The Tibet Conflict:

Core Causes and Possible Solutions

Introduction
In March 2008 Tibet, known for its deeply religious and peaceful Buddhist people, broke out
in widespread protests all over the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as in the
ethnically Tibetan areas of neighboring provinces. Some of these protests were peaceful, but
others turned into riots and violence including the burning and looting of stores owned by
Han Chinese, China's majority ethnic group. "When violent rioting broke out in the Tibetan
capital, Lhasa, on March 14, 2008, after four days of peaceful protests, businesses owned by
Chinese were looted and burned. At least 19 people were killed, most of them Han
Chinese."[1] The Chinese government's response to the protests and riots throughout Tibet
was swift and extreme. By some estimates, the March protests culminated in the deaths of
over 100 "unarmed" Tibetans many of them Buddhist monks.[2]

Attempting to understand the mass Tibetan anger, this paper will begin by recounting a few
of the recent events of Tibetan and Chinese history. In 1950, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), winners of the 1949 Chinese Civil War, launched an invasion of Tibet. From Tibet's
perspective, this invasion interrupted centuries of independent nationhood. The Chinese,
meanwhile, believed they were simply reestablishing control of part of their sovereign
territory, which had been wrested from them during the past century of foreign imperialism
and precipitating civil war. Later, a 1959 Tibetan uprising partly nonviolent, partly
violent, and largely inspired and led by the CIA, was violently squashed by the Chinese.
Following these events, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet for northern India. The Dalai Lama, who
has as of yet never returned to Tibet, and the Tibetan Government in Exile have been based
there in Dharamsala, India for the past half-century. The CCP created the TAR in 1965,
nominally establishing Tibet's regional autonomy; however, in practice Tibetans enjoy
minimal or zero autonomy, as Tibet's politics, economics, and increasingly its culture are
controlled by Beijing.

With this context in mind, this paper will investigate the causes of violent conflict in Tibet,
and it will provide some recommended solutions that could potentially lead to a more
peaceful and just arrangement in the region.

Core Causes of the Conflict

The China-Tibet conflict is often viewed as an ethnic and/or religious conflict. This is
understandable, given the prominence of ethnicity and religion in the conflict. First, while the
native inhabitants of the Tibetan plateau are Tibetans, the majority ethnic group in China is
Han Chinese. The Chinese government is made up mostly of Han Chinese, and it does not
have a strong record of dealing with China's ethnic minorities like Tibetans in a fair
way. Secondly, virtually all Tibetans are Buddhists, while ethnic Han Chinese are generally
not, even though the Chinese people are becoming increasingly religious including
Buddhist now that the ideology of Communism has collapsed in China (except in name
only). Moreover, the Chinese government has a history of persecuting religious movements,
especially those which draw large numbers of followers and which have the potential to
transform into political movements that could potentially threaten the regime's hold on
power. Tibetan Buddhism has this kind of following and transformative potential. For these
reasons, headlines from the Tibet conflict often paint a picture of intense religious and ethnic
conflict. While these are aspects of the conflict, they are better described as residual causes,
or even consequences, of it.

There is no inherent reason that ethnicity or religion must cause violent conflict in Tibet or
anywhere else. Rather, the primary sources of conflict in Tibet are history and geography;
Chinese security and sovereignty concerns; and the policies of the Chinese government in
Tibet. While they bring attention to ethnic and religious differences between Tibetans and
Chinese, these factors are what really drive the conflict in Tibet.

History and Geography

First, history and the different views on whether Tibet has historically been an independent
nation represent a core cause of the conflict. In the Tibetan view, Tibet has been an
independent nation and at times a great empire throughout the last several centuries.[3]
In this view, Mongolian rule over Tibet ended with Tibet reestablishing independence, and its
relationship with China thereafter was not one of subservience.[4] Tibet remained
independent up until the Chinese invasion in 1950, which is therefore illegal.

On the other hand, the Chinese believe that Tibet's historically great empire greatly declined
beginning in the 9th Century and then was finally and completely brought down by the
Mongols centuries ago.[5] Tibet then came under Chinese "suzerainty" in the 18th Century,
and it remained under Chinese administration until the late 19th Century when Great Britain
invaded Tibet, wanting to control Tibet as a buffer between China and British India.[6]
Moreover, China contends that Britain created the fantasy of an "independent Tibet", for this
purpose of creating a buffer between China and British India.[7] China then reclaimed Tibet
when Britain came preoccupied with a rising Germany, and effectively gave Tibet back to
China via a 1907 treaty.[8] China was finally able to reestablish control over Tibet when it
emerged from foreign imperialism and civil war in the middle of the 20th Century.

These competing claims are still debated in academic and policy making circles. However,
Dickinson states that "Tibetans, by virtue of their lack of participation in the larger
community during the first half of the twentieth century, by their failure to participate in
international organizations such as the League of Nations, and by their failure to modernize,
have been unable to mount a convincing case to establish that Tibet was an independent state
at the time of the 1950 Chinese occupation." In fact, neither the United States nor any other
major country recognizes Tibet as independent; they all recognize Chinese sovereignty over
Tibet.[9] "As a result, China has been able to maintain its occupation and assert that Tibet
was historically part of its territory, relying on other states not to interfere in its domestic
affairs on a basis of territorial integrity."[10]

Chinese Concerns over Its Security and Sovereignty

Chinese concerns over its security and sovereignty represent another core cause of the
conflict in Tibet. The Chinese see themselves as victims of foreign imperialism especially
during the century of humiliation, which remains fresh in their minds and therefore feel
that they must take (what others see as) a hard-line stance on sovereignty issues in places like
Tibet. After all, if Tibet became independent, it could inspire similar succession movements
in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. These areas not only make up significant border
territories as well as buffers against foreign influence but also are central to the Chinese sense
of identity which had been devastated in the last two centuries, given the China's once
proud, imperial past. Moreover, China views the Dalai Lama, perhaps unfairly, as a "splittist"
that could spark "Color Revolutions" throughout China.

U.S. policies have thus far not helped the situation. The CIA's 1950s and 1960s involvement
in Tibet as well as the George W. Bush administration's belligerent anti-China policy
(especially early in President Bush's tenure) have reinforced China's sovereignty fears.
Moreover, recent U.S. policies have not only failed to moderate Chinese policy but have also
inspired Tibetan exiles to keep lobbying for independence.[11] Because of this, U.S. action
on Tibet has tended to exacerbate China's fears that the United States is trying to destabilize
China.[12] This reality weakens the position of those Chinese willing to work with Tibetans,
strengthens the hard-liners, and does nothing to actually help the Tibetan cause.[13]

Chinese Governance

Another principal cause of the Tibet conflict has been Chinese governance and the
precipitating "Sinicization" of the region.[14] While the Chinese government claims that it
has successfully raised the standard of living in Tibet, many Tibetans both inside and
outside Tibet believe that the Chinese government's "modernization" policies have hurt the
region.

China claims that the $45.4 billion it has spent in the TAR has helped make the region's 2003
GDP 28-times greater than its 1978 GDP.[15] According to Newsweek, for the last four
years, there has been a 13% per-capita GDP increase per year in rural Tibet, where 80-90% of
the TAR's three million people live.[16] As is the case for the rest of China, the CCP believes
that a lack of political freedom is a small price to pay for this kind of economic growth.[17]

The source of Tibetan frustration largely stems from the fact that while Tibet's standard of
living has improved, most of the benefits have gone to the ethnic Han Chinese who have
immigrated into Tibet.[18] Moreover, Han immigration encouraged by the Chinese
government through tax incentives[19] is also, according to Tibetans, undermining Tibet's
political, religious, and cultural freedom. Though the CCP disputes this charge, Tibetan exiles
claim that 60% of Lhasa is now ethnic Han.[20]

In fact, a recent study by a Chinese group called the "Open Constitution Initiative" concluded
that the 2008 riots in Tibet were inspired by "legitimate grievances", as Tibetans are feeling
increasingly "disenfranchised" in their own land.[21] Supporting this claim, one scholar
noted that many of the 2008 rioters were unemployed youth.[22] Ethnic Han in Tibet have a
"monopoly" on jobs; it is difficult to find a job if you are a Tibetan.[23] Furthermore, only
300 of the 13,000 shops and restaurants in Lhasa are owned by Tibetans.[24] To make
matters worse, the ethnic Han generally send their incomes back home, so Tibet does not
receive much of the benefit.[25] Accordingly, a 2002 study found that while 15% of Tibetans
benefit from the Chinese government economic programs, 85% live in abject poverty.[26]

Tibetans are also angered by the Chinese government's intrusions on the political and cultural
freedoms of their supposedly autonomous region. Despite Tibet officially having a
"governor", real power resides with the Communist Party Secretary, who is Han Chinese.[27]
Also, there is a serious problem with local government accountability as CCP officials do a
poor job reconciling the Chinese political system and Tibetan culture.[28] Because of this,
the Tibetan way of life in terms of its religion, agriculture, and wildlife is at risk. The CCP
imposes certain restriction on religious freedom, such as the number of monks allowed at a
given monastery.[29] The Chinese government's preferred methods of farming have reaped
poor harvests and subsequently led to hunger, and according to some, famine.[30] Finally,
Tibet's unique wildlife is being threatened by poaching and hunting.[31]

These issues make up the roots of the tension between Tibetans and Chinese. To help resolve
violent conflict in Tibet, possible solutions which will be discussed later must be
implemented by the following actors.

Actors Involved in Tibet

The primary parties in the Tibet conflict are the Chinese and the Tibetans. The Chinese side
includes ethnic Han the majority ethnic group in China living in Tibet and the Chinese
government. The Tibetans can be further divided into those living in the TAR as well as its
neighboring provinces versus Tibetan exiles living in northern India, or elsewhere in the
world.

Tibetans both inside and outside China can be further divided into those that want to
remain part of China, but with increased autonomy, and those who believe Tibet should be an
independent country. Some of those who want independence advocate nonviolent means;
others promote the use of violence in the cause of Tibetan freedom from Chinese rule.
* (Except in Lhasa, the first group represents a large majority of the 3 million TAR Tibetans).

No third parties have played a consistent and active role in mediating the conflict. The United
States acted as an interested second party during the 1950s and 1960s, when the CIA was
trying to destabilize a newly Communist China. However, it later lost interest in playing a
concerted role, and the rest of the international community has been unable to put together a
cohesive policy. However, third parties will be discussed later in the paper as an essential part
of any solution to the violent conflict in Tibet.

Future Vision
Here is one vision of a possible future Tibet. Tibet would be more autonomous, but still
remain part of China and under its sovereignty. However, Tibet would have more political
self-determination. Economic development would continue, but in a way that genuinely
benefits Tibetans, rather than only Tibet's Han Chinese immigrants. Moreover, these and
other steps would help keep Tibetan culture intact. Gradually, this kind of self-determination
and improved governance would be extended to the ethnically Tibetan areas of neighboring
provinces. Finally, through a long term, incremental process, China and therefore
eventually Tibet would one day become a liberal democracy.

The following are some of the actions that various parties to the conflict can take to bring
about a just resolution, like that envisioned above.
* (To understand why this solution one has to consider the anthropological geography of
what is called the 5000 year old Silk Road and admit that not all Han Chinese are recent
immigrants.

Archeological discoveries show that since thousands of years the Tibetan region was under
rule or control of the Chinese empire or kingdoms. The silk route had a structure of
intermediate stations, each a day march from each other, since the silk route had different
branches: from east to west and south or north of mountains or deserts.
This route has been densely populated by Chinese traders since ancient times. This implies
deep rooted historical rights.
There was also a branch reaching to Katmandu which lasted until 1969 but reopened later on.
Coming from China silk was the major trade product which traveled on this road, it was
named the Silk Road in 1877 by Ferdinand von Richthofen a well-known German
geographer. This ancient route not only circulated goods, but also exchanged the splendid
cultures of China, India, Persia, Arabia, Greek and Rome.

Let us have a look at some archeological findings:

Credit: SOURCE: EARLIEST TEA AS EVIDENCE FOR ONE BRANCH OF THE SILK
ROAD ACROSS THE TIBETAN PLATEAU, BY HOUYUAN LU ET AL., IN SCIENTIFIC
REPORTS, VOL. 6, ARTICLE NO. 18955; JANUARY 7, 2016; Map by Mapping Specialists
Archeologists Uncover another Branch of the Silk Road
New evidence suggests the ancient trade route ventured through the heights of Tibet

Famous for facilitating an incredible exchange of culture and goods between the East and the
West, the ancient Silk Road is thought to have meandered across long horizontal distances in
mountain foothills and the lowlands of the Gobi Desert. But new archaeological evidence
hidden in a lofty tomb reveals that it also ventured into the high altitudes of Tibeta
previously unknown arm of the trade route.

Discovered in 2005 by monks, the 1,800-year-old tomb sits 4.3 kilometers above sea level in
the Ngari district of Tibet. When excavations began in 2012, the research team examining the
site was surprised to find a large number of quintessential Chinese goods inside. The haul
lends itself to the idea that merchants were traveling from China to Tibet along a branch of
the Silk Road that had been lost to history.

The findings are astonishing, says Houyuan Lu, an archaeobotanist at the Chinese
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Geology and Geophysics in Beijing. Among other artifacts,
archaeologists unearthed exquisite pieces of silk with woven Chinese characters wang hou
(meaning king and princes), a mask made of pure gold, and ceramic and bronze vessels.

They also were taken aback by what looked like tea buds. The earliest documentation of tea
in Tibet dates to the seventh century A.D., but these buds would be 400 to 500 years older.
To confirm the identification, Lu and his colleagues analyzed the chemical components of the
samples and detected ample amounts of caffeine and theanine, a type of amino acid abundant
in tea. Moreover, the chemical fingerprints of the tea residues were similar to those of tea
found in the tomb of a Chinese emperor of the Han Dynasty dated to 2,100 years ago, and
both could be traced to tea varieties grown in Yunnan in southern China. This strongly
suggests that the tea [found in the Tibetan tomb] came from China, Lu says. The findings
were recently published in Scientific Reports.

Such early contacts between Tibet and China point to a high-altitude component of the Silk
Road in Tibet that has been largely neglected, says Martin Jones, an archaeobotanist at the
University of Cambridge. The evidence contributes to the emerging picture that the Silk
Roadwhich the Ottoman Empire closed off in the 15th centurywas a highly three-
dimensional network that not only traversed vast linear distances but also scaled tall
mountains.

Other studies, too, have documented signs of trade along mountain trails in Asia from around
3000 B.C.routes now known as the Inner Asia Mountain Corridors. This suggests that
mountains are not barriers, says Rowan Flad, an archaeologist at Harvard University. They
can be effective conduits for the exchange of cultures, ideas and technologies.)

See also: http://www.sikkimsilkroute.com/about-silk-route/

end of *
Reconciliation
As always in a violent conflict, one of the first steps should be to bring about reconciliation
in this case between Tibetans and Chinese. Of course, this is easier said than done.
According to Lederach, relationships among members of society must be rebuilt in ways that
address the conflict's emotional and psychological issues.[32] Moreover, he says this process
should lead, not just to the end of conflict and negative emotions, but the building of
something new and positive.[33] This process needs to take place at all three levels of society
the elite, the middle, and the grassroots levels.[34]

The middle level which Lederach calls the most important level because it can connect the
other two levels[35] can play a key role in Tibet. One example of this might be bringing
Han businessman together with Tibet's Buddhist leaders, which could help alleviate one of
the main sources of tension. Tibet's religious leaders feel like their religion and culture are
being undermined by certain business practices. Meanwhile, many Han business owners may
simply want to earn a living to support their families and/or to help the Tibetans develop their
society. Through relationship building, the two sides may be able to find common ground and
reconcile their differences.

Also, the grassroots level would be crucial in Tibet, given that ordinary Tibetans and Chinese
are divided largely by a lack of understanding of the other side's perspective. While Tibetans
feel disenfranchised in their own land, most Han Chinese are bewildered by the Tibetans lack
of "gratitude" for what they perceive to be a sincere and effective effort by their government
to raise the standard of living of Tibetans.[36]

Nevertheless, while action must be taken at all three levels simultaneously, the nature of the
Tibet conflict calls for a solution focused more at the elite level. This is partially because of
the potentially transformative role of Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama's Role

The Dalai Lama would be central to any peace building process in Tibet. This is because he
may be only actor who can simultaneously reassure and moderate hard-liners both in the
Chinese government and in Tibet's exile community.[37]

Despite the Dalai Lama's admiration around the world, the Chinese government does not trust
him largely because of his connections to the extremely pro-independence elements of the
Chinese Diaspora and its Western allies.[38] They believe his "Middle Way" approach
("autonomy" without independence) to ameliorating the conflict is a guise for eventual
independence in not only the TAR but also in "Greater Tibet" (those ethnically Tibetan areas
of neighboring provinces), which combined represent one-fourth of China's territory.[39] In
order to gain the trust of China, the Dalai Lama may need to distance himself from the more
extreme, pro-independence elements.

This would not represent an abdication of his mission to stand up for the rights of the Tibetan
people. This is because most Tibetans actually living inside Tibet are more interested in
better governance and more freedom than they are in undertaking risky endeavors for outright
independence.[40] As evidence that the Dalai Lama could convince Tibetans to choose to
remain under Chinese sovereignty, Thurman points out that when the Dalai Lama said it was
inhumane to kill animals for their fur, tens of thousands of Tibetans voluntarily discarded
very valuable furs.[41]

When the Chinese government sees the Dalai Lama making efforts to moderate the views of
Tibetans on the issue of independence, it will likely be more receptive to the idea of
negotiations on issues such as governance reforms in Tibet. Nevertheless, it may be difficult
for either side to take the initial steps necessary to move the process forward. For this reason,
third party mediators have a crucial role to play in the Tibet conflict.

Outside Intervention
Ideally, third party intervention should be as internationalized as possible. This is especially
true in a case like this, where China has serious reservations for historical reasons
about U.S. intentions in the region. However, the UN is handicapped by China's ability to
veto resolutions. Meanwhile, the West in general has been unable to generate a consensus on
how to deal with China on the Tibet issue.[42] Therefore, the United States will need to play
a strong role in bringing the two sides to the table. The initial steps could be taken by second-
tier actors, which would set the stage for later participation by the U.S. and Chinese
governments and the Dalai Lama.

Some question the notion, regardless of who takes the lead in mediating the conflict, that
China would ever consider changing its behavior in Tibet. However, China has good reason
to negotiate a settlement with the Tibetans. First, China recognizes how much it benefits from
its participation in the international economy. Moreover, China's efforts to defend its human
rights record via white papers that adopt the language of the global human rights
community from global criticism show that it is not only concerned about its image but
also responsive to international norms.[43] Secondly, the Chinese government is beginning to
realize, according to Newsweek, that its policies in Tibet whether they have generated
economic growth or not have failed to win the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people.[44]
The CCP leadership may even be coming to the realization that its hard-line policies in Tibet
are making China less secure both internally and externally by creating fear and anger among
Tibetans and others around the world.

Through enlightened diplomacy, the United States must reinforce China's beliefs on these
matters. The United States should emphasize to China how it can take a major step toward
becoming a responsible global power with all the benefits that entails merely by
adopting policies in Tibet that are in its own best interests anyway.

In summary, if the Dalai Lama is able to moderate the more extremist goals and activities of
the Tibetan exile community, he may be able to gain the trust of the Chinese government.
Moreover, through effective diplomacy, the United States may be able to push China the rest
of the way to the negotiating table. Once this is accomplished, Tibetans and Chinese can
begin to work out the details of a potential peace building framework. One of the first issues
on the table should be the issue of Chinese governance in Tibet, which may be the primary
cause of rising tensions.
Better Governance
According to Lederach, addressing economic and cultural concerns is critical to successful
peace building efforts.[45] In Lederach's book, Prendergast uses the case of Ethiopia to show
that feelings of marginalization and anger were diminished in those areas where policies of
poverty reduction and decentralization were implemented.[46] Similarly, reducing poverty
and CCP interference in Tibetan society are central to ameliorating the Tibet conflict.

While any peace building framework must involve Tibet remaining part of China, the
Chinese government must do a much better job of preserving Tibetan culture and assuring
that Tibetans benefit from the economic development being undertaken in Tibet. Granting
Tibet more genuine self-determination should be the first step toward this goal.

First, Tibetans should be appointed to head all of the government and Party offices in Tibet
including First Secretary of the Party.[47] As Tibetans gain more control over regional
and local politics, they can also begin to exert more influence over the program of economic
modernization unleashed by the CCP. Currently, the modernization program mostly benefits
Han Chinese immigrants, rather than Tibetans. Solutions to this problem include ending the
tax incentives that draw Han immigrants to Tibet and sending many of those already in Tibet
back home.[48] Exceptions can be made for those Chinese workers and business owners who
exhibit a sincere interest in helping to develop Tibet, without undermining its culture;
moreover, the Chinese government can divert some of the resources it has spent in Tibet to
the provinces and villages these immigrants are leaving in search of better opportunities.[49]

The modernization program has also been undermining Tibetan culture. To combat this
problem, certain steps should be taken. First, the Tibetan language should be restored as the
official language of Tibet's government and schools.[50] Moreover, religious freedom
which has suffered under Chinese rule should be enhanced. For example, restrictions on
the number of monks allowed in a given monastery should be lifted.[51] Finally, threats to
Tibet's unique ecology and wildlife should be addressed through sustainable agricultural
practices and enforced bans on poaching.

Power Sharing and Power Dividing

As Tibetans will need to work side-by-side in government with Han Chinese, at least in the
early stages of the peace building process, "power sharing" could help ease the conflict
between Tibetans and Chinese. According to Roeder and Rothschild, while power sharing
does not, in the long run, lead to lasting peace and democratization, it can help "initiate a
transition from conflict."[52] Moreover, the authors list a set of conditions under which
power sharing can be more successful, some of which may apply to the Tibet case.

Power sharing works best when, for example, the elites once they have reached an
agreement to end violent conflict have the ability to also stop regular citizens from
continuing the fight at the grass-roots level.[53] In China/Tibet, the CCP certainly has
significant capacity which it exercises on a daily basis to control the behavior of its
citizens through coercion and repression. Meanwhile, Tibetans are also very likely to refrain
from violence if the Dalai Lama requests this of them, although for different reasons the
great admiration and respect they hold for him.
The chance of successful power sharing also goes up when the parties demonstrate a strong,
sincere commitment to the agreement.[54] While the CCP claims that the Dalai Lama is a
"splittist" who is insincere about not wanting independence and therefore cannot be trusted,
there is reason to believe Tibet's spiritual leader means what he says. The Dalai Lama points
to his friendly visit to Taiwan, which also views Tibet as an essential part of China, as
evidence that he is not interested in independence.[55] Moreover, according to Newsweek,
the world leaders who have met the Dalai Lama are convinced of his sincerity on this
matter.[56] Regardless, there are powerful elements of the Tibet lobby who strongly favor
independence.

Power sharing, a reasonable short term strategy, is risky in the long run. An alternative
political arrangement may be a better option in Tibet: power dividing. A power dividing
arrangement works to protect minority rights by setting up a system of checks and balances.
As governance reforms in Tibet begin to increase the number of Tibetans who hold real
political power, power dividing could be used to reassure apprehensive Han Chinese who
remain in Tibet that their civil liberties and rights as minorities will be protected.[57]

Power dividing and its emphasis on civil liberties, checks and balances, and the protection of
minority rights could even mark the first steps toward the long term goal of liberal
democratization in China.

Gradual Liberal Democratization of China (and then

Tibet)
According to Paris, while the process of democratization can be destabilizing to nations
coming out of violent conflict, the Wilsonian goal of liberal democracy remains the best long
term goal for nations in transition.[58] Because of China's fear of Western actors' propensity
for inspiring succession and "Color Revolutions", democratization of China is not a policy
that can be pursued in the short run at least not overtly. Western actors can help nudge
by way of political engagement and economic interdependence China toward democracy
in small, incremental steps where the institutions that will eventually nourish democracy are
slowly developed. Then via this gradual, evolutionary process as opposed to the
destabilizing policy of rapid elections China may one day develop into a liberal
democracy. Moreover, a liberal democratic China would be one that respected the political
and human rights of its citizens including Tibetans.

Conclusion
The Tibet issue remains a source of conflict and controversy in China and around the world.
The differing perspectives of the Tibetans and the Chinese government in terms of the
history of Tibet and the benevolence of Chinese governance there make resolving the
impasse extremely difficult, even for the most enlightened and committed mediator. This
paper has attempted to outline the kinds of steps that the conflict's various parties can take to
bring about a just resolution to the violent conflict in Tibet. If this outcome is to be achieved,
however, the United States and the rest of the international community must begin to treat
this issue with the urgency it deserves. Escalation in the conflict between Tibet and China
could cause great suffering not only among Tibetans but also could put China on a path of
confrontation with the West potentially leading to a new "Cold War" or even World War
III. Meanwhile, if the United States and its allies are able to help Tibetans and Chinese
reconcile their differences, not only might Tibetans enjoy peace and self-determination but
China might also become a responsible global power that respects even embodies
human rights and democratic values.

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[2] Robert A. F. Thurman. Why the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for
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[3] E.V.W. Davis. "Tibetan Separatism in China." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21,
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[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Robert J Barnett. "Can China's Tibetan Crisis Be Resolved?" Council on Foreign
Relations (2010), http://www.cfr.org/publication/18707/can-chinas-tibetan-crisi s-be-
resolved.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F278%2Ftibet, 1.

[10] R. Dickinson. "Twenty-First Century Self-Determination: Implications of the Kosovo

Status Settlement for Tibet." Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 26, no. 3
(2009), 574.

[11] Melvyn C. Goldstein. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai
Lama. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 122.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., 123.

[14] Davis, 158.

[15] BBC.com. "Inside Tibet." http://ne

ws.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/456900/456954/html/nn2page1.stm, 1.

[16] Isaac Stone Fish. "Charity Case." Newsweek (2010), http://www.newsweek.com/id/233

726?obref=obinsite, 1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Davis, 158.

[19] Ibid.
[20] Sudip Mazumdar. "Course Correction." Newsweek (2010),
http://www.newsweek.com/id/232606, 1.

[21] Wong, 1.

[22] Davis, 158.

[23] Wong, 1.

[24] Mazumdar, 1.

[25] BBC.com, 1.

[26] Andrew Martin Fischer as cited in Bhattacharya, A., and A. Notices. "Chinese
Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet: Implications for India and Future Scenarios." Strategic
Analysis 31, no. 2 (2007): 237, 255.

[27] Mazumdar, 1.

[28] Wong, 1.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Thurman, 132.

[31] BBC.com, 1.

[32] John Paul Lederach and United States Institute of Peace. Building Peace Sustainable
Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997,
34.

[33] Ibid., 84-85.

[34] Ibid., 34.

[35] Ibid., 60-61.

[36] Barnett, 1.

[37] Goldstein, 111.

[38] Barnett, 1.

[39] Davis, 159.

[40] Goldstein, 114-115.

[41] Thurman, 165.

[42] Goldstein, 122.

[43] Dickinson, 580-581.

[44] Mazumdar, 1.

[45] Lederach, 87.

[46] Ibid., 165.

[47] Goldstein, 125.

[48] Ibid., 127.

[49] Thurman, 141.

[50] Goldstein, 125.

[51] Ibid., 127.

[52] Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild. Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy
after Civil Wars. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005, 49.

[53] Ibid., 41.

[54] Ibid., 43.

[55] Goldstein, 112.

[56] Mazumdar, 1.

[57] Roeder and Rothschild, 53.

[58] Roland Paris. At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge, U.K.; New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 185.

* The parts marked by * and end of * were added by Victor E Rosez during the review of
September 2016. More reviews will follow in 2017.
Hakuna Matata, Amani Mingi (No problems, Many Peace)