CASE 1

SECOND DIVISION

ROLLY PENTECOSTES, A.M. No. P-07-2337

Complainant, [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-
P]

Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO CARPIO MORALES,
MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the TINGA, and
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Kabacan,North Cotabato,
Respondent. Promulgated:

August 3, 2007

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, standsadministratively charged with grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a
criminal case which was placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint [1] filed on
November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was
recovered by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Mlang, North Cotabato from
suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged
at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the
motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued
an Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent,

however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the Mlang chief of police on August 1, 1995, he
requested Alex Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued
an acknowledgement receipt thereof.
 He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police station for which
he (respondent) prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the criminal case
was conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes
on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already cannibalized and
unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be responsible for
reconditioning the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he
accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss,
he prepared a letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the
conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal case and the
page of the blotter where the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn
statements of Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his
custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondents averments, Pentecostes, in his Rejoinder,[6] contended as follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by police
operatives[7] of Mlang.
Respondents act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of hand washing
as the records showed that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for
this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the
loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted
on January 16, 2006 his findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against respondent.[9]

In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the turnover of
the motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered
by the PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the motorcycle
when it was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof
of Pentecostes claim that the vehicle was cannibalized from the time it was under respondents custody
until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early part of 2000
and the absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise
decision in turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabangs report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and
was already cannibalized when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court from the Mlang police
station.
 Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the police
station of Kabacan was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who
should be held responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judges recommendation to be
sufficiently supported by the evidence.[11]

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabangs recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle
upon its delivery to respondent and the latters lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP
of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the motorcycle at
the time it was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the
investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the
motorcycle was loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA,
could only mean that the vehicle could not run by itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently proved that
the vehicle was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask
prior authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only when respondent was having problems with
Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior authority from
the court before evidence is turned over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be
warned to be more careful to prevent any similar incident from arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondents lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well
taken, on account of which respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge. [12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court
(now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s
involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and
safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the
court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was
charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination
of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.
 No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But
whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of
the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the
motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case
No. 1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor
as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the evidence indicates
that it was still serviceable when it was delivered by the Mlang police to respondent and at the time it was
turned over by respondent to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and
Police Inspector Romeo Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in good running
condition when they delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he
was the the driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle when the
vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1, 1995.[15]

Even respondents following testimony that:

x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately delivered

together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that respondent do[es] not
know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and
deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan [16] (Italics supplied)

suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently transferred its
custody to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. [17] Their
duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed
out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on
their jobs under one pretext or another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the
efficient administration of justice.[19]

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted positions as
keepers of public faith.[20] The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees
are reflective of the premium placed on the image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of court personnel. [21] It becomes the imperative and sacred
duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain
the courts good name and standing as true temples of justice. [22]

By transferring Pentecostes motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give premium to his
avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of
his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is

an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Memorandum Circular
No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension
of One Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering that this is respondents first offense and no taint
of bad faith has been shown by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple

Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a sternWARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

ROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO

529 SCRA 146 (2007)

The clerk of court has the duty to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property.

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court North Cotabato, was administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was placed under his
care and custody.

The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a sworn affidavit complaint filed on
November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by
members of the Philippine National Police of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers.

The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes refused to receive it because it was
already cannibalized and unserviceable.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North
Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended that the
administrative complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed because there was no proof of
Pentecostes claim that the vehicle was cannibalized from the time that it was under Atty.
Hermenegildos custody until its transfer to Philippine National Police (PNP) of Kabacan. The Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct

HELD:

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now
Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) which provides
all exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence
shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, Atty. Hermenegildo was
charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination
of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.

The Court said no explanation was offered by Atty. Hermenegildo, however, for turning over the
motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, Atty. Hermenegildo was mandated to secure prior consultations
with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the
motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records, with nary a lead as
to who was responsible for it. These circumstance are viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the
safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as clerk of court.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their
duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed
out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

-------------------------------------------

CASE 2

EN BANC

Father RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. A.C. No. 5095

GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA,
POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R.
MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. Present:
QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO
*
C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAEZ, PUNO, C.J.
*
AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. QUISUMBING,
**
AGATEP, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Complainants, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Atty. EDWIN PASCUA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 28, 2007

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then
Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M.Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed
as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one
Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of
1998, datedDecember 10, 1998.
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of
one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series
of 1998, datedDecember 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in
the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on
December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register
due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his
comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the
Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were LinaM. Garan and the other above-
named complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents
Comment. They maintain that Atty.Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.[2]
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and
the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA
318).
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument,
xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line
shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV,Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly
notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of
his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter
 into his notarialregister the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty
on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he
notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand,
the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document
Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and
the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely
assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on
his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible
since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No.
1213) was submitted only when Domingos affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that
Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on
December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence
then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and
1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to
subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in
his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance
of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from
his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document
without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he
was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction
would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme
penalty of disbarment, it being the respondents first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from
the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous
misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him
as a lawyer.Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation
of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that
the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and
that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. [3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and
conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascuaguilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph
B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. [4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.[5]
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A.Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute
Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act
constitutes misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked
thenotarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six
months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he
notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of
law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubiafor making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his
offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Facts: For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then
Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan. In his letter-complaint, Father
Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering
the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register
of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and
that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties.

Held: Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his
Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal
intent.

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa, wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six
months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, we revoked the
notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months
for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
In Mondejar v. Rubia, however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was
imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

CASE 7

THIRD DIVISION

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA,
Complainant, A.C. No. 7204

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Respondent.
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 7, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal
advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway
Travel andTours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy
attached as Annex I) to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to
discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel
and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner,
respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at
Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint
to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually
did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so
sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt
Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic)
her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant
even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that
she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case
folder from him.The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and
read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with

At 5:33:46 pm other lawyer

replied by respondent - does this mean I can not c u anymore

at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant - I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take

at 6:17:59 pm advantage of the situation.

Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if

Sent by complainant you dont have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the
At 6:32:43 pm situation, 2 put it rightly it s an
expression of feeling. S sri (Im very
sorry. Its not taking advantage of the
situation, to put it rightly it is an
expression of feeling)

Follow up message - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I

by respondent can show u my sincerity (Im so sorry.
at 6:42:25 pm Ill not do it again. Will you still see me
so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to

complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. Im realy sri.
Puede bati na tyo. (I dont know what to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede
bati na tayo).

Respondent replied talk to my lawyer in due time. Then another message was
received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me.
(Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear
manifestation of admission of guilt.[2]
 In his answer,[3] respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant;
that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and
Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car
where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the
corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married
to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was
archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao,
Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant
never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every
time they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,[4] recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting,
with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct
required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. [5]

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly
immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good
moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law. [6] In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,
[7]
we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it
is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one
of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity
of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.[8] We explained in Barrientos v.
Daarol[9] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community.

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor.[10]

In Bar Matter No. 1154,[11] good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [12]

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,[13] respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face
towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I
lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and
plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no
lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying sexual harassment.

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas
Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the
corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each
other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said she
opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a
Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is
along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we
ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic)
order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that,
after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or beyond that
time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then
I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on
(sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where
you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the
corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her
can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the
slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and
when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said
good night. She went down the car, thats it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx
 ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment.
So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she
said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened
the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the
use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again
softly on the lips and thats it. x x x.[14] (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct
or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. [15]

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[16] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion ofgood and respectable members of
the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply
be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,[17] a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[18] a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her
and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,[19] respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during
the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[20] it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[21] respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a bachelor so
he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[22] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that [s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the
institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for
the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such, there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to
be disbarred.

In Tucay v. Tucay,[23] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant
with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral
conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession,
warranting respondents disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage
still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,[25] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter
satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at
all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community,
and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. [26]
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie,[27] forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.

Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a
lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof
rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof,[28] disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court
of its disciplinary power.[29] Thus, the adage that he who asserts not he who denies, must prove. [30] As a
basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit .[31] In the
case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. [32]

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant alsovia cellular phone text message. The exchange of
text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the
vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place
where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor
highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
 The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.[33] When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the
public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other
lawyers from similar misconduct.[34] Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of
justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [35] While it is discretionary upon the Court to
impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to
the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only
justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense should also be considered.[36]

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. [37] In the Matter of
Darell Adams,[38] a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising
her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents
first offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of
gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial,
and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
 WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is herebyREPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent

Facts:

The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It was
alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal advice from peitioner regarding her
collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in February 2005,
they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company
because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm
and kissed her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."

The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way home after the
said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to
refer the case to another lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would warrant the
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

Held:

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon admission
to the Bar but all throughtout their legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and should adhere to the
unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the
complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from complainant in his text
message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the
Court held that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately asked for
forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this
is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or suspension. But the
Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.

Digest 2
Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata, AC No. 7204, March 7, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:
complainant Cynthia Advincula seeked the legal advice of the respondent Atty. Macabata, regarding
her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours.
After their dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
After the meeting at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City, respondent offered again a
ride, which he usually did every time they met. When she was almost restless respondent stopped his car
and forcefully hold her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant
even in a state of shocked succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage to go out
of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to
refer the case with another lawyer and needs to get back the case folder from him.
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at
4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please
next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that:
there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending
legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky
Toriana
complainant was living with a man not her husband
complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for their
bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of 1 month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117, approving and adopting, with modification that Atty. Ernesto
A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3 months
ISSUE: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral
depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
HELD: Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is DISMISSED. However, REPRIMANDED with a
STERN WARNING.
NO.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
requirement of good moral character has 4 ostensible purposes:
to protect the public
to protect the public image of lawyers
to protect prospective clients
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing
as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment
Zaguirre v. Castillo:
definition of immoral conduct
o conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.
o must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral.
o must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.
In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A
mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place
where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only
justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense should also be considered.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first
offense, reprimand would suffice.
it was difficult and agonizing on complainants part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of
gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial,
and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
CASE 10

EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts
 Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent
a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice
of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave

misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19
May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as
a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent
prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed ascounsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has
been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in
the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
 In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act
as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
 Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance. [10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there
was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll
of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently,
the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his
comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the
Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the
meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading
as counsel for the candidate.

I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities
he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of
the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and with
the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its
members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath,
he was denied admission to the bar.

DIGEST 2
AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:
 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an
election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondents services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.

CASE 15

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me
under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don
Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of
title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr.
Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge
that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred
for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest
scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because
respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner
San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years
and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six
months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he
was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He
also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had
no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified
his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing
a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them
to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST
#25

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7054 December 4, 2009

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final
 judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2(MeTC) and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts
have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked
the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer
case;

(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to
impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain
and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an
imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the
respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his
clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.4

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the
good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment
of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the
homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases
formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case
handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the
respondents present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity,
honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the
interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based
on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful
detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud
committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly
detained property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The
respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for
declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal
strategy to protect the interests of his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the
petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the
respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had
taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No.
Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them
from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31
out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules
on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the
Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was
no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients)
and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request
to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case. 6

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral
acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings
with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the
law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the
disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an
axe to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint violated the
rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint
was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and
defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized
members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan)
found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he
stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his
client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary
duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which
enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means,
inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or
brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the
unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions
of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.10

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing
two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for
declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer
case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for
annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the
presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents
explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom
were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To
the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by
claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-
forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the
respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of
title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.

The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years.13 On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the
respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.14

The Issue

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should
carry.

The Courts Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the
respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders,
Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act
of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months. 16
Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the
CA held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must
be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.17

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a
petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an
ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC
dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed. 18

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and
Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the
unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed "for lack of legal
personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the petition.19

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment
of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the
alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had
filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second
petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the
respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC
and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means
allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already
uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these
attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and
obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning
parties in that case.20

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,21 as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the
filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court
processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 23

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions
involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure
favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of
the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most
obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared
towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had
become final.

Willful, intentional and deliberate

falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood in
the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud
was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper
remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly
sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in
complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging
representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) 24

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed "that
the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void." 25 These conflicting claims,
no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse,
it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another
violation we shall separately discuss below.

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands 26 on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a)
the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the
proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition
without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone
stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel
the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his
clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel
have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in
the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the
counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.27[Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse
partys motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the
respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by
the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as
transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration are not true.

how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases
as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the
preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the
open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent
took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to
convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the
June 28, 2002 hearing. 30

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the
court. This provision states:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall
he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31 The respondent
failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in
the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his
work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the
court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. 34 In case of conflict,
his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court. 35
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW

Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent
with truth and honor.36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute
clearly groundless actions.37 The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the
judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly
prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of
deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation
against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition
for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was
filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the
respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is
now dead and unable to defend himself.

Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented
parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in
the second petition for annulment of title.38

In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals
did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a
majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already
gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of
lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged
in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so
proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with
which he was previously associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping
glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he
allegedly represented.

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines
in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of
forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the
plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when
he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof,
without leave of court.40 The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case
constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer
for professional misconduct.41

The Respondents Defenses

We find no merit in the respondents defenses.

"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. 43 As both
concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more
particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients.
We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all
obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC.
That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably
strengthen the presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness
and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions,
considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of
cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are
simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer
judgment against his clients.

On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to
note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. 44 As we explained in Plus
Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of
truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of
promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the
Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A
lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of
action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.45

We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the
counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument,
considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is
only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the
respondent.

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants
unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the
dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance.
For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information
of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.46 1avvphi1

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que
and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court
is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in
the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that
the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the
same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.
We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his
past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated

December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01
and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should
be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.