LABOR CASES COMPILaTION

COMPILATION OF LABOR LAW CASES
-by-
BLOCK C
Agamao, Brenn Jay-ar R. Labiaga, Janzeri Vehemente, Harvey
M.
Ang, Donwill Y. Macadangdang, Dinos, Aurea
Benjamin Valerie E.
Arios, Diero Thomas R Manzano, Ranieri Ignacio, Regine
B. Noelle B.
Bagayao, Kurt Paul G. Pagulayan, Gionico Kitong, Irish S.
L.
Camsol, Jonathan M. Paraan, Brian Kiwang, Chesty Joy
Jonathan T. M.
Caramat, Clinton C Pascual, Joshua Maggay, Maria
Virginia B.
Cayetano, Algerico D. Taculog, Mark Sumakey, Novelyn
Bernard B.
Donggayao, Bryan Tagtag, Jonathan Dinos, Aurea
Christoper C. M. Valerie E.
Submitted to:
ATTY. JENNIFER ASUNCION
December 4, 2014
2 | Labor Law Cases
LIST OF CASES PAGE NO.

Escasinas, et al. v Shangrilas Mactan Island Resort 3
Wilgen Loon, et al. v. Power Master, Inc 4
Jebsend Maritime Inc., et al. v. Eleno A. Baul 7
Charlito Penaranda v Baganga Plywood Corporation 9
Labor Congress of the Philippines v. NLRC 10
Duncan Association v. Glaxo Wellcome Phil, Inc. 12
Star Paper Corporation v Simbol 14
Casumpang v ECC 16
Castor-Garupa v ECC 18
De Guia v. ECC 20
Mora v ECC 22
Raro v. ECC 24
Sarmiento v ECC 25
Spouses Aya-ay v. ARPHAPHIL Shippine Corp 27
PASUDECO v. Quiroz 29
Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. 31
Enao v. ECC 33
Inter-orient Maritime Enterprises v. NLRC 34
Lapid v NLRC 36
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. WCC 38
Godizano v ECC 40
Panotes v ECC 41
Chavez v. ECC 42
Rosales v ECC 44
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 | Labor Law Cases
ESCASINAS and SINGCO vs. SHANGRI-LAS ISLAND RESORT and DR.

PEPITO
G.R. NO. 178827, MARCH 4, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS
Dr. Jessica Joyce R. Pepito engaged two registered nurses, Evan Rigor
Singco and Jeromie D. Escasinas in 1996 and 1999, respectively, to work in
her clinic at Shangri-las Mactan Island Resort in Cebu of which she was a
retained physician via a MOA. In 2002, Escasinas and Singco (petitioners)
filed a complaint with the NLRC claiming among others that they are regular
employees of Shangri-la and thus, they should be accorded the same
benefits as that of regular employees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
petitioners holding that they are regular employees of Shangri-la because
they usually perform work which is necessary and desirable for the latters
4 | Labor Law Cases
business. But the NLRC en banc granted the respondents appeal and
dismissed the petitioners complaint for lack of merit finding no employer-
employee relationship exists between Shangri-la and the petitioners. The CA
affirmed the NLRC decision, hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Shangri-la is required to employ a registered nurse?
HELD
The Court ruled in the negative. While it is true that Article 157 of the
Labor Code mandates the duty of every employer to furnish its employees
with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of engaging
the services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist,
and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds 200, but
not more than 300, such as in the case of Shangri-la; nothing in said
provision states that said establishments needs to, or actually hires or
employs the service provider. Moreover, Article 280 of the same Code is not
the yardstick for determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, because this provision merely distinguishes between two kinds
of employees, i.e., regular and casual. Thus, the phrase services of a full-
time registered nurse should be taken to refer to the kind of services that
the nurse will render in the companys premises and to its employees, not
the manner of his engagement.
Wilgen Loon, et. al. VS. Power Master, Inc.

G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013
BRION, J.
FACTS
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed
and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against
Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses
Homer and Carina Alumisin (the respondents). The petitioners alleged in
their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday,
5 | Labor Law Cases
premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further
averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June
11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal
dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents
relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original
complaint.
In a decision dated March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas

partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter awarded the
petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month
pays. In awarding these claims, the Labor Arbiter stated that the burden of
proving the payment of these money claims rests with the employer. The
Labor Arbiter also awarded attorneys fees in favor of the petitioners,
pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code. However, the Labor Arbiter denied
the petitioners claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays.
The Labor Arbiter observed that the petitioners failed to show that they
rendered overtime work and worked on holidays and rest days without
compensation. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that the petitioners
cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because they
did not show any notice of termination of employment. They were also not
barred from entering the respondents premises.
Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The petitioners disputed the Labor Arbiters
denial of their claim for backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays.
Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the Labor Arbiters ruling on the
ground that the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons
because they insisted that they were not personally served with summons
and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the petitioners
minimum wages, service incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As
proofs, they attached photocopied and computerized copies of payroll sheets
to their memorandum on appeal. They further maintained that the
petitioners were validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners
repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their
violations of the company rules and regulations constituted serious
misconduct and wilful disobedience.
In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially ruled in

favor of the respondents. The NLRC affirmed the LAs awards of holiday pay
and attorneys fees. It also maintained that the Labor Arbiter acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents through their voluntary
6 | Labor Law Cases
appearance. The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully
dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and wilful disobedience. It found
that the petitioners failed to comply with various memoranda directing them
to transfer to other workplaces and to attend training seminars for the
intended reorganization and reshuffling.
The NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a

resolution dated April 28, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs ruling. The Court of Appeals held
that the petitioners were afforded substantive and procedural due process.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and thus entitled

to backwages?
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to salary differential,
overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth
month pays
3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees?
RULING
For the first issue, the answer is yes. In termination cases, the burden
of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee from his
employment rests upon the employer. The employers failure to discharge
this burden in the instant case arising from their non-submission of evidence
at the proceedings before the labor arbiter resulted in the finding that the
dismissal is unjustified. Thus, the employees are entitled to the payment of
backwages.
On the second issue, the petitioners are only entitled to salary

differential, service incentive, holiday, and thirteenth month pays because in
illegal dismissal cases, the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment of these money claims. The rationale for this rule is that the
pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar
documents which will show that differentials, service incentive leave and
other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the
worker but are in the custody and control of the employer. However, for the
award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays and rest days, petitioners
7 | Labor Law Cases
are not entitled to. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and
premium pay for holidays and rest days rests on the employee because
these are not incurred in the normal course of business. In the present case,
the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence that would show that they
actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day,
and that they in fact worked on holidays and rest days.
Lastly, for the third issue, the award of attorneys fees is also
warranted under the circumstances of this case. An employee is entitled to
an award of attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of
the wages in actions for unlawful withholding of wages pursuant to Article
111 of the Labor Code.
JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., ESTANISLAO SANTIAGO, and/or HAPAG-

LLOYD AKTIENGESELL SCHAFT vs. ELENO A. BABOL
8 | Labor Law Cases
G.R. No. 204076 December 4, 2013

MENDOZA, J.
FACTS
Eleno A. Babo, despite having received an expensive company-
sponsored treatment, still demanded the payment of disability benefits from
the petitioners. His demand being unheeded, respondent filed a claim before
the LA, for the payment disability benefits, sickness allowance and medical
reimbursement.
The petitioners opposed the work-relation argument of respondent in

light of a contrary finding made by the company-designated oncologist that
NPC was caused by genetic factors; and that full and expensive medical
assistance had been generously extended, on top of the medical attention
provided to respondent
On May 7, 2008, the LA rendered a decision awarding respondent the

sum of US$60,000.00 as total disability benefits plus 10% thereof as
attorneys fees. It ruled that there existed a causal relationship between
respondents cancer and his diet on board the vessel; and that the
petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of the work-relatedness of
repondents disease. NLRC affirmed the LA ruling but deleted the award for
attorneys fees. It held that the petitioners failed to substantially disprove the
disputable presumption of work-relation under the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). It
further noted that respondent, being a seafarer, had no choice but to eat the
food prepared by the kitchen staff and correlatively his diet was limited to
salt-cured foods such as salted fish, dried meat, salted egg, frozen meat, and
other preserved goods, all of which allegedly increased the risk of
contracting NPC
ISSUE
Whether or not the disease of Babol was aggravated by the working
conditions onboard the vessel
HELD
As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the
disease in question must be one of those listed as an occupational disease
under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Nevertheless, should it be not classified as
occupational in nature, Section 20 (B) paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC provides
that such diseases are disputed are disputably presumed as work-related.
9 | Labor Law Cases
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was NPC afflicted while on

board the petitioners vessel. As a non-occupational disease, it has the
disputable presumption of being work-related. This presumption obviously
works in the seafarers favor. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented
by the employers, the work-relatedness of the disease must be sustained.
In this wise, the petitioners, as employers, failed to disprove the
presumption of NPCs work-relatedness.
Complainant avers he had no other alternative or option but to eat
whatever is served at the mess hall, and considering further that his "diet" or
sustenance such as salt cured foods and preserved meats while on board the
vessel had presumably contributed to, if not caused by, his present health
condition, there is good reason to conclude that his ailment or affliction is
work related or, otherwise stated, reasonably connected/aggravated by his
work.
Those assertions of respondent do not constitute as substantial
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
conclusion that there is a causal relationship between his illness and the
working conditions on board the petitioners vessel. Although the Court has
recognized as sufficient that work conditions are proven to have contributed
even to a small degree, such must, however, be reasonable, and anchored on
credible information. The claimant must therefore, prove a convincing
proposition other that by his mere allegations. This he failed to do.
10 | L a b o r L a w C a s e s
Charlito Penaranda v Banganga Plywood Corporation and Hudson

Chua
G.R. No. 159577, May 3, 2006
Panganiban, CJ
Facts
Charlito Penaranda was hired as an employee of Banganga Plywood
Corporation with a monthly salary of P5,000 as Foreman/Boiler Head/ Shift
Engineer to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam
plant boiler. He alleges that he was illegally terminated and was not paid his
Over Time pay, premium pay for working during holidays, and night shift
differentials.
Hudson Chua, the General Manager of Baganga alleges that

Penarandas separation was done pursuant to Art. 238 of the Labor Code.
The company was on temporary closure due to repair and general
maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE to shut down and
dismiss employees. Chua also alleges that since he is a managerial
employee, he is not entitled to Over Time pay and if ever he rendered
services beyond the normal hours of work, there was no office order for him
to do so.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Penaranda is entitled to Over Time pay,
premium pay for working on rest days and attorneys fees. On appeal, NLRC
deleted the award of Over Time pay, premium pay and attorneys fees. The
CA dismissed Penarandas Petition for Certiorari based on procedural failures.
Issue
Whether or not Penaranda is entitled to monetary benefits under Art.
82 of the Labor Code
Held
NO. Penaranda is part of the managerial staff which takes him out of
the coverage of labor standards. Penaranda supervised the engineering
section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation
of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering
section. This work necessarily requires the use of discretion and independent
judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As

supervisor, Penaranda is deemed a member of the managerial staff.
Penaranda admitted that he was a supervisor in his Position Paper. He

stated that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler.
The term foreman implies that he was the representative of management
over the workers and the operation of the department. His classification as
supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He
belonged to the 10% of 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis;
the others were paid only on a daily basis.
Labor Congress of the Philippines (for and in behalf of its members)

vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G. R. No. 123938. May 21, 1998
J. DAVIDE, JR.
Facts
1. 99 rank-and-file employees (represented by the Labor Congress of
the Philippines) of Empire Food Products filed a complaint for money claims
against the latter for alleged violation of Labor Standards. A Memorandum of
Agreement was subsequently designed by both parties and approved by the
Labor Arbiter. After the submission by the parties of their respective position
papers and presentation of testimonial evidence, Labor Arbiter Ariel C.
Santos absolved private respondents of the charges of unfair labor practice,
union busting, violation of the memorandum of agreement, underpayment of
wages and denied petitioners prayer for actual, moral and exemplary
damages. Labor Arbiter Santos, however, directed the reinstatement of the
individual complainants.
The NLRC reversed such decision because apparently, the

complainants failed to present witnesses to support their contentions.
Therefore, the case had to be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. Their Motion for Reconsideration was denied. As a result, this
special civil action for certiorari was filed.
Issue
Whether there was a violation of Labor Standards in this case by the
employer which should justify a reinstatement of herein dismissed
employees
Held
Yes. Even assuming arguendo that the respondents failed to maintain
their payroll and other papers evidencing hours of work, payment etc., such
circumstance, standing alone, does not warrant the directive to reinstate
complainants to their former positions. It is [a] well settled rule that there
must be a finding of illegal dismissal before reinstatement be mandated.
In this regard, the LABOR ARBITER is hereby directed to include in his

clarificatory decision, after receiving evidence, considering and resolving the
same, the requisite dispositive portion.
It may likewise be stressed that the burden of proving the existence of

just cause for dismissing an employee, such as abandonment, rests on the
employer, [11] a burden private respondents failed to discharge.
Private respondents, moreover, in considering petitioners employment

to have been terminated by abandonment, violated their rights to security of
tenure and constitutional right to due process in not even serving them with
a written notice of such termination.[12] Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 2. Notice of Dismissal. - Any employer who seeks to dismiss a

worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known
address.
Petitioners are therefore entitled to reinstatement with full back wages

pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715.
Nevertheless, the records disclose that taking into account the number of
employees involved, the length of time that has lapsed since their dismissal,
and the perceptible resentment and enmity between petitioners and private
respondents which necessarily strained their relationship, reinstatement
would be impractical and hardly promotive of the best interests of the
parties. In lieu of reinstatement then, separation pay at the rate of one
month for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months of
service considered as one (1) year, is in order.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMENT vs. GLAXO WELLCOME

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
TINGA, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson
had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates,

among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules;
to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy,

an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers
and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
In January 1999, Tecsons superior informed him that his marriage to

Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Sorigao

City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision,
but his request was denied.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continue acting as medical

representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings Tecson was paid his
salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance

machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo
offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he decline the offer. On November 15,
2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its
Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming
Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson file a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
assailing the NCMB Decision.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for review on the ground that
the NCMB did not erred in rendering its Decision. Tecson filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from
marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid.
RULING
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it
ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship
with an employee of a competitor is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with

employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interest of the company. In laying down the assailed
company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interest against the possibility
that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN

CHUA vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA
G.R. No. 164774April 12, 2006

PUNO, J.
FACTS
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products.

Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration
Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. On the other
hand, respondents herein are regular employees of the corporation. Ronaldo
Simbol married co-employee Alma Dayrit while Wilfreda Comia also married
co-employee Howard Comia. Prior to the marriages, Ongsitco advised them
that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get
married. Subsequently Simbol and Comia resigned pursuant to the company
policy. Petitioners also stated that Luisito Zuiga, a married man and also an
employee, got Lorna Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign.
On the other hand, Simbol and Comia alleged they were compelled to
resign in view of an illegal company policy. While Estrella alleges that she
had a relationship with Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a separated
man. After he got her pregnant, Estrealla discovered that he was not
separated. Thus, she severed their relationship to avoid dismissal due to the
company policy. She then had an accident and when she returned for work
she was given a memorandum stating that she was being dismissed for
immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on
leave and she was not given a chance to explain. After submitting an
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed. She later on resigned due to
her urgent need for money. Respondents subsequently filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorneys
fees. They averred that the companys policy is illegal. Labor Arbiter Sol del
Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed an MR but it was
denied by the NLRC. On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC decision. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouses from

working in the same company is a valid exercise of management prerogative
HELD
No. In the US there is a term called a bona fide occupational
qualification exception that unless the employer can prove that the
reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital
status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of employees spouse.
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must

prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In the Philippines, we employ the standard of reasonableness of the
company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification
requirement. In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO
and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., The cases of Duncan
and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly
established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has
the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. The
burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
In the case at bar, the Court does not find a reasonable business
necessity. It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-
employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of the employees
would detriment business operations. The policy is just premised on the mere
fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in

imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be
free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons
working together in one company. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present
undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, the questioned policy is
an invalid exercise of management prerogative.
Gliceria Casumpang vs. Employees Compensation Commission
G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987

Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS
The crux of the present case is a review of the decision of the

Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System, denying the claim for death benefits
of Gliceria C. Casumpang, widow of the late Jose Casumpang. The questioned
decision denied the claim for compensation originally filed by the deceased
employee, Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of
Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm,
Zamboanga City. The System's denial of the appellant's claim was predicated
on the ground that the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the
result of the deceased's nature of occupation as Prison Guard. The conclusion
of the respondent System cannot be faulted. From even the cursory reading
of the record, the pieces of evidence submitted by the appellant in support of
her claim would fail to indicate that the cause of death is in occupational
disease, noting further thereon that the work of the deceased did not involve
handling of wood products such as those of wood workers, loggers,
carpenters and employees of plywood, pulp and paper mills (the cancer of
the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels were considered
occupational only among woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters,
loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills). Neither
did these pieces of evidence measure up to the substantial and positive
evidence requirement for a determination of compensability, since there is
no showing that the risk of contracting gastric carcinoma was increased by
the deceased's working conditions.
ISSUE
Whether or not cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and
hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
HELD
No, under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an
occupational disease considering the decedent's employment as prison
guard. After a close perusal of the records of the case, nowhere does it
appear that Jose Casumpang contracted his disease or ailments before
January 1, 1975. There are no medical findings, reports, affidavits or any
indication that he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the
effectivity of the Labor Code which by liberal interpretation may have worked
in his favor. In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis and
melena which began in November 1975. In other words, all of his ailments
were after January 1, 1975. In view of this, it is important to determine which

law is applicable and it boils down then that Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, therefore, is applicable in this case and not the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as amended,
the claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was then
legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment under the
presumption of compensability. However, under the new law, the principles
of aggravation and presumption of compensability have been stricken off by
the lawmaker as grounds for compensation. Under Article 167 (b) of the New
Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease
listed under the Rules subject to certain conditions; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (De Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92).
Castor-Garupa vs. ECC & GSIS

G.R. No. 158268 April 12, 2006
Justice Chico-Nazario
Facts
Rhoda Castor-Garupa was employed as a Medical Officer III at the
Bayawan District Hospital since 1979. She was diagnosed with End Stage
Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis in and was confined
in National Kidney and Transplant Institute in March 1999. She also
underwent a kidney transplant.
Petitioner filed with GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under PD
626 or Employees Compensation Act. However, it was denied because it was
not among the occupational disease listed in Annex A of Section 1(b), Rule
III of PD 626. A reconsideration was considered as an appeal by the GSIS
which forwarded the case to the ECC. ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS. A
petition for review was filed before the CA but it also affirmed the decision of
the ECC.
ECC found the cause of glomerulonephritis to be the bacterium
streptococcus, while respondent GSIS declared that
chronic glomerulonephritis is not a single entity but a mlange of different
diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts.
Issue
Whether or not the disease acquired by petitioner is an occupational
disease which entitles her to compensation benefits under PD 626.
Held
The Court held that such disease contracted by petitioner should be
compensated under the increased risk theory. Under Section 1(b) of Rule III
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with
the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the

claimant must adduce reasonable proof between his work and the cause of
the disease, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
claimants working conditions. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation. The degree of proof required under Presidential
Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not
a direct causal relation. It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the
workmens claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone.
Petitioner is a practicing doctor in a public rural hospital from 1 January
1979 until she underwent a kidney transplant on 11 March 1999. As a doctor
who was in direct contact with patients, she was more exposed to all kinds of
germs and bacteria, thus increasing the risk of
contracting glomerulonephritis. Given the nature of her work, and
considering further that resident physicians work for extended hours, the
likelihood of petitioner being infected by the streptococcus bacterium is,
without a doubt, increased. Thus, probability of petitioner contracting
chronic glomerulonephritis in her workstation has been substantiated.
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned
the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent
under the Workmens Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment,
however, the present law has not ceased to be an employees compensation
law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the
working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law
to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.
JOSE DE GUIA vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 95595 July 8, 1991
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS
Jose De Guia was first employed as storekeeper by the Bureau of

Internal Revenue. He later earned several promotions as Assistant Agent,
Assistant Examiner, Revenue Examiner II, and Senior Revenue Examiner,
until he became a Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer, which position
he held when disability forced him to retire at age 61.
Jose De Guia claims that sometime he experienced loss of vision for which he
consulted an eye specialist who diagnosed his visual impairment as "the
result of continuous visual insult in the pursuit for his duties, wherein
cataract and vitreous hemorrhage sets in as complication of both eyes".
Laser photo-coagulation was prescribed and rendered by another eye
specialist of the Eye Referral Center who found petitioner to be suffering
from "Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous Hemorrhage"
Meanwhile, Jose De Guia filed a claim for compensation benefits under Pres.
Decree No. 626. However, the GSIS denied his claim on the ground that De
Guia's underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus," is not listed as an
occupational disease and that it has not been shown that the nature of his
work had increased the risk of his contracting his eye ailment. This Decision
was affirmed by the ECC.
ISSUE
Whether or not diabetes mellitus is a disease which is compensable

under sickness benefits by the Labor Code
RULING
The Supreme Court held that De Guia's "diabetic retinopathy" is a

complication linked with his diabetic condition, from which he was suffering
for twenty-five (25) years. The very medical terminology emphasizes that
complication. In other words, petitioner's eye condition was not contracted
by reason of his employment but came about as a complication of an
underlying disease. Neither can it be said, therefore, that the risk of
contracting the eye ailment was increased by his working conditions for
irrespective of those conditions, the complication could have set in.
The underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus" is neither work connected. It is a
metabolic and a familial disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of
heredity, obesity or old age. While petitioner states that no one in his family
is suffering from the illness, genetic susceptibility is a factor that stretches
from generation to generation. And even assuming that petitioner has
satisfactorily proven that he is not predisposed to the disease due to
heredity, he has not shown that he is not predisposed thereto due to old age
or obesity. Stated otherwise, irrespective of the type of work that petitioner
had been engaged in, he could have contracted diabetes.
Eulalio Mora, Jr. vs. Employees Compensation Commission

G.R. No. L-62157 December 1, 1987
PARAS, J.
Facts
The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979 a
telegraph operator of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City.
During the course of her employment, and more particularly in January 1978,
she complained of frequent epigastric pain radiating to the periumbilical
region. Biopsy conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed
a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a certain portion of
the small intestine). She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with resection
of ileocaecal junction" but her ailment continued to recur.
She then filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as
amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) but
it was denied on the ground that her ailment is not an occupational disease
considering her particular employment as telegraph operator. Not satisfied,
she sent a letter to the Chairman of respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC), requesting for a review of her case. On Nov. 22, 1980,
Leticia Mora died. Her appeal to the ECC which was prosecuted by her
husband after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness which
caused Leticia Mora's death is not work-connected.
The husband of Leticia then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not Leticia Mora is entitled to claim compensation benefits
for disability and for her subsequent death?
Ruling
Yes. The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code, PD
442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness, disability or death occurring
on or after January 1, 1975. The new law on employee's compensation
makes compensable disability or death arising from an ailment under any of
the following grounds namely: (a) when the illness is definitely accepted as
an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b)
when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the work conditions.
The cause of the decedent's death is not listed as occupational
disease. To be compensable thereby the law requires that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the employment of the deceased. But
this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease cancer can
itself be known. However, despite scientific advances on the matter, even
professional experts have not as yet determine its cause.
As stated in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation
Commission, citing Cristobal v. ECC, and Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System, the
necessity of proof is present only when the cause of the disease is known. If
not known, there is no duty to present proof, for the law does not demand
impossibility.
ZAIDA G. RARO vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences)
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS
Petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a
clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte
regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began
suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of
vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical
treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.The
petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from
brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning
power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS
decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted
during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws
HELD
The petition is dismissed.
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive
thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is
not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary
to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of
otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
The Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme
under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and
substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system
is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees'
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium
between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or
disability.
If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund
is endangered, brain tumor is not among the diseases listed to be
compensable when acquired during the course of employment.
JOSE B. SARMIENTO vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION &

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS
The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power
Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk. At the time of her death she
was the manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness
showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound
over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of
the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell
carcinoma."
The Flordeliza sought treatment in various hospitals. A soft tissue mass

emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became
deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment
and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center was due to her difficulty
of swallowing food and her general debility. Suddenly, she succumbed to
cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma.
Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by

her during employment was service-connected, Jose B. Sarmiento herein
filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended. However, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied
the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of
the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused
by employment and employment conditions
The Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the GSIS'

decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma
is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by
reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.
ISSUE
Whether or not parotid carcinoma is not compensable
RULING
The Supreme Court held that under the present law, a compensable
illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by
the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions. Applying the law to the present
case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an
occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting
clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must,
therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or
that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal
illness.
Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the

public respondents which found no proof that the deceased's working
conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her
illness.
Spouses Aya-ay v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., and Magna Marine, Inc.

G.R. No. 155359, 31 January 2006
J. Carpio Morales
Facts
Ponciano Aya-ay, Jr. was engaged as a seaman of respondent Magna
Marine and was employed through the manning services of Arpaphil
Shipping. They entered into a 11-month contract for the services of Ponciano.
On one occasion, while Ponciano was cleaning the vessels air compressor,
he met an accident wherein a sudden backflow of compressed air containing
sand and rust hit his right eye. He asked for the medical help from the
authority in the vessel but was denied and was asked to relax. When they
arrived on Brisbane, Australia, several specialists checked on his condition

and was diagnosed of an infection his eye. He was then repatriated to the
Philippines where he was asked to undergo an eye transplant on the injured
eye. But prior to his operation, he died. The cause of the death was cerebro-
vascular accident (VCA).Due to his death, his parents filed a case in NLRC for
the death benefits of their son and was granted by Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz,
but, the same decision was reversed on appeal and was later on affirmed by
the Court Appeals with the findings that the cause of death of Ponciano,
cerebro-vascular accident was not a direct effect or was not a direct result of
the injury he sustained at the performance of his duty. There was a
consideration given for humanitarian considerations at the amount of P
20,000.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the death benefits under
the employment contract
Held
No, the Court finds that under the circumstances petitioners bare
allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of
compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or
presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive
proposition. That a seaman died several months after his repatriation for
illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the same illness; (b) his
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused
his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable
basis to support otherwise. While petitioners attempted to scientifically
establish that Aya-ays eye injury resulted to, or increased the risk of, CVA by
resorting to a "detailed medical discussion" lifted from medical sources and
subjecting them to their own laymans interpretation and randomly applying
them to the circumstances attendant to the case, the same fails. Without an
expert witness to evaluate and explain how the statements contained in such
medical sources actually relate to the facts surrounding the case, they are
insufficient to establish the nexus to support their claims. Aya-ay died due to
CVA or stroke, a disease not listed as a compensable illness under Appendix
1 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. It was incumbent on
petitioners to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the
eye injury sustained by Aya-ay during the term of his employment with
respondents caused, or increased the risk of, CVA. Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and
not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-
aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.
Pampanga Sugar Development Co. Inc. v Quiroz

G.R. No. L-22117, April 29 1966
Concepcion, J.
Facts
Donato Quiroz is an employee of Pampaga Sugar Development Co. Inc.
He reported for work at around 9:30 p.m. and was dismissed at around 5:30
a.m. the following day. After he stepped out of the company gate to wait for
a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney which resulted to various wounds
on his body as well as a complete fracture of his left clavicle. According to
the records of the case, the injured was with other employees of the same
company waiting for transportation.
Issues
a What is the difference of arising out and in the course of
b Whether or not Donato Quiroz is entitled to be paid by PASUDECO
Held
a As stated in In re McNicol, It is sufficient to say that an injury is
received "in the course of" employment when it comes while the
workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises
"out of" the employment when there is apparent in the rational mind ...
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury .... But it excludes an
injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a
contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which
the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the
employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and
not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the
character of the business, and not independent of the relation of
master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but
after the event, it must appear to have had its origin on a risk
connected with the employment, to have flowed from that source as a
rational consequence.
b It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Ampil, G.R. No. L-
7130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury
sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work
to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's
main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an
obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the the gate, the
employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his
inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the
accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstances appears to exist.

There is no particular causative connection between the injury
sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer.
Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not
show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting
place safe for the employees", neither does the record show either that
the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or

that said place was particularly unsafe.
JUSTA AFABLE and the minors POTENCIANO MADLANGBAYAN and

ROSA MADLANGBAYAN, by JUSTA AFABLE, as guardian ad litem
vs.SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-36858 March 6, 1933
VICKERS, J.
FACTS
Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine
Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of
the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district
according to the records of the company.
On the afternoon of Sunday, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a

bicycle was run over and fatally injured in the City of Manila by a truck driven
by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora
Alonso Street in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time
of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San
Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors
made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount
collected to the company the next morning.
The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the

present action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No.
3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12
for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they
sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of
P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
ISSUE
Whether or not the heirs Leopoldo Madlangbayan can receive
compensation for his death due to the pursuance of his employment
RULING
The Supreme Court held that the accident which caused the death of
the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the
time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the
pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his
way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory
where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. The employer
is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an
employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an
employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an
accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the

course of his employment.
Futher, in the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own
conveyance. Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified
the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of
Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on
the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its
employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use
bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not
due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased
saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and
to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as
the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use
one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of
his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by
him.
Emelita Enao vs. The Employees Compensation Commission

G.R. No. L-46046, April 5, 1985
J. Alampay
Facts
On August 1, 1975, a day designated as non-working day by virtue of a
District Memorandum in Dipolog City, classes were then held in its stead on
July 26, 1975. On that day, Emelita Enao, together with two other co-
teachers traveled to Dipolog City to purchase supplies and other training and
school aids for their office. While on their way, they were ambushed by later
on identified NPAs. Enao was injured and was hospitalized for 5 days since
she has to undergo operation for the removal of shrapnel in her forearm and
abdomen. She then filed an income benefits for disability with the
Government System Insurance System, it was however denied on the wise of
GSIS that the cause of her disability is not work related or it was not happen
during the performance of her duties since August 1, 1975 was declared non-
working day. She then filed to the Employees Compensation Commission but
the decision was affirmed.
Issue
Whether or not the Enao is entitled to her claims.
Held
The Supreme Court held that Enao is entitled to her claims. It
enunciated that while it is true that on August 1, 1975, it was declared as a
non-working day by virtue of District Memorandum, and hence it was
ordained to be non working day, the act of Enao and her other co workers to
travel to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing materials and other
supplies for their office necessary for their teaching, it can still be consider as
work-related. The provision of Section 1, Rule 11 of the Employees
Compensation Commission applicable at that time provides that three
requisites must concur for the claim of benefit to materialize, it provides that
for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions: (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during
his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been
performing his official function. Given the foregoing, the conditions is said to
have met, the Supreme Court thus enunciated that Enao is entitled to her
claims.
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs NLRC

G.R. No. 115497 September 16, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts
The deceased, Jeremias Pineda, was a seaman hired by Interorient
Maritime Enterprises, Inc. to work as an oiler abroad on board the vessel MV
Amazonia, owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping
Corporation for a period of nine months, renewable for three months upon
mutual consent on both parties. On September 28, 1989 he was discharged
from service as his contract expired and was repatriated to the Philippines.
During a stopover in Thailand, Jeremias Pineda, went out of the airport and
run amuck in the streets of Bangkok wherein he threatened bystanders and
threatened to stab a Policeman on duty who had no choice but to shoot him
on the spot, Jeremias Pineda died due to the shooting. His heirs claim that
the manning agent Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its principal
Fircroft Shipping Corporation are liable for death benefits and burial expenses
for letting Jeremias Pineda, who was mentally unstable, travel alone for
repatriation to the Philippines which caused his death. Interorient Maritime
Enterprises, Inc. and Fircroft Shipping Corporation contends that they are not
liable to pay for the said claims as the death of Jeremias Pineda was through
his own fault and actions and that his mental instability was not proven.
Issues
1. What is the evidence needed to prove the mental instability of the
deceased?
2. Is the manning agent and its principal liable for the death of an
employee in transit during repatriation?
Held
1. Claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not
be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts usually
apply to other complainants who have more facility in obtaining the
required evidence to prove their demands. Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. The police reports forwarded by the Thailand Police
Department to the Philippine Embassy stated that the officer who shot
Jeremias Pineda was convinced that he was suffering from a mental

disorder based from his actions, this was considered as sufficient
substantial evidence for proving the presence of mental instability.
2. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and Fircroft Shipping Corporation

is jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Jeremias Pineda the
cost of burial and death benefits. Their reliance on the Article 172 of
the Labor Code which provides for a limitation on the liability of the
State Insurance Fund when the "disability or death was occasioned by
the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or
another, notorious negligence is unfounded as the death benefits
and burial cost are not chargeable to Employee's Compensation
Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These
claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together
with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his
repatriation and until his arrival in this country, i.e., the point of hire.
Through the termination of the employment contract was duly effected
in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that
Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4,
Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment
clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident
and life insurance covering accident death, dismemberment and
disability of overseas workers:
Sec. 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. The minimum coverage
shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended
worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the worker's
contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of the contract
of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the
insurance coverage be less than one year.
RICARDO B. LAPID in behalf of ARIEL LAPID, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHIL HANSE SHIP AGENCY, INC.
G.R. No. 117518. April 29, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS
ARIEL LAPID, son of petitioner Ricardo B. Lapid, was a seaman on
board the vessel M/V Cast Muskox. His lifeless body was found hanging by
the neck from the ceiling of an abandoned warehouse in Quebec, Canada.
Dr. Claude Paquin of the Coroners Office was called to conduct an autopsy
on the cadaver as he did. The examination yielded that probable cause of
death was asphyxiation by hanging and, circumstance of death was following
self-destruction. Dr. Paquin certified that the information he gave was final
and shall appear in his investigation report which shall be completed upon
receipt of all necessary or useful documents and facts.
When the remains of his son arrived in Manila, Ricardo Lapid

immediately noted that Ariels body bore several bruises. Consequently,
together with his relatives, they sought the assistance of the National Bureau
Investigation and submitted the cadaver for post mortem examination. The
NBI came up with the post mortem findings that there are abrasions on the
elbow, contusions on the forehead, hematoma and ligature marks on the
neck of Ariel and that these findings were all inconsistent with suicide,
petitioner filed a claim with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
asserting that his son was a victim of foul play abroad in the course of his
overseas employment.
Asserting that his son could not have committed suicide petitioner
raised the following arguments: (1) Per NBI report Ariel had abrasions on the
elbow, contusions on his forehead and hematoma on the neck, evidently
showing physical abuse or assault hence contradictory to suicide; (2) There
was constant exchange of letters between Ariel and his family and he
seemed excited to go home and did not appear that he had any serious
personal or professional problem; (3) The declaration that suicide was

committed by Ariel was merely based on a partial and incomplete report of
the coroner; and, (4) Ariels employer while having the resources and means
to cause a more thorough investigation in Canada did not do so.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Ariel Lapid was by suicide or self-
destruction which does not entitle him to compensation as provided under
Sec. 6, par. 6, Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino
Seaman
HELD
Clearly, petitioners entitlement to any death benefit depends on
whether the evidence of PHIL HANSE suffices to prove that Ariel committed
suicide, and the burden of proof rests on his employer. In the instant case,
the evidence presented by PHIL HANSE to prove that suicide was committed
is lean, frail and far from convincing. The coroners incomplete report cannot
be the basis of a categorical pronouncement that Ariel committed suicide.
The records are bereft of any substantial evidence showing that respondent
employer successfully discharged its burden of proving that Ariel committed
suicide, so as to evade its liability for death benefits under POEAs Standard
Employment Contract for Filipino Seaman.
Although the disputed coroners report was admitted by both the POEA
Administrator and the NLRC, this piece of evidence is nevertheless
discredited. It is not disputed that the report contained a finding that death
was caused by asphyxia by hanging and that it could not be conclusive as to
circumstances regarding Ariels death.
In NAESS Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC wherein the vessels chief

steward Pablo Dublin fatally stabbed the second cook during a quarrel while
M/V DYVI Pacific was plying its sea route. The culprit ran to the deck from
where he jumped or fell overboard. His body was never seen again and he
was declared dead. The Court ruled that Dublins death was compensable
notwithstanding the claim that he committed suicide. Thus, in falling
overboard, we held:
x x x x it makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his

own life, or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration
triggered by remorse over the killing of a second cook, or he
accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit,
which last possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of
evidence. It may be noted parenthetically that these conjectures

sound equally plausible because the events surrounding the death of
Dublin have not been established with certitude.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION vs. WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEONARDA VDA. DE HAYSON
G.R. No. L-37896 July 22, 1981
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS
Pantaleon Hayson, was en employee of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
as a Gang Boss. On February 16, 1970 Hayson along with his four co-
workers, were waiting for the cargoes and telling stories to pass the time,
and since it was cold that time and there was a party on board the boat at
that time the Hayson asked for something to drink from their 3rd Officer. The
3rd Officer gave them a half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay Rhum.
The group then took turns in drinking from the said bottle with Hayson
taking the first drink. After his co- workers drank from the supposed bottle of
Tanduay Rhum they found out that the contents of the said bottle was not
liquor but oil of winter green. Later, Hayson was found poisoned by the drink
that led to his death.
The Referee ruled that the death of Pantaleon Hayson arose out of and
in the course of his employment and ordered Stevedoring to pay his family
his compensation and their burial expenses. Stevedoring disputed the
Referee's decision alleging that Pantaleon Hayson was notoriously negligent;
hence, his death is not compensable.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Hayson falls outside the compensatory
coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act
HELD
Acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an employee while
at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands
or protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment
and injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable as
arising out of and in the course of the employment.
When an employee dies in line of duty, or when actually at work as in

this case, his death is presumed to be service connected and is compensable
and that when doubts on the cause and/or aggravating factors of illness of
the claimant arise, they must be resolved in favor of the claimant and his
heirs, the affirmance of the respondent Commission's judgment is
clearly inevitable and justifiable.
The law presumes that a claim is compensable, absent substantial

evidence to the contrary. So this Court has consistently and resolutely
adhered to the doctrine that even where the cause of death is unknown, the
right to compensation subsists, the underlying philosophy being that the
Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation formulated in observance
to the social justice guarantee of the Constitution. And so, it has been
reiterated in a long chain of workmen's compensation cases elevated to and
resolved by this Court that the Workmen's Compensation Law should be
construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of and for the benefit of
employees and their dependents and an doubts as to the right of
compensation as well as all presumptions resolved in their favor.
Therefore, the death of Pantaleon Hayson is compensable under

workmens compensation act.
Godizano vs. ECC

136 SCRA 344
Makasiar, J.
Facts
The late Enrique B. Godizano, husband of the herein petitioner
Rosalinda Godizano, was a Philippine Navy officer. On March 10, 1978,
Enrique B. Godizano sought consultation at the Naval Station Hospital in
Cavite City for pain associated with vomiting of previously taken food, and
was later found out that that he has a bipedal edema At the age of 39
Godizano succumbed to pulmonary edema and uremia secondary to chronic
glomerulonephritis while confined in a hospital and later died.
Rosalinda Godizano, in her behalf and in behalf of their two minor
children, filed with respondent GSIS a claim seeking death benefits. However,
the GSIS denied her claims for the reason that the injury/sickness that
caused his death is not due to circumstances of the employment or in the
performance of the duties and responsibilities of the said employment. After
filing for reconsideration the system grant only permanent partial disability
benefits. Nevertheless the Supreme Court ordered the system t o grant te
death benefit of Godizano. Respondent GSIS then filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, which motion grants the petitioner bigger benefits under the
present law in the amount of P27,525.90 death benefits and P428.96 as
monthly income benefits. The GSIS further requests however, for
reconsideration and/or modification of the P1,600.00 attorney's fees "in the

light of Article 203 of the labor Code, or in the alternative, in the light of the
previous holding by the Supreme Court of awarding 5% merely of the
principal sum as and for attorney's fees"
Issue
Whether or not the attorneys fees in this case must be reduced from
10% of the death benefits to 5%
Held
The court held that it cannot assent to the prayer of the GSIS to reduce
the attorney's fees. The intent of the law is to free the award from any
liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy and use it to the fullest. It
is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting
employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees; because
it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly
refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is
the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award
of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits
awarded. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for
his services; otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of
whom are not teamed in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service.
To deny counsel compensation for his professional services, would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law.
VENUSTO PANOTES vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION,

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education
and Culture)
G.R. No. L-64802 September 23, 1985

MAKASIAR, C.J.
FACTS
The Court has rendered a Decision in this case, promulgated on March
29, 1984, granting compensation benefits to petitioner Panotes for the death
of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes, a public school teacher who died due to
colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon. The said fatal disease was
considered by this Court to have been contracted or at least the risk of
contracting the same has been increased by the working conditions to which
Agustina was exposed to. Accordingly, the GSIS was ordered to pay Venusto
the corresponding death benefits, reimbursement of hospital expenses,
funeral expenses, and payment of attorneys fees equivalent to P1,200.00.
The GSIS filed a motion of reconsideration on May 2, 1984 assailing the
Courts March 29, 1984 Decision. It alleged that the evidences presented
show a mere case of aggravation and not reasonable work-connection that
could entitle Venusto to his claims. The GSIS likewise argued that the award
of attorneys fees is not proper or that it should have been reduced to only
5% of the compensation claim.
ISSUE
Whether or not the award of attorneys fees in favor of petitioner was
proper
HELD
YES, there is a clear difference, from the standpoint of legal policy,
between attorneys fees to be paid by the laborer and fees awarded by the
court to be paid by the employer. The plain intent of the statute is that the
compensation to be received by the injured workman should not be reduced
by more than 10% on account of lawyers fees. This purpose is attained
where the fees are to be paid by the employer, since the compensation
receivable by the workman is then in no way diminished. In the latter
eventuality, all that the law requires is that the counsels fees should be
reasonable. Thus, the award of 10% attorney's fees is proper. There is no
prohibition in the law as to such an award nor as to the proper amount that
should be awarded. The amount is actually discretionary upon the Court so
long as it passes the test of reasonableness.
Chavez vs ECC
G.R. No. L-61931 March 3, 1987
Paras, J.
Facts
Jesus Chavez at the age of 60 years, 10 months and 8 days retired as
Postmaster 1, Bureau of Posts. Chavez applied for retirement benefits under
the provisions of PD No. 1146. He has already received a gross 5-year lump
sum annuity of P24,598.80 and will receive a monthly pension of P409.98
starting in 1986. He alleges that he first complained of frequent urination
and irregular bowel movement sometime in October 1972. In 1974, he
underwent surgery for removal of renal stones. In 1976, he experienced
hypochondriac pains because of kidney stones. And, in July 1982, or one year
and a half (1 1/2) after his retirement, he submitted himself to surgery for
removal of a right urethral stone.
On February 10, 1982, the GSIS denied his claim for compensation on
the ground that petitioner's ailments are not work-connected, as required by
law. The GSIS also evaluated petitioner's claim under the provisions of PD No.
1146 for Possible non-work connectedbenefits, particularly the sickness
income benefit, but the same could not be granted because he was enjoying
sick leave with pay at the time. The GSIS reiterated its decision on May 3,
1982. Later, on September 2, 1982, respondent ECC affirmed the action by
the GSIS.
Issue
Whether or not the ailments were occupational diseases and that
petitioner's compensation claim for ailments contracted by him prior to the
effectivity of the New Labor Code on November 1, 1974 but filed after said
date should be adjudicated under the old Workmen's Compensation Law (Act
No. 3428 as amended) or under the New Labor Code.
Held
The Labor Code as amended applies, for what is important is when
compensation is sought.
Chavez is found to have chronic pyelonephritis, ureterolithiasis and

ascariasis. Under Art. 1167 paragraph 1 of P.D. 626 as amended a
compensable sickness is defined as (1) any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission or (2) any illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions. Since his ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases, petitioner must perforce present proofs and evidence
that these ailments were work-related and that the risk of contracting the
same was aggravated by the working conditions of his employment as

postmaster and/or male carrier.
Chavez employment brought him to places not common to the

ordinary public nor to a clerical employee in an air-conditioned office. In the
execution of his duties, he had to go to far-flung barrios braving or indifferent
to all kinds of weather. He had to walk or cross flooded places, and in the
course of his travel he had to partake of food bought or taken from
unsanitary places where he found himself situated, be it in the barrio, the
town or the market sites. His nature of work made him thirsty most of the
time forcing him or leaving him no choice except to drink water from sources
unknown and uncertain as to its cleanliness. In remote barrios and villages,
the common source of potable water would be the ordinary artesian well or if
there is none, from the rivers and places which city folks and employees
would not even dare to consider. In such a situation, it would not be difficult
to conclude that petitioner contracted his ailments more particularly
ascariasis since this disease is transmitted from contaminated food and/or
water. His ailments could also be due to slowly progressing infections which
take time to attack the human body. It is undisputed that petitioner in the
course of his employment had constant exposure to the elements such as
the heat of the sun, sudden rain, wind, floods, and similar conditions. The
discomfort attendant to the inconvenient relief of personal necessities, the
long hours of travel on land and sea-all these contributed to his ailments,
resulting in his incapacity to continue working. Undoubtedly, therefore
petitioner's ailments are work-connected, work-aggravated and hence
compensable.
When Chavez filed his complaint on January 4, 1982, the 3-year prescriptive
period provided under Art. 292 of the New Labor Code had not yet lapsed.
His incapacity to work began when his doctors advised him to quit working to
be able to live longer, and this was in January 1981 when he filed his forced
retirement papers at the age of 61 years. The determining point of the
accrual of the cause of action is the time the complainant-employee
becomes disabled or incapacitated to do his regular work because that is the
time when the benevolent mantle of the Law commences to cover and
protect him.
Under the "exclusivity of benefit" doctrine, since he already availed himself

of his sick leave with pay benefits and retirement benefits, he is entitled only
to benefits, plus 20% thereof. The record shows that he has already received
his gross 5-year lump sum annuity retirement of P 24,598.80 and a monthly
pension of P 409.98 starting 1986. He is therefore entitled only to 20% of P
24,598.80 as disability benefits. Petitioner is likewise entitled to the
reimbursement of his medical and hospital expenses duly supported by
proper receipts, it appearing that his operation in 1982, one year after his
retirement, was for the removal of a right urethral stone.
The State Insurance Fund is composed of funds coming from employers'

contributions under the New Labor Code which took effect on November 1,
1974. Petitioner retired in January 1981. After payment by the GSIS, it can
seek reimbursement from the Bureau of Posts which shall be heard thereon
pursuant to the requirement of due process. Additionally, it appearing that
herein petitioner had availed himself of the services of a lawyer, petitioner is
entitled to recover attorney's fees.
NONATO ROSALES vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION,

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and The DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-46443, June 28, 1988
PADILLA, J.
Facts
Petitioner was employed at the Development Bank of the Philippines as
a file clerk. On April 6 to 10, 1976, during his tenure, he suffered from
rheumatoid arthritis. Following his disability, petitioner filed a claim for
employees compensation under P.D. No. 626 with the GSIS but his
application was denied. Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his
claim but the same was denied.
Issue
Whether or not P.D. NO. 626 is applicable
Held
The Supreme court held in the affirmative. It discussed that in
workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date
on which the claimant contracted his illness. Thus, where an ailment
supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the
old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, were an ailment
occurred after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation
applies. Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in
the allegations as to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do
so, and having filed his claim under PD No. 626, the presumption is that he
contracted the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1 January 1975.
The ECC, therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution,
denying petitioner's claim, could not be faulted in applying the governing
law, which is PD No. 626.

LABOR CASES COMPILaTION

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LABOR CASES COMPILaTION

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COMPILATION OF LABOR LAW CASES

LIST OF CASES PAGE NO.

ESCASINAS and SINGCO vs. SHANGRI-LAS ISLAND RESORT and DR.

Wilgen Loon, et. al. VS. Power Master, Inc.

In a decision dated March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas

In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially ruled in

The NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a

1. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and thus entitled

On the second issue, the petitioners are only entitled to salary

JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., ESTANISLAO SANTIAGO, and/or HAPAG-

G.R. No. 204076 December 4, 2013

The petitioners opposed the work-relation argument of respondent in

On May 7, 2008, the LA rendered a decision awarding respondent the

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was NPC afflicted while on

Charlito Penaranda v Banganga Plywood Corporation and Hudson

Hudson Chua, the General Manager of Baganga alleges that

judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As

Penaranda admitted that he was a supervisor in his Position Paper. He

Labor Congress of the Philippines (for and in behalf of its members)

The NLRC reversed such decision because apparently, the

In this regard, the LABOR ARBITER is hereby directed to include in his

It may likewise be stressed that the burden of proving the existence of

Private respondents, moreover, in considering petitioners employment

SEC. 2. Notice of Dismissal. - Any employer who seeks to dismiss a

Petitioners are therefore entitled to reinstatement with full back wages

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMENT vs. GLAXO WELLCOME

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates,

Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy,

In January 1999, Tecsons superior informed him that his marriage to

In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Sorigao

Tecson defied the transfer order and continue acting as medical

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN

G.R. No. 164774April 12, 2006

Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products.

Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouses from

To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must

The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in

Gliceria Casumpang vs. Employees Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987

The crux of the present case is a review of the decision of the

were after January 1, 1975. In view of this, it is important to determine which

Castor-Garupa vs. ECC & GSIS

For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the

JOSE DE GUIA vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND

Jose De Guia was first employed as storekeeper by the Bureau of

Whether or not diabetes mellitus is a disease which is compensable

The Supreme Court held that De Guia's "diabetic retinopathy" is a

Eulalio Mora, Jr. vs. Employees Compensation Commission

ZAIDA G. RARO vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the

JOSE B. SARMIENTO vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION &

The Flordeliza sought treatment in various hospitals. A soft tissue mass

Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by

The Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the GSIS'

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the

Spouses Aya-ay v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., and Magna Marine, Inc.

arrived on Brisbane, Australia, several specialists checked on his condition

respondents caused, or increased the risk of, CVA. Substantial evidence is

Pampanga Sugar Development Co. Inc. v Quiroz

In the case at bar, no such special circumstances appears to exist.