Ridgeview Publishing Company

Mental Quausation
Author(s): Terence Horgan
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), pp. 47-
76
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
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 3
Perspectives,
Philosophical
ofMindand ActionTheory,1989
Philosophy

MENTALQUAUSATION

TerenceHorgan
MemphisStateUniversity

1.

Evenifindividualmentaleventsandstatesarecausallyefficacious,
are theyefficaciousqua mental?I.e.,do thementaltypes(proper-
ties)tokenedbymentaleventsandstateshavethekindofrelevance
causal transactions
to individual whichallowstheseproperties to
figureingenuinecausalexplanations? Thisquestionhasarisenwith
increasingfrequency and urgencyin recentphilosophy ofmind.
My projecthere has fourstages.First,I shall arguethatour
common-sense beliefin theefficacy of the mentalpresupposes a
positiveanswerto thequestionjustposed;thusa negativeanswer
wouldconstitute a versionofepiphenomenalism hardlylessoffen-
sivetocommonsensethanis theversionwhichdeniesthatmental
eventshave anyeffects at all. Second,I shallconsiderand reject
severalpossibleaccountsofwhatitisfortwoeventsc ande, together
withtwoproperties F and G,to jointlyinstantiate the4-placerela-
tionexpressedbythelocution'c qua F causese qua G'. (I call this
relation quausation.) Third, I shall propose- albeit somewhat
sketchily-a accountofquausation.
positive I shallargue
Andfourth,
makesveryplausiblean
thatthisaccount,despiteitssketchiness,
ofthemen-
answertothequestionofthecausalefficacy
affirmative
tal qua mental.
I shalltakeforgrantedseveraltheseswhichare widelyheldin
contemporary and whosepopularity
philosophy, is largelydue to
is a relation
DonaldDavidson.'I'llassume(i)thatcausation between

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48 / TerenceHorgan

concrete, spatio-temporally located,eventsor states;(ii)thatevery

tokenmentaleventorstateis identical tosometokenphysical event
orstate;(iii)thateveryactioniscausedbya reasonofa certainsort,
"primary
viz.,a so-called reason";and(iv)thata tokenprimary reason
forperforming an actionofkindK is a complexstateconsisting of
a tokenbeliefb and tokendesired whichjointly "rationalize" per-
forming an actionofkindK,inthesensethatb is a beliefthatper-
forming a K-action would(or probablywould)bringabouttheob-
jectofthedesired. Butalthough theseassumptions willplaya cen-
tralrolein myexposition, I doubtthattheyare essentialeitherin
generating theproblem I shalladdressoras a component ofmypro-
posed solution;the subsequentdiscussionprobablycan be refor-
mulatedto avoidsomeor all ofthem.2
In addition,I shallspeakfreelyof bothproperties and possible
worlds;butI leave itopen whethersuchtalkcan be paraphrased
intomoreausterely nominalisticterms,orcan otherwise be so con-
struedas toeliminate anygenuineontological commitment tosuch
entities.AndI shallsometimes usetherubric'event'ina broadsense,
toincludestates,processes, andanyotherentities thatcanbe causal
relata.

2.

Theproblemofmentalquausation can be motivated byconsider-

ingtheseminalaccountofrationalizing explanations ofactionsin
Davidson(1963).3 Davidsontherepointsoutthatan agentwhohas
a particular
primary reasonforperformingan actionofa certain
kind,
andwhodoesperform an actionofthatkind,might notperform the
actionbecauseofthatreason.Something is needed,inordertoturn
thefirst'and' into'because'in sentenceslike
(1) He exercisedand he wantedto reduceand thought
exercisewoulddo it.
Davidson'sposition, is thatall we need to add is
essentially,
way,by his
was caused,in an appropriate
(2) His exercising
desireto reduceand hisbeliefthatexercisewoulddo
it.4
ineffect
I.e.,hemaintains of(1)and(2)isbothnecessary
thatthetruth

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 MentalQuausation/ 49

and sufficient
forthetruthof
(3) He exercisedbecausehe wantedto reduceand thought
exercisewoulddo it.
But althoughthe conjunctionof (1)and (2) surelyexpressesa
necessaryconditionforthetruthof(3),itdoes notexpressa suffi-
Sometimes
cientcondition.5 thecause ofa giveneffect has a cer-
tainpropertywhichis notappropriate to citein a causalexplana-
tionofthateffect.
The following
examples,fromFredDretskeand
ErnestSosa respectively,
nicelyillustratethepoint:
Meaningful sounds,iftheyoccurat therightpitchand
amplitude, can shatterglass,butthefactthatthesesounds
have a meaningis irrelevant to theirhavingthiseffect. The
glasswouldshatterifthesoundsmeantsomething
completely or iftheymeantnothing
different, at all. This
doesn'timplythatthesoundsdon'thave a meaning, butit
does implythattheirhavingmeaningdoesn'thelpexplain
theireffectson theglass.To knowwhytheglassshattered
you have to knowsomething abouttheamplitude and
frequencyofthesesounds,properties ofthesoundthatare
relevantlyinvolvedin itseffecton theglass.(Dretske, this
volume.)

A gungoes off,a shotis fired,and it killssomeone.The

loudnoiseis theshot...In a certainsensethevictimis killed
by theloudnoise.Butnotby theloudnoiseas a loudnoise,
butonlyby theloud noiseas a shot,or thelike...The
loudnessoftheshothas no causalrelevanceto thedeathof
thevictim.Had thegunbeen equippedwitha silencerthe
shotwouldhave killedthevictimjustthesame.(Sosa,1984,
pp. 277-8.)
Whenone keepssuchexamplesin mind,itbecomesquiteevident
whytheconjunction of(1)and (2) does notentail(3). Supposethat
sentences(1)and (2) are true,butthatthecause'sbeinga primary
reasonforexercising has no morerelevanceto thecausaltransac-
tionthandoes,intheseexamples,themeaningofthesoundsvis-a-
vistheircausingtheglasstoshatter, ortheloudnessoftheshotvis-
a-visitscausingthevictim's death.6Thensentence(3) is justfalse.
Thisisso eventhough theprimary-reason propertyofthecause-state

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50 / TerenceHorgan

doesprovide a rationale i.e.,showsthattheeffect-

fortheeffect-event,
eventhadsomething tobe saidforitfromtheagent'spointofview.
Providing such a rationaledoes not,by itself,establishthatthe
primary-reason property ofthecause is any morerelevantto the
causaltransaction thanis thesounds'meaningin Dretske'sexam-
ple,or theshot'sloudnessin Sosa's.
Sosaremarks thatalthough thevictim'sdeathiscausedbytheevent
whichisa loudnoise,itisnotcausedbythatevent"as a loudnoise."
As one mightsay,thedeathis notcausedby thateventqua loud
noise.Thisuse of'qua'-constructions is quitenatural,andalso quite
common, whenquestions ofexplanatory relevanceare at issue.As
I saidat theoutset, the neologism 'quausation' willherebe usedto
refer tothe4-placerelation betweentwoeventsandtwoproperties
thatis expressedby thelocution"c qua F causese qua G." I shall
construethislocutionin sucha way thatthe truthof (4) is both
necessary and sufficient forthetruth of(3)-assuming, as I do,that
reasonsare indeedcauses:
qua theproperty
(4) His exercising, beingan exercising,
was causedby hisdesireto reduceand hisbeliefthat
exercising qua therespective
wouldresultin reducing,
beinga desireto reduceand beinga belief
properties
thatexercisingwouldresultin reducing.7
as I shallunderstand
Quausation, explicatedas
it,maybe partially
follows:
F and
For anytwoeventsc and e and anytwoproperties
e
G, c qua F causes qua G iff:
(i) c causese;
(ii) c instantiates
F;
(iii) e instantiates
G; and
(iv) thefactthatc instantiates relevant
F is explanatorily
G.
to thefactthate occursand instantiates
Clause(iv)is thecrucialone,and is itselfin needoffurtherexplica-
tion.Thisclause,as I am employing it here,expresses(bystipula-
tion)theadditional conditionrequiredto makestatements like(3)
comeouttrue,overand above whatis assertedin statements like
(1)and (2).8I shalluse thephrase'quausalrelevance'forthispar-
kindofexplanatory
ticular relevance.Providing anaccountofquausal
relevancewillbe a centralconcernbelow.9

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 MentalQuausation/ 51

Now,supposethatstatements like(4)arenever(orvirtually never)

truewhenthecitedproperties ofcauseandeffect are reason-types
and act-types, respectively. More generally,supposethatsuch
statements are never(orvirtually never)truewhenthecitedprop-
ertyofthecause is mental-regardless whether thecitedproperty
oftheeffect is mental,actional,or something else. Thenthecor-
responding mentalistic 'because'statements, like(3),also are never
(orvirtually never)true.Butthislatterclaimis surelyan outrageous
offense againstourcommon-sense beliefintheefficacy ofthemen-
tal.We believenotmerely thatreasonsare causes,butalsothatpeo-
pleactthewaytheydo becausetheyhavereasonswhichrationalize
theiractions.Moregenerally, we believenotmerelythatmental
eventsandstatesare causes,butalsothattheyhavetheeffects they
do becausethey instantiate the specific mental propertiesthey do.'0
In short,commonsenseholdsnotmerelythatmentaleventsand
statesare causallyefficacious, butalso thattheirmentalproperties
are explanatorily relevant to the causaltransactions inwhichthose
events figure as causes. Accordingly, any view which deniesthelat-
terclaimsurelyqualifiesas a kindofepiphenomenalism, a kindI
shallcall quausalepiphenomenalism.
Ifone claims,withDavidson,thattokenmentaleventsandstates
are identical to tokenphysicaleventsand states,thenone thereby
fendsofftraditional epiphenomenalism-the viewthatmental events
lackanyeffects at all. Butunlessand untilitcan be shownthatthe
mentalqua mentalis efficacious, i.e., thatmentalproperties are
quausal,thereremains thepossibility thatquausalepiphenomenalism
is trueanyway-token physicalism notwithstanding. Theproblem of
quausalepiphenomenalism is therefore veryreal,and verypress-
ing.Indeed,itcan fairly be calledthelatestincarnation oftheMind-
Bodyproblem, ina formespecially applicabletothe"nonreductive
materialism" so prevalent inrecentphilosophy ofmind.Successful-
ly fending offquausalepiphenomenalism willrequiredoingtwo
things:first,givinga plausibleaccountofquausalrelevance;andse-
cond,usingthisaccounttoarguethatthemental qua mental iscausal-
ly efficacious.

3.

Supposethatan eventc causesan evente, and thatc and e in-

twoproperties
stantiate Whatis requiredin
F and G respectively.

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52 / TerenceHorgan

orderforF andG tobe explanatorilyrelevanttothecausaltransac-

tionbetweenc and e? One suggestion,withan accompanying line
ofreasoningto supportit,goes as follows:
For twoeventsto be causallyrelatedis forthemto have
descriptions
whichjointlyinstantiatewhatDavidsoncallsa
"strict
law"-a law whichis as preciseand exceptionless
as
possible,whichcontainsno ceterisparibusclauses,and
whichcontainsno causal-dispositional
notionswhich
themselves need cashingoutin termsofmorefundamental
scientific
conceptsand laws.So wheneverwe givea causal
explanationofan event,theexplanatorily relevant
propertiesofthecause and theeffect willbe properties
whichare connectedby a strictlaw.
Thislineofthought has a certaininitialplausibility,
especiallyif
one acceptsDavidson'sconceptionof causationas subsumability
undera strictlaw. But,whether or notDavidsonis rightaboutthe
natureofcausation itself,
thestrict-law
criterion ofquausalrelevance
is reallyfartoo stringentto be credible.1'For,thereare all kinds
ofgarden-variety causalexplanations citingproperties ofthecause
and effectwhich,although explanatorilyrelevant, almostcertainly
do notfigure in strict
laws.("Thebridgecollapsedbecausea truck
droveontoitwhichexceededitsweightbearingcapacity." "Thefire
was causedbya short-circuit." Etc.)Causalexplanation is a highly
contextrelative,highlyinterestrelativeaffair, and attention to
numerous examplesofthiskind- bothin scienceand in ordinary
life-makescleartheimplausibility ofinsisting thattheonlyproper-
tiesofa causeandeffect thatare relevant tocausalexplanation are
ones whichfigurein a strictlaw.
Davidsonhimself, has neveradvocateda strict-law
incidentally,
criterionof explanatory relevance;on thecontrary, he has long
repudiated sucha view.TowardtheendofDavidson(1963),forex-
ample,thefollowing passageoccurs:
Ignoranceofvalidcausallaws does notinhibit validcausal
explanation, or fewcausalexplanationscouldbe made.I am
certainthewindowbrokebecauseit was struckby a rock-I
saw it all happen;butI am not(is anyone?)in commandof
laws on thebasisofwhichI can predictwhichblowswill
breakwhichwindows.A generalization like,'Windowsare

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 MentalQuausation/ 53

and fragilethingstendto breakwhenstruckhard

fragile,
enough,otherthingsbeingright', is nota predictivelaw in
therough-thepredictive law,ifwe had it,wouldbe
quantitativeand woulduse verydifferent concepts.The
likeour generalizations
generalization, aboutbehavior,
servesa verydifferent it providesevidenceforthe
function:
existenceofa causal law coveringthecase at hand....[It]is
an errorto thinkno explanationhas been givenuntila law
has been produced.(Davidson,1980,pp. 16-17.)
Davidsonhasconsistentlymaintained aboutcausalex-
thisposition
And,although
planation. variouscommentatorsseemtohavethought
withhis"anomalism,"
is notincompatible
theposition
otherwise, the
doctrinethatthereare no strictpsychophysicalor psychological
laws.12
Sincethestrict-lawcriterionofquausalrelevanceis toostringent,
we need a moreliberalone. Presumably, an appropriate criterion
shouldbe suitablyflexible,allowingfortheinterest relativityand
contextrelativityofexplanation Onepossibility,
itself. suggested by
Davidson'sremarks in theabove-quoted passage,is this:twoprop-
ertiesF and G,instantiatedbya cause-event c and an effect-event
are explanatorily
e respectively, relevantto thecausaltransaction
betweenc ande justincase F andG areconnected bya generaliza-
tionwhich,although it maynotbe a strictlaw itself, at leastpro-
videsevidencefortheexistenceofa strict causallawthatsubsumes
c and e. Butthissuggestionis quiteimplausible. For,ifF and G are
onlyrelevantto thecausaltransaction in thisevidential way,then
itseemsjustwrongtoemploy'because'statements as we do incausal
explanations.Consider statement (3) above,forinstance. Whenwe
sayofsomeonethathe exercisedbecausehe wantedtoreduceand
believedexercising woulddo it,whatis theforceofthisclaim-
overand above whatis claimedby theconjunction of(1)and (2)?
Surelynotthattherationalappropriateness oftheaction,vis-a-vis
thereason,provides evidencefortheexistence ofa strict
causallaw
subsuming thetwoevents!Ifthatsortofepistemic rolewerethe
onlywaythattherespective reasonalandactionalproperties were
relevant tothecausaltransaction,thenitseemsthemosttheseprop-
ertiescoulddo wouldbe to provideevidencefortheexistenceof
a genuinecausalexplanation; theywouldnotreallybe explanatori-
ly relevantthemselves. Bona fidequausalrelevanceis notmerely

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54 / TerenceHorgan

butmetaphysical:
epistemic, relevant mustsomehowper-
properties
to thecausaltransaction
taindirectly and notmerelyto our
itself,
knowledgethatitis a causaltransaction.
A slightly suggestion
different aboutquausalrelevance,withan
accompanying lineof reasoningto supportit,is this:
Causalexplanation is a matterofsubsuming thecause and
theeffect undersomecounterfactual-supporting
generalization. However,sucha generalization need notbe
a strictlaw in orderto servethispurpose.Manyofour
causal explanations advert,explicitly or implicitly, to the
kindsofgeneralizations whichDavidsoncalls
"heteronomic"-i.e., looser,vaguer,exception-ridden
generalizations whichoftenemployineliminable 'ceteris
paribus'clausesand/orineliminable causal-dispositional
concepts.Mentalistic causalexplanation is no exception.And
thereare certainly generalizations ofthiskindlinking mental
eVent-kinds and to action-kinds, even ifDavidsonis rightin
claimingthatthereare no strictpsychological or
psychophysical laws.Accordingly, iftwologicallyand
metaphysically independent propertiesF and G are
respectively instantiated by thecause-event and theeffect-
eventin a givencausaltransaction, thenF and G willbe
explanatorily relevantto thattransaction providedthatthey
are at leastheteronomically connected.Furthermore, the
reasonwhyproperties connectedby a merelyheteronomic
generalization are relevantto causalexplanation is not,
contraDavidson,thatthegeneralization providesevidence
fortheexistenceofa strictlaw which"covers"theeventsc
and e (eventhoughthegeneralization mayhappento serve
thisevidential roletoo).Rather,thereasonis thatthe
heteronomic generalization itselfcoversc and e. I.e.,built
intoourconceptofcausation,as thekeycriterion fortwo
events'beingcausallyrelated,is thattheyare subsumedby
a generalization whichis at leastheteronomic. Evenifno
twoeventscouldeversatisfy thiscriterion without also
beingsubsumedby somestrictlaw,thefactremainsthat
strict-lawsubsumability is notitselfcriterialforbeing
causallyrelated,i.e.,is notpartoftheveryconceptof
causationitself.

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 MentalQuausation/ 55

Butthislineofreasoning
isquitedubious, foratleastthreereasons.
First,
therearecaseswheretwoevents,although subsumable under
a robust,counterfactual-supporting, heteronomic generalization,
simplyare notcausallyrelatedat all. Suppose,forinstance, thata
certaindiseasecausesprogressiveliverfailurein humans, and also
causesan intensedesireto eat worms.Thenthefollowing willbe
a perfectly
respectable
heteronomic generalization:
'Ceterisparibus,
anyonewhoeatswormswilldie ofliverfailure'. Yetex hypothesi,
eatingwormsdoesn'tcause liverfailureat all; thediseasedoes.
Second,thereare examplesof causaltransactions in whichthe
cause and theeffecthaveproperties whichevidently are notcon-
nectedbyevena heteronomic generalization,butwhichseemex-
planatorily
relevantanyway.Suppose,forinstance, thatBarry's notic-
inga flowershopcauseshimtoremember thattomorrow is hiswife's
birthday.'3The properties
beinga noticingthatthereis a flower
shopyonder, andbeinga remembering thattomorrow is one'swife's
birthday,certainly
appearexplanatorily relevanttothecausaltran-
like
saction;yetgeneralizations
Ceterisparibus,a (married)
manwho noticesthatthereis a
flowershopyonderwillremember thatthefollowing day is
hiswife'sbirthday
seemjustfalse.'4
Third,even in cases wheretheproposedcriterion yieldsthein-
tuitivelyrightverdict,
one doesn'tfeelintuitively
thattherightness
restson satisfaction
ofthisputativecriterion.
Take,forinstance,ac-
tion/reason causaltransactions.
Nobodydoubtsthatthereareceteris
paribusgeneralizationslinkingreason-typestotheact-typestheyra-
tionalize.Butintuitively,
theexistenceofsuchgeneralizations just
doesn'tseemgoodenoughto guarantee thatactionsare causedby
reasonsqua reasons.On thecontrary, therepersiststheintuitive
that
worry unlessreasonal and actionalproperties meetsomefur-
thercriterion, theyare ultimately superfluous these causal
to
transactions-that of
theonlyproperties thecauseandtheeffect with
anyreal quausalrelevanceare properties citedin thehomonomic
laws ofnaturalscience.
Whatiswanted, isan accountofquausalrelevance
therefore, which
linksup moredirectly withourpre-theoretic aboutthis
intuitions
matter,and whichyieldsthe correctverdictin cases wherethe
heteronomic generalizationcriterion
yieldsthewrongone.

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56 / TerenceHorgan

4.

I shall now sketchthe broadoutlinesof a positiveaccountof

quausal relevancewhichevidentlymeetsthese desiderata.Ar-
ticulatingtheproposedaccountindetailwouldbe a projectinitself,
wellbeyondthescopeofthispaper.ButI willtryto sayenoughto
makeplausible theclaimthatthementalproperties ofmentalevents
reallyareexplanatorily relevanttothecausaltransactions inwhich
theseeventsfigureas causes.
ConsideragainDretske'sexampleofmeaningful sounds'causing
a glasstoshatter,andSosa'sexampleofa loudshot'scausinga vic-
tim'sdeath.Whatis it aboutthesounds'meaning, and theshot's
loudness,whichrenderstheseproperties irrelevantto theshatter-
ingandtothevictim's death,respectively?Itseemsevident thatpart
ofwhatis required, inorderforproperties F andG oftherespective
cause-event c andeffect-evente to be explanatorily to the
relevant
causaltransaction is
betweenc and e, is thatF's beinginstantiated
necessary
a counterfactually condition fortheoccurrence ofan event
thatfallsundertheevent-type ofthefollow-
G. I.e.,a counterfactual
ingformmustbe nonvacuously true:
F,
(N) Iftherehad notoccurredan eventwithproperty
thentherewouldnothave occurredan eventwith
propertyG.
Or rather, ofform(N) mustbe nonvacuously
a counterfactual true
unless the causal transaction involves overdetermination, the
presenceofa preempted cause,
potential or some suchfamiliarkind
ofnon-standard whichmakesproblems
feature foranalysesofcausa-
tiongenerally; thepropertiesandG mustbe logically
inaddition, F
and metaphysicallyindependent ofone another.15 (Theseprovisos
willcarryoverto whatI shallsay below, even when I do notex-
mention
plicitly them.)
The operativeinstancesof(N),forDretske'sand Sosa'sexamples
(Assumethatintheglassshattering
are thefollowing.
respectively,
case, thesoundsmeant'shatter'.)
(Ni) Iftherehad notoccurredsoundswhichmeant'shatter',
thentheglasswouldnothave shattered.
(N2)Iftherehad notoccurreda loudshot,thenthevictim
wouldnothave been killed.

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 MentalQuausation/ 57

If(NI) and (N2)each failto be nonvacuously true,thenthesounds'

meaning'shatter' and theshot'sloudnesseach wouldtherebyfail
to satisfy a necessary condition forquausalrelevance.However,it
is doubtful whether (NI) and (N2)reallydo failtosatisfythiscondi-
tion.Giventheright sortofbackground theyevidently
stories, both
are non-vacuously true.Thisis thecase,forinstance, ifwe suppose
thattheglass-shattering soundsweresungbya sopranowhowas
strongly determined eithertosing'shatter'highandloudortosing
nothing at all;andifwe supposethatthepersonwhofiredtheshot
had no meansat handto muffle itssound.So the moralis this:
although thenon-vacuous ofa statement
truth ofform (N)isevidently
a necessarycondition forthequausalrelevanceofproperties F and
G, it is nota sufficient condition.
Whatmoreis required?One suggestion is that(N) shouldbe
strengthened to this:
(N') Ifc had notinstantiated F, thentherewould
property
nothave occurredan eventwithpropertyG,
wherec is theeventwhichwas thecause in theactualworld(or
the"counterpart" ofthatevent).'6Butwhenone examinesthissug-
itappearsseriously
gestioncarefully, forin-
Consider,
problematic.
stance,Dretske's example,withrespecttotheprop-
glassshattering
ertiesof the soundswhichclearlyare quausallyrelevant:pitch,
amplitude, Thentheoperative
etc.Callthesethesounds'R-properties.
instanceof(N'), fortheR-properties,is this:
(N' ) Ifc had notpossessedtheR-properties,
thentheglass
wouldnothave shattered.
Butis thiscounterfactual nonvacuously true?Arguably not.For,it
mightbe claimed,withconsiderable plausibility,thatifsoundsin
anotherpossibleworldlacktheR-properties, thentheycannotbe
with(orcounterparts
identical of)thesoundswhichactuallyoccur-
red.Afterall,itis at leastarguablethattheR-properties are essen-
tialpropertiesof the in
sound-events question, so thattheycould
nothavebeen those sounds without the
possessing R-properties.17
Theseconsiderations suggest thatitisa mistake totrytounderstand
quausal relevance solely in terms of counterfactuals whose
antecedentsexplicitly citethe event its
(or counterpart) which was
theactualcause-event Better
itself. toseek an account which remains
neutralaboutthehighly vexedissueofthetransworldly individua-

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58 / TerenceHorgan

tionofevents-andwhichtakesintoconsideration whatwouldhave
happened, undervariouspertinently similarcircumstances, ifthere
hadoccurred(or had notoccurred) an eventwhichboth(i) instan-
tiatedproperty F,and(ii)waspertinently similartotheactualcause-
eventc.18
Whatseemsrequiredforquausalrelevance, then,is a widerpat-
ternof counterfactual dependenceof the occurrenceand non-
occurrence ofeventswithproperty G upontheoccurrence or non-
occurrence ofeventswithproperty F. Incharacterizing therequisite
pattern itwillbe useful toemploytheterminology ofpossibleworlds.
Supposethatan eventc causesan evente. Associated withthiscausal
transaction, I suggest,is a set P[c,e]ofpertinently similarworlds
(PSW's).Each PSW containsa situationpertinently similarto-
although perhapssomewhat different from-thesituation in which
c causede intheactualworldW.Also,each PSWw containsexact-
ly one eventc* whichis pertinently similarto theeventc ofthe
actualworldW;andw might, ormight not,contain an evente* which
is pertinently similarto theevente ofW. An eventin w, in order
to be pertinently similarto c (or e) ofW, notonlymustresemble
c (ore) ofW inpertinent intrinsicrespects; italso mustoccurincir-
cumstances in w whatare pertinently similarto thecircumstances
in W in whichthecausaltransaction betweenc and e transpired.
Ifyoulike,thetransworld pertinent-similarityrelationholdsbetween
c* (ofa PSWw) andc (ofW) onlyif(i)c* is a goodprimafaciecan-
didateforbeingidentical with(orthecounterpart of)c; and (ii)c*
is also a bettersuchcandidatethananyothereventinw. Likewise,
mutatis mutandis, forpertinent similarity betweenan evente* (of
w) and e (ofW). But,forthereasongivenabove,itis bestto allow
thetransworld pertinent-similarityrelationto be weakerthanthe
transworld identity (or counterpart) relation.
Quausalrelevanceoftheproperties ofa cause-event and effect-
event,I suggest,dependsuponwhathappensacrosstherangeof
PSW'sin theclass P[c,e].Myproposalis this:
If (i) eventc causesevente,
(ii) c and e respectively instantiate
propertiesF and G,
(iii) F and G are logicallyand metaphysically
independent, and
(iv) thecausaltransaction betweenc and e does not
involvepreemption, overdetermination,or thelike,'9

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 MentalQuausation/ 59

thenthefactthatc and e instantiate F and G, respectively,

is explanatorily relevantto thefactthatc causese iff20 the
following RelevanceCondition is satisfied:
(R) For anyworldw in P[c,e],ifc* is theeventin w that
is pertinentlysimilarto c ofW, then
(i) ifc* instantiates F in w, thenc* causes(inw) an
evente* whichbothinstantiates G (inw) and is
pertinentlysimilarto theW-event e; and
(ii) ifc* does notinstantiate F in w, thenc* does not
cause (inw) an eventwhichis pertinently similar
to theW-event e.21,22

Patterns ofcounterfactual dependenceofthekinddescribedby

condition (R)are oftensoughtempirically, bymeansofcontrolled
experimentation. Mill'smethods ofcausalinquiry can be construed
as techniques forexperimentally probingforjustsuchpatterns.23
Mill'sjointmethod ofagreement anddifference isespeciallygermane.
Theprimary formofagreement, amongthevariousPSW'sinwhich
thec*-event instantiates theproperty F, is thatin each suchworld
w,c* ofw causesan evente* thatispertinently similartotheeffect-
evente ofW.Andtheprimary form ofdifference betweenthePSW's
in whichF is instantiated by thec*-event and thosein whichF is
notso instantiated is thatineachworldw ofthelatterkind,c* does
notcausesuchan evente*.24Thisdirectconnection betweenMill's
methodsand condition (R)is encouraging, becauseitsuggests that
(R)reflects wellourpre-theoretic intuitions aboutwhatitis forthe
properties F and G to be explanatorily relevantto thecausaltran-
sactionbetweentheeventsc and e.
Fleshingoutthisskeletalaccountofquausalrelevancewouldre-
quiresayingsomething systematic aboutwhatdetermines theclass
ofPSW's,relative toa givencausaltransaction, andaboutwhatstan-
dardsgovernthetransworld pertinent-similarity relation.I shallnot
undertake thistaskhere.Variousquestions wouldneedaddressing
within a morecompleteaccount,suchas these:(1)Does theclassof
PSW's,and/ortheoperative pertinent-similarity relation,dependin
partuponourcurrent scientifictheories,and ifso howand why?
(2)Do context-relative parameters, suchas features ofthepragmatics
ofexplanation, partially determine theappropriate classofPSW's,
and/ortheappropriate standards oftransworld pertinentsimilarity
betweenevents?25 (3) Is italwaysfullydeterminate whichworlds

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60 / TerenceHorgan

are PSW'sandwhichare not,or is theborderline sometimes vague

and indeterminate? (4) Is the vaguenessof transworld pertinent
similarityalwayscompletely resolvedby contextualparameters,
relativetoa particularexplanatory situation
anda particular
causal
transaction,or is theresometimes (oralways)a residualdegreeof
vagueness?26
Even in the absence of a morecompleteaccountof quausal
relevance, however, onefinds oneselfwithfairlystrong pre-theoretic
intuitions aboutpossibleworlds-andaboutcertaineventsinthose
worlds-which seemclearlypertinent, or clearlynotpertinent, to
questions abouttheexplanatory relevanceofspecific propertiesvis-
a-visspecific causaltransactions.Suchintuitions, beingdatawhich
anyadequatetheoretical accountofquausalrelevancewouldneed
to accommodate, havefairly strongprimafaciecredibility. Admit-
tedly, anyparticular intuitivejudgment aboutthesematters isdefeasi-
ble;intheendofthejudgment might provemistaken, ifitgetsover-
ruledonweighty grounds bya developed theoryofquausalrelevance
whichaccommodates lotsofotherrelevant data.Butmeanwhile, the
presumption ofcorrectness shouldbe accordedto one'sstrongin-
tuitive judgments aboutwhichworldscountas PSW'sandwhichdo
not,and aboutwhicheventswithin thePSW'scountas pertinently
similarto theactualcause-event or effect-event.27
Oneimportant featureoftheclassofPSW's,fora givencausaltran-
saction,doesrequiremention. Roughly put,itis this:theclassdoes
notincludenearbyworldsin whichan eventoccurswhichis per-
tinently similar totheactualcause-event c, whichlackstheproper-
tyF ofc,butwhichinsteadhasa property F* withthesetwofeatures:
(i)F* isofthesamegeneraltypeas F; and(ii)F* isa property which,
ifF itselfis quausallyrelevant, wouldalso be quausallyrelevantin
essentially thesamewaythatF is.28Refining thisvagueformulation,
inan informative and non-circular way,is an important partofthe
taskoffleshing outtheaccountofquausalrelevanceI amsketching.
I willnotattempt to do so here,butwillmerelyillustrate thepoint
withan example.Consideragainthequausallyrelevantproperties
inDretske's glassshattering case-theonesI amcallingR-properties,
likethesounds'specificpitchand amplitude. Supposethatcertain
properties whichare onlyslightly differentfromtheR-properties-
say,slightly differentpropertiesofpitchand amplitude-alsohave
glass-shattering capacity;call theseR* properties. It clearlywon't
do toincludeamongthePSW'sa possibleworldinwhich(i)thesitua-

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 MentalQuausation/ 61

tionis pertinentlysimilartotheactualsituation; and(ii)thereoccur

sounds,quitelikethesoundsintheactualcausaltransaction, which
instantiateR* properties butnottheR-properties.
I am readynow to drawoutsome moralsfromtheaccountof
quausalrelevanceheresuggested. To beginwith,theaccountex-
plainsquitenaturally why,inDretske's example,thecontent ofthe
soundsis irrelevant totheircausingtheglasstoshatter. For,among
thePSW'sare worldsinwhichpertinently similarsoundsoccurbut
eithermeansomething differentor meannothing at all; and the
ornotshattering
glass'sshattering isnotcorrelated,acrossthePSW's,
withthepresenceor absenceofsoundswhichmean'shatter'.29 As
Dretskeremarks, "The glass wouldshatterif the soundsmeant
something completely or iftheymeantnothingat all"
different,
(Dretske, thisvolume).30
Sosa's exampleoftheshot'sloudnessfaressimilarly. Amongthe
PSW's,relativeto theshot'scausingthevictim's death,are worlds
wherealthough (i) thereoccursa shotthatis pertinently similarto
theactual-world shot,nevertheless (ii)thisshotis notloud-forin-
stance,worldsinwhicha quietergunis used,worldswheretheac-
tualgunis fitted witha silencer, and so forth.The loudnessofthe
actualshotis irrelevant, thecausaltransaction
vis-a-vis inquestion,
becausethepresenceor absenceofa loud shotis notcorrelated,
acrossthe PSW's,withthe victim'sdyingor not dying.As Sosa
remarks, "Hadthegunbeenequippedwitha silencer theshotwould
have killedthevictimjustthesame"(Sosa,1984,p. 278).

5.

Whenoneturnsfrom andSosa'stotypical
exampleslikeDretske's
cases of mentalcausation,however,thingslook verydifferent.
whena mentaleventc causesanother
Typically, evente, thefollow-
ofSupervenient
ingprinciple Relevanceholdsforsomesalientmen-
talpropertyF ofc andsomesalientpropertyG ofe thatis logically
and metaphysicallyindependentofF:
(S.R.)Foranyworldw in P[c,e],ifc* is theeventin w that
is pertinentlysimilarto c oftheactualworldW, then
(i) c* instantiates
F in w, and (ii)c* causes(inw) an
evente* thatbothinstantiates G and is pertinently
similarto c ofW.

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62 / TerenceHorgan

Thisprinciple assertsa formofdependence, or supervenience, of

theproperties F andG uponotherproperties ofthevariousc*-events
ande*-events inthevariousPSW's:viz.,ineveryPSWw,(i)theevent
c* has theproperty F; and (ii)an e*-eventoccursin w, causedby
c*,whichhas theproperty G. Thusprinciple (S.R.)does indeedex-
pressthe"supervenient relevance"ofF and G.31
Consider,forexample,a case wherea mentaleventcausesan ac-
tion:Fredexperiences a desirefora beer,andthisdesirecauseshim
towalktotherefrigerator. Thementalcausec hastheproperty be-
inga desirefora beer. Now,thereare PSW'sin whichFredex-
periences a desirefora beerina situation thatis modestly different
from theactualsituation-for instance, worlds inwhichFredislocated
different
at a slightly position inhishousethanhisactual-world posi-
tionat thetimeheexperiences thedesirefora beer.InthesePSW's,
Fred'sdesirecausesa sequenceofbodilymotions thatis somewhat
differentfromhisactual-world motions; however, theotherworldly
sequencestillqualifiesas an actionofwalkingto therefrigerator,
andhencecountsas pertinently similar toFred'sactual-world action.
Butare thereanyPSW'sinwhichan eventoccurswhichboth(i)
is pertinentlysimilarto theactual-world eventofFred'sdesiring a
beer,andyet(ii)lacksthementalproperty beinga desirefora beer?
I submitthatthereare not.In makingthisclaim,I do notmeanto
takeissuewiththewidelyacceptedviewthatthecontentofpeo-
ple'spropositional attitudesdoesnotnormally supervene on "what's
inthehead."32 I am prepared to allow thatthere are possible worlds
in which there occurs, in Fred's head or in the head of a Fred-
doppelganger, an event c* which is physicallyjust likethe actual-
worldeventthatwas hisdesirefora beer,whichcausesbodilymo-
tionsthatare physically justlikethemotionsthatconstituted his
actual-world actionof walking to the but
refrigerator, which does
notinstantiate theproperty beinga desirefora beer.Butalthough
theremaybe suchworlds, myclaimisthattheyare fartoodifferent
fromtheactualworldto countas PSW's.Hencetheyare justnot
pertinent to thequestionwhethertheproperty beinga desirefor
a beerisexplanatorily relevant tothecausaltransaction hereatissue.
Consider,afterall,howmuchalteration ofactuality itwouldtake
to geta possibleworldofthekindenvisioned. One modeofaltera-
tionwouldbe head-external: leaveFred'sbrainandbodyjustas they
wereintheactualworld,butplace him(ora doppelganger ofhim)
ina largerenvironment whichdiffers enoughfromhisactual-world

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 MentalQuausation/ 63

environment thatthephysicaleventwhichwouldotherwise have

beena desirefora beernolongerqualifies as a desirewiththissame
content. (MaybeFred'sdoppelganger desiresschmeer, eventhough
he callsit'beer';schmeer, ofcourse,is madefromXYZratherthan
water.)Fine,butwhyon earthshouldwhathappensinsuchTwin
Earthly environments be consideredpertinent toquestionsaboutthe
quausalrelevanceofproperties instantiated bycause-events inour
ownearthly environment? Possibleworldsinwhichtheagent'sen-
vironment hasTwinEarthly qualitiesseemfartoogratuitously dif-
ferentfromactualityto qualifyas PSW's.33Anyonewho would
claimotherwise takeson a veryheavyburdenofproof.34
Anothermodeofalteration wouldbe head-internal: leave intact
thephysicaleventin Fred'sbrainwhichwas hisdesirefora beer,
butalterthesurrounding "neuralwiring" so drastically
thatphysical
eventsliketheoneinquestionnowfigure inthehead-
so differently
internalcausalnexusthattheyno longertokentheproperty being
a desirefora beer.Butsuchworlds,surely, are againtooweirdto
countas PSW's.Theactual-world neuralwiring surroundingtheevent
whichwas Fred'sdesirefora beer,beingan important background
condition withinwhichthateventcausedFred'saction,surelyre-
mainsintactwithinall theworldswhichare PSW's,relativeto the
causal transaction in question.35
Theseremarks carryover,mutatis mutandis, notonlytootherin-
stancesofthementalcausationofaction,butalso to cases where
one mentaleventcausesanother. We routinely engagein(putative)
mentalisticexplanation;ourverycriteria forattributingpropositional
attitudesand othermentalstatespresuppose thesoundnessofthis
practice;and(putatively)mentaleventsinteract witheachother, with
sensoryevents,andwithbehaviorincontent-appropriate waysthat
aresystematic enoughtorenderthepractice of(putative)mentalistic
causalexplanation a usefuland viableenterprise. Thesefactscon-
straintheclassofPSW's,relativeto a givencausaltransaction in
whicha mentaleventis thecause,in thefollowing way: content-
determining features ofthecause'senvironment takeon thestatus
of background conditions, and hence are held fixedacross the
PSW's.36
Consideragainthecase whereBarry'snoticingtheflowershop
causeshimtoremember thattomorrowis hiswife'sbirthday.
Now,
thereare certainpsychological
background conditions at
present,
themoment whenBarrynoticestheflowershop,without whichthis

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64 / TerenceHorgan

eventwouldnothave caused himto remember thattomorrow is

thatall-important day.In anyPSWin whichthereoccursan event
c* thatis pertinently similarto theactualcause-event c, c* takes
place in thepresenceofsuchbackground conditions, and also in-
stantiatestheproperty beinga noticing thatthereis a flowershop
yonder;in each suchPSW,c* willcause Barryto remember that
tomorrow is hiswife'sbirthday. Furthermore, ineachPSWinwhich
Barrydoesnotnotice(inthepertinently similarsituation) thatthere
is a flowershopyonder,he doesnotremember thebirthday (while
inthatsituation). As intheearlierexample,theresimplyis no PSW
inwhichthereoccursan eventc* thatis pertinently similarto the
actualcause-event c andyetfailsto instantiatethementalproperty
beinga noticing thatthereis a flowershopyonder.For,anyworld
in whichthereoccursan eventthatis physically likec, butlacks
thismentalproperty, is a worldtoo distantfromtheactualworld
to qualifyas a PSW.Again:weirdworldsare notPSW's.37
Itappears,therefore, thatthementalproperties ofmentalevents
areindeedexplanatorily relevantinthecausaltransactions inwhich
thoseeventsare causes.38Eventhoughwe humansevidently are
physico-chemical systems all ofwhosebehaviorand innergoings-
on are explainable, in principle,in termsofthelawsofphysicsas
appliedtoourmicrophysical we arealsocreatures
parts, whosemen-
tal qua
states, mental, are causally efficacious.It is nice to have
philosophical forbelievingin mentalquausation,
justification since
mostofus-myselfincluded-could no morebelieveotherwise than
we couldfly.39

Notes

1. See,forinstance, Davidson (963,1967,1970), inDavidson

reprinted Q980).
Although writings
I shallciteDavidson's bytheir dateandsource,
original
all thepagenumbers I giveforquotedpassageswillreferto Davidson
(1980).
2. In fact,I regardthe assumptions as expository Elsewhere
fictions.
(Horgan,1978,1981, 1982)1havearguedforan event-free ontology,as
partofa generalprogram ofminimalizing commitments
ontological by
resortingto non-standard devicessuchas adverbial
logico-grammatical
operators andnon-truth-functionalsentential See alsoTye
connectives.
(1984a,1984b,1984c,forthcoming), HorganandTye(1988), and Horgan
(forthcoming).Foran argument againstthetoken-tokenpsychophysical
identitytheory, whichcomplements theno-eventontologyfavored by
MichaelTye and me,see Horganand Tye (1985).

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 Mental Quausation/ 65

3. Quitea numberof philosophers have objectedto Davidson'saction

theory, and/orhisoverallphilosophy ofmind,similarly to thewayI
shall-although nobodyhasformulated theproblem quiteas I do. See,
forinstance,Stoutland (976,1980),
Toumela(977),Hess(981),Honderich
Q982,1984),Hornsby (982),Kim(984),Skillen
(984),Sosa(984),Follesdal
(985),andJohnston (985).Forrelateddiscussion,see LePoreandLoewer
(1987),and Dretske(thisvolume).In myview,theproblemofmental
quausation doesnotshowthatDavidson'sviewsare fundamentally in-
consistent, or that he is unavoidablycommitted to a formof
epiphenomenalism; however, theproblemdoesreveala lacunain his
position,a gap whichneedsfilling. As faras I can tell,theaccountof
mentalquausationI shallproposebelowis consistent with-andeven
complementary to-thecentral tenetsofDavidson's philosophy ofmind.
4. Whythequalifier 'inan appropriate way'?Becauseoftheproblem of
"wayward causalchains," whichwaslaterillustrated inDavidson (973a)
withthefollowing example:
A climbermightwantto ridhimself oftheweightand danger
of holdinganothermanon a rope,and mightknowthatby
looseninghisholdon theropehe couldridhimself ofthe
weightand danger.Thisbeliefand wantmightso unnervehim
as to cause himto loosenhishold,and yetit mightbe the
case thathe neverchoseto loosenhishold,nordidhe do it
(Davidson,1980,p. 79.)
intentionally.
Characterizingthedifference betweenappropriate andwayward causal
chains,in Davidson'sview,is beyondtheconceptual resources ofour
commonsensementalistic psychology, andwouldrequiredropping to
thelevelofdetailedand accuratephysical laws.I myself suspectthat
common sensecando better thanDavidsonthinks, byvirtue-of theway
ournotionofquausationoperates;moreon thisbelow.
5. BythisI meanthatthereis moretothemeaning of(3)thanis captured
bytheconjunction of() and (2); a further
condition needsto be met,
tobe spelledoutbelow.Butforreasonstobe explained, I wouldclaim
thatthisfurthercondition if() and(2)aretrue;
cannotfailtobe satisfied
inthismodalsenseofsufficiency, theconjunctionof(1)and(2)isindeed
sufficient
for(3).
6. Letmestress thatinmaking thishypotheticalsupposition,I do notmean
to suggestthatI thinkitis metaphysicallypossibleforthesupposition
to be true.In factI do not,forreasonsto be explainedbelow.
7. Itis worthnotingthatthementalistic andbehavioral predicates in (3)
expressmentaland actionalproperties ofan agent,whereasthosein
(4) expresscorresponding mentaland actionalproperties ofconcrete
eventsandstates.Thetwokindsofproperties aresystematically related,
and bothkindscan be (and havebeen)regardedas typeswhichare
tokenedby concreteeventsand states.In Horgan(984), section2, 1
proposea theory whichtreatsbothkindsofproperties as eventtypes,
whichspellsoutthevarioussystematic interconnections insomedetail,
and whichdefinestwokindsoftype/token relation.

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66 / Terence Horgan

8. One can,ifone likes,viewclause(iv)as expressing a relationbetween

factsofa certainkind.I myselfprefer, however, to construe thelocu-
tion'thefactthat...is
explanatorilyrelevanttothefactthat...'as having
thelogico-grammatical statusofa non-truth-functional sententialcon-
nective,and henceas notontologically committed to facts.Elsewhere
(Horgan, 1978,1982)1havearguedthatsingular causalstatements should
likewisebe regimented usinga non-truth-functional causalconnective
(ratherthana predicate overevents), andthatthestatements flanking
thisconnectiveshouldcontainno putatively event-denoting terms.
(Typically theseflankingstatements can be obtainedby simply"un-
nominalizing" the nominalizedsentencesthat flankedthe causal
predicate intheoriginalunregimented singularcausalsentence.) Were
I to approachquausationinthesamespirit, I woulddispensewiththe
4-placequausalpredicate.InsteadI wouldfocusdirectly upon'because'-
statements like(3),whichI wouldregiment thisway:
(3') Thefactthathe wantedto reduceand thoughtexercise
woulddo itcausallyexplainswhyhe exercised,
withtheitalicized wordsviewedas expressing a non-truth-functional
sentential connective.(Undersuchan approach,theapparentdistinc-
tionbetweencausationand quausationmightdissolve;thiswouldde-
penduponwhether ornotthereturned outto be adequatetheoretical
motivation forpositingtwodistinctconnectives, onecausalandtheother
quausal.)I havevariousreasonsfornotpursuing theno-event format
in thepresentpaper,including these:(1) it is philosophically tenden-
tious;(2) thecentralideasI wanttostresshere,beinglargelyindepen-
dentofissuesconcerning theontology ofcausation, are mostreadily
graspedwithin thecommonly acceptedpictureofcausationas a rela-
tionbetweenevents;and (3) reformulating theseideasundertheno-
eventformat presumably requiresfirst
working themoutwithin thestan-
dardframework anyway.
9. Perhapsclause(iv)shouldbe qualified with'in theappropriate way',
forthesamereasonthatthisphrasewas inserted into(2).Or perhaps
appropriateness can be cashedout as partof an accountofquausal
relevance.I leavethisquestionopen,although I am inclined to think
thatthelatter willturnouttobe thecaseundertheapproachtoquausal
relevancesketchedbelow.
10. By'we' I meanthoseofus whobelieveinmentality at all,whichisjust
abouteverybody except"eliminative materialists" likeChurchland (1981)
andStich(1983).Fora critique ofChurchland's andStich'sarguments,
see HorganandWoodward (1985);andforsomepositivearguments in
favorofrealismaboutpropositional attitudes,see GrahamandHorgan
(1988).Ifthecausalefficacyofthementalqua mentalcannotbe sustain-
ed, however,thenrealismloses its point;one mightas well go
eliminativist.
11. LePoreand Loewer(1987)distinguish betweentwonotionsofcausal
relevance,and theyinvokethis distinction to defendDavidson's
anomalous monism thechargeofepiphenomenalism.
against Theywrite:

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 Mental Quausation/ 67

Considerthefollowing locutions:
a) Properties F and G are relevant,to makingitthecase that
c causese, and
b) c's possessingproperty F is causallyrelevant2 to e's
possessing propertyG.
We willsay that(a) holdsiffc hasF and e has G, and there
is a strictlaw thatentailsFs causeGs. It is in thissense
that...c'shavingF and e's havingG "makeitthecase" thatc
causese. Relevance2...holds whenc's beingF bringsitabout
thate is G. We shallarguethatthosewhocharge[anomalous
monism] withepiphenomenalism are guiltyofconfusing
relevance,withrelevance2. (pp.634-635)
As I understand thispassage,relevance1 is meantto capturetheidea
thattheproperties F and G are relatedto one anotherin a waythat
is criterial
forc's beinga cause ofe. I.e.,it is supposedto be partof
ourveryconceptofcausationthattwoeventscannotqualify as being
causallyrelatedunlesstheyrespectively instantiate F andG
properties
thatare relatedto one anotherin therelevance1 way.(ForDavidson,
thisway is theexistenceofa strictlaw entailing thatF's cause G's.)
Relevance2, I takeit,is meantto be whatI am herecallingquausal
relevance.(Although LePoreandLoewer'swording of(b)suggeststhat
theonlypertinent explanatory questionis whye instantiates G,their
overalldiscussion suggests otherwise. Itappearsthattheyalso regard
thequestion whye occurred as highlypertinent, andthusthattheirac-
tualintentis better captured byclause(iv)inmyabovepartialexplica-
tionofquausation.) Ifthisisa fairreformulationoftheirdistinction,then
I agreewiththemabouttwocrucialpoints:first, thatiftheproperties
F and G are relevant2 inthecausaltransaction betweenc and e, then
F andG arenotepiphenomenal inthetransaction; andsecond, thatthose
philosophers whochargeDavidsonwithepiphenomenalism oftenjust
conflaterelevance2 withrelevancel. (Ofcoursesomeonemight, without
conflating thesenotionsat the outset,tryto argueexplicitly that
relevance2 entailsrelevance1. Butundera Davidsonian con-
strict-law
ceptionofrelevance1, at least,I am quitedubiousabouttheprospects
foranysuchargument.)
12. Onanomalism, see Davidson (1970,1973b,1974).EveninDavidson (1963),
one alreadyfindsthispassage:
connecting
[Gleneralizations reasonsand actionsare not-and
cannotbe sharpened into-thekindoflaw on thebasisof
whichaccuratepredictions be made....[It]is easy
can reliably
to see whythisis so. Whatemerges,in theex postfacto
atmosphere ofexplanation and justification,
as thereasonwas,
to theagentat thetimeofaction,one consideration among
many,a reason....The lawswhoseexistenceis requiredif
reasonsare causesofactionsdo not,we maybe sure,deal in
theconceptsin whichrationalizationsmustdeal. (Davidson,
1980,pp. 15-17.)

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68 / Terence Horgan

13. The exampleis due to BarryLoewer.

14. Onemight trybecoming so liberalaboutwhatcountsas "ceterisparibus"
thatthegeneralization comesouttrueafterall. Butprimafacie,this
is quiteimplausible.Andin anycase,ifone adoptsthispositionthen
itwillbe veryhardtoavoidallowing superfluous
allsortsofexplanatorily
properties to qualifyas quausallyrelevant-likethemeaningof the
sounds,in Dretske'sglass-shattering example.
15. By 'logicallyindependent' (and'metaphysically independent') I mean
(metaphysically)
thatitis logically by
possibleforF to be instantiated
an evente without G beinginstantiated eitherby e itselfor bysome
eventwhichis eithera causeoran effect ofe; andlikewise forG,vis-a-
vrisF.
16. On counterparts, see Lewis(1968,1971).
17. 1amassuming thatforcounterfactuals oftheform (N'), theantecedent
holdsat a worldw ifftheeventc occursin w butfailsto instantiate
property F inw. LoewerandLePore0987)invokecounterfactuals which
looksimilarto (N'), viz.,oneswiththeform
(N*) - Fc > - Ge,
wherec ande are(orarethecounterparts of)theactualworld'scause-
eventandeffect-effect, Theysaythatthenon-vacuous
respectively. truth
ofsucha counterfactual isa necessaryconditionforthecausalrelevance
ofthecause-property F. However,theyalso readsuchcounterfactuals
differently thanI do: theysaythatonewayfortheantecedent (orcon-
sequent)to hold,at a possibleworld,is forc (ore) nottooccurinthat
world.Butthisdifference betweentheirreadingand mineultimately
doesn'tmatter, forpresent purposes.Ifonereads(N') and(N*)myway,
thenitis arguablethatneitheris suchthatitsnon-vacuous truth is a
necessary condition forthequausalrelevanceofproperties F and G-
forthereasonsjustgiven.Ontheotherhand,ifonereads(N') and(N*)
theirway,thenalthough thenon-vacuous truthofthesecounterfactuals
evidently is a necessary conditionforthequausalrelevanceofF and
G, it is nota sufficient condition-for thesame reasonthatthenon-
vacuoustruthof(N)is nota sufficient condition.
18. Davidson(1987)argues,ineffect, thatcounterfactuals like(NiF) arevir-
tuallynevernon-vacuously true,becausean eventinanotherpossible
worldwhichdiffers inanyinteresting wayfrom a corresponding actual-
worldeventis boundtodiffer somehowwithrespectto causesandef-
fects,andhencecannotbe identical tothatactual-world event.(Healso
tookthislinein hisoralcomments on Dretske,at the1986ChapelHill
Colloquium.) Now,onecertainly might takeissuewithDavidson's trans-
worldly applicationofhisownfamous criterion
identity forevents. Never-
theless, thepossibility ofsucha hyper-essentialistposition concerning
trans-world eventidentity doesunderscore thedesirabilityofan account
ofquausalrelevance whichdoesnotpresuppose thattheonlypertinent
counterfactuals concern whatwouldhavehappened hadthecause-event
itselfbeen different in variousrespectsfromhowit actuallywas.

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 Mental Quausation/ 69

19. Strictly speaking, one shoulddistinguish betweencausaland quausal

preemption oroverdetermination. Quausalpreemption involvesnota
preempted potential cause,butrather a preempted, potentially instan-
tiated,quausally relevantproperty-i.e.,a property F', notinstantiated
by theactualcause c, suchthat(1) ifF had notbeen instantiated by
c thenF' wouldhavebeeninstantiated byan eventpertinently similar
to c; and (2) in everyPSWw in whichF' butnotF is instantiated by
theeventc* (ofw) thatis pertinently similarto c, c* causesan event
e* thatis pertinently similartoe. Quausaloverdetermination involves
notthesimultaneous occurrence oftwoeventseachofwhichseparate-
lycausesthegiveneffect, butrather thesimultaneous instantiation, by
theactualcausec,oftwoproperties JandK,logically andmetaphysically
independent ofoneanother, suchthat(1)ifonlyoneofthetwoproper-
tiesJand K hadbeen instantiated byan eventpertinently similarto
c, thenthateventwouldhavecausedan eventpertinently similarto
e; and(2) inanyPSWw inwhichonlyone ofthetwoproperties Jand
K is instantiated bytheeventc* (ofw) thatis pertinently similar to c,
c* causesan evente* thatis pertinently similar to e. Condition (iv)in
theantecedent ofmyproposed accountofquausalrelevance isprobably
bestconstrued as excludingonlyquausalpreemption, quausaloverdeter-
mination, orthelike.I.e.,theaccountactually seemsapplicable incases
ofordinary causalpreemption or overdetermination, providedone is
willing to describecausaloverdetermination as involving twodistinct
causes.
20. Evenifsatisfaction ofthefollowing RelevanceCondition shouldturn
out to be onlynecessaryforquausal relevance,ratherthanboth
necessary andsufficient,thisstillwouldgo a longwaytowardrefuting
quausalepiphenomenalism. For,as shallbe seen presently, although
the proposedconditionis not satisfiedby examplesof quausally
superfluous properties likeDretske's andSosa's,itevidently is satisfied
bymental propertiesofcause-events intypical
instances ofmental causa-
tion.Thisfactshifts theburdenofproofto thosewhowouldespouse
quausalepiphenomenalism.
21. One mightask whyclause(ii)of(R) is notwordedthisway:
ifc* does notinstantiate
F in w, thenc* does notcause (inw)
an eventwhichbothinstantiates G and is pertinently
similarto
theW-event e.
Thereasonforeschewing isthat(R)is supposedtoex-
thisformulation
presstheexplanatory relevanceofthepropertiesF andGtothecausal
transactionitself-andnotmerelytherelevanceofthefactthatc in-
F tothefactthate instantiates
stantiates G.Someadditional comments
are inorderhere.Sometimes, ina singularcausalstatement, theeffect
is designatedbya descriptionwhichcitesa quausallyirrelevantprop-
ertyof thatevent-as in "ThesoundscausedFred'sfavorite event,"
whereFred'sfavorite eventhappenstobe theglass'sshattering. More
commonly, however,the descriptionof the effectcitesa property
(perhapsa sortalproperty)whichdoesseempertinent of
to questions

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70 / Terence Horgan

quausalrelevance-asin "The soundscausedtheglass'sshattering."

Oftenintheselattercases,theproperty attributed to theeffect figures
as a contextual parameter whichpartially determines (1) whichother-
worldly eventscountas beingpertinently similarto theactualeffect
e ofW,and (2) whichpossibleworldscountas PSW'srelativeto the
givencausaltransaction. In theexamplejustgiven,forinstance, itis
clearthatan evente*, ina possibleworldw,can qualify as pertinently
similartotheactualeffect e evenife* (inw) differs quitesubstantially
frome (inW) at thelevelofmicrophysical detail-provided thate* is
indeeda glassshattering. Andthisfact,in turn,influences theextent
towhicha givenpossibleworldcandiffer from W whilestillqualifying
as a PSW.
22. Theletters 'F' and 'G' (and/ortheletters 'c' and 'e') might bestbe con-
struedas dummyexpressionsreplaceableby specificproperty-
designators (event-designators), ratherthanas variablesranging over
properties (events).Underthisconstrual (R) is a schema,ratherthan
a formula withtwoevent-variables and twoproperty-variables. The
schemainterpretation wouldbe calledforiftheclassofPSW's,and/or
thetransworld pertinent-similarityrelation amongevents,shouldturn
out to dependin partuponhowwe designatethecause and effect,
and/ortheirrespective properties.CompareLewis(1971), whereit is
arguedthatthetrans-world counterpart relationis subjectto thissort
ofdescription-relativity.
23. Sometimes, however, Mill'smethods are usednotto determine which
properties ofthecauseare quausallyrelevant, butrathertodetermine
whicheventisthecause.Insuchcasestheappropriate pattern ofcounter-
factualdependencewillbe somewhatdifferent fromtheone I have
described. Inparticular, theclassofPSW'swillincludeworldsinwhich
theredoes notoccuran eventthatis pertinently similarto theactual
causec; andtheoccurrence ornon-occurrence ofan eventpertinently
similar toc (ofW)willbe correlated, acrossthePSW's,withtheoccur-
renceor non-occurrence ofan eventpertinently similarto e (ofW).
24. Mill'smethod ofconcomitant andhismethod
variation, ofresidues, come
intoplaywithrespecttopatterns ofcounterfactual dependence among
propertieswhichadmitof varyingdegrees,like the quantitative
magnitudes so ubiquitous in physics.I shallnotdiscusssuchdegree-
relateddependence patterns, becauseI am notimmediately concerned
withcausalclaimsinwhichthecauseand/ortheeffect arecharacteriz-
ed in termsofthedegreeto whicha givenproperty is manifested.
25. HereI shouldremarkthatboththeclassof PSW'sand theoperative
transworld pertinent-similarity relationamongeventscandependupon
whichspecific properties F andG,instantiated byc ande respectively,
are beingscrutinized forquausalrelevance;cf.notes20, 27, and 34.
Indeed,perhapsitwouldbe betterto explicitly relativize theclassof
PSW's,and thepertinent-similarity relation, to theproperties F and G
(andnotmerely tothegivencausaltransaction). I haverefrained from
doingso largelyin orderto simplify exposition.

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 Mental Quausation/ 71

26. Variousquestionsaboutcausalexplanation also wouldbear explora-

tion,in connection witha morefullydevelopedaccountof quausal
relevance.Suchan accountcouldbe expectedto yieldinsights about
matters including: (i)thenatureofcausalexplanation itself;(ii)thedif-
ferent typesofcausalexplanation; (iii)therole(s)playedbyheteronomic
generalizations in variouskindsofcausalexplanation; (iv)therole(s)
playedbystrict laws;and(v)thestrengths anddeficiencies oftheclassic
Hempel-Oppenheim "deductive-nomological" modelofexplanation. For
pertinent discussion see Woodward (1979,1984,1986).Thesepapersby
JimWoodward are one sourceofinspiration forthegeneralapproach
to quausalrelevanceI am hereproposing.
27. Letmeaddsomeadditional methodological remarks, inlight ofthefact
thatthecenterpiece ofthispaperisa biconditional inwhich'iffisflanked
ontheright bytheRelevanceCondition (R).Onepotential useofbicon-
ditionals in addressing philosophical problems is thestrategy ofhard
coreconceptual analysis(forshort,HCCA).Heretheidea is to findan
'iff'statement whoseleftside(theanalysandum) expressesa concept
centralto theissueat hand,and whoseright side(theanalysans) pro-
videsclear,precise, non-circularnecessary andsufficient conditions for
the analysans.The proposedconceptualanalysisshouldbe freeof
counterexamples; also,thetermsemployed intheanalysans shouldbe
"conceptually prior"tothetermexpressing theanalysandum, andalso
conceptually priorto othertermsthatare closelycognateto the
analysandum-term. TheHCCAstrategy fordealingwitha philosophical
conundrum consists ofproposing an analysis whichsupposedly hasthe
features justmentioned, and thenarguingthatthisanalysis-perhaps
together withadditional relativelyuncontroversial premises-entails the
desiredsolutionto theproblem.Anotherapproach,however,is the
strategy ofsoftcoreconceptual geography (SCCG).Heretheidea is to
proposea biconditional whoseleftsideexpressesa conceptcentralto
thediscussion, andwhoseright siderevealssomething illuminating about
thehowthisconceptfits together withvariousotherconcepts. Theright
sideofthebiconditional maywellbe somewhat vague,allowing forvary-
ingresolutions (orpartial resolutions)ofitsvagueness depending oncon-
text,speakers'interests andpurposes, andthelike.Thetermsoccurr-
ingon therightsideneednotbe "conceptually prior"to thetermon
theleft;and notionscloselycognateto theconceptexpressedon the
leftmaywellre-appear in one'sdescriptions ofhowthevaguenessof
theright-hand termsgetsresolvedin certaincontexts ofusage.Such
descriptions neednotrestuponpurelya prioriconsiderations, butin-
steadmayappealto certainempirical facts(forinstance, factsabout
thekindsofputative explanations thatpeopleactually employ) as hav-
ingnormative importconcerning whatcountsas a contextually ap-
propriate vaguenessresolution. The SCCGstrategy foraddressing a
philosophical problemconsists ofproposing sucha biconditional, and
thenusingitas partofan overallargument thatthedesiredsolution
totheproblem comports bestwiththeglobalconceptual geography of
theconceptinquestionandvariouscognateconcepts. I regardmyap-

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72 / Terence Horgan

proachinthispaperas an instance oftheSCCGstrategy. (I doubtthat

theconceptofquausalrelevance, orindeedmostotherconcepts either
insideor outsideofphilosophy, haveprecisenecessary and sufficient
conditions ofthekindsoughtintraditional "analytic" philosophy. But
I thinktheSCCGstrategy isphilosophically usefulinanycase,whether
or notold-style conceptual analysisis a viableenterprise.) The SCCG
approachrevealsitself, forinstance, in notes29, 36, and 37 below.
28. The intuitive rationaleforthisprovisois thatwe are askingwhether
ornotthepresence orabsenceofF wouldmakea difference inthecausal
transaction.Inaddressing thisquestion, itisnotappropriate toconsider
worldsinwhich, although F itselfis notinstantiated,thereis instantiated
a property F* ofthekinddescribed.
29. Supposethesoprano'svocalapparatusis so constructed thatshe can-
notshatter glasswithhervoiceexceptbyemitting soundswhichhap-
pen to mean'shatter'; suppose,in fact,thatthisis trueofall humans.
Wouldthismeanthattheproperty means'shatter' turnsout,wrongly,
to countas quausallyrelevantundermyaccount?No. For,soundsin
anotherworldw can qualify as beingpertinently similar to theactual
sounds,and w itself can qualify as a PSWrelativeto thegivencausal
transaction, evenifthesoundsin w are producedquitedifferently-
say,bya noise-emitting artifact. Gratuitous departures fromactuality
won'tdo, eitherwithrespectto theclassofPSW'sor withrespectto
thepertinent similarity relation amongevents. Butinsomeunusual cases,
a fairlysubstantial non-gratuitous departure willbe appropriate, inorder
toreacha worldw wherean eventc* occurswhich, although itinstan-
tiates(inw) thesamequausallyrelevantproperties thatwereinstan-
tiatedby c in W, does notinstantiate F (in w).
30. As I interpret thiscounterfactual conditional, thephrase'thesounds'
nonrigidly designates thesoundsthatoccurintheenvisioned counter-
factualsituation; theseneednotbe identical to(orcounterparts of)the
soundsthatactually occurred. Suchusageisfamiliar enough.Ifonesays,
forinstance, "TheVietnamWarwouldhavecontinued intotheearly
1970'sevenifthePresident hadbeenHumphrey," one doesnotmean
thatthewarwouldhavecontinued evenifNixonhadbeenHumphrey.
Cf.Kripke(1972).
31. Supervenience is,I recognize, a modalnotion: heretheoperative modal
claimis thattherecouldnotoccuran eventc* (oran evente*) which
ispertinently similar totheactualworld'scause(oreffect) andyetlacks
theproperty F (orG).Itis important to remember, however, thatthe
accessibilityrelationgoverning modalassertions is a context-relative
parameter ofdiscourse-apointwellarguedby Lewis(1979).Whena
questionof quausalrelevanceis at issue,it is naturalto use modal
languageinsucha waythatallandonlythePSW's,relative tothecausal
transactioninquestion, countas accessible; afterall,thesearetheworlds
thatpertainto questionsofquausalrelevance.So itis ofno smallim-
portancethatmentalproperties are supervenient, in the way here
described, underthecontextually appropriate accessibility relation.
32. See Putnam(1975),Stich(1978),and Burge(1979,1982,1986).

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 Mental Quausation/ 73

33. AgainI stressthatone mustkeepin mindthereference classofpos-

sibleworlds(i.e.,thecontextually appropriate accessibility relation),
when one asks about the pertinenceof supervenience or non-
supervenience ofmental propertiestoquestions aboutquausalrelevance.
Relativetoa broadenoughclassofworlds, itis truethatmentalprop-
ertiesdon'tsuperveneon what'sin thehead.Butthisclassis much
broaderthantheclassofPSW'sfora givencausaltransaction involving
a mentalcause.Whenone restricts one'sattention to PSW's,one finds
thatmental properties ofcausesnormally obeyprinciple (S.R),andhence
are quausallyrelevant.
34. Two additional observations shouldbe added.First, I alreadypointed
outthattheclassofPSW'sshouldnotincludeworldswhere,although
theredoes notoccuran eventwiththeproperty F, theredoes occur
an eventwitha property F* whichbelongsto thesamegeneraltype
as F andwouldbe no lessquausallyrelevant thanF itself. Theproperty
beinga desirefora schmeermaywellbe suchan F*property, inwhich
casewe haveanother reasontoexcludesucha TwinEarthly worldfrom
theclassofPSW's.Second,ifweaskwhatsortsofhead-external altera-
tionsofactuality itwouldtaketo geta worldwherean eventoccurs
thatis physically justlikeFred'sactual-world desirebutwhichis not
a propositional attitudeatall,thenthingsstartgetting so weirdthatsuch
a case is veryhardevento describe.
35. Besides,ifwe weretoinclude, amongthePSW's,worldsinwhichFred's
neuralwiring is altered,thenpresumably we also shoulddo so when
applying Mill'smethods to determine whicheventinW causedFred's
action;cf.note22.Thus,c'sstatus as thecausewouldcomeintoquestion.
36. This interdependence betweenactualexplanatory practiceand the
operative classofPSW'spresumably wouldbe accommodated, ina more
thoroughly developed versionoftheaccountofquausalrelevance I have
sketched here,bywedding theaccounttoanappropriate theory ofcausal
explanation-perhaps alongthelinesofWoodward (1979,1984,1986).
Itshouldbe noted,too,thattheinterdependence cutsbothways.I.e.,
featuresofthesituation inwhichtheactualcausaltransaction tookplace
willqualify as causal"background conditions," and hencewillremain
fixedacrossall PSW's,onlyiftheclassofworldswhichthereby count
as PSW'shasthefollowing attribute:thereare properties F and G,in-
stantiated bytheactualcause-event andeffect-event respectively, such
that(i)G-events dependcounterfactually uponF-events, relative tothe
givenclassofPSW's,inthewayspecified bytheaboveRelevanceCon-
dition(R);and(ii)thispatternofcounterfactualdependence isrichenough
andvariedenoughtorenderuseful, illuminating,andpragmatically ap-
propriate thegeneralpracticeofcitingtheproperties F and G in ex-
plainingthoseG-events thatare causedbyF-events.
37. Butsupposethereis an all-female societyofAmazons,each ofwhom
canproduce, andcanperceptually distinguish,soundswiththeproper-
tiesofpitchandamplitude which,in Dretske's glassshattering exam-
ple,werethequausallyrelevant ones(theR-properties). Suppose,also,
thatsoundsinstantiating theR-properties,andonlysuchsounds,hap-

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74 / Terence Horgan

pen to mean'shatter' in theAmazonlanguage.WhenAmora,queen

oftheAmazons,first encounters something madeofglass,she reacts
by saying'shatter'(inAmazon);and it promptly shatters.Wouldthis
meanthattheproperty means'shatter' inAmazonturns out,wrongly,
to countas quausallyrelevant undermyaccount?No.For,a situation
inanotherpossibleworldw can countas pertinently similar to theac-
andw itself
tualsituation, cancountas a PSWrelative tothegivencausal
transaction,eveniftheobjectin w whichAmoraordersto shatter is
madeofsomething otherthanglass(e.g.,clay);and ifthisobjectinw
doesshatter uponAmora'scommand, thenitsshattering willcountas
an eventpertinently similarto theactualworld'seffect-event. Butof
coursetheclayobjectdoes notshatter in sucha counterfactual situa-
tion,and hencetheproperty means'shatter' inAmazonturnsoutnot
tobe quausallyrelevant intheactualcausaltransaction afterall. Here
we see an application ofthepointI madein note36. Whentheques-
tionofthequausalrelevanceofthesound'sintentional property is at
issue,thefactthattheobjectwas madeofglassdoes notqualify as a
background conditionthatremains fixedinallPSW's.Whynot?Because
ifwe do holdthisfactfixedacrossall PSW's,thentheresulting pattern
ofcounterfactualdependence ofshatteringsuponsoundsthatmean'shat-
ter'(in Amazon)justis notrichenoughand variedenoughto be il-
luminating.Objectsmadeofothersubstances don'tshatter insuchcir-
cumstances; glassdoesn'tshatter on command whentheorderis given
inanylanguageexceptAmazon;etc.Henceitis clearlyjustcoinciden-
tal thattheglass-shattering properties oftheAmora'sutterance hap-
pento be precisely theproperties which,underthelinguistic conven-
tionsof theAmazonlanguage,qualifythissoundas a tokenof the
Amazonwordfor'shatter'.
38. Although myexamplesofmentalcausaltransactions all haveinvolved
propositionalattitudes,I thinkmydiscussion herealso is applicableto
thequalitative,or phenomenal, properties ofmentalevents.Thereis
a close connection betweenmypresentappealto principle (S.R),as
grounds forthequausalrelevanceofthemental, andmydefense ofthe
supervenience ofqualiain Horgan(1987).
39. Forhelpful discussion,and/orusefulcomments onpriordrafts, I thank
FredDretske, GaryGleb,BarryLoewer,JohnTienson, JimWoodward,
andespecially BrianMcLaughlin. A version ofthispaperwaspresented
at theUniversityofMassachusetts at Amherst, whereI benefited from
theensuingdiscussion; specificchangeswereprompted bycomments
fromFredFeldman,MichaelJubien, and GarethMatthews.

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