JOHN TURNBULL

5/1/17
PRESENTATION HANDOUT, ENGL 620: SEMANTICS (SPRING 2017)

NOTES ON PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND FAITH

PUSHING THE LIMITS OF SEMANTICS?

Word cloud for faith in Islam (Bedford 2012, 13)

WHAT ARE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE PREDICATES?

Usually verbs also adjectives that express thoughts: think, believe, know, hope, etc. (Kearns 2011, 134)

1. Betty thinks [that the White House is a den of thieves].

2. Pope Francis believes [that G*d created heaven and earth].

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE PREDICATES?

Philosopher William van Orman Quine (19082000) (photo at right), Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes (1956) shock, horror! The Principle of Substitutivity (see
Kearns 2011, 135) does not work in two opaque contexts: (a) modal contexts and (b) those
involving propositional attitude predicates.
Sentences 1 and 2 above: [T]he bracketed parts describe some sort of mental contents [of
Betty and the pope] rather than describing some situation out in the world (Kearns 2011,
137).
With apologies to Quine (1956, 179), consider this scenario:
There is a certain boy with red hair whom John has encountered several times sitting nearby in
ninth-grade geometry class; John thinks he is a drug user. Also there is a kid in a Baltimore
Orioles cap, known to John as a good athlete, whom John only met once when they wrestled in
Mr. Doughertys gym class. Now John does not know it, but the boys are the same person.

In addition, John knows the kid that he wrestled by name, as Mike Watts. John says that the boy
he wrestled is no drug user. Therefore:

3. Mike Watts = the boy with red hair = the kid John wrestled true

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 JOHN TURNBULL
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PRESENTATION HANDOUT, ENGL 620: SEMANTICS (SPRING 2017)

4. John believes [that Watts is a drug user]. false

5. John believes [that the boy with red hair is a drug user]. true
6. John believes [that the kid John wrestled is a drug user]. false

The change in single definite, same-referring NPs produces a change in truth value (Kearns 2011, 138).
Another friend of Johns, Howard, could say, Guess what? John thinks that Mike Watts takes drugs!
7. John believes that the kid John wrestled is a drug user.
de dicto (about the words) narrow scope, false
BELIEVE(j, [The x: KID HE WRESTLED(x)] DRUG USER(x))
John believes the guy he wrestled is a drug user.

de re (about the thing) wider scope, true

[The x: KID HE WRESTLED(x)] BELIEVE(j, DRUG USER(x))
You know the kid John wrestled, Mike Watts John thinks hes a drug user.

Kearns summarizes: [P]ropositional attitude reports contain embedded sentences which denote mental
concerns. Our system of semantic representation, on the other hand, uses symbols which denote things
and situations in reality and possible realities, not conceptual representations in a thinkers mind. (147)

BARBARA PARTEE ON PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

[F]ormal semantics has some internal inadequacies especially with regard to the semantics of
propositional attitudes (Partee 1982, 87). She contrasts the formal semantics of Richard Montague
(193071) with psychological semantics (Chomsky et al.), which aims to model psychological
processes when a sentence is produced or understood (92). Consider two logically equivalent
statements:
8. John believes that God created the world. therefore
9. John believes that the world is Gods creation.
For formal semantics, as represented by Montague, the logic is valid. Partee: There is no evidence that two
belief sentences, in which the embedded sentences differ, can be linked to same mental construct. The
differences in 8 and 9 lead to non-entailment. Semantic competence is recognizing valid
entailments.
To make 8 and 9 entail each other, formal (mathematic) semantics must make simplifying assumptions,
assuming a closed world, a fixed universal set of semantic primitives. (102)
[W]e would be limiting ourselves to the description of the language of creatures or machines whose
minds are much more narrowly and rigidly circumscribed than those of humans (103). Need to reconcile
formal and psychological approaches.

THE SEMANTICS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

Modern biblical theologys fear and dislike of the proposition. In [biblical theologys] reserved attitude
to any psychological treatment of religious thought it has paid insufficient attention to that frontier of
linguistics and psychology which is seen in the relation between any word and the mental reality or
concept corresponding to it. . . . (Barr 2004 [1961], 246, emphasis added)
For discussion: What are the semantic differences between believe that and believe in? Can semantics
offer an adequate account of religious belief? Can we say, There is no faith without language?

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PRESENTATION HANDOUT, ENGL 620: SEMANTICS (SPRING 2017)

SOURCES

Barr, James. 2004 [1961]. The Semantics of Biblical Language. Repr., Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock.

Bedford, Denise A. D. 2012. Visual Exploration of the Semantic Markers of Faith. Advances in the Study
of Information and Religion 2, art. 1:120.

Kearns, Kate. 2011. Semantics. 2d ed. Modern Linguistics Series. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Partee, Barbara Hall. 1996. SemanticsMathematics or Psychology? Pp. 88100 in Readings in

Language and Mind, ed. Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

. 1982. Belief-Sentences and the Limits of Semantics. Pp. 87106 in Processes, Beliefs, and
Questions: Essays on Formal Semantics of Natural Language and Natural Language
Processing, ed. Stanley Peters and Esa Saarinen. Synthese Language Library: Texts and Studies in
Linguistics and Philosophy 16. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel.

Quine, W. V. 1956. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 5
(March):17787.