San Agustin vs.

People

SC partially granted the petition; the petitioner was illegally arrested and as such Preliminary Investigation
needs to be conducted.

On June 25, 2002, the petitioner received a subpoena from Ferdinand M. Lavin, the Chief of the Anti-
Organized Crime Division of the NBI, requiring him to appear before said office the next day, on June 26, 2002, in
order to give his evidence in connection with said complaint and to bring with him the barangay logbook for June
19, 2002. The petitioner complied with the subpoena and presented himself at the NBI with the barangay logbook.
However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and prevented from going back home. The State Prosecutor
conducted an inquest investigation and found the guilt for serious illegal detention. Information was filed in the
RTC with the crime of kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail recommended.

the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, this time, on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute the felony of kidnapping/serious illegal detention. He claimed that he was a barangay
chairman when the private complainant was allegedly detained; hence, he should be charged only with arbitrary
detention. CA rendered against the petitioner.

SC upheld the decision of CA, the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested;
hence, he was entitled to preliminary investigation and release from detention subject to his appearance during
the preliminary investigation. However, the Court of Appeals declared that the lack of preliminary investigation did
not impair the validity of the Information filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that the
petitioner had already been granted a reinvestigation after which the Information filed with the RTC was
withdrawn. However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no need for the City
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation since the crime charged under the Information filed with the
MeTC was arbitrary detention.

GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN
AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR.,
SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. Nos. 105965-70,
March 20, 2001 ]

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999],
petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated
as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa
through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner
filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had
no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try
petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b)
of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the
Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial
over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall
within the rank requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law,
thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none of the
accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a

partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed
by http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the
Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February
22, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of

the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
RULING: No. The http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman is clothed with authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving
public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The
power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the
clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by
public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

The exercise by the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers
and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of
the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the
Congress deliberately endowed the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman with such power to make him a
more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office.

Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of
thehttp://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show
that, at its inception, the Office of thehttp://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman was already vested with the
power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
UY vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001

DOCTRINE: (1) RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the
Sandiganbayan provides that such will have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of
members of the Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of
higher rank.

(2) The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.

FACTS: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latters supervisor, on matters
relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for
Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for violation of
Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy and 19 other accused. The petitioner was said to
have signed a P.O. stating that the unit received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact,
only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be
withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive investigation.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the
Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which provides for the jurisdiction of
court martial should govern in this case

The court ruled that: It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction
to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D.
1850, Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National
Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines

As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank
requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction
over petitioner is vested in the regular courts ,as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which
states that In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file
the corresponding information/s against Uy in the RTC. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial
motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor,
which was then denied. The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed
by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9,
1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

ISSUE: (1) WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or
the person of the petitioner

(2) WON the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling
within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

HELD: (1) No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

(2) No, the power of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority between the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the
government in prosecution of cases.

RATIO: (1) The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus, Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing of the informations and as
now prescribed by law.

RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that
such will have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippine Army
and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank.
In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his position
as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains
and all officers of higher rank. It must be noted that both the nature of the offense and
the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before Sandiganbayan
can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the person of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law
which states that incase where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be
vested in the proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense charged since under
Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said law shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than six years and one month to fifteen years. The indictment
of the petitioner therefore cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC.

(2) The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts as well.

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does
not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission
of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of
office.

The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution
of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the
people in ensuring accountability in public office. Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630)
originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan),
and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the
Office of theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and
prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular
courts.

Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from his
car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioners car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by
the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police
forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was
at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as
the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived
his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and
that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7,
Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of
lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been just committed at the time that
he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who
arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan
and accordingly none had the personal knowledge required for
the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by
the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest
or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms
of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6)
days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting
officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did
not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does
not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived
his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had
waived their right to preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial without previously claiming that they
did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
 preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when
the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioners claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate
one.

Sausi vs. Querubin

It was shown that the municipal court of Talisay Occidental Negros, after conducting a preliminary
investigation recommended that the proper complaint against the accused, now petitioner, be one for serious
physical injuries with permanent deformity rather than frustrated murder. It did not dismiss the case. In the
information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental, the offense for which the accused had to
stand trial was one for frustrated murder. He did not conduct a new preliminary investigation. Then came a motion
to dismiss by the accused before the trial could be held "based mainly on the ground that the Provincial Fiscal had
no authority to file the above-mentioned "Information" against the petitioner without first conducting a new
preliminary investigation of the case ... ."; respondent Provincial Fiscal alleged that there is no need for a new PI
and the case was not yet dismissed by the municipal court; and, respondent judge denied the petition for the
dismissal of the case.

SC held that, the prevailing doctrine is that if a municipal judge, after a preliminary investigation, finds that
the charge against the accused is not warranted, the prosecution for such offense is not thereby barred as long as
the fiscal conducts another preliminary investigation before filing the corresponding information; and, moreover,
manifests fidelity to the principle that underlies the concept of a preliminary investigation as set forth in the leading
case of United States v. Grant and Kennedy, decided as far back as 1910: "The object or purpose of a preliminary
investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive trials." While neither malice nor oppression could be imputed to the actuation of the
provincial fiscal, still in view of the grave doubt entertained by the municipal judge, the holding of another
preliminary investigation is more than warranted.

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

My view is that a fiscal has no authority to file, without having conducted a new preliminary investigation in the
manner provided by law, an information charging an accused with an offense different from that which the
municipal judge certifies to have been probably committed by the accused.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_______
Budiongan vs. De La Cruz

The SC affirmed the decision of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, recommending
that petitioners be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and petitioner Pedro E.
Budiongan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019.

Municipal Ordinance No. 2 was created to purchase of a road roller for the municipality with the amount of 450k
but the Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3 recommended that the amount be realigned and
used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a certain street; the Office of the Municipal Engineer prepared the
program and later was noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Espejo and Mayor Budiongan; the project of
realigned proposal commenced without an ordinance approving the realignment of the funds and as a resolution,
the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No.8 approving such project; Private respondents Palgan and Nadala
filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, alleging for the illegality of the
 project including the bidding and commencement of the work; Ombudsman found probable cause and
recommended the filing of information for violation of Article 220 against the two persons who approved the said
project; but upon review the charges was modified to violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1)
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis
and (2) violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly "directly or indirectly
having financial or pecuniary interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity."; and, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information and the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and remanded the case to Ombudsman. There was then a refusal to conduct a re-
investigation.

The SC affirmed the decision because the petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute
commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the case; the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment; and, absent any showing of arbitrariness on the
part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case,
courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination
of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same
defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.

Olivas vs. Ombudsman

The SC granted the petition and set aside the decision of respondent Ombudsman Investigator, requiring
petitioner to submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses at the preliminary investigation of a case for
unexplained wealth against petitioner, despite the fact that the Presidential Commission on Good Government, as
complainant, had not reduced its evidence in the form of affidavits and submitted supporting documents.

Petitioner, Major Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, was Commanding General of the PC Metrocom. He was retired
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and after wards, complaint letters were sent to the Presidential
Commission on Good Governance charging him with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupts Practices Act; the
issue was passed to the board for investigation against AFP personnel, whether retired or in the active service;
the petitioners accounts were freeze due to the investigation, the petitioner then attended the hearings; the case
against the petitioner be provisionally dismissed without prejudice to its revival should new evidence be found; the
case was then filed in the Ombudsman, respondent Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Ombudsman Investigator in the
Officeof the Ombudsman, issued the assailed order, reiterating the earlier finding that petitioner had failed to file
his income tax returns, petitioner failed to explain his unexplained wealth and the case is then set for a preliminary
investigation; and, petitioner then claims that the respondent abuse their power in compelling him to submit his
counter-affidavit in the absence of a complaint and affidavits of witnesses against him.

SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The PCGG indorsed the case at bar to the Office of the Ombudsman. It
may be assumed that the PCGG had found sufficient evidence against petitioner to warrant submitting the case
for preliminary investigation. For the rationale of Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG is that the role of law enforcer must not
be confounded with that of the public prosecutor who must determine whether there was probable cause for filing
the case in court. In this case, the PCGG had issued a freeze order against petitioner's bank accounts and a hold
order which it refused to lift despite the fact that the AFP panel had provisionally cleared him; there was no actual
complaint filed; and the evidence presented by the respondent is weak and those not proved the guilt of the
accused.

in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG in which we described the general power of investigation of the PCGG as
consisting of two stages: the first stage, called the criminal investigation, is a fact-finding inquiry conducted by law
enforcement agents, whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses and afterwards assess the evidence
so that, if they find sufficient basis, they can file a complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The
second stage, called the preliminary investigation stage, is conducted for the purpose of ascertaining if there is
sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial. We held in that case that, having found petitioner prima facie guilty of
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, for which reason it issued a freeze order against him and filed a civil complaint for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, the PCGG could not thereafter act as an impartial judge in conducting a
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints based on the same facts found by it to constitute prima facie
evidence against petitioner. We there said:

In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence
and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the
preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in such instances that
We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the
complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his
own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.