C.
Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards
1. Interest of Law and Order
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919) Malcolm, J.
Petitioner: Rubi et al.
Defendant: Provincial Board of Mindoro
Concept: Interest of Law and Order
Brief facts:
Rubi and other Maguines tribesmen were forced to live in
Tigbao Mindoro against their will. They now seek the remedy
of habeas corpus, praying for the courts to strike down the
resolutions of the Provinvial Board that mandate they stay in
Tigbao.
Doctrine:
We were (are?) pretty fucking racist. And sometimes it really
isnt funny. Oh also, the phrase interest of law and order
covers a broad range of public policies and is best executed by
local governments.
FACTS:
1. Rubi and other Maguines tribesfolk petition for habeas
corpus, alleging that they were being held in Tigbao
against their will.
2. This detainment began in February 1, 1917, when the
provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been
made for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless
some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of
this province, no successful result will be obtained
toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to
live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that
the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
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convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the
approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended
by the provincial governor."
3. On December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro
issued executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25,
current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the
Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21,
1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial
governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do
hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and
Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on
the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than
December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed
in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code."
4. The assailed resolutions relied on Sections 2145 and 2759
of the Administrative Code of 1919, which read as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites
selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
an approved by the provincial board.
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up
appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a
provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand
 one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days
5. Before getting into the issues, J. Malcolm first discusses
the history of the term non-Chrisitan and the separation of
the same from the rest of the Philippines. In sum, the
Spanish government, in Laws VII-XIII created reducciones
to segregate the less-civilized away. It was intended to
protect them as much as the rest of society, and was
intended for the development of these tribes.
6. When the Americans acquired the Philippines, McKinleys
instructions were ratified by the Philippine Congress. It
reads:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the
Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government and under which many of these tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
7. The demarcation between uncivilized tribes and the rest
of the Philippines was likewise seen in the Philippine bill of
1901, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was
to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros
or other non-Christian tribes
8. The Jones Law of 1916 also established a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall
have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives
9. Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to
recognize a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and
the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes
10. There were also specific Acts that bar local governments
over non-Christian tribes. Act 547 specifically governed
the Maguines, but the Administrative Code of 1916
ultimately superseded these, although it carried with it
sections 2148 and 2579, which are now in question.
ISSUES:
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1. WON non-Christian contrary to religious discrimination
(NO)
2. WON American law on Native Americans favors the petition
(NO)
3. WON Secs. 2148 and 2579 are invalid delegations of Police
Power (NO)
4. WON the orders were in violation of Constitutionally
guaranteed rights to due process and liberty. (NO)
RATIO:
1. NO. The term non-Christian refers to degree of civilization
and not religious affiliation
-The term enjoyed constant use in Philippine legislature,
but does not refer to merely a religious or geological
distinction. From history, we see that the term "non-
Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization,
and is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial,
and executive history. This is bolstered by a letter of the
Secretary of Interior that was acknowledged by the
Governor General:
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation
for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced
far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation
which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes
is so great that it is almost out of the question to
enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided
to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one
most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the
Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those
lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to
their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial
Government Act and the Municipal Code.
-Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres
de Rozas de Filipinas, says, racistly:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies
"savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may
be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even
in primitive times without doubt this name was given
to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employed in three Filipino languages shows that the
radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-
day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists
and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce
that the name was applied to men considered to be
the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders,
in whose language they were called the "ancients."
-Now J. Malcolm says, also racistly: The Manguianes are
very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood
and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization.
They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
 people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and,
as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable
to bring them under any form of municipal government.
2. NO. American Law on Native Americans grants broad
latitude to the legislature in developing laws, and the Courts are
hesitant to strike these down.
-US v Sandoval: Not only does the Constitution expressly
authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage
and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized
nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original
territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether
within or without the limits of a state." In american law,
with reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been
held that it is not within the power of the courts to
overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason,
the subject has always been deemed political in nature,
not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of
the government.
-The only case which is even remotely in point and which
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of
United States vs. Crook. In this case, some Native
American had left their tribe and adopted the general
habits of the whites were unlawfully arrested by Crook. It
was ultimately decided that the that an Indian is a
'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ
of habeas corpus. While J. Malcolm holds that Rubi is
likewise a person as covered by Philippine law, he
ultimately decides that If any lesson can be drawn from
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when
once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps,
just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as
existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in
the United States
3. NO, the delegation was valid. (I know this should be the main
issue, but this is really all J. Malcolm has to say on the matter.
Ive quoted it almost in full)
-Rule of valid delegation: The true distinction therefore is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be
made.
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-The case of West vs. Hitchock, was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to
approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty
acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United
States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes
provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and
of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice
Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially
in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not
broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for
the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The
power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been
treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was
necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of
special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the
Indian Department.
-In this case, who but the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order?" As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but
they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
-Anent the possibility that the Provincial Governor might
abuse his powers of discretion and oppress the
indigenous tribes, J. Malcolm claims that the job of the
Governor is the opposite (WTF right) and that no
oppression had actually been made.
4. NO, said rights may be limited in the interest of the general
public.
-Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person
to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good.
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
"Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint
by law for the good of the individual and for the greater
good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every
man must renounce unbridled license.
-The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power.
-To constitute "due process of law," as has been often
held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In
 some instances, even a hearing and notice are not
requisite a rule which is especially true where much must
be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases.
-Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created
free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not
precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not
free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals
of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship
implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as
surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of
intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the
progress of the State.
-Public Policy: Our attempt at giving a brief history of the
Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians
has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent
governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines
from early days to the present. The idea to unify the
people of the Philippines so that they may approach the
highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful
country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile
regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view
to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy,
must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own
good and the good of the country.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes
against petitioners. So ordered.
DISSENTS
J. Johns: Rubi et al. were not provided a hearing and therefore
deprived of due process.
J. Moir:
-They are being displaced from their native locales and being
forced to move to a new area.
-They are being forced to accept civilization whether they
want it or not.
-The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a
heavy burden to the state and on account of their ignorance
they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they
will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to
abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and
never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they
do, let the law punish them." The authorities are anticipating
too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
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people." Their history does not demonstrate that we must
expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the
possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they
more liable to be subjected to involuntary servitude when left
free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have
been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if
closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may
not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that
they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small
reservation for the great boon of binding themselves and their
children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed
them and clothe them in return of their services?
-All of them, according to the court's opinion under the
present law, may be taken from their homes and herded on a
reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the
prior approval of the department head. To state such a
monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality
of the section of the law under which these people are
restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is no
probability of the department head ever giving his approval to
such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in
the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The
arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be the
measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the
probability of doing harm.
-After the reservation is once established might not a
provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a
non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation.
No matter what his education and culture, he could have no
trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might
be in a distant province and not within reach, and the
provincial governor's fiat is final.
2. Public Interest
People v Osmena (1939)
Petitioner: The People of the Philippines
Defendant: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicanor Osmena
Concept: Interest of Law and Order
Brief facts:
Osmena and Rosenthal were trading stocks of South Cebu Oil
Co., but did so without the supervision of the Insular Treasurer,
contrary to law. They now assail the constitutionality of Act
2851 , alleging it is an undue delegation of police power.
Doctrine:
Public Interest constitutes sufficient standard if the evils
intended to be protected against can clearly be seen.
FACTS:
1. Osmena and Rosenthal were both charged with violation
of the Act 2851 or the Blue Sky Law. The assailed portions
of this law are summed up by the Court as follows:
2. Under section 2 of Act No. 2581, every person,
partnership, association, or corporation attempting to
offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any
kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the
required tax of twenty pesos. Certain securities listed in
section 3 are exempted from the operation of the Act.
3. Section 5 imposes upon the Insular Treasurer the
mandatory duty to examine the statements and
documents thus filed and the additional duty to make or
cause to be made, if deemed advisable by him, a detailed
examination of the affairs of the applicant.
4. Section 5 also provides that "whatever the said Treasurer
of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without
the examination herein provided, that any person,
partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the
right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such
person, partnership, association or corporation a
certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership,
association or corporation has complied with the
provisions of this Act, and that such person, partnership,
association or corporation, its brokers or agents are
entitled to offer the securities named in said certificate or
permit for sale"; that "said Treasurer shall furthermore
have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public
interest, to cancel said certificate or permit", and that "an
appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be
had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of
Finance."
5. Upon motion, the court ordered separate trials but both
parties were all the same convicted in the lower courts.
ISSUES:
1. WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to
the Insular Treasure (Main)
2. WON it Violates equal protection clause (NO)
HELD
1. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power.
2.
-It is argued that sec. 5 empowers the Insular Treasurer to
issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities, no standard or rule is fixed in the
Act which can guide said official in determining the cases
in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby
making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its
issuance which is unconstitutional.
-However, the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the
Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding
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the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite
that the person, partnership, association or corporation
applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of this
Act", and this requirement, construed in relation to the
other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or
permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.
-The authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a
certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a
finding that such cancellation "is in the public interest."
a. When this is considered alongside the intention
and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public
against "speculative schemes which have no more
basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the
"sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil
wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations" Then it properly constitutes a sufficient
standard.
b. Furthermore, the fact that the law allows for the
decision of the insular treasurer to be appealed to the
Secretary of Finance proves that there are restraining
influence, contrary to the contention that he can act
with abusive discretion.
c. Finally, it is also argued that the Insular Treasurer
possesses "the discretionary power to determine
when a security is a speculative security and when it is
not" because "he is given the power to compel any
corporation, association or partnership already
functioning, to surrender to him for examination its
books and accounts enumerated in section 2,
'whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that
the securities being sold or offered for sale are of a
speculative character.
o However, that section 1 of Act No. 2581
defines and enumerates what are
"speculative securities" and all the other
provisions of the Act must be read and
construed in conjunction and harmony with
said section. This again shows that there are
standards that have been set down by the
legislature.
NO. It doesnt violate the equal protection clause.
-It is argued that the law discriminates between an owner
who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who
disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions.
However, in the case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co it was
held that If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous
example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th
Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise
and merely logically not distinguishable from others not
embraced in the law
DISPOSITIVE: JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED
3. Justice, Equity, and Substantial Merits of the Case
International Hardwood Co v Pangil Labor (1940) J. Laurel
Petitioner: International Hardwood Company
Defendant: Pangil Labor Federation
Concept: Interest of Law and Order
Brief facts:
Osmena and Rosenthal were trading stocks of South Cebu Oil
Co., but did so without the supervision of the Insular Treasurer,
contrary to law. They now assail the constitutionality of Act
2851 , alleging it is an undue delegation of police power.
Doctrine:
Public Interest constitutes sufficient standard if the evils
intended to be protected against can clearly be seen.
FACTS:
1. In 1939 there was an industrial dispute between IHC and
PLF about the stipulation of minimum wage. The CIR ruled
in favor of the workers, and established that the workers in
the mountains be paid 1 peso/day and those in the plains
90 cents. (Better days)
2. In ruling so, the CIR relied on CA 103, specifically sections
4 & 5 thereof.
In section 4, the Court of Industrial Relations is
empowered to "take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences
as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals,
lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers,
tenants or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions
of tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers."
SEC. 5. Minimum wage and maximum "canon" or
rental. Whenever conditions in a given industry or
in a given locality so warrant, and in the interest of
public welfare and for the promotion of industrial
peace and progress, the President of the Philippines
shall direct the Court of Industrial Relations to
investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the
industry concerned or to the industries established in
a designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share for
laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental
to be paid by the 'inquilinos.' or tenants or lessees to
land-owners.
3. It is alleged that while Sec. 5 empowers the CIR to decide
minimum wage, the same requires the initiative of the
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President. IHC contends that to expand this power to
include the cases contemplated by section 4 would be
tantamount to undue delegation of power
ISSUE: WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to
CIR (NO)
RATIO:
There is no undue delegation.
-To adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at
naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to
enable it to "settle all question, matters, controversies, or
disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees" and to frustrate the very objective of the law,
namely, to create an instrumentality through which the
intervention of the Government could be made effective
in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the
determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. It is
fundamental that the intention and policy of the National
Assembly, as expressed in the enactment, should be
effectuated, and the Act should receive a construction that
will lead to this result.
-The sufficient standard is found in Sec. 20, which
prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court
shall act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms.
DISPOSITIVE: JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED
4. What is Moral, Educational, or Amusing
Mutual Film Corp. v Industrial Commission of Ohio (1915)
McKenna, J.
Petitioner: Mutual Film Corp
Respondent: Industrial Commission of Ohio
Concept: What is Moral/ Educational/ Amusing
Brief facts: Commission of Ohio was given the power to screen
films. Complainant now saying that its a restraint on free
speech.
Doctrine: If a thingy is used for business, its not covered by
free speech.
FACTS:
1. Appeal from an order denying appellant, herein
designated complainant, an interlocutory injunction
sought to restrain the enforcement of an act of the
General Assembly of Ohio passed April 16, 1913 (103 Ohio
Laws 399), creating under the authority and
 superintendence of the Industrial Commission of the state
a board of censors of motion picture films.
2. Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing,
selling, and leasing films, the films being produced in other
states than Ohio, and in European and other foreign
countries.
3. Also, complainant has a film exchange in Detroit, Michigan,
from which it rents or leases large quantities to exhibitors in
the latter state and in Ohio. The business of that exchange
and those in Ohio is to purchase films from complainant
and other manufacturers of films and rent them to
exhibitors for short periods at stated weekly rentals.
4. The complainant claims that the business of selling and
leasing films from its offices outside of the State of Ohio to
purchasers and exhibitors within the state is interstate
commerce, which will be seriously burdened by the
exaction of the fee for censorship, which is not properly an
inspection tax, and the proceeds of which will be largely in
excess of the cost of enforcing the statute, and will in no
event be paid to the Treasury of the United States.
5. The board has demanded of complainant that it submit its
films to censorship, and threatens, unless complainant
complies with the demand, to arrest any and all persons
who seek to place on exhibition any film not so censored or
approved by the censor congress on and after the date to
which the act was extended.
6. The complainant was claiming that it was physically
impossible to comply with such demand and physically
impossible for the board to censor the films with such
rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed with its
business, and the delay consequent upon such examination
would cause great and irreparable injury to such business,
and would involve a multiplicity of suits.
7. Here are the significant provisions of the contested statute:
Section 4. "Only such films as are, in the judgment and
discretion of the board of censors, of a moral, educational,
or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and
approved by such board."
8. The films are required to be stamped or designated in a
proper manner.
9. Section 5. The board may work in conjunction with censor
boards of other states as a censor congress, and the action
of such congress in approving or rejecting films shall be
considered as the action of the state board, and all films
passed, approved, stamped, and numbered by such
congress, when the fees therefor are paid, shall be
considered approved by the board.
10. By 7, a penalty is imposed for each exhibition of films
without the approval of the board, and by 8, any person
dissatisfied with the order of the board is given the same
rights and remedies for hearing and reviewing, amendment
or vacation of the order "as is provided in the case of
persons dissatisfied with the orders of the Industrial
Commission."
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ISSUES:
1. WON the statute imposes a burden on interstate
commerce? (NO)
2. WON the statute violates the freedom of speech and
publication? Specifically, do films enjoy the same
protection? (NO) (spoiler alert, ma oover turn sya sa next
case)
3. WON there was undue delegation of power? (NO)
RATIO:
1. NO; The statute only pertains to those to be exhibited in
Ohio.
1.The censorship therefore is only of films intended for
exhibition in Ohio, and we can immediately put to one
side the contention that it imposes a burden on interstate
commerce.
2.It is only films which are "to be publicly exhibited and
displayed in the State of Ohio" which are required to be
examined and censored.
2. NO; Films do not enjoy the same protection.
-It is not questioned by the Ohio statute, and under its
comprehensive description, "campaigns" of an infinite
variety may be conducted. Films of a "moral, educational,
or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and
approved," are the words of the statute.
-No exhibition, therefore, or "campaign" of complainant
will be prevented if its pictures have those qualities.
Therefore, however missionary of opinion films are or may
become, however educational or entertaining, there is no
impediment to their value or effect in the Ohio statute.
-But they may be used for evil, and against that possibility
the statute was enacted.
-Their power of amusement, and, it may be, education,
the audiences they assemble, not of women alone nor of
men alone, but together, not of adults only, but of
children, make them the more insidious in corruption by a
pretense of worthy purpose or if they should degenerate
from worthy purpose.
-RE: Films and constitutional protection on free speech
It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be
regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio
Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country,
or as organs of public opinion.
-They are mere representations of events, of ideas and
sentiments published and known; vivid, useful, and
entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of
evil, having power for it, the greater because of their
attractiveness and manner of exhibition.
-It was this capability and power, and it may be in
experience of them, that induced the State of Ohio, in
 addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions,
as it does in its Criminal Code, to require censorship
before exhibition, as it does by the act under review. We
cannot regard this as beyond the power of government.
3. NO; the statute provides for a standard.
-The statute by its provisions guards against such variant
judgments, and its terms, like other general terms, get
precision from the sense and experience of men, and
become certain and useful guides in reasoning and
conduct.
-The exact specification of the instances of their
application would be as impossible as the attempt would
be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the
law properly relies.
DISPOSITIVE: Decree AFFIRMED.
5. What is Sacrilegious?
Burstyn v Wilson (1952) Clark, J.
Petitioner: Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
Respondent: Industrial Commission of Ohio
Concept: What is Sacrilegious
Brief facts: Film was permitted to be shown. A lot of people
complained about it offending their religious feelings and all
that.
Doctrine: Free speech wins over religious feelings. And films
enjoy the same amount of protection even if it is made for
profit.
FACTS:
1. The issue here is the constitutionality, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which
permits the banning of motion picture films on the ground
that they are "sacrilegious."
2. The New York State had a law mandating that films had to
be licensed by the state to be publicly shown.
3. The law read, "The director of the [motion picture] division
[of the education department] or, when authorized by the
regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause
to be promptly examined every motion picture film
submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film
or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman,
sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue
a license therefore. If such director or, when so authorized,
such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall
furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the
reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected
part of a film not rejected in toto."
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4. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., was a corporation that distributed
motion pictures in New York, including a movie
entitled The Miracle.
5. The motion picture division of the New York education
department, acting under the statute quoted above, issued
to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The
Miracle," with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy
called "Ways of Love."
6. For a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways of Love"
was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New
York City under an agreement between appellant and the
owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated
percentage of the admission price.
7. Some groups in the state considered the movie
sacrilegious and therefore religiously offensive and called
on Commissioner Wilson of the New York State
Department of Education, to withdraw the film's license.
Wilson agreed, and the film could no longer be shown in
public theaters.
8. The film's distributor sued in the state court to force
Commissioner Wilson to grant the license.
9. Burstyn brought the present action in the New York courts
to review the determination of the Regents. Among the
claims advanced by Burstyn were (1) that the statute
violates the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint
upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is
invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the
guaranty of separate church and state and as a prohibition
of the free exercise of religion; and, (3) that the term
"sacrilegious" is so vague and indefinite as to offend due
process.
10. The New York Appellate Division sustained the revocation
of the license, deeming the film "sacrilegious," and the
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the decision.
Burstyn then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing
that the state law violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. WON motion pictures are within the ambit of protection
which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth,
secures to any form of "speech" or "the press."? (YES)
2. WON a state may ban a film based on the finding that it is
sacrilegious? (NO)
RATIO:
1. YES; Regardless if they were made for profit. Mutual film
doctrine is abandoned.
-The court now starts to do a throwback to a previous
case.
-In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, a distributor of
motion pictures sought to enjoin the enforcement of an
Ohio statute which required the prior approval of a board
of censors before any motion picture could be publicly
exhibited in the state, and which directed the board to
approve only such films as it adjudged to be "of a moral,
educational or amusing and harmless character."
-The statute was assailed in part as an unconstitutional
abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court
rejected this contention, stating that the first eight
Amendments were not a restriction on state action.
-On appeal to this Court, plaintiff in its brief abandoned
this claim and contended merely that the statute in
question violated the freedom of speech and publication
guaranteed by the Constitution of Ohio.
-It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be
regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio
constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country
or as organs of public opinion.
-This Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press
which the First Amendment guarantees against
abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action.
-This case is the first to present squarely to us the question
whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection
which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth,
secures to any form of "speech" or "the press."
-It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a
significant medium for the communication of ideas. They
may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not
lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as
well as to inform.
-In Winters v NY:
o The line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar
with instances of propaganda through fiction.
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's
doctrine.
-Re: Motion pictures capacity for evil
o It is further urged that motion pictures possess a
greater capacity for evil, particularly among the
youth of a community, than other modes of
expression.
-Even if one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not
follow that motion pictures should be disqualified from
First Amendment protection.
-If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in
determining the permissible scope of community control,
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but it does not authorize substantially unbridled
censorship such as we have here.
-It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places.
-Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method tends to present its
own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First
Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as
they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make
freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in
this case for making an exception to that rule.
-The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a
past offense, speech or writing falling within the
permissible scope of subsequent punishment.
-On the contrary, New York requires that permission to
communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state
officials who judge the content of the words and pictures
sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many
years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of
infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially
condemned.
-A major purpose of the First Amendment guaranty of a
free press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication,
although it was carefully pointed out that the liberty of the
press is not limited to that protection.
-The protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been
recognized only in exceptional cases.
2. NO; It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious
doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or
motion pictures.
-The statutory provision involved in granting the power to
determine what is sacrilegious is:
o that no religion, as that word is understood
by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be
treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and
ridicule. . . .
-In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition
of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor
is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of
conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but
those provided by the most vocal and powerful
orthodoxies.
-New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control
over motion pictures in a censor.
-Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant
censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring
one religion over another, and he would be subject to an
 inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular
sentiments sacred to a religious minority.
-Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other
respects, might raise substantial questions under the First
Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with
freedom of worship for all.
-However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and
the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no
legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior
restraints upon the expression of those views.
-It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular
religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications,
speeches, or motion pictures.
-Since the term "sacrilegious" is the sole standard under
attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide, for
example, whether a state may censor motion pictures
under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to
prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very
different question from the one now before us. We hold
only that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a
state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's
conclusion that it is "sacrilegious."
DISPOSITIVE: Decree REVERSED
The Mutual Film rulings inconsistent with this one is declared
abandoned.
CONCURRING OPINION
Frankfurter, J
3. This is a long one. And I think this is what the old guy
would want.
4. He first goes on retelling the facts and eventually
discusses what Sacreligious and how confusing it is. This
is mostly what he talked about.
5. If the New York Court of Appeals had given
"sacrilegious" the meaning it has had in Catholic thought
since St. Thomas Aquinas formulated its scope, and had
sustained a finding by the Board of Regents that "The
Miracle" came within that scope, this Court would have
to meet some of the broader questions regarding the
relation to the motion picture industry of the guarantees
of the First Amendment so far as reflected in the
Fourteenth. But the New York court did not confine
"sacrilegious" within such technical, Thomist limits, nor
within any specific, or even approximately specified,
limits. It may fairly be said that that court deemed
"sacrilegious" a self- defining term, a word that carries a
well known, settled meaning in the common speech of
men.
6. So far as the Court of Appeals sought to support its
notion that "sacrilegious" has the necessary precision of
meaning which the Due Process Clause enjoins for
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statutes regulating men's activities, it relied on this
definition from Funk & Wagnalls' Dictionary: "The act of
violating or profaning anything sacred." But this merely
defines by turning an adjective into a noun and bringing
in two new words equally undefined. It leaves wide open
the question as to what persons, doctrines or things are
"sacred." It sheds no light on what representations on
the motion picture screen will constitute "profaning"
those things which the State censors find to be "sacred."
7. To criticize or assail religious doctrine may wound to the
quick those who are attached to the doctrine and
profoundly cherish it. But to bar such pictorial discussion
is to subject non-conformists to the rule of sects.
8. Even in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, it
was deemed necessary to find that the terms
"educational, moral, amusing or harmless" do not leave
"decision to arbitrary judgment." Such general words
were found to "get precision from the sense and
experience of men."
9. This cannot be said of "sacrilegious." If there is one thing
that the history of religious conflicts shows, it is that the
term "sacrilegious" -- if by that is implied offense to the
deep convictions of members of different sects, which is
what the Court of Appeals seems to mean so far as it
means anything precisely -- does not gain "precision
from the sense and experience of men."
10. The vast apparatus of indices and digests (funny they
read stuff in digests. LOL), which mirrors our law, affords
no clue to a judicial definition of sacrilege.
11. The Motion Picture Division of the Education Department
does not support with explanatory statements its action
on any specific motion picture, which we are advised is
itself not made public. Of the fifty-odd reported appeals
to the Board of Regents from denials of licenses by the
Division, only three concern the category "sacrilegious."
12. the Board's reported opinion confines itself to a bare
finding that the film was or was not "sacrilegious,"
without so much as a description of the allegedly
offensive matter, or even of the film as a whole.
13. history demonstrates that the term is hopelessly vague
when it goes beyond such ecclesiastical definiteness and
is used at large as the basis for punishing deviation from
doctrine.
14. Etymologically, "sacrilege" is limited to church-robbing:
sacer, sacred,and legere, to steal or pick out. But we are
told that "already in Cicero's time it had grown to include
in popular speech any insult or injury to [sacred things].
"In primitive religions [sacrilege is] inclusive of almost
every serious offence even in fields now regarded as
merely social or political. . . ." The concept of "tabu" in
primitive society is thus close to that of "sacrilege."
15. In the Theodosian Code the various crimes which are
accounted sacrilege include -- apostasy, heresy, schism,
Judaism, paganism, attempts against the immunity of
 churches and clergy or privileges of church courts, the
desecration of sacraments, etc., and even Sunday. Along
with these crimes against religion went treason to the
emperor, offences against the laws, especially
counterfeiting, defraudation in taxes, seizure of
confiscated property, evil conduct of imperial officers,
etc.
16. To the extent that English law took jurisdiction to punish
"sacrilege," the term meant the stealing from a church,
or otherwise doing damage to church property. This
special protection against "sacrilege," that is, property
damage, was granted only to the Established Church.
Since the repeal less than a century ago of the English
law punishing "sacrilege" against the property of the
Established Church, religious property has received little
special protection. The property of all sects has had
substantially the same protection as is accorded non-
religious property.
17. The New York Court of Appeals' statement that the
dictionary "furnishes a clear definition," justifying the
vague scope it gave to "sacrilegious," surely was made
without regard to the lexicographic history of the term.
As a matter of fact, the definition from Funk & Wagnalls'
used by the Court of Appeals is taken straight from 18th
Century dictionaries, particularly Doctor Johnson's.
18. It would seem that the Funk& Wagnalls' definition uses
"sacrilege" in its historically restricted meaning, which
was not, and could hardly have been, the basis for
condemning "The Miracle." If the New York court reads
the Funk & Wagnalls' definition in a broader sense, in a
sense for which history and experience provide no gloss,
it inevitably left the censor free to judge by whatever
dogma he deems "sacred" and to ban whatever motion
pictures he may assume would "profane" religious
doctrine widely enough held to arouse protest.
19. History teaches us the indefiniteness of the concept
"sacrilegious" in another respect. In the case of most
countries and times where the concept of sacrilege has
been of importance, there has existed an established
church or a state religion. That which was "sacred," and
so was protected against "profaning," was designated in
each case by ecclesiastical authority. What might have
been definite when a controlling church imposed a
detailed scheme of observances becomes impossibly
confused and uncertain when hundreds of sects, with
widely disparate and often directly conflicting ideas of
sacredness, enjoy, without discrimination and in equal
measure, constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom.
20. If "sacrilegious" bans more than the physical abuse of
sacred persons, places, or things, if it permits censorship
of religious opinions, which is the effect of the holding
below, the term will include what may be found to be
"blasphemous."
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21. The crime of blasphemy in Seventeenth Century England
was the crime of dissenting from whatever was the
current religious dogma.
22. Blasphemy was the chameleon phrase which meant the
criticism of whatever the ruling authority of the moment
established as orthodox religious doctrine.
23. Moreover, the scope of the English common law crime of
blasphemy has been considerably limited by the
declaration that "if the decencies of controversy are
observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be
attacked," [n54] a limitation which the New York court
has not put upon the Board of Regents' power to declare
a motion picture "sacrilegious."
24. In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of
one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.
25. Conduct and beliefs dear to one may seem the rankest
"sacrilege" to another.
26. In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of
one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.
27. Conduct and beliefs dear to one may seem the rankest
"sacrilege" to another.
28. Sooo, this is where it starts to be important
29. It is this impossibility of knowing how far the form of
words by which the New York Court of Appeals
explained "sacrilegious" carries the proscription of
religious subjects that makes the term unconstitutionally
vague.
30. To stop short of proscribing all subjects that might
conceivably be interpreted to be religious, inevitably
creates a situation whereby the censor bans only that
against which there is a substantial outcry from a
religious group. And that is the fair inference to be
drawn, as a matter of experience, from what has been
happening under the New York censorship.
Consequently the film industry, normally not guided by
creative artists, and cautious in putting large capital to
the hazards of courage, would be governed by its notions
of the feelings likely to be aroused by diverse religious
sects, certainly the powerful ones. The effect of such
demands upon art and upon those whose function is to
enhance the culture of a society need not be labored.
31. From all that has been said, one is compelled to
conclude that the term "sacrilegious" has come down
the stream of time encrusted with a specialized, strictly
confined meaning, pertaining to things in space, not
things in the mind.
32. The New York Court of Appeals did not give the term
this calculable content. It applied it to things in the mind,
and things in the mind so undefined, so at large, as to be
more patently in disregard of the requirement for
definiteness, as the basis of proscriptions and legal
sanctions for their disobedience, than the measures that
 were condemned as violative of Due Process in several
cases.
33. This principle is especially to be observed when what is
so vague seeks to fetter the mind and put within
unascertainable bounds the varieties of religious
experience.
6. Adequate and Efficient Instruction
PACU v Secretary (1955) Bengzon, J.
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES, ETC
Respondent: Secretary of Education and the Board of
Textbooks
Concept: Adequate and efficient instruction
Brief facts: The Secretary of Education now implemented
guidelines for schools. Petitioners are now claiming that its a
violation of the right to own a school
Doctrine: "adequate and efficient instruction" should be
considered sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare"
"necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest"
and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case"
have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying
delegation of authority to regulate.
FACTS:
1. P In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make
a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of
all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof.
2. The following are findings from the study:
3. There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today
to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance,
greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school
to teach the young. It it true that in order to post over the
door "Recognized by the Government," a private
adventure school must first be inspected by the proper
Government official, but a refusal to grant such recognition
does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to
exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized
private schools than of the recognized variety. How many,
no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps
records only of the recognized type.
4. Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact
presented under the caption Private Adventure Schools
leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them
from primary grade to university are money-making devices
for the profit of those who organize and administer them.
5. Recommendations.The Commission recommends that
legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any
school by an individual or organization without the
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permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. That
before granting such permission the Secretary assure
himself that such school measures up to proper standards
in the following respects, and that the continued existence
of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform
to these certain conditions (enumeration of conditions)
6. Act No. 2706 was approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act
making the inspection and recognition of private schools
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public
Instruction."
7. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the
owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of
Education. Such requirement was not originally included in
Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Act No.
180 approved in 1936.
ISSUES:
1. WON the questioned statute confers upon the Secretary
of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe
rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power? (NO)
2. WON the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts
of all private schools for additional Government expenses
in connection with their supervision and regulation is a tax
on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open
a school, the liberty to teach etc? (It depends)
RATIO:
1. NO; There was sufficient instruction and guidelines in the
statute.
34. It is quite clear the two sections (section 1 & 6)
empower and require the Secretary of Education to
prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and
efficient instruction to be observed by all such private
schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate.
35. Despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of
Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and
efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or
revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final
examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.;
and the system of private education has, in general, been
satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows
that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the
educational experience and training of those in charge of
the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate
minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis
of government recognition of any private school.
36. petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules
and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such
discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who
"bully heads and teachers of private schools."
Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those
regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to
book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot
 to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show
that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a
statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality
of such statute.
37. Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should
be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public
welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order"
"public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative
standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate.
38. the statute does not in express terms give the
Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to inspect
private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them
official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to
revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to
complete control. If any of such Department circulars or
memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds
of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it
would surely be invalid.
2. It depends. Case to be decided upon institution of a case to
determine the nature of the same in the proper court.
39. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere feeand not a
taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and
power to regulate and supervise private schools, the
exaction may be upheld; but such point involves
investigation and examination of relevant data, which
should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the
other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within
the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
DISPOSITIVE
For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the
petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and at the
proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue
herein presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be
denied. So ordered.
7. Reasonableness as an Implied Standard
Wisconsin inspection Bureau v. Whitman (1928) -Rosenberry, J.
Petitioners: State Ex. Rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau et al.
Respondent: Whitman, Commissioner of Insurance
Note: Ang hirap intindihin nung case.
Brief Facts: The constitutionality of the Rating Law of 1917 is
assailed based on undue delegation of the power granted
onto the commissioner of insurance. The Rating Law of 1917
created a rating bureau (Wisconsin Inspection Bureau), which
filed its rule book with the commissioner. Such rule book is
used in the rating and rerating of risks in a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory manner. The commissioner approved only
some of the proposed rules and disapproved others.
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Doctrine: While the statute does not in terms provide that the
commissioner shall exercise a sound and reasonable discretion
on the disapproval of proposed rules, that condition is
necessarily implied. Administrative officers must act, not only
within their field of statutory powers, but in a reasonable and
orderly manner. The rule of reasonableness inheres in every
law and the action of those charged with its enforcement must
in the nature of things be subject to the test of reasonableness.
FACTS:
1. The commissioner of insurance is an administrative officer.
The office has long been known to the law.
2. The laws delegating powers to insurance commissioners
were very closelyscrutinized, and a rather rigid and
inflexible application was made of the doctrine of
separation of powers and its corollary that powers once
vested cannot be redelegated.
3. Section 203.36 of the rating law states:
"All regulations or rules of any such rating bureau shall be
filed with the commissioner of insurance, and no such
regulations or rules shall be in force before such filing, nor
in any case, after a written order by the commissioner of
insurance, disapproving such regulations or rules."
4. On the one hand, it is contended that all so-called riders
which may be issued by a bureau must be submitted by
the bureau to the commissioner and cannot be in force
after the commissioner has disapproved the same.
5. On the other hand, it is said that the language referred to
relates only to the internal management and control of the
business of the rating bureau, has no application to riders
prepared by the bureau for use by its members and that
the same are not subject to approval or disapproval by the
commissioner.
6. A rating bureau--- the Wisconsin Inspection Bureau was
organized and it filed its rule book in the office of the
commissioner of insurance. The commissioner of
insurance considered its rule book in order to determine
as to whether or not the rates, rules and regulations
promulgated by the various rating bureaus are reasonable
and nondiscriminatory.
7. The said rule book, which was the subject of the rating law
has always been considered by the insurance department
and the insurance companies as a necessary and
important part of the rating system, through the use of
which the rating and rerating of risks in a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory manner may be accomplished.
-contained 73 pages.
8. The said rule book has always been a topic of controversy
because numerous rule books that have been filed had
been disapproved by the department because the rates,
rules and regulations contained therein were at variance
with past practices and custom that the attempt to
enforcethem always resulted in complaints.
9. In 1897, the legislature adopted a so-called anti-compact
 statute which provided that all insurance companies were
prohibited from combining for the purpose of establishing
and maitaining a fixed schedule of rates. It authorized
local boards of underwriters to establish rates for their
respective localities.
10. The Rating Act of 1917 (law that is under consideration) is
designed to set up a new plan which would make state
supervision of rate-making more efficient and attainable.
11. The general scheme of the law may be stated as follows:
-Every company writing the designated kind of insurance
is required to be a member of a rating bureau.
-A rating bureau may be formed by any five or more
companies and each bureau is required to admit applying
companies to membership.
-Rates were to be established by the bureau and no
company could establish a different rate except the
manner provided by that act.
ISSUES:
1. Is such statute valid? (YES)
2. Does it constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power? (NO)
3. Does the statute erect no standard in accordance with
which the discretion of the commissioner of insurance is to
be exercised, and vests in him an arbitrary power? (NO)
RATIO
-An attempt to specify a standard for rules and regulations
to be promulgated by rating bureaus and approved by the
commissioner of insurance would be nothing more nor
less than the prescribing of the rules and regulations and
riders themselves.
-The general purpose of the law is indicated. The
commissioner of insurance must act within the boundaries
of reason and not oppressively. The standard prescribed,
considering the subject-matter dealt with meets the test
already indicated.
-The statute does not attempt to prescribe a basis of
reasonableness as it might well do, nor does there seem
to have been much progress made in arriving at a basis of
reasonableness.
-Conclusion: The commissioner did not act within the
statute nor in accordance with the statute and do not
reach the question of whether or not his order was invalid
on constitutional grounds.
Notes from C2016 reviewer: Consider the context and nature
of the subject matter. Insurance industry requires only general
standards, because flexibility is required to make the laws
applicable to different situations or cases such as changing
conditions in the markets. Reasonableness is an implied
standard in every law.
8. To Promote Simplicity, Economy, or Efficiency
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Cervantes vs. Auditor-General (1952) Reyes, J.
Petitioners: Cenon S. Cervantes
Respondent: The Auditor General
Concepts: To Promote Simplicity, Economy or Efficiency (under
Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards)
Doctrine: The rule is that so long as the Legislature lays down
a policy and a standard is established by the statute, there is
no undue delegation. RA 51, in authorizing the President to
make reforms and changes in GOCCS, lays down a standard
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent
government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was
set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry out the
mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question, which, tested by the rule, does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power.
FACTS:
1. The NAFCO was created by Commonwealth Act No. 332
on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of P20,000,000. The
management of the corporation was vested in a board of
directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
a. The corporation was made subject to the
Corporation Law in so far as they were
compatible with the provisions of its charter
and the purposes of which it was created
and was to enjoy the general powers
mentioned in the corporation law in addition
to those granted in its charter.
b. The members of the board were to receive a
per diem of not to exceed P30 for eac day of
meeting actually attended, except the
chairman of the board, who was to be at the
same time the general manager of the
corporation and to receive a salary of
P15,000 per annum.
2. On October 4, 1946, RA 51 authorized the President of the
Philippines to effect reforsm and changes in GOCCs for
the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operation.
3. On October 4, 1947, EO 93 created the Government
Enterprises Council, which was to advise the President in
the exercise of his power of supervision and control over
these corporations and to formulate necessary policies.
4. The council was to have a Control Committee with the
following powers:
a. To supervise, for and uner the direction of
the President, all the corporations owned or
controlled by the Government for the
 purpose of insuring efficiency and economy
in their operations
b. To pass upon the program of activities and
the yearly budget of expenditures approved
by the respective Boards of Directors of the
said corporations
c. TO carry out the policies and measures
formulated by the Government Enterprises
Council with the approval of the President.
5. Cervantes was the 1949 manager of the National Abaca
and other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO). Cervantes had a
salary of P15,000 a year. He was also granted allowance
not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that
month by a resolution of the Board of Directors.
6. The said resolution was submitted to the Control
Committee of the Government Enterprises COUncil for
approval, which was later on disapproved based on the
recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred by the
Auditor General.
a. Quarters allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by the charter of
the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the
general manager thereof at the sum not to
exceed P15,000 a year
b. The precarious financial condition of the
corporation did not warrant the granting of
such allowance.
7. Cervantes asked the Control Committee to reconsider and
approve his claim for allowance. The previous
recommendation was reaffirmed because the
corporations finances hadnt improved.
ISSUES:
1. Should the NAFCO grant the resolution for additional
allowance? (No)
2. Is EO 93 null and void? (NO.)
Ratio:
1. NAFCO is a Government controlled corporation subject to
RA 51 and EO 93.
-NAFCO is subject to the powers of the Control
Committee created in EO 93:
a. power of supervision for purpose of insuring efficiency
and economy in the operations of the corporation
b. Power to pass upon the program of activities and the
yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of
directors.
-The Control committee had good grounds for
disapproving the resolution, for as pointed out by the
Auditor-General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of
the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of
petitioners salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate
charter.
2. EO 93 is not null and void
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-Cervantes contends that EO 93 is null and void because it
is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal
delegation of legislative power
SC:
-The rule is that so long as the Legislature lays down a
policy and a standard is established by the statute, there
is no undue delegation.
-RA 51, in authorizing the President to make reforms and
changes in GOCCS, lays down a standard policy that the
purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon
the establishment of the free and independent government
of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operations.
-The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President
had to carry out the mandate. This he did by promulgating
the executive order in question, which, tested by the rule,
does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power.
-Cervantes contends it was promulgated beyond the
period of one year limited in said law.
SC:
-This ground ignores the rule that in the computation of
the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the
last day included. The President was given a period of one
year within which to promulgate his EO , and it was within
the given period.
Dispositive: Petition is dismissed and Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is denied.
9. Maintain Monetary Stability, Promote Rising Level of
Production and Real Income
People vs. Joliffe (1959) Concepcion, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellant: William Ernest Jolliffe
Concepts: Maintain monetary stability, promote rising level of
production and real income (under Judicial Determination of
Sufficiency of Standards)
Brief Facts: Jolliffe was arrested for being in possession of 4
gold bullions with the intention of exporting them without a
required license. He assails the constitutionality of CB Circular
21, which requires such license, contending that it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the Central Bank.
Doctrine: The powers granted to the Central Bank must be
construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of law
creating the Central Bank, which, among others, is to
maintain monetary stability in the Philippines and to
promote a rising level of production, employment and real
income in the Philippines. These standards are sufficiently
concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the
character of ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS in the enforcement of
the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the
category of a delegation of legislative powers.
FACTS:
1. Jolliffe is a Canadian, born in China and residing
permanently in Hong Kong. He is the son of a former
Chancellow of the West China Union University and had
been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai and
Hong Kong, until 1948. He frequented Manila to meet his
wife and children passing thru Manila.
2. Jolliffe went to Manila to collect the debt owed to him by
TW Woo, a prominent businessman in Jong Kong. He had
no idea how said debt was to be paid, whether in peso or
in gold. He was paid in gold, which he hid under his shirt.
3. When he was going to his hotel room, Amanda Arimbay, a
secret service agent accosted him.
4. Four pieces of gold bullion and a 100USD travelers check
was found on him. JOlliffee had no license to export the
gold.
5. Jolliffe was arrested for violating RA 265: AN act
Establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines, Defining
its Powers in the Administration of the Monetary and
Banking System; CB Circular 21 stated that any person
desiring to export gold bullions must obtain a license from
the Central Bank.
6. Jolliffee contends that Circular 21 is an undue delegation
of legislative power because the Monetary Board
exceeded the authority granted to it by the Central Bank
Act because the context of the circular does not indicate
that it was a temporary emergency measure, among
others.
ISSUE: Is CB 21 unconstitutional for being an undue
delegation of legislative Power? (NO)
RATIO:
-Sec. 74 of RA 265 granted the Monetary Board and the
President the following powers:
a. To subject to licensing all transactions in gold and
foreign exchange so as to protect the international
reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange
crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the
Government time to take constructive measures to
combat such crisis.
b. To take such appropriate remedial measures to
protect the international stability of the peso.
-These powers must be construed and exercised in
relation to the objectives of law creating the Central
Bank, which, among others, is to maintain
monetary stability in the Philippines and to
promote a rsing level of production, employment
and real income in the Philippines.
-Central Bank Circular 21 requiring said license under
section 34 of RA 265 refers to consummated exportation,
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not to attempted or frustrated exportation.
-Under our system of government, said power may not be
delegated except to local governments. However, one
thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law
shall be and another thing to delegate the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself.
-The rule is that the delegated powers fall under the
second category, if the law authorizing the delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks
the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it
may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance
with the legislative will.
-These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to
vest in the delegated authority the character of
ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS in the enforcement of the law
and to place the grant of said authority beyond the
category of a delegation of legislative powers.
Dispositive: Appeal Denied
IV. Administrative Procedure
A.
Book VII (Administrative Procedure), Administrative Code of
1987.
SECTION 1. Scope.This Book shall be applicable to all
agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the
Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to
Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole,
and state universities and colleges.
SECTION 2. Definitions.As used in this Book:
(1) Agency includes any department, bureau, office,
commission, authority or officer of the National Government
authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue
licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases;
research institutions with respect to licensing functions;
government corporations with respect to functions regulating
private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in
the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law.
(2) Rule means any agency statement of general applicability
that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the
procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency,
including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or
statements concerning the internal administration or
management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or
procedure available to, the public.
(3) Rate means any charge to the public for a service open to
all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates,
tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates
which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed
and followed by any person.
(4) Rule making means an agency process for the
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(5) Contested case means any proceeding, including
licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted
by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are
to be determined after hearing.
(6) Person includes an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, public or private organization of any character
other than an agency.
(7) Party includes a person or agency named or admitted as
a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be
admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing
herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting
any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.
(8) Decision means the whole or any part of the final
disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether
affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any
matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights
and privileges.
(9) Adjudication means an agency process for the
formulation of a final order.
(10) License includes the whole or any part of any agency
permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration,
charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.
(11) Licensing includes agency process involving the grant,
renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment,
withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or
conditioning of a license.
(12) Sanction includes the whole or part of a prohibition,
limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person;
the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the
destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the
assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution,
compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or
suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or
restrictive action.
(13) Relief includes the whole or part of any grant of money,
assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception,
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or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege,
exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the
application or petition of any person.
(14) Agency proceeding means any agency process with
respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
(15) Agency action includes the whole or part of every
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or
denial thereof.
SECTION 3. Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the
University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
SECTION 4. Effectivity.In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency
rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
SECTION 5. Publication and Recording.The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rules
filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published
and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and
appropriate tables.
SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules.(1) The University of the
Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be unduly
cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies
of that rule shall be made available on application to the
agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice
stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new
copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which,
pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty
shall in all cases be published in full text.
SECTION 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules.The
University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1)
free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified
rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress,
all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and
the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to
such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication
and mailing or distribution costs.
SECTION 8. Judicial Notice.The court shall take judicial
notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as
published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
SECTION 9. Public Participation.(1) If not otherwise required
by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
SECTION 10. Compromise and Arbitration.To expedite
administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or
claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in
the public interest, encourage amicable settlement,
compromise and arbitration.
SECTION 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases.(1) In
any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and
hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before
the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place
of the hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence
and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal
disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation,
agreed settlement or default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
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SECTION 12. Rules of Evidence.In a contested case:
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence
commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of
copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon
request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the
copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of
a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses
presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts
and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within
its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and
afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
SECTION 13. Subpoena.In any contested case, the agency
shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or
the production of books, papers, documents and other
pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the
hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise
provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience,
invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court
may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
SECTION 14. Decision.Every decision rendered by the
agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days
following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the
decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their
counsel of record, if any, or to them.
SECTION 15. Finality of Order.The decision of the agency
shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless
within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if
proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration
may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said
period.
SECTION 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions.(1)
Every agency shall publish and make available for public
inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of
contested cases.
(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his
equivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of
those decisions or final orders for use by the public.
SECTION 17. Licensing Procedure.(1) When the grant,
renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be
preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning
contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.
(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules
and regulations or when public security, health, or safety
require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended,
revoked or annulled without notice and hearing.
SECTION 18. Non-expiration of License.Where the licensee
has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a
license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the
existing license shall not expire until the application shall have
been finally determined by the agency.
SECTION 19. Appeal.Unless otherwise provided by law or
executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency
may be taken to the Department head.
SECTION 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals.(1)
Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision
complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with
the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal,
serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the
appellate agency, and paying the required fees.
(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall
have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of
the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution
of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the
aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit
the records of the case to the appellate agency.
SECTION 21. Effect of Appeal.The appeal shall stay the
decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or
the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it
may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of
the case.
SECTION 22. Action on Appeal.The appellate agency shall
review the records of the proceedings and may, on its own
initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence.
SECTION 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency.In any
contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall
become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt
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by the parties of a copy thereof.
SECTION 24. Hearing Officers.(1) Each agency shall have
such number of qualified and competent members of the base
as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and
adjudication of contested cases.
(2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of
prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually
related case.
SECTION 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be
subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and
applicable laws.
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency
decision may seek judicial review.
(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the
agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary
parties as defined in the Rules of Court.
(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing
with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a
petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be
served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition
shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied
with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with
copies of such material portions of the records as are referred
to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be
under oath and shall how, by stating the specific material
dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter.
(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1)
motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is
denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the
remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the
resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal.
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified
by statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
(7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a
whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by
substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically
provided otherwise by law. 2. Respondent National Labor Union Inc. (NLU), prays for the
vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of the
SECTION 26. Transmittal of Record.Within fifteen (15) days Court and the remanding of the case to CIR for a new trial:
from the service of the petition for review, the agency shall o That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to
transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the come up with new evidence/documents that they
entire records of the proceeding under review. The record to were not able to obtain before as they were
be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to inaccessible and they were not able to present it
the proceedings. The court may require or permit subsequent before in the CIR.
correction or additions to the record.
ISSUE: WON due process would be better served if the
respondent is given opportunity to present the new evidence.
B. In Rule-Making, Price, Wage, or Rate-Fixing
(YES)
C. In Adjudication of Cases
RATIO:
1. Rules of Procedure
-The motion for new trial should be, and the same is hereby
2. Due Process
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
a. Cardinal Primary Rights
remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (1950) Laurel, J.
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
Petitioner: Ang Tibay and National Workers Brotherhood
forth.
Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor
-The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically
Union, Inc.
stated in the law of its creation, CA 103.
Concept: Cardinal Primary Rights
o It is more of an administrative board.
-Goseco v. CIR: CIR is not narrowly constrained by
Brief Facts:
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to act
National Labor Union prayed for the nullification of judgment
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
of the CIR and the remand of the case to the said court for
the case.
receipt of new evidence. Earlier, members of the NLU were
temporarily laid off by employer Ang Tibay, who claimed there
-The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
was a shortage of leather shoes, a contention which, according
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
to the NLU, is not supported by the records of the Bureau of
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
Customs and other accounts.
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an
Doctrine:
administrative character.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court that is more
-There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
administrative than judicial in nature. Pursuant to the Act
(7):
creating it, it must not be narrowly constrained by technical
o The right to a hearing, which includes the right of
rules of procedure; however, such does not mean that it can
the party interested or affected to present his
entirely ignore fundamental requirements of due process.
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
Administrative Due Process:
o Not only must the party be given an opportunity
7 Cardinal Rights which must be respected.
to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts
FACTS:
but the tribunal must consider the evidence
1. Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
presented.
company which supplies the Philippine Army.
o While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
o Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused
obligation to decide right, it does imply a
the layoff of members (89) of National Labor Union
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
Inc.
that of having something to support its decision.
o NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is
not within the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
a nullity, a place when directly attached.
o That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay;
o Not only must there be some evidence to
o That the employer Toribio was guilty of unfair labor
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly
must be substantial.
favouring NWB.

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 o The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
o The CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
o The CIR should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered.
DISPOSITION: Motion for new trial granted.
Asprec v. Itchon (1966) Sanchez, J.
Petitioner: Cleto Asprec
Respondent: Victoriano Itchon, Jose Suguitan, Felipe Cruz, The
Executive Secretary, Nicanor Jorge, Antonio Noblejas, and
Jacinto Hernandez
Brief Facts: Asprec failed to deliver a plan approved by the
Director of Lands, a requirement to obtain a certificate of title,
to Hernandez. An administrative Case was filed against him the
board of examiners found him guilty for violation of the Code
of Ethics. His certificate as a land surveyor was revoked. A
petition was filed in the SC after denial of certiorari by the RTC.
Doctrine: Presence of a party at trial is not always the essence
of due process. It is sufficient that the parties be given notice
of the trial, an opportunity to be heard.
Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to
appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was
previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his
day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he
pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been
given an opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
1. Jacinto Hernandez enlisted the services of petitioner Cleto
Asprec, a private land surveyor.
2. It was agreed that upon payment of compensation,
Asprec would deliver to Hernandez a plan approved by
the Director of Lands within three months after
completion of the survey, and would procure the issuance
of a certificate of title to the lot thus surveyed within 6
months after the plans approval.
3. Asprec failed to deliver, the lapse of 4 years
notwithstanding.
4. He averred compliance by allegedly delivering PSU-
138774 (AP-2419). Hernandez claims it was a mere copy of
a survey made for one Damian Alhambra.
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5. Hernandez filed an administrative complaint for
unprofessional conduct with the Board of Examiners for
Surveyors.
6. Board of Examiners for Surveyors: Asprec was guilty of
deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for Surveyors.
a. Asprecs certificate of registration as a private land
surveyor was revoked.
7. Assistant Executive Secretary: Approved the Boards
decision. The Board demanded the return of the
certificate of registration.
8. Office of the President: Denied petitioners MR.
9. Meanwhile, the Director of Lands directed all offices under
the Bureau of Lands to return to petitioner unacted all
surveys executed or corrected by the latter.
10. CFI of Camarines Sur: Denied the petition for certiorari.
11. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON Asprec was denied due process (NO)
2. WON it was necessary for Asprec to be present in the
proceedings before the Board (NO)
3. WON the judgment on the pleadings was invalid (NO)
4. WON the revocation of his certificate of registration was
proper (YES)
RATIO:
1. Asprec was not denied due process
-Court draws attention to the events that transpired
before the Board of Examiners:
1. March 31, 1958: Petitioner objected to the fact
that the complaint was not under oath.
Hernandez directed to file a verified complaint.
Hearing postponed.
2. May 12, 1958: Petitioner claimed that the
complaint sets forth new facts, asked for 10
days to file an Answer. Instead, he filed an MTD.
3. August 18, 1958: Petitioner prayed that the
hearing be held in abeyance until the Board shall
have resolved the MTD.
4. March 11, 1959: Asprecs counsel was not feeling
well. Hearing postponed.
5. May 11, 1959: Asprec and counsel were not
present. Hernandez rested his case and filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
-Petitioner thus had an ample opportunity to defend
himself before the Board.
-Presence of a party at trial is not always the essence of
due process. It is sufficient that the parties be given notice
of the trial, an opportunity to be heard.
-Petitioner knew of the trial on May 11. He did not appear.
He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.
-He only appeared on April 16 of the following year. Surely
enough, this patent inattentionbetter termed gross
negligencewill not carry the day for him.
 -Frankfurter: Due process is merely the embodiment of
the sporting idea of fair play.
2. It wasnt necessary for Asprec to be present.
-Petitioner contends that the proceedings were quasi-
criminal in nature, such that no valid trial could proceed if
he absented himself therefrom.
-The Court does not agree. Where the respondent in a
petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for
the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was
held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the
judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he
was adjudged to give, he having been given an
opportunity to be heard.
3. The judgment on the pleadings is valid
-Technical rules of court practice, procedure, and
evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in
administrative proceedings.
4. The revocation was proper
-Petitioner: Surveyors AO No. 1 provides: Any surveyor
who has been suspended three (3) times shall no longer
be authorized to practice surveying in the Philippine
Islands.
-He loses sight of the fact that Sec. 10, Act No. 3626, as
amended, states:
The Board of Examiners may suspend or revoke the
license or certificate as practising surveyor granted to
any person in case the same has been convicted by
any court of a crime involving moral turpitude, if he
has been guilty of immoral and dishonest conduct, if
he is mentally incapacitated, or for unprofessional
conduct.
-The Board thus had the discretion to suspend or revoke
his license.
DISPOSITION: Decision affirmed.
Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (1998) Panganiban, J.
Petitioner: Vinta Maritime Co, Inc.
Respondent: NLRC and Leonides Basconcillo
Concept: Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
Brief Facts: This is a case on illegal dismissal filed by Basconillo
for being relieved of his duties barely 3 months into the job
after a verbal altercation with Robinson. POEA ruled in his
favor and this was appealed by Vinta Maritime for lack of
conducting a full-blown trial.
Doctrine: In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
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due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense.
These rules equally apply to cases filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office. Section 6 of Rule III, Book VII of the POEA
Rules and Regulations of 1991 categorically states that
proceedings before a POEA hearing officer is non-litigious,
although they are still subject to the requirements of due
process.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Leonidas Basconillo was hired as the
Chief Engineer in petitioners vessel MV Boracay.
2. Barely three (3) months after boarding the vessel, private
respondent was informed by the ships Master that he was
relieved of his duties per recommendation of the Marine
Superintendent, Mr. Peter Robinson, due to his gross
negligence, incompetence, and poor performance.
3. This came after private respondent had a verbal
altercation with Robinson, a British national, regarding the
discipline or lack thereof of the Filipino crew under private
respondents supervision.
o No inquiry or investigation, however,
regarding his supposed incompetence or
negligence was ever conducted; neither was
private respondent furnished with a notice or
memorandum regarding the cause of his
dismissal.
4. Private respondent was made to disembark at the port of
Oslo, Norway, and immediately repatriated to the country.
5. Contrary to his perceived incompetence, private
respondents Seamens Book contained the following
entries: Conduct Very good; Ability Very good;
Remarks Highly Recommended
6. Basconillo filed a case for illegal dismissal with the POEA.
7. Administrator Achacoso ruled that Basconillo was illegally
dismissed.
8. Petitioner alleges that the Commission gravely abused its
discretion by rendering the resolution and decisions
without a full-blown trial on the merits, and by
disregarding the evidence for the petitioners and ruling
that the company illegally dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative due process.
(NO)
2. WON respondent was illegally dismissed (YES)
RATIO:
1. Trial is not indispensable in administrative due process.
-Although bound by law and practice to observe due
process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements.
 -As applied to these proceedings, due process requires
only an opportunity to explain ones side.
-In labor cases, it has been consistently held that due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing,
but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard.
-The requirements of due process are deemed to have
been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to
submit position papers.
-In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.
-These rules equally apply to cases filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office. Section 6 of Rule III, Book VII of the
POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 categorically states
that proceedings before a POEA hearing officer is non-
litigious, although they are still subject to the
requirements of due process.
-Applied to this particular case, it is undeniable that
petitioners were given their chance to be heard.
-Their answer, position paper and supporting documents
had become parts of the records and were considered
accordingly by the POEA rendering their respective
decisions.
2. Respondent was illegally dismissed
-For an employees dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal
must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be
afforded due process.
-The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is
patent. Petitioners allege that private respondent was
dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating
incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by
private respondents seamans book which states that his
discharge was due to an emergency leave.
-His alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made
by petitioners in the same book that private respondents
services were highly recommended and that his conduct
and ability were rated very good.
-On the second requisite, no notice was ever given to him
prior to his dismissal. This fact alone disproves petitioners
allegation that private respondent was given fair warning
and enough opportunity to explain his side [regarding] the
incidents that led to his dismissal.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
Bachrach Motor v CIR (1978) - MUNOZ-PALMA, J.
Petitioners: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., BACHRACH
TRANSPORT CO. as operator of RURAL TRANSIT
Respondents: COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RURAL
TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
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Brief Facts: Bachrach was to fire one of its employees, Maximo,
for violations of the Motor Vehicle Law. During the hearings,
they presented only one witness, Mr. Kaplin, who never
attended the hearings. Maximo moved that his testimony be
stricken off the records, which was allowed by the CIR.
Doctrine: The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is
common to civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings. If an
adverse party fails to present their witnesses for cross
examination, the other party may order that their witnesses'
testimonies (and sometimes evidence) be stricken off the
record.
Under what topic: Due process in administrative proceedings
(Right to cross examine witnesses)
FACTS:
1. In 1958, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on
strike. The dispute between it and Rural Transit reached the
CIR for compulsory arbitration. The CIR then immediately
issued a return to work order.
2 While this dispute was pending, Bachrach filed for Authority
to discharge a certain Maximo Jacob, claiming that Maximo
committed multiple violations of the Motor Vehicle Law
resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties,
such as the total destruction of one of the company buses.
o Maximo challenges this decision, alleging that
the bus incident was due to a mechanical defect
of the bus-- it was beyond his control.
3. The case was then heard in the CIR, where the petitioner
presented only one witness-- Mr. Kaplin, their general
manager.
o After he concluded his direct testimony, the
hearing for cross-examination was rescheduled
multiple times, but Kaplin never appeared in any
of those dates.
4. In response, the respondent association filed a motion
praying that Kaplin's testimony be stricken off the records
(along with the reinstatement of Maximo). The CIR ruled in
favor of them, even on motion for reconsideration.
o The petitioners challenge this ruling, especially
the striking out of Kaplin's testimony.
ISSUE: WON it was proper for the CIR to strike out Kaplin's
testimony for non-appearance in the hearings for cross-
examination. (YES)
RATIO:
1. YES, as his non-appearance was in effect a denial of due
process that could not be countenanced.
-One of the rights of parties is to confront and cross-
examine opposing witnesses. The right is an indispensable
part of due process, although it may be waived.
- If the witness does not appear at all, as in this case, it is
the right of a party to have the adverse party's testimony
stricken off the record as they are effectively being denied
 an indispensable part of due process-- the testimony
cannot be considered as complete, and cannot be used as
evidence. This rule does not distinguish between civil,
criminal, and administrative cases.
-In a case cited by the petitioners, Savory Luncheonette v
Lakas, the difference there was that the delay in the cross-
examination of the opposing party was due to the
complaining party's fault (through dilatory tactics). Such
was a considered an implied waiver of the right to cross-
examine the witness
-The petitioners claim that they had another witness
instead of Mr. Kaplin. However, in one of the hearings,
they admitted the signatures of Mr. Kaplin on the said
documents,but they did NOT do anything as to the truth
of the contents. In effect, the documents may only be
admitted without the testimony of Kaplin. They are now
considered hearsay, weakening the defense even more.
-Without any evidence to controvert Maximo's case, the
petition to discharge was rightly dismissed, and he should
be reinstated to his previous post.
DISPOSITIVE: CIR judgment affirmed; salary adjusted to 3 years
backwages.
UP Board of Regents v. CA (1999) Mendoza, J.
Petitioners: UP BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR
POSADAS, DR. E. ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA
CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO
AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO
Resondents: COURT OF APPEALS, AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE (I'll be referring to her as Swamy for the
rest of the digest)
Brief Facts: Swamy was found to have committed 90 instances
of plagiarism in her dissertation. Her degree was eventually
withdrawn, while giving her ample opportunity to explain
herself. She filed a petition for mandamus seeking to have it
returned, but it was denied by the RTC, but granted by the CA.
Doctrine: Due process in administrative proceedings requires
only that one be heard. In cases involving students, trial-type
proceedings are not required, and certain rights are not
available, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses.
Under what topic: Due process in administrative proceedings
FACTS:
1. Swamy was an Indian citizen who enrolled in CSSP's
doctorate program in Anthropology. She wrote a
dissertation on Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia,
and the Philippines.
2. At the home stretch of her dissertation work, around Dec
22 1992, Dr. Rolda, chairperson of the UP Anthro
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Department, wrote to Dr. Diokno, then CSSP Associate
Dean and Grad Program DIrector, certifying that Swamy
had finished her work and was ready for her oral defense.
o The defense committee consisted of Drs. Arsenio
Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel
Teodoro, and Isagani Medina
o While going over the dissertation, Dr. Medina
informed Dean Paz that there was a portion in
the dissertation that was lifted, without proper
acknowledgment from 2 articles.
o The issue was not touched upon in the oral
defense; in fact, the panel only required Swamy
to incorporate suggested revisions before they
could approve of the dissertation.
3. Swamy then sought a meeting with the panel members to
discuss the suggested revisions. During the meeting,
Dean Paz remarked that she only need a majority vote of
the panel emmbers in order to pass (and she need not
obtain the consent of the Dean's representative, Dr.
Medina).
o While this was pending, her graduation was
approved.
o At the same time, she began submitting copies
of the supposedly revised dissertation. 3 of the
panel members assented to the dissertation,
although they noted that the revisions were not
made. Since she already had 3/5 approvals (a
majority), she simply left copies of the
dissertation with the other professors (Dr.
Teodoro disapproved; Dr. Medina was silent),
and submitted the final copy of it to the CSSP.
4. Dean Paz accepted the dissertation. Swamy was included
in the list of candidates for graduation for the second
semester of AY 1992-1993.
o In spite of the acceptance, Dean Paz requested
the exclusion of Swamy's name, as there were still
issues with respect to her dissertation (non-
inclusion of Dr. Medina's signature, the revisions).
o The Paz request arrived too late, as the list of
students was approved. Two days later, Swamy
graudated.
o Instead, Dean Paz opted for the denial of
academic clearance.
5. Eventually, on May 1 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged
Swamy with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate be withdrawn.
o Dean Paz informed the respondent of the
charges against her. A committee headed by Dr.
Ventura found 90 instances of plagiariasm in her
dissertation.
o This led the CSSP College Assembly to
unanimously recommend the withdrawal of
Swamy's doctorate degree. The University
 Council approved of the same, and transmitted it
to the Board of Regents.
o However, the Board of Regents deferred action
to study the legal implications of its approval.
6. Months later, former Diliman Chancellor Roman also
summoned Swamy to a meeting, where she informed her
of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of
the Ventura committee. Swamy also submitted her written
explanation.
o They held several meetings to discuss the
charges, but Swamy did not attend the third
meeting, claiming that the Board of Regents had
already decided her case before she could be
fully heard.
o She wrote to Dr. Javier, then UP President, and
Dr. Fabella, then Chair of the BOR. In fine, she
complained that she had not been afforded due
process and claimed that UP could no longer
withdraw her degree. They did not budge.
7. A year later, Swamy sent a letter to the BOR requesting a
re-investigation of the case, claiming that her case should
have been tried by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. UP
did not budge-- the UP Diliman Council withdrew Swamy's
degree, informing her of the decision in a letter dated
January 1995.
8. Undettered, Swamy wrote a letter to the Commission on
Human Rights, the Board of Regents, and the UP
President. The latter two denied her. In the end, she filed
a petition for mandamus in the RTC-QC, seeking her
degree, as well as damages.
9. The court dismissed her petition, but the CA reversed on
appeal, citing denial of due process, claiming that . UP
appeals this decision to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent was denied due process given the
events leading up to the withdrawal of her degree. (NO)
2. Whether or not UP's dismissal of the respondent was a valid
exercise of academic freedom. (YES)
RATIO:
1. NO, as she was given ample opportunity to be heard.
-In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a
controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the
action/ruling complained of.
-It must be noted that various committees had been
formed to investigate the respondent's case, and she was
given opportunities for hearing (informed in writing of the
charges, took part in meetings on the case, asked to
submit a written explanation, sent countless letters to the
UP authorities explaining her position). In fact, the
problem here was that there were too many investigations
conducted, all with the same result.
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-This is enough-- trial-type proceedings are not required in
administrative cases. In fact, the right to cross examination
is not even present (which is why the respondent need not
be furnished a copy of the findings of the committees).
2. YES, as part of the measures that UP may undertake to
protect its integrity as an institution.
-Art. XIV, Sec. 5.2 of the Constitution provides for
academic freedom. It involves the power of institutions to
determine the requirements for graduation.
-Thus, when shown that the conferment of an honor was
obtained through fraud, a university has the right to
revoke that honor. This extends even after graduation,
especially as that graduation is the issue here. The only
reason Swamy attended the graduation ceremonies was
because there were too many investigations.
-Here, that freedom would extended to the protection of
UP's integrity by going after cases of plagiarism. Such was
the case here-- no less than 90 instances in one paper. The
presumption of regularity applies in the absence of proof
of the contrary.
(As for the issue on the Student Disciplinary Tribunal, the
tribunal deals with disciplinary actions, but what UP is doing
here is NOT a disciplinary action for a student-- it is
withdrawing a degree mistakenly granted to a now-graduate.)
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision reversed.
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. CA (1979) - Aquino, J.
Petitioners: ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO
P. NAVA, VIOLA S. NAVA, FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA,
HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO S. NAVA, PURIFICACION
SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO
ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF
MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO MENDEZ,
NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO YABUT,
ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, CASIMIRO N.
EBIDO, ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B.
MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN, FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO
ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE, PABLO
PABILONA, ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and
CECILIO OOVILLA
Brief Facts: In a contested mining claim, Director of Mines
Gozon's decision was affirmed on appeal by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources... Gozon himself. Such was
questioned in the CFI, who affirmed the decision, but such was
reversed in the CA. Both parties appeal because one of the CA
MRs remanded the case back to the Ministry of Natural
Resources (when an initial decision awarded the claims asked
by the petitioners).
Doctrine: Normally, one would appeal an order from an agency
to the secretary. However, that presupposes the trier be a
different person from the person handling the appeal.
Otherwise, the judgment would be a farce.
Under what topic: Due process in administrative proceedings
FACTS:
1. In Mines Admin Case V-227, then Director of Mines Gozon
dismissed the case filed by the petitioners, who were
claiming several mining claims in Zambales. Gozon found
that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor
staked and located mining claims in accordance with law.
However, he granted the claims of respondents Martinez
and Pabilona.
2. The case was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. While appeal was pending, Gozon
became the Secretary, and he decided the appeal as if he
were adjudicating the case for the first time (instead of
inhibiting). He dismissed the appeal from his own
decision.
3. The petitioners then filed a complaint in the CFI Zambales,
assailing Gozon's decision. The CFI dismissed the case-- it
held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own
decision/ruling under Rule 137.1 ROC does not apply to
administrative bodies, nor is there a similar provision in
the Mining Law.
4. The CA reversed the CFI decision on the ground of right
of possession. It did not touch on the impropriety of
Gozon's review. It, however, granted a reversal of the
mining claims.
5. On MR, however, modified its decision-- it remanded the
case to the Minister of Natural Resources as Gozon's
decision was void because he was disqualified to review
his own decision as Director of Mines. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON due process was denied when Gozon reviewed
his own decision when he became department secretary. (YES)
RATIO:
YES, as there is no point in an appeal if the appellate judge
were the same person as the trial judge, for no 'sane' person
would be willing to admit his previous decision was wrong.
-Gozon's act was a mockery of administrative justice.
When Sec. 61 refers to the appeal of the decision of the
Director of Mines, it contemplates that the secretary be a
different person. Otherwise, there would be no point to an
apppeal-- one would not admit that he was mistaken in
the first view of the case, hence why such a disqualification
should also apply to administrative agencies.
-Gozon should have asked his undersecretary to
undertake the review.
DISPOSITIVE: Vacate judgment on claims. Remand case to
Minister of Natural Resources.
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Rivera v. Civil Service Commission (1995) Vitug, J.
Plaintiff: George Rivera
Respondent: Civil Service Commission and Land Bank of the
Philippines
Concept: Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
Brief facts: Rivera was held guilty for acts prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and grave misconduct by the LBP
and was meted out a penalty of forced resignation. He
appealed to the MSPB which lowered the penalty of
suspension for 1 year. He filed a MFR to the CSC which
imposed the penalty of dismissal. In both MSPB and CSC
proceedings, Hon. Gaminde participated. Rivera claims he was
denied due process because of such participation.
Doctrine: In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case.
FACTS:
1. George Rivera was the Manager of Corporate banking
Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
2. On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus
Perez, Rivera was charged by the LBP President of the
following offenses:
a. Dishonesty
b. Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other
valuable thing, in the course of official duties or
in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or
other valuable thing is given by any person in the
hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better
treatment than that accorded to other persons
c. Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft
Laws
d. Pursuit of private business vocation or profession
without the permission required by the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations
e. Violation of Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of
the Office of the President
f. Violation of Res. 87-A, RA 337, resulting to
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service
3. River allegedly told Perez, the Marketing manager of
Wynner which had a pending loan application with PNB,
that he could facilitate the processing, approval and
release of the loan if he would be given a 10%
commission. Rivera was said to have received P200k
commission out of the P3M load proceeds from LBP.
4. Rivera supposedly received from Lao an amount of P20k
as pocket money for his trip to the US, as well as
 additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodation
and pocket money for another trip to HK.
5. Violation of Memorandum Circular 1025 he served and
acted, without prior authority required by the Civil Service
Rules and Memorandum Circular 1025, as the personal
consultant of Lao and as consultant of various companies
where Lao had investments. Received salaries amounting
to P20k a month, evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel,
Inc., J & M Clothing Corp, and JME Trading Corp.
6. Once charges were filed, Rivera was placed under
preventive suspension.
7. After formal investigation, LBP held River guilty of grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
service in accepting employment from a client of the bank
and receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Sec
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Also found
guilty of violating Sec 3(d) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).
8. He was meted out a penalty of forced resignation without
separation benefits and gratuities.
9. Rivera appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) which held that he was only guilty of committing
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
reduced his penalty to suspension of 1 year.
10. LBP filed a MFR but was denied. Hon. Thelma Gaminde
participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of
MSPB.
11. Both LBP and Rivera appealed to the CSC which rejected
LBPs appeal and acted upon Riveras appeal by finding
him guilty of grave misconduct and imposing the penalty
of dismissal from service Gaminde also took part in
Riveras MFR, this time as CSC Commissioner.
ISSUE: WON Rivera was denied due process when Gaminde
participated in the MSPB proceeding and also in the CSC
proceeding (YES)
RATIO:
-Zambales Chromite Mining Company v CA: decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set
aside by the SC after it had been established that the case
concerned an appeal from the Secretarys own previous
decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent
Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a
mockery of administrative justice, the SC said:
In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,
the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the
officer whose decision is under review; otherwise,
there could be no different view or there would be no
real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not
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admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case
-Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should
have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibited
herself totally from any participation in resolving Riveras
appeals to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to the fundamental aspect of due process.
DISPOSITIVE: CSC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Case is
REMANDED to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation
of Commissioner Gaminde of Riveras Motion for
Reconsideration.
American Inter-Fashion Corp v. Office of the President (1991)
Gutierrez Jr., J.
Plaintiff: American Inter-Fashion Corporation
Respondent: Office of the President, Garments and Textile
Export Board, and Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
Manufacturing Co.
Concept: Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
Brief Facts: Glorious Sun was found guilty of dollar-salting by
the GTEB and as a result, its export quotes were given to 2
newly formed corporations. Glorious Sun appealed to the
Office of the President 3 years later, alleging that it was denied
due process because the GTEB Resolution in 1984 had no
basis. OP ordered for the case to be remanded to GTEB.
Doctrine: The record clearly manifests that in cancelling the
export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent's constitutional right to due process.
Before the cancellation in 1984, the private respondent had
been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect
the private respondent's export quota allocation which initially
was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which
should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due
process only to hurriedly confer it on another.
FACTS:
1. On April 27, 1984, Glorious Sun was found guilty of dollar-
salting and misdeclaration of importations by the
Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) as a result of
which the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.
2. Its quotas were given to 2 newly formed corporations (De
Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American
Inter-Fashion Corporation) which were allegedly owned by
a member of the family and a crony of Mr. Marcos. These
2 corporations eventually became major stockholders of
Glorious Sun, allegedly due to the pressures imposed by
former Minister Mr. Ongpin to Glorious to enter into a
joint venture agreement.
3. Glorious filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the SC, claiming that its right to due process was violated
and that the GTEB decision wasnt supported by
substantial evidence. The court issued a resolution,
ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the
administrative case against Glorious.
4. However, Glorious filed a manifestation of its intent to
withdraw the petition which the SC granted. (Later in the
discussion, it will be revealed that the motion to withdraw
arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not only
Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed
by the martial law regime).
5. Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for
restitution of its export quota allocations and requested a
reconsideration of the GTEB decision. It alleged that the
GTEB decision was rendered as a result of duress, threats,
intimidation and undue influence exercised by Mr. Ongpin
in order to transfer the export quotas to Marcos crony-
owned corporations denied by GTEB
6. Glorious appealed to the Office of the President which
ruled in its favor. It found that the proceedings before the
GTEB in 1984 were irregular, and remanded the case to
GTEB for further proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. WON its the Office of the President who has jurisdiction
over the appeal and not the Sandiganbayan (YES)
2. WON the previous petition in the SC which Glorious
withdrew amounted to res judicata (NO)
3. WON Glorious was denied due process (YES)
RATIO:
1. It is the Office of the President who has jurisdiction over the
appeal of Glorious and not the Sandiganbayan.
-Republic v Sandiganbayan: Under Section 2 of the
President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986,
all cases of the Commission regarding the funds, moneys,
assets, and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated
by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates,
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees,
whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such
cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
-The issued resolved by the Office of the President isnt
proper for the Sandiganbayan for the following reasons:
1. The 1984 cancellation of the export quotas of
Glorious Sun is a main case. As a principal case it
cannot be an incident of any sequestration or ill-
gotten wealth case which should be referred to
the Sandiganbayan.
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2. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to
ascertain whether or not the questioned
Malacaang decision is tainted by grave abuse of
discretion. Whether or not the Office of the
President correctly reviewed a 1984 GTEB
decision is not proper for the Sandiganbayan to
ascertain. The correctness of that decision is for
the Supreme Court to decide and not for the
Sandiganbayan.
2. The resolution which granted the withdrawal of the petition
did not constitute res judicata on the matter because it wasnt
decided on the merits.
-Petitioner argues: In entertaining the appeal of Glorious,
the Office of the President made itself a tool in a cunning
move to resurrect a decision which had become final and
executor for more than 3 years.
-SC: for a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur:
1. It must be a final judgment;
2. The court which resolved it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties
3. It must be a judgment on the merits
4. There must be identity between the two cases as
to the parties, subject matter, and cause of action
-A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished
from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or
merely technical point.
-The dismissal of the earlier petition cannot be
categorized as a judgment on the merits. The courts
action in 1984 didnt resolve anything. This dismissal was
solely based on Glorious notice of withdrawal. It was
based on a purely technical matter and hence, it cannot
constitute res judicata.
3. Glorious was clearly denied due process in the GETB
proceedings.
-GTEB even admitted that in the 1984 hearings, it failed to
disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by it in arriving at
its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting.
However, it claims that such non-disclosure was remedied
by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its
request for the copies of the relevant documents in 19877.
-GTEBs posture is misleading. The issue of this petition is
the 1984 resolution which was the sole reason for stripping
off Glorious export quotas and awarding them to the 2
newly and hastily created corporations. GETB cannot use
as an excuse the subsequent disclosure if the evidence it
used in 1987 to justify the 1984 resolution.
-Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious in 1987
enhanced that it was denied due process. It was ranked
only 5th in the import prices at $2.00. The highest was Lee
Phils ($3.13) and the lowest was Pie Wynner ($1.42).
Glorious price of $2.00 is below the median of $2.485.
-Apparently, the 1984 GTEB investigative panel picked up
4 importers whose import prices were lower than that of
Glorious in order to show that the latters import prices
was the highest to justify the cancellation of the export
quotas in obedience to the instruction of then Minister
Ongpin.
-The conclusiveness of GTEB as to the excessiveness of
Glorious import prices drew a controverting statement
from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation
Division:
Considering the unit prices gathered with the unit
prices of Glorious Sun would lead one to believe that
Glorious Sun's prices are not exceptionally high at
$2.00/yd Furthermore, it can be seen from (1) that
some descriptions of the materials are not
complete. Thus there is not enough basis for
comparing import prices.
-Petitioner also cites inconsequential matters which
formed the basis of the decision of the Office of the
President which ought to be disregarded for lack of legal
worth. It cites the dissenting opinion in PCGG v Pena and
claims that this pronouncement is obiter since the issue on
the matter wasnt presented in that case:
I participated in the deliberations and hearings of the
Glorious Sun case in 1984 and I recall that there was
not the slightest scintilla of evidence to support the
charges of dollar salting made by GTEB A scrap of
yellow pad paper on which were pencilled a few
computations and with nothing to support them, a
graph of import prices of four local importers
identified only by letters, and another piece of paper
with supposed 1983 prices of fabrics were the only
"proof that the respondent Minister with all the power
(he was issuing warrants of arrest) and resources at his
command could produce before the Court. So
patently arbitrary was the finding of dollar salting that
it would have been easy for the First Division to
uphold the exporter's rights.
-SC: Even assuming that such observations were obiter,
we find no legal impediment to re-examine the same
conclusions which are borne by the records of the instant
case.
-Petitioner also cites affidavit of Chairman Puno given
before the PCGG and claims that it is an inconsequential
matter because the GTEB didnt give credence to the
affidavit which states that:
2. Prior to the start of the investigation, I was
instructed by Minister Ongpin to submit a report
finding Glorious Sun (Appellant herein) guilty of
dollar-salting and other violations that would justify
the cancellation of Glorious Sun's export quotas
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which were among the most substantial and valuable
in the garments industry in trouser's line.
3. After Glorious Sun submitted its evidence refuting
the dollar-salting charge, I told Minister Ongpin that
there was no evidence to substantiate the dollar-
salting charge against Glorious Sun or any other
violations of existing laws or rules. However, Minister
Ongpin still instructed me to submit a report to the
GTEB, of which Minister Ongpin was the Chairman,
finding Glorious Sun guilty of dollar-salting.
-SC: The fact that the other members would not agree
that there was pressure from Minister Ongpin to cancel
the export quotas of the respondent does not mean that
Mr. Puno was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he
was pressured by Minister Ongpin. He did not state that
the members of the Investigating Panel were pressured.
Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel.
Hence, it is plausible that in view of his position in the
Panel, he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin.
There is every reason to suspect that even before Glorious
Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas
and to award them to friends of their administration had
already been made.
-Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect
and finality, and generally shouldnt be disturbed by the
courts. However, if such findings arent supported by
evidence; are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedures which lead to the findings are
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is
manifest, such factual findings may be disregarded.
-The record clearly manifests that in cancelling the export
quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent's constitutional right to due process.
Before the cancellation in 1984, the private respondent
had been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977.
In effect the private respondent's export quota allocation
which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of
property right which should not be removed from it
arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer
it on another.
-Also, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to
question the Malacaang decision. It was incorporated
after the incidents in this case happened. It was created
obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily
removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered
precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony
corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted
on another private corporation.
DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. The instant petition is
DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of the Office
of the President are hereby AFFIRMED.
Justice Feliciano, Concurring:
- I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that
petitioner American Inter-fashion Corporation has failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion or act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent
Office of the President.
- At the same time, it seems useful to record the
consensus of the Court reached during its deliberation on
this case that, firstly, there is nothing in the present
decision that in any way modifies the rule in Presidential
Commission on Government v. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pea
- Secondly, such conclusions as the GTEB may reach in
respect of the factual and legal issues involved in OSC
Case No. 84-B-1, relate to the administrative charges
against private respondent Glorious Sun for
misdeclaration of importations, and will not bind
the Sandiganbayan in resolving Civil Cases Nos. 0002 and
0081 presently pending before theSandiganbayan,
involving charges of acquisition of "ill-gotten" wealth by
members of the Marcos family and their business
associates or cronies.
Pefianco v. Moral (2000) Bellosillo, J.
Petitioner: Hon. Erlinda C. Pefianco (DECS Secretary)
Respondent: Maria Luisa Moral
Concept: Due Process Cardinal Rights
Brief facts:
DECS Secretary filed a complaint against Moral for dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. After an investigation, she was found guilty and
was dismissed from her office. Instead of filing an appeal,
Moral filed a mandamus compelling Secretary to issue the
investigation committee report so that she would be guided
on what to do.
Doctrine:
A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against her during the hearings of the investigation
committee.
FACTS:
1. On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria
filed a complaint against Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief
Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for
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dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
- The complaint charged Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and
Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were
under her control and supervision as Division Chief and
keeping in her possession, without legal authority and
justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the
National Library.
2. The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several
hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special
Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented
the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while Moral
was represented by her own private counsel.
3. On 25 September 1996, Secretary Gloria issued a resolution
finding Moral "guilty of the administrative offenses.." She
was ordered dismissed from the government service with
prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits and other remunerations.
4. On 30 September 1996 Moral received a copy of the
resolution (twice the second one corrected a typo). Moral
did not appeal the judgment.
5. Instead, on 2 October 1996 Moral filed a Petition for the
Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report
purportedly to guide her on whatever action would be most
appropriate to take under the circumstances. Her petition
was denied.
40. She filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report
and DECS Resolution dated September 25, 1996, which
Secretary Gloria similarly denied.
41. Moral moved for reconsideration but the motion was
merely "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October
1996 Order that the denial of the request for the
production of the Investigation Committee Report was
final.
6. Moral did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September
1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted
an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular
courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from
enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of
the said report. Secretary Gloria filed MTD for lack of COA.
TC: MTD denied.
CA: Affirmed TC
Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco
who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
DECS Argument: there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish
Moral with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation
Committee

Moral Argument: DECS has not shown any law, DECS order or
regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents
for reasons of confidentiality or national security.
ISSUES:
1. WON DECS Sec should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to
dismiss? (NO)
2. WON DECS has to furnish Moral a copy of the Report of
the DECS Investigation Committee? (NO)
RATIO:
1. (PROCEDURAL) NO; Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a
motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor. Clearly, the above rule proscribes the
common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to
dismiss "for lack of merit."
42. The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997
falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The
Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus
and the trial court's jurisdiction over the rulings and actions
of administrative agencies without stating the basis why
DECS Secretarys motion to dismiss was being denied.
43. Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court,
through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an
opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or
order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to
well-recognized exceptions.
44. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent
nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of
the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration may
be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the
act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.
2. NO; there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on
DECS to furnish Moral with a copy of the investigation
report.
- A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges
filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record,
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee.
- Moral no doubt had been accorded these rights.
- Morals petition for mandamus will not prosper because
mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective.
It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary
duty.
o It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
Moral should have a clear legal right to the thing
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demanded and it must be the imperative duty of DECS
Secretary to perform the act required.
o While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
expressed, it must nevertheless be clear.
o In her petition for mandamus, Moral miserably failed to
demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish
her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled
to the writ prayed for.
- Primarily, Moral did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the
service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the
DECS resolution from becoming final and executory.
Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel
petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.
- Moral's assertion that the investigation report would be
used "to guide her on what action would be appropriate to
take under the circumstances," hardly merits consideration.
o The disputed investigation report is an internal
communication between the DECS Secretary and the
Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended
for the perusal of Moral or any other person for that
matter, except the DECS Secretary.
o The DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of
appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law
upon which Moral's removal from office was grounded.
o This resolution, and not the investigation report, should
be the basis of any further remedies Moral might wish to
pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced
by denying her access to the investigation report.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for mandamus filed by Moral to compel DECS
Secretary to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of action.
NAPOLCOM v. Bernabe (2000) Pardo, J.
Petitioner: NAPOLCOM, 1. National Appellate Board (Second
Division) and PNP
Respondent: Police Chief Inspector Leonardo Bernabe
Concept: Due Process Cardinal Primary Rights
Brief facts:
A newspaper article was published accusing PNP Chief
Inspector Bernabe of fraudulently encashing treasury warrants
of personnel who are dead, AWOL, suspended and separated
from service. PNP ordered a criminal investigation on these
charges. As a result of the investigation, he was dismissed. He
alleges dismissal claiming there was lack of due process.
Doctrine:
Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in
all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The
essence of due process is simply to be heard,or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
FACTS:
3. On March 03, 1993, there appeared an article in a
newspaper that PNP Chief Inspector Bernabe headed a
syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers,
policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already
dead, on AWOL, suspended and separated from the
service.
4. President Fidel V. Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to
conduct an investigation and prosecute Bernabe if
necessary. The Secretary referred the directive to the PNP
Director General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation
Service Command to investigate the charges.
5. On the same day, Bernabe was informed of the Batuigas
article with the Presidents marginal note on it and S/Supt.
Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit.
6. On March 5, 1993, Bernabe submitted his affidavit
answering point by point the charges against him.
- He alleged that all the cases against him were either
dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution,
except one which was pending before the
Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of seven
treasury warrants.
7. On March 18, 1993, CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted
to the Chief, PNP, a memorandum which states:
- In January 1989, then PC Captain Leonardo W. Bernabe
(et al.) was charged by the CISC of several counts of
Estafa thru Falsification of Documents in five (5) separate
cases. These cases involved some THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY SIC (376) pieces of treasury warrants (TWs) of
AWOL, deceased, discharged, separated and terminated
PC/INP personnel for the pay period of 1-15 and 16-30
April 1988. These TWs, which were supposedly cancelled
but were fraudulently encashed by the officers, were
identified and turned-over to the CIS Investigators by the
Auditing/Investigating team of the PC/INP Finance
Center. Later on, the cases were referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman. At present, however, only one of the
cases involving seven (7) TWs is being tried at the 3rd
Division of the Sandiganbayan. The other four (4) cases
are pending resolution at the Office of the Ombudsman.
8. On April 23, 1993, by command of the Police Deputy
Director General, Bernabe was suspended from the police
service for a period of ninety (90) days effective April 23,
1993. Subsequently, he was given notice of
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complaint/charge and order to answer within five days from
receipt of the complaint.
9. On March 31, 1993, Bernabe filed a motion for bill of
particulars. In reply, the CICS asserted that the technical
procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly
applicable to administrative proceedings; hence, the
allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable
Bernabe to file an intelligent answer.
10. On April 26, 1993, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer
issued a resolution recommending for Bernabes dismissal
from the PNP service.
11. On July 13, 1993, the PNP Inspector General concurred
with the recommendation of the Summary Dismissal
Officer.
12. On July 20, 1993, the Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of
Bernabe from the police service based on:
- The fraudulent encashing of treasury warrants
- He has unexplained assets or wealth consisting of
three (3) mansions, two (2) condominium units, three
(3) residential lots, ten (10) passenger jeeps, three (3)
big cargo trucks, fish pens at Laguna de Bay,
residential houses at Legaspi City, coffee and coconut
plantations at Basilan City and a big furniture shop at
Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila
- His total assets, mostly hidden in the names of his
blood and in-law relatives, can reach hundreds of
millions of pesos.
- He was also charged before the Board of
Accountancy, Professional Regulations Commission
(PRC), after CISC found out that he falsified his
transcript of records with the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines (PUP)
NAPOLCOM: sustained the summary dismissal of Bernabe
from the PNP
CA: Set aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for
failure to comply with the due process requirement of the
Constitution. (also held Section 42, R. A. 6975 constitutional
because the constitutionality was raised on appeal)
Argument of Bernabe: Case was decided by the Chief, PNP
without the benefit of a hearing, and therefore he was not
given the opportunity to fully present his evidence and was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers.
ISSUE: WON Bernabe was denied due process in the conduct
of the investigation of the charges filed against him? (NO.)
RATIO:
NO; Due process as a constitutional precept does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The
essence of due process is simply to be heard,or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
- Bernabe was given notice of the complaints/charges
against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted
an affidavit answering point by point the charges against
him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief,
PNP dismissing him from the police service to the
National Appellate Board, and submitted a 5. The letter-complaint and its attached documents were
memorandum.
- Consequently, Bernabe was given more than adequate
opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no
violation of his right to procedural and substantive due
process.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision set aside. Affirms the decision of the
Chief, PNP dismissing Bernabe Police Chief Inspector
Leonardo W. Bernabe from the police service.
Montemayor v. Bundalian (2003) Puno, J.
Petitioner: Edillo Montemayor
Respondent: Ronaldo B. Zamora (Executive Secretary, Office of
the President) and Gregorio Vigilar (Sec of DPWH)
Concept: Due Process Cardinal Primary Rights
Order Assailed: Administrative Order No. 12 (ordering
dismissal of Montemayor as Regional Director of DPWH)
Agency: Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC)
Brief facts:
Montemayor was accused of accumulating unexplained wealth
by Bunalian. PCAGC investigated this complaint. Montemayor
participated in the proceedings, while Bundalian could not be
located in the country. PCAGC recommended Montemayors
dismissal. Office of the President issued an order dismissing
Montemayor. Montemayor now assails the order, arguing that
he was not accorded due process in the proceedings.
Doctrine:
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
FACTS:
1. Luis Bundalian addressed an unverified letter-complaint to
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, CA,
accusing Montemayor (OIC-Regional Director, Region III,
of the DPWH), of accumulating unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
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2. In 1993, Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and
lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, CA,
making a down payment of US$100,000.00.
3. Montemayor's in-laws who were living in California had a
poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they
could not have purchased such an expensive property for
Montemayor and his wife.
4. Bundalian now accuses Montemayor of amassing wealth
from lahar funds and other public works projects.
indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San
Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation.
6. Montemayor, represented by counsel, submitted his
counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real
owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela
Fajardo.
o Montemayors wife inquired from her family in
the U.S. about their possible emigration to the
States. They were advised by an immigration
lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had
real property in the U.S.
o His sister-in-law Fajardo was interested in buying
a house and lot in Burbank, California, a provision
in her mortgage contract prohibits her to
purchase another property pending full payment
of a real estate she earlier acquired. To
circumvent the provision and to support
Montemayor and his wife in their emigration
plans, Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank
property and put the title in the names of
Montemayor and his wife.
o Moreover, the charge against him was the
subject of similar cases filed before the
Ombudsman. His charge was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
7. From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC
conducted its own investigation of the complaint.
Montemayor participated in the proceedings and
submitted various pleadings and documents through his
counsel, Bundalian, on the other hand, could not be
located as his Philippine address could not be
ascertained.
8. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly
required Montemayor to submit his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns
(ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet.
9. Montemayor ignored these directives and submitted only
his Service Record.
10. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly
issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in
Burbank, California.
PCAGC: Montemayor purchased a house and lot in Burbank,
California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M); however, Montemayor
could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his
annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his
Service Record. Property was unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended Montemayor's dismissal from service pursuant
to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
Office of the President: concurred with PCAGC and issued
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 12, ordering Montemayor's
dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government
benefits.
CA: dismissed appeal
Argument of Montemayor: PCAGC committed infractions of
the cardinal rules of administrative due process when it relied
on Bundalian's unverified letter-complaint. His counter-affidavit
should have been given more weight as the unverified
complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. PCAGC failed to
respect his right to confront and cross-examine the
complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the
hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative
therein.
ISSUES:
1. WON he was denied due process in the investigation
before the PCAGC? (NO)
2. WON his guilt was proved by substantial evidence? (NO)
3. WON the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the
PCAGC moot and academic. (NO)
RATIO:
1. NO; The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.
- His active participation in every step of the investigation
effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency,
if there was any, and satisfied the due process
requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge
the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.
o In the case at bar, Montemayor voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in
the proceedings before it. He was duly represented
by counsel.
o He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary
evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a
reconsideration of ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 12
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issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal
before the Court of Appeals.
- The lack of verification of the administrative complaint
and the non-appearance of Bundalian at the
investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority
to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth.
o Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating
the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption
may be filed before it in any form or manner against
presidential appointees in the executive department.
- In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before
the case against him is decided. This was afforded to
the Montemayor in the case at bar.
2. NO; The burden is on the complainant to prove by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.
- Montemayor submitted as proof the checks issued by
Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the
property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to
convince the Court.
- First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the
alleged internal arrangement Montemayor entered into
with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the
investigating body nor did she testify before it
regarding her ownership of the Burbank property.
- Second, Fajardo's mere issuance of the checks cannot
prove Montemayor's non-ownership of the property.
Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was
appointed by Montemayor as attorney-in-fact and the
latter would naturally course through her the payments
for the Burbank property.
- Third, Montemayor's denial of ownership of the
property is contradictory with the loan statement he
adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the
World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on
June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property.
Three (3) years later, Montemayor and his wife executed
a Quitclaim Deed, donating the Burbank property to his
sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove
his non-ownership of the property. The Quitclaim Deed
is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after
a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against
Montemayor.
- Montemayor admitted that the Grant Deed over the
property was in his name. He never denied the
existence and due execution of the Grant Deed and the
 Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela
Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank
property.
o With these admissions, the burden of proof was
shifted to Montemayor to prove non-ownership of
the property.
o He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to
the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as,
in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the
Court's power to do so. He had every opportunity to
adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
3. NO; The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
- Montemayor was investigated by the Ombudsman for
his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the
Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
- For the same alleged misconduct, Montemayor, as a
presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC
by virtue of the administrative power and control of the
President over him.
- As the PCAGC's investigation of Montemayor was
administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata
finds no application in the case at bar.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DISMISSED.
Shoppes Manila v NLRC (2004) Callejo, J.
Petitioner: Shoppes Manila
Respondents: NLRC and LORIE TORNO
Concept: Hearing Power of the LA
Brief Facts: Lorie Torno was dismissed from her work in
KAMISETA for alleged theft, and the LA ruled it was illegal for
lack of due process. Shoppes Manila now claims that the LA
should have conducted a formal hearing, as the LA had at an
earlier point in the case declared the same necessary.
Doctrine: A declaration that a formal hearing is necessary does
not vest parties the right thereto, and so long as it is not
mandatory, the absence thereof is not contrary to due process.
FACTS:
1. Lorie Torno had been an employee of Shoppes Manila
owned KAMISETA since 1994.
2. 1997: She was accused of stealing Kamiseta products,
When informed of the accusation, Torno agreed to have
her house inspected and searched for the alleged stolen
items.
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3. On July 30, 1997, the private respondents supervisor, Ms.
Myrasol O. Silva, conducted the inspection and submitted
a report to the effect that she found stolen goods.
4. When Torno failed to appear in the subsequent
disciplinary hearing, she was dismissed from work,
prompting her to file a case of illegal dismissal.
5. Shoppes Manila filed a motion for the labor arbiter to
conduct a formal investigation on its claim that a full
blown hearing during which the witnesses can be cross-
examined by the opposing counsel was necessary to
ascertain the truth.
6. Acting on the motion, LA Tumanong granted the same
and set the case for hearing. However, the hearing failed
to materialize because of the absences of either the
private respondent or her counsel. In the meantime, LA
Tumanong was replaced by LA Cuyaca who issued an
order declaring that the case was submitted for
decision. Shoppes Manila filed a manifestation and
motion informing LA Cuyuca that a formal hearing had
been set by LA Tumanong and requested that the case be
set for hearing anew. However, no action was taken by LA
Cuyuca on the said motion.
7. LA Cuyaca later declared that the Torno was denied of
her right to due process before she was dismissed from
her employment and that the petitioner failed to show
that it notified the private respondent of the charges
against her. The petitioner also failed to show that the
private respondent received the notice of
dismissal. Hence, the dismissal of the private respondent
was illegal.
8. Aggrieved, Shoppes Manila appealed the decision to the
NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its right to a formal
hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her decision. It
argued that while the conduct of hearing is not mandatory
in labor cases, the Labor Arbiter was mandated to do so in
this case because LA Tumanong had already declared that
a formal hearing was necessary. Hence, the petitioner had
acquired a vested right thereto, amounting to the absence
being a denial of due process.
9. Both the NLRC and CA refuted Shoppes Manilas
argument.
ISSUES:
1. WON Shoppes Manila denied due process (NO)
2. WON dismissal illegal (YES)
RATIO:
1. The petitioner did not have a vested right to a formal hearing
simply and merely because LA Tumanong granted its motion
and set the case for hearing.
 -Pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has the authority
to determine whether or not there is a necessity to
conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for
adjudication.
-The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary
with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties
cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within his
authority to decide a labor case before him, based on the
position papers and supporting documents of the parties,
without a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due
process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are
supposed to attach all the documents that would prove
their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be
conducted or was necessary.
-The order of LA Tumanong granting the petitioners
motion for a hearing of the case was not conclusive and
binding on LA Cuyuca who had the discretion either to
hear the case before deciding it, or to forego with the
hearing if, in her view, there was no longer a need therefor
as the case could be resolved on its merits based on the
records.
2. Petitioner failed to show that it complied with the two-notice
requirement.
(a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for
the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity
to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires;
(b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of
the employee, the employer must notify him in writing of
the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason
therefor
Dispositive: DECISIONS AFFIRMED.
Autencio v Manara (2005) Panganiban, J.
Petitioner: Inocelia Autencio
Respondents: Rodel Manara
Concept: Hearing Power of the LA
Brief Facts: During a hearing on grave misconduct, Autencio
alleges that she was promised a lighter charge of simple
negligence if she waived her right to present evidence. When
the hearing charged her with grave misconduct and she was
dismissed from work, she claimed that she was denied due
process.
Doctrine: Administrative proceedings are akin to criminal
prosecutions in the sense that no compromise may be entered
into between the parties as regards the penal
sanction. Complainants are not vested with the power of
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removal or suspension. That prerogative belongs to the
proper government officials.
FACTS:
1. City Administor Manara filed an administrative case against
Autencio in the Office of the City Mayor for dishonest and
misconduct in office. It was alleged that Autencio doctored the
payroll so the same would show that several workers worked
more days than they actually did, and that they split the extra
pay.
2. The Office of the City Mayor found Autencio guilty of
misconduct but not of dishonesty, and imposed a penalty of
forced resignation and waiver of retirement benefits. On
appeal to the CSC, the penalty was modified to dismissal with
cause and forfeiture of all accessory benefits.
3. On Autencios appeal, she claimed that she had waived her
right to present evidence on the promise and Manifestation of
Manara (the Hearing Officer and complainant) that she would
only be charged with simple negligence. She claims that the
same was tantamount to a deprivation of due process. To
bolster her claim, she introduces as evidence a Manifestation
of the incumbent Mayor alleging the same.
ISSUE: WON Autencio denied due process. (NO)
RATIO:
-The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly
performed. Government officials are presumed to have
regularly performed their functions and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption. The Manifestation is
insufficient to overturn this principle. It contains mere
conclusions, not statements of fact. (It is also worth noting
that the incumbent Mayor was not in office during the
events leading up to her and during her trial, further
casting doubt on its probative value.
-In her original appeal to the CSC, petitioner did not raise
the issue of respondents alleged misrepresentation,
which had allegedly induced her to agree to submit the
case for resolution without any formal hearing. Instead,
she merely questioned the harshness of the penalty
imposed by the City Government. Failure to invoke a
defense within the prescribed period constitutes a waiver
thereof. Defenses not invoked below cannot be raised on
appeal
-By waiving the presentation of evidence in a formal
hearing, the counsel of petitioner might have believed in
the futility of resisting the charge; thus, he opted to waive
her right to present evidence. That he allegedly relied on
respondents statement that she could be held liable only
for the lesser offense of simple negligence was a risk he
took on her behalf. It is jurisprudentially settled that
mistakes of counsel as to argumentation, the relevancy or
irrelevancy of a certain evidence or the introduction
 thereof are among others all mistakes of procedure that
bind the client.
-Administrative proceedings are akin to criminal
prosecutions in the sense that no compromise may be
entered into between the parties as regards the penal
sanction. Complainants are not vested with the power of
removal or suspension. That prerogative belongs to the
proper government officials.
-Moreover, in a real sense, complainants in administrative
cases are just witnesses. Therefore, regardless of their
desistance or representations, courts will not desist from
imposing the appropriate disciplinary sanction, if the
evidence so warrants. If administrative actions are made to
depend upon the whim or will of complainants, the
disciplining authorities and the courts would be stripped
of their prerogative
-On the formal charge against her, she had received
sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to
prepare her defense. She filed her Answer controverting
the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of
personnel in the Assessors Office to support her claim of
innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by
the legal officer, during which she -- assisted by her
counsel had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal
the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to
the CA.
-In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of
due process.
Dispositive: DECISIONS AFFIRMED.
Samalio v CA (2005) Corona, J.
Petitioner: Augusto Samalio
Respondents: CA, CSC, DOJ, Bureau of Immigration
Concept: Hearing Power of the LA
Brief Facts: Charged administratively for grave misconduct,
Samalio contends that the decisions against him were
improperly made, because no witnesses or evidence was
presented against him during the hearing, which he argues is
tantamount to deprivation of due process.
Doctrine: It is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, afidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses .
FACTS:
1. Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an Intelligence Officer of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. In Resolution
No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City
Prosecutors office of Pasay City recommended that
petitioner Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of
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Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration
Law before the Sandiganbayan, alleging that Samalio had
strong armed Ms. Wang Sai Qin into paying him $500 in
immigration by withholding the latters passport. When
Ms. Wang discovered that he hadnt even given her
passport the immigration arrival stamp, she complained.
2. An administrative case was commenced against petitioner
Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2,
Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
requiring petitioner to submit his answer to the charges
together with supporting statements and documents, and
whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his
answer is not considered satisfactory. In the same
Personnel Order, Samalio was preventively suspended for
a period of ninety (90) days as the charge sheet against
him involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct.
Forthwith, petitioner attempted the lifting of his
preventive suspension. It was struck down
3. He was simultaneously charged criminally, and convicted
for robbery.
4. His administrative hearing was decided against him, and
the penalty was dismissal from service. The CSC and CA
upheld the decision on appeal.
5. Samalio now alleges that he was denied due process,
alleging that no witness or evidence was presented
against him, and that the CA erred in the interpretation of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that there
was no hearing conducted on his case.
ISSUE: WON Samalio denied due process. (NO)
RATIO:
-The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirming the
decision of the Commissioner of the BID are supported by
substantial evidence. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of
Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the
case on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted
by the parties, and relied on the records of the
proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was based
on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against
petitioner before the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay
City, as well as Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4,
1993 of the same office recommending the prosecution of
petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery
and violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law.
-The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took
cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 and the fact of
petitioners conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample
evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows
support the decision of the CSC. a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
-The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for
applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of being violative of due process for an administrative
Court, otherwise known as the rule on former testimony, agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
in deciding petitioners administrative case. The provisions afidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the
of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of
rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising their direct testimony.
quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or -We have consistently held that the essence of due
the rules of procedure of the administrative agency process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as
concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to
to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
may be applied to proceedings before an administrative reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And
body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing
and valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process
the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
adjudication of cases before it. opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
a. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is Dispositive: DECISIONS AFFIRMED.
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or
deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between
the same parties or those representing the same
interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on
different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to
by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case and (e) the adverse
party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the former case.
b. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in
the administrative proceedings before the BID
because she left the country on February 6, 1993.
-Further, administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the
observance of fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense.
-Due process in an administrative context does not require
trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice.
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.

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