TORTS Case Doctrines

TORTS CASES
Compilation of Doctrines and Rulings
3/24/2017
Saint Louis University
Ariola, Louella C.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT
Barredo v. Garcia 6
Elcano v. Hill 6
Cinco v. Canonoy 6
Baksh v. CA 7
Dulay v. CA 7
Garcia v. Florido 8
Andamo v. IAC 8
Taylor v. Manila Electric Company 9
Tayag v. Alcantara 9
II. QUASI-DELICT V. DELICT

Barredo v. Garcia 10
Padilla v. CA 10
Cruz v. CA 10
Philippine Rabbit v. CA 11
People v. Ligon 11
III. QUASI-DELICT V. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Cangco v. Manila Railroad 12
Fores v. Miranda 12
Far East v. CA 13
Air France v. Carrascoso 13
PSBA v. CA 14
Syquia v. CA 14
Calalas v. Sunga 15
IV. ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE

Picart v. Smith 15
V. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN CHILDREN

Taylor v. Manila Railroad 16
Jarco Marketing v. CA 16
Del Rosario v. Manila 17
Ylarde v. Aquino 17
VI. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN EXPERTS AND PROFESSIONALS

Culion v. Philippines 17
US v. Pineda 18
BPI v. CA 18
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VII. INTOXICATION
Wright v. Manila Electric 18
VIII. INSANITY
US v. Baggay 19
IX. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE

Marinduque v. Workmens Compensation Commission 19
X. RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Layugan v. IAC 20
Ramos v. CA 20
Batiquin v. CA 21
DM Consunji v. CA 21
XI. PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE

Manila Electric v. Remoquillo 22
Bernardo v. Legaspi 22
Bernal v. JV House and Tacloban Electric 23
PLDT v. CA 23
XII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Genobiagon v. CA 23
Rakes v. Atlantic 24
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA 24
XIII. FORTUITOUS EVENT

Juntilla v. Funtanar 25
Hernandez v. COA 25
Gotesco Investment v. Chatto 26
Servando v. Phil Steam 26
National Power v. CA 27
Southeastern College v. CA 27
XIV. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Afialda v. Hisole 28
Ilocos Norte v. CA 28
XV. DUE DILIGENCE

Ramos v. Pepsi 29
Metro Manila v. CA 29
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XVI. PRESCRIPTION
Kramer v. CA 30
Allied Banking v. CA 30
XVII. PROXIMATE CAUSE

Bataclan v. Medina 31
Fernando v. CA 32
Urbano v. IAC 32
Phoenix Construction v. IAC 33
Pilipinas Bank v. CA 33
Quezon City v. Dacara 34
XVIII. REMOTE CAUSE

Gabeto v. Araneta 34
Urbano v. IAC 34
XIX. CONCURRENT CAUSE

Far East Shipping v. CA 35
Sabido v. Custodio 35
XX. BUT FOR TEST

Bataclan v. Medina 36
XXI. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST

Philippine Rabbit v. IAC 36
XXII. CAUSE AND CONDITION

Phoenix v. IAC 37
Rodrigueza v. Manila Railroad 38
XXIII. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

McKee v. IAC 38
Teague v. Fernandez 39
Urbano v. IAC 40
XXIV. LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Picart v. Smith 40
Bustamante v. CA 41
Phoenix v. IAC 41
Glan v. IAC 41
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Pantranco v. Baesa 42
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA 42
Ong v. Metropolitan 43
Anuran v. Buno 43
Raynera v. Hiceta 43
Canlas v. CA 44
Consolidated Bank v. CA 44
Engada v. CA 44
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ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT
1.
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
The Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If the Supreme Court were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life. The Supreme Court, in the
interpretation of the laws, is disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. It will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
2.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. The Supreme Court held, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
3.
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First
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Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch
ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a

separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code.
The jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation
"not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the
Civil Code bolsters this conclusion.
4.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
5.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon
City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
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There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but
also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of
the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
6.
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO.,
INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
having always had its own foundation and individuality. The institution of the civil
action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that
should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which
require reservation by the injured party, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code)
already makes the reservation, the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action.
7.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged
also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
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8.
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his
own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character
of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to
have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and
at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by
him.
9.
G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO
VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or commission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based,
not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an
obligation arising from other sources, like quasi delict. The petitioners' cause of action
being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo
Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of
Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict.
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QUASI-DELICT V. DELICT
10.
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
11.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition
that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied
institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case
refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the
accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
12.
G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA

UMALI, respondents.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in

the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science. He therefore has a duty to use at
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least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical
malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care
of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls
below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has
been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion
as to causation.
13.
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent
civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the
civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34] and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same
act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising
from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for
the same act or omission.
14.
G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
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only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission.
QUASI-DELICT V. BREACH OF CONTRACT
15.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act

that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a
general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions,
as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
16.
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959
PAZ FORES, petitioner,
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.
Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of

the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent
that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or
fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an
award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract cannot be considered included in the descriptive term
"analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides
for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of
quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
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17.
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S.
LUNA, respondents.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is

shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. Bad faith,
in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract
of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger
attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a
contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the
fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict
provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained
of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.
18.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from

any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of
the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier.
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19.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA
D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the
school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent
trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious
deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still
avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
20.
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC., respondents.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not

preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care" on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been
actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be
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held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
21.
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the
Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE
22.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case

may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case.
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STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN CHILDREN
23.
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his
own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character
of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to
have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and
at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by
him.
24.
G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA
PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive

presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable
of contributory negligence. In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt
from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under
fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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25.
G.R. No. L-35283 November 5, 1932
JULIAN DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the

deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would
feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored
the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the
case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be
properly imputed to the deceased, a proposition upon which the members of the
court do not all agree, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of
action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident.
26.
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree
of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct
of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children
of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances.
STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN EXPERTS/PROFESSIONALS
27.
G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring

professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
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28.
G.R. No. L-12858 January 22, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously
qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care
known to practical men." The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what
he sells.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless
sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law
penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through
negligence or mistake.
29.
G.R. No. 102383 November 26, 1992
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH JUDICIAL), HON. JUDGE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 59, CHINA BANKING CORP., and PHILIPPINE CLEARING
HOUSE CORPORATION, respondents.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of
their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For
obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
INTOXICATION
30.
G.R. No. L7760 October 1, 1914
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle
under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the
rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the
unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to
break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter
what his condition and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
18 | P a g e
would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters
the realm of speculation and guesswork.
INSANITY
31.
G.R. No. 6659 September 1, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BAGGAY, JR., defendant-appellant.
True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person
liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and
for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts
ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from
criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his
irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still
reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even
though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to
suffer from the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite
of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him
during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for
reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary
for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
32.
G.R. No. L8110. June 30, 1956.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., petitioner
vs.
THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO AMADOR and
GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is
not negligence, ordinarily. It couldnt be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se.
Even granting there was negligence, it surely was not notorious negligence, which the
Court had interpreted to mean the same thing as gross negligence implying
conscious indifference to consequences, pursuing a course of conduct which would
naturally and probably result in injury, utter disregard of consequences. (38 Am. Jur.,
691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the companys haulage truck could not be
gross negligence because no danger or risk was apparent.
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RES IPSA LOQUITUR
33.
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-
INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is
not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference
arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which
is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the
precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the
occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be
involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be
made, whatever the source of the evidence.
34.
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians
of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA.
PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but
a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised.
A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or
treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular
20 | P a g e
practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his
peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation
any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance
occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations which, if unexplained, would themselves reasonably speak to the average
man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there were such
extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the
defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
35.
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS,
respondents.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is
not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
(Layugan vs. IAC)
36.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or
not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was
of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff

establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
21 | P a g e
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant
to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances, disputable presumption, such as that
of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to
explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Evidence by the defendant of, say, due care comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.
PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE
37.
G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL,
BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed
MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as
looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latters length of 6 feet.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
38.
G.R. No. 9308 December 23, 1914
JUAN BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
M. B. LEGASPI, defendant-appellee.
Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes

to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes
thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant and as both of them,
by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither
can recover.
22 | P a g e
39.
G.R. No. L30741 January 30, 1930
TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907],
7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar
to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
40.
G.R. No. L57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN,
respondents.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained
sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site
of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot
charge petitioner for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one
should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore,
respondent had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson
Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his
wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
41.
G.R. No. L40452 October 12, 1989
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner,
vs.
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COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CAG. R. No. 321,
March 29,1947)."
42.
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
M. H., RAKES, petitioner
vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, respondent
In deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident, the test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the
injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it. But contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side
of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of
omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event
or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
43.
G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL,
et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO
LIPANA, its President & General Manager, respondents.
It cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in

not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would
have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against respondent by its
secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only
respondent had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission
by respondent amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages
that may be awarded to petitioner.
24 | P a g e
FORTUITOUS EVENT
44.
G.R. No. L45637 May 31, 1985
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.
In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), the Supreme Court laid down the following
essential characteristics of caso fortuito:
xxx xxx xxx
... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso

fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2)
It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor)
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor. (5 Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should
teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed
limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring
the safety of passengers at all times.
45.
G.R. No. 71871 November 6, 1989
TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
As for petitioners choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one
could easily agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view
of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner
miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he
made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable
and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other
passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and
negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event, something that could not have
been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.
25 | P a g e
46.
G.R. No. L87584 June 16, 1992
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.
It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement

impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for
the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not
discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that where a patron of a theater
or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is
wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper
care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. Besides,

even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the
cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because
it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned
from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be
exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should
not have been guilty of negligence.
47.
G.R. No. L364812 October 23, 1982
AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.
In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada

Espanola says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso
fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will (2) it must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner and (4) the obligor must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor."
In the case at bar, the burning of the Customs warehouse was an extraordinary
event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not
have foreseen the event.
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred in delay in
the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified
appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be
26 | P a g e
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, one of the appellees had taken delivery
of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage
of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees
was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse
belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.
48.
G.R. Nos. 10344245 May 21, 1993
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the
petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively
by an act of God or force majeure a human factor negligence or imprudence had
intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have,
even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence
was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of
God.
49.
G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA
DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural

occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight,
diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse
consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation
amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from
liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is
conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be
the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent and
reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
50.
G.R. No. L2075 November 29, 1949
MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
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BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.
51.
G.R. No. L53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
The deceased was on her way to her grocery store to see to it that the goods
were not flooded. Should she be punished for exercising her right to protect her
property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person
is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known
danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the
life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence174(5), p. 301), or when he
seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little,
Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires
prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p.
474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National
Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel Electric Plant, set out in the early morning of
June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging
from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at
the INELCO office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of
petitioner.
DUE DILIGENCE
52.
G.R. No. L22533 February 9, 1967
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSICOLA
BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
28 | P a g e
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, the Supreme Court said in Bahia
vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both and
(2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
53.
G.R. No. 104408 J une 21, 1993
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND NENITA CUSTODIA, respondents.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke
the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part
of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only
in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome presumption.
The mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing

that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability
arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that
in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company
policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Paying lip service to these injunctions
or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will warrant stern
sanctions from the Court.
29 | P a g e
PRESCRIPTION
54.
G.R. No. L83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must
be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed.
In Paulan vs. Sarabia, the Supreme Court ruled that in an action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four
(4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, the Supreme Court

held as follows:
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it
can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ...
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be
counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the
commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the
time when the cause of action arises.
55.
G.R. No. L85868 October 13, 1989
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSELITO Z. YUJUICO, respondents.
In the case of Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, the

Supreme Court ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right
of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive
period must be reckoned.
Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted,
however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary
Board ordered the General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines while
the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has
prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted.
30 | P a g e
PROXIMATE CAUSE
56.
G.R. No. L10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.' More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle.
But in the present case, under the circumstances obtaining in the same, the
Supreme Court did not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning
of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was
to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping
of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
57.
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children,
namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS
LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor
children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed
31 | P a g e
BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor
children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and
EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardian ad litem, of her minor
grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.
The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and
without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the
nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned
for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this
kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,
and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.
58.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas)
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote
cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. As the Supreme Court ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et
al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp.
931932).
32 | P a g e
59.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in
other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's
car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.
60.
G.R. No. 105410 July 25, 1994
PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO REYES, respondents.
For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that
private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of
jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of
and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have
been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the
injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural
and probable consequence." In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the
injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash
deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a
similar first name.
61.
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON v. FULGENCIO
DACARA
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the

accident. Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of
February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara,
Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging
done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate
33 | P a g e
warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is
pervasive.
REMOTE CAUSE
62.
G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921
CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three
children, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.
The stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was
too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal
or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the
head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the
accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
63.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do."A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
34 | P a g e
CONCURRENT CAUSES
64.
G.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPELAS and
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
[G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998]
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, respondents.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is

solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarity liable
for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
65.
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners,
vs.
CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a

proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners'
truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the
road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus
coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its
running board.1 According to the great weight of authority, where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons,
although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts
of the other tort-feasor.
35 | P a g e
TESTS
66.
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural
guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
67.
G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET
AL., respondents.
It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner
in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement,
Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the
accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the
accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving
fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the
bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to
the passengers of the jeepney.
36 | P a g e
68.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
vs.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the
active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which
made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as
the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which
have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is
invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have
gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a
spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about
the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be
liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition"
still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in
a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
69.
G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own
behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and
the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
37 | P a g e
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
70.
G.R. No. L-15688 November 19, 1921
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of
the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this
fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the
property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to
passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made
the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as
contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that
condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on
this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad
Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly
there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
71.
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH
MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO, respondents.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be

said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate
cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
38 | P a g e
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
72.
G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own
behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and
the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
73.
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not

rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency
if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. To consider
the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not
portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say
that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was
precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two
stairways instead of only one.
74.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
39 | P a g e
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. This is
called proximate cause, which is defined as that caused which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, and without
which the result would that have occurred.
Thus, where there is efficient intervening cause - a cause which destroys

the causal connection between the negligent act and the injury, such as a
tetanus negligently caused by the victim himself - there can no recovery for
damages.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
75.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by

reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly

applied to automobile accidents, cannot be invoked where the negligence of the
plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he
reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid
injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery.
76.
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of
minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC, all surnamed
BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses
JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and
ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA.
COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners,
vs.
40 | P a g e
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO
MONTESIANO, respondents.
The principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it
would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
77.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
vs.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine

whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use
of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission
of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community
78.
G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989
GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. AGAD, FELIX
LIM and PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO, Minors
ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE, JACQUELINE BRIGITTE JOCELINE
CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed CALIBO, represented
by their mother, CECILIA A. VDA. DE CALIBO, respondents.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides, as valid and complete, a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts.
79.
G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru
41 | P a g e
her personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO and SHARON
ICO, Respondents.
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages. For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show
that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it.
Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
80.
G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA
PASCUAL, et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO
LIPANA, its President & General Manager, respondents.
The last clear chance doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages
for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
81.
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, defendant-appellee.
The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
42 | P a g e
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or,
"As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent,
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident."
82.
G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354 May 20, 1966
GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PEPITO BUO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO RAZON,
ANSELMO MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO, respondents.
.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence.
It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its

passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence"
from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary
diligence" (Art. 1756). Failure to overcome the presumption will necessarily
follow that the driver and the owners of the common carrier must answer for
injuries to its passengers.
83.
G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and
REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY
ORPILLA, respondents.
The doctrine of last clear chance cannot apply where the victim himself
was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of a truck, for in that
case he was the one who has the last clear chance to avoid the collision; not the
driver of the truck.
84.
G.R. No. 112160. February 28, 2000
OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ASIAN SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS and VICENTE
MAOSCA, respondents.
43 | P a g e
Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequence
arising therefrom.
The antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of

damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
85.
G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.
The doctrine of last clear chance, do not apply for breach of contract due
to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation. Stated otherwise,
in a case of culpa contractual, neither the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by
the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff
but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.
86.
G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003
ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth
Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. But a person who invokes the doctrine must substantiate his invocation,
otherwise it cannot apply.
44 | P a g e

TORTS Case Doctrines

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TORTS Case Doctrines

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TORTS CASES

Compilation of Doctrines and Rulings

II. QUASI-DELICT V. DELICT

III. QUASI-DELICT V. BREACH OF CONTRACT

IV. ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE

V. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN CHILDREN

VI. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN EXPERTS AND PROFESSIONALS

IX. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE

X. RES IPSA LOQUITUR

XI. PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE

XII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

XIII. FORTUITOUS EVENT

XIV. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

XV. DUE DILIGENCE

XVII. PROXIMATE CAUSE

XVIII. REMOTE CAUSE

XIX. CONCURRENT CAUSE

XX. BUT FOR TEST

XXI. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST

XXII. CAUSE AND CONDITION

XXIII. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

XXIV. LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a

Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in

QUASI-DELICT V. BREACH OF CONTRACT

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act

Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive

It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the

STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN EXPERTS/PROFESSIONALS

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring

The defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff

Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes

It cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in

... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso

It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. Besides,

In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada

There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:

The mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, the Supreme Court

In the case of Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, the

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is

Petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a

EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be

The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not

Thus, where there is efficient intervening cause - a cause which destroys

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by

The "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly

Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine

It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its

The antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of