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Modern aircraft
Reliability improvement
of electronics standby display
system of modern aircraft
955
G. Pari
Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance, Ministry of Defence, Received January 2008
Bangalore, Karnataka, India Accepted February 2008
Santhosh Kumar
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), Bangalore, Karnataka, India, and
Vinay Sharma
Department of Production Engineering, Birla Institute of Technology,
Mesra, Ranchi, India
Abstract
Purpose Through this analysis an attempt has been made to improve the reliability of an ESDS
used in the cockpit.
Design/methodology/approach The process used for carrying out FMEA is specified by
MIL-STD-1629A procedure for carrying out failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.
Findings In an increasing demand in avionics sector, particularly in modern defence and civil
aircraft, safety and reliability are the prime concern to complete the mission successfully. This made
technocrats to rethink over the safety of complete system by adding redundancy to the critical
activities or what else not? The electronic stand by display system (ESDS), being an avionics unit and
fitted in the cockpit for displaying very important navigation and engine parameters to pilot whenever
main display unit fail to perform it primary functions. So even standby system need to have high
reliability to serve the purpose by providing important flight parameters for the safe landing of pilot
and crew. Failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) is one of the effective reliability assessment tool,
which evaluate systematically and document the potential failure modes of a system or equipment and
their causes. It helps in grading the severity of all potential failure modes and useful in carrying out the
changes in early phase of design. The analysis starts with the potential failure of a smallest component
at the final indenture and goes up to the initial indenture level.
Originality/value The paper adds insight into the reliability improvement of electronics standby
display systems of modern aircraft.
Keywords Aircraft, Failure modes and effects analysis, Navigation, Product reliability
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The electronic stand by display system (ESDS) is presently under development for the
usage in Military Aircraft. The ESDS displays the important parameters like, calibrated
airspeed and vertical speed, Mach number, angle of attack, rotor speed, turbine International Journal of Quality &
discharge temperature, variable nozzle area, fuel flow rate, etc. Further as ESDS being Reliability Management
Vol. 25 No. 9, 2008
airborne equipment, its reliability should be very high. All measures have been taken pp. 955-967
during design and development of the unit by means of selecting right materials, q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0265-671X
processes, components, planning and various tests for conforming to the requirements, DOI 10.1108/02656710810908106
IJQRM involving various agencies like quality assurance/quality control to increase confidence
25,9 level of the equipment function. The equipment (ESDS) shares the load of main display
units, i.e. multi function display (MFDs). In case of the failure of main display units, ESDS
will provide vital flight information to the pilot to navigate the aircraft safely to the base.
In normal mode, the flight performance information, which requires to be continuously
monitored for the safety of the flying, can be also displayed by this unit and MFDs can be
956 programmed to display other mission related parameters. The ESDS is stand alone color
display unit of size 3 3 inches. ESDS generates and displays page information as
predefined pages based on the parameters received through its various interfaces. Two
units of ESDS are envisaged for one cockpit. One ESDS is to be located on left main
instrumental panel and other on the right hand main instrumental panel.
Methodology
The process used for carrying out FMEA is specified by MIL-STD-1629A procedure
for carrying out failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.
Analysis approach
Based on the design complexity and available data there are two primary approaches
one which lists individual hardware items and analysis their possible failure modes.
The other is a functional approach, which recognizes that every item is designed to
perform a number of functions that can be classified as output. The outputs are listed
and their failure modes where analyzed. In this case, there are few modules and sub
modules like ICs, DC-DC converters, AMLCD, etc. which are procured as finished
components therefore designed details are not available for these modules/components.
Further the ESDS being a complex system, combination of both the approaches, i.e.
hardware as well as functional approaches was considered for carrying out failure
modes and effect analysis (FMEA, www.admin@fmea.com; www.omnicongroup.com
(Department of Defense, 1980; Stamatis, 1995)[1]).
Severity classification
Severity of failure effects where categorized as per military standards and are
summarized below (Department of Defense, 1980):
.
Catastrophic A failure which may cause inadvertent release of stores or
damage to aircraft or crew.
.
Critical A failure which may cause major system damage which will result in
mission loss.
.
Marginal A failure which may cause minor system damage which will result
in delay or loss of redundancy or mission degradation.
.
Minor A failure not serious enough to cause system damage, but which results
in unscheduled maintenance or repairs.
.
For improving the system and future expansion.
Procedure
Each single item failure was considered to be the only failure in the system, while
analyzing its effects, when a single item failure was not detectible, the analysis was
extended to determine the effects of a second failure, which in combination with the first
undetectable failure could result in a catastrophic or critical failure condition. Passive Modern aircraft
and multiple failures, which may result in catastrophic or critical conditions, were also
identified. When Safety, redundant, or back-up items exist, failure assumption
was broadened to include the failure condition. Design changes or special control
measures were identified and defined for all catastrophic and critical failure modes.
All single failure points identified during the analyses were uniquely identified on the
FMEA worksheets to maintain visibility of these failure modes (Department of Defense, 957
1980; Stamatis, 1995; Kara-Zaitri et al., 1991; Bednarz and Marriott, 1988).
Levels of ESDS
In this case, FMEA was introduced at the lowest indenture level and preceded
through increasing indenture levels, up to the main unit level and for the entire
system. Figure 1 shows the various indenture levels of system. At the lowest
Figure 1.
FMEA at various
indenture levels
IJQRM indenture level, the failure modes were based on the functions of the complete unit.
25,9 Similarly at the higher indenture levels the failure modes were based on the
functions of the module or sub section. For analysis purpose ESDS was divided into
four major modules viz:
(1) Graphic interface module.
(2) Input/output modules two numbers.
958
(3) Power supply module.
(4) Back plane and rear I/O two numbers.
Further each module was divided into number of sections and subsections to make
analysis simpler. In this paper, only power supply module analysis was summarized
due to length constraint.
The critical failures of components in various subsections, sections of the power
supply card are shown in Figure 2.
The critical failures in this section are caused by:
.
02 cases of resistor and 01 case of inductor failing in open mode;
.
02 cases of resistor and 01 cases of transistor failing short mode;
.
06 cases of integrated circuits failing functionally; and
.
01 cases of MOSFET, 01 case of regulator and 01 cases of rectifier failing in
short/open mode.
Figure 2.
Cause and effect analysis
for failure of power supply
card
Failure effects of power supply module Modern aircraft
Power supply module provides the voltage required by the GIU, IO module, LCD
module, Bezel and other external services like magnetometer, etc. Failure of this
module will cause the failure of complete system. The reliability diagram of power
supply module is shown in Figure 4.
DC-DC converter
This section generates various supply voltage required by the ESDS system to
function. The reliability block diagram of DC-DC converter is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 3.
Reliabilty diagram
of ESDS
Figure 4.
Reliability diagram
of power supply module
Figure 5.
Reliability diagram EMI
filter
Figure 6.
Reliability diagram
of DC-DC converters
IJQRM There are five DC-DC converters which are used in this section viz., 3.3, 5, 30, 12
25,9 and 2 12 V. A 30 V DC-DC generator is configured to supply 15 and 2 15 V and the
12 and 2 12 V DC-DC converters are cascade to give 24 V power. The entire DC-DC
converter is to function for the smooth operation of the ESDS. Failure of one or other
DC-DC converter will fail the system.
The switching circuit switches on the power supply 3.3, 5 and 15 V
960 simultaneously through MOSFETS. Failure of this circuit will lead to the power failure
to the ESDS. Regulator was used for regulating 2.5 V from 3.3 V power supply
required for the bezel lighting. Failure of the regulator will cause the failure of the bezel
lighting.
Pi-filter was used for filtering line ripples generated in the DC-DC converters. Each
output of the DC-DC converter had individual filters. Since the filter was in series with
the power supply line, failure of the Pi-filter will cause the power failure and failure of
the system.
Filter and logic circuit feeds power to the LCD heater and lamp heater. In case of the
failure of this section, ESDS cannot be switched on when the external temperature was
below 158C.
Figure 7.
Reliability diagram
of magnetometer power
supply converters
components fail at random due to electrical over stress (EOS). From the analysis it was Modern aircraft
seen that supervisory circuits, which maintain the voltage to the threshold limit,
is likely to deteriorate the other component when it fails. The deteriorated component
may fail at later date, where the cause was EOS again due to failure of supervisory
circuit. Therefore, the column probable cause of failure in the work sheet was filled
mostly with EOS.
The failure of the system means there is no display by ESDS, which can be seen 961
visually. But to identify the failure at subsystem level (module level/section
level/subsection level), the power on self-test (POST) of continuous built in test (CBIT)
was used. When the failure at the section/subsection level is identified, it becomes easy
to identify the failed components. The column Failure detection method/warning is
filled with POST and CBIT mostly. FMEA of power supply module is summarized in
Tables I and II for DC-DC converter.
Conclusion
From the table it may be seen that there are 22 cases of capacitor failure and 15 cases of
resistor failure which are categories as critical. But from the selection criteria of these
components and the data sheets, the failure rate is below 0.001 per cent per 1,000 h.
Similarly 13 cases of electromechanical components (connectors) are categorized under
critical where they fail due to mechanical stress. The reliability of these components
under mechanical stress is proved by subjecting the unit to vibration (sine and random)
and shock as a part of qualification testing. The remaining failure of 24 cases of ICs,
Transistors MOSFETs, optocoupler and regulators which are consider as critical, is a
causes for concern for reliability of the units.
Improving the reliability of a system by adding compensating mechanism or
redundancy adds weights. But the weight is critical factor for any fighter aircraft.
In case of ESDS, which is cockpit instrument, apart from weight there is space
constraint also. At the same time one should not loose the reliability of a system, which
is very important for any airborne equipment. Therefore, compromise between
reliability of a system and weight at some point is necessary.
In the design feature, it has been brought out that the unit is subjected to
environmental stress screening at various level like, component level, card (PCB) level
and unit level. Further at unit level thermo shock is also being planned. These
measures are likely to bring out the inherent failure in the unit and weed out the infant
mortality. Burn-in and endurance testing of the unit is also proposed to carryout on the
unit. The reliability measure is included as design feature. If the development of the
unit is considered to be satisfactory then no further compensating mechanism to cater
for the critical failure is suggested at this stage.
25,9
962
module
Table I.
IJQRM
3.1.1.1 Schottky rectifier Reverse Short EOS a. U10 becomes serviceable Nil IV Provided for safety,
(U 10) polarity redundancy provided
protection b. No reverse polarity
protection For open mode
c. No effects on the system
Open a. U10 becomes serviceable Visual (no II
power
b. No power supply to
DC-DC convertor
c. System failure
3.1.1.2 Choke L1 & L4 Act as part of Broken Mechanical a. Failure of the component Visual III
(ferrite bead type) RLC filter stress b. Presence of line ripples in
the power supply
c. System will have noise
3.1.1.2 Choke L5 Act as part of Open EOS a. Failure of the component Visual (no II
RLC filter power
b. No power supply to
DC-DC convertor
c. System failure
3.1.1.2 Capacitor C9 or Act as part of Open EOS a. Failure of the component POST or III
C10 or C12 or C13 RLC filter Short b. Power supply to DC-DC CBIT
converter. Will have no
interface
(continued)
System: ESDS Part no. A1KII 1210-000-000
Part no.
Module: power supply card SD-1210-150-000
Section: EMI filter Function: reduce the input line reflected ripple current of the ATR DC-DC converter
Failure effect on:
Probability a. Components Failure
Failure cause b. Sub-systems detection
ID no. Item/functional ID Function mode of failure c. Systems method Severity Remarks
963
Table I.
25,9
964
converter
Table II.
IJQRM
analysis of DC-DC
Failure mode and effect
System: ESDS Part no. A1KII 1210-000-000
Module: power supply card Part no. SD-1210-150-000
Section: DC-DC converter Function: provides various ripple free power supplies to the system
Sub section: DC-DC converter Function: provides 3.3, 5, 15, 2 15and; 24 V supplies
3.2.1.1 3.3 V DC-DC converter Provides 3.3 V DC Output EOS a. Failure of the Visual (no II Has over voltage and
(U4) from 28 V open component power) short circuit protection
Output b. Failure of 3.3 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.2 ^ 15 V DC-DC converter Provides ^15 V from Output Mech. a. Failure of the Visual (No II Has over voltage and
(U5) 28 V open Stress component power) short circuit protection
Output b. Failure of ^ 15 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.3 24 V DC DC converter Provides 24 V DC Output EOS a. Failure of the Visual (no II Has over voltage and
(U1 and U2 in series) from 28 V open component power short circuit protection
Output b. Failure of 24 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.4 5 V DC-DC converter(U3) Provides 5 V DC from No EOS a. Failure of the Visual, II Has over voltage and
28 V output component POST or short circuit protection
(open) CBIT
Output b. Failure of 5 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.5 Capacitor C2 Common mode noise Open EOS a. Failure of the POST or IV
for 5 V DC line component CBIT
short b. Noise in the input to
DC-DC converter U3
c. No immediate effect
Modern aircraft
Section Sub section Component ID Component Failure mode
If necessary the selection of the components, which are likely to cause the critical
failures may be reviewed. Further any failure or the discrepancies noted during the
qualification testing and life/endurance testing should be considered in view of the
outcome of FMEA for improving the reliability.
Note
1. Reliability and Maintainability for Experiment Flight Equipments (ISS Pressurised
Modules) Project Specific Annex GPQ-010-PSA-108 Issue 1.
References
Bednarz, S. and Marriott, D. (1988), Efficient analysis of FMEA, Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE
Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium.
Department of Defense (1980), Procedure for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis, Mil-Std 1629A.
Kara-Zaitri, C., Keller, A.Z. and Fleming, P.V. (1991), An Improved FMEA Methodology, Bradford
University, Bradford.
Stamatis, D.H. (1995), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis FMEA from Theory to Execution, ASQ
Quality Press, Milwaukee, WI.
1. Hctor H. Guerrero, James R. Bradley. 2013. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis: An Evaluation of Group
versus Individual Performance. Production and Operations Management 22, 1524-1539. [CrossRef]