentof Mount Holyoke College and taught at Oberlin College. Mead
attended Oberlin, which in his day was becoming something of a hotbed for
progressiveideas (Shalin 1988, 919). As a young man Meadseriouslyconsid-

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148 Hypatia

ered becoming a Christiansocial worker.In 1884 he wrote to his good friend

Henry Castle about this option.
I shall have to let personsunderstandthat I have some belief in
Christianityand my prayingbe interpretedas a belief in God,
whereasI have no doubt that now the most reasonablesystem
of the universe can be formed to myself without a God. But
notwithstandingall this I cannot go out with the worldand not
workfor men. The spiritof a ministeris strongwith me and I
come fairlyby it. (Shalin 1988, 920-21)
Mead'sameliorationistimpulsesremainedwith him throughhis manyyears
as a professorat the Universityof Chicago and expresseditself in his involve-
ment in city affairs.His interestin city life and politics wasevident ratherearly
in life. In another letter to his friendCastle he declared:
We must get into politics of course-city politics above all
things, becausethere we can begin to workat once in whatever
city we settle, because city politics need men more than any
otherbranch,andchieflybecause,accordingto myopinion, the
immediateapplicationof principlesof corporatelife-of social-
ism in America muststartfromthe city. (Shalin 1988, 923)
And it may very well have been that his lifelong political and community
involvements were in part responsiblefor the fact that-with the exception
of a coedited volume on vocational training-he never publisheda book.
When Mead refersto "the independenceof mind and self which every one
legitimatelycraves,"mind and self mustnot be thought of as merelypersonal
attributes,for they aresocial phenomena.Yet,as we shall see, the social nature
of the self does not deny the independenceof individuals.ForMead, indepen-
dence suggestsnot isolation fromothers but the self-respectand dignity that
a social being acquiresin virtue of the acknowledgmentof others. In orderto
understandMead'sconcepts of mind and self, one mustappealto their genesis
in linguisticinteraction.

Mentalityon our approachsimplycomes in when the organism

is able to point out meaningsto others and to himself. This is
the point at which mind appears,or if you like, emerges.... It
is absurdto look at the mind simplyfromthe standpointof the
individualhumanorganism;for,althoughit has its focus there,
it is essentiallya social phenomenon;even its biological func-
tions areprimarilysocial. (Mead 1934, 132-33)
Mead viewed mind as emergingthrough the use of gestures.Gesturesare
usedby manyspecies;forexample,a dog growlsat anotherdog and the second
dog runs or growlsback. In this context the first dog'sgrowl is a gesturethat

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 149

meansrun or growlback,becausemeaningis definedin termsof the responses

that gestureselicit. But for human beings a differentsort of gestureis possible
becauseof our abilityto vocalizeand the sophisticationof ournervoussystem.
When using vocal gestureshuman beings can hear themselves as others hear
them. For example, say you are about to walk out in front of a car on a busy
street and I shout out "Stop!"I hear the vocal gestureas you do, and I have a
tendency to heed my own gesture.Thus I might "feel"myselfstoppingunder
the circumstancesthat promptedmy gesture.
Mead tells us that "the critical importanceof languagein the development
of human experience lies in this fact that the stimulusis one that can react
upon the speakingindividualas it reacts upon the other" (Mead 1934, 69).
Forlanguageto evolve one mustbe able to respondcovertlyor "implicitly"to
a gestureas the otherrespondsovertlyor "explicitly,"as suggestedin the above
example of shouting "Stop!"It is through taking the position of the other,
respondingas the other does to verbal gestures,that one lears a language.
And with languagecomes what Meadcalls mind. It is worthnoting that hand
signscan serve the samefunction as verbalgestures;they allow individualsto
see (and feel) their own gesturesas they see the responsesof others to their
gestures.
It is by means of reflexiveness-the turning-backof the expe-
rience of the individualupon himself-that the whole social
process is thus broughtinto the experience of the individuals
involved in it; it is by such means,which enable the individual
to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the
individualis able consciouslyto adjusthimself to that process,
and to modifythe resultantof that processin any given social
act in termsof his adjustmentto it. Reflexiveness,then, is the
essential condition, within the social process,for the develop-
ment of mind. (Mead 1934, 134)

Mind, then, entails the capacityto be awareof sociallysignificantsymbols,

and it developsin the context of these verbalgestures.We develop the capacity
to take the position of the other as we become linguisticallycapablecreatures,
andbeing ableto takethe positionof the otherwith regardto linguisticsymbols
is a prerequisitefor morecomplex sets of behaviors.These more complex sets,
which mayentail nonverbalbehaviorsaswell asverbalones, aretermed"roles"
by Mead."The child sayssomethingin one characterand respondsin another
character,and then his respondingin anothercharacteris a stimulusto himself
in the first character,and so the conversationgoes on" (Mead 1934, 151).
Roles are complex sets of responsesthat we can only lear by taking the
position of the other, and in so doing we lear to anticipate what the other
will do and what is expected of us.

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150 Hypatia

In the present context I will have to bypassthe temptation to provide a

detailedanalysisof Mead'sposition. ButI wouldlike to outline Mead'saccount
of how gesturesand role-takingallow him to go on to give a social analysisof
the genesisof the self. One might begin by discussingthe emergenceof the self
throughthe multitudeof rolesthat an individuallearnsto take. But this would
only representthe beginningof Mead'sanalysis,for althoughwe need specific
othersto learn to take specificroles,Meadtells us that we need a "generalized
other"in orderto have a self. Meadtries to explicate the distinction between
mere roles and selfhood by talking about "the game."When involved in an
organizedgameone learnsmorethan roles;one mustlearnto takethe positions
of the variousplayerson the team, as well as learn the implicit rules of the
gamethat unifythe activitiesof all the agents.The well-knownexampleMead
used was of a ball team, but this examplecan be somewhatmisleading.
The organizedcommunityor social groupwhich gives to the
individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized
other."The attitude of the generalizedother is the attitude of
the whole community.Thus, for example,in the case of such a
social groupas a ball team, the team is the generalizedother in
so far as it enters-as an organizedprocessor social activity-
into the experienceof any one of the individualmembersof it.
(Mead 1934, 154)
Perhapsit would be best to leave aside the sportsanalogy and emphasize
that the generalizedother ariseswhen we internalizethe expectations of an
organizedgroup. Groups of this sort can be thought of as systems. We are
capableof "viewing"ourselvesas partand parcelof these groups,and when we
do so, selves emergethat correspondto them. Examplesof such groupswould
include "political parties, clubs, corporations"(Mead 1934, 157). But they
might just as well be families.
In any co-operativeprocess,such as the family,the individual
calls out a responsefromthe other membersof the group.Now,
to the extent that those responsescan be called out in the
individualso that he can answerto them, we have both those
contents which go to makeup the self, the "other"and the "I."
The distinction expressesitself in our experience in what we
call the recognitionof others and the recognitionof ourselves
in the others.We cannot realizeourselvesexcept in so faras we
can recognizethe other in his relationshipto us. It is as he takes
the attitude of the other that the individual is able to realize
himself as a self. (Mead 1934, 194)

Through our interactionswith others in a specific context, we arriveat a

system of responses that serves to unify various roles. When we "see" our

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 151

responsesfrom the perspectiveof this unified group,we are said to be taking

the position of the generalizedother.By takingthe position of the generalized
other, we become aware of the unity of our behaviors;that is, we become
self-conscious.For Mead, the self is a cognitive object that is "viewed"from
the perspectiveof the generalizedother.In short,selfhood and self-conscious-
ness go hand in hand. "The self-conscioushuman individual,then, takes or
assumesthe organizedsocial attitudesof the given social groupor community
(or of some one section thereof) to which he belongs ... [and]he governshis
own conduct accordingly"(Mead 1934, 156).
So Mead has us "viewing"ourselvesnot only from the perspectiveof an
other but also from the perspectiveof groupsthat provideus with generalized
others;what we view are selves that correspondto them. In a certain sense,
then, individualscan be said to have morethan one self becausethey partici-
pate in numerouscommunitiesthat give rise to generalizedothers. Now this
is by no meansthe end of the story.Meadsuggeststhat some generalizedothers
aremoreuniversalthan others.Claimsthat these moreuniversalcommunities
make on us can (and should at times) overridethe claims of what he would
describeasnarrowerandparochialcommunities.Wewill returnto the question
of Mead'suniversalismbelow.
The self that we have thus far describedcan be referredto as a "me."But
Meadalso tells us that there is an "I."The "I"is the "home"of novel responses
and the "source"of our awarenessof the "me."Mead treatsthe "I"and "me"
as functional distinctions, and togetherthey describewhat he refersto as the
personality,althoughat times he refersto their combinationas the self. Given
the constraints of this article, we will have to sidestep the intricacies and
ambiguitiesof Mead'smodel. It is worth noting, however,that Mead'sintro-
duction of the "I"helps prevent him from falling into an overly socialized
conception of personality.
The "I" is not an afterthoughtfor Mead but follows from deeply held
convictions. He arguestime and againthat novelty is partof the fabricof the
universeand can be observedin, for example,the evolution of life. ForMead,
the responsesthat human beings give to stimuli entail, in varying degrees,
novel modificationsof priorresponses.This is a fact that can be studiedand
observed.He goes so faras to suggestthat we can never be absolutelycertain
how we will respondto a stimulusuntil after we have done so (Mead 1934,
177-78). The uncertaintyhere is not simplydue to ignorancebut followsfrom
the natureof human behavior.Further,he tells us that systems,which would
include the "me," are dynamic and undergo transformation.Much of our
experience takes place in the "in-betweenness"of systemic transformations,
which he refers to as "sociality."The in-betweenness of sociality can be
thought of as a "space"in which novel responsescan arise.2

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152 Hypatia

II.

So central are the terms "mind"and "self"to Mead'sworldviewthat it is

difficultto believe that his invocation of them in his letter to his daughter-in-
law did not have deep resonances for him. We have seen that, for Mead,
without others and languagethe development of mind would be impossible,
and without organizedsocial groupsselves wouldnot emerge.Now one might
wonder why family life would not have been enough to satisfyhis daughter-
in-law'sneed for a self, especiallysince I suggestedabove that a family might
be viewed as a systemwith its own generalizedother.Why couldn'tMeadhave
simplysuggestedthat she stay at home in orderto have independenceof mind
and self?
Partof the answerlies in understandingthe historicalcurrentsthat Mead
had to vie againstat the Universityof Chicago.As MaryJo Deegan points out,
there was a strongpush at the Universityof Chicago duringMead'stenure to
change coeducationalclassesto segregatedones, a move he resisted (Deegan
1988, 120, 196). The ideologicalunderpinningforthe segregationof male and
female studentswas the doctrine of separatespheres.

Womenwere expected to remainwithin their "specialsphere,"

even though educatedin an advancedmanner.This "Doctrine
of the Separate Spheres"was the dominant attitude towards
women'splace in society at this time. Eachsex wasexpected to
be distinct. Women "managed"the home, emotions, culture,
morality,and children. Men "govered" the family,social and
political institutions, especially the economy, and were more
rational than women. Thus Chicago made a forwardstep by
includingwomen within the universitystructure,but retained
its belief in a "separatesphere"forwomenwithin this structure.
(Deegan 1988, 194)
Mead had to endure male colleagueswho supportedboth the doctrine of
separatespheresand the segregationof the sexes. More congenial to his taste
must have been social planners and scientists who expressedan interest in
findingnew scientific paths to help "improve"interpersonalrelationshipsand
the managementof the household.FromMead'svantagepoint, then, women
who were "persuaded"to remain"traditional"motherscould lose out on two
fronts:they would be cut off fromopportunitiesfor personalgrowthfound in
nontraditionalcareers (or spheres), and they might be turned into merely
passive recipients of scientific developments (or even miss out on them
altogether). It is with these concerns in mind that we must evaluate Mead's
remarksto his daughter-in-law.

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 153

It is a difficultthing you areundertakingbut worthwhilethings

are all difficult.Being a wife and a motheris no longera calling
in itself, becausethe exerciseof intelligence in those activities
has passedout of the home and involves scientific method at
every point. You must be a part of this intellectual world to
which this method belongs,or you must accept the judgments
of others without feeling competent to criticize them. (Diner
1978, 409)
Mead follows these wordswith the previouslyquoted remarkon intellectual
independence,in which he mentions the need for "competencein some field
of the society which is responsiblefor the very existence of ourselves."One
reaction to Mead'sreferenceto the scientific method might be to view him as
a parochialpositivist,who perhapswishesthe best forhis daughter-in-law,that
is, to be in tune with the reigningpowers that be. Mead'sunderstandingof
science, however,wasdecidedlynonpositivisticand closely linked to his views
on the nonhierarchicalnatureof democracy.He viewed the scientific method
not as an esoteric methodology but as an extension of day-to-dayproblem
solving, reflective thought. For Mead, reflection is a mode of thought that is
directlylinked to our ability to take variousperspectives,and one utilizesthe
perspectivalnatureof mindwhen solvingproblemsat hand.The modernworld
has given rise to a methodicaldeploymentof this capacityin science.
Scientific method ... is nothing but a highly developed form
of impartialintelligence.... [It]is not teleological in the sense
of setting up a final causethat shoulddetermineour action, but
it is as categoricalin insistingupon our consideringall factors
in problemsof conduct, as it is in demandingthe recognition
of all of the data that constitute the researchproblem. (Mead
1964c, 256, 257)
Mead's view of science would call on practitionersto reflect on their
personalinvestmentsin paradigmsand modesof operation.ForMead,science
or the sciences are clearly social activities closely affiliatedwith many other
kindsof social activities.When properlyemployedand understoodin termsof
his perspectivalism,the scientific method is an inherently democraticmeth-
odology.Mead'sgood friendJohn Dewey put it well when he wrote:
No scientific inquirercan keep what he findsto himselfor turn
it to merelyprivateaccountwithout losing his scientific stand-
ing. Everythingdiscoveredbelongsto the communityof work-
ers. . . . The scientific attitude is experimental as well as
intrinsically communicative. If it were generally applied, it
would liberate us from the heavy burdenimposed by dogmas
and external standards.(Dewey 1930, 154, 156)

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154 Hypatia

That the practitionersof science have not always lived up to Mead's and
Dewey'sexpectations goes without saying, and we must leave open here the
questionof whetheror not all of the sciences can be understoodas extensions
of commonplace skills. But Mead'sattitude towardscience does allow us to
begin to understandhow he could link his daughter-in-law's well-beingto the
claimthat she "mustbe a partof this intellectualworld."Yetto fullyunderstand
Mead'sremark,another aspect of his thought mustbe introduced.
Meadwas a dedicatedinternationalist.No doubthe was led to this position
in part through his early commitment to certain religiousand moral ideals.
Jane Addams may also have had some influence on Mead'scommitments
(Deegan 1988, 136 n.22). He arguedthat due to numerousfactors in the
modem world-for example, the increasinglyinterdependentnature of the
modem economies, enhanced possibilities for contact and communication
with others,the growingself-destructivenatureof modernwarfare-"intema-
tional-mindedness"would eventuallybecome the wave of the future.
We all belong to smallcliques,andwe mayremainsimplyinside
of them. The "organizedother"present in ourselvesis then a
communityof a narrowdiameter.We are strugglingnow to get
a certainamountof interational-mindedness. We arerealizing
ourselvesas membersof a largercommunity.The vivid nation-
alism of the present period should, in the end, call out an
international attitude of the largercommunity. (Mead 1934,
265)3
When Mead says to Irene Tufts Mead that she "must be a part of this
intellectualworld,"he is concernedabouther personalgrowthand not merely
about the fragilityof her position vis-a-vis the powerpossessedby the practi-
tionersof science. No doubthe wantsher to be able to respondwhen criticized.
This, however, is not simply a statement about power relations. Credible
responsesto criticismrequirethat we accommodateourselvesto moreexpan-
sive communities."Theonly wayin which we can reactagainstthe disapproval
of the entire communityis by setting up a higher sort of communitywhich in
a certainsense out-votesthe one we find"(Mead 1934, 167-68). Becauseselves
correspondto communities,to be cut off fromwidercommunities-for exam-
ple, an internationalcommunityof the scientificallyminded-is to be blocked
fromthe realizationof one'spotentialities,that is, the self one could become.
It is also to be cut off from the kind of "enlargedmentality"that helps one
place one's own situation in perspective,which Hannah Arendt, following
Kant'slead, so stronglyadvocates(Arendt 1982, 70-77). These widercommu-
nities should be understood in terms of generalizedothers that are more
inclusive, and they can be more inclusive because they operate at "higher"
levels of abstraction.Generalizedotherscan be thought of as connected with
groupssuch as "political parties, clubs, corporations,"but they can also be

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 155

thought of in terms of more abstractgroups,such as classes of creditorsand

debtors (Mead 1934, 157). An individual'sparticipationin several abstract
groupscan lead to
definite social relations (however indirect) with an almost
infinite number of other individuals... cutting acrossfunc-
tional lines of demarcationwhich dividedifferenthumansocial
communitiesfromone another,and includingindividualmem-
bersfromseveral(in some casesfromall) such communities.Of
these abstractsocial classesor subgroupsof human individuals
the one which is most inclusive and extensive is, of course,the
one defined by the logical universeof discourse(or system of
universallysignificant symbols) determinedby the participa-
tion and communicative interaction of individuals. (Mead
1934,157-58)

Insteadof the generalizedother of, for example,a ball team or a family,we

can have generalizedothers (and selves) that correspondto complex ethical
or political systemsof interaction.

In the communitythere arecertainwaysof acting undersitua-

tions which are essentiallyidentical, and these ways of acting
on the partof anyone arethose which we excite in otherswhen
we take certain steps. If we assertour rights,we are calling for
a definite responsejust becausethey arerightsthat are univer-
sal-a responsewhich everyoneshould,and perhapswill, give.
(Mead 1934, 260-61)

But we cannot assertour rights unless we are viewed and view ourselvesas
active participantsin the communitiesthat observethese rights.The doctrine
of separatespheresis a threatto just this sort of participation.Needless to say,
such a doctrine would violate Mead'segalitarianimpulses,impulsesthat are
directlylinked to his commitmentto the actualizationof each and everyone's
socially redeemablepotentialities. It should be noted, however, that given
Mead'scommitment to the latter, he could easily defend voluntarysegrega-
tion-for example, at a woman's college-if it contributed to individual
development, for instance, in terms of building self-confidence and critical
skills. But ideally such segregationwould be a means for Mead, never an end
in itself, never an excuse for permanentseparatespheres.
For Mead, as for Habermas,greater"socialization"leads to more, not less,
individuation.4Membershipin variousgroupsenhances one's individualityby
increasingthe rangeof one'sexperience.Modem democracy'spromiseis that
it will providethese new possibilitiesforself-development,not for the few,but
for the many.

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156 Hypatia

It is often assumedthat democracyis an order of society in

which those personalitieswhich are sharplydifferentiatedwill
be eliminated, that everythingwill be ironeddown to a situa-
tion where everyone will be, as far as possible, like everyone
else. But of coursethis is not the implicationof democracy;the
implication of democracyis ratherthat the individualcan be
as highly developed as lies within the possibilitiesof his own
inheritance,and still can enter into the attitudesof the others
whom he affects.(Mead 1934, 326)

To keep IreneTuftsMeadat home wouldhave been to deny her the self that
wasclearlywithin society's(and thereforeher) powers.No doubtMeadwould
have viewed such an occurrenceas a form of injustice, for readilyrealizable
potentialities were being denied. Mead drew,as did Marx,on a set of Aristo-
telian assumptionsabout the relationshipbetween potency and act. In the
democratizedhands of Mead and (young) Marx, the relationship between
potency and act was articulated in terms that allowed them to condemn
societiesthat preventedthe actualizationof sociallyredeemablepotentialities.

III.

In closing I wish to offer a modificationof Mead'sapproach,one that is in

keeping with the tenor of his position and may help to answerthe question
posed by the title of this paper. As self-conscious, perspectively oriented
creatures,human beings become aware not only of the selves that they
experience in termsof generalizedothersbut also of the limits and privations
they sufferin relationshipto currenthistoricalpossibilities.In so doing they
can define themselves in terms of what they perceive as denied and absent.
And these perceptionscan actuallyprovidea certainkind of selfhood,one that
nurturessolidaritywith like-minded individualsin terms of shareddepriva-
tions. Before proceeding, however, I should note the obvious danger here.
Women,afterall, have long been definedin termsof what they lack in relation
to men-and not just women, for we all know what little girlslack that little
boys have. There have been many strong voices that have sought to avoid
approachesof this sort.But partof the problemlies in who is determiningwhat
potentialitiesare lacking.
There are a numberof interestingadvantagesto seeing one'sself in termsof
privations.First,it providessolidaritywith othersin termsof demonstrableand
sharedinequities. Even in the face of disagreements-for example, over the
degreeto which genderand sex overlap,or over the notion that genderis solely
a linguisticconstruct-individuals can still feel a sense of shared"selfhood"in
relationshipto a perceivedlack. Political action thrives on such perceptions.

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 Mitchell Aboulafia 157

Second, it servesto highlight differencesthat make a difference,in partby

readily confirming some very down-to-earth intuitions about differences
between men and women and among women. The timewom question of
whetherthere can be male feminists,for example,can easilybe put to the test
here. Women, and variousgroupsof women (e.g., Black and Latino women),
can genuinely claim that in one sense men (and other women) cannot
experience what they are experiencing.The felt privationsthat help define
the selves of membersof particulargroupsare uniquely their own. They are
theirown becauseof present-daycircumstances,that is, becauseof how persons
relateto specific generalizedothers (or their absence), and also becauseselves
have histories.One doesn'tnecessarilyforgetthe felt privationsof one's past
even when these privationsare overcome. So in this sense no man can ever
be a feminist.
But given the multiplicityof "selves"and aspectsof selves that exist in the
modem world, and the breadth of certain generalizedothers, individuals
participate in groups whose domains overlap. People belong to different
political partiesor workfor differentcorporateentities, but there are general-
izedmodesof action that membersof these organizationsfollow that aresimilar
and interchangeable.There are patternsand "selves"that can be sharedat
different levels of abstraction, and these are (seemingly) becoming more
prevalentin the modem world.Meadwould tell us that we can and often do
lear how to operateon these differentlevels of social abstraction.
While I may not have experiencedyour specific form of privation, I may
have experiencedsomethinganalogous,and I can see it as analogousbecause
I can abstractfrom the particularsof my situation. I have learnedhow to so
abstract(in part) fromthe activity and experienceof takingthe positionsof a
multitude of generalizedothers and through learning how to manage the
transitionsbetween them. In the processI may very well have had my own
experiences of forced privation or at least have developed a capacity to
empathizewith those who have had them. I come to appreciatehow it feels to
be arbitrarilydenied and to understandthe danger that such arbitrariness
would pose for my own development and, hence, the development of any
individual. In this sense men can indeed be feminists. And George Herbert
Meadwas surelyin such a circle.

NOTES

1. In his recentbookJohnDeweyandAmericanDemocracy,
RobertWestbrookargues
that Deweyshouldbe viewedas a radicalprogressive.
He suggeststhat Mead,Jane
Addams,andRobertBourneshouldbeplacedinthesamecamp(Westbrook 1991,189n).
Meadwas indeeda radicalprogressive.
2. Fora discussionof these themes,see Mead (1932) and Aboulafia(1986).

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158 Hypatia

3. Mead was not so oblivious to present-dayconditions that he thought such

intemational-mindednessto be around the comer. In 1929 he even warned of the
possibilitythat "anothercatastrophemaybe necessarybeforewe have cast off the cult of
warfare,but we cannot any longerthinkour internationallife in termsof warfare"(Mead
1964a,363).
4. "If,with GeorgeHerbertMead,we understandthe processof socializationitself
as one of individuation,the sought-formediationbetween individualand society is less
'puzzling'" (Habermas1987a,334). See also Habermas(1987b, 1-42; 1992)

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