10.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, cannot re-categorize the unprotected conduct into a
Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (2010)
Facts: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition
were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA
9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the
basis of being suspected communist fronts by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke
the transcendental importance doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in
that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace and coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue: W/N it is constitutional.
Held: Yes. Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the
subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation
that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that
the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime,
including the coercion of the government to accede to
an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting
the communicative component of the prohibition
protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of
words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of s ransom or conditions, or
in negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established
neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
11. Imbong v. Ochoa (2014)
Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality One of
the ground they are assailing is that it violates due
process.
Issue: W/N RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH)
Law is unconstitutional for violating the due process
clause
Held: No. The RH Law does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
The definition of private health care service
provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a public health service
provider. The private health care institution cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to
private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad
enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information.
Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense
of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health.
12. Agabon v. NLRC (2004)
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the
employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the
employee. This became known as the Wenphil
Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is
not for any of the justifiable or authorized by law.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal
but the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity
should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice
of dismiss now, pay later which we sought to deter
in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees rights
warrants the payment of nominal damages.

Facts: Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home,
which is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials, as
gypsum board and cornice installers from January
1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed
for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and were decided in
their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to
the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal
because of petitioners abandonment of work. NLRC
ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in
turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because
they have abandoned their work but ordered the
payment of money claims.
Issue: W/N petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held: No. To dismiss an employee, the law required
not only the existence of a just and valid cause but
also enjoins the employer to give the employee the
right to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal
of an employee to resume his employment. For a
valid finding or abandonment, two factors are
considered: failure to report for work without a valid
reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt
acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work.
13. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commisssion
(2010)
Facts: President Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but
it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. One of its argument is that it
violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
Issue: W/N it violates equal protection clause.
Held: Yes. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly
constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
14. Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC (2015)
15. Garcia v. Drilon (2013)
Facts: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to
have inflicted violence against private respondents.
Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual
relations to the household help. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent. Their
quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter,
Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to
despair causing her to attempt suicide on December
17, 2005 b y slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to
the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never
visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days.
He even told his mother-in-law that respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is
not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a
child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate
from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial
support. He warned her that if she pursued legal
battle, she would not get a single centavo from him.
After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her
to hold office. This deprived her of access to full
information about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe
there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering
petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his
firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK.
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the law.
Some of his contentions are that it violated the equal
protection clause and due process.
Issue: W/N it violated equal protection and due
process.
Held:
1. No. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of
the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection
clause by favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
2. No. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of
ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot
be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
16. GSIS v. Montesclaros (2004)
Facts: Milagros assailed the constitutionality of
section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process
and equal protection clause. When her husband died,
she filed in GSIS a claim for survivorship pension.
GSIS denied claim. It said surviving spouse has no
right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
Issue: W/N the law is violative of due process and
equal protection clause.
Held: There is denial of due process when it
outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving
spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard.
There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso
requiring certain number of years of togetherness in
marriage before the employees death is valid to
prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary
gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified
for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years
before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within 3 years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and the
purpose intended.
17. Tablarin v. Gutierrez (1987)
Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges
or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or
did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985,
dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After
hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Petitioners asserted that students seeking admission
during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when
subjected to a different cutoff score than that
established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are
discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order "arbitrary and capricious."
Issue: W/N the law is violative of equal protection
clause.
Held: The force of this argument is more apparent
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions
obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate
cutoff score for a given year may be a function of
such factors as the number of students who have
reached the cutoff score established the preceding
year; the number of places available in medical
schools during the current year; the average score
attained during the current year; the level of difficulty
of the test given during the current year, and so forth.
To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The
above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from
being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of
Medical Education with the measure of flexibility
needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and
requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
18. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
(2009)
Facts: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by
respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-
approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of
US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days
paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that
he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make
Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only
two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion
of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor
Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision
based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the
last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA
8042.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section
10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article
II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected
sector.
Held:
1. The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim
that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his
employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble
end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be
employed.
2. The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the
foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears
facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However,
a closer examination reveals that the subject clause
has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than
one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of
more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-
period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right
of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
10. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado (1993)
Facts: Petitioners members of the lower courts
with the intervention of National Land Registration
Authority (NLRA) assailed the validity of Sec 35
R.A. No. 7354 (Repealing clause of the Post Service
Act of 1992) which authorized the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PPC) through its Circular No. 9228 to
withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain
agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service
free of charge.
They prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order
against the circular PPC.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7354 on the grounds that:
1. Its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes;
(It is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect the purposes of the law).
2. It did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and
(The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph
of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege did not appear in Senate or House version.
It only appeared in the conference committee report.
However, it did not even became a subject of
disagreement for both Senate and House)
3. It is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary. In other words, it is
violative of their equal protection clause.
(It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking privilege
from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the
President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public
in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers).
Issue: W/N RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially
GRANTED and Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The SC sustained RA 7354 against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
however, it annulled section 35 of the law as violative
of article 3, sec.1 of the Constitution providing that
no person shall be deprived of the equal protection
of the laws.
1. The petitioners claim is untenable. We are
convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.
No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that,
by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
the said law.
2. The argument is unacceptable. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except
in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2)
of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that
no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection
of laws."
The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as
it is vital to its operation for communicating with
lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process.
Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to
the judiciarys franking needs. The respondents
argument to withdraw the franking privilege because
of high expenses is in effect saying that the franking
privilege should be extended only to those who do
not need it very much. It is like saying that a person
may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not
really necessary but not an operation that can save his
life.
(If the problem is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of the government,
including those who do not need it).
The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where
there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from
which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec
35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to
which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.