Constitution InTheSupremeCourtofNigeria

ofNigeria OnFriday,the5 thdayofOctober1990

Courtof SC218/1988
Appeal
BeforeTheirLordships
HighCourts
HomePage
Law AndrewsOtutuObaseki ...... Justice,SupremeCourt
Reporting AugustineNnamani ...... Justice,SupremeCourt
AdolphusGodwinKaribiWhyte ...... Justice,SupremeCourt
Lawsofthe
PhilipNnaemekaAgu ...... Justice,SupremeCourt
Federation
ofNigeria OlajideOlatawura ...... Justice,SupremeCourt

Legal Between
Education
Q&A AdemolaAtoyebi ...... Appellant

Supreme And
Court
WilliamOdudu ....... Respondent
Jobsat
Nigerialaw JudgmentoftheCourt
Deliveredby
OlajideOlatawura.J.S.C.

When this appeal came before us on 9th July, 1990, l allowed the appeal and indicated that the reasons for
allowingtheappealwouldbegiventoday.Inowgivemyreasons.

Theappellantwhowastheplaintiffsuedtherespondent,thedefendantintheHighCourtofKwaraState,claiming
thesumofSeventyThousandNaira(N70,000.00)asSpecialandGeneralDamagesfor"wordsfalselywrittenand
circulated at Ilorin in Kwara State of Nigeria in a Circular dated 15th August, 1979 titled "DISCLAIMER"
addressedtoallpractisingEstateSurveyorsinIlorinbythedefendanttothediscreditoftheplaintiffandwhich
circularthedefendantmeanttoand,whichdoesinfact,refers(sic)totheplaintiff,asaresultofwhichtheplaintiff
hasbeengreatlyinjuredinreputation,andhasbeenbroughtintopublicscandal,ridiculeandcontempt."

InhisStatementofClaimdated2nddayofJanuary,1980andfiledon4thJanuary,1980theplaintiffaverredas
follows:

1.ThatplaintiffisareputableCharteredSurveyor,EstateAgentandValuerandwasformerlyaSeniorEstate
SurveyorandValuerwiththedefendant.

2.TheplaintiffresidesatNo.17YorubaRoad,Ilorin.

3.ThedefendantisalsoCharteredSurveyor,EstateAgentandValuerandtheManaging/SeniorPartnerof
Odudu&Co.,afirmofCharteredSurveyorscarryingonbusinessat124IbrahimTaiwoRoad,Ilorin.

4.Theplaintiffwasemployedbythedefendanton31stAugust,1976andhewaswiththedefendantuntil
13thAugust,1979.

5.Between31stAugust,1976and13thAugust,1979,theplaintiffrosefromthepostofanAssistantEstate
Manager to that of a Senior Estate Surveyor, that is from an annual salary of N4,000.00 to that of N
6,500.00,havingbeenpromotedfivetimesbythedefendantforwhatthedefendantalwaysdescribedas
the"plaintiff'sgoodperformance."

6.Theplaintiffwillrelyonhispromotionletterof31/8/76,16/2/77,24/8/77,17/7/78and25/6/79atthe
hearingofthissuit.

7. On 17th March, 1978, the defendant promoted the plaintiff as Associate Member of his Firm. The
promotionletterisherebypleaded.

8.Byaletterdated13thAugust,1979andsignedbythedefendant,thedefendantterminatedtheplaintiff's
employment without notice and without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself on the
unsubstantiatedchargeslevelledagainsthim(plaintiff).

9.Byacirculardated15thAugust,1979,signedbythedefendant,titledDISCLAIMERandtoallEstate
SurveyorsandsomeotherpeopleinandoutsideIlorin,thedefendantfalselyandmaliciouslywroteand
communicated to the said Surveyors of and concerning the plaintiff and of him in the way of his
occupation,thewordsfollowing.thatistosay."ThatistoinformyouthattheappointmentofMr.A.A.
Atoyebi, who was in our employment until 13thAugust. 1979, has been terminated for professional
misconduct.(italicsours)Anypersontransactingbusinesswithhimonourbehalfdoessoathisorher
 misconduct.(italicsours)Anypersontransactingbusinesswithhimonourbehalfdoessoathisorher
ownrisk".Theplaintiffherebypleadsthesaidcircular.

10. The said words, particularly terminated for proffessiona1 misconduct in their natural and ordinary
meaningmeantandwereunderstoodtomean:

(a) that the plaintiff, as a Chartered Estate Surveyor and Valuer, was a dishonest and dishonourable
personwhointheleastshouldnotbetrustedasaCharteredEstateSurveyorandValuer.

(b)Thattheplaintiffisunfitand/orincompetenttobetrustedoremployedtocarryoutanyworkasa
CharteredEstateSurveyor.

(c)ThattheplaintiffhasabusedtheconfidencereposedinhimbyclientsasaCharteredEstateSurveyor
andValuer.

(d) That the plaintiff is a man of dubious character who in the course of his professional calling has
growntobeacheat,adupeand/orafraud.

(e)Thattheplaintiffwasofadissoluteandprofligatecharacter.

11.Furtherorinthealternative,thesaidwordsmeantandwereunderstoodtomean:

(a)Thattheplaintiff,inthecourseofhisemploymentwiththedefendant,wasinvolvedinsomedirty
deedsand/ordealsunbecomingofaCharteredEstateSurveyorandValuer.

(b)Thattheplaintiffhasthrownoverboardalltherulesand/orprofessionalethicsguidingtheInstitute
ofCharteredSurveyorsandValuersinNigeria.

(c)That(theplaintiffshouldbetreatedwithsuspicionbybothcoprofessionalsandclientssinceheis
notafitandproperpersontobecalledaCharteredEstateSurveyorandValuer.

(d) That an embargo should be placed on the plaintiff from operating or carrying out business as a
Chartered Estate Surveyor and Valuer in and outside Ilorin since the plaintiff is a disgrace to the
professionofEstateSurveyorsandValuers.

(e)Thattheplaintiffwasunfittoassociatewithrespectablepersons.

12.TheplaintiffwillatthehearingofthissuitrelyonthecircularaddressedtoMessrsOpaleye&Co.,dated
15thAugust,1979andsignedbythedefendant.

13.Furthermore,theplaintiffpleadsanothermemorandumdated13thAugust,1979signedbythedefendant
andaddressedtooneMr.D.O.Akinola,anotherEstateSurveyorintheemploymentofthedefendant.

14.Thedefendantknewandbelievedthesaidwordstobefalsebutheonlywantedtodamagetheplaintiffs
reputationforsomeunsubstantiatedandflimsyexcuses.

15. The plaintiff will contend at the trial that throughout his 3 year stay in the employment of the
defendant,hewasnevergivenanyqueryneitherwashefoundwantinginthedischargeofhisdutiesby
thedefendant.

16.Thesaidcircular,particularlythewordsterminatedforprofessionalmisconductwerecalculatedtoand
theydiddisparagetheplaintiffinhissaidprofessionasaCharteredEstateSurveyorandValuer.

17.Inconsequenceofthesaidwords,thatis,terminatedforprofessiona/misconduct,theplaintiffhasbeen
greatly injured in his credit. character and reputation and in his said profession as a Chartered Estate
SurveyorandValuerandhehasbeenbroughtintohatred,scandal,ridiculeandcontempt.

18.WHEREUPONtheplaintiffclaimsagainstthedefendantthesumofN70,000.00beinggeneraldamages."

InhisAmendedStatementofDefencethedefendantaverredasfollows:

1.ThedefendantwillraiseapreliminaryobjectionduringthetrialofthisSuitthattheproperpersonhad
notbeensued.

2.Thedefendantdeniesparagraph1oftheStatementofclaimandwhilethedefendantwillputtheplaintiff
to its strictest proof during the trial of this Suit, the defendant will also contend that the plaintiff has
neverbeenamemberoftheRoyalInstituteofCharteredSurveyors(RICS)

3.Thedefendantisnotinapositiontoadmitordenyparagraph2oftheStatementofClaimandwillputthe
plaintifftoitsstrictproofatthetrialofthisSuit.

4.Thedefendantadmitsparagraph3oftheStatementofclaimonlytotheextentthatthedefendantisa
CharteredSurveyor,EstateAgentandvalueraswellastheManaging/SeniorPartnerofOdudu&Co.but
thedefendantdeniesthatitcarriesonbusinessonlyatNo.124IbrahimTaiwoRoad,Ilorin.Thedefendant

willproveatthetrialofthisSuitthatdefendantcarriesonbusinessalsoat(a)5,BeirutRoad,Kano(b)15,
 willproveatthetrialofthisSuitthatdefendantcarriesonbusinessalsoat(a)5,BeirutRoad,Kano(b)15,
IsheriRoad,Ikeja,Lagos.(c)25AkpakpavaStreet,BeninCity.

5.Thedefendantadmitsparagraph4oftheStatementofclaim.

6.ThedefendantadmitsparagraphoftheStatementofclaimonlytotheextentthattheplaintiff'sSalarywas
increasedfromN4,000.00toN6,500.00betweenAugust,1978andAugust,1979butthedefendantwill
contendatthetrialofthissuitthatincrementofsalarydoesnotipsofactoamounttoPromotionandthe
defendantwillputtheplaintifftoitsstrictestproofatthetrialofthissuit.

7. The defendant is not in a position to admit or deny paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim and will
thereforeputtheplaintifftoitsstrictestproofatthetrialofthissuit.

8.Thedefendantdeniesparagraph7oftheStatementofClaimandwillputtheplaintifftoitsstrictproofat
thetrialofthissuit.

9.Thedefendantadmitsparagraph8oftheStatementofClaimonlytotheextentthatthedefendantwrotea
lettertotheplaintiffinwhichthedefendantterminatedtheplaintiff'sappointment,butthedefendantwill
contendatthetrialofthissuitthattheplaintiff'sappointmentwasterminatedasaresultofmisconduct
The defendant will prove the misconduct of the plaintiff through a letter written by Akinola to the
plaintiffdated9.45a.m.on14/8/79aswellasallothermalpracticesbytheplaintiffsuchasthefollowing
whichthedefendantwillrelyonatthetrialofthisSuit.

(i)BetweenJune&July,1979theplaintiffmetoneMr.SeithMaiyekogbonofAlmaIndustrialand
ManagingConsultantof147IbrahimTaiwoRoad,Ilorintocanvassforjobsforhimselfpersonally
whereas the jobs should be for the defendant since the plaintiff was at the material time in the
Employmentofthedefendant.

(ii)ThesaidSeithMaiyekogbonknowingthattheplaintiffwasintheemploymentofthedefendantat
thematerialtimerefusedtogivethejobsbeingsoughtforfromthesaidSeithMaiyekogbonbythe
plaintiffandthesaidSeithMaiyekogbonlaterreportedthemattertothedefendant.

(iii)AsaresultofthereportlodgedbythesaidSeithMaiyekogbontothedefendant,thedefendant
warned the plaintiff verbally but as the plaintiff did not change his dishonest act, the defendant
wrotealettertotheplaintiff,terminatingtheplaintiff'sappointment.

10.Thedefendantadmitsparagraph9oftheStatementofClaimonlytotheextentthatthedefendantwrote
acirculardated15/8/79totheEstateSurveyorsandvaluerinIlorinbutthedefendantdeniesthatthat
letterwasfalseormalicious.ThedefendantwillproveduringthetrialofthisSuitthattheCompanyof
Estate Surveyors in Ilorin to whom the disclaimer was addressed have interest in receiving such
informationastheybelongtothesameProfessionalbodywiththeplaintiff.

11. The defendant denies paragraphs 10 (ac) 11 (a)(c) of the Statement of claim and conversely, the
defendant will contend at the trial of this Suit that the words terminated for Professional misconduct
complainedof

(a)Didnotbearandwerenotunderstoodtobear(andwerenotcapableofbearingorbeingunderstood
tobeartheallegedoranydefamatorymeaning.

(b) The defendant was privileged as the person to whom the words were communicated to and the
defendanthaveacommoninterestinthemattersincetheybelongtothesameProfessionalbody.

(c) The defendant was justified in Communicating the said words to the people to whom they were
communicated.

(d)Thedefendantwrotethewordstoprotecthisinterestandbusiness.

12.Thedefendantdeniesparagraphs14,15,16,and17oftheStatementofClaimandwillputtheplaintiffto
theirstrictestproof.Thedefendantwillalsorelyonthedefencesraisedinparagraph11ofthisstatement
ofdefenceforthedefenceofthisparagraph.

13.ThedefendantdeniesbeingliabletotheplaintiffinthesumofN70,000.00asgeneraldamagesorinany
sumwhatsoever.

14.ThedefendantpraysthisHonourableCourttodismisstheplaintiff'sclaimasbeingvexatiousfrivolous
andanabuseoftheCourt'sprocess.

On 24th June, 1980 the learned Counsel for the defendant applied to withdraw paragraph 1 of the Amended
StatementofDefence.Itwasaccordinglystruckout.

Fromthepleadingsandevidenceledthereisnotmuchindispute.EvidencewasgiveninlinewiththeStatement
ofClaimfiled.TheplaintiffwhoisanEstateSurveyorandValuerwasoriginallyemployedbythedefendanton
31stAugust,1976.Heworkedforabout3yearsuntilhisappointmentwasterminatedon13thAugust,1979bythe
defendant.Betweenthedateoftheemploymentandtheterminationofhisappointmenthissalarieswereincreased.
On25thJune,1979hewaspromotedtothepostofSeniorEstateSurveyorandValuer.Beforehisterminationsof
appointment he had no query of any kind and in fact his last salary was N 6,500.00 per annum. After the
appointment he had no query of any kind and in fact his last salary was N 6,500.00 per annum. After the
terminationofhisemploymenthestartedtolookforjobinthecourseofwhichheapproachedoneMr.Opaleyefor
employment.Mr.Opaleyewasalsoformerlyemployedbythedefendant.He(Mr.Opaleye)hadearlieronleftthe
defendantandsetuphisownpracticeasanEstateSurveyorandValuer.ItwasMr.Opaleyethatshowedhimaletter
written by the defendant headed "Disclaimer." Mr. Opaleye informed him that unless the circular letter headed
"Disclaimer"waswithdrawnbythedefendant,he(Mr.Opaleye)wouldnotemployhim.Hesawthecontentsofthe
Disclaimerwhichhesaidwereuntrueandfalse.Hecouldnotgofurthertoapproachanyotherpersonashewas
ashamedoftheseriousallegationsofprofessionalmisconductlevelledagainsthimbythedefendant.Undercross
examination he denied diverting the business meant for the defendant to other persons. He was sure that the
disclaimerwassenttosomeoftheirclientssuchasAlbajiOjolowo,Maiye Engineering, Banks, Companies and
some Ministries especially Ministry of Lands and Housing. He called 3 witnesses: Mr. Opaleye a Chartered
SurveyorwhotenderedtheCircularLettertitled"Disclaimer"andreceivedinevidenceasExhibit7,Mr.Benjamin
DadsonOlleanotherEstateSurveyorandValuerwhowastheactingChiefLandsOfficerKwaraStateandoneMr.
Ezekiel Oladipo Toki a Chartered Estate Surveyor. All these witnesses were of the opinion that the plaintiff's
reputationasaSurveyorwasdamagedasaresultofthepublicationi.e.Exhibit7.

Thedefendantgaveevidence,headmittedappointingtheplaintiffas"anassociate."Hesaidhetrainedhimand
paidhimsalary,andincrementsatvarioustimes.Itwastowardstheendof1978hediscoveredhedeterioratedin
theperformanceofhisdutyasasurveyorforhewasnolongerdevotinghistimetotheworkintheoffice.Hewas
reportedbysomeoftheirclients.Healsofoundhimtobedisloyal.AstowhetherhesignedtheDisclaimeri.e.
Exhibit7,thedefendantsaid:

I signed a letter of disclaimer because the plaintiffs appointment was terminated as a result of
professionalmalpractices.IfeltitwasmydutyasaSeniormemberoftheProfessiontoinformmyother
ProfessionalColleaguesandafewofourkeyclients.IinformedMessrsToki,Atta&Co.,E.O.Opaleye&
Co.,andMessrsLawrenceandMosesallinIlorin..IsenttheNoticetomyColleaguesbecausethe
plaintiffisdishonesttomycompanyandmycolleagueshaveacommoninteresttoprotecttheintegrity
oftheprofession.

He called two witnesses, Matthew Odudu (the defendant's brother) and Seith Abel Maiyekogbon. Both counsel
addressedthecourt.Afterameticulousreviewoftheevidenceledandaconsiderationofthesubmissionsmade,
thelearnedtrialJudge,GbadeyanJ.foundinfavouroftheplaintiffandawardedhimthesumofN10,000.00 as
damages.ItisagainstthatjudgmentthedefendantappealedtotheCourtofAppeal.

The Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, set aside the judgment of the Court of first instance and dismissed the
claim.Theplaintiffwhoisnowtheappellantinthiscourthasappealedtothiscourtandwiththeleaveofthecourt
filed5amendedgroundsofappeal.Theyreadasfollows:

(1)Thatthejudgmentisagainsttheweightofevidence.

(2)ThattheCourtofAppealerredinlawandinfactbyholdingthattherespondentiscovered"bythelawof
defamationrelatingtoqualifiedprivilege"onthegroundthattheappellant"wassolicitingforvaluation
jobofthenatureD.W.2normallypassedtoOduduandCo.

ParticularsofError

(i) The purported job which the appellant solicited for with the D.W.2 was not meant for an Estate
Surveyor.

(ii) The said job which the appellant purportedly solicited for with D.W.2 was not given to the
respondentorthatitwasalreadycompletedbeforetheappellantpurportedlywenttoD.W.2'soffice.

(iii)D.W.2isnotaclientoftherespondent.

(iv)Exhibit7onwhichtheappellant'scomplaintrelateswasnotcopiedtoD.W.2bytherespondent.

(3)TheCourtofAppealerredinlawbyholdingthattherespondentcouldavailhimselfofthedefenceof
qualifiedprivilege.

When:

(i)AsbetweentherespondentandhisprofessionalcolleaguestowhomcopiesofExhibit7weresentto,
they do not share any reciprocity of interest in any action that destroys the career of another
colleague:

(ii)Therespondentandtheotherpeople(besideEstateSurveyors)towhomExhibit7wascopieddonot
shareanycorrespondinginterestintheprofessionofEstateSurveyorsandValuers.

(iii)Noreportoftheappellant'spurportedprofessionalmisconductwaslodgedwiththeInstitutionof
EstateSurveyorsandValuers.

(4)TheCourtofAppealmisdirecteditselfinlawbyholding(relyingonBakare&AnotherV.AihajiAdo
Ibrahim(1973)6S.C.205)thatifcounselfortheappellantwantedtoestablishmaliceinfactheoughtto
havefiledareplytothateffect.

When:
When:

(a)Ithadinteraliaheld(perAkpata,J.C.A.)that"IwishtostateemphaticallythatIcannotholdasafact
thattherespondentcommittedprofessionalmisconduct."

(b) It is shown on the pleadings and evidence that the respondent sent copies of Exhibit 7 to some
individualsandinstitutionswhoarenotEstateSurveyorsandtheCourtofAppealagreedthatthis
mightbeevidenceofmalice.

(c)Thepublicationbeingcomplainedof,towit,Exhibit7isfalseandunjustifiedandthelearnedtrial
Judgesofound.

(d)InBakarev.IbrahimsupratheSupremeCourtheldthatifapublicationisshowntobefalse,malice
isinferredbyoperationoflaw.

(e)AfterallegingthatExhibit7isfalseand/orwithoutanylawfulexcuseinbothhisstatementofclaim
andevidence,theappellantwasnotrequiredtofileanyreplytothestatementofdefencealleging
malice.

(5)TheCourtofAppealerredinlawandinfactwhenitheldasfollows:

The fact remains however that the appellant honestly believed that the respondent committed
professionalmisconduct.Ithasnotbeendisputedthattheappellantterminatedtheappointmentofthe
respondentforprofessionalmisconduct.Therespondentdidnottenderinevidencetheletterterminating
hisappointmentforobviousreason.

ParticularsofError

(i) The only reason on record while the respondent "believed" that the appellant committed
professionalmisconductistraceabletotheevidenceofD.W.2andtherearenogoodotherreasonsfor
hissobelieving.

(ii)Exhibit7wasnotcommunicatedtoD.W.2.

(iii) The other purported reason which made the respondent B believe that the appellant committed
professional misconduct, to wit, "Exhibit D2 rejected" was not, in the Court of Appeal's opinion,
relevanttotherespondent'scase.

(iv)Sincetheplaintiffappellantwasnotsuingforterminationofappointment,theletterterminatinghis
appointmentwas/isnotrelevant.

(v)Inthealternativetosubparagraphivsupratheonuswasontherespondenttotenderthepurported
letterterminatingtheappellant'sappointmentforprofessionalmisconduct.

ThecrucialissueintheappealiswhethertheDisclaimerExhibit7publishedbytherespondentwasdefamatory.
Disclaimer in its ordinary meaning means denial or renunciation. It is now almost a daily publication in our
National Dailies. Published ordinarily in respect of anybody, it is to show that the person should no longer be
associatedwithaparticularofficeorhisplaceofwork.TheDisclaimeri.e.Exhibit7reads:

ThisistoinformyouthattheappointmentofMr.A.A.Atoyebi,whowasinouremploymentuntil13th
August,1979hasbeenterminatedforprofessionalmisconduct.Anypersontransactingbusinesswithhim
onourbehalfdoessoathisorherownrisk.

Theappellanthadnoquarrelwiththesimplefactofterminationofappointment,butwaspiquedbythereason
statedi.e."forprofessionalmisconduct."AssaidearlierheclaimedthesumofN70,000.00asgeneraldamagesfor
libelcontainedintheDisclaimerwhichwascirculatednotonlytomembersofhisprofession,itwasalsoadvertised
inoneoftheNigerianDailiesNigerianHerald.TherespondentdidnotdenypublishingExhibit7butpleadedand
relied on qualified privilege. In his address before the court of trial the learned Counsel who appeared for the
defendant(therespondentinthiscourt)andanchoredhisdefenceson:

(1)Thewordscomplainedofdidnotbearandwerenotunderstoodtobearandwerenotcapableofbearing
orbeingunderstoodtobeartheallegedoranydefamatorymeaning

(2)Justificationtopublishthewords"Professionalmisconduct"complainedof

(3)Qualifiedprivilege.

ThetrialCourtmadesomefindingsoffactwhichhavenotbeenattackedonappeal.Infactthelowercourtcameto
the same conclusions on these findings. The lower Court as per Akpata, J.C.A. (as he then was) in his lead
judgmentsaid:

Thisappealturnsmainlyonthelegaldefenceofqualifiedprivilege(sic)andthequestionofmaliceinan
actionforlibel."

Havingconcludedthatthedefencewasrightlyraisedandproved,thelowercourtdidnot,andrightlytoo,
 Havingconcludedthatthedefencewasrightlyraisedandproved,thelowercourtdidnot,andrightlytoo,
considerthegroundwhichdealtwithdamages.

Briefswerefiled.Theappellantraisedsixissuesbutthreearegermanetothisappeal.Theyare:

1.Whetherthedefenceofqualifiedprivilegecanavailtherespondentherein.

2. Whether in order to establish malice the appellant ought to have filed a reply (to the Statement of
Defence)when:

(a)ItwasheldbyboththeHighCourtandtheCourtofAppealthattheAppellantdidnotcommitany
professionalmisconduct.

(b)ItwasshownthattheDISCLAIMER(Exhibit7)isfalse.

3.Whetherthefailureoftheappellanttofileareplygivingparticularsofmaliceinfactwasraisedbefore
theCourtofAppealandifraised,whetheritwasfataltohiscasewhenfromthecircumstancesofthiscase,
malicecouldandwasactuallyinferredbyoperationoflaw.

Closelyconnectedwiththeaboveissuestherespondentraisedissueswhicharealmostsimilar:

1.Whetherthedefenceofqualifiedprivilegecanavailtherespondentherein.

2.Whethertheappellantoughttohavefiledareplyinordertoestablishmalice.

3.Whetherthefailuretofileareplybytheappellantandgivingparticularsofmaliceinfactwasraisedat
theCourtofAppeal,andifraiseditwasfataltoappellant'scasewhenmaliceinlawhasbeeninferredby
thetrialcourt.

IwillpointoutbeforetheconsiderationoftheseissuesthatExhibitD2rejectedbythelearnedtrialJudgewas
ruledbythelowercourttohavebeenwronglyrejected.ExhibitD2nowformspartoftherecordoftheappeal.It
would however appear, notwithstanding its admission, not to have much hearing on the case or if it does its
evidentialvalueisminimalbecausethelowerCourtsaid:

TheappellantstatedinhisevidencethatExhibitD2rejectedwasattachedtoavaluationreport.

Icannotmakemuchoutoftherejecteddocument.(italicsmine).

Inhisoralsubmission,Mr.WoleOlanipekunthelearnedCounselfortheappellantadoptedhisbrief:hepointed
outandrightlytoothatExhibits7and8ucthesamethoughsenttodifferentpeople.Hecontendedthatthelower
courtmisinterpretedandmisappliedthecaseofBakareandAnor.V.AlhajiAdoIbrahim(1973)6S.C.205inthat
thelowerCourtsaidthattheappellantoughttohavefiledareplyifhehadwantedtorelyonmaliceandsubmitted
thattherewasnoqualifiedprivilegeestablished.ThelearnedCounselforrespondentMr.Akintoyereliedonhis
brief.

I now come to the issue of qualified privilege. There must exist a common interest between the maker of the
statement and the person to whom it is made. Reciprocity of interest is an essential element in the law of
priviledge.Adamv.Ward(1917)A.C.309at334Whitev.J&FStone2K.B.827Pullmanv.Hill(1891)1OB524
at 528. The facts relied upon by the makermust he true a mere belief will not sustain the defence.Hebditchy.
Macllwaine(1894)2 Q.B. 54. The question then is: Was Exhibit 7 i.e. the Disclaimer, published so as to set in
motionthedisciplinarymachinerywhichthestatutorybodychargedwiththedisciplineofmembershas?Fromthe
evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3.,this is not the case. An allegation of professional misconduct implies an
offenceagainsttherulesandpracticeoftheparticularprofession.Inthiscasetheallegedmisconductcanonlybe
sustained after due investigation in which the appellant accused of professional misconduct was given an
opportunity to defend himself. No person, not even a professional body, can be allowed to make such a grave
accusation without due investigation. To ground such a grave accusation on reasonable belief of the person
makingtheaccusationis to give a licence to malignothers.Itisnotunusualtodeprecateaman'sconductbut
vilificationshouldnotformpartofadisclaimer.Thosewhopublishdisclaimershouldbecautiousnottoinfringe
on the rights of others. Where caution is thrown into the wind recklessness is enthroned. Exhibit 7 i.e. the
disclaimerappearstomearecklessoutburstofadisgruntledboss.Thereisamplejustificationforthelearnedtrial
Judge'sfindings:

Ifindnoevidencetoconvincemethattheplaintiffengagedinanyactivitywhichwouldamounttoa
misconductletaloneprofessionalmisconduct.Thereisalsonoevidencewhatsoeverthattheplaintiffhas
everbeenqueriedbyhisemployerortriedbyanytribunal

This in my view is an implied rejection or disbelief of the evidence of D.W.2 Seith Abel Maiyekogbon. The
finding of the trial Judge was confirmed by the Court ofAppeal, per Akpata, J .C.A. (as he then was) when his
Lordshipsaid:

IwishtostateemphaticallyIcannotholdasafactthattherespondentcommittedprofessionalconduct.

Thisinmyviewoughttohavebeentheendofthematterinsofarasqualifiedprivilegeisconcerned.Butthe
CourtofAppealbasedthesuccessofthedefenceofqualifiedprivilegeonthehonestbeliefoftherespondent.The
Courtsaid:


The fact remains however that the appellant honestly believed, and there are good reasons for his
believing,thattherespondentcommittedprofessionalmisconduct.

Itwouldhavebeendifferentifthereportwasmadetoaprofessionalbody.TheconclusionoftheCourtofAppeal
inmyviewcontradictstheearlierstatementquotedabove.SuchconclusionwasbasedontheevidenceofD.W.2
whichwasimpliedlyrejected.ThelowerCourtreliedverymuchonthecaseofBakareandAnor.v.AlhajiAdo
Ibrahim(supra)toreachtheconclusionthatabsenceofareplywasfatalinordertoestablishmaliceinfact.Iwill
cometotheratiodecidendiofthiscaselater.

Intherespondent'sbrief,Mr.Akintoyehadvirtuallyadmittedthattheproofrequiredinanycasewherecrimeis
allegedisproofbeyondreasonabledoubt.Onpage5oftheappellantsbrief:4.8(inthelowerCourt)thelearned
Counselsaid:

It is admitted that the quasicriminal nature of professional misconduct must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Agreed, this must be tried and pronounced by the professional body trying it.
Nevertheless this does not mean that it cannot be charged with professional misconduct before it is
tried......

ItisthisallegationthatformedthebasisofExhibit7thedisclaimerwhichisthecauseofaction.LearnedCounsel
appearedtohaveoverlookedtheprovisionofs.137(1)oftheEvidenceActwhichrequiresburdenofproofbeyond
reasonabledoubttheprincipleofalawearlierenunciatedbythesamecounsel.LearnedCounselagainreliedon
ExhibitsDlandD2whichwererejectedbutonwhichtheCourtofAppealdidnotplacemuchevidentialvalue.It
shouldbeappreciatedthathonestbeliefinthecommissionofacrimetogroundaconvictionisnotsynonymous
withthemandatoryrequirementofsection137(1)oftheEvidenceAct.

I now come to Bakare's case in so far as it affects the requirement of filing a reply by the plaintiff where the
defendantreliesonqualifiedprivilege.Onpage212oftheReportinBakare'scasetheSupremeCourtsaid:

Where defamatory words are published without lawful excuse the law conclusively presumes that the
defendantismotivatedbywhatisoftendescribedasmaliceinlawaccordingly,theplaintiffisusually
notrequiredtogiveparticularsofthefactsonwhichheseekstorelyinsupportoftheallegationthatthe
wordswerepublished"maliciously."

Inmyview,therespondentinthisappealhasfailedtoprovethathehadlawfulexcuseforthepublication.His
reliance on DW2 is unhelpful to his defence. The case of Hulton v. James (191O) A.C.23/24 covers this point
whereLoreburnL.C.said:

Amaningoodfaithmaypublishlibelbelievingittobetrueanditmaybefoundbythejurythathe
actedingoodfaith,believingittobetrue,butinfactthestatementwasfalse.Underthosecircumstances
hehasnodefencetotheactionhoweverexcellenthisintention.
IagreewiththesubmissionofMr.Olanipekuninhisbriefwhenhesaid:

This finding of the trial Court as regards the presumption of malice in law was what the respondent
attackedbeforetheCourtofAppealandnotthatofmaliceinfactwhichtheCourtofAppealbasedits
judgmentupon.

ACourtshouldadjudicateonmattersorissuesproperlysubmittedbythepartiesandnotonmattersnotraisedby
theparties.TheCourtinthatcircumstancewillbemakingacasefortheparties.

Sincethedefencerelieduponbytherespondenthasbeenprovedtobefalseadefenceofqualifiedprivilegedoes
notavailtherespondent.Duyile&Anor.v.KellyOgunbayo&SonsLtd.(1988)1N.W.L.R.(Pt.72)601.

Onthewholetheappealsucceeds.ThejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealdated27thJanuary,1987isherebyset
aside.ThejudgmentoftheHighCourtdated4thSeptember,1981isherebyrestored.Costsoftheappealinthis
CourtisassessedatN500.00.CostsinthelowercourtisassessedatN300.00infavouroftheappellant.

Judgmentdeliveredby
Obaseki.J.S.C.

On the 9th day of July, 1990,1 allowed this appeal after hearing counsel's submission at the oral hearing and
reading the briefs of argument together with the record of proceedings and judgment of the court below. I then
reservedmyreasonsforthejudgmenttilltoday.

IhavesincethenhadtheadvantageofreadinginadvancetheReasonsforjudgmentjustdeliveredbymylearned
brother,Olatawura,J.S.C.andIfindhisopinionsonalltheissuesraisedfordeterminationinthisappealinperfect
accordwithmine.Ithereforeadoptthemasmyown.ThoseweretheReasonsonwhichIbasedmyjudgmentin
allowingtheappeal.

Judgmentdeliveredby
KaribiWhyte.J.S.C.

On the 9th July, 1990, I summarily allowed the appeal of the appellant, after hearing oral argument from both
On the 9th July, 1990, I summarily allowed the appeal of the appellant, after hearing oral argument from both
counselwhoreliedandelaboratedontheirbriefsofargument.Ialsohadreadtherecordofproceedingsinthis
appeal. I stated then that there was considerable merit in the appellant's arguments, and that I would give my
reasonsforallowingtheappealonthe5thOctober,1990.

Ihavereadthereasonsforjudgmentofmylearnedbrother,Olatawura,J.S.C.inthisappeal.Iagreeentirelywith
themandIadoptthemasmine.

Judgmentdeliveredby
NnaemekaAgu.J.S.C.

This appeal was heard on the 9th of July, 1990 and allowed summarily. But I postponed the reasons for my
judgmenttotoday.Inowgivemyreasons.

Theappealcallsforaconsiderationofoneoftheusualdefencesinlibelnamely:QUALIFIEDPRIVILEGE.

The action for libel arose in this way. The plaintiff, Ademola Atoyebi, a Chartered Surveyor, Estate Agent, and
Valuerwasemployedinhisprofessionalcapacitybythedefendant.William0.OduduinhisfirmofFOdudu&
Co., a firm of Chartered Surveyors carrying on business at 124, lbrahim Taiwo Road, Ilorin. Between 16th
February,1977and25thJune,1979theplaintiffrosefromthepositionofAssistantEstateManagertothatofa
Senior Estate Surveyor as result of a series of promotions. On 13th August, 1979 the defendant terminated the
appointmentoftheplaintiff.Followingthis,thedefendantwroteaDisclaimerinthesewords.

ThisistoinformyouthattheappointmentofMr.A.A.Atoyebiwhowasinouremploymentuntil13th
August,1979hasbeenterminatedforprofessionalmisconduct.Anypersontransactingbusinesswithhim
onourbehalfdoessoathisorherownrisk.

This was circulated to all the Estate Surveyors in and around Ilorin, and a number of establishments including
banks,andpublishedinthe"NigerianHerald"Newspaper.

TheplaintiffsuedthedefendantforlibelandlaterfiledhisStatementofClaim.Inthedefendant'sstatementof
defencehepleadedjustificationandprivilege.AftertrialthelearnedJudge,Gbadeyan,J.,foundfortheplaintiff
andawardedhimasumofN10,000.00asdamages.OnappealtotheCourtofAppealthatcourtperWali,Akpata,
JJ.C.A.(astheythenwere)andOgundare,J.C.A.reversedthedecisionanddismissedtheplaintiff'scase.

TheplaintiffhereinaftercalledtheappellanthasappealedfurthertothisCourt.Thedefendantshallhereinafterbe
referredtoastherespondent.

Partieshaveexchangedtheirbriefs.Imaymentionthat,althoughlearnedcounselfortheappellantmadesomehalf
hearted submissions on justification, that issue in fact is not, and cannot be, a life issue in this appeal. This is
becausethetwolowercourtsfoundasafactthatthemainstinginthepublication,thatistheimputationthatthe
appellanthasbeenfoundguiltyofprofessionalmisconductwasnotproved.Itisindisputablethatitiswithinthe
right and power of the professional body of both parties to try and find the appellant guilty of professional
misconduct that the respondent had not the competence so to do that in case of such a trial strict proof is
required and that there was not the calibre and standard of evidence required for the proof thereof. In the
circumstances, in so far as truth is the kernel of the defence justification in libel, it must be conceded that the
defencefailedintheabovestateofthefacts.Itisimmaterialthattherespondentbelievedittobetrue.See:onthis
PetersV.Bradlaugh(1884)4T.L.R.467Truth(N.Z.)LimitedV.Holloway(1960)1W.L.R.997(P.C.).Andwhatis
requiredisstrictproofoftheimputationcomplainedof.

Thedecisiveissueis,therefore:wasthedefenceofqualifiedprivilegeavailabletotherespondent.Onthis,Akpata,
J.C.A.(ashethenwas)statedinhisjudgment:

Itistrue,asstatedbythelearnedtrialJudgethatwheredefamatorywordsarepublishedwithoutlawful
excuse,thelawpresumesthatthedefendantismotivatedbywhatisoftendescribedasmaliceinlaw.The
positionofthelawhowever,asitstands,andasrightlystatedbytheappellant,isthatifadefendantfilesa
defenceoffaircommentorprivilegethepresumptionofmaliceinlawislost.Itthenbehovestheplaintiff
whoallegesmalicetofileareplyraisingtheallegationofmalice.Onceaplaintifffails,asinthiscase,to
fileareplythecourtwouldnotpresumemaliceandtheplaintiffcannotpleadevidenceofmalice.Apart
fromEnglishauthoritiesonthematter,theoutstandingNigerianauthorityonitisthecaseofChiefS.B.
BakareandAnor.v.AlhajiAdoJbrahim(1973)3E.C.S.L.R.(Pt.1)485atpage489.Italicsmine.

Withgreatestrespects,IbelievethattheeminentandrespectiveJusticeslippedthere.Inthefirstplace,theCaseof
Bakaredidnotsaythatthedutytofileareplyallegingexpressmalicearisesonceadefendantfilesadefenceof
faircommentorqualifiedprivilege.Ratheritsaysthatthatdutyariseswhensuchadefencehasbeenmadeout.Itis
usefulinthisrespecttoquotetheipsissimaverbaofIbekwe,J.S.C.(ashethenwas)intheCaseofBakare.Hesaid
atpage489ofthereport.

We think it is necessary to stress here that the word "maliciously", as usually pleaded in defamation
actions,hasatechnicalmeaning.Wethinkthatinpleadings,sufficientcareshouldbetakentodrawa
cleardistinctionbetweenthis"technicalmalice",ifwemaysayso,andactualmalice.Inourview,each
hasadefiniteplaceinthepleadings,andeachalso,hasadistinctroletoplayatthetrial.Itshouldalways
beborneinmindthat,oncethepleaoffaircommentorqualifiedprivilegeismadeout,asithasbeenin
the present case, the inference of malice is rebutted, and the burden is thrown upon the plaintiff of
showingandproving"expressmalice"againstthedefendants.Thisisgenerallyknownasmaliceinfact",
 showingandproving"expressmalice"againstthedefendants.Thisisgenerallyknownasmaliceinfact",
andtobeabletodischargethisonusatthetrial,itisimportantthattheplaintiffshoulddeliverareply,
allegingexpressmaliceandgivingparticularsofthefactsfromwhichsuchmaliceistobeinferred.

Itappearsclearfromtheabovewordsthattheneedtodeliverareplytopleadexpressmalicearisesnotmerely
becauseadefendanthasfiledadefence of qualified privilege or fair comment. Rather, it arises because he has
madeoutthedefence.Toputitinanotherway,itisadutywhichiscastonhimbytheshiftingoftheburdenof
proofinthecivilcaseandnotmerelyasaruleofpleading.Itisamatterofcommonsensethatlegaldefencesare
nevermadeoutbyadefendantmerelyfilinghisdefencebutbyhiscallingcogentevidenceinproofofthedefence
filed.Ibelieveitisalwaysopentoaplaintifffacedwithadefenceofqualifiedprivilegetodecidewhetherhecan,
asinthiscase,relyonthefactthatthedefenceisnotmadeout,atwhichcasethereisnoneedforhispleading
expressmalice,theonusofproofofwhichisonhim.Or,whenhebelievesthatsuchadefencewillprobablybe
madeout,hemayandshouldseektodestroyitbypleadingandshowingthatthepublicationwasactuatedby
malice.Inthiscaseinwhichheobviouslyoptedforthefirstalternativehedoesnotfailsimplybecausehedidnot
pleadexpressmalice.Andasrespondentdidnotdischargetheonusofprovingthedefencetheburdenofpleading
andprovingexpressmalicehasnotshiftedtotheappellant,asplaintiff.

ItisalsonecessarytocommentuponanotherstatementofthelearnedJusticeofAppeal,ashethenwas,which
underpinshiserroneousapproachtothedefenceofqualifiedprivilegebestated:

Thereareoccasionsuponwhich,ongroundsofpublicpolicyandconvenience,apersonmay,without
incurringlegalliability,makestatementsaboutanotherwhicharedefamatoryandinfactuntrue.Onsuch
occasionsamanstatingwhathebelievestobethetruthaboutanother,isprotectedindoingsoprovided
he makes the statement honestly and without indirect or improper motive. (See Gatley on Libel and
Slander7thEditionparagraph441atpage186).

Myfirstobservationisthatthisisanintroductoryparagraphtothewholeofchapter13ofthelearnedauthor's
work. Understandably therefore it is a form of a general statement which was later explained, cut down, and
delimitedinsubsequentparagraphs.Fromtheauthorities,however,thelawappearstobethatitisonlywhenthe
plaintiffhasputadefendant'sintentioninissuebyservingareplyallegingexpressmalicethatthebeliefornon
belief of the defendant becomes material. See: on this: Plymouth Mutual Cooperative and Industrial Societiy,
Limited V. Traders Publishing Association, Limited (1906)1 K.B.403 at page 418, per Fletcher Moulton, L.J.
IndeedthelearnedauthorofGatleyhimselfmadethesamepointinparagraph1177oftheworkwherehestated:

Wherethedefenceofqualifiedprivilegeorfaircommentispleaded,andtheplaintiffhasservedareply
allegingexpressmalice,theconditionofmindofthedefendantwhenhepublishedthewordsisamatter
directlyinissue.

Seealso:DewsanV.DoverChronicle(1913)108L.T. at page 484 also Caryll v. Daily Mail (1904)90 L.T. 307.
Localdecisionsarealsoinlinewiththefactthatadefendant'sbeliefinthetruthofsuchallegationcannotbea
ground for exculpating him when there is no issue of express malice which can only be raised in a reply. See:
EzekweV.Otomewo(1957)W.N.L.R.130alsoDr.LouisNthrendaV.PaulAlade&Anor.(1957)N.N.L.R.94where
Bello,S.P.J.,quotedwithapprovalthedictaofLordLoreburn,L.C.inHultonv.Jones(1910)A.C.20atpages2324
tothelikeeffect.Itisclear,therefore,fromtheaboveauthoritiesthatwhereamaningoodfaithpublishesalibel
believing it to he true whereas infact the statement was false, he cannot hide under the defence of qualified
privilegewhichisnotclearlymadeoutnomatterhowinnocenthisintentionwere,unlessanduntilafterhehas
primafaciemadeoutthedefencehisintentionhasbeenputinissuebytheplaintiffdeliveringareplypleading
expressmaliceonthepartofthedefendant.Alsoitisonlywhentheissueofexpressmaliceisbeingtriedorfor
purposesofmitigationofdamagesthatthedefendant'sintentioninmakingthepublicationmayberelevant.Inthe
instantcasewhereexpressmalicewasnevermadeanissue,itwaswrong,inmyview,forthelearnedJusticeof
Appealtohavecometotheconclusionthattherespondentwasimmunefromliabilitysimplybecauseheprobablv
believedinthetruthofwhathepublishedwhichwasfoundtobedefamatoryoftheappellant.

FinallyIshalldealwiththequestionwasadefenceofqualifiedprivilegemadeoutsothatitcanbesaidthatas
theappellantfailedtopleadorproveexpressmalicethedefenceofqualifiedprivilegesucceeded?Toanswerthis
questioncorrectlyIshallbeguidedbywhatIsaidinDayo Dayile & Anor. V. Kelly Ogunbayo & Sons Limited
(1988)3S.C.J.(Pt.1)page1,atpage12(1988)IN.W.L.R.(Pt.72)601atPg.614.ThereIstatedthatthefactthatan
occasionisprivilegedaffordsnopanaceaforpublicationoflibellousimputationsunnecessaryorirrelevanttothe
privilegedoccasion.IcitedwithapprovalthedictumofLordAtkinsoninAdamv.Ward(1917)A.C.309atPages
320321.

Nowthestingofthepublicationcomplainedofinthiscaseistheimputationthattheappellanthadbeenfound
guiltyofprofessionalmisconductasaCharteredSurveyor,EstateAgent,andValuer,Asitturnedout,hewasnever
triedofsuchanoffencebyhisfellowmembersofhisprofessionalbody.Therespondenthadnotthecompetenceto
tryhim,and,inanyevent,couldnotrightlybewitness,juryandjudgeatthesametime.Thetwolowercourts
found,andIagreewiththem,thatprofessionalmisconductwasnotproved.Worse,evidencegivenatthetrialby
the respondent himself shows that there was no ground at all for imagining that the appellant committed any
professionalmisconductbycanvassingforjobsforhimselfwhilehewasinrespondent'sappointment.Itisenough
formetoquotetwopiecesofevidence,amongothers,onthis.Undercrossexamination,therespondentadmitted:

Exhibit I' is a letter of the plaintiff's appointment by me. Exhibit 'I' does not forbid the plaintiff from
doinganotherprivatejob.

Lateron,healsoadmitted:

Imandatedallassociatesinmycompanytocanvassforbusinessforthecompanyandtheyareentitledto
 Imandatedallassociatesinmycompanytocanvassforbusinessforthecompanyandtheyareentitledto
apercentageofthefeesfromsuchjobabovecertainlimits.

When the appellant's letter of appointment does not forbid him from doing any private job and the employer
himselfadmittedthathemandatedhisemployeestocanvassforjobs,Idonotseethebasisoftherespondent's
complaint. Neither do I see how a professional employee can be held guilty of professional misconduct for
practising his profession in a way not shown to be contrary to any rule or the terms of his employment. The
conclusion I have reached, therefore, is that the publication complained of was not only false it was also
completelygroundless.AlsoguidedbywhatIsaidinDuyilecaseIreferredtoabove,itwouldhavebeensufficient,
iftherespondent'sinterest,weremerelytoprotecthisbusinessinterest,tostopbymerelystatingthattheappellant
wasnolongerinhisemployment.Itwasabsolutelyunnecessarytoaddthestingthathewasguiltyofprofessional
misconduct.Moreoverhedidnotconfinethepublicationofthedefamatorymattertotheprofessionalcolleagues
oftheappellantandtherespondentand,perhaps,hisclients.Hewentaheadtopublishittothewholeworld.It
mustbenotedthatsuchanexcessivepublicationisagroundforaggravationofdamagesbutasthishasnotbeen
askedfor,Isaynomoreaboutit.Iam,however,satisfiedthatthepublicationcomplainedofwaslibelousofthe
plaintifftotheextreme,aswellasitwasgroundlessandunnecessary.Yetitwasoverpublicisedandtherespondent
hadnodefencetotheaction.

Fortheabovereasonsandthefullerreasonscontainedinthereasonsforjudgmentjustdeliveredbymylearned
brother,Olatawura,J.S.C.whichIadoptasmyown,Iallowedtheappellant'sappealonthe9thofJuly,1990and
reservedthereasonsformyjudgmenttilltoday.Ihavenowgivenmyreasons

Editor'sComment

On the 9th of July, 1990, Nnamani, J.S.C indicated his concurrence in unanimously allowing the appeal.
Unfortunately,HisLordshipdiedonSaturday,22ndSeptember,1990beforetheReasonsforJudgmentweregiven
on5thOctober,1990.

Counsel

WoleOlanipekun,Esq. ........ FortheAppellant
D.AkinAkintoye,Esq. ........ FortheRespondent