[A.C. No. 4673.

April 27, 2001]

ATTY. HECTOR TEODOSIO, petitioner, vs. MERCEDES NAVA, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed against petitioner Atty. Hector Teodosio for having allegedly represented
clients with conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent Mercedes Nava alleged that petitioner acted as counsel for Melanie Batislaong in
several cases[1] in various branches of the Iloilo City Regional Trial Court while acting as counsel
for Letecia Espinosa and Ma. Gilda Palma in cases[2] filed by them against Melanie Batislaong
and herself, respondent Mercedes Nava.

In his comment, petitioner admits that Melanie Batislaong, Letecia Espinosa, and Ma. Gilda Palma
are indeed his clients with respect to the cases mentioned by respondent. He denies, however,
that his clients interests are conflicting and contends that his clients in fact have a common
interest against respondent Nava. According to him, Nava used to be the manager of Batislaongs
lending business and, in that capacity, dealt with several borrowers, including Espinosa and
Palma. Due to acts of mismanagement allegedly committed by Nava, Batislaong, then
represented by Atty. Eugenio O. Original, sued Nava for accounting and damages (Civil Case No.
21417). In turn, Nava charged Batislaong (Criminal Case Nos. 79688 and 44181) and Espinosa
and Palma (I.S. Nos. 2200-93 and 2068-93) with estafa.

While the complaints against them were pending preliminary investigation, Espinosa and Palma
hired petitioners services in seeking the annulment of certain trust receipt agreements allegedly
falsified by Nava, on the basis of which the criminal complaints against them were filed. As a
result, petitioner filed on behalf of Espinosa and Palma Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493 against
Nava and Batislaong for annulment of contract and damages. Petitioner claims that he
impleaded Batislaong as Navas co-defendant because Espinosa and Palma wanted to settle the
balance of the amount they had borrowed from Batislaong through Nava but they were unsure
whether the payment should be made to Nava or Batislaong as the two had parted ways. Both
were, therefore, impleaded so that they could interplead who between them should receive the
payment. Petitioner claims that it was only after he had filed these cases that Batislaong offered
to hire him as her counsel not only in the civil case she had filed against Nava (Civil Case No.
21417) but also in the two estafa cases, Criminal Case Nos. 79688 and 44181, filed against her
by Nava. Petitioner claims that he agreed to represent Batislaong in these cases only after he
had explained to her the nature of the complaints filed by Espinosa and Palma against her and
Nava in Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493.[3]

Petitioner submitted affidavits executed by Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma stating that they
have no complaints in the way petitioner handled their cases and that each of them was aware
that the other was represented by petitioner. Petitioner further submitted another set of
affidavits executed by Espinosa and Palma stating in detail the extent of their knowledge of
petitioners involvement in Batislaongs cases as well as the basis of their consent for him to act
as their common counsel.[4]
Respondent assails the affidavits of Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma on the ground that they
were notarized by a lawyer from petitioners law firm and that they do not bear the data as to the
residence certificates of the affiants. In addition, respondent claims that petitioner failed to ask
the court to declare Batislaong in default despite the latters failure to answer the complaints filed
by Espinosa and Palma, and contends that this is proof of petitioners bias for her (Batislaong).[5]

In response, petitioner claims that there was no need to declare Batislaong in default in Civil
Case Nos. 21511 and 21493 because Nava, in her Answer, had disclaimed any interest in the
offer of payment of Palma and Espinosa, making the necessity for the defendants to interplead
moot and academic as the money would logically be paid to Batislaong.[6]

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation. In a report, dated June 23, 1998, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.[7] However, the IBP Board of
Governors, in Resolution XIII-99-23 of February 23, 1999, found petitioner guilty of violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and ordered him suspended from the
practice of law for one year. The Boards resolution reads:

RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-23

Adm. Case No. 4673

Mercedes Nava vs.

Atty. Hector Teodosio

RESOLVED to SUSPEND Atty. Hector Teodosio for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law for
representing litigants with CONFLICTING INTERESTS.[8]

IBP Governor for Eastern Visayas, Kenny A.H. Tantuico, dissenting, adopted the report and
recommendation of Commissioner San Juan in view of the consent given by respondents clients.

On April 13, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to set aside IBP Resolution XIII-99-23. The Court
referred the motion to the IBP which, on December 11, 1999, issued Resolution XIV-99-286,
affirming the Boards original Resolution XIII-99-23.

After receipt of IBP Resolution XIV-99-286, the Court resolved to treat petitioners motion to set
aside the questioned IBP resolution as his petition for review thereof and required respondent to
file comment. In lieu of comment, respondent filed a manifestation stating that the points raised
in petitioners motion were mere reiterations of what he had already stated in his prior pleadings.
[9] Petitioner filed a Reply to respondents manifestation.[10]

We now deal with the issues raised in the petition for review.

First. Petitioner points out that the IBP Board ordered him suspended from the practice of law
without stating the facts and the law on which its decision is based. On the other hand, although
the report of the investigating commissioner contains findings, her recommendation was for the
dismissal of the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that even the
commissioners report is of doubtful validity since she failed to schedule any hearing on the case
before she submitted her report to the Board of Governors.[11]
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the IBPs investigation of
disbarment complaints, the report of its investigator, and the review of the latters findings by the
Board of Governors, state:

SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall
have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.

....

SEC. 10. Report of Investigator. Not later than thirty (30) days from termination of the
investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the
transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the
report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the
report reproduce substantially from the Investigators personal notes any relevant and pertinent
testimonies.

....

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator
shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it
by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigators report.

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis added)

The requirement that the IBP investigator afford the respondent in a disbarment complaint full
opportunity to present his case cannot be taken lightly for it is meant to ensure that baseless
accusations against members of the Bar do not prosper.[12] Similarly, the requirement that the
decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is
akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, serves an important function. For
aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the
appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to
appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case,
reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[13]

In the case at bar, the IBP failed to observe these procedural requirements. Commissioner San
Juan appear not to have scheduled a hearing on the case nor required the parties to submit their
evidence. Similarly, the Board of Governors resolution suspending petitioner from the practice of
law does not contain any findings of fact or law upon which it based its ruling.
Non-compliance with the foregoing procedural rules would normally result in the remand of the
case.[14] Nevertheless, in instances where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite
sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the
Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[15]
In view of the presence of such circumstances in this case, the Court deems it advisable to do so.

Second. We now resolve the question whether petitioner is guilty of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which in pertinent part provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Under Canon 6 of the previous Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.[16] The rule is designed to remove from attorneys the
opportunity to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained during the existence of the
client-attorney relation.[17]

Based on the facts of this case, we hold that petitioners conduct does not amount to a violation
of the rule. The records bear out petitioners contention that based on the causes of action of the
cases involving Melanie Batislaong on one hand and Letecia Espinosa and Ma. Gilda Palma on the
other, he could simultaneously represent them without any possible violation of the client-
attorney confidentiality. In the cases filed by him for Espinosa and Palma (Civil Case Nos. 21511
and 21493), it is only Nava against whom the former have an adverse interest as it was the latter
who allegedly falsified the trust receipt agreements to the prejudice of Palma and Espinosa.
Indeed, were it not for the offer of Palma and Espinosa to settle their obligation, there would have
been no need to implead Batislaong as a defendant. On the other hand, in the other cases in
which Batislaong is a party, either as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21417 or as an accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 78200, 79688, and 44181, neither Palma nor Espinosa are parties. Indeed, it is Nava
who is the respondent in the first case and the private complainant in the last two criminal cases.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the danger that petitioner may abuse his clients confidences
to the detriment of the other is absent.

Respondent contends that petitioners failure to ask the court to have Batislaong declared in
default in Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493 despite the fact that she failed to file her answer is
proof that he was favoring Batislaong over Espinosa and Palma. This contention is untenable. As
petitioner explains, with Nava disclaiming any interest in the offer of payment of Espinosa and
Palma, petitioner found no need to have Batislaong declared in default as Navas contention
meant that it was Batislaong alone who would be entitled to receive payment. In any case,
Batislaongs failure to file her answer, coupled with Navas disavowal of interest, could only mean
that the money offered in payment will be kept in the custody of the court subject to future
claims.

Third. Even granting that the interests of Espinosa, Palma, and Batislaong are conflicting,
petitioner cannot be held liable for acting as their common counsel in view of the fact that, as
stated in their affidavits, petitioner explained to them the consequences of his representation
and that they gave their consent to the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it was
they themselves who brought Batislaong to petitioners office so that the latter could engage his
services.[18] The fact that the first set of affidavits were uniformly notarized by an associate in
petitioners law firm and that they did not state certain data relating to the residence certificates
of the affiants do not adversely affect their validity absent any proof that the affiants did not
execute them of their own volition or that their signature therein are not authentic.

WHEREFORE, Resolutions XIII-99-23 and XIV-99-286 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
SET ASIDE and the complaint against respondent Atty. Hector Teodosio is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

TIRSO UYTENGSU III, ADM. CASE No. 5134

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL,
Respondent.
Promulgated:

December 14, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

Tinga, J.:
A sworn letter-complaint[1] dated 1 July 1999[2] was filed by Tirso Uytengsu III (complainant)
against Atty. Joseph M. Baduel (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a pending patent
application. He alleges that sometime in December 1998 respondent requested him to sign a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing Luis Wee (Wee) and/or Thomas Jacobo (Jacobo) to
claim, demand, acknowledge and receive on his behalf the certificates of title from the Register
of Deeds, General Santos City, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and from any
government office or agency due to complainant and his co-heirs by reason of their application
for Homestead Patent II.A. No. 37 142 (E 37 124) over Lot 924-A Cad. II-013120-D with an area of
5.3876 hectares and II.A. No. 116303 over Lot No. 924-B Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5,1526
hectares, both situated in Lagao, General Santos City.

Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he wanted to obtain the documents personally.
Subsequently though, before he could get the title and other documents, complainant learned
that respondent caused to have the SPA signed by Connie U. Kokseng (Kokseng), the former
guardian of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. Complainant maintains that the document signed by
Kokseng was the same SPA which was presented to him for signature by respondent in December
1998. As a result, the titles and other documents were received and taken by other persons
without his or his co-heirs knowledge and consent.

Complainant contends that the said SPA was prepared and notarized by the law office of
respondent and the latter stood as a witness to the public instrument. Complainant further avers
that respondent used to do some legal work for him and knew fully well that Kokseng has already
ceased to be his and his co-heirs guardian when the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 of Cebu City
terminated the letters of guardianship over her youngest sibling on 30 August 1985 in the case
entitled In the Matter of Guardianship of Tirso M. Uytengsu III, Kathleen Anne M. Uytengsu, and
Barbara Anne M. Uytengsu, docketed as SP Proc. No. 3039-R.

In essence, complainant asserts that respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA in favor of
Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. even if he
knew that Kokseng had no authority to do so.

Respondent in his comment,[4] argues that the allegations of complainant are purely hearsay. He
stresses that complaint was instituted to harass him because he was the counsel of an opposing
litigant against complainants corporation in an ejectment case entitled General Milling
Corporation v. Cebu Autometic Motors, Inc. and Tirso Uytengsu III.

On 9 August 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[5]

Notices of hearing were sent to both parties between 11 January 2001 and 8 May 2001. However,
no actual hearings were conducted then due to the unavailability of either or both parties.
Finally, on 26 June 2001, both parties appeared before the investigating commissioner. They
were then directed to file their position papers and their respective replies thereto.

Investigating Commissioner Tyrone Cimafranca submitted his Report and Recommendation dated
2 April 2002, recommending the dismissal of the case. The Commissioner characterized the
evidence against respondent as hearsay. Moreover, the Commissioner concluded that Kokseng
had legal basis to execute the SPA in favor of a substitute, the records showing that complainant
and his co-heirs have constituted Kokseng as their attorney-in-fact for the purpose of filing the
homestead application.[6]

Thereafter, the IBP submitted their resolution dated 29 June 2002 approving and adopting the
report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, dismissing the complaint against
respondent.[7] Complainant filed his motion for reconsideration[8] but was denied by the IBP in
its resolution dated 19 October 2002 on the ground that the IBP no longer had jurisdiction to
consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[9] This notwithstanding, the Court
remanded[10] the administrative case for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration
on the merits to the IBP in the Courts resolution dated 20 January 2003.[11]

On 27 February 2004, the IBP filed its resolution adopting and approving the investigating
commissioners report and recommendation denying complainants motion for reconsideration.
[12]

Subsequently, on 1 July 2004,[13] complainant filed a petition for review on certiorari[14]

assailing the resolution of the IBP dated 27 February 2004.

In his petition for review, complainant questions the findings of the IBP that complainants
allegations were based on hearsay and in finding that Kokseng had the authority to execute the
special power of attorney in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo.

We dismiss the complaint.

At the outset, the Court finds that herein respondent was in fact the counsel in the homestead
patent application of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. This can be deduced from the letters[15]
dated 9 October 1991 and 15 January 1993, addressed to respondent by Victoria Villasor-Inong
(Villasor-Inong), Accounts Liquidation Officer III of the Board of Liquidators of General Santos City.

In said letters, Villasor-Inong communicated to respondent the requirements for the grant of the
homestead patent to herein complainant and his co-heirs. From the tenor of the letters, it would
seem that respondent actively participated in representing complainant and his co-heirs in their
patent application for the subject land. Apparently, he stood as counsel for the heirs of Tirso
Uytengsu, Jr.

With that ostensible representation and without any evidence to show that complainant or his co-
heirs withdrew such authority from respondent, the latter himself can even claim the certificates
of titles and other documents with regard to the homestead patents.

It should be remembered that the first letter of Villasor-Inong addressed to respondent was on 9
October 1991.[16] The addressees of the said letter were The Heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr., Rep. by
Connie Uytengsu Kokseng, c/o Atty. Joseph Baduel.

Complainant also presented a letter[17] dated 23 September 1992 addressed to Villasor-Inong by

the general manager of the Board of Liquidators, directing the former to personally contact the
heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. to ascertain who among the persons giving conflicting directives as to
the course of the patent application is the true authorized representative of the heirs of Tirso
Uytengsu, Jr.

After four (4) months, respondent received from Villasor Inong another letter,[18] dated 15
January 1993, also attached to complainants position paper and petition for review, furnishing
respondent the requirements needed for the homestead patent application of complainant and
his co-heirs.

Complainant himself submitted all the aforementioned letters clearly showing that respondent
was indeed the counsel or representative of complainant in the application for patent.

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency and the general rules of
ordinary agency apply to such relation.[19] The extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting on
behalf of his client outside of court, is measured by the same test as that which is applied to an
ordinary agent.[20]

Such being the case, even respondent himself can acquire the certificates of title and other
documents without need of an SPA from complainant and his co-heirs.

In addition, the Court agrees with the investigating commissioner that the allegations of
complainant constitutes mere hearsay evidence and may not be admissible in any proceeding.

In Marcelo v. Javier,[21] it was held that:

In all cases the determination whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for
a period involves the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, mindful always of the fact that
disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and should be resorted to only in cases
where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with
approved professional standards. In cases of lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an order of
suspension, which is correctional in nature, should be inflicted. In view of the nature and
consequences of a disciplinary proceedings, observance of due process, as in other judicial
determination, is imperative along with presumption of innocence in favor of the lawyer.
Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to overcome such presumption and
establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.[22]

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges against him until the contrary is proved. The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof.[23]

In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions of complainant, the evidence presented by the
latter does not suffice to tip the scale of justice to his side.

It should be stressed that in administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving
the allegations in the complaint. We cannot depend on mere conjectures and speculations. There
must be substantial evidence to support respondents guilt.[24]
Complainant averred that: (1) the SPA which the respondent asked him to sign was the same
document that Kokseng executed; (2) the document was notarized by a notary public from the
office of the respondent; and (3) the respondent was a witness in the SPA.

As correctly observed by the investigating commissioner, all the aforementioned charges are not
based on his personal knowledge of the acts complained of but acquired from other sources.

Complainant charges that respondent committed an act meriting disbarment when the latter
caused to have a special power of attorney, which the former reused to sign earlier, executed by
Mrs. Connie Kokseng, former guardian of complainant and his co-heirs, authorizing certain
individuals to secure the release from the Register of Deeds and other government offices in
General Santos City, titles and other documents pertaining to complainants and his co-heirs
homestead application. However, this charge is not based on his own personal knowledge of the
acts complained of but acquired from another source. In other words, what he offered in
evidence to prove his charge is a second-hand version. Complainant identified his source but
failed to present any sworn statement or affidavit of said witness. In other words, what he
presented in evidence to prove his charge is hearsay.[25]

The hearsay rule provides that no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or
has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as
provided otherwise by the rules on evidence, by rules of court, or by statute. The chief reasons
for the rule are that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and
are not subject to cross-examination.[26]

He did not submit to this Court or to the IBP any witness or documentary evidence to support his
claim that respondent has indeed caused the execution of the disputed special power of attorney.
Furthermore, complainant in his reply[27] to respondents comment stated that he has a credible
witness in the person of Edward U. Kokseng, son of Kokseng, who has first hand knowledge of
Koksengs signing of the SPA. However, he failed to present his witness before the IBP or
submitted an affidavit of his witness to affirm his allegations. Neither did he present any witness,
whether expert nor otherwise, to attest to the genuiness of the signature of respondent which
was allegedly found in the SPA, if that was his objective.

This is not to say that complainant was not given any advice by the Court to make the proper
attachment to pleadings. As early as 21 July 1999, Atty. Erlinda C. Versoza, the then Deputy Clerk
of Court and Bar Confidant, sent word to complainant through a letter that

complainants letter-complaint must be verified and the supporting documents duly

authenticated.[28]

As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei
incumbit probatio, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio
nulla sit.[29]

It is also worth noting that complainants claim that he suffered damage and prejudice due to the
alleged unauthorized procurement of the certificates of titles and other documents was not
substantiated by independent evidence. Complainants silence as to the extent of the alleged
damage and the lack of material evidence to show that his rights were impaired by the acts of
respondent would lead this Court to believe that complainant has suffered no or minimal injury,
should there be any.

As held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan,[30] no right of action is given where no injury
is sustained. A wrongful violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action
unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damage. There must be therefore, both
wrongful violation and damages. The one without the other is not sufficient.[31]

Complainant made no statement on whether or not, at present, other persons who procured the
certificates of title and other documents are still in possession of the same. He also has not
stated the direct injury that was produced by the acts of respondent.

With all the foregoing, the Court finds that complainant did not overcome the presumption of
innocence of respondent.

We need not dwell on the other factual issues of the case as it involves the presentation of
concrete evidence that, sadly, complainant was not able to offer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case against respondent is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral
turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,
[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing
up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi
driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano
sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled
him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the
offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be

disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had
shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are
as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether
his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the
crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter
to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to
the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.
[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from
the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa
only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince
the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals
of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact,
under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters
worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind
him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound
himself to obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of
their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy
of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court
settlement with complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a conference
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if
not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable --
lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to
rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His
actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the
mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In
the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a
member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
Adm. Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
"The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of
Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission:
the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal."1
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds "deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his
oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct."
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara
Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to
handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire
respondent as his personal counsel.
Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He traveled
and dined with them abroad.2 He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-
year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumptionlavvphil.net
Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in
Hongkong. It was only the next
day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that "everything is legal."
Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three
children. Upon investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their
tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to
go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over
in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as "bachelor" before the Hong Kong
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth
Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a
petition3 for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as
Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4 dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint5 for disbarment, imputing to
respondent the following acts:
"a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and
his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent
secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity
between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over
Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and
advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) children;
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in
her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for
complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he
made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;
c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal
impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in
inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of
Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Elizabeth H. Palma and that the "advice" of Maria Luisas parents should first be obtained she
being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her
in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities
that he is a bachelor. x x x."
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended
that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or
violation of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation that he acted with "wanton recklessness,
lack of skill or ignorance of the law" in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of
grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with "utmost
sincerity and good faith" and that "it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral
man to marry the woman he sincerely loves."
In the Resolution7 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 645388 a
Resolution9 (a) setting aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-
P declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding
the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to
disclose the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings10
on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to
the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining
Order.11 In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the
investigation of the disbarment proceedings.12
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline. On October 19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:
"Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a practical measure
to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or supervening events
have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be
deemed closed and terminated."13
In his Manifestation,14 complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in
prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he
needed more time to locate vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of
December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he
fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.15
Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered
submitted for resolution.16
On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath
as a lawyer. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years. Thus:
"The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the following
acts which warrant his disbarment:
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant;
b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor,
however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term
"spinster" with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well that in
marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by
complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
SO ORDERED."
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it
reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may
at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the
complaint does not allege that he acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of
the law."
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,19 however,
professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage
with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows
that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the
other hand, the Certificate of Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong,
proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at
the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P.
Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend.22
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a
common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community."24 Measured against this definition, respondents act is
manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a "bachelor"
so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted
to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[S]uch pattern of misconduct by
respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks
to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-
being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there
can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute
"a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession," warranting respondents disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,27 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive,
their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good
moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted
to the bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,28 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law.
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,29 respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his
law education, and thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he "failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar." For this,
respondent was disbarred.
(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30 respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed
cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that "abandoning ones wife and resuming
carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman," constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was
respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him
that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like
the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry
the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he
even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had
crossed the limits of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he
cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on
the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.31 How could respondent perform these obligations
to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing
he could have done was to walk away.
Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college
student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional
immaturity.32 Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been
determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present
disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage
has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33 a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,34 or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,35 then the judgment of annulment of
respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So
long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.36
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
that they "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This is founded
on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
"CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the
above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is
the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex
Parte Wall:37
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic."
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the
country has to take before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity
of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY;
VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION. However, the phrase
"without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second
paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate
Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material
statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima
facie case of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense
which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers solemn duty to act at all times in a manner
consistent with truth.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the accused-
appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in effect the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.

On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June
26, 1991, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in
dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before it 2
earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became final
and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990; and, (b)
the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the issue then
being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely objected to in a
motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four
(4) issues which nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-
appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving real
property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the notice of the petition in two (2)
successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the accused-
appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.

Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the
issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in
fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioners failure to seasonably file an
appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.

It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for
reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes
final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In fact, in Dueas
v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have committed an error in
the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in this case, but considering
that their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer
be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of
an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has
become final. We have also declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment
becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow
the Court of amend or reverse a decision which has attained finality will result in endless
litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come to an end.

Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial
court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than a
year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court, however
erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner then
simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal
from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land registration
proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give
personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest
the courts with power or authority over the res. 10 Thus, while it may be true that no notice was
sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such
failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v.
RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the
notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that
such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so
within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person
purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not
sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No.
21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioners action to annul the order of the trial
court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was
granted but later reversed by the appellate court which reversal became final and executory
due to petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by
varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 13

Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become final and executory. Accordingly, We affirm
the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991, by
respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty,
Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel purports to quote, as
he does, the questioned decision when he alleges

"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

x x x

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated November 20,
1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, granting the
applicants petition for reconstitution in the name of the deceased Elias Eugenio" (Italics
supplied)

However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the
above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision
penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears
as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not.
This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a serious offense which
constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent
with truth.

ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court
a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading
this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar.

Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
Petitioner,

- versus -
ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Adm. Case No. 6554

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 14, 2005

xx------------------------------------------------------------------------------xx

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On petition for review is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (petitioner)
against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 02-984.

In her complaint against respondent, petitioner alleges that on July 15, 1991, her father, the late
Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando
Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009,[1] Republic of the
Philippines v. Jose L. Africa, et al., of which Ilusorio was one of the defendants.

In that civil case, the Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares in the latter corporation of which appeared to be
owned by POTC. Respondent, together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon,
actively handled the case for Ilusorio.

While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and Lokin
(successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement
with the Republic which bore the imprimatur of the Sandiganbayan.[2] Under the Compromise
Agreement which, by petitioners claim, constituted the full, comprehensive and final settlement
of claims of the parties, the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673
POTC shares.

Petitioner alleges that during the special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August
27, 1998 which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the newly appointed
government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of POTC, the gathering,
through the high-

handed and deceitful maneuvers of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed
into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected.

Petitioner adds that Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-98-6086, against
Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT,[3] in
which SEC case respondent appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to
represent conflicting interests.

Ilusorio, together with Fidelity Farms, Inc. and Great Asia Enterprises, Inc., had earlier filed with
the IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same grounds as those raised in the
present case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children, namely,
Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and petitioner, to establish their qualification to substitute for
him, his complaint was dismissed. The dismissal having explicitly stated that it was without
prejudice to the filing of a new complaint by Ilusorios children or any person who knows of
respondents unethical acts, petitioner contends that her present complaint is not barred by such
dismissal.

After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan found merit in
petitioners complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three months.

By the now assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, however, the IBP Board of Governors set
aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint.

No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless, learned
about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the Board
of Governors, prodding her to write a March 10, 2004 letter to the Board in her own name
requesting that the Board take up the matter once more and asking for the remanding of the
case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors. In the same letter, petitioner stated that
the very brief time it took the Board to review the case and resolve it in respondents favor
confirms the information she received that a former IBP official had been intervening for
respondent.

By letter of April 16, 2004 bearing the signatures of all its members, the Board of Governors
denied what it considered as petitioners malicious and reckless allegations, stating that it was
constrained to deny [petitioners] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case as
there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose
Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently National President of
the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her complaint,
and attaching thereto as further evidence a document for its consideration in the event that no
such action had yet been taken.

Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board could no
longer act on petitioners July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the
letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for
cases of the kind. And the Chairman referred petitioners counsel to the Boards April 16, 2004
letter to her.

Atty. Divina thereupon sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, National
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of Resolution of the
Board of Governors and of the Investigation Report of Commissioner San Juan, so that petitioner
may appeal the case to the Supreme Court.

Atty. Divina later sent Atty. Vinluan another letter, dated August 27, 2004, stating that upon
further reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared that it was the
Chairmans intention that the said letter be treated as a Notice of Resolution and, therefore,
petitioner had until September 2, 2004 to file a Petition for Review (since the August 11 letter
was received on August 17, 2004). Instead of asking for the Notice of Resolution as in his
previous letter, Atty. Divina only requested in his August 24, 2004 letter for a copy of the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the record, if any, of the deliberations of
the IBP indicating the basis for reversing her findings. This letter, according to petitioner, was
simply ignored.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 to which respondent has already
filed his Comment.

Before delving into the merits of this case, the procedural issues raised by respondent against
the petition will first be addressed.

Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, as
petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on
August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board
Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired
knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juans recommendation. Hence, respondent
claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review.

Respondent further contends that even on the assumption that the petition was timely filed, the
same should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being based not on a
resolution of the IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP President, contrary to Section 12 of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:

xxx

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
(Underscoring supplied)

This Court finds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioners counsel may not be deemed
to be the notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule 139-B, paragraph (c).
The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information
that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of
the Board, but to the official notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy
of which is given to all parties and transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately
follows paragraph (c) states:

(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their
counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent
to petitioner: The Board has not to date issued the notice of resolution confirming the dismissal
of CBD Case No. 02-984 for the reason that all the relevant records have yet to be completed for
transmittal to the Supreme Court. The complainant will be formally furnished a copy of the
resolution upon transmittal of the records to the Supreme Court.[4]

The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of Resolution. A copy was
supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not submitted any proof of service.

Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as the
August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution,
the present petition has been timely filed.

Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not act on
motions for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the rules of
procedure for disbarment cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente[5] instructs:

x x x The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under
Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this Court held:

Although Rule 139-B, 12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text
or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days
from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is
made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency
rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced. (Underscoring supplied)

In another vein, respondent claims that the petition is premature as it is not based on a notice of
resolution of the Board, hence, it should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper.

While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBPs dismissal of a disciplinary case
should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite
issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of
resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the IBPs statement noted earlier, there was still no
notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005 almost one year after the dismissal of the subject
complaint. The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that
records were still being completed. In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that
her complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be
faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution.

Respondent also challenges the qualification of petitioner to file this case on the ground of her
purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint. He invokes the
resolution of the IBP in the prior disbarment case against him, where petitioner who therein
sought to be substituted in place of her deceased father was held to be without the requisite
personal knowledge to pursue the complaint.

Even granting arguendo that the earlier resolution constitutes res judicata with respect to the
finding that Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances for
which Respondent is sought to be administratively liable, personal knowledge is not a requisite
for filing a disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:

SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys

may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are
any. Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by the Investigating Commissioner who
dismissed the earlier disciplinary case against respondent omitted the phrase any person,
making it appear that complainants must have personal knowledge of the facts they allege.[6]

Moreover, the ruling of this Court in Navarro v. Meneses III[7] bears reiteration:

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute
a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The
evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain
its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)

While this Court notes petitioners claim that she herself has personal knowledge of the facts
alleged in her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the foregoing
discussion.

Segueing to the merits of the petition, respondent admits that his firm represented Ilusorio in
Sandiganbayan Case No. 009[8] and that he represented Manuel Nieto, Jr. and Lourdes Africa in
SEC Case No. 09-98-6086.[9] The Court notes, however, that besides Nieto and Africa,
respondent represented Salvador Hizon as well, as indicated in his Memorandum submitted to
the SEC[10] and as found by the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and
Disbarment of the IBP.[11]

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC cases,
respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he proffering that, in
the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan has been the personal account of Atty.
Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law partnership. Not only is this claim
unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by respondents own evidence and statements.

Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition documentary evidence
consisting of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he signed on behalf of
his firm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of his firm.[12] The subject of
both letters was the then pending negotiations between the PCGG and Ilusorio who was therein
identified as the client of respondents firm. In connection with these letters, respondent claims: If
by chance the signature of the Respondent appears on some correspondences, it is only because
Respondent, in good faith, accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latters request who, as then
Deputy Secretary of the Senate of the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private
practice.[13] Besides being a flimsy excuse by itself, this claim of respondent, being an
acknowledgment that he signed correspondences with the PCGG pertaining to the Ilusorio case,
only shows that both he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said case.

Furthermore, as earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in
the Sandiganbayan case.[14] In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of
ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm. So this Court
held in Hilado v. David:[15]

x x x If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Franciso and he
was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney
and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he
personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law
firm is information imparted to the firm. This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such
member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with
the firm is available to his associates or employers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent denies, however, representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB Case No.
009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other. He attempts to distinguish
them as follows:

36. SB Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is totally distinct and
separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-98-6086. Said cases involve different
parties and causes of action.

37. In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing parties are the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party
Plaintiff; and Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp.
(MLDC).
38. The subject matter in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the National Government,
through IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).

39. SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the PHILCOMSAT election of its Board
of Directors and corporate officers.[16]

The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a defendant in the
Sandiganbayan case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that among the grounds
Ilusorio relied upon in his petition in the SEC was the existence of the Compromise Agreement in
the Sandiganbayan, which vested in him ownership and voting rights corresponding to 673 POTC
shares.[17]

Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondents Memorandum dated September
28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows:

A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by this
Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the disputed
shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the
Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement
entered into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission.
Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.
[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest
hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated
for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by respondents
firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there was no conflict of
interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case did not in any way involve the validity of
the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG.[19]

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3)
Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed
against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take
the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of
which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989,
after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to
his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of
the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10
February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and
Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989.
These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready
reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in
SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take
his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his
Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28
June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM
No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no
position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was
a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying
that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the
community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the
IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board
of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the
lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by
the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial
attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP
testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers
of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's
oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25
August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any
acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of
title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of
Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990,
signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of
any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above
findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from
admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to
Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan
(in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4
August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this
Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and
required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v.
Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990,
by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter
44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he
had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing
her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose
his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes
make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development,"
the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request
this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was
Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990,
stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the
question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases.
On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme
Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or
amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing
final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as
anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties,
devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy
could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial
Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the
latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17
December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion,
which, according to him, was already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached
between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent
in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan;
provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate
of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over
said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of
P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against
defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of
29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge
Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case
with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion
dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid
Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring
them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment,
dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's
sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated,"
and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take
the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years
having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful
consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were
the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that
time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor
were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's
procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain
and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an
employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by
order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere
compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and
paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by
defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General
interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a
confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time
said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied
on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration
alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case
against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not
but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his
moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can
not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no
determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a
confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his
title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and
notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did
not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal
to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that
he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor
and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack
of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government
against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty
and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619)
have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have
already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has
withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis
of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the
legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification
for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this
Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City.
RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:p
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to
the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and
"has exhibited such a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a
member of the legal profession," ordered his disbarment.
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission, supported by
resolutions from members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters,
members of professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to
respondent's good conduct and moral character since his disbarment, and petitioning for his
reinstatement to the legal profession.
The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously
disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by
positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been
successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an
office of trust.
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified
petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and integrity and other indications of
his good moral character (clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City
Courts and of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council
No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.), and
after the hearing on the petition for reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a resolution
on July 20, 1972, to wit:
... [A]cting on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar, and
considering (a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since
then the said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate punishment; (c) that
he has observed exemplary conduct since then, according to credible certifications attesting to
his repentance for the offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago, and may be reasonably
expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view of
the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of
his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that
respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular
fourth year review classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of
this Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attesting to his
having regularly attended and passed their subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary
students said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon
his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of
this Supreme Court.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Court's above-quoted
resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review
classes attended by him attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects
under the same conditions as ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated February
25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of the University of the
Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar
Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.
WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972, respondent Carlos C.
Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after
paying to this court the requisite fees.
A.C. No. 126 October 24, 1952
In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero.
Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:
The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Tranquilino
Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been
found in a final decision rendered by then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the
customs law by fraudulently concealing a dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to
three times the customs duty due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which
was subsequently found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948,
"respondent Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice against customs revenue, as defined and
penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code." The respondents admits the
existence of the of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of
Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice
of law, especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely
discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the
exercise of his legal profession.
Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and
this ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer.
Moral turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In
re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.)
Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves
an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor
General is aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private
person, but the Government.
Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and
he is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this
resolution shall have become final.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office
in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239
of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino
Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a
nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el
varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara
al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica,
Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al
Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death
in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first
died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies
and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they
are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,
one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960
the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant
to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day,
28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice
of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui
later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of
age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of
the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds
the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February
1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a
strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means
not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar
after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is
defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion"
(Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by
a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law.
This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who
are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being
his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little
to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose,
however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers.
(Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.")
Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or
university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under
Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see
to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which
work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he
is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that
the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge
of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he
assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation,
upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of
good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5
Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding
the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that
the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney
& Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and
is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to
the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental
qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to
the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to
hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and
Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance
upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further
proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First
he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of
the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had
taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the
position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950
(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the
plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank
then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as
stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration
of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954
he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon
afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it
said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive
Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The
motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540),
which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties,
who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in
quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying
the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid
motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case
of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his
acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to
continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui
after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be
ventilated in such an action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present
claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the
right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action
against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the
running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the
defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any
better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right
arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to
discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson
of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the
deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is
a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in
the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui,
to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the
deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A. C. No. 6656
Complainant, (formerly CBD-98-591)

ATTY. CARMENCITA
BAUTISTA LOZADA,
Respondent. Promulgated :

December 13, 2005

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In this disbarment case, we are faced with conflicting versions of the incidents surrounding the
filing of the verified complaint[1] for deception and malpractice allegedly committed by Atty.
Carmencita Bautista Lozada.
For her part, complainant Bobie Rose Frias alleged that respondent became her retained counsel
and legal adviser in the early part of 1990. She entrusted to respondent documents and titles of
properties in November of that year. Sometime in December 1990, respondent persuaded
complainant to sell her house located at 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City. Respondent allegedly acted as broker as she was in need of money.

On December 7, 1990 respondent hastily arranged a meeting with her and a prospective buyer,
Dra. Flora San Diego, in Valenzuela, Manila. She was allegedly made to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)[2] without her having read it because they had to reach the bank before it
closed at 3:00 p.m.

When they arrived at the Security Bank branch in Valenzuela, San Diego handed respondent P2M
in cash and P1M in check, instead of P3M in cash as the down payment[3] indicated in the MOA.

Out of the P2M in cash, respondent took P1M as her commission without complainants consent.
When complainant protested, respondent promised to sign a promissory note later. The P1M
check was later on dishonored by the bank because it was a stale check.

San Diego eventually backed out from the sale. However, she converted the aborted sale into a
mortgage loan at 36% p.a. interest, as provided for in the MOA.

Since the transaction between her and San Diego did not materialize, complainant allegedly tried
to recover from respondent the title[4] to the property and other documents.[5] Respondent,
however, started avoiding her. Complainant recovered the documents placed inside an envelope
only on May 6, 1991. On the same day, however, the envelope was allegedly stolen from her
Pajero. She reported the incident to the police.[6] She also informed respondent about the
incident, and the latter prepared an affidavit of loss.[7] Complainant later offered this affidavit as
evidence in a petition for issuance of a duplicate copy of the title she filed in the RTC of Makati,
Branch 142.[8]

A perjury case[9] was then filed by San Diego against complainant on the ground that the title to
the property was never really lost (as alleged by complainant in the affidavit of loss) but was with
San Diego all along. San Diego maintained that complainant handed it to her on the day they
signed the MOA. Complainant denied these allegations. She instead claimed that the perjury
case was filed by San Diego, with respondent as counsel, to coerce her (complainant) to assign
the property to San Diego and to abandon her claim of P1M from respondent.

San Diego also filed a case[10] for the return of the P3M she paid complainant, at 36% p.a.
interest. Complainant claimed that her failure to return the money to San Diego was by reason of
respondents refusal to give back the P1M she took as commission. Complainant was thus
constrained to file a civil case against respondent. Despite the favorable decision[11] of the trial
court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals[12], respondent refused to return the money.

In her answer[13] to the disbarment complaint, respondent claimed that, although complainant
was engaged in the buy-build-and-sell of real property, she represented her only in labor cases
relative to the latters overseas recruitment business. Respondent denied that she persuaded
complainant to sell the property in Ayala Alabang. Rather, it was complainant who offered to sell
or mortgage the property to respondent. Since respondent did not have enough money,
complainant requested her to sell or mortgage the property and offered her a loan, commission
and attorneys fees on the basis of the selling price.

According to respondent, complainant confided that on October 29, 1990 she offered the
Alabang property to a certain Nelia Sta. Cruz. Complainant received P400,000 as earnest money
in this transaction on the condition that she would return the said amount to Sta. Cruz in two
weeks in case the latter decided not to proceed with the sale.[14] The said amount would in turn
be used to buy another property.

Respondent also claimed that on December 4, 1990, she introduced complainant to another
client, Dra. San Diego, as a prospective buyer. They visited the Alabang property to check on the
house. It was there that complainant offered the house to San Diego for either sale or mortgage.
They then discussed the terms and conditions to be contained in the MOA.[15] The agreement
was thereafter signed in respondents office in Valenzuela, Metro Manila on December 7, 1990,
duly notarized by Atty. Manuel Aguinaldo.[16] They then proceeded to Prudential Bank (not
Security Bank as alleged in the complaint) to withdraw P2M in cash. Upon receipt of P2M in cash
and P1M check down payment, complainant gave San Diego the TCT.

Complainant then handed to respondent P900,000 as commission and loan, duly receipted in a
promissory note.[17] Complainant further entrusted P100,000 to respondent to be given to Nelia
Sta. Cruz as partial reimbursement of the P400,000 earnest money.[18]

Respondent maintained that when San Diego backed out from the transaction, the latter
demanded the return of only P2M, not P3M, as clearly stated in San Diegos letter[19] to the
complainant dated March 20, 1991.
Respondent denied that complainant previously demanded the return of the P1M until the civil
case against her was instituted. She expressed her willingness to pay the P900,000 plus the
agreed interest, but not the P1M plus interest baselessly demanded from her by complainant. In
an attempt to settle the controversy, respondent offered to pay the P900,000 to complainant in
the presence of San Diego, so complainant could in turn pay San Diego the P2M.

Respondent also denied that she prepared the affidavit of loss which was offered as evidence by
complainant in the petition for issuance of lost title.

Respondent further denied that she represented San Diego in the criminal cases of perjury and
false testimony which the latter filed against complainant.

In a report and recommendation dated July 25, 2000, the IBP Investigating Commissioner[20]
found respondent guilty of dishonesty and malpractice for concealing the identity of the person
in actual possession of complainants documents and for preparing an affidavit of loss even if she
knew that the documents were in San Diegos custody. A suspension for six months from the
practice of law was accordingly recommended.

A careful study of the records reveals that the IBP recommendation relied solely on complainants
self-serving and unsupported claims. A re-examination of the differing claims of the parties,
however, discloses that, instead of the grounds relied on by the IBP, respondent should be held
accountable for certain serious violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present[21] or former client.[22] He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests.
This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.[23] It springs from the
relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.

The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in its performance.[24] The conflict exists if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against the first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[25]

In this case, respondent not only admitted that she represented both complainant and San Diego
in unrelated actions but also counseled both of them in the sale of the Alabang property.

As their lawyer, she was duty-bound to protect both of their interests. She should have therefore
refrained from jumbling their affairs. Yet she introduced complainant to another client of hers as
a buyer of the property. She even had the temerity to broker the transaction. At that early stage,
she should have realized that her role as their lawyer had been seriously compromised. Since
buyer and seller had evident antagonistic interests, she could not give both of them sound legal
advice. On top of this, respondents obvious tendency then was to help complainant get a high
selling price since the amount of her commission was dependent on it.

After several suits were filed as an offshoot of the transaction between her two clients,
respondent found herself in a very tight situation. Although she denied that she represented any
of them, her active participation in the transaction was obvious and it clearly displayed an utter
disregard of the rule against discharging inconsistent duties to her clients. The great likelihood
was that she would be called upon to use against either the complainant or San Diego
information acquired through her professional connection with them.

Furthermore, her role as their counsel in the other unrelated cases was also compromised. Both
parties had, at this point, become wary of her since she had by then taken for her own
convenience San Diegos side by refusing to return the P900,000 to complainant until San Diego
was paid. It was not surprising therefore that complainant filed this administrative case because
of the suspicion that respondent had double-crossed her.

The records further establish that respondent collected her full commission even before the
transaction between complainant and San Diego was completed. This unmasked respondents
greed which she now wants us so badly to ignore. Her integrity was placed in serious doubt the
moment her promised commission started motivating her every move. Her behavior was, sad to
say, simply distasteful.
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent advice.

A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes
within those acts considered as abuse of clients confidence. The canon presumes that the client
is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation.

Finally, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the
court lawfully requires.[26] Here, respondent continues to disregard the final order of the Court
of Appeals finding her liable for the P900,000 she received from complainant. We see no
justification for her continued delay in complying with an order that has long become final.
Respondent adamantly insists that she and complainant should simultaneously settle their
obligations. As a lawyer, she should have known that her obligation to complainant was
independent of and separate from complainants obligation to the buyer. Her refusal to comply
with the appellate courts order is, therefore, a willful disobedience to its lawful orders and must
not be left unpunished.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final
and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in respondents personal records.

SO ORDERED.