salistic and exclusive logics.
This is not our intention we merely
want to indicate the trend followed by typical formal logical sys-
tems: the dialectical, analytical, symbolic, and
logics.
Dialectical Logics. By dialectical logic we mean
ontological systems of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, who
identify thoughts and things. Such logic is built mostly of uni-
versals or quality forms. Relations are regarded as internal-that
continuous with terms related. As such, relations are presumed
to be qualitative essences. Also, for such logics quantities
with qualities.
Whatever representation fact one can find in such systems
is vitiated by the universalistic and necessitarian character given
Precisely because are articulated com-
monsense events, rather than with or mathematical
materials, the fall is all when the climbs
above the reaches of concrete data.
Analytical Logics. Logical systems derived from Aristotelian
sources are built with or aggregates as building blocks.
The primary problems concern the interrelation of members of
classes. The subsumptionistic features of such logics really con-
cern class inclusion or exclusion.
But what of the great emphasis upon sentences or propositions?
The answer : Verbal or sentential materials are representational,
and are employed only to interrelate class members
Symbolic Logics. Symbolic or mathematical logics are con-
structed of relations. The fact that rnathematics is the ideal and
prototype of symbolic logic in itself: substantiates this point. In
the symbolic domain propositional logic deals only with propo-
sitions as terms in relation. Various truth functions serve to relate
sentences or propositions.
Methodological Logics. Operations, actions, and methods ab-
stracted from various manipulations are the building materials
of those logics claiming to be methodologies of science. We have
discussed such systemological products in Chapter
CHAPTER XIX
INTERBEIIAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION
CAUSATION AS ApPLIED LOGIC
T HE study of causal problems brings us to the essentialiy
applied division of our treatise. This division includes, besides
causation, the consideration of probability, laws of thought, meas-
urement, and scientific method.. These are topics not treated by all
logicians, nor, indeed, even regarded as necessary subject matter
of logical investigation. For us, however, their examination is ex-
tremely important, as it enables us to observe the results we ob-
tain from applying interbehavioral principles to such materials.
The procedure we follow in this work of application is illustrated
by the following questions:
( I) 1)0 such problems as causation, probability, measurement,
and the nature of scientific method belong to the logical domain?
If so, on what basis? And do they belong to logic exclusively?
(2,) 1"'0 what extent do answers to the above questions depend
upon cultural presuppositions, as well as upon prior assumptions
concerning psychology, epistemology, and logical theory i)
(3) Are there single and unique descriptions of the above top-
ics,or are there many?
(4) 1)0 any or all of these topics pertain exclusively or pri-
marily to the event, language, or system-construction domains?
In the present chapter we ask: What light can specificity logic
throw upon the causation problem?
Is CAUSATION A LOGICAL PROBLEM?
Historically, causal problems were not apportioned to the Iogi-
cal, but rather to the ontological field. Some logicians still declare:
"Cause and effect are not logical categories.?" They may add that
cause and effect are "recalcitrant metaphysical ideas.?" In a similar
mood it is asserted that the analysis of the meaning of causality
is not the logician's task," It is not uncommon, however, to find
1 Eaton, General, p. 5 0 8.
2 Ibid.
S Cohen and Nagel, Introduction, p. 245.
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION
147
logicians firmly insisting that cause is not an ontological but a mathematics logicians resulted in the evolution of
logical category concerned with the . of means and lo~ical ~eaturing symbol structures, organizations of re-
ends.' Some logicians even declare that inquiry into cause is an Iations, of order, and similar abstractional organizations.
inevitable feature of logic. Thus logi~ians .i~creasingly inclined toward formulating and
The question whether causal problems are at home in logic transforming propositions (sentences) and away from observations
obviously involves more than a simple adjudication of the boun- concerned particular existential occurrences. The latter are
daries set to inquiry. It is a question of the nature of cause itself. even as experiental and intuitive.
Moreover, any answer implies a distinctive logical theory. Whether ('::ause, treated other than as an abstract formal
a logician treats causation, and in what manner, depends also cate~ory, is not :velcome in conventional logic. Certainly, cause
upon his psychological views-his notions of the way individuals envisaged as an Interrelationship of particular happenings has a
operate in causal situations. Those who hold that logic is essen- very place in logical treatises. Methodologians are
tially system building find that causal situations provide scope ... " " ... Ji. ...... u even when they are interested in setting up large gen-
....l.Lv'1.0

in a unique way for logical work. method for scientific work; thus they make cause into
a catego~ to the logical domain. In such a methodologi-
EMERGENCE OF CAUSALITY IN METHODISTIC LOGIC cal t:-eatIse as Dewey's the adjective logical, employed to
To Kant's Copernican revolution and to Mill's renovation of quahfy the cause category, removes cause from the domain of
Inductive Logic we may trace the entrance of causal problems into ""'..0,......,;) ..."-'..........."" and actual things and places it among the constructs.

the logical domain." The synthesis of ontological and logical in-
vestigation was initiated when Kant forced objects to conform to
the knower's modes of cognition, which, of course, comprise causal
as well as other categories.
But if Kant originated this tradition, Mill established it by
welding logic to the methodology of science. Mill thoroughly
incorporated causal problems into logic when he attempted to con-
vert logic, in whole or part, into a science of scientific method."
There is hardly a doubt that Kant and Mill emphasized cause as
a logical problem in to build up an empirical world system,
In line with their architectonic interests their logics were designed
to show how reason operated in ordering actual rather than
to demonstrate the interrelation of inferential propositions, as in
traditional Formal Logic.
The formalistic tradition, however, has never really been sup-
planted. Certainly the tremendous development of mathematics
as a rigid constructional or hypothetico-deductive enterprise has
only served to support and vitalize it. The encouragement which
4 Cf. Dewey, Logic, pp.
:>We pass over any claims made for the system of concrete universals.
6 The procedure is to incorporate ampliative induction into logic) and to equate
induction with the search for causes. Cf. Kneale, Probability, Part 2.
logicians apparently can only assimilate causal
problems as as the latter remain detached from concrete
ev~nts, ~lthough sometimes cause is regarded as a leading principle
which directs contact with existing things. This middle course is
ado~te~ b~cause, like species, essence, purpose, end, and simplicity,
onto oglca cause has been interpreted as an objectionable property
of llatur~. We suggest that the fault of contemporary theories
1
of causation . not ~n their inclination toward ontology or
temology, but In their departure from objective happenings and
to some culturally influenced attitude. At the
basis interpretations of causation is the absolutistic
logical tradition. is this same tradition which accounts for un-
satisfactory ontologies and epistemologies.
In order to. clarify the causal problem and its relation to logic
we briefly the development of concerning causation.
CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF CAUSALITY
It is an appealing convention. that the technical notion of cause
originated among the Greek scientists who developed it as a re-
placement for ideas of indetermination and chaos. In order here
is the declaration of Leucippus:
7 Logic, p. 462.
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC
INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION 14-9
No thing arises without a cause, but everything through determined
agent, as an (4) the end or "that for the sake
grounds and under the stress of necessity. 8
of which" a is the end of walking."
The widely held view that when thinkers adopted the causal more sophisticated conditions cause became an all-em-
notion to account for things they discarded mystic processes and LJ.La,\."Ll.l<':;;:;' Lprinciple or law employed to account for every-
"'"J'<.<.. I--', .... "..: nV.l.J."..

became exclusively occupied with events as caused by other events happened, and to order events within a single system,
is; however, scarcely true. The evolution of the causality construct The scientific problem was construed as the search
did not once and for all establish a mode of thinking concerned or conditions which rise to certain events.
only with laws derived from observed things and events. Actually, were reinforced by the quest for certainty and incon-
the interest in cause in no sense excluded the mystical from the testable knowledge.
explanations natural happenings. Worse, from time to time a somewhat higher of cultural evolution cause became
cause itself was made into a mystical process, for under this rubric a series of conditions requisite for explaining ob-
were placed innumerable magical forces which were presumed to ","--,LLLA..~,- were accordingly regarded as rules of order
.. "",

bring things about in some unknown, and sometimes impossible, or as laws describing, or referring to, events. This
manner. "..",.,'"'+-....' .. peak development when cause was
r.4-.r>.......

Under simple cultural conditions causes have been regarded as problems of predicting and controlling
elementary agencies for producing various objects and events'
not infrequently the term cause refers to acts of personal creation, __ L,~~;""I\.,"I. CAUSAL THEORY
Again, causes are powers exerted by an agent in carrying out some
directly from a cultural matrix. Logi-
.ls;:.J..L.I."'-I\.."",,0
purpose. As is well known, even thinkers of the 17th and early
writers who espouse a single and universal causal
r Sth centuries were not emancipated from such views. the
construct have a range of items from which to
controversy between Leibnizians, who believed the supreme power
They may variously characterize cause as some kind of
so created the universe that it was everlastingly self-operating, and
category, a power, a relation, or an action.
Newtonians, who held that the cosmic mechanism required oc-
the inspection of classical causal constructs we dif-
.... ....,'"'.....L.L ................

casional divine intervention to run smoothly.

three types of theory: (a) formal, (b) epistemological,
.....LJ.."'JLUO\.V

It is clear, then, that the causal construct has had an uneven

and (c) ontological. Each a special mode of inter-
career in the history of thought. What lends credence to the belief
with causal situations. The for accepting a particu-
that among the Greeks cause became a definitely naturalistic idea is
lar +- is
h " .. """,.",.. adherence to a certain philosophical school and
the simple but straightforward presentation of Aristotle. He be-
proximity to scientific research. Such factors influence the kind
gins with the problem of knowing a thing and asserts that knowl-
problems formulated, descriptions of cause, and the way
edge depends upon cause or primary conditions."
causal situation is handled.
Thus he enumerates four causes: (I) material, that from which
(a) Cause Theory. The formal theory consists of as-
a thing comes into being-the silver of the bowl, the bronze of a
concerning symbolized relations. Causal events are inter-
statue, (2.) the formal, in the sense of shape, pattern or formula
with as abstruse entities. Even when particular happenings
-for example, the ratio 2.: 1, in the case of the octave, (3) the
to be the sources of constructed theories, the ideas
",-..I....l.,...,j;;;.\""'U.
primary source of the change, "what makes of what is made," an
1J.L\..'~.l.J.\.",~ on the abstract plane of formal and verbal systems.
8 Diels, Vorsokratiker, vol. II, p. I questions typical formal issues:
10
i Analytica Posteriora, 7Ib, 9; Physica, 184a, 2. 194b, 16;
11
Burtt, Value.
 INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION 51
IS PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC

are as causes are contiguous. 14

Is an exception possible to the law or to the fact causal necessity?
Are cause and absolutely distinct, or can one contain the A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another.
other? 1-~'-'.l..I.
.l. ... J. .... of course, by
.... , ............ doctrine that all
Must cause inevitably precede effect, or can cause and effect be v'lw!l. ..-I..... .l.IJ.J."-' to sensation; and cause is not a sensation or
simultaneous? an obj 16
Can cause continue after the cessation of effect?
Can effect continue after the cessation of cause? more stable prototype of the view that causes are
Can causes produce effects at a distance, or must they operate we must back to Hobbes' attempt to establish a natural
through a contiguous medium? opens his discussion of cause and effect with the
Are causes different from, or identical with, conditions? statement:
body is said to w~rk :~pon or act, that is to say, do something to
On the whole, interbehaving formally with cause results in another when It either generates or destroys some accident in
systems of compatible sentences (p. 147). Ample scope is therefore 11

available for the autistic of cause-and-effect things and

relations. .......................... '. ...1. J.LJ,J..I.~ the cause of motion, Hobbes is clear:
(b) Epistemological Cause Theory. Epistemological causal the- There can be no cause of motion, in a body contiguous
ory concerns processes of knowing the connections existing or al- rnoved.
to between things. Kant's categorial theory to the effect
statistics are lacking, there is no doubt that a trernen-
that cause is an a priori determiner of invariable and irreversible
of thinkers regard causes as things, as in the case
succession is an excellent illustration.
or drugs .
\., ... L""'L.l.JL1 .... A.Jl0death. The entire traditional formula-
The epistemological handling of causal happenings is well
of and patients, of doers and sufferers, is supported
demonstrated by the discussions concerning causal necessity. It is
the pillar of cause as object, or property and accident of an
ask~d: Is cau.sal necessity an objective necessity of things, or a
Iogical necessity of thought or assertion? Again, do assertions of
Relation Causes. Abstractive and universalistic habits of thought
causal necessity refer to hypothetical and existential things or only
automatically result in the notion of cause as relation. are
to absolute and mathematical connections? 12 Still other questions
constant conjunction, Kant's irreversible succession,
concern the exclusive applicability of cause to past events or pre-
uniform and unconditional sequence. Also there are varia-
dictions of the future.
tions as to constancy of conj unction," or absence of recurrence
(c) Ontological Cause Theory. Theoretical constructs of the
a of relations between particular concrete events."
ontological type stress relations between things and events. They
Again, differ as to terms that are related; some
are effectively demonstrated by the following classic ='T<"~<r"o.
toward instead events; still others define the causal re-
Thing Causes. Though Hume finally settled down to the belief
as connecting in a single event."
that cause basically consists of relations things, vacil-
lated between this view and the notion that causes are themselves p. 75
things, as the following passages indicate: Ibid., 170.
Ibid., p. 75.
The idea, then, of causation must be derived from some relation 11 Works, vol. I, p. 120.
18 Ibid., p. 12 4 .
among obj ects."
19 Hume, Treatise.

20 Ducasse, Nature.
C' Pap, Meaning. :t1 Winn, Nature.
13 Treatise, p. 75.
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION r
Causes. Change, Wundt declares, is the primary condi- and his
.... ,..A.......... J'v intended to prohibit this kind of equa-
tion of causality. Cause accordingly concerns not things but events." were on the right The search for absolute causes
Obviously, however, even the doctors who differ as to the counter to procedure actually practiced in a
nature of events. For example, it is asserted that causation always I t is doubtless this type abstract and re-
involves transmission of energy from place to place." This mote cause to which Newton referred in connection with . . . . . . . TT'.<~ ....

lation is opposed to such characterizations of cause as that it is tion:

motion" or change," or, finally, action."
\...-Alj~a"LlH_U
the phenomena of the
CAUSALITY: UNIVERSAL AND SPECIFIC of gravity, but have not assigned the
Everyone who approaches causality from the angle of events cause of power.. ... Hitherto I have not been able to discover
cause of those properties gravity from phenomena, and I frame
must be impressed by the variety of causal situations. Still there
no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is
is no repressing the great urge to set up a single comprehensive to an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical
theory. Conventional doctrine projects the general presupposi- or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place
tion that causality constitutes a basic of nature or of science. philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions
v.A .. -'vJ..LJ.Jl. ........ .l.... ".:::l..1

The assumption is made either that the universe is constructed ..........,.........,',-, ,-"- from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered
on a plan of necessary connection or that scientific explanation de- 28

mands a universal causal principle.

Once more we see exhibited the enormous hold of abstraction- might argue that the very number and variety of causal
ism and generality on logical thought, as well as on the analysis of ,,,,)J."'..... ~L,.l.V,J.,Jl0 are so as to accommodate the two grand generaliza-
o ...... The result for causal study is such a vaporization of events
J.\,.....l..L ......'...... tions the universe is a set of connections and that
as to allow anything to be said about them. In such a vacuous v\..J.',... ~~J.J."' v a
.l..l\,"'......... '. ............. ...causal principle. Even if this result
causal universe it may be asserted that "Whatever is, may not be brought about by judicious deflation and
be," "Not everything that could happen does happen," "The con- the assertions, their relevancy at once
trary of every matter of fact is still possible." comes limited. Similarly, by proper treatment the more
The universalistic claim that the world is a system of necessary 0LJ ... ,\..J!. ... JlL formulations that we have called formal, epistemological,
connections-namely, "every effect must have a cause"-is not may
V..lJl.If.",V.L'V);.J. ......o ".I. to certain phases of causal
condemned by us merely because it is a vain apothegm. Not at all. cases in which generalized formulae are adapted to
The gravamen lies in assuming that such an assertion is factually 'C.r".T1'
e- ... r it is the detailed variation of the events under
11'"\"""i'f,ri::>C'

significant. Even more serious is the fact that it serves to cover consideration which becomes Causal principles are
up inevitable specificity of causal situations. No for- closer approach concrete events.
mula can ever satisfactorily symbolize the complicated concourses to events makes irrelevant any
of events comprising causality. Important only are analyses and formulations that serve
The assumption that the goal of science is to discover universal to connect one event with others in a class. Specific causal formula-
absolute causes is to equate science with metaphysics. Insofar as exclusively enable us to make predictions" and in
vol. I, p. 586.
achieve some experimental control over certain situations.
Winn, Nature, p. 202.
24 Carns, Problem. General Scholium, p. 546.
Schopenhauer, Fourfold, p. 20; li01:sch,alk, Nature. Ibid., 547.
Mercier, Causation. Cf. Schlick, va.I,J,;,a..l..l.LY.
154 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC
INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION
LOGICAL NECESSITY AND FACTUAL
to differentiate logical (analytic) necessity from
""l,.I- ......LLLj.J\..
Formalistic logicians separate themselves into two The
necessitv U,""-,"~""''-'',,,,'-L,.:l only in revealing the irrelation of
strictly mathematical logicians remain completely within
formal concrete events.. The formal interrelation of
bounds of mathematical forms. The philosophical formalists in-
sentences can not be with descriptions of specific
cline toward the more contentful systems which articulate with
. . . ~"''' ... ' ..... _ linguistic events can be handled only by nOll-
scientific materials. It is the latter who are confronted with chal- formalistic sentence "TU-.4-r>Vv'\'''''
lenging causal problems. On the one hand, they are concerned
Causal events are clearly different from the
with propositions or sentences implying absolute and ul:iversal
terns with them. Of the latter there are
necessity. On the other, causality implies ev.ents and thel~
types. must choose among systems.
tions-in short, probabilities, specificities, and, in Induc-
logician sensitive to events, and conditions ~11r111\PC'
tive as over against deductive processes. .
as as sentence actual inter-
The way out of this discrepancy is found, of course, In the very
relations of components. But few ..LV~;"",\"""",~",.l.v
fact of formalism itself-that is, sententiality. Thus the
that they are objective happenings; thus are
construct logical necessity. For the most part, this sort of neces-
inevitably limited to abstruse sentences. I t is significant,
sity consists simply of assertions-"Every event must ha,,:e a
logicians attempt to at least so to events
cause," "Order is the essence of nature." Formal comprises,
the relationship between formal and
.....V.l,.I.u....,...&...... .I. implica-
in fact a stock of sentences containing the word cause--sentences
which 'have no connection with the interrelations of things, their
an event standpoint the logically possible consists a
properties, and relations in concrete event systems. . _
(factors). The are . . . . . c.:.00>f>''1f'"

Logical necessity and causation are to classical metaphysics

catalyzer. relevance or significance is attached to
despite the fact that formal logic is presumed to be ex-
or combination except as it is known from observation
clusively with abstruse sentences. Certainly logical necessity is re-
is, through prior interbehavior.
mote from any causal system of concrete happenings. It nothing
.I.~~J.uL.L""' logic and occupation with
............

to do with such factual necessity as providing strato-

can only lead to argument and
spheric flying or an adequate diet to maintain growth. The domain
justice to logic nor to causal events. Linguistic
of formal logic allows for such mystic ideas as a deterministic or
example, may entertain the metaphysical assump-
indeterministic universe, a causal or an acausal cosmos.
tion that world is such that not everything that could hap-
The gulf which linguistic logic creates between logical and fac-
does happen. What "could happen" is regarded as a product
tual necessity is thrown into relief by a comparison recently ma~e a or restrictive action.
between causal and formal implication;" Hofstadter asks hIS
is meant by the logically possible may be illustrated
readers to suppose that formula "All men are mortal" repre-
of possible combinations of 5 and P. A
sents a formal implication, and at the same time a causal law. Now,
rnay be 5 and P, 5 but not P, P but not 5, and neither. Now
he says, the real possibility of an immortal man is comlpa~i~le with
the assumption is made one of these combinations does not
the truth of the formal implication. But the very SUppOSItIon that
occur. is interpreted as a causal necessity limiting logical neces-
under certain conditions a man might live forever signifies the pos- or 33
1-'''-' ...., -.; ... 1,.1' ..............

sibility of violating a causal principle. And this counter to

Connected with such a view is the belief that when we seek the
the idea of a causal law.31
30 Horstadter, Causality. :12 Ho.tstadter.. Ibid., Logic.
Ibid., p. 259- tiosszouu is used to avoid Cf. also
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC
INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION 157

cause of an event we seek the reason "why" this event, and not
-.r,....... v .... 'le ... v .L .. it has been thought, must be an essentially effec-
.L \-V.l..L~.J.
On this basis it is . . "flo,~
.......11-/.1. .......,;;1.....,.1../.,\.......,. _r-..
some other logically possible one, is occurring. It chiefly the
consist of things or persons, which, in COffi-
linguistic influence which fortifies the belief that a causal i
.L ........ \.,'J"', V

r'''' other, constitute new fields as compared with

tion involves anything but the problem "how" an event ""',-.r>,"' ....~~~
.-.. . . . . ,.... 'P".

other words, causal correlations are regarded

--namely, how the constituent factors of things, their properties
V ",-,,,_,,-L"'''-' sort factorial combination, a coming together of
and conditions, are organized in an event situation.
.... "",,,,",1.\..,1.1. v which, when together, constitute a different event

CAUSALITY, FUNCTIONALITY, AND "-''''-JL'I..I.'".L:.LiJrl.iJ.VJ.'t

an unwitting return to previously rejected ways of

Sophisticated views of causality as a feature of nature have de-
\-.L.LJ,"J. ... J.~JL.l.J.l:;;;. we must differentiate between effective combinations re-
veloped under a number of influences. Outstanding has been the
a conjunction "potencies" and effective cornbina-
effect of detailed facts such as the sciences uncover. The of
from changes in event fields. We exclude here all
""'v ..... ".L....L.1.,,=
powers and potencies appear unserviceable and even repugnant to
No obj or action of an object,
the scientific worker. For this reason causality in the traditional
factor prior to or occur-
sense of potency or productivity has been replaced by the notion
a specified field. antecedent potencies are ~-o~ar"~->rf
of ~unctionality. x f(m), or more elaborately dy /dx", sym-
when are presumed to have inhered in any copresent object,
bolizes the kind of relationship of variables envisaged by the scien-
as antecedent. Causal changes or fields
tist. It may well be that such symbolized relations are constructs
are functions of mutual and reciprocal changes in every aspect of
that can not be properly descriptive of events, but they neverthe-
a factorial system.
less help to avoid occult powers. Weare willing to sponsor such
Causal any field constitute a rearrangement in the
formulae if they are descriptive, since no description can be more
factors in a unique pattern. When we
than a referential construct.
an inflammable substance is caused to ignite by a spark
Statisticians, too, concerned with concrete data a sharp
"')l.~IJ1J"'",II,' to fall it, we utter a misleading statement.
distinction between correlation and cause. Sometimes they go so
or event actually occurs without the co-
far as to declare that statistics is fundamentally the investigation
of both the spark and the inflammable substance in a
of events which, because they can not causally interrelated, must
spatiotemporal frame. The emphasis here is on
therefore be statistically correlated. On the other hand, many stu-
properties, and conditions making up the particular
'-.LJ..I..I..Ls:;.."v.
dents admit no cause relation Hume's constant temporal
event In some fields the factors constitute a pattern which
sequence. They believe, then, that cause and effect amount to no
:nay no~ be intens~ nor even discernible. Frequently an explosion
more than a covariance of presence and absence.
IS to stimulate causal investigation but other event
Cause and causal relations, therefore, may simply be regarded . .
cons:st1n~ of
'
noticeable factorial arrangements art
as the interrelations of field components. Certainly, causation can
not In
r1.-Hl-a..-,,,,, ... 4- t-'.L L ... .L"-' s: t-'..L'......
be formulated as correlation. At first, correlationists were prima- JThe many and transformations of events art
rily interested in organizing two-factor systems. Later, the devel-
neglected or as inconsequential suggests a differentiation
opment of partial and multiple correlation techniques amplified
between features of causal situations. First, there are the
the original view. The above paradox is easily resolved by indicat-
\-J.'-;.I.~v and recombinations of factors under specific condi-
"-'>J ... .L.l.Iv.l..I.J...,..

ing that cause is, after all, only a type of correlation.

we must point to events occurring without human in-
Always there remains, however, dissatisfaction with the simple
example, complex reversible chemical reactions.
association of factors lacking any efficacy with respect to each
N ext, we have descriptions of such reactions in the form of func-
34 Cf. Hempel and Oppenheim, Studies.
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION 159
tional equations. Here the observations influenced by the causal description of enumerating
problems and interests stand out. And finally, there is the more the situation. This analysis is
remote descriptive interrelating of certain events with other . tiated some problem achievement or prediction.
and analogous events. In such instances constructional opera- Since causation basically amounts to of a given
tions are emphasized which are only partially stressed in describ- number of every vestige of ultimacy and absolute-
ing and recording events. ness is barred. the only element of universality
in the formula. Beyond that there is no
OPERATIONAL "'-'.C1, ..........L:I. ......

rese:mblance to any reduces cause to a .

Classical cause theories are metaphysical-at least, type of event or construction. Faced with the multiplicity
Their proponents interbehave with causal problems in a cific one can scarcely remain convinced that there
manner. By contrast we an of cau:al IS of cause.
interbehavior, based on the assumption that problems arise
directly from the scientist's contact with objects, events, ~nd AND ,-,.Ll.UoJ"'>..LJ

dons. His operation with causal problems is examined a Causal we indicated (p. 149), always and
particular type of situation-a fact which is true, of course, . an~ maintain as part a comprehensive cultural \.-\...I ..... J....-'J."-'_"...

thing he investigates. Operational cause can only be studied In This means that the many intellectual counterparts to cause
connection with problems localizable in a certain domain-chem- we find a psychological theory. Outstanding variants of causal
istry, biology, physics, and so on. The operations consist asses~- theory are associated with corresponding psychological
or . with their varying on the baSIS of monistic or monadic mind. For instance, a rational-
of developed techniques and available materials in order to istic and a causal theory correlates with a doctrine of unitary
at some answer to a particular question. As a rule, the mind, an empirical and a posteriori notion fits into a mona-
answers are stated in the form of propositions indicating the distic or mind theory. To consider some ex-
relationship of event factors. Whether or not general cau.ses amples, an adherent of unified mind as Kant naturally enter-
and why, are questions falling outside the scientist's field of tained a theory to which necessity was a
terest. ing condition the of events, while ......... '.. . .
J.JL""'

According to our hypothesis that causal processes ~nd ,-,..u"~."'J.V'''''''v atomism had necessity among things
constitute in event fields, causal elements consist objects, their it is psychistic psychology which
their combinations and relations particular systems. All things vides to who must differentiate between the abstrac-
existing as parts or features of a certain pattern of happenings may tion of and the of existence.
to participate as factors in that particular causal field. In recent writing on causal problem centers around
some causal events there are few factors, in others many. In case IJ.J.i~)IL.l\... psychology
a.0vV\.,.U;.l"l,..J. .... and Mill. Scholars are in-
there are many we find variations in the proportion of those fluenced by psychology when they (I) adopt the
factors that appear more prominent than the remaindel~. Again, . Mill pronouncements on cause, (2,) modify them in detail or )
in some events there may be no outstanding factors at all. Whether oppose entirely. of causation, around
there are many or few, the factors may be either s~quenti~l or the immediate spatial contiguity of antecedent and
coordinate in time. Causal situations must further be differentiated consequent or necessary connection, as well as inevitable
on the basis of the relative availability of the factors for observa- tion, definitely reflect the Hume-Mill reduction of psychological
tion and experimental manipulation. In some instances the factors events to appearance and reappearance of psychic states as
can only be hypothetically named and enumerated. crete tied together by habit and custom, or by the gentle
160 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION

forces of association. As we have already intimated, the British to do with causal or

empiricists, for whom both knowledge and the world consisted of events 157). Admittedly, is a definite in-
and their interrelations, could not make cause a
u,"-,..I.Jl\.J{;.l,,\_1.V.l1.u
objects in the sense of crude things, such as tht
'u quality such as
.'L.U..'-'.LI " were presumed to be, and interrelationship of chemical elements or compounds, or
fore had to turn to cause as a relation. It followed that for them water is thrown upon a burning house. The reduction of causatior
causation was a necessary sequence of sensations or . combina- to relationship in the British empirical tradition is, of course
tions. set
From an historical standpoint no one can deny that Hume's other hand, interbehaviorallogic allows for the "~r>ro.1-I,,..,, ....

notion causation has been of value in upsetting of relational factor as primary in

\'.d. .l,LI....'..I..LUo-u..l.u r-ir.r',..,. ......

rationalism rampant in his time. But it is questionable whether is to be according to interbehavioral psy-
his own type of sensationism, which, of course, is not ~\-..I..l
(,.4..Lvv.s;;. ... ...,..I. term to the combination of concretr
different from rationalism though of another order, should be a causal situation. In no case, however, are we dealing
allowed to confound the study of causal problems. remote
v.llAi,LJ.\../.l.1.0 actual things, for, obviously, from ar
Certainly, cause is no quality, as Hume's "impressions" are point of relations are only abstracted frorr
presumed to be. Nor are objects reducible to psychic so of objects or events.
........ ..LU,'-J.\.<'J.J.0.L.lJ.&.-'0

that notions of precarious existence or interrelation are warranted.

No objectionable are the mentalistic constructions which dif-
ferentiate between experiencing on the basis of impression or sen-
sation as immediate psychic states, and reasoning, which is more or
less independent of such immediately states.
PI.-ationalistic causal doctrines which, generally speaking, imply
that cause is a necessity of existence, correspond to monistic psy-
chology involving a continuously existing unitary mind. In formu-
lating causal principles this version of monistic psychology is no
more helpful the monadistic one. No connection can be pos-
tulated between natural events and creative powers, regarded
either as mirrored in a unified mind or as independent of such a
mind. Rationalistic causation may be characterized as why causa-
tion. It certainly harks back to impersonal or personal creative
powers, and, the latter case, to the projection of human desires
and into events. When such a procedure is fortified by
some sort of psychic psychology its weakness is doubled. No tra-
ditional spiritistic psychology can do justice to any occurrence or
interpretation of natural events.
Such ways of thinking are, of course, completely superseded
by objective psychology. When dealing with concrete situations the
causal agency may be a thing or an event. By thing we may refer
to a chemical compound, which, when brought into combination
with other compounds, results in an explosion. But since in all
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION I

which we refer to as Smith's death by arsenic. As products the if one grants the occurrence of such events. Assuming
data, or stimulus objects, comprise propositions, allegations, or correctness of the hypothesis that causation consists of a ~"",ft-a"~T"1
events or alleged events. of Clll',,\P'r)"P't'\t'c or event we find a continuous of inter-
Because data are secondary-that is, come to the observer with such events. simplest level is that of every-
by means of a person's (Jones') intermediating action it. may well "commonsense" Here simple are
happen that no arsenic death has actually transpired. Jones' belief goal of the inquiry is a practical outcome of the inter-
may be delusory, his assertion mistaken or false. In such cases we events. On the scientific level more questions
assume that he is responding to substitute stimulation, not to the with a correspondingly greater capacity on the
direct Smith-arsenic-death event. Substitute stimuli, of course, to the interacting factors; hence, a more
can stand for mystic and magical apparitions as well as for actual" t-".U........,LJ.'-~~_ ..... '-+ procedure of events. scientist,
events. of this latter possibility we TInay regard Jones' . . ., . . . . .,"-"""'.......,.. . . . experimental for the .
interaction with the substitute stimulus object as an ,.,rf1"'~"'::'rlr'lr _ '-v ~i..J.. reassociation of factors in order to discover
.LJ..lJ.. l\....

though nevertheless fictitious-causal datum. ....................... ' vand invariants.

On the whole, construct data play a larger role in causal more formal situations causal interbehavior
investigations conducted by logicians and philosophers than in contacts with substitutes for highly analytic
those carried on by The latter are definitely more direct stimulus obj ects are kept at a remote distance for
terested in causal situations in which data consist of events. achieving descriptions and interpretations
We must not, however, lose' of the may factors and their interrelationships.
regard all causal data not as natural-event data but as construct ........""'vv .,YVEvents. events as data consist of particular
data. J.'-'Ju.u.L.J.~v of observed happenings. The essentially causal
..... ...........

This point is illustrated by Russell's assertion that there is no comprises the of the event components.
such things as cause and that the classical law of causality is un-- can observed to occur through the addition and subtraction}
scientific and false." Scientists are never interested, Russell separation and contiguation of the factors. Certain chemical com-
in necessary succession, but in functional relations among variables. pVJl.lv.lLl,.,.). are and only a temperature or . . . +"'L:>C'cn'.~n
The causal data of philosophers, or what they interbehave with, en
rl11n.-o
is for a new chemical state to ensue. a
to him consist of sentences-in our terms, substitute chemical reaction may speeded up by another com-
stimulus objects. who causality as a characteristic pound or varying temperature or pressure. If, while
of natural asserts that Russell is not talking about causality our of an event we refer to OUf' observation, this
at all, but about physicists' expressions of natural law," These ex- to do with the event itself; its factorial combinations
pressions refer to observations of correlations. constitute of our observation or ,.;0':"1"+"'',.......,..,"'''''
Pepper is probably correct is indicated by the following: psychological terms, combinations and recombinations
The essential business of physics is the discovery of "causal Iaws" and events are independent stimulus objects with which
by which I mean any principles which, if enable us to infer some- the observer interacts.
thing about a certain region of space-time from something about some in sorne cases it may be legitimate to describe one
other region or regions." causal, or key, it may be the factor required to
example, when a person facilitates
Substitute stimulus objects may correspond to authentic causa-
or . . . . . . ,,/ . . . . . . . the occurrence of an event by switching on the current
v

Notion.
npt"pc,C''1f'''-';T for an explosion. behavior must be regarded as a
How.
37 Russell, Reply, p. 7 1 "-'-'J.Jl."~V.I..I.""""'.I.\.. of system. It operates like any other
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION

factor necessary to complete a particular kind of event combina- acts the use products. ,~ .....'....v
in so many other
................ ..........

tion, and thus constitutes a part of the causal data. mythical subject matter is possible means
Interbehavioral data of both the construct and event type must of . . . . . . . . = ....... "~ .I."'".... u. It is possible to construct real
d .... VI..,;.1. n."I:T1,.,f-o'nr"0

be sharply distinguished from everything pertaining to psycho- temic and determiners of all sorts without
physical philosophy. This admonition is necessary because a adequately acts and stimulus objects. \Ve that
similarity in the use of terms. The terms construct and construction the elimination traditional mind constructions clarifies the
frequently been employed since Russell formulated "the I"'r...-."'.f- ... " and inferential situation and enables us to make
...... .f-.""'....... I

supreme maxim in scientific philosophising"38-namely, "~rherever approach to events as data."

possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for in-
ferences to unknown entities.":" Investigative Operations
Russell and all the many writers who deal with the contrast A study the pattern of investigation demands that we
between constructions and inferred entities?" are concerned with differentiate between the two orders of observer and .'""' .,.r..~'I-.n.- r,_ -e- ........

relations between mythical sensations and sensibilia of externally The behavior of operator mentioned in the agentive illustra-
caused mental states and the products of purely psychic opera- tion constitutes a first-order operation. His activity belongs
tions of the mind. This is the case even when writers do not accept within pattern of a system.
Russell's view that objects of everyday circumstances and of tech- The second-order analyzes the work of the first op-
nical physics consist of logical constructions made up of the crude erator as part of the data before him. is c.C'~,or."
data of sense. ... JL""'''''' ..,.....
''-d.in interaction of the experimenter as he unravels the
Such problems and solutions belong to a philosophical system l _'~, '~IL<.IL\...J'-.I., threads he finds among the materials with which he
......

which entertains questions concerning the construction an ex-

ternal world (p. 206) and its relation to private and individual causal can be demonstrated by consider-
mentality. No contrast could be greater than that marking off ing the work an as he and _a"' "'.....
such a philosophy from investigations which exclude "mind," "sen- the factors event situations. We select this . . . . '1.- an '''''('\0

sations," and "immediate experiences," either as building ma- I-Iopkins. 4 2

terial or as constructing powers. Constructs as products, from our Beginning with the hypothesis that young animals grow nor-
standpoint, are always (a) recombinations of things, as the syn- mally on a diet of protein, fat, carbohydrates, mineral and
thesis of water from hydrogen and oxygen, (b) measurements the investigator that when these substances are
achieved by definite operations, (c) descriptions and recordings of to animals they do not produce the assumed re-
events and of our operations in securing them, and (d) indirect To of rats he fed purified milk casein (pro-
r..-_/..... ' ..... A

interrelations of things by means of manual (drawings) and vocal tein), sugar (carbohydrates), and obtained
behavior. In each case the constructing activities consist of concrete oat and In addition, he fed one group 2 c.c.
interactions of the individual with his stimulus objects on the milk day. The milk-fed rats increased in weight normal.ly,
basis of problem presented, motivation) expertness, and other while the control group without milk feeding began to
concrete factors . after 10 to 15 days.
Central to the constructional problem is the nature of linguistic lJ.JL~ that the operations are well controlled and the re-
J...1.v''':>"J..LJ..

sults valid, the next step in the causal investigative pattern is to

Mysticism, p. 155-
39 Logical, p. 363. For a comprehensive study of construction in situations see Kantor, Inter-
40 See, for exarnpre, Existential; and Beck, Constructions, and the writers behavior.
4:~
to whom they zefer. ..JLIC:UU~ll~ p. 291f..
166 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION I

construct propositions concerning them. Convenient terms for the investigator's 1ft't'O .... ,OC'f"

such constructions are descriptions and interpretations. the investigator's purpose is a

"1 when causes are to determined. I
f""",,Y\ r"l a ....

c. Constructions IS between an
Descriptions and interpretations of causal occurrences naturally with in his attempt
differ on the basis of the type of crude datum upon which they are understand. a certain or how X-rays are diffracted-a
constructed. Causal theories based on construct data are very dif- an individual attempting to set up a generalized r i r d........,. . 4-.

from those based on independent event data. in the possible causes. latter procedure can not yield any s
case of independent event data, theory constructions may show result, and the acceptance or rejection of such a
divergences. One may set up descriptions and laws of causal events 'Io.,A.'-'U\..,~J.'-.l-,:, upon
,J .... .LA...... J..L.LIA. formulator's caprice.
which are altogether independent human agency, such as the is a place to point out again that interact)
tidal relationships between the moon and earth. Other construc- concrete events is vastly different from interacting with v
tions of causal factors involve the activities of the agent or in- propositional substitutes for such events. construct:
vestigator who deliberately produces certain changes in the crude propositions achieves a certain degree
data. account of concrete situations.
Cause and E !feet. Faithful to the traditional relation concep- ....... ,..r<,....,,~.,. ... BUILDING
tion, writers on cause have maintained in their descriptions two
related factors, cause and effect. Critics of such a notion as neces- ~L<. events as
...... 'LL' occurrences are completely independ.
sary or inevitable relation have pointed out that it is impossible activity. Accordingly such events far
to keep two distinct. Since we are dealing with event from logical or system-building behavior. f
patterns, the terms cause and effect must serve specific descriptive cause and building may be brought very togeth
purposes. Accordingly, when they refer to stimulus objects, first place, causation is essentially systematic. Causal sitt
terms to prior and subsequent combinations of factors. Cause as we have seen, comprise interrelations of t
and as constructive terms serve only to isolate particular is system. Again, human behavior occupies an """"""',~,...,.r."".",,,,
stages of observed events. as an in causal systems, as all C'r1~:.nf"1hf"
Causes and Conditions. we have seen (p. 152), writers on mentation testifies. Those who as system
causation regard the term cause as standing for a single and unique in a favorable position to conjoin
or agency. From the standpoint of field theory, instead of basis logic can be closely connected with cau
rv ... T"'.f- ............ ,.., """ I

.f-."""_.~ in two ways:

,.,..." .... as a structurization ent.
singularity, we meet with all sorts of combinations of factors.
Some writers" insist upon the distinction between cause and con- (B) as a local instrumental procedure.
dition on ground that cause implies a sufficient factor, and
General "../ lAIUl/.' L'-'''

condition a necessary one. This is good' as far as it goes, but in

investigations a much number of differentiations we observe the behavior the system builder as he ere
must be made. When we deal with concrete situations we perforce a
discover innumerable degrees of availability or participation of first thing he is to develop or borrow comprehensi
causal factors. or postulates as the
"",..." ........., . . . 4-........... . of syste
Causes and Causal Interpretation. Both in the event and. in do not imply that he deliberately seizes upon assum
its interpretation we may specify all sorts of causal conditions and the contrary, he is most likely in full possession
48 Ducasse, Nature, p. 58. them through the subtle influence of his general cultural milir
168 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION

Whatever specific materials he builds upon he is forthwith pre- we have organizations tc

pared with a ground plan. such as the structures of nononto
From a number of universalistic systemization enterprises we one can hardly put high
abstract the following series assumptions. "Everything is ar- .l.\J~;".L'-''''.J. so remote actual events as to T,_.~~rtr.
C"l;jct',Pt,,, r. -c

ranged or governed by necessity or law," "nature is uniform and and existential happenings, it is quite possible to
recurrent," "invariant relations exist," "every event has a cause."
A prominent feature of general structurization behavior con- illustration of linguistic systemization
sists in applying these principles to things. This procedure Inay causal methods which he regards as
be described as defining and interpreting operations. Certain things only possible modes experimental inquiry. Because this
are asserted to cause or produce other things as effects or results. so admirably exemplifies linguistic causal systemization we presen
Causes are invariably antecedent to effects. Events which occur in full items which he names methods and canons.
under precisely the same circumstances must cause or produce the I. Method of Agreement
same effect. First Canon. If two or more instances of the under investizatio
From this sort of activity issues a product which may consist of have one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone th
instances agree, is the cause of the
systems actual things and events or systems of arguments, sym-
bols, sentences or propositions, or a combination of The Method of Difference
following examples from event, language, and forrnalistic levels Second Canon. If an instance in which the under investizatio
occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance i
illustrate the processes employed in the structurization of causal common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance i
materials. which the two instances is the or the cause, or an
(a) Event Level. Things, conditions, and combinations things part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
may be conjoined for many different purposes. Naturally, system o. Joint Method of Agreement and Difference
builders are motivated in diverse ways, and thus employ all sorts Third Canon. If two or more instances in which the occurs
criteria. Concomitantly, the system products assume every pos- one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it dor
not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; th
sible grade of quality. circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or th
Generally speaking, causal situations are systemized on either cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
an analytic or a synthetic plan. In the former case, a situation is
3. Method of Residues
chosen which is regarded as causational, and an organization of Fourth Canon. Subduct from any such part as is known b
the factors is then made. Synthetic systemization, on the other inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of th
hand, stresses the organization of factors for some purpose. The phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.
-I-a.-,4-''1'1''')'0 of a situation not immediately apprehended as causal are
4. Method of Concomitant Variations
creatively connected in order to demonstrate causal Fifth Canon. Whatever varies in any manner whenever anothe
The aim may be description, explanation, or prediction. phenomenon varies in some manner, is either a cause or an
of that or is connected with it some fact of causatior
of events are ordered as sequential or coexistent, more or
proximate or overlapping. Favoring such logical or system-build- (5) experimental methods stand out starkly 1:
ing procedures is our hypothesis that causation consists of inter- nudity.. AII the more so perhaps because he ~\..'-'.I.,J.~'-" .L'.L.

relationships of field factors. actual situations. To begin with,

(b) Linguistic Level. Systemization of this type is more or less is based upon a verbal and general atomistic uni
autistic-namely, independent of events. The emphasis is on sys- verse in which the determination of causes consists of in
tem as asserted and alleged, rather than on events and their intra- ~ what are to be antecedents and consequences.
...v ...... ""'-'c........ ........l"'o.
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION I

even the of differentiable factors becomes reduced to "post hoc opposite, "Every effect has a cause,"
the simple abstractive common absence and presence of formalized "Same cause same As we have indicated,
circumstances. the assumption is made that maxims are related to data, but
Mill and hosts of logicians after him, have clearly recognized the enormous differences between specific events and generalized
the many difficulties and insufficiencies of the system of experi- formulae are su to nullify the assumption.
mental methods. This fact is illustrated by the following points. Another example is the causal principle alleged to
( I) Mill was troubled by the problem of plurality of caus~s exist in identical structures." The causal system here is character-
which negated considerably his simplicity of approach. For this ized by the possible content. An assertion is
reason the method of agreement, originally regarded as coordinate made about basic interrelations of things and events on the ab-
with the method of difference, had to be devalued. (2.) Again, stract ground of sameness of structure. Causal connection is as-
Mill realized that his system was not as elaborate as it appeared, serted both on ground that structural identity in different
since the methods of agreement and difference were basic to the things implies a common causal ancestry and that items in
others. Later writers have charged that treating the formulations successive structures cause or produce the ones.
as so many separate methods seriously darkened the subject of
induction;" Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the methods B. as Specific Causal Instruments
are essentially Their function is to eliminate combina- On the locale of to used as instruments
tions of factors which do not meet the causal conjunction criterion. in studying is the field of scientific investigation.
Conventional criticisms, however, do not really focus on the When the study is the discovery or explanation of
fundamental objection that these formulae and systems are essen- specific events, local are constructed as definite instru-
tially incongruous with actual events. To describe methods of dis- ments of Aside from the fact that instrumental causal
covering causal relations implies taking some account of the vast are constructed for the solution of specific problems, they
number of contacts an investigator must have with things. So are kept close influenced by, the events they are designed
as Mill's methods went, his idea that they were inductive sy110- to elucidate. can not assume the proportions of
gisms or, at least, similar sorts of schema indicates that he dimly abstract grand-scale systems.
realized he was concerned with an enormous job of linguistic con- In one sense we may say that every specific scientific . . pc,p""l1t"'t"'h

structionism. is an example the construction of a specific causal system.

(c) Formal Level. Generalized causal systems on the formal, such research . at some point or other the organization of
like on the linguistic, level are built primarily out of words. event factors. when analytic processes prevail over
The former may be distinguished from the latter, however, on the thetic, a of concrete causal system.
basis function. Because linguistic systems are reference The work with components and combinations
systems they still are indexes to something beyond themselves. marks the causal construction.
Not so formal systems, which some cases are completely re- It might be argued that the lack of a causal interest
moved from things. Since word or symbol systems have no re- in a routine minimizes somewhat prominence of a
ferents the systems themselves constitute the only things in the definite causal This point, loses validity as soon
siruation. When concrete things are forcibly dragged in to il- as an attempt is made to explain one's results. Such an \v~IIJ..L(A"~J.c:l..
lustrate the systems, they are clearly only descriptive analogies tion is always in terms of building a system stressing inter-
to actual objects and events. relations of an event situation.
Formal causal systems are exemplified by the classical maxims: Although instrumental and noninstrumental system-building
H Joseph, Introduction, p. 430. 45 Russell, rs.nowreos-e. P: 4 60ff .
17'2 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC INTERBEHAVIORAL LOGIC AND CAUSATION 173
behavior is in general associated with scientific and nonscientific routine In history. The recent allegation that the
situations respectively, the correspondence is not at all complete, findings of mechanics no stable basis for prediction,
It may well be the scientist who attempts to construct universalistic but only random movements by statistical
causal systems, while nonscientists may be keenly interested in coefficients, is not most startling of causal ineptitudes.
specific causal patterns. Recall, for instance, those rationalistic The causal law is suspended in the case of microscopic
scientists who are ambitious to construct a single universalistic sys- events all, the incongruous views concerning both
tem. Working with mathematical tools they may be interested in facts short, events and constructs. greater con-
developing systems of equations, all of which are interrelated, trast can be imagined than exists between (a) the search for an
and when taken together may constitute a single system. Even organizational pattern tying together a series of things as factors
here, of course, certain criteria may be preferred, but the single- and (b) metaphysical approaches to causal problems provided
ness of system remains the ideal of achievement. An excellent ex- by the various philosophies." Obviously, such problems as the
ample is Laplace's classic statement of essential causality: determinism or of events are unn1itigatedly meta-
An intelligence knowing, at a given instant of time, all forces act- physical.
. If we
.
agree that metaphysics, ,
unlike science deals with
ing in nature, as well as the momentary positions of all things of spurious problems, then the determinism-indeterminism issue is
which the universe consists, would be able to comprehend the mo- only a pseudo-problem. Be this as it may, this issue certainly mis-
tions of the largest bodies of the world and those of the smallest construes (a) relations between events or partial events, (b) knowl-
atoms in one single formula, provided it were sufficiently powerful edge and event patterns, and (c) descriptions of such knowledge.
to subject all data to analysis; to it, nothing would be uncertain, notions in the domain of quantum mechanics
both future and past would be present before its eyes." merely add another item to the repetitions of intellectual history.
On the other hand, scientists may employ specific causal prin- Recall enormous paradox of locating the constancies of
ciples for developing unit systems in any particular scientific field, causation, which did not really exist for him in the customs or
such as in chemistry, physics, biology; or within these fields units habits of an insubstantial mind, which does not for anybody.
may be developed on the basis of the interaction of field factors. Such confusions between events, alleged events, and the way both
I t is also possible to construct instrumental systems outside scien- are treated (explained) the wildest flights of sentence
making..
tific domains.
So large is the scope for employing specific systems in authentic Since the of quantum indeterminacy from a con-
causal situations that anyone of the many system instruments dis- crete situation in which all sorts of interrelated obj ects are
cussed in Chapter 16 may be pointed to as an example of a logical . we can only conclude that the problem is
tool for causal interpretation. simply a matter of metaphysical interpretation. In other words
determination is a free construction not from quantum-mechanical
CAUSATION AND INDETERMINISM facts but from metaphysical sentences.
The causal paradoxes which have turned up in connection with Even if it were the case that the simultaneous locus and state
quantum mechanics vividly remind us of the curious part which of an eluded observation or measurement, there would
causality has always played in scientific methodology. The rumor be no about: the existence of electronic events which are de-
that quantum-mechanical investigations have led to the astounding scribed in terms of behavioral properties.
discovery that the universe is bereft of causal principles, of de- as so many philosophical situations, the ex-
termining relations, of systems of order and regularity, is only a istence of a thing and its properties are confused with knowing
and them. There are many operationalists and phenorn-
-ill 'Theorie, Introduction. 41 Cf. for FeigPs survey of nine in Existential.
174 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC

enologists who identify observational acts with the things ob-

served. Since most writers who this position are mentalistic
in their psychological views they reduce the observational formula
to Berkeley's esse est -percipi. OF THOUGHT AND THINGS
What may well be lacking in a specific causal situation is knowl-
edge of the pattern of events-that is, causal knowledge. If we .LJ"-J'J .... ,..." AND LAW
differentiate explanation and reason from we corre- T IKE all enterprises, is a domain of rules, laws, and
late the former with knowledge, the latter with the combination L norms. laws, however, envisaged as the conventional
of factors. These factors are given and are the for inquiry Laws of Thought, or as expressing the absolute and
and subsequent knowledge. True, such factors may be missing, necessary structure things, are not properly interpreted. Because
but never the ground about which knowledge is sought. trinity of Jlogicallaws-namely, identity, noncontradiction, and
The essentially metaphysical interpretation of scientific situa- excluded middle or third-have suffered misconstruction, they
tions is strikingly exemplified in the assumption that properties of have perennially employed to implement the dogmas of uni-
things are constituted of the process or result of measurement." versality and necessity.
The analogy is the metaphysical one that since things seen are The flaw in the conventional notion of logical laws is that
created in the act of seeing, things measured are created by acts although few :in number they are as universal
of measuring. This analogy is made plausible by the presence of of thoughts things. To make logical laws into fundamental
numbers. Numbers, in such instances, are taken to be either sym- normative principles reflects the creed of logical omnicompetence.
.bols of properties or the properties themselves. Once we take ac- To reject such an interpretation means in no sense to disparage
count, however, of that with which we are interbehaving, we find principles, and norms, nor to deny them an important place
no warrant to confuse things with the acts or results of measuring in the logical it means to evaluate more effectively
them, nor constructions with the numbers which represent the di- the for understanding things, acts, and even
mensions of things. comprehending rules themselves. What, then, are rules and norma-
48 Cf. Lenzen, Indeterminism.
constitute to the operations and. pro-
cedures the work performed in logic, science, and or-
ganized At once we must distinguish a priori and
absolute norms froln operational principles. The former are well
illustrated definition of logic:
Diese von den notwendigen Ge:3eti~en
und Vernunft liberhaupt, oder, welches einerlei ist, von der
blossen des Denken ilberhaupt, nennen wir nun La gik. 1
In contrast, scientific and logical laws are definitely constructed
principles based upon observed events; any normative suggestions
are prompted only by the conditions of the enterprise. Principles
or laws so construed constitute a definitive concern of logic. They
are not only to be distinguished from the three classical principles,
1 Jasche, Kant's p. 14; see also vol. I, this treatise, p. 59.