Chapter 6: Adjudicatory Power
investigate and prosecute all dollar salting
46. THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING
TASK FORCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83578. March 16, 1989
FACTS: The State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is
assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of
convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160 and 161 against the private respondents. The application
for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty.
Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a
deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the
said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an
operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said
Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the
purported deposition to support the application for the
issuance of the 6 search warrants involved in this case. Shortly
thereafter, the private respondent went to the Regional Trial
Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search
warrants in question. The trial court then issued a temporary
restraining order and set the case for hearing on March 18,
1985. The lower court declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157,
158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest. Appellate Court held that petitioner is a
special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated
under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations
defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. Further, the
petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with
the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had
no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null
and void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force a quasi-judicial body and it is one co-
equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial
Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's
jurisdiction; and
2. Whether or not such presidential body be said to be
"such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973
Constitution.
HELD:
1. No. A quasi-judicial body has been de ned as "an
organ of government other than a court and other than
a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making." It
is the basic function of quasi-judicial bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and
unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the
proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality
and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court
that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-
judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims
and execute its judgments.
The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force has the
following powers and authority:
a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to
activities, including the overvaluation of
imports and the undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons or
issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of
such books, papers, contracts, records,
statements of accounts, agreements, and
other as may be necessary in the conduct of
investigation;
c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants,
state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and
hearing officers to assist the Task Force in
the discharge of its duties and
responsibilities; gather data, information or
documents; conduct hearings, receive
evidence, oath oral and documentary, in all
cases involving violation of foreign
exchange laws or regulations; and submit
reports containing findings and
recommendations for consideration of
appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with
the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court; and To adopt such
measures and take such actions as may be
necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
"f. After due investigation but prior to the filing
of the appropriate criminal charges with the
fiscal's office or the courts as the case may
be, to impose a fine and/or administrative
sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon
any person found committing or to have
committed acts constituting blackmarketing
or salting abroad of foreign exchange,
provided said person voluntarily admits the
facts and circumstances constituting the
offense and presents proof that the foreign
exchange retained abroad has already been
brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted
against said person before any other judicial regulatory or
administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman
of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in
Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign
exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials,
uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits,
interest rates and such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain
Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be
entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be
no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty
percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the
general funds of the National government. The amount of the
fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its
Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the
Task Force."
The Court sees nothing in the provisions (except with respect
to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will
reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial
responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential
Decree No. 1883. As the President's arm called upon to
combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and
salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. It
cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional
Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would
demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
No. It must be observed that under the present Constitution,
the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it
was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions
conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon
an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been
at best controversial. In a case decided by the Court, the
"responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law
should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge." The Court agree that the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to
be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence
of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success
of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and
his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed,
warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his
own right, when he is neither. That makes Presidential Decree
No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional.
47. Cojuangco vs PCGG
G.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990
Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor
General to prosecute all persons involved in the
misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above
directive the Solicitor General created a task force to
conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement
of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy
funds.
the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints
with respondent PCGG
The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor
Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation
At the scheduled preliminary investigation on
January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through
counsel. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as
required in the subpoena, he filed two motions
addressed to the PCGG, namely; (1) a motion to
disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to
dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear
or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit
PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss.
Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and
declared the proceedings closed and the cases
submitted for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner
requested the PCGG to resolve directly his aforesaid
motion
The PCGG issued an order denying petitioner's
motions and required him, together with all the
respondents in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-
affidavits within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Petitioner did not submit the required counter-
affidavit.
He filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the herein
petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.
He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a
preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by
the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's
rights to due process and equal protection of the law,
and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such
preliminary investigation.
On May 4, 1990 petitioner filed a reply to the
consolidated comment as required by the Court. In a
resolution dated June 5, 1990, the Solicitor General
was required to file a rejoinder. On May 31, 1990, a
motion for hearing of said cases was filed by
petitioner and this was granted by the Court on June
21, 1990. It was directed that the Ombudsman be
impleaded as party-respondent. The Court required
the Ombudsman to comment on the petition within
ten (10) days from notice. The case was set for
hearing on Tuesday, July 17, 1990 at 10:00 in the
morning.
The Ombudsman submitted his comment on July 3,
1990 and the Court required petitioner to file a reply
to the same.
On July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
a Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they
ask that the PCGG desist from further proceeding
with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75,
77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the
intervenors and other respondents, including
petitioner, with violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in
connection with the, coconut levy funds. The
intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the said cases.
They maintain that even assuming that the PCGG has
such authority, the same cannot be delegated to a
prosecutor or his assistants.
Issue:
whether under the circumstances of this case, it would be fair
and just for the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the said complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other
duly authorized investigating agency.
Held:
Upon the creation of the PCGG under Executive
Order No. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG
was charged with the task of assisting the President
not only in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth or
unexplained wealth accumulated by the former
President, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates but also in the
investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as
the President may assign to the Commission from
 time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the
future.
From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that
the PCGG has the following powers and authority:
o 1. To conduct an investigation including the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of
the ill-gotten wealth cases of former
President Marcos, relatives and associates,
and graft and corruption cases assigned by
the President to it;
o 2. Issue sequestration orders in relation to
property claimed to be ill-gotten;
o 3. Issue "freeze orders" prohibiting persons
in possession of property alleged to be ill-
gotten from transferring or otherwise
disposing of the same;
o 4. Issue provisional takeover orders of the
said property;
o 5. Administer oaths and issue subpoenas in
the conduct of its investigation;
o 6. Hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties as provided by the rules.
Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested
with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1)
sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional
takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of
attachment and receivership, there exists a prima
facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration
order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and
fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its
negation or nullification. Both are assured under the
foregoing executive orders and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
Insofar as the general power of investigation vested
in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided into two
stages. The first stage of investigation which is called
the criminal investigation stage is the fact-finding
inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence
and interview witnesses after which they assess the
evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the
complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation. The second stage is the preliminary
investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this
stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if
there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that
the PCGG conducted the appropriate criminal
investigation of petitioner and intervenors as a law
enforcer. In the process it sequestered all the
properties of the petitioner after a prima facie finding
that the same amount to ill-gotten wealth and/or were
acquired in relation to allegedly anomalous
disposition or misuse of the coconut levy funds.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that
in earlier instances, the PCGG had already found
a prima facie case against the petitioner and
intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the
freeze order of the properties of petitioner. Thereafter,
acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the
Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the evidence
and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the
aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the
Solicitor General filed a series of criminal
complaints.
It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such
preliminary investigation the PCGG could even make
a turn about and take a position contradictory to its
earlier findings of a prima facie case against
petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated in
the undue haste with which I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 was
investigated and the informations were filed in court
even as the petitioner and intervenors questioned its
authority, invoked the denial of due process and
promptly informed the PCGG of the filing of this
petition.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a
prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having
gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a
law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration
and freeze orders against petitioner's properties, it
was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the
same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation
to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus,
the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly
conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge," as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the
fact that there are many suits filed by petitioner and
the intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.
48. Santiago Jr. v Bautista
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2
days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the
invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a
Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who
composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed
a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even
assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc
the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there
was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the
Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising
judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy
against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for
an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial
functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of
persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to
pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign
which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the
legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties
are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:
as authority to determine the rights of persons or
property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to
hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or
the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and
determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of
its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board
clothed with power and authority to determine
4 9 . S m a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , I n c . v. N a t i o n a l
Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
G.R. No. 151908; August 12, 2003
Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers,
the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.
The NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular
mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone units, by requiring presentation and
verification of identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card
customers, deny acceptance of customers using stolen units
registered to somebody other than the applicant, share all
information of stolen cellphone units, and require registration
and identification cards from the customers. This was followed
by another memorandum stating that all prepaid cards sol on
October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years
from the date of first use.
Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
Pilipino Telephone Corp filed against the NTC and its
commissioners an action for the declaration of nullity of the
NTC memorandums, with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before
the RTC.
They alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call
cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of
Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines;
that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
of property without due process of law; that the Circular will
result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular
service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the
Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Thereafter,
Globe and Smart filed their intervention which was granted. A
TRO was issued enjoining NTC from implementing the
memorandums. The NTCs motion for reconsideration and
motion to dismiss were denied by the RTC.
NTC filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA, which annulled the decision of the
RTC. Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied.
Hence this instant petition for review filed by Smart , Piltel,
Globe, and Islacom.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the action
for declaration of nullity for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Ruling:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to
what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are
subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-
making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion
in a judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In
Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine
Coconut Authority, it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before a party may
seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by
the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application
here. The resolution in question was issued
by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-
making or legislative power. However, only
judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise
of their quasi-judicial function is subject to
the exhaustion doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the
records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this
requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages
leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the
proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective
position papers setting forth their objections and submitting
proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was
issued, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the
suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing
Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6,
2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed
Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing
Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the
requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting
them to seek judicial relief.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies only where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer
the same to an administrative agency of special competence
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts
will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises
of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the
claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional
trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which
includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of the
memorandums was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking
the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v.
Lim, it was held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
Section 187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion
of their conformity to the fundamental law.
Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
even as the accused in a criminal action has the right
to question in his defense the constitutionality of a
law he is charged with violating and of the
proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

50. PEDRO GUERZON, petitioner, vs. CA, BUREAU OF
ENERGY UTILIZATION, F. C. CAASI JR., and
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
respondents
G.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner executed with Shell, a "Service Station Lease"
contract for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's
properties, facilities and equipment for a period of 5 years.
Petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a
"Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of
respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the
leased service station. Respondent Bureau of Energy
Utilization approved the Dealer's Sales Contract pursuant to
which petitioner was appointed dealer of SHELL's gasoline
and other petroleum products which he was to sell at a
gasoline station. Respondent BEU issued a certificate of
authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of
validity, in line with the terms of the contract.
The Service Station Lease Contract provides that the
cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract shall
automatically cancel this Lease.
Respondent SHELL informed petitioner that the Company was
not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract together with the
service station lease and reminding him to take appropriate
steps to wind up his business activities at the station and, on
the appropriate date to hand over the station with all its
facilities and equipment. A copy of this letter was furnished
BEU.
BEU, through Caasi, Jr., officer- in-charge of its Mindanao
Division Office, issued an order directing the petitioner to
1)immediately vacate the service station and turn it over to
Shell; and 2) show cause, within ten (10) days from
receipt, why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings
shall be instituted against him.
Pursuant to the order, SHELL, accompanied by law
enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the
gasoline station in question together with the equipments and
accessories, and turned them over to the control of the
personnel of SHELL who accompanied them.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint to annul the order of
respondent Caasi, Jr., but this complaint was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body
of equivalent category as the RTC.
Thus, petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against Shell ,
Caasi, Jr. and the BEU seeking the annulment of the order and
the restoration to petitioner of possession of the service station
and the equipment removed therefrom. The CA dismissed the
petition after holding the disputed order valid and the
proceedings undertaken to implement the same sanctioned by
PD 1206.
ISSUE: WON the Bureau of Energy Utilization, the agency
charged with regulating the operations and trade practices of
the petroleum industry, has the power to order a service station
operator-lessee to vacate the service station and to turn over its
possession to the oil company-lessor upon the expiration of
the dealership and lease agreements
HELD:
From a cursory reading of the assailed order, it is readily
apparent that the order is premised on petitioner's refusal to
vacate the service station in spite of the expiration and non-
renewal of his dealership and lease agreements with Shell.
Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner had engaged in
illegal trading in petroleum products or had committed any
other violation of B.P. Blg. 33. The order merely makes a
vague reference to a "violation of BEU laws, rules and
regulations," without stating the specific provision violated.
That petitioner had engaged in illegal trading in petroleum
products cannot even be implied from the wording of the
assailed order.
But then, even if petitioner was indeed engaged in illegal
trading in petroleum products, there was no basis under B.P.
Blg. 33 to order him to vacate the service station and to turn it
over to Shell. Illegal trading in petroleum products is a
criminal act wherein the injured party is the State. Shell is not
even alleged by the Solicitor General as a private party
prejudiced and, therefore, it can claim no relief if a criminal
case is instituted.
Even on the assumption that petitioner's continued occupancy
and operation of the service station constituted a violation of a
law or regulation, still the Court has no recourse but to rule
against the legality of the order, the BEU not being
empowered to issue it. Section 7 of PD 1206 is very clear as to
the courses of action that the Bureau may take in case of a
violation or non- compliance with any term or condition of
any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any
of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. The Bureau may:
(1) impose a fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of
failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the
violation or non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or
stoppage of operations of the establishment of the guilty party.
Its authority is limited to these 2 options.
Jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is
vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful
detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in PD 1206 that
would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been
granted to the Bureau. It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof. That issuing the order to vacate was the
most effective way of stopping any illegal trading in petroleum
products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise,
adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless.
Contrary to the Solicitor General's theory, the text of the
assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in
connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute
between Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau, like its
predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no
power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers
and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of
law granting to it such power. As explicitly stated in the law, in
connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the
Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or
non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate,
license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions,
rules or regulations.
Viewed from any angle, Caasi, Jr., in issuing the assailed
order, acted beyond his authority and overstepped the powers
granted by PD 1206, as amended. The order was, therefore,
null and void.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that
National Housing Authority. The National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of
this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled
out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory
authority to the NHA in the following manner:

Even if the issuance of the order to vacate was within the SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the
authority of Caasi, Jr., still its nullity is apparent because of the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
failure to comply with the requirement of notice and hearing. provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
P.D. 1206 requires notice and hearing before any Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
administrative penalty provided may be imposed. and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
51. Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
G.R. No. L-50444, [August 31, 1987], 237 PHIL 389-403 owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
FACTS: statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision from the petitioner broker or salesman.
Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr.
Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory
respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second
Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no
the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of
payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the contracting parties under the law administered by it and under
president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their
respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting
resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No.
15. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October
1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October
1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding
the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all
installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr.
Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public
respondent NHA. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision
on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to
Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's
complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy.

HELD:
NHA was upheld by the SC. It is by now common place
learning that many administrative agencies exercise and
perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a
limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-
judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction,
basically because the need for special competence and
experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution
of questions of complex or specialized character and because
of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular
courts have remained crowded and clogged. |||

Chapter 7: Administrative Proceedings
52. Bantolino vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phils Inc.
GR 153660 June 10, 2003
Facts: 62 employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Inc.
filed a complaint against the latter for unfair labor practice
through illegal dismissal,violation of security of tenure and
the perpetuation of the Cabo System. They alleged that
they perform duties such as helpers, bottle segregators,
and others and that they were employees of the respondent
company to which they were replaced and prevented from
entering. The respondent company on its part, alleged that
they were not their employees and were merely employees
of independent contractors, thus no employer-employee
relationship existed. The respondent company further
alleged that some affidavits of the respondents should not
have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.
Labor Arbiter to which the NLRC affirmed, ruled in favor
of the employees. But upon appeal to the CA, modify such
order wherein it dropped some respondent due to the fact
that some of their affidavits did not undergo any cross-
examination. Now, the respondent filed a petition for the
reversal of the judgment of the CA.
Issue: Are the LA or NLRC bound to the technicalities of
law?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that administrative bodies
like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e.,
by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Under
the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given
the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial
or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even
required as the cases may be decided based on verified
position papers, with supporting documents and their
affidavits.
53. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110571. March 10, 1994
FACTS: The Board of Investments (BOI), in its decision in
BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product
from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually,
oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said BOI decision. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of
Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the
BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to
show cause why no injunction should issue. The respondent
court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own
terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent
court issuing any preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to
Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court
has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the
same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987. However, the same was denied, hence, this instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over the case.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its
Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of
implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing
the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final
orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and
confusing rules of procedure.
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be
validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a
substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise
of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it
seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O.
226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of
the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and
in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court
has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner
appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains
only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive
right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right
to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O.
226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1- 91
simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a
different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It
did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list
of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of
Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular
does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the
BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states
that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeal from final orders or
decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is
now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration
is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . .,"
strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies
which are covered by the Circular but which have not been
expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall
within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the
circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory
orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those
of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the
Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from
which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by
statute. Since in DBP v. CA we upheld the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax
Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the
agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129
is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI
should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but
implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the
BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which
by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of
Appeals.
54. Villa vs Lazaro
G.R. No. 69871 August 24, 1990
Facts:
Anita Villa was granted a building permit to construct
a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in Gen. Santos
City.
In October of that same year, as the funeral parlor
was nearing completion, a suit for injunction was
brought against Villa by Dr. Jesus Veneracion, the
owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, standing about
132.36 meters from the funeral parlor.
After appropriate proceedings and trial, judgment on
the merits was rendered on November 17, 1981,
dismissing Veneracion's complaint as well as the
counterclaim pleaded by Villa. The Trial Court found
that there was a falsified Zoning Ordinance,
containing a provision governing funeral parlors,
which had been submitted to and ratified by the
Ministry of Human Settlements, but that ordinance
had never been passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and that the genuine Zoning Ordinance
of General Santos City contained no prohibition
whatever relative to such parlors' "distance from
hospitals, whether public or private". Villa then
resumed construction of her building and completed
it.
Veneracion did not appeal from this adverse
judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he
brought the matter up with the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with
that commission praying "that the funeral parlor be
relocated because it was near the St. Elizabeth
Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary
locational clearance"
Two months after the rendition of the judgment
against Veneracion, or more precisely on January 22,
1982, Villa received a telegram dated January 21
from Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon of the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
No doubt with no little discomfiture Villa received on
June 2, 1982 a "Show Cause" Order dated April
28,1982, signed by one Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf
of the Commission, requiring her to show cause why
a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-
desist order issued against her for her failure to show
proof of locational clearance
If she thought the affair had thus been satisfactorily
ended, she was sadly in error, of which she was very
shortly made aware. On July 27, 1982, she received
an Order of Commissioner Dizon dated June 29,
1982 imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and
requiring her to cease operations until further orders
from his office
The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied. Her appeals to the Commission,
and subsequently to the Office of the President, were
likewise denied. It must be stressed that neither the
respondent nor the Commission ever made known the
complaint ledged by the respondent to the petitioner
until much later, after the Commissioner has rendered
several adverse rulings against her.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner denied of due process against which
the defense of failure of AV to take timely appeal will not
avail?
HELD:
All of the foregoing translate to a denial of due
process against which the defense of failure to take
timely appeal will not avail. Administrative
proceedings are not exempt from the operation of
certain basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials. And this administrative
process is recognized to include: (a0 the right to
notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution
of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal
right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as
to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the records or disclosed to the
parties affected. And it being clear that some, at least,
of those essential elements did not obtain or were not
present in the proceedings complained of, any
judgment rendered, or order issued, therein was null
and void, could never become final and could be
attacked in any appropriate proceeding.
Also, an earlier judgment on the merits by a
competent court cannot be negated by a result of
administrative proceedings. What the record shows is
that the petitioner responded promptly to orders and
communications sent to her. At any rate, this court
will not permit the result of an administrative
proceeding riddled with serious defects already
pointed out to negate an earlier judgment on the
merits on the same matter regularly rendered by
competent court.
55. Ute Paterok v Bureau of Customs
193 SCRA 132 (1991)
FACTS:
In March 1986, petitioner shipped from Germany to the
Philippines two containers, one with used household goods
and the other two used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one
Mercedes Benz). The first container and the Bourgetti car
were released by the BOC, but not the Mercedes Benz, which
remained in custody of the Bureau.
Petitioner then received a notice of hearing, informing him
that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said
Mercedes Benz. While this case was pending, petitioner
received a letter from the District Collector of Customs,
informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her
Mercedes Benz had been rendered.
Petitioner did not know that the same Mercedes Benz was
subject to two different forfeiture proceedings. He only found
out later that the Notice of Hearing for the forfeiture
proceedings before the District Collector was posted on the
bulletin board of the BOC, at Port Area, Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the posting on the bulletin board of
the public respondent was sufficient compliance with
proper service of notice and procedural due process
Whether or not seizure and forfeiture was proper in
the instant case
HELD:
The Court held that there was no sufficient compliance with
requirement of notice and hearing under the due process
clause. But notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, the Court
ruled that the petition cannot be granted.
The seizure and forfeiture proceedings was based on a
violation of B.P. 73, specifically a law that promotes energy
conservation and prohibits the importation, manufacture or
assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with
engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters.
The Mercedes Benz subject of this case has an engine
displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters, which clearly
falls within the prohibited importation and as such, is liable for
seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.
56. Lumiqued v Exevea
G.R. No. 117565; November 18, 1997
Facts:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of
the Department of Agrarian Reform for Cordillera
Autonomous Region until President Ramos dismissed him
from that position. In view of Lumiqueds death, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
questioning such order.
The dismissal was by reason of 3 affidavit-complaints
filed by the Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeanette
Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The
first complaint charged petitioner with malversation through
falsification official documents through falsified gasoline
receipts. The second complaint accused petitioner with
violation of COA rules and regulations for concealing
unliquidated cash advances. The last complaint charged him
with oppression and harassment, for removing Jeanette as
Regional Cashier without just cause.
Upon referral to the DOJ of the affidavit-complaints,
a committee was created to investigate petitioner, appointing
Regional State Prosecutor Exevea as committee chairman.
Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting, to enable him
to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the
motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the
date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional
hearing, alleging that he suffered a stroke. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently
because the investigation had already been terminated. In an
order, the State Prosecutor denied the motion, since he did not
notify the committee of his confinement and inability to
attend. The Committee rendered a report finding Lumiqued
liable for all the charges against him, and ordered his removal
from office. President Ramos issued the Administrative Order
finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the
alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from
the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
A petition for appeal was addressed to President
Ramos praying for reconsideration of the order, premised on
the fact that Dwight Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-
CAR, confessed to having authored the falsification of
gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner being an honest
man. This was denied. Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration, but during such pendency, he died. Hence, a
petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed praying for the
reversal of the order praying for retirement benefits and
backwages to the heirs, by reason of the investigating
committees failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel
could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in
the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should
have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a
reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own.
If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
Issue:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to
be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Ruling:
No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be
invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any
crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted
by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was
for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed
against him.
While investigations conducted by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests
on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the
option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear
from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act
No. 2260 (Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2,
Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 202 (Administrative Code of
1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was
confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with
the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera
v. Auditor General, the Court said: x x x There is nothing in
the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the
due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act
at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable
than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is
not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as
a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of
law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for
reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.
The constitutional provision on due process
safeguards life, liberty and property. In the early case of
Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal the Court
held that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public
trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right
to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to
due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right
to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the
countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public
officers and employees must serve with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In this case, it has been clearly
shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional
precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for the
charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued
were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief.
Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and
evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the
doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must
be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
57. CASIMIRO vs. TANDOG
Gr 146137 June 8, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Haydee began her service in the government as
assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer. Later, she was
appointed Municipal Assessor.
Administrative Officer II Andres, submitted a report based on
an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the
office of petitioner. The report spoke of an anomalous
cancellation of Tax Declarations in the name of Teodulo
Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of
petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations in
the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new
ones in favor of petitioners brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.
Respondent Mayor issued a Memorandum Order placing
petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty 30 days. 3
days later, Mayor Tandog issued a MO directing petitioner to
answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,
petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming that the
cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother was
done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor,
and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her
brother-in-law by virtue of a deed of sale executed by San
Sebastian in Molina's favor.
A Memorandum Order was issued by respondent Mayor
directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-
complaint of San Sebastian and Matillano. In response,
petitioner submitted a letter stating that with respect to the
complaint of San Sebastian, she had already explained her side
in another letter. As to the complaint of Matillano, she alleged
that it was a certain Barrientos who executed a deed of
absolute sale over the parcel of land subject of the complaint
in favor of her brother.
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding
committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings,
the committee submitted its report recommending petitioners
separation from service.
Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor
issued an Administrative Order dismissing petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the order of
dismissal. Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the CA,
which subsequently affirmed the CSC decision
ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and
substantive due process when she was terminated from her
employment as Municipal Assessor
HELD:
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar,
procedural due process simply means the opportunity to
explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. To be heard does not
mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and
to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing
was conducted which petitioner attended and where she
answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-
finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner
was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed
her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful
evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a
decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the CA. Indeed,
she has even brought the matter to this Court for final
adjudication.
Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality. Bias and
partiality cannot be presumed. In administrative proceedings,
no less than substantial proof is required. Mere allegation is
not equivalent to proof. Mere suspicion of partiality is not
enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as
manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an
extrajudicial source or some other basis. Thus, in the case at
bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members
of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of
one party over the other. In addition to palpable error that may
be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is
required to establish bias. The petitioner miserably failed to
substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty prevails.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners argument that the
affidavit is hearsay because the complainants were never
presented for cross examination. In administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.
Nothing on record shows that she asked for cross examination.
In our view, petitioner cannot argue that she has been deprived
of due process merely because no cross examination took
place. Again, it is well to note that due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner
not only filed her letter-answer, she also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the recommendation of the committee. The
essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain one side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
As to the substantive due process, the assailed decision must
be supported by competent and credible evidence.
The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear
and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action
upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his
participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and
confidence demanded by his position.
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove
petitioners dismissal.
Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service
of herein petitioner:
1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillanos tax
declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of
petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling; and
2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of
complainant Noraida San Sebastian Cesars parent in favor of
petitioners brother-in-law, Marcelo Molina.
IN ALL, we affirm the finding of the CA that petitioner is
guilty of acts of dishonesty.
58. Lozano vs De los Santos
G.R. No. 125221 June 19, 1997
FACTS:
In August 1995, upon the request of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, petitioner Reynaldo M. Lozano and
private respondent Antonio Anda agreed to consolidate their
respective associations and form the Unified Mabalacat-
Angeles Jeepney Operators' and Drivers Association, Inc.
Elections were held on October 29, 1995 and both petitioner
and private respondent ran for president. When petitioner won,
private respondent protested and alleging fraud, refused to
recognize the results of the election. Private respondent also
refused to abide by their agreement and continued collecting
the dues from the members of his association despite several
demands to desist. Petitioner was thus constrained to file the
complaint before Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga to restrain private respondent from
collecting the dues and to order him to pay damages. Private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction was lodged with the
SEC. The MCTC denied the motion. It likewise denied the
motion for reconsideration. Private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC, Branch 58, Angeles City. The
trial court found the dispute to be intracorporate, hence,
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and ordered the MCTC
to dismiss the Civil Case accordingly. It denied
reconsideration, hence this petition. Private respondent raised
the defense of corporation by estoppel thus within SEC
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an intracorporate or partnership
relation between petitioner and private respondent.
HELD:
The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the
light of its nature and function under the law. This jurisdiction
is determined by a concurrence of two elements: (1) the status
or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question
that is the subject of their controversy. There is no
intracorporate nor partnership relation between petitioner and
private respondent. The controversy between them arose out of
their plan to consolidate their respective jeepney drivers' and
operators' associations into a single common association. This
unified association was, however, still a proposal. It had not
been approved by the SEC, neither had its officers and
members submitted their articles of consolidation is
accordance with Sections 78 and 79 of the Corporation Code.
Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of
the members but only upon issuance of the certificate of
consolidation by the SEC. When the SEC, upon processing
and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the
consolidation of the corporations is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Corporation Code and existing laws, it issues
a certificate of consolidation which makes the reorganization
official. The new consolidated corporation comes into
existence and the constituent corporations dissolve and cease
to exist.
The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner and
private respondent belong are duly registered with the SEC,
but these associations are two separate entities. The dispute
between petitioner and private respondent is not within the
KAMAJDA nor the SAMAJODA. It is between members of
separate and distinct associations. Petitioner and private
respondent have no intracorporate relation much less do they
have an intracorporate dispute. The SEC therefore has no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel advanced by private
respondent cannot override jurisdictional requirements.
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and is not subject to the agreement
of the parties. 17 It cannot be acquired through or waived,
enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties;
neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of equity and
is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. It applies when
persons assume to form a corporation and exercise corporate
functions and enter into business relations with third person.
Where there is no third person involved and the conflict arises
only among those assuming the form of a corporation, who
therefore know that it has not been registered, there is no
corporation by estoppel.
59. Globe Telecom vs NTC
GR. 143964 July 26, 2004
Facts:
Globe and private respondent Smart Communications, Inc.
("Smart") are both grantees of valid and subsisting legislative
franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System ("CMTS"), utilizing the
Global System for Mobile Communication ("GSM")
technology. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with
NTC to interconnect Smart's and Globe's GSM networks,
particularly their respective SMS or texting services. The
Complaint arose from the inability of the two leading CMTS
providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged that Globe,
with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart's
request for the interconnection of SMS. NTC rendered its
decision and also declared that both Smart and Globe have
been providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of
Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs
intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure
prior approval from NTC through an administrative process.
Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to
prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. It
reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should
have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions
precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. It also claimed
that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no
authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not
raised as an issue before it at all. Finally, Globe alleged that
the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative
penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was
sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to
due process. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration, Globe elevated the controversy to the
Supreme Court.
Issues: WON NTC acted with due process in levying the fine
against Globe
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that Every party subject to
administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know,
through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of
the objective standards that have to be met. Such rule is
integral to due process, as it protects substantive rights. T
he NTC likewise transgressed due process in many ways. It is
essential to understand that the assailed Order was
promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. the assailed NTC's determination and corresponding
penalty were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions. Therefore, all the requirements of due process
attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the
present case.

First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence.

Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the
decision rendered.
- Our earlier discussion pertained to the lack of clear legal
basis for classifying SMS as VAS, owing to the failure of the
NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations to that effect. The
Court usually accords great respect to the technical findings of
administrative agencies in the fields of their expertise, even if
they are infelicitously worded. However, the above-quoted
"finding" is nothing more than bare assertions, unsupported by
substantial evidence. The Order reveals that no deep inquiry
was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning
entails. In fact, the Court is unable to find how exactly does
SMS "fits into a nicety" with NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95, which
defines "enhanced services" as analogous to "format, media
conversion, encryption, enhanced security features, computer
processing, and the like."

Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present

evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and the
prior approval.
-the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of
the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority
was at all an issue for consideration. As a result, neither Globe
or Smart was afforded an opportunity to present evidence in
their behalf on that point.

Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due

process.
-The Court is convinced that prior to the promulgation of the
assailed Order Globe was never notified that its authority to
operate SMS was put in issue. There is an established
procedure within NTC that provides for the steps that should
be undertaken before an entity such as Globe could be
subjected to a disciplinary measure. In this case, NTC
blindsided Globe with a punitive measure for a reason Globe
was not made aware of, and in a manner that contravened
express provisions of law. Consequently, the fine imposed by
NTC on Globe is also invalid. Otherwise put, since the very
basis for the fine was invalidly laid, the fine is necessarily
void.

Chapter 8: Judicial Review of Admin Bodies
60. VILLAFLOR vs. CA
G.R. No. 95694. October 9, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a sales application with the Bureau of
Lands covering a tract of public lands consisting of 140
hectares. In paragraph 6 thereof, he recognized that the land is
of public domain. Petitioner then entered into a Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights in favor of private respondent in
consideration of P5,000. On the same day, private respondent
filed a sales application over two parcels of land which was
correspondingly awarded the following day. Petitioner
protested the sales application of private respondent claiming
ownership, and claiming that it has not paid the P5,000
provided for in the deed. The Director of Lands, however,
found that petitioner was paid the stipulated amount, the same
being part of the administrative process in the disposition of
the land in question, that his sales application was rejected for
leasing the same to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto and that he recognized the public
character of the land in his application and relinquished any
and all rights he may have by virtue of continuous occupation
and cultivation thereon. The same was affirmed by the
Minister of Natural Resources.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for Declaration of
Nullity (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of
Possession and Damages, at about the same time he appealed
the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources at to the
Office of the President. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, which on appeal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals Hence, this recourse, petitioner assailing the findings
of the Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to
acquire public lands.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in adopting or relying on
the factual findings of the Bureau of Lands, especially those
affirmed by the Minister (now Secretary) of Natural Resources
and the trial court?
HELD:
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to
apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the
question involved is also judicial in character. It applies
"where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view."
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian dispute
over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System vs. Vasquez, the Court recognized that the
MWSS was in the best position to evaluate and to decide
which bid for a waterworks project was compatible with its
development plan.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the questions
on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual
qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales
application require a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to
determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior
judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside
even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative
agency.
The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and
the minister of natural resources over the issues regarding the
identity of the disputed land and the qualification of an
awardee of a sales patent is established by Sections 3 and 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act.
Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the
factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of
Natural Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact
in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts.
The findings of fact of an administrative agency, such as the
Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources, must
be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even, if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant. By reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts.
61. Commissioner of Customs vs Navarro
G.R. No. L-33146. May 31, 1977
FACTS:
The stress, and rightly so, by the Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs in their
exhaustive and scholarly petition for certiorari was on
the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set
aside in order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for
by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic
Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh
fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with
the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified
as non-essential consumer commodities, they were
banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and
295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary
 to law and thus made subject to forfeiture
proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs
pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
Petitioners pointed out that seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, which, as held in a number of decisions,
was a matter falling within the exclusive competence
of the customs authorities.
SC required respondents to file an answer and at the
same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by petitioners to prevent the challenged
order of respondent Judge from being implemented.
Instead of preparing an answer, they just submitted a
manifestation stating that after an intensive and
serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents
have decided to abandon its interest in the case. The
rationale behind such a move was ostensibly the
desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the
fact that the shipments, being perishable, have
already deteriorated.
ISSUE:
Who has jurisdiction over the confiscated goods?
HELD:
The Commission of Customs.
That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is
exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia. This
Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon,
realistically observed: This original jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an
action for recovery of personal property which is a
subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of
Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render
futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The court
should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs. Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice
Zaldivar in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals,
promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to
Government v. Gale, 26 a 1913 decision, where there
was a recognition in the opinion of Justice Carson
that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture
proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the
law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions touching the forfeiture and
further disposition of the subject matter of such
proceedings.
The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce
Enrile v. Vinuya, 28 decided in 1971. Thus: The
prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction
in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector
of Customs precludes a court of first instance from
assuming cognizance over such a matter.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of
the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection
with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes
of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to
the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then
would the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction over the
goods in question after the Collector of Customs had
issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as
respondents contend, that the issuance of said
warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent
Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not
acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when
the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so
there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not
having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had
no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
62. Centeno v Centeno
343 SCRA 153
Respondent is the owner of two (2) parcels of riceland with an
area of 1,200 sqm and 2,862 sqm situated at Cofradia, Sta.
Isabel, Malolos, Bulacan. The said parcels of land were the
subject of an earlier case filed by respondent against
petitioners before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
for cancellation of certificates of land transfer (CLT). In said
case, it was established that petitioners, through fraud and
misrepresentation, obtained CLTs in their names. On
November 15, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of
Agrarian Reform issued an order directing the recall and
cancellation of petitioners' CLTs. The aforesaid order was
affirmed by the Office of the President in its decision dated
July 8, 1987, which had become final and executory. The
instant case has its roots in a complaint filed by herein
respondent Ignacia Centeno with the DARAB for
"Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and
Damages." Respondent alleged that, despite the decision of the
DAR recognizing her ownership over Lot Nos. 111 and 122,
as affirmed by the Office of the President, herein petitioners
Cipriano Centeno, Leonila Calonzo and Ramona Adriano have
interfered with and prevented respondent from exercising acts
of possession over the landholdings earlier adjudicated to her
and kept on harassing, molesting and disturbing her peaceful
possession as well as the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, to her
great damage and prejudice. She prayed that petitioners be
restrained from committing acts tending to deprive respondent
of her possession, and that they be ordered to vacate the
premises.petitioners insisted that they are better entitled to the
possession of the lots in dispute, having been allegedly in long
possession thereof, with their houses thereon. On the other
hand, the award of said lots to respondent is unauthorized, not
only because she has no possession thereof but also because
she has other landholdings in the locality. They averred that
the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action
and for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the DARAB over the
case.
On April 14, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a
decision, after hearing, favorably to respondent, adverting to
the decision of the DAR. Not satisfied with the decision of the
DARAB, herein petitioners filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision
affirming the decision of the DARAB.
Issue: Does DaR have jurisdiction over the case or one for
recovery of possession which falls under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts?
Held:
The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program.
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the present case
for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of
the suit for cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners
before the DARAB. That previous case culminated in a
decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of the
subject landholdings under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. The case at bar is for the maintenance of her
peaceful possession of the premises and to prevent the
petitioners from further harassing her and disturbing her
possession and enjoyment thereof. Hence, the appellate court
was correct in holding that the present case is an incident
flowing from the earlier decision of the administrative agency
involving the same parties and relating to the same lands.
63. Nuesa v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132048. March 6, 2002.
Facts:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order
of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over 2 parcels of
agricultural land in Bulacan. After 21 years, private respondent
filed an application with the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots
claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in
the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of
protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the
manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had
been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the
same.3 Petitioner had filed his own application for said parcels
in opposition to that of private respondent.
A representative of the DAR undertook an
investigation to look into the conflicting claims, finding that
Jose Verdillo violated the terms and conditions of the Order of
Award, since several persons tenanted the property for almost
16 years. The Regional Director of DAR ordered the
cancellation of the award in favor of Verdillo and allowed the
application of Rivera for purchase to be processed.
Aggrieved by the cancellation of his award, private
respondent then filed, a Petition with the Provincial
Adjudication Board, for Annulment of said Order. Instead of
filing an Answer to the Petition, herein petitioners (as
respondents below) filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal to the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform from the
Order of the Regional Director, under DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 5-87, and not by a Petition with the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator, hence, the aforesaid Order had become
final and executory. The petitioners manifested that they were
no longer submitting their position paper and were opting to
rely solely on their Motion to Dismiss.
The DARAB provincial Adjudicator, however, chose
to resolve the case on the merits and promulgated a decision
denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and reversing the
order of the Regional Director.
Petitioner Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration
from said Decision, but it was denied by the Provincial
Adjudicator. He then appealed before the DAR Appellate
Adjudication Board (DARAB), but it affirmed the decision of
the Adjudicator.
The Petition for Review filed by herein petitioners
with the CA was denied due course and ordered dismissed,
with costs against petitioner Rivera.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioners
claim that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Yes. P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the
administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the
tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
including: x x x (5) issuance, recall or can cellation of
certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of
P.D. No. 816. The revocation by the Regional Director of
DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of
Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the
DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of
adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning
the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the
case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity
to present his case.
As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, the
DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. The
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations. Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP
Law), agrarian dispute is defined to include (d) . . . any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent
had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between
them within the ambit of the abovecited provision.
Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private
respondents petition in the first place.
While it bears emphasizing that findings of
administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care
should be taken that administrative actions are not done
without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the
enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had
overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the
controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent
Verdillo as to who should be awarded the lots of the
Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARABs unjustified action taken with grave abuse
of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
64. REGIONAL DIRECTOR vs. CA
G.R. No. 110193 January 27, 1994
FACTS:
Private respondents, together with other Negros Oriental
public school teachers held a mass action, or a strike from
their school classes, to demand the release of their salaries by
the Department of Budget.
A return-to-work order was promptly issued by one of the
petitioners, Regional Director Gomez of the DECS, with a
warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to
resume their classes within 24 hours, administrative charges
would be filed. Since the order was not heeded, administrative
complaints against the teachers concerned were filed. The
teachers were each given 5 days from receipt of said
complaints within which to submit their respective answers
and supporting documents. An investigation panel, composed
of three DECS lawyers (the other petitioners herein), was
constituted to look into the case.
Prior to the start of the hearings by the DECS Investigating
Team, private respondents filed with the RTC, a complaint for
injunction, prohibition and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction. The court a quo issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.
The petitioners filed their answer, later followed by a motion
to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set
the case for pre-trial hearing, holding that the complaint stated
a cause of action and that the court had jurisdiction.
The pre-trail, however, was pre-empted by the petitioners
when they filed with the SC a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. The Court referred the petition to
the CA which denied the petition.
ISSUE: WON the seeking of the dismissal of the complaint
filed by school teachers is proper
HELD:
There we have ruled that it has indeed been precipitate for the
DECS officials to seek the dismissal of the complaints filed in
court by the school teachers even as no restraining order could
lawfully issue against the continuation of the administrative
investigations. This Court has rationalized, thus
(1) There being no dispute that the root of the cases filed
before the court a quo deals on the performance of official
functions by the DECS officials, there cannot be a full
determination on whether the actions taken by them have been
proper or improper, or whether they have acted in good faith
or bad faith, pending a full hearing that would give all the
parties a chance to ventilate their respective claims;
(2) Public officials are not necessarily immune from
damages in their personal capacities arising from acts done in
bad faith, for if malice is indeed established, public officials
can no longer be said to have acted within the scope of official
authority so as to still find protection under the mantle of
immunity for official actions;
(3) The issuance, however, of the restraining orders by
the lower court against further proceedings of the
administrative complaints is inappropriate inasmuch as the
authority of the DECS Regional Director to issue the return to
work memorandum, to initiate the administrative charges, as
well as to constitute the investigating panel, can hardly be
disputed; and
(4) The court cases and the administrative matters being
closely interrelated, if not interlinked, it behooves the court, in
the interest of good order and conformably with the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases
before it pending the final outcome of the administrative
charges.
65. Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan,
G.R. No. 139492, [November 19, 2002], 440 PHIL 734-743
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region
IV, conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna
CATV Network, Inc. After the summary investigation,
Regional Director Alex E. Maraan directed Laguna CATV to
pay the concerned employees of their unpaid claims. Laguna
CATV filed a motion for reconsideration. However, for failure
of Laguna CATV to comply with the aforementioned Order,
Director Maraan issued a writ of execution. The sheriff levied
the L300 van and garnished the bank deposits of Dr.
Bernardino Bailon as owner of Laguna CATV. Laguna CATV
and Dr. Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
notice of levy and sale on execution. But it was denied by
Director Maraan on the ground that Laguna CATV failed to
perfect its appeal and the writ of execution should be
considered as an "overt denial" of Laguna CATV's motion for
reconsideration. Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor,
Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review. Laguna CATV
was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor
"would be an exercise in futility considering that the said
appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely
be disapproved." Consequently, it was dismissed by the
appellate court for reasons, among others, for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, Laguna CATV filed
the instant petition.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. As provided
under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order
issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary
of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should
have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing
with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to
file a petition for review.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies
have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
HELD:
The SC ruled that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies. As provided under Article 128 of the
Labor Code, as amended, an order issued by the duly
authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may be
appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have first
appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the
Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies
have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy. As
succinctly explained by this Court in Carale vs. Abarintos: "It
(the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies)
ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary
sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly
within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance
of interference with functions of the administrative agency by
withholding judicial action until the administrative process
had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the
courts by a resort to them in the first instance."
The SC, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the courts judicial power can be sought.
The party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief
but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency
an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance
to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.
Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative
process by appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of
Labor.
66. Corpus vs Cuaderno
GR. L-17860 March 30, 1962
Facts: Petitioner Marino Corpus was holding the position
of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of
the Philippines before he was administrative charged for
alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or
abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred
against him by employees of the Bank. He was then
subjected to a 3-man committee investigation wherein the
latter found no basis for recommending disciplinary
action. Unable to agree with the committee report, the
Monetary Board adopted Resolution No 957 considered
Corpus as resigned as of the date of his suspension and
thereafter appointed Mario Marcos to the position
involved. On Aug, 18, 1959 petitioner filed a petitioner for
certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, against the
herein respondents.
Issue: WON petitioner violated the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedy
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where, by the terms or implications of the statute
authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is
permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the
legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even
though the administrative remedy has not been
exhausted. In the case at bar, (1)There is no law requiring
an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. The
fact that the President had, in two instances cited in the
orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be
regarded as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts
of condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. (2)
While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law
regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service
and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the
petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his
status and the Charter of the Central Bank.
67. MADRIGAL vs. LECAROZ
G.R. No. L-46218. October 23, 1990.
FACTS:
Governor Aristeo Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso
Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members
Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe (public respondents)
abolished petitioner-appellant Joventino Madrigal's position as
a permanent construction capataz in the office of the
Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads and Bridges Fund
Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution No.
204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial
condition of the province and it appearing that his position was
not essential.
Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission.
He then transmitted a follow-up letter to the Commission
regarding his appeal. Consequently, the Commission in its 1st
Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the
service illegal. Public respondent Governor Lecaroz moved for
a reconsideration of said resolution which was denied.
Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board
requesting implementation of the resolution of the
Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his former
position which however was denied through Resolution No.
93 because his former position no longer exists. In the same
resolution, it ordered the appropriation of the amount of
P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering the period December
1, 1971 up to June 30, 1973.
Madrigal then filed a petition before the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque
against public respondents, Provincial Engineer Enrique
Isidro, Abraham Taduran and the Province of Marinduque for
mandamus and damages seeking, inter alia, (1) restoration of
his abolished position in the Roads and Bridges Fund Budget
of the Province; (2) reinstatement to such position; and (3)
payment of his back salaries plus damages.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition
on the ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred by
laches because he was separated from the service on
November 25, 1971, and it was only on December 15, 1975,
or FOUR (4) YEARS and TWENTY (20) DAYS after, that he
filed this case for 'Mandamus and Damages' with the principal
aim of causing his reinstatement to the public position from
where his service was terminated.
Madrigal filed a motion for reconsideration, however,
the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the
petition for mandamus and damages on the ground of laches.
HELD:
No. The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus
affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1)
year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position.
The reason behind this thing was expounded in the case of
Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., wherein the Court ruled that, "in
actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action
must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been
the law in the island since 1901, the period having been
originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190). The Court find this provision to be an
expression of policy on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said
office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and
convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for
persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may
(sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon,
may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:
'Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly
be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one
year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a
renunciation which no principle of justice may
prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position
anytime he pleases.
'And there is good justification for the limitation
period; it is not proper that the title to public
office should be subjected to continued
uncertainly (sic), and the peoples' interest requires
that such right should be determined as speedily
as practicable.'
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or
advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a
position in the civil service as against another actually holding
it, so that the Government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person
actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so.
We hold that in view of the policy of the State contained in the
law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo
warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a
position in the civil service should also be required to file his
petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his
office."
The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he
came to court out of time. As aforestated, it was only after four
(4) years and twenty (20) days from the abolition of his
position that he led the petition for mandamus and damages.
This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favor.
And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the
prosecution of any administrative remedy. Actually, the
recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It
is fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are
raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer of orders involving questions of law
would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers
cannot decide such issues with finality. In the present case,
only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not
the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with
law.
68. CABADA vs ALUNAN
G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996
FA C T
S:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against petitioners
for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and
Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the
Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by
private respondent Mario Valdez. The complaint
was referred to the PNP Eight Regional Command
(PNP-RECOM 8) which, after the conducting its
own investigation, filed an administrative charge of
Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and
instituted summary dismissal proceedings.

On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-
RECOM 8 handed down a decision finding the
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to
this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April
1994, was issued ordering, among other things, the
dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
Petitioners claimed that they were not formally
furnished with a copy of the decision and that they
were able to secure a copy thereof "thru their own
effort and initiative" only on 13 June 1994.
However, they received a copy of Special Order No.
174 on 26 April 1994.Although they insist that the
basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was
Special Order No. 174, petitioner Cabada stated
under oath in his Appeal filed with the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in
fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-
RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act
on the said motion, and that he asked that the said
motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional
Director. However, it denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of its decision. The
petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26
January 1995.
Petitioners then filed with the Honorable Secretary
of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM
their Appeal" dated 5 February 1995 and "Petition
for Review" dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners'
appeal and petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction it appearing. . . That both the
Decision and the Resolution of the Regional
Appellate Board had long become final and
executory and there being no showing that the
RAB failed to decide respondents' appeal within
the reglementary period of sixty (60) days." In
support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002, which provides that failure
of the Regional Appellate Board to decide the
appeal within the reglementary period shall
render the decision final and executory without
prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by
either party with the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government; and Section 5,
Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular
No. 91-006 maintaining that the decision of
the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case
shall become final and executory after ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed
within said period. A motion for Reconsideration
may be filed by either party from a Decision
rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an
appealed case, provided that the same is filed
within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision in question. However, only one (1)
Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence the instant petition.
The OSG seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground
of prematurity because the petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; they should have
instead appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter
6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which
vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases of government personnel where
the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal
from office
OSG opines that this provision covers PNP personnel,
like the petitioners; consequently, they should have
appealed to the CSC. It also advances the view that
the instant petition should have been filed with the
proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE(S):
(1) WON the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioners' appeal from and petition for review of the
decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) WON this special civil action was
prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.
HEL
D:
(1) Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990
specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an
appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days,
the appealed decision becomes final and executory
without, however, prejudice to the right of the
aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the
DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as
regards the availability of an appeal from a
decision rendered by a RAB within the
reglementary period.
Complementary laws on discipline of government
officials and employees must then be inquired into
considering that in conformity with the mandate of
 the Constitution that the PNP must be national in
scope and civilian in character, it is now a part, as a
bureau, of the reorganized DILG. As such, it falls
within the definition of the civil service in
Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.
Thus it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the
notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed
final and executory, and the aggrieved party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the
DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal
within the sixty-day period, its decision may
still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was
addressed to "the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local
Government . . . as Chairman and Presiding Officer
of the National Police Commission," while De
Guzman's petition for review was addressed to "the
Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior
and Local Government and Chairman, National
Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila."
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as
appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section
45 of the DILG Act of 1990
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one
way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have
authority over the appeal and the petition for review,
and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the
DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the
NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the
jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does
not have such jurisdiction because Section
14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides
that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate
jurisdiction only on the following cases and
THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary
actions involving demotion or dismissal from the
service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b)
the RAB in administrative cases against policemen
and over decisions on claims for police benefits. It
has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered
by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the
power or authority to issue, through Commissioner
Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision
denying due course to the appeal and petition
for review filed by petitioners Cabada
and De Guzman, respectively, for lack
of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule
III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No.
91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002.
The reference to these rules suggest that the
NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over
appeals from decisions of the RAB if the latter
has not decided the appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days. Such a
suggestion is flawed because it would allow a
ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests
upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision
rendered by it in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of
the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner
Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the
NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body
composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG
Act of 1990.
It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its
reconsideration before the institution of this special
civil action may be dispensed with.
(2) The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General
that the instant action is premature for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus
untenable. We would have sustained it if the
Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due
course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner
Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De
Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the
DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987; and Section 31 and
32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have
to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the
petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of
the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions
to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies
69. Dartiles v Sucaldito
186 SCRA 704
Datiles and Company has in its favor a fishpond lease
agreement whereby the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, agreed to
lease to the company 175.9959 has. of public land located in
Batu, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, for fishpond purposes.
Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA) was executed on 16 June
1971 with an original period of ten (10) years, later extended
to twenty five (25) years, or up to year 2002. About the middle
of 1973, petitioner-lessee filed a complaint for "Injunction
with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and Prohibitory
Injunction, with Damages" before the CFI against herein
private respondents Jesus Deypalubos and Daniel Cabdieza
Said court action was alleged to have been resorted to after the
vehement refusal of the respondents to obey the orders of the
then Philippine Fisheries Commission and Bureau of Fisheries
(now Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) to vacate
that portion of the area covered by FLA No. 1902 which they
(private respondents) were occupying without a fishpond
permit and the knowledge and consent of petitioner.
To the accusation of their unlawful entry, private respondents
set up the defense of good faith at the time of their entry and
occupation of the land which they described as forested and
uncultivated. They added that prior to the filing of their own
respective fishpond lease applications over the disputed area
(i.e., Deypalubos on the southern portion of about forty-nine
(49) hectares and Cabelieza on the eastern part of about two
(2) hectares) on 3 January 1973, they were assured by an
officer from the Bureau that the areas were unoccupied and
not subject of any pending leasehold agreement or application.
Meanwhile, respondent Deypalubos submitted to the BOF his
formal protest against petitioner's existing fishpond permit
over the 49 hectares trial court ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction against both respondents
resulting in the restoration of possession and occupancy of the
disputed areas by the petitioner Thereafter the Barrio Council
of Batu prepared and submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries a
resolution which attests that the 49 hectare controverted
fishpond area was never occupied by the Datiles family and
that it was Mr. Deypalubos who cleared the same and
constructed all the improvements therein. The resolution
further requests that the original grant of 175.9959 hectares to
Datiles and Company be reduced to fifty (50) hectares only in
accordance with a certain presidential decree limiting the
cultivation of a fishpond to about fifty (50) hectares, with the
remaining area to be distributed to poor families.
No investigation of both the above-mentioned barrio council
resolution and Deypalubos' formal protest over the forty-nine
(49) hectares was held. On 3 January 1975, another
memorandum was issued by the Bureau Director addressed to
herein public respondent Regional Director Guieb, directing
"an immediate formal investigation of those issues involved in
the foregoing resolution and the protest of Mr. Jesus
Deypalubos. Praying to restrain the proposed investigation on
the fishpond conflict, petitioner filed its 10 February 1975
petition for "Prohibition and/or Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction" (Special Civil Case No. 1426) before the CFI of
Zamboanga del Sur against public respondent Guieb and
impleading pro forma therein respondents Deypalubos and
Cabelieza. The presiding judge of the court a quo, Hon.
Melquiades S. Sucaldito (now respondent), seeing that a
possible irreparable injury could be caused the petitioner if the
investigation in question were to proceed, issued the 31 March
1975 restraining order
Issue: whether or not an investigation of a formal protest over
a lease grant, by a Regional Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources may be the subject of a
petition for prohibition and/or injunction before the Regional
Trial Court
Held:
It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an
executive officer, the petitioner must first exhaust
administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the
assumption that the administrative body, board or officer, if
given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error, may amend
its/his decision on a given matter. 20 It follows therefore that
there has to be some sort of a decision, order or act, more or
less final in character, that is ripe for review and properly the
subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body or officer,
for the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to
operate. In the present case, however, there is no
administrative order or act as above described, that can be
appealed from. The respondent Regional Director has not
rendered any decision, or made any final finding of any sort,
and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which
happens to be the very act sought to be prevented.
Consequently, administrative remedies that must be exhausted,
although available, cannot be resorted to. There being urgency
in stopping public respondent Guieb's investigation but no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, petitioner's recourse to the respondent court for relief by
way of a petition for prohibition was proper. We now look into
PD No. 605. Its evident purpose is to prevent the substitution
of judicial judgments for those of public administrative
officials in disputes involving the disposition or utilization of
natural resources of the country. The decree seeks to leave to
administrative agencies the authority to decide controversies
involving licenses, permits, patents or public grants in
connection with natural resources, obviously because of the
expertise of such administrative officials in dealing with such
problems. We now look into PD No. 605. Its evident purpose
is to prevent the substitution of judicial judgments for those of
public administrative officials in disputes involving the
disposition or utilization of natural resources of the country.
The decree seeks to leave to administrative agencies the
authority to decide controversies involving licenses, permits,
patents or public grants in connection with natural resources,
obviously because of the expertise of such administrative
officials in dealing with such problems.
As to the prohibition dictated by PD No. 605, the same
pertains to the issuance by courts of injunctions or restraining
orders against administrative acts on controversies which
involve facts or exercise of discretion in technical cases,
because to allow courts to judge these matters could disturb
the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. But
on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts are not prevented by PD No. 605 from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.
The insistence still of respondent Regional Director Guieb to
proceed with the investigation, knowing fully well that there
remain no other issues in Deypalubos' protest that were not
previously raised in Civil Case No. 1389 and before the same
Bureau, leads one to conclude that he is acting in excess of his
delegated authority to investigate. After these issues had been
tried and investigated, administratively and judicially, the
same issues can no longer be reopened by public respondent
Guieb.
70. National Food Authority v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 115121-25. February 9, 1996.
Facts:
The NFA conducted a pubic bidding to award
security contracts for the protection of its properties and
facilities all over the country. 12 security agencies were
awarded 1-year contracts, among whom were private
respondents Col. Manubay (under the name Greenview
Investigation and Security Agency), Continental Watchman
and Security Agency, Lasala under the name PSF Watchman
and Investigation Agency, and Mapagay (under Peoples
Protective and Security Agency).
When petitioner David became NFA Administrator,
he caused a review of all security service contracts, procedures
on the accreditation of private security agencies and the
bidding for security services. Pending this review,
Administrator David extended the services of private
respondents and the other incumbent security agencies on a
periodic basis.
The review was completed after almost a year, and
new terms for accreditation, bidding and hiring of security
agencies were made. A special order was thereafter issued for
the implementation of the new rules and procedure.
 The administrator created, through a Special Order, a
Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) to
undertake the prequalification of prospective bidders, conduct
the bidding, evaluate the bids tendered and recommend to the
Administrator the bids accepted. Notices for prequalification
and bidding for security services were published in a
newspaper of national circulation. All incumbent security
contractors were required to pre-qualify and only those
prequalified bidding. A total of 41 security agencies submitted
documents.
Upon a review of the documents submitted, the
PBAC disqualified respondent Mapagay for failure to submit
proof of his financial capability to support his bid. It also
disqualified respondent Lasala for alleged failure to meet the
five-year service requirement. Only respondents Manubay,
Continental and Masada participated in the prebidding and
were declared prequalified to bid.
Meanwhile, however, 2 of the applicants who failed
to prequalify, namely Lanting Security and Watchman Agency
and respondent Lasala, filed separate complaints with the RTC
to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC from
proceeding with the public bidding. As prayed for, restraining
orders were issued by the courts, and no bidding took place.
During the effectivity of the injunction, Administrator
David sent to all incumbent security agencies, including 4 of
herein private respondents, notices of termination. Private
respondents were informed that their services were to end
inasmuch as their respective contracts had expired and
they no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
NFA. They were thus instructed to withdraw their security
guards from all NFA installations. It also contracted the
services of 7 new security agencies on a month-to-month
basis pending resolution of the injunction against the
bidding. Private respondents forthwith filed separate
complaints with the RTC for prohibition, mandamus and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and restraining order, which were issued.
These orders were challenged by NFA and David in
separate petitions before the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion by respondent judges. The CA consolidated the
rendered a decision partially granting the same by annulling
that part of the orders restraining NFA from terminating
the contracts with the incumbent security agencies but
affirming the orders insofar as they enjoined NFA from
awarding the contracts to the 7 new security agencies.
Petitioners argue that the new security agencies were
hired as an emergency measure after the contracts with the
incumbent security agencies expired. They claim that without
the new security agencies, the properties of the NFA worth
billions of pesos would be exposed to danger of loss and
dissipation. They also argue that respondents did not avail
or exhaust available administrative remedies rendering
their complaint premature.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents did not avail or
exhaust available administrative remedies rendering their
complaint premature.
Ruling:
The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some
limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents
contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations
and their replacements hired barely five days after their
termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder,
submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public
bidding only to find out that contracts had already been
awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board
or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture
pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled
private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation
of these negotiated security contracts.
We are neither impressed by petitioners claim that
the subject contracts were negotiated as a necessity to stave off
a crisis that gripped the NFA, i.e., the loss, destruction and
dissipation of their properties, warehouses, rice and corn
stocks and facilities with an estimated value of P19 billion.
Petitioners allege they were merely exercising their sound
business judgment in an emergency situation brought about by
respondent security agencies themselves who, in the first
place, obtained the injunctions from the Quezon City trial
courts.
Reason for the Ruling:
First of all, the restraining orders and writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the two Quezon City trial
courts on complaint by Lanting and respondent Lasala
suspending the public bidding did not result in the emergency
situation petitioners alleged. The security vacuum was created
when petitioners terminated the services of the incumbent
security agencies after the issuance of the said orders and
before the injunctions issued by respondent trial courts on
application by private respondents.
When the bidding did not take place, the incumbent
security agencies continued rendering services to petitioners,
albeit on a temporary and provisional basis. However, one
month later, they were all terminated on grounds of expiration
of contract and loss of trust and confidence.
We agree with the CA that it was well within the
power of petitioners to discontinue the services of the
incumbent security agencies. Their contracts with the NFA
expired in 1992, hence, their services were deemed terminated
on said date. The fact that these agencies continued rendering
services to NFA did not amount to an implied renewal of their
respective contracts. Respondents do not have any vested right
to continue their contracts with NFA. They remained and
continued performing their tasks at the tolerance of NFA who,
by sending the notices of termination, simply reminded them
of the expiration of their contracts. These contracts can be
renewed, revived or extended only by mutual consent of the
parties. No court can compel a party to agree to a contract thru
the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Nevertheless, what causes eyebrows to arch is the act
of petitioners in discontinuing the incumbents services.
Respondents Manubay and Lasala allege that their agencies
had been rendering security services to the NFA since 1985
and 1988, respectively. Moreover, Manubay and Continental
passed the prequalification stage and were declared by the
PBAC eligible to join the public bidding. Scarcely a month
later, however, their services were terminated at the same time
and for the same reasons as the rest of the incumbent security
agencies. It is certainly strange why petitioners chose to do
away with the incumbents services at a time when a security
void would directly and most necessarily result from their
withdrawal. The least petitioners could have done under the
circumstances was to maintain the status quo until the writ of
preliminary injunction obtained by respondent Lasala shall
have been lifted.
Assuming arguendo that an emergency actually
existed and the negotiated contracts were justified, petitioners
continued failure to conduct a public bidding and select the
bidder within a reasonable time casts doubts on the good faith
behind the negotiated contracts. This Court specifically
ordered petitioners to conduct a public bidding and report the
results within thirty days from holding thereof. In compliance,
a public bidding was conducted but until now no bidder has
been chosen and no contract has been awarded.
Petitioners cited various reasons for the delay. They
alleged that the minimum number of bidders in three of the
five areas had not been met and that two bidders in the other
two areas were in collusion. This suspicion of collusion
generated so much controversy that the PBAC could not
decide whether to include the bids of the two agencies. Finally,
the PBAC excluded them and recommended that the
Administrator declare a failure of bidding in all five areas of
responsibility.
The Administrator should have immediately acted
upon the PBACs recommendation and accordingly scheduled
another public bidding but somehow petitioners chose to abide
by a restraining order of the Davao trial court. It must be noted
that what the Davao trial court issued was a temporary
restraining order enjoining petitioners from awarding the
contracts to the lowest or next lowest bidder public bidding. It
was not a writ of preliminary injunction nor was it an order
restraining the holding of another bidding.
Petitioners and the PBAC are obviously taking their
sweet time to select and award security contracts to winning
bidders. They took one year evaluating and deliberating on
thirteen bid proposals only to declare a failure of bidding in all
five areas of responsibility. Then they relied on a restraining
order of a trial court after no less that this Highest Court
specifically ordered them to conduct and conclude a public
bidding.
Litigants should be conscious of the position lower courts
occupy in the operation of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. There is only one Supreme Court and all courts and
litigants should take their bearings from this Court.
Petitioners manifest reluctance to hold a public
bidding and award a contract to the winning bidder smacks of
favoritism and partiality toward the security agencies to whom
it awarded the negotiated contracts and cannot be
countenanced. A competitive public bidding aims to protect
the public interest by giving the public the best possible
advantages thru open competition. It is a mechanism that
enables the government agency to avoid or preclude anomalies
in the execution of public contracts.
The General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1993
cannot be used by petitioners to justify their actuations. An
appropriations act is primarily a special type of legislation
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated
to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Section 31 on
the General Provisions of the GAA of 1993 merely authorizes
the heads of departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the
national government to hire, through public bidding or
negotiated contracts, contractual personnel to perform specific
activities or services related or incidental to their functions.
This law specifically authorizes expenditures for the hiring of
these personnel. It is not the governing law on the award of
service contracts by government agencies nor does it do away
with the general requirement of public bidding.
71. PEDRO GRAVADOR vs. MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967
FACTS:
Petitioner was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary
School in Negros Oriental when he was advised by the then,
Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the
respondent Supervisor Dayao, of his separation from the
service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65.
A few days later respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated
teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.
Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his
forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not
November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his
letter was the affidavit of Bandoquillo and Sienes in which
these two affiants declared that they knew that petitioner was
born on December 11, 190.
Petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendents of Schools,
reiterating his claim that he had not reached the age of 65 and
enclosing some papers in support thereof.
He filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in
the CFI. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the
office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and
to order payment to him of not only his back salaries but also
damages.
The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on
December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition.
Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the
petitioner was reinstated. The respondents appealed directly to
this Court.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the office of principal of
the Sta. Catalina Elementary School
HELD:
The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a
result of the conflicting records of the Division of Schools of
Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show
his date of birth to be November 26, 1897. These records
consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one Employee's
Record Card. It is on the basis of these records that the
Superintendent of Schools determined the petitioner's age to
be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days.
On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an
Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an Employee's Record
Card, and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, state that
the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901. These are the
records on which the petitioner bases his claim.
The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts,
namely, that the records of the church where the petitioner was
baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil
register contains no record of the petitioner's birth.
According to the trial court, the post-war records were
intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the
correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901.
The respondents now contend that the trial court erred in
placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the
date of birth of the petitioner. They argue that as some pre-war
records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-
war records should be regarded as controlling and that the
finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner
was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding
that should not be disturbed by the court.
That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding
on the courts if supported by substantial evidence, is a settled
rule of administrative law. But whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of
Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The school official
based his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war
records in the preparation of which the petitioner does not
appear to have taken a part. On the other hand, the petitioner
post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove
the date of his birth.
It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied
upon the post-war records.
Still it is argued that the petitioner's action was prematurely
brought because he had not availed of all administrative
remedies. This argument is without merit. Suit for quo
warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one
year. Before filing this case the petitioner waited for 8 months
for the school officials to act on his protest. To require him to
tarry a little more would obviously be unfair to him, when this
case was filed, he had only 4 months left within which to bring
the case to court. There was neither manner nor form of
assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools
would be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its
observance would result in the nullification of the claim being
asserted.
72. Almine vs CA
GR No. 80719 September 26, 1989
FACTS:
Hilda Almine filed a sworn application for retention of her
riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land
Transfer Program with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. She
alleged that her tenant, Sulpicio Bombales, deliberately failed
and refused to deliver her landowners share and that the latter
had distributed his landholding to his children. After
investigation, it was concurred that the properties of the
petitioner, evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title, are not
covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program. However,
then Minister Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's application
for retention.
Petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court;
however, it was denied. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a landowner
should or should not be allowed to retain his land-holdings are
appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of
Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the power of review
over the administrative decision on the transfer of the land to
the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
amendatory and related decrees.
HELD:
YES Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside and the records of the case are remanded
to said appellate court for further proceedings.
The respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition for review by way
of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his
discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the
competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform.
A perusal of Section 12 (original and exclusive jurisdiction of
The Courts of Agrarian Relations) of PD No. 946
(Reorganizing The Courts Of Agrarian Relations, Streamlining
Their Procedures, And For Other Purposes) reveals that
questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be
allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable
by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and
not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus
excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the
Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of
the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by
the courts through a special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions
seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus.
Note that the failure to appeal to the Office of the President
from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this
case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the
President .
73. Smart vs NTC
GR. 151908 August 12, 2003
Facts: NTC pursuant to its rule- making and regulatory
powers, issued a Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services and other matters relating to
prepaid call cards and sims cards. The said Memorandum
Circular was published in the Philippine Star Newspapers
on June 22, 2000. On Oct. 20, 2000 petitioners Isla
communications and Pilipino Telephone which later, Globe
and Smart intervened filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of the NTC Memorandum Circular against the
NTC and its Commissioners. It was contended by the
petitioner that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since
such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines. The
Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners but when
reversed when appealed to the CA.
Issue: WON the petitioner violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedy
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that In questioning the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This
principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained
to its rule-making or quasi- legislative power. In like
manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only
where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial
or adjudicatory function.
74. UP BOARD of REGENTS vs. RASUL
G.R. No. 91551. August 16, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., was appointed by
the petitioner Board of Regents (B.O.R.) as Director of the
Philippine General Hospital, to take effect from September
1986 until 30 April 1992; that the petitioner B.O.R. speaking
thru its then University Secretary Professor Martin Gregorio
intended to have the Dr. Estrella, Jr. serve his full term, as
Director, since any other arrangement would impede the
hospital's development, not to mention the continuity of its
service operations.; that the duties and responsibilities, under
Chapter 29, of the Revised Administrative Code, as PGH
Director, inter alia, to direct and manage various activities
within the hospital; formulate and implement regulations;
develop institutional plans and policies; approve/recommend
budget proposals of the hospital; execute contracts; represent
the hospital in proper functions; approve and sign warrants,
checks, vouchers and recommend or endorse appointments of
personnel to higher authorities.
Barely two (2) weeks after assuming the presidency
of the University of the Philippines petitioner Jose Abueva
submitted a memorandum to the B.O.R. to reorganize the U.P.
Manila including the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) with
a draft resolution for approval of the B.O.R., recommending
that certain key positions of U.P. Manila including that of
respondent be declared vacant; the B.O.R., upon
recommendation of petitioners Abueva and Dr. Ernesto
Domingo approved the so-called reorganization plan for the
PGH.
Domingo acting on instruction of Abueva issued a
memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for the UP-
PGH Medical Center Director; the petitioner-members of the
Nomination Committee thus created, are scheduled to
nominate respondents replacement as Director; consequently,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, his complaint
for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction or temporary
restraining Order, seeking to enjoin petitioners Abueva,
Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the U.P. B.O.R.
from proceeding with the nomination of UP-PGH Medical
Center Director, in order to forestall the consequent removal/
dismissal of the Dr. Estrella, Jr., incumbent PGH Director even
before the expiration of his term of office on April 30, 1992
without any cause provided by law.
The Court then issued the Restraining Order and after
due hearing the trial court, thru its then Presiding Judge Hon.
Julio Logarta issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
enjoining petitioners from implementing the reorganization
plan for the UP-PGH Medical Center. The Respondent Judge,
based on the evidence presented, concluded that the
reorganization of PGH was done in bad faith. Accordingly, the
lower court ruled that Dr. Estrella, Jr. cannot be removed from
office as a result of such defective abolition of the position to
which he was appointed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe A. Estrella who
holds the position of Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure during his term
of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said position by
the University of the Philippines Board of Regents.
HELD:
Yes. It is clear from the record that the PGH itself
was not abolished in the reorganization plan approved by the
UP Board of Regents. The PGH was merely renamed "UP-
PGH Medical Center" and some of its functions and objectives
were expanded or consolidated. There is no substantial
distinction, in terms of functions, between PGH and the
proposed UP-PGH Medical Center.
While PGH itself was not abolished, the position of
PGH Director was abolished and in its place, the position of
UP-PGH Medical Center Director was created. After
abolishing said position, it was proposed to be reclassified as
Director, Charity Hospital, one of the five (5) hospital director
positions proposed to be created in the reorganized PGH.
The UP Board of Regents acted within the scope and
limitations of its charter, Act No. 1870, as amended when it
approved the reorganization plan renaming the PGH and
expanding and consolidating some of its functions and
objectives. The UP Board of Regents did not and could not
have abolished PGH. And rightly so. The PGH and one of its
component units, the Cancer Institute, are creations of special
laws, the old Administrative Code (Chapter 29, Secs. 706-707)
and Commonwealth Act No. 398, respectively. The authority
of the UP under Act No. 1870 as amended, to combine two or
more colleges in the interest of economy and efficiency does
not empower UP to abolish offices created by special laws.
It is therefore clear that the authority of the UP is
limited to what is expressly provided in Act No. 1870 as
amended, that is, to combine or merge colleges. That is all the
law speaks of in such instance.
On the other hand, the power to create and abolish
offices carries with it the power to fix the number of positions,
salaries, emoluments, and to provide funds for the operation of
the office created. This power is inherently legislative in
character. The UP Board of Regents does not have such power.
Hence, the abolition of the position of respondent Dr. Estrella
is not valid.
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an
office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure.
However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the
PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and
bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director. This is
because where the abolished office and the offices created in
its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith.
The Court hereby apply the principle enunciated in Dario vs.
Mison that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature
of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the
incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the
abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the creation
of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal
of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the
duties and functions of the two positions are basically the
same. The UP-PGH Medical Center is essentially the same
PGH hence, the Medical Center Director will be performing
duties very similar to the present PGH Director. It cannot be
invoked to sustain the argument that respondent is not entitled
to security of tenure. In Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz, the
abolition of the position of "Chief of Clinic" and the creation
of the position of "Assistant Director, Professional Services"
were set aside for the reason that the two positions are
basically one and the same except for the change of
nomenclature.
The Court held that the creation of additional
management positions in a proposed reorganization is
evidence of bad faith and is in violation of Republic Act No.
6656. We hold that the same applies to the PGH
reorganization.
75.ARROW TRANSPORT VS BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION
G.R. No. L-39655 March 21, 1975
FACTS:
Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-
Car are domestic corporations. Arrow has in his favor
a certificate of public convenience (CPN) to operate a
public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service
from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and
vice-versa with the use of twenty (20) units.
Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for
the issuance of a CPN to operate a similar service on
the same line. Eight days later, without the required
publication, the Board issued an Order granting it
provisional permit to operate.
After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such
provisional permit filed but without awaiting final
action thereon, Arrow filed the present petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction, alleging that
the question involved herein is purely legal and that
the issuance of the Order without the Board having
acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.
In their answer, the respondents denied the need for
publication before a provisional permit can be issued,
in light of Presidential Decree No. 101, which
authorized respondent Board to grant provisional
permits when warranted by compelling circumstances
and to proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
ISSUE:
WON publication is necessary before provisional permits can
be granted
HELD:
No. The question of whether the controversy is ripe
for judicial determination was likewise argued by the
parties. For it is undeniable that at the time the
petition was filed, there was pending with the
respondent Board a motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior
thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can be
raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would
stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe
procedural due process ousted respondent Board of
whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the
premises.
This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the
controversy at this stage, not only because of the
importance of the issue raised but also because of the
strong public interest in having the matter settled. As
was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which
prescribes the procedure to be followed by
respondent Board, it is the policy of the State, as
swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable
condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum
utilization of existing public motor vehicles and
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, as well as update the standards
of those carrying such business, making it
"imperative to provide, among other urgently needed
measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing,
redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of
operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or
thereafter, may operate in this country."
It is essential then both from the standpoint of the
firms engaged as well as of the riding public to
ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in
this case and very likely in others of a similar nature
satisfies the procedural due process requirement.
Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent.
76. Tan v Veterans Backpay
[G.R. No. L-12944. March 30, 1959.]
FACTS:
That the petitioner is of legal age, a widow and a resident of
the Philippines and that the respondent is a government
instrumentality or agency, duly vested with authority to
implement the provisions of Backpay Law, otherwise known
as Republic Act No. 897, further amending Republic Act No.
304; That the petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat
Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, and bonafide
member the 1st Regiment, United State-Chinese Volunteers in
the Philippines; died in a battle at Rizal Province; and certified
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered
aritorious military services during the Japanese occupation;
That petitioner as widow of the said recognized deceased
veteran, filed an application for back pay. The Secretary and
Chief of Office Staff the Veterans Back Pay Commission sent
a letter to General Vicente Lopez of the United States-Chinese
Volunteers in the Philippines apprising the latter that the
Commission has reaffirmed its solution granting the back pay
to alien members; the AFP certified certified that deceased
veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerrilla. That
after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous stands
and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay; That on
February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans Back Pay
Commission, through its Secretary & Chief of Office Staff,
made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein
petitioner denying her request on the ground that aliens are not
entitled to backpay; That upon refusal of the Veterans Back
Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this
Honorable Court by way of mandamus;

The trial court ordered respondent Commission to give due

course to the claim of herein petitioner. Against the decision,
the respondent instituted this appeal and it further contended
by the Commission that the petitioner should have first
exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the
President of the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a
bar to her action in court.

Issue: Issues:
(1) Whether or not a petition for mandamus is proper to
correct the acts of the commission.

(2) Whether or not it is necessary in the case at bar that

Natividad should have exhausted all administrative remedies,
i.e. before the president.

Held:
(1) Yes. The discretion of the Veterans Backpay Commission
is limited to the facts of the case; that is, in evaluating the
evidence whether or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla
force duly recognized by the United States Army. It has no
power to adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are
established. Having been satisfied that the deceased was an
officer or a guerrilla outfit duly recognized by the United
States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the Commission to give due
course to his widow's application. For this reason, mandamus
lies against the Commission.

(2) No. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke

the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions
of the Secretary of Justice were "advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the
opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse",
thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the
Commission.