A.

Freedom of Assembly and Association

1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Sections 4, 8, 15
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.

SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

UDHR, Article 20
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

ICCPR, Articles 21, 22

Article 21

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.

Article 22

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their
exercise of this right.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in
such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

ICESCR, Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:

(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject
only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his
economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others;

(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right
of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;

(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the
particular country.

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these
rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in
such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

CRC, Article 15
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to freedom of
peaceful assembly.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in
conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, Januaryy 27, 1948

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a
permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is,
"that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in
any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119,
Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places
to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the
streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount
to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the
government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, November 9, 1983 (supra)

Franz Wallmann et al. v. Austria, Communication No. 1002/2001
3.1 The authors claim to be victims of a violation of article 22, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant, because the limited partnerships compulsory membership in the Regional
Chamber of Commerce, combined with the obligation to pay annual membership fees,
effectively denies them their right to freedom of association, including the right to found or
join another association for similar commercial purposes.

3.3 The authors argue that even if the Chambers were to be considered public law
organizations, the financial burden placed on their members by the annual membership fees
effectively prevents members from associating with one another outside the Chambers, since
individual businesspeople cannot reasonably be expected to make similar contributions in
addition to the Chambers annual membership fees, to fund alternative private associations
to enhance their economic interests. The annual membership fees therefore serve, and are
calculated, as a de facto prohibition of the exercise of the right freely to associate outside the
Chambers.

9.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the imposition of annual membership
fees on the Hotel zum Hirschen (third author) by the Salzburg Regional Chamber of
Commerce amounts to a violation of the second authors right to freedom of association
under article 22 of the Covenant.

9.3 The Committee has noted the authors contention that, although the Chamber of
Commerce constitutes a public law organization under Austrian law, its qualification as an
association within the meaning of article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant has to be
determined on the basis of international standards, given the numerous non-public functions
of the Chamber. It has equally taken note of the State partys argument that the Chamber
forms a public organization under Austrian law, on account of its participation in matters of
public administration as well as its public interest objectives, therefore not falling under the
scope of application of article 22.

9.4 The Committee observes that the Austrian Chamber of Commerce was founded by
law rather than by private agreement, and that its members are subordinated by law to its
power to charge annual membership fees. It further observes that article 22 of the Covenant
only applies to private associations, including for purposes of membership.

9.5 The Committee considers that once the law of a State party establishes commerce
chambers as organizations under public law, these organizations are not precluded by article
22 of the Covenant from imposing annual membership fees on its members, unless such
establishment under public law aims at circumventing the guarantees contained in article 22.
However, it does not appear from the material before the Committee that the qualification of
the Austrian Chamber of Commerce as a public law organization, as envisaged in the
Austrian Constitution as well as in the Chamber of Commerce Act of 1998, amounts to a
circumvention of article 22 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore concludes that the
third authors compulsory membership in the Austrian Chamber of Commerce and the
annual membership fees imposed since 1999 do not constitute an interference with the
second authors rights under article 22.

10. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it do not disclose a violation of article 22,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

Pinchuk v. Belarus, Communication No. 2165/2012 (supra)

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958)
FACTS: n 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John Patterson, brought a suit to the State
Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama, challenging the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for violation of a state statute requiring foreign
corporations to qualify before doing business in the state. The NAACP, a nonprofit
membership corporation based in New York, had not complied with the statute, as it
believed it was exempt. The state suit sought both to prevent the Association from
conducting further business within the state and, indeed, to remove it from the state.

Referring to the Association's involvement with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 and its
role in funding and providing legal assistance to black students' seeking admission to the
state university, the suit charged that the Association was ". . . causing irreparable injury to
the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which
criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief . . . ." On the day this
suit was filed, the circuit court agreed to issue an ex parte order restraining the Association
from conducting business in the state or taking steps to qualify it to do so.

The Association, represented throughout by Robert L. Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, responded by moving to dissolve the order on the grounds that its activities within the
state did not require its qualification under the statute and that the state's suit was intended
to violate its rights to freedom of speech and of assembly as guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States. Before a hearing date was set, the state issued a subpoena for much of
the Association's records, including bank statements and leases, but most notably the names
and addresses of the "agents" or "members" of the Association in Alabama.

In its response to the lawsuit, the Association admitted that it was in breach of the statute
and offered to obtain qualification to continue business if that part of the ex parte order was
lifted. Because the Association did not comply with the order to produce its records, that
motion was denied and the Association was held in contempt and fined $10,000. The
contempt order allowed for the reduction or remission of the fine if the production order was
complied with within five days, after which the fine would be raised to $100,000.

Contending that the State could not constitutionally force disclosure of the records, the
Association moved to dismiss the contempt judgment once more. According to Alabama case
law, however, a petitioner could not seek a hearing or to dissolve an order until it purged
itself of contempt.

HELD: In an opinion delivered by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, the Supreme Court
decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's
membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" and, further, that freedom to associate with
organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The action of the state's obtaining the
names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its
members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional
rights of the petitioners.[1] Harlan J said the following.

It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups

engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the
forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the
particular constitutional rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. When referring
to the varied forms of governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly,
it said in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra, 339 U.S. at page 402, 70 S.Ct. at
page 686: 'A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear
identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature.' Compelled disclosure of
membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same
order. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses
dissident beliefs. Cf. United States v. Rumely, supra, 345 U.S. at pages 56 58, 73 S.Ct. at pages
550551 (concurring opinion).
We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn in question, must be regarded
as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's
members of their right to freedom of association. Petitioner has made an uncontroverted
showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it
apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect
adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster
beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to
withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of
exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this
exposure.

It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect
compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have upon participation by
Alabama citizens in petitioner's activities follows not from state action but from private
community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action,
for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that
private action takes hold.

[...]

Whether there was 'justification' in this instance turns solely on the substantiality of
Alabama's interest in obtaining the membership lists. During the course of a hearing before
the Alabama Circuit Court on a motion of petitioner to set aside the production order, the
State Attorney General presented at length, under examination by petitioner, the State's
reason for requesting the membership lists. The exclusive purpose was to determine whether
petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama foreign corporation
registration statute, and the membership lists were expected to help resolve this question.
The issues in the litigation commenced by Alabama by its bill in equity were whether the
character of petitioner and its activities in Alabama had been such as to make petitioner
subject to the registration statute, and whether the extent of petitioner's activities without
qualifying suggested its permanent ouster from the State. Without intimating the slightest
view upon the merits of these issues, we are unable to perceive that the disclosure of the
names of petitioner's rank-and-file members has a substantial bearing on either of them. As
matters stand in the state court, petitioner (1) has admitted its presence and conduct of
activities in Alabama since 1918; (2) has offered to comply in all respects with the state
qualification statute, although preserving its contention that the statute does not apply to it;
and (3) has apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the
membership lists, by furnishing the Attorney General with varied business records, its
charter and statement of purposes, the names of all of its directors and officers, and with the
total number of its Alabama members and the amount of their dues. These last items would
not on this record appear subject to constitutional challenge and have been furnished, but
whatever interest the State may have in obtaining names of ordinary members has not been
shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the production
order.

From what has already been said, we think it apparent that People of State of New York ex
rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184, cannot be relied on in
support of the State's position, for that case involved markedly different considerations in
terms of the interest of the State in obtaining disclosure. There, this Court upheld as applied
to a member of a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, a New York statute requiring any
unincorporated association which demanded an oath as a condition to membership to file
with state officials copies of its '* * * constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and oath of
membership, together with a roster of its membership and a list of its officers for the current
year.' N.Y. Laws 1923, c. 664, 53, 56. In its opinion, the Court took care to emphasize the
nature of the organization which New York sought to regulate. The decision was based on
the particular character of the Klan's activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation and
violence, which the Court assumed was before the state legislature when it enacted the
statute, and of which the Court itself took judicial notice. Furthermore, the situation before
us is significantly different from that in Bryant, because the organization there had made no
effort to comply with any of the requirements of New York's statute but rather had refused to
furnish the State with any information as to its local activities.

We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their
lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And we conclude that Alabama has
fallen short of showing a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free
enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have.
Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the $100,000 fine which resulted from
petitioner's refusal to comply with the production order in this respect must fall.

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)

FACTS: After the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of Education, especially
the 1955 decision known as Brown II,[1] which ordered federal courts to enforce the 1954
decision "with all deliberate speed", U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd declared a policy of Massive
Resistance to desegregation of Virginia's schools. Meanwhile, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was filing legal challenges to segregation in
various Virginia schools. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County had been
filed in 1951, and became a companion case decided along with Brown. In January 1956,
Virginia voters called for a limited state constitutional convention to allow tuition grants,
which could be used at segregation academies and thus undercut the desegregation required
by Brown. That constitutional convention was held in March 1956.

On September 29, 1956, the Virginia General Assembly met in a special session and passed
more than two dozen statutes concerning segregation and the schools, which Governor
Thomas B. Stanley soon signed into law and which became known as the "Stanley plan."
Some concerned tuition grants. Seven of the new statutes concerned NAACP practices in
Virginia, and of those, five regulated lawyers: expanding the definitions of the common law
legal ethical violations called barratry, champerty, maintenance, running and capping.[2]
Barratry is the "stirring up" of litigation by inducing individuals or organizations to sue
when they otherwise would not.[3] Champerty occurs when a third party (not the plaintiff or
nor their legal counsel) assumes the risks and financial costs of a lawsuit in return for a
portion of the monetary award.[4] Maintenance occurs when a third party supports or
promotes a litigant's suit to prolong litigation when the parties would otherwise have
brought an end to litigation or settled the suit.[4] The bills were specifically aimed at curbing
the NAACP, which many segregationists believed was "stirring up" integration lawsuits
against the Commonwealth.[5] By 1956, the NAACP had filed fifteen desegregation petitions
with local school boards.[6]

The new laws also collectively required annual filing of financial reports and membership
lists for any group that promotes or opposes state legislation aimed at (1) any race, (2) any
organization attempting to influence public opinion on behalf of any race, or (3) any group
raising funds to employ legal counsel in connection with racial litigation.[5] Virginia's
legislature also established two new legislative committees composed of lawyer members of
both houses, which investigated NAACP practices both in light of and using the new
statutes. One chaired by John B. Boatwright became known as the "Boatwright Committee";
another chaired by Byrd's son-in-law James M. Thomson became known as the "Thomson
Committee". This was similar to the approach taken by several other southern states, decided
as Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1958) (overturning Arkansas laws requiring public
schoolteachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or made donations to
during the previous five years; and prohibiting NAACP members from holding any state
job), NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)(overturning an Alabama
attorney general Patterson's attempt to enjoin all NAACP activities in the state) and
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (overturning Louisiana's attempt
to prevent NAACP from doing business in the state).

The Virginia NAACP soon filed suit in federal court in 1956 against the five new legal ethics
laws, and also supported Quaker printer David Scull when he was subjected to aggressive
testimony by the Thomson Committee. Both cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court around
the same time, and were argued after January 19, 1959 (Robert E. Lee's birthday, a holiday in
Virginia), when both a three-judge federal panel in James v. Almond and the Virginia
Supreme Court in Harrison v. Day invalidated many other provisions of the Stanley plan.
Then on May 4, 1959, the Supreme Court unanimously threw out the contempt conviction
the Thomson Committee had obtained in Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Committee on Law Reform
and Racial Activities.

The case that ultimately became this one had been filed by the NAACP against the Attorney
General of Virginia (first James Lindsay Almond Jr. then when he resigned to run for
governor his interim successor Kenneth Cartwright Patty, and later other successors), to have
the five barratry, champerty, maintenance, running and capping laws thrown out as an
unconstitutional infringement of its members' rights under the 1st Amendment to freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly.[7] The district court overturned three of the laws on
constitutional grounds, and remanded the remaining two to state courts. The newly elected
Attorney General, Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, although he
delegated the case to outside counsel David J. Mays who argued it on March 23 and 24, 1959,
with future justice Thurgood Marshall arguing on behalf of the NAACP.

In Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (June 8, 1959), the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Mays'
arguments and held that the federal district court should have abstained from deciding the
laws' constitutionality until state courts had had a reasonable chance to construe them.

The NAACP then pursued its suit in state court, suing Harrison and later substituting his
successors as Virginia Attorney General (initially Frederick Gray then Robert Button, since
Harrison resigned to run for Governor, and was elected on the Democratic ticket with
Button), in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond to have the two remaining statutes
overturned on constitutional grounds. During the three day trial, the NAACP (represented
by Robert L. Carter of New York and Oliver W. Hill of Richmond) called its Executive
Secretary W. Lester Banks to establish the harms the new provisions had caused, as
membership dropped significantly even though the NAACP refused to disclose its
membership lists as required by the new laws. Attorneys representing Virginia's attorney
general questioned several Virginia attorneys who handled NAACP cases, as well as more
than a dozen plaintiffs in such actions.

Meanwhile, in February 1960, the NAACP and other organizations began sit-ins to support
desegregation. The Virginia State Bar, following the reports of the Boatwright committee,
also initiated disbarment proceedings against NAACP attorney Samuel W. Tucker in
Emporia, Virginia based on the expanded laws. The NAACP brought in attorney Robert
Ming from Chicago to defend Tucker, and after two years of litigation, state judges dismissed
the charges against Tucker in early 1962. This did, however, keep desegregation progress
slow. By the fall of 1960, NAACP litigation had resulted in some desegregation in eleven
localities, and the number of at least partially desegregated districts had slowly risen to 20 in
the fall of 1961, 29 in the fall of 1962, and 55 (out of 130 school districts) in 1963 (only 3,700
black pupils or 1.6% attended school with whites even in 1963).[8] However, the Richmond
court refused to declare the new attorney discipline laws unconstitutional.[9] The NAACP
appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld one statute but not the
other.[9]

The NAACP appealed again to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. While
Mays (who had argued the case previously before the U.S. and Virginia Supreme Courts)
supervised the brief and attended the oral arguments (Robert L. Carter arguing for the
NAACP), due to time constraints Mays let Wickham handle what turned out to be two
arguments.[10] The case was argued on November 8, 1961 and reargued on October 9, 1962,
due to the resignation of two justices (Charles E. Whittaker and Felix Frankfurter) and their
replacement (after a Senate confirmation process) by Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.
Both resigned justices were in the majority in Harrison v. NAACP; both new justices were in
the majority in this decision.

HELD: Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the decision for the majority, and was
joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Associate Justices Hugo Black and Arthur Goldberg.
Associate Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the decision, but wrote an opinion
expressing further views on the subject.
For Brennan, the first issue before the court was a procedural one. In Harrison v. NAACP, the
Supreme Court had ordered the district court to remand the case back to the state courts for
disposition. However, the district court was to still maintain jurisdiction over the issue. The
question before the Supreme Court was whether the NAACP could appeal the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' ruling directly to the U.S Supreme Court, or was the NAACP
required to go through the federal district court again? Brennan held that although the
federal district court had reserved jurisdiction, this did not impinge on the Supreme Court's
authority to review a supreme state court's decision.[11]

Having asserted the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the matter, Brennan now turned to
the constitutional issues. The Commonwealth of Virginia argued that it was not regulating
the free speech of individual lawyers and citizens, but rather that of a corporation (the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), and that the U.S. Constitution
did not protect the free speech rights of corporations as strongly as it did that of people.
Brennan disagreed: Corporations, he said, not only have rights equal to that of individuals,
but a corporation may also assert free speech and free assembly rights on behalf of its
members.[12] The nature of these free speech rights in particular, Brennan said, were not
limited to "abstract discussion", but included lawful advocacy against government intrusion
on this and other rights.[13] Litigation, too, he said, was protected. Litigation was not merely
a mechanism for resolving differences between two private parties but a constitutionally
protected form of political expression.[14] Furthermore, litigation is constitutionally
protected because it is one of the few lawful means by which equal protection of the laws can
be enforced.[14] The state of Virginia had argued that organizational activity (collecting
membership dues, hiring attorneys, advocating lawsuits, etc.) of the kind the NAACP
engaged in was not literally a speech act, a petition for redress of grievances, or assembly of
the kind mentioned in the First Amendment. But Brennan and the majority disagreed,
concluding that Court precedent clearly establishes that this kind of lawful activity is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.[15]

Relying on the authoritative construction of the acts by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, Brennan noted that merely telling another individual that their rights have been
violated and referring that person to an attorney or group of attorneys became a crime under
the five statutes.[16] This chilled the lawyers' and individual's First Amendment rights, and
made the individual's ability to enforce its Fourteenth Amendment rights difficult, both of
which were unconstitutional:[17] "There thus inheres in the statute the gravest danger of
smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the
rights of members of an unpopular minority."[16]

The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had asserted that government had an interest in
ensuring high professional standards in the legal community, and that it was not the state's
intent to restrict freedom of expression. Brennan said this was no defense, for only the most
compelling of governmental interests justifies an imposition on freedom of speechand
Court precedent had long established that a state's interest in prohibiting professional
misconduct did not constitute a compelling interest.[18] Virginia does have a governmental
interest in regulating the practice of law, Brennan said, because litigation can be malicious: It
can abuse the legal system for personal gain, it can be used to oppress others, and lay people
can urge the use of the legal system for their own personal financial gain.[19] But "the
exercise ... of First Amendment rights to enforce constitutional rights through litigation, as a
matter of law, cannot be deemed malicious."[20] Yet First Amendment litigation is exactly the
sort of activity the Virginia laws sought to bar.[21] Furthermore, Virginia could not show at
trial any substantive evil flowing from the NAACP's activities.[22]

The judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was reversed.[23]

Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)

FACTS: The Boy Scouts of America is a private, non-profit organization engaged in instilling
its system of values in young people. At the time of the case, it asserted that homosexuality
was inconsistent with those values.[2]

When Dale was a student at Rutgers University, he became co-president of the Lesbian/Gay
student alliance. In July 1990, he attended a seminar on the health needs of lesbian and gay
teenagers, where he was interviewed.[3] An account of the interview was published and in a
local newspaper and Dale was quoted as stating he was gay. BSA officials read the interview
and expelled Dale from his position as assistant Scoutmaster of a New Jersey troop.[4] Dale,
an Eagle Scout, filed suit in the New Jersey Superior Court, alleging, among other things,
that the Boy Scouts had violated the state statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.[5] The New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled against the Boy Scouts, saying that they violated the State's public accommodations
law by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality.[6] Among other rulings,
the court (1) held that application of that law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly
affect members' ability to carry out their purposes; (2) determined that New Jersey has a
compelling interest in eliminating the destructive consequences of discrimination from
society, and that its public accommodations law abridges no more speech than is necessary
to accomplish its purpose; and (3) held that Dale's reinstatement did not compel the Boy
Scouts to express any message.[7]

The Boy Scouts appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to
determine whether the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violated the
First Amendment.

HELD: Chief Justice William Rehnquist's majority opinion relied upon Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984), in which the Supreme Court said: "Consequently, we
have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." This right, the Roberts
decision continues, is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups
that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas. Government actions that may
unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is "intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association" like a "regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire." Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair
the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express. Thus, "freedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."

However, to determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment's expressive

associational right, it must first be determined whether the group engages in "expressive
association." After reviewing the Scout Promise and Scout Law the court decided that the
general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: "[T]o instill values in young people."[9] The Boy
Scouts seek to instill these values by having its adult leaders spend time with the youth
members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping, fishing, etc. During the
time spent with the youth members, the Scoutmasters and assistant Scoutmasters inculcate
them with the Boy Scouts' valuesboth expressly and by example. An association that seeks
to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity.

First, associations do not have to associate for the "purpose" of disseminating a certain
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An association
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
protection.
Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders from disseminating views on sexual
issues, the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts' method of expression. If the Boy Scouts
wishes Scout leaders to avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example, this fact does
not negate the sincerity of its belief discussed above.
Regarding whether the Boy Scouts as a whole had an expressive policy against
homosexuality, the Court gave deference to the organization's own assertions of the nature of
its expressions, as well as what would impair them. The Boy Scouts asserts that it "teach[es]
that homosexual conduct is not morally straight", and that it does "not want to promote
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior".[10] While the policy may not
represent the views of all Boy Scouts, the First Amendment "does not require that every
member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be expressive
association."[11] The Court deemed it sufficient that the Boy Scouts had taken an official
position with respect to same-sex relationships. The presence of an openly gay activist in an
assistant Scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a
heterosexual assistant Scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.
The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the
other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it
tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection.[12]
The decision concluded:

We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings
with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a
tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the
organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization's expressive message. While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in
place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened
either purpose may strike the government.[13]

B. Freedom to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances

1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Section 4
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

Phil.ippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine

Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 , June 05, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to
property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and rights
of petition
FACTS:
March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise
of their constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly
and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency,
the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon
where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however,
that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
thus whoever fails to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed for violation
of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal
strike
March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation
since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the
company.
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers
directly responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an
inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization.
The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers
or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees.
 While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of
the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day,
even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it
legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry
out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence
from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of
free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of
the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of
their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion
of their moral, social and economic well-being."
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-
1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are
errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest
between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ
the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and
zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services
enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges
on such human rights. It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent
power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require."

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (supra)

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), was an important decision by the United States Supreme
Court on paid petition circulation. Colorado was one of several states with a process for
citizens to propose initiatives for the ballot, which if passed became law. One of the
requirements was to get the signatures of a significant number of registered Colorado
electors. Colorado prohibited initiative sponsors from paying for the circulation of these
petitions. The state argued this was necessary to "protect[...] the integrity of the initiative."

In 1984, Coloradans for Free Enterprise, an interest group, proposed an initiative to

deregulate the motor industry by removing it from the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities
Commission. After the title and summary were approved by the state, they began unpaid
circulation. They eventually concluded that they would not be able to get the 46,737 required
signatures by the deadline. They then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Secretary of
State of Colorado, Natalie Meyer, and the Attorney General of Colorado, Duane Woodard, in
their official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged that the Colorado statute infringed on their
First Amendment rights. The district court, with Judge John P. Moore sitting, declined to
overturn the law, finding that "the evidence did not indicate that plaintiffs were prevented in
any way from espousing their cause simply because they could not obtain paid petition
circulators." The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. Judges James Barrett and William Doyle affirmed in a panel opinion.[1]
The court granted a rehearing en banc at the plaintiff's request, and vacated the panel's
opinion.[2] The full court of appeals reversed and remanded, determining that Colorado's
law "impede[d] the sponsors' opportunity to disseminate their views to the public."[3]

The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard oral argument on April 25, 1988. The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision, ruling that "the State has failed to
demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their message in
order to meet its concerns."[4]

C. Freedom of Movement
1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Section 6
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.

UDHR, Article 13
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.

ICCPR, Articles 12, 13

Article 12

1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Article 13

An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the
competent authority.

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 , September 15, 1989

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of
the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.
Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to
return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may
only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode
and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and
live and die in his own country. I say this with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless.
That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be
beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land.

The right of the United States government to detain him is not the question before us, nor
can we resolve it. The question we must answer is whether or not, assuming that Marcos is
permitted to leave Hawaii (which may depend on the action we take today), the respondents
have acted with grave abuse of discretion in barring him from his own country.

My reluctant conclusion is that they have, absent the proof they said they were prepared to
offer, but could not, that the petitioner's return would prejudice the security of the State.

I was the one who, in the open hearing held on June 27,1989, asked the Solicitor General if
the government was prepared to prove the justification for opposing the herein petition, i.e.
that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it was. Accordingly, the Court, appreciating the
classified nature of the information expected, scheduled a closed-door hearing on July
25,1988. The Solicitor General and three representatives from the military appeared for the
respondents, together with former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, representing the petitioners.

In about two hours of briefing, the government failed dismally to show that the return of
Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the national security as it had alleged. The fears
expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and economic
destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases
for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the
impressions of the Court after that hearing.

In holding that the President of the Philippines has residual powers in addition to the
specific powers granted by the Constitution, the Court is taking a great leap backward and
reinstating the discredited doctrine announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil. 62). This does not
square with the announced policy of the Constitutional Commission, which was precisely to
limit rather than expand presidential powers, as a reaction to the excesses of the past
dictatorship.

I can only repeat Justice Black's wry observation in the Steel Seizure Case (343 U.S. 579) that
if it was true that the President had been granted the totality of executive power, "it is
difficult to see why our forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some
trifling ones, . . . I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable
executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers
thereafter stated."

I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with paeans of praise, considering
that Marcos is perhaps the most detested man in the entire history of our country. But we are
not concerned here with popularity and personalities. As a judge, I am not swayed by what
Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may make us see things through the prisms
of prejudice. I bear in mind that when I sit in judgment as a member of this Court, I must
cast all personal feelings aside.

The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on the basis only of the
established facts and the applicable law and not of wounds that still fester and scars that
have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That phantom did not rise when
the people stood fast at EDSA against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their
freedom.

I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for more than three decades as a
professor of Constitutional Law. These principles have not changed simply because I am now
on the Court or a new administration is in power and the shoe is on the other foot.

Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the Philippines against
the prohibitions of the government then, Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and
the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son
returning, and tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels of every stripe.

I vote to grant the petition.

Villavicencio v. Lukban., 39 Phil.., 778 , March 25, 1919 (supra)

Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851, January 1, 1949 (supra)
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149, May 30, 1986
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the
trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then
Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon
and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief
of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad.
There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other
person in his behalf.

Silverio v. CA, 195 SCRA 760, April 8, 1991

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.

More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioners passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Courts finding that since the filing of the Information, the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this
Court. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by
the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power
of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro., 39 Phil.., 660 , March 07, 1919

(supra)
Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)
Rockwell Kent wanted to travel to England to attend a meeting of the World Council of Peace
in Helsinki, Finland. He was denied a passport because he was allegedly a Communist and
was alleged to have "a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line."
Kent sued in U.S. District Court for declaratory relief. The District Court granted summary
judgment against him.

On appeal, Kent's case was heard with that of Dr. Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist. When Briehl
applied for a passport, the Director of the Passport Office asked him to supply an affidavit
with respect to his membership in the Communist Party. Briehl, like Kent, refused. His
application for a passport was tentatively disapproved. Briehl filed his complaint in the
District Court, which held that his case was indistinguishable from Kent's and dismissed it.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard the two cases en banc
and affirmed the District Court by a divided vote. 101 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 239, 248 F.2d 600,
561.

HELD: The cases were heard on writ of certiorari. 355 U.S. 881. The Court reversed the Court
of Appeals. Kent v Dulles was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. It did not decide the extent to which this liberty
right can be curtailed. The Court was first concerned with the extent, if any, to which
Congress had authorized its curtailment by the U.S. Secretary of State. The Court found that
the Secretary of State exceeded his authority by refusing to issue passports to Communists.

It did not rule on the constitutionality of the law because the only law which Congress had
passed expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across U.S. borders had yet to take
effect. Six years later, the Court in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,[2] found that the law
violated First Amendment principles and left unsettled the extent to which this liberty right
to travel can be curtailed.

Majority Opinion[edit]
In a majority opinion written by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court reviewed the history
of the issuance and regulation of U.S. passports, noting that the passport is "a document
which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a
request that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely, and is to be considered rather in the
character of a political document by which the bearer is recognized in foreign countries as an
American citizen" citing Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 9 Pet. 692, 699 (1835) and that except in
wartime "for most of our history, a passport was not a condition to entry or exit" concluding
that the issuance of passports is "a discretionary act" on the part of the Secretary of State.

The Court then surveyed Angevin law under the Magna Carta, citing Article 42 in support of
the right to travel as a "liberty" right. It referenced Chafee in Three Human Rights in the
Constitution of 1787. At that point the Court began to use the phrase "freedom of movement"
as in "Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values," citing Crandall v. Nevada, 6
Wall. 35, 44; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 and
Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13-14, although all the cases it cited involved
interstate travel. The Court concluded that although "Freedom to travel is, indeed, an
important aspect of the citizen's liberty" it need not decide the extent to which it can be
curtailed because it was first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress had
authorized its curtailment.

It reviewed prior administrative practice, noting that the power of the Secretary of State over
the issuance of passports is expressed in broad terms, but long exercised quite narrowly.
Historically, the cases of refusal of passports generally fell into two categories. First was the
question pertinent to the citizenship of the applicant and his allegiance to the United States.
Second was the question whether the applicant was participating in illegal conduct, trying to
escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct
which would violate the laws of the United States. It considered wartime measures, citing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, for the proposition that the government could
exclude citizens from their homes and restrict their freedom of movement only on a showing
of "the gravest imminent danger to the public safety." It found that although there were
scattered rulings of the State Department concerning Communists, they were not
consistently of one pattern.

The Court concluded that although the issuance of a passport carries some implication of
intention to extend the bearer diplomatic protection, its crucial function is control over exit
and that the right of exit is a personal right included within the word "liberty" as used in the
Fifth Amendment. It found that when that power is delegated, the standards must be
adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests, citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 420-430. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307; and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 and that where activities or enjoyment natural and often necessary to the
wellbeing of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, the Court will construe
narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. Consequently, it found that 1185
and 211a did not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority exercised in this case.

Mansour Ahani v. Canada, Communication No. 1051/2002

Mansour Ahani entered Canada in 1991, claiming Convention refugee status. In 1993, the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration filed a security certificate for Ahani's deportation
on the basis of a report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). CSIS claimed
to have obtained evidence that Ahani was a trained assassin operating with the Ministry of
Intelligence and National Security of Iran (MOIS). Ahani admitted to an association with
MOIS and having received military training, however he denied that he was an assassin.
Ahani argued that he would likely face torture if deported to Iran, and that deportation
under this circumstance would be a violation of fundamental justice, a right guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

HELD: As in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Court ruled
that when a refugee establishes a prima facie case that deportation may lead to torture, they
are entitled to a higher degree of procedural protections than the Immigration Act stipulates.
[1] In particular, the appellant has a right to know the full case against him, and to be given a
full opportunity to respond in writing. The appellant must be given the opportunity to rebut
claims and evidence and to produce their own evidence. Finally, the appellant has the right
to receive written reasons for a decision of the Minister.

In this case, the court ruled that the requirements of procedural fairness had been met. This
result differs from the Suresh case, where the Court ruled that procedural fairness
requirements had not been met, and ordered a new hearing. Ruling unanimously, the Court
concluded:

We are satisfied that Ahani was fully informed of the Minister's case against him and given a
full opportunity to respond. Insofar as the procedures followed may not have precisely
complied with those we suggest in Suresh, we are satisfied that this did not prejudice him.
We conclude that the process accorded to Ahani was consistent with the principles of
fundamental justice, and would reject this ground of appeal.[2]

D. Freedom to Participate in Public Affairs

1987 Phil. Consti., Article 5, Section 1
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

UDHR, Article 21
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

ICCPR, Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 210 , January

21, 2015 (J. Brion Separate Opinion)
E. Right to Information
1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Section 7
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

UDHR, Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.

ICCPR, Article 19 (2)

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

CRC, Article 13
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's
choice.

2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such
as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health
or morals.