Professional Documents
Culture Documents
College of Law
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MAY 4, 2017
List of Cases
A. G.R. NO. 197293, ALFREDO MENDOZA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., APRIL 21, 2014
B. G.R. NO. 187769, ALVIN PATRIMONIO V. NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ AND OCTAVIO MARASIGAN, III, JUNE 4, 2014
C. G.R. NO. 192912, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DEMOCRITO PARAS, JUNE 4, 2014
D. G.R. NO. 192912, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DEMOCRITO PARAS, OCTOBER 22, 2014
E. G.R. NO. 206832, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALFREDO MORALES, JANUARY 21, 2015
F. G.R. NO. 205867, MARIFLOR HORTIZUELA V. GREGORIO TAGUFA, ET AL., FEBRUARY 23, 2015
I. G.R. NO. 193707, NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, DECEMBER 10, 2014
J. G.R. NO. 166680, ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULY 7, 2014
K. G.R. NO. 179080, EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ET AL. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOVEMBER 26, 2014
L. G.R. NO. 207950, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, SEPTEMBER 22, 2014
M. G.R. NO. 206379, CECILIA PAGADUAN V. CSC AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, NOVEMEBER 19, 2014
N. G.R. NO. 202692, EDMUND SYDECO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOVEMBER 12, 2014
O. G.R. NO. 200334, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VICTOR COGAED, JULY 30, 2014
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A. G.R. NO. 197293, ALFREDO MENDOZA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND JUNO CARS, INC., APRIL 21, 2014
FACTS:
In this case Juno Cars, Inc. hired Alfredo Mendoza as a trade-in/ used car
supervisor. Upon a partial audit conducted by its dealer/ operator, it was discovered
that 5 cars had been sold and released by Mendoza without the dealers or the
finance managers approval. The said audit also showed that the buyers of the
subject cars made payments but Mendoza failed to remit such payments.
Consequently, Juno Cars filed a complaint against Mendoza alleging that the latter
pilfered an amount to its prejudice and damage. Mendoza raised Juno Cars
supposed failure to prove ownership over the 5 cars or its right to possess the
purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the public
prosecutor on the basis of its own findings of lack of probable cause.
RULING:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. While the information filed by the
public prosecutor was valid, the trial court still had the discretion to make its own
findings of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of Mendoza and
proceed with the trial. The executive determination of probable cause concerns
itself with whether there is lack of evidence to support an information being filed.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The Constitution prohibits the
issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, he may produce allows a
determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte. For this reason, Sec. 6, Par.
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(a) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable
cause. Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge
Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Mendoza.
FACTS:
The trial court ruled in favor of Marasigan and found petitioner, in issuing the
pre-signed blank checks, had the intention of issuing the check even without his
approval. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Art. 1878, Par. 7 of the Civil
Code, a written authority is required when the loan is contracted through an agent.
In the case at bench, the petitioner is not bound by the contract of loan since
the records reveal that Guttierez did not have any authority to borrow money in
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behalf of petitioner. Records do not show that the petitioner executed any special
power of attorney in favor of Guttierez to borrow in his behalf, hence, the act of
Guttierez is in violation of the said provision, and thus, he should be the only one
liable for the loan he was not able to settle.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the rape "in March
1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto," the applicable provision of the law in
this case is Article 33516 of the Revised Penal Code. The relevant portions of said
statutory provision read:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
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2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-
appellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent
using force or intimidation. The courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her
positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual
abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA
was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant
was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse
with her. The Court, thus, sees no reason to disturb the lower courts appreciation of
the credibility of AAAs testimony
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA,
namely, her inability to remember the birth date of her child and the name of her
neighbor, did not destroy her credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to
do with the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a person
through force or intimidation.
FACTS:
In this case, Democrito Paras was charged with one count of rape. The
Regional Trial Court found Paras guilty as charged which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals . Paras appealed the decision of CA before the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed the judgment of conviction against Paras. However, Police Superintendent
Roberto R. Rabo, Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court that
Paras had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of Paras is extinguished together with his
criminal liability in case of death pending appeal?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Art. 89, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death of an accused pending his appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto. The Court, in People v.
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Bayotas, enunciated the following guidelines construing the above provision in case
the accused dies before final judgment:
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)
Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) xxx; e) Quasi-delicts.
Moreover, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
In this case, when Paras died on January 24, 2013, his appeal to the Court
was still pending. The death of Paras, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as well
as his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime committed.
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E. G.R. NO. 206832, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALFREDO MORALES,
JANUARY 21, 2015
FACTS:
In this case, Alfredo Morales was convicted of illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs by the RTC and was affirmed by the CA.
While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing
Division Officer-in-Charge Emerenciana M. Divina informed the Court that accused-
appellant Morales died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on November
2, 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death Report signed by New Bilibid Prison
Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil and criminal liability of the accused are extinguished
RULING:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. Under Art. 89 Par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
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Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.
However, a violation of R.A. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil
liability needs extinguishment.
FACTS:
The MCTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Mariflor resorted to a wrong
remedy in filing the case. The RTC however reversed the MCTC. It ordered Gregoria
to reconvey the property to Mariflor. On petition for review to the CA, the latter
reversed the RTC. Although an action for reconveyance, the same is clearly an
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attack on the validity of OCT No. P-84609, which is not allowed by Sec. 48 of PD
1529, which proscribes collateral attacks on Torrens titles. The issue of whether or
not a title was fraudulently issued should be treshed out in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, Mariflor appealed to the SC. She maintains that her action was not
an action to nullify the title, but merely to reconvey the property covered by that
title, as Gregoria was clearly aware of the sale by Atty. Marquez to her husband,
Runsted. On the other hand, the respondents argue otherwise. The fact that
Mariflor filed the action for reconveyance was because she failed to file within one
year the action for reversion as a remedy provided under Act 496. Further, Mariflor
being an American citizen, is not allowed to own land in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title warranting
dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy,
an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside
the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks
to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. It is also noteworthy to point that Gregoria Tagufa
never acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.
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G. G.R. NO. 206004, JOSEPH TIMBOL V. COMELEC, FEBRUARY 24, 2015
FACTS:
In this case, Joseph Timbol filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod on October 5, 2012. On January 17, 2013, he received
a notice from the election officer for him to appear before her office for a
clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. During the hearing, Timbol,
assisted by counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate, alleging that in
the 2010 elections, he ranked 8th among all the candidates for the Sangguniang
Panglunsod, and he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. While his
name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates in the COMELEC website,
the panel assured him that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course
and his name deleted in the list of nuisance candidates. Indeed, the election officer
thru a Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 recommended that Timbols COC be
given due course. Despite the recommendation, his name was not deleted from the
list, and since the printing of ballots for the automated election will be held on
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February 4, 2013, he filed before the COMELEC on February 2, 2013 a petition
praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidtates.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Joseph.
RULING:
I.
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. The court has taken cognizance
of moot and academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the
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issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review.
The court may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included
in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for
Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with the court his Petition
for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the
ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded,
with the winners already proclaimed.
II
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service. This, however, does not guarantee
a constitutional right to run for or hold public office. To run for public office is a
mere privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
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That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of
candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he
would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the
first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent
denied petitioners Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had
already begun on February 4, 2013.
FACTS:
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on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the
elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was
summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of
attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of
COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. The
COMELEC rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and the
denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia.
COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was
never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of
her age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she
seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified
to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid
COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberlys COC on the ground
of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was
no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she
withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to
have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia. Firstly,
subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course
to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the
requirements for a valid substitution; The High Tribunal also answered in the
affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the last day
for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same
political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later
than mid-day of election day.
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I. G.R. NO. 193707, NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, DECEMBER 10, 2014
FACTS:
In this case, Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem were married in
Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marital bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Socorro and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Van Wilsem never gave support to their common son. Socorro filed a
complaint against Van Wilsem for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Since Van Wilsem is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, the agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Van Wilsem is not obliged to support Socorros son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Van Wilsem
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Van Wilsem
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Van Wilsem to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. In the light
of the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
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obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
FACTS:
On the evening of May 14, 1989, Baleriano Limbag awoke when Edigardo
Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil suddenly entered into his house and,
without a search warrant, began scouring the place for firearms, but instead food
and took away his airgun. Limbag also sustained injuries as a result of the raid.
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil were all charged with
the crime of Violation of Domicile, under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the above-mentioned accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical Injuries, but acquitted them of the
crime of Violation of Domicile because, according to the trial court, the prosecution
failed to prove that the petitioners were public officers, which is an essential
element of the crime.
The petitioners then appealed their case to the Court of Appeals (CA), praying
that the decision of the lower court be reversed. The CA, however, ruled that the
petitioners should not be convicted of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries
but, rather, Violation of Domicile, considering their judicial admissions that they
were the barangay captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU).
ISSUE:
RULING:
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The Court explained that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review to the appellate court. As such, the accused waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy, and gives jurisdiction to the courts to examine
the records of the case, and impose the proper penalty, even if this means
increasing the penalty previously imposed. It is the duty of the appellate courts to
correct the errors that they may find in the assailed judgment.
That being the case, the petitioners could not have been placed in double
jeopardy when the CA set aside the original ruling of the trial court, and instead
found them guilty of Violation of Domicile
One of the essential elements of the crime of Violation of Domicile is that the
accused be a public officer or employee.
In the present case, the Court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the CA. In their testimonies and pleadings, Geroche did not deny that he was
the barangay captain. Likewise, Garde and Marfil did not refute the fact that they
were CAFGU members. By virtue of their positions, they are considered to be public
officers or employees. Hence, they can be found guilty of Violation of Domicile, as
all the elements for the crime are met.
(The Court modified the penalty imposed by the CA in their decision. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional, as
maximum.)
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L. G.R. NO. 207950, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARK JASON
CHAVEZ, SEPTEMBER 22, 2014
FACTS:
In this case, Mark Jason Chavez was charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. On or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, the said accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of
force, violence and intimidation upon the person of Elmer Duque a.k.a Barbie by
then and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen
knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the said occasion or by reason
thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following: 1 Unit of Nokia
Cellphone, 1 of Unit Motorola Cellphone, 6 pcs. Ladies Ring, 2 pcs. of necklace, 1 pc.
of bracelet. The trial court acquitted Chavez. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same
pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being
questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure,
he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to
the police station. The Supreme Court finds that the circumstantial evidence
sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of
homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
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M. G.R. NO. 206379, CECILIA PAGADUAN V. CSC AND REMA MARTIN
SALVADOR, NOVEMEBER 19, 2014
FACTS:
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ISSUES:
Whether or not her conviction and eventual discharge from probation prevent
another administrative case to be filed against her.
RULING:
As to the first issue the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Not every
criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. The crime of falsification of public
document is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and therefore, involves
moral turpitude.
The court found that she made untruthful statements in a narration of facts
and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.
As to the second issue the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Probation
does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty
imposed.
The purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, unlike
pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under
probation has been convicted.
The reform and rehabilitation of the probation cannot justify her in the
government service. Moreover, probation only affects the criminal liability of the
accused and not her administrative liabilities, if any.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The High Tribunal ruled in the affirmative. Going over the records, it is fairly
clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on
one hand, and Sydeco on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the vehicle
for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search
only. Sydecos twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful
order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this
would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that Sydeco has not, when flagged
down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable
inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He
came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance
and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person
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in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys
such person or his agent.
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical
certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to Sydecos intoxicated state,
as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of
SPO4 Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in
the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that
smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts.
Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a
person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56. par. f of R.A. 4136 penalizing the act of
driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed
with the approval of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586)
which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined
under its Sec. 3, par. e as the act of operating a motor vehicle while the drivers
blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer
test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the DOH, the
NAPOLCOM and the DOTC. Under Sec. 3, par. g of the IRR of R.A. 10586, a driver of
a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms
who has blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive
proof that said driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the
prism of R.A. 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond
reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the
threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or
over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they
are favorable to the accused. Sect. 19 of R.A. 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56, par.
f of R.A. 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3, par. e
of R.A. 10586 alone, Sydeco could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving
under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in
2006.
FACTS:
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In this case, Senior Inspector Bayan received a text message from an
informant that one Marvin will be transporting marijuana from Brgy. San Lun-oy, San
Gabriel to Poblacion, San Gabriel. Hence, he established several checkpoints to
apprehend the suspect. SPOI Jaime was ordered to establish a checkpoint at the
waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound to San Fernando. One passenger
jeepney arrived at the checkpoint manned by Jaime, and the jeepney driver pointed
to two male passengers allegedly carrying marijuana. When asked by Jaime the
contents of their bags, the two answered they did not know since they were only
requested by Marvin to carry the bags. One of the men, Victor, opened the bags,
revealing marijuana bricks. He and his companion were then arrested by Jaime and
brought to the police station. In his defense, Victor said he only helped his
companion, a minor to carry his things. Upon arrival at Poblacion, San Gabriel, they
were approached by Jaime, who conversed with the minor. Jaime then brought them
to the police station, where he hit Victor on the head. He only came to know that
the bags they were carrying contained majiruana when he was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs before the RTC. His companion was not charged
because he was only 14 years old at the time of his arrest.
After trial, the RTC convicted Victor for violation of Sec. 11 of R.A. 9165, and
sentenced him to life imprisonment. This ruling was affirmed by the CA, hence he
elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The High Tribunal ruled in the negative. The search involved in this case was
initially a stop and frisk search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk searches are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses.
However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
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the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled
to the police that Cogaed was suspicious.
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