The Speech of Nature in Lucretius de Rer PDF

The Speech of Nature in Lucretius' "De Rerum Natura" 3.
931-71
Author(s): Tobias Reinhardt
Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2002), pp. 291-304
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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52.1 291-304(2002)Printedin GreatBritain
ClassicalQuarterly 291
THE SPEECH OF NATURE IN LUCRETIUS'

DE RER UM NA TURA 3.931-71*
I
For an Epicurean,what stands betweenus and a happylife is the fear of death, -ro
0pLKOwseaTraovTwV KaKWV (Epic. Ep. ad Men. 125), as well as the other types of
fear or worrieswhich the Epicureansconstrueas dependenton the fear of death,
amongthose in particularthe fearof the gods.
It is clearfromtreatiseslikePhilodemus'De morteor Pap.Herc.1251,veryprobably
a work of Philodemustoo, as well as from the second part of D.R.N 3, that the
Epicureanswere acutely awareof the fact that fear of death is a rathercomplex
phenomenon,and that argumentssuitableto convinceus that one particulartype of
fear of deathis irrationalmay be completelyirrelevantto curinganothertype of fear
of death.
Forthe convenienceof the reader,I providea surveyof the varioustypesof fearof
death which one should distinguish,and I brieflyindicatehow the Epicureansage
wouldcope with them. First,thereis the fear of beingdead,whichmanifestsitself in
worriesaboutwhatmighthappento our bodiesafterour death,or in the idea thatwe
might haveto undergoa punishmentin the underworld,for instancefor the sins we
havecommittedwhilealive,or that we might haveto lead an otherwiseunappealing
continuedexistencein Hades.Second,thereis the fear of death qua curtailmentof
pleasures.In orderto havepleasantexperiencesand, in particular,to be ableto havein
a more narrowsense pleasant sensations,we have to be alive. Consequently,many
peoplefeardeathbecauseit meansthe end to a pleasantlife. This attitudeeventually
leadsto the wish to live as long as possible,ideallyfor ever.Third,thereis the fear of
deathquafrustrationof plansor projects.Both in planningour life and in judgingthe
successof a life, we intuitivelyrelyon the notion of a completelife. In retrospect,we
call a life completewhen the plans and projectsthat the personin questionhad, like
bringingup a child or havinga particularcareer,have been successfullycompleted.
And, correspondingly, we feara deathwhichinterruptssuchprojects,in particularone
that is 'premature';fromthis point of view,deathaftera long and fulfilledlife seems
less dreadful.'
The Epicureansagewouldcope witheachof thesefearsin a differentway.As to the
fear of being dead, he would tell himself what is summarizedin KA 2: '0OOvatos
o3ev 7Tpo%! eui- rd yp % 8' v oV'Svrp'
taAvOav cvacxLUO7p-Ea &vatuqr" 7%tS''.
Nothing remainsof us afterour deathwhichcouldbe harmedin anyway.The fear of
death qua curtailmentof pleasuresis tackled a differentway, namely via the
in
Epicureantheoryof 'Sov'. Becausefor an Epicureanpleasurefirst and foremostis
identifiedwithan untroubledstateof the soul whichallowsus to be,in a disinterested
way, open for pleasant experiences,2duration of life becomes irrelevant;for this
* Forcommentsand/ordiscussionon earlierdraftsof this paperI am verygratefulto

M.Frede,E.J.Kenney,
Professors M.Winterbottom, andto theanonymous of CQ.
referee
' On thisthirdvarietyof fearof death,see especially
G. Striker,
'Commentaryon Mitsis',
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquiumfor Ancient Philosophy 4 (1988), 323-8.
2 See G. Striker,'Epicureanhedonism',in Essays on HellenisticEpistemologyand Ethics
1996),196-208.
(Cambridge,

292 T. REINHARDT
untroubledstatecannot,on the Epicureantheory,be enhancedby persistinglonger.As

Philodemus says in De morte (c. 38 Gigante): 'O S voi5v 'Xov diTELAdpbWS 'T
svvaTaL rnv V7rEPLTOL77craL rT
rpogEvSaltpova /3ov av5TapK1Es,EVN r&j-qT7 oLTov
KL
EVV7E'ratpEvoS7rEplTOaTEL V i~LcLv7pLEptvWoatova KEpSalVEL.... Finally,the
Epicureansage wouldnot T7 fearof death frustrationof
experience qua this
plans.Partly,
wouldbe a consequenceof the fact that he exploitsthe fuzzinessof the notion of a
completelife, and interpretssome of the thingsin our life that structureit and thus
might be called projects(like bringingup a child or havinga particularcareer),as
sourcesof pleasantexperiences; he can thenapplythe Epicureantheoryof pleasureto
them.But, moreimportantly,his life is unlikelyto be suchthat a distinctivestructure
wouldemergein it whoseintegritycouldbe endangered.Forthe Epicureansagewould
stayawayfromthe traditionaleducationand the arts (whichmightmakehim wish to
complete,say,a book or finisha painting),he would avoidall situationsin whichhe
coulddevelopambition,andhe wouldnot fall in love,havechildren,or get involvedin
publiclife.3
Wecan see thatin orderto copewithfearof deathin all its varieties,one alreadyhas
to be an Epicureansage. One needs to have fully acceptedthe Epicureantheory of
pleasureandmustbe ableto bringit to bearon the wayin whichone lives.And, ideally,
one musthavestructuredone'slife in theway outlinedabove.
A consequenceof the fact that only the Epicureansage is fully equippedto cope
withfearof deathis thatEpicureantreatisestendto juxtaposetheunreformedlayman,
with all his fearsand neuroticbehaviouralpatterns,and the sagewho leadsthe perfect
Epicureanlife. Clearly,the wondersof Epicureantherapyare only to be foundin full
operationin the Epicureansage.And only when manifestedin him can they exhibit
theirfull persuasivestrength.
Lucretius' De RerumNaturacannotto the sameextentaffordsuchliterarystrategies.
It not only presupposesa readerwho is a completenovicein Epicureanphilosophy,4
but it also, in orderto achieveits didacticpurpose,needsto pick up the readerfrom
wherehe stands.That is, whilemuch of what Lucretiussays may be consistentwith,
inspired by, or straightforwardlyexhibitingEpicureandoctrine,he will normally
assumethat the readersubscribesto certainEpicureandoctrinesor is able to bring
themto bearon a certainproblemonly whenthesedoctrineshavebeenintroducedat
lengthand hencemaycount as proven.5The differencein purposebetweenEpicurean
treatisesand D.R.N mentionedat the beginningof this paragraphaccountsfor the
structureof Book 3 which, as is well known, contains an account of Epicurean
psychologyin its firstpartwhichis intendedto provethe mortalityof the soul, andthe
so-calleddiatribeagainstthe fearof deathin its secondpart.The relationshipof these
two parts is less straightforwardthan it might seem. There are, on the one hand,
passageswhereLucretiussimplytriesto connectthe resultestablishedin the firstpart
of the book-that the soul is mortal-with the particularfearsand worriesthe reader
might have.As Lucretiussays on one occasion(3.870-93), it is possibleto graspthe
3 'Iltempoe il sapiente
SeeM. Jufresa, in G.Giannantoni
Epicureo', andM. Gigante(edd.),
Grecoe Romano1 (Naples,1996),287-98.
Epicureismo
4 SeeK. Kleve, 'Whatkindof workdidLucretius write?',SymbolaeOsloenses54 (1979),81-5;
D. Clay,Lucretiusand Epicurus(Ithaca, 1983), 212ff.;P. Mitsis, 'Committingphilosophyon
the reader:didacticcoercionand readerautonomyin De rerumnatura',in Mega Nepios.II
destinatario
nell'eposdidascalico,MD 31(1993), 111-28.
' Inhisproofs,Lucretius
mayattimesrelyonpremisseswhichareto beestablished
onlylater;
thishasto do withthe'modeof absorption'
he envisages
forhispoem(seebelow,n. 37)andis
compatiblewiththestatementmadeabove.

THE SPEECHOF NATURE IN LUCRETIUS'D.R.N. 3.931-71 293
import of the first part of the book, and yet to retain-inconsistently--concerns about
what might happen after death to the body through the various forms of burial.
On the other hand, there are more complex cases, like this one (3.894-903):
'Iamiam non domusaccipiette laetanequeuxor

optima,nec dulcesoccurrentosculanati
praeripereet tacitapectusdulcedinetangent.
non poterisfactisflorentibusesse tuisque
praesidium.miseromisere'aiunt'omniaademit
una dies infestatibi tot praemiauitae.'
illudin his rebusnon addunt'nectibi earum
iam desideriumrerumsuperinsidetuna.'
quod benesi uideantanimodictisquesequantur,
dissoluantanimimagnose angoremetuque.
Here mourners of a young father complain that premature death prevents him from
experiencing the joys of a parent and husband, and does not allow him to continue as
the praesidium of his family. This is countered by the objection that after his death the
deceased could not possibly worry about the loss of these praemia uitae.
On the face of it, the passage is directed against mourning someone else's death. But
surely the overall context of D.RNP 3, the allusion to Hector's famous speech in the
Iliad (6.450-65) in which he contemplates his own death, and the fact that Lucretius'
observation in lines 900-1 is meant to rid the mourners of metus as well as of angor
(903), all suggest that it is meant equally to apply to fear of one's own premature death.
(I shall shortly return to the question of why Lucretius runs the two together.)
In terms of argument, two things seem to be going on in this passage. First, there is
the interpretation of frustration of plans (here: not seeing one's children grow up,
being unable to support and protect one's family) as curtailment of pleasures (this shift
is obvious, for instance, in the term praemia uitae, which denotes pleasant experiences;
cf. 3.956).6 Second, mourning a premature death-or fearing it-is presented as mis-
guided because, when a person is dead, the loss of these things could not possibly cause
him any grief. There is something odd about this, on both the level of grief and that of
fear: Lucretius' point will impress the family only to an extent (their grief is primarily
their sense of loss; cf. 3.904-8),7 and the possibility of premature death troubles us in
life-which is compatible with it being of no concern to us when we are dead.
I do not think that Lucretius was really interested in soothing grief, and I suggest
that the shift of focus from fear of one's own death to mourning someone else's is a
device that is meant to facilitate the attack on the reader's fear of premature death.8
What Lucretius is doing is trading one argument for the other, offering us an argument
that is actually pertinent only to a particular kind of grief and to the fear of being dead.
6 Lucretius has chosena way to look at the losses incurredby prematuredeaththatmakesit

lessimplausibleto viewthemas loss of pleasantexperiences; thisassiststheargumentative
aimhe
pursuesin the passage.If he had said: 'He won't see his childrenhave an impressivepolitical
career'(a possiblethingto say,givenhis addresseeMemmius),it wouldhavebeenlessplausibleto
call failureto watchthe children'ssuccessa forfeitof pleasantexperiences.
7 Cf. E. J. Kenney,Lucretius-De RerumNaturaBook3 (Cambridge,1971),who remarkson
3.898:'L.'sanswer,that these thingsdo not troublea man whenhe is dead,is totallybesidethe
point.'The othercommentaries usedhereare:R. Heinze,T LucretiusCarus-De RerumNatura
Buch III (Leipzig, 1897); C. Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri sex (Oxford, 1947),
who remarkson 3.911:'But Lucr.'sconsolationis inadequate:it does not soothe the mourners'
senseof loss to knowthatthe deadis in a peacefulsleep.'
8
I am indebtedto the refereeof CQforclarifyingmy mindaboutthispoint.

294 T. REINHARDT
And that the argumentis not strictlyapplicableto fear of prematuredeathis glossed

overby the fact that Lucretius,ratherthan havingthe youngfatherhimselfvoice his
fearof prematuredeath,has the mournersbewailthe deathof someonewho is already
dead;for the deadman does not indeedworryaboutthe frustrationof his plans.
It seemsthat the reasonfor this elaboratestrategyis the D.R.N's beinggearedto a
novicereader.Lucretiuscannot count on the reader'slife havingthe structureof an
Epicureanlife or on his subscribingto the Epicureantheory of pleasure.Therefore,
what he does is steer the issue awayfrom fear of death qua frustrationof projects,
becausethis is the most difficultfear to eradicate,but also steerthe issue awayfrom
fear of death qua curtailmentof pleasure,becausehis readercannot be expectedto
haveat his disposalthe Epicureanremedyagainstit. Afterthesetwo moves,he triesto
tacklethe problemwith an argumentthat is suitableonly for curingus of the fear of
beingdead;this seemsthe most promisingline of attackbecauseonly for this type of
argumentis theresufficientback-upin the formof the firsthalf of the book. And the
change of perspectivefrom fearingone's own death to mourningsomeone else'sis
thereto obfuscatethe fact thattheremaybe somethingdubiousaboutthis.Needlessto
say, all this is not satisfactorilyexplainedby the suggestionthat Lucretiuswas just
confusedabouttheseissues;rather,we are dealingwith a cleverattemptto overcome
the obstaclesof the particulardidacticprojectLucretiusis engagedin. Likewise,need-
less to say,parallelsfor this kindof rhetoricalstrategyin forensiccontextsarelegion.
It is against this background,I believe,that we should read the text I shall be
concernedwithfor the restof this article,the celebrated'Speechof Nature'.
II
Althoughin some sense a conspicuousclimaxto the D.R.NN,the 'Speechof Nature'
has not receivedmuchattentionin the recentpast, whichis remarkable,giventhat the
secondpart of the thirdbook has otherwisebeen at the centreof Lucretianstudies.
Surelyone reasonwhythe speechmayhavebeensuspectedof beingsomewhatlow on
philosophicalcontentis thatit drawsheavilyon non-Epicureansourcematerial.And
while the commentatorsextensivelyquote parallelsfrom diatribeand consolatory
literature,9connectionswith extant Epicureantexts are comparativelyloose.'0One
of the claims I should like to defend here is that this state of affairsis somewhat
misleading,and that Lucretius,for all his relyingon non-Epicureansources,is pur-
suinga distinctlyEpicureanaim.
At this point it is necessaryto quotethe relevanttext in full (3.931-77 Bailey):
Deniquesi uocemrerumnaturarepente
mittatet hocalicuinostrumsicincrepet
ipsa
'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris
luctibusindulges?quidmortemcongemisacfles?
935 namsi gratafuittibiuitaanteactapriorque

et nonomniapertusumcongestaquasiin uas 1. Rightattitude
commodaperfluxereatqueingratainteriere,
curnonutplenusuitaeconuiuarecedis
aequoanimoquecapissecuram,stulte,quietem?
sein
9 See also T. Stork, Nil igitur mors est ad nos-Der Schluflteil des dritten Lukrezbuchsund
Verhiltniszur Konsolationsliteratur(Bonn, 1970).
10
Cf.Bailey(n.7),vol.2, at 1149ff.

THE SPEECH OF NATURE IN LUCRETIUS' D.R.N. 3.931-71 295
940 sin ea quaefructus cumquees periere profusa
uitaque in offensast, cur amplius addere quaeris, 2. Wrong attitude
rursumquodpereat male et ingratumoccidat omne,
non potius uitaefinem facis atque laboris?
nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inueniamque,
945 quodplaceat, nil est: eadem sunt omnia semper.
si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus

confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 2.1. of young people
omnia si pergas uiuendouincere saecla,
atque etiam potius, si numquamsis moriturus,'
950 quidrespondemus,nisi iustamintenderelitem

naturamet veramverbisexponerecausam?
[955] grandiorhic uerosi iam seniorquequeratur
[952] atqueobitumlamenteturmiserampliusaequo,
[953] non meritoinclametmagiset uoce increpetacri?
955 [954] 'auferabhinc lacrimas, balatro, et compesce querelas.
omnia perfunctus uitai praemia marces. 2.2. of old people
sed quia semper aues quod abest, praesentia temnis,
imperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataqueuita
et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante
960 quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum.
nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte
aequo animoque agedum tmagnist concede: necessest.'
iure,ut opinor,agat,iureincrepetinciletque.
ceditenimrerumnouitateextrusauetustas
965 semper,et ex aliis aliudrepararenecessest:
nec quisquamin barathrumnec Tartaradedituratra.
materiesopus est ut crescantposterasaecla;
quae tamenomniate uita perfunctasequentur;
nec minusergoante haecquamtu cecidere,cadentque.
970 sic alid ex alio numquamdesistetoriri
uitaquemancipionullidatur,omnibususu.
Before consideringthe question of how the speech fits into the largercontext of
the argumentsagainst the fear of death, I shall providea brief surveyof the text,
highlightingsome ambiguitiesand introducingthe most importantmodels, philo-
sophicaland non-philosophical,for particularideasor lines of thought.
As to the literary device of prosopopoeia, a formal resemblance to the speech of
IHE'a in Bion of Borysthenes has been noted," though critics have been hesitant
to assume Bion an actual model. Whether model or not, it is remarkablethat the simil-
arities include not only the manner in which the speaking character is introduced,12
or the analogous roles poverty and nature play in Cynic and Epicurean contexts
respectively;for instance, both Nature and Poverty radiate in their speeches an air of
self-evidence, and charge the addressee with an inappropriate interpretation of reality.
Denique in 931 stands at the beginning of the paragraph. It may have various
" Preservedin Teles,Ilept al?rapKfias ap. Stobaeum,Florilegium3.1.98.I quote Bion from

the edition with commentaryby J. E Kindstrand,Bion of Borysthenes(Uppsala, 1976);the
speechof HlEviais fr. 17Kindstrand.A verydetailedstudyof the section'spointsof contactwith
the diatribaltraditionand Bion in particularis B. PriceWallach,Lucretiusand the Diatribe
Against the Fear of Death (Leiden, 1976), 61-83.
12 Cf.Wallach(n. 11),at 63.

296 T. REINHARDT
meaningsin Lucretius(and elsewhere),like 'further'or 'then again',etc.,'3and it is

usuallyonly throughthe contextthatits exactmeaningcan be determined.Here,after
a comparisonof death with dreamlesssleep at the end of the previousparagraph
(3.923-30),thatis, afterthe mentioningof dreamlesssleepas the Epicureanidea of a
near-deathexperience,it is naturalto suspectyet another use of the conjunction,
namelyin the senseof 'finally'.14'Finally'itself is ambiguous,and I shall laterreturn
to the questionof how far Nature'swordsare suitablyintroducedby deniquein this
sense.
The beginningof the speechcomes unexpectedly(931: repente).Natureaddresses
'one of us' (aliquisnostrum).Her tone is describedas strident(932: increpet).Two
impatientdirectquestionsstandat the beginningof her speech,askingthe addressee
why he mourns about death;these questionswork towardsbuildingup the air of
self-evidenceI mentionedabove.
Therefollows,as the first horn of a rhetoricaldilemma,a section describingthe
attitude towards death Nature regardsas desirable:if you have enjoyedlife and
pleasureshavenot beenpouredinto you(or yoursoul)as into a leakingvessel,whynot
withdrawfromit likea contentedand satiatedparticipantof a conuiuium? Twopoints
need to be made about this sentence:first, it has recently been shown that the
metaphorof the soul as a vesselis not to be foundin anyotherEpicureantext,but that
neverthelessit seemsto be ideallysuitedto describethe stateof katastematicpleasure,
that is, the state of calm and detached unperturbednessof the soul in which the
Epicureanexperiences rTapa~la.'5 Apparently,Nature suggests to us to adopt,
provided we have enjoyed our lives, an attitudeof contentedfreedomfrom worries
whichresembleskatastematicpleasure,and Lucretiushas triedto encapsulatethis idea
in a non-Epicureanmetaphor.My secondpoint is about the conuiuium-comparison:
what exactly is the meaning of ut plenus conuiua recedere?'6Are we supposed to
withdrawfrom life like a contented guest from a banquet, that is, at its 'natural'
end when guests typically withdrawif they are to withdrawcontented?On this
interpretationthe phrase impliesthat our life has a structureanalogousto that of
convivium(which consists, for example,of starter,main course,dessert,etc.). Con-
sequently,on this interpretationNature'sadvicewouldmake senseonly for someone
who has grownto old age,thatis, towardsthe point of naturalclosureof a humanlife.
By contrast, someone who is young or middle-agedand-like the addresseeand
impliedfirst readerof the D.R.N-not yet an Epicurean,would find Nature'sadvice
somewhatcounterintuitive. He may be expectedto reply:How am I to part with life
contentedlyif a dreadfuldiseasekills me in my early thirties,withouthaving'com-
pleted'my humanlife (by havinga career,growingold, seeingmy grandchildren, etc.)?
That would be, as one interpreterwrote,like havingbeen invitedto dinnerand then
being sent home after the starter.17But a second interpretationof ut plenusconuiua
'~ Cf. H. A. J. Munro,T LucretiCariDe RerumNaturaLibrisex42 (London, 1928),25 on
1.17.
14 Onthissenseof denique 1.461in R. A. B.
andthenoteonVerg.Georg.
seeTLL5.1.528.18
Mynors,Virgil-Georgics(Oxford,1990).
in K. A.
15 See W.G6rler,'Storingup pastpleasures', Algra,M. H. Koenen,and P. H.
Schrijvers(edd.),Lucretiusandhis IntellectualBackground
(Amsterdam,Oxford,New York,and
Tokyo,1997),193-207.
16 NotethatLucretius,
in talkingaboutplenusuitaeconuiua, thelevelof
artfullyintertwines
the illustransand the illustrandum.
17 See M. C. Nussbaum,The Therapyof Desire-Theory and Practicein HellenisticEthics
1994),at211.
(Princeton,

recedereis possiblethatcreatesnone of theseproblems.On this secondinterpretation,

ut wouldbe readin a differentway,so thatwe wouldbe invitedto withdrawfromlife at
any time (regardlesswhetherat thirty-fiveor eighty)as if we werea contentedguest.
On this reading,therewouldbe no implicationthat the structureof a life is analogous
to thatof a conuiuium; rather,the comparisonwouldjust be usedto illustratethe state
of contentmentwith whichwe are supposedto acceptdeath.This secondreadingis
thus compatiblewith the notion that it does not matterwhetherwe die youngor old
(whichis the driftof the restof the speech).Readerswho prefercoherenceto tension
will thereforebe drawnto the secondalternative.'8
AfterthatNaturemoveson to the secondhorn of the dilemma,clearlythe attitude
she regardsas undesirable:if you havenot enjoyedlife, and if you are evidentlynot
ableto enjoyit, whynot end it withoutcomplaints?Herefinemfacere(943) might be
taken to mean 'to end it actively',that is, to commit suicide.Alternatively,it could
mean 'to acceptthe end'whenthe needto do so arises,and in that senseto makean
end. I shalllook at the argumentsforeitherinterpretation below.In anycase,giventhe
envisagedcircumstances, finemfacere would be advisable,becauseNaturecould not
possiblycome up with anythingthe addresseehas not seen or experiencedbefore:
eademsunt omniasemper.This is a strangelynegativeview of what the Epicurean
wouldcall kineticpleasures,19 referringto the typeof sensorypleasurepeopletypically
call pleasure(cf. Plut. Adv.Col. 1122E= fr. 411 Usener:'.. . thesebeautiful,smooth
and gentlemotionsof the soul .. .'). And althoughthe Epicureansassignedpriorityto
katastematicpleasure,theydid not normallyrejectthesekineticpleasures;rather,they
probablytook the view thatwhatmadeexperiencingkatastematicpleasurea pleasant
state(as opposedto a neutralone) was preciselythe fact that it madeus free to enjoy
kineticpleasures(sc. undercertainconditions).20 In consolatoryliterature,in contrast,
thereare argumentsdirectedat those who are about to die; to them one would say
somethingalongthe linesof nihilsubsole nouum(for exampleSen.Ep.77.6) and that
consequentlythey do not miss anythingby not continuingtheirlife. But it is obvious
that this kind of pessimismis very muchad hoc:if life is to end anyway,one will be
betteroff withoutthe desireto live on. So how are we to accountfor whatlooks-in
the contextof the speech-like a strangelyimplausibleand apparentlyun-Epicurean
view?
Eademsunt omniasemper,as is emphasizedby an almost exact repetition(947),
holdsforyoungpeoplewhohavelivedforbut a fractionof theirpotentiallifespan,and
wouldnot changeif theylivedsuperhumanly long or indeedforever.ThatLucretiusis
now focusingon a young personsuggeststhat the speechup to 945 was directedat
humanbeingsin general,regardlessof theirage (I haveanticipatedthis observationin
the commentsto the rightof the speechabove).
Then at 950 the narratorcomes in. He identifieshimself with the addresseeby
askingquidrespondemus ... ?, and therebyclarifiesthe scopeof the expressionaliquis
in
nostrum; principle, Nature is addressingall humanbeings.Then Lucretiusmakesa
"8Thereis a parallelin Bion(Teles,HeptiabrapKElas ap.Stobaeum,Florilegium3.1.98= fr.68

Kindstrand; cf.Wallach [n.11],65-6),butit is concerned
withsomething if our
different:
slightly
bodybecomes too faulty(through illnessoroldage,wemaysupply), weareadvised to leaveit as
a contentedguestwouldleavea banquet.
'9 It seemsthereforeprimafacie inappropriate
to quoteas Epicureanparallelspassageswhich
talkaboutpleasure notbeingincreased
byduration
withreference
to katastematic (cf.
pleasure
Kenney on945).
20
Cf.Striker
(n.2),at207.

298 T. REINHARDT
commentin a markedlylegallanguage:the case Naturebringsagainstus is a just one.

This type of language,I feel, needs to havea purpose,too. That it is in Bion (or in
diatriballiteraturein general)alreadyseemsnot be a satisfactoryexplanationof whyit
is preservedhere,nor wouldbe the referenceto the fact thatin philosophicalcontexts
therecan be no personificationof abstractentitieswithoutan implicitreferenceto the
lawsin Plato'sCrito.I shalllaterreturnto the questionof whetherthe legalstylization
can be viewedas assistingthe overallpurposeof the speech.
Then (at 955) Lucretiusenvisagesthe case of an old personwho lamentsabouthis
death,and evidentlytreatshis case with less patienceand understandingthan that of
the youngperson.WhatNaturehas to sayto the old personlamentinghis deathis that
he has wastedhis life by the continueddesireto experiencemore(or somethingnew),
so that he, being alwaysuncontented,is now not readyto part with life. But this he
shoulddo, becauseit is appropriateto his age and inevitable(3.962necessest).Again,
the narratorstressesthat Nature'sis a just case.Thenhe continuesthat, for the world
to exist, thingsand livingbeingswhichexist now mustceaseto exist, therebypassing
on theirmaterialconstituentsto theirsuccessors;otherwisenothingnew could arise,
with no materialbeing available.And he ends on the famous line: uitaquemancipio
nullidatur,omnibususu(971);life is givenus for use,but it is not ourproperty.
If we now look backto the issuesdiscussedin the firstpartof the paper,we can see
that the speech,in a way yet to be clarified,primarilyaddressesthe fear of deathqua
curtailmentof pleasures;this is an obviousimplicationof the soul-vesselmetaphor,
and expressions like commoda (937), fructus (940), or uitai praemia (956). By exten-
sion, however,given the instancecited aboveof tradingone argumentfor the other
(3.894-901),the speechmayequallyaddressthe fearof deathquafrustrationof plans
or projects.The distinctionbetweenyoungand old may be readin both ways.Whatis
crucialis thatthe speechis firstand foremostconcernedwith the type of fearof death
whichthe Epicureansage wouldcounterwith his theoryof pleasure,a theorythat is
not coveredin D.R.N.in detailand whichconsequentlythe readercannotbe expected
to accept.21
III
Thereis more to the situationin whichNaturespeaksthan I could point out in my
initial survey.It may be useful to begin by clarifyinga particularexpressionin the
speech. For someone who is afraid of dying, because it implies the loss of all
pleasureshe can experiencewhile alive,Nature'sadvicewould be to withdrawfrom
life if one has enjoyedit, like a contentedguest at a banquet,or else, if one has not
enjoyed it, finem uitae facere (3.943). Much depends on how we interpretthe
expressionfinemuitaefacere.If we readthis as a suggestionto commitsuicide,as do
the commentatorsBaileyand Kenney,then suicidewould appearas the way to end a
life now which has been unpleasant,and to get rid of our present fear of death
(cf. 3.933ff.).Butfinem uitaefacere cannot have this meaning here. It is not only
that Epicureandoctrine does not allow suicide in a situation like the one under
discussion;22Lucretius himself, in the prooemiumof D.R.N. 3, had singled out
21 Passageswherethe Epicurean viewof pleasureis touchedare2.1-61and6.1-28;both

passagesformpartof prooemia whereno expositionof doctrines
is to be expectedanyway.Of
coursewedonotknowwhatLucretius wouldhavedoneinanyfurther revision.
22 TheEpicureansallowsuicideonlyin caseswhereit becomesimpossible to guarantee
one's
(cf.Cic.Fin. 1.49).On the Epicureanattitudeaboutsuicide,see J. Cooper,'Greek
drape4t'a

suicide as an extreme consequence of fear of death (3.79-84). So it would be bizarre

if Nature herself suggested suicide as a cure for it.
What, then, does finem uitaefacere mean? It must mean 'to accept the end of one's
life' (sc. when it actually comes),23 a meaning for which there are parallels, in other
authors as well as in Lucretius (3.1093, where it seems clear that suicide is not the issue;
see also Heinze's note ad loc.).24But if the phrase means 'to accept the end of one's life'
or 'to give in to death', then this has major consequences for the situation in which
Nature speaks. I can only give in to death or, for that matter, withdraw like a contented
guest from the banquet of life (in a non-suicidal sense of 'to withdraw'), if death is
actually imminent, if continuing life is not an option, if I am at all in a position to
accept that my life is ending.25
Let us now go through the whole speech and see in what way we can read it as pre-
supposing imminent death of the addressee. There is, for instance, the tense-pattern in
the conditional beginning 935 (see above). Perfect tense in the subordinate clause ('If
you have enjoyed life . . .') and present tense in the main clause suggest that, at the
moment this sentence is spoken, willingly retiring from life is the choice the addressee
has. However, an alternative interpretation is possible, which takes this statement to
apply to a time in the future; this use of the tense-pattern perfect/present tense would
be colloquial, and the context obviously is colloquial. (In less colloquial Latin prose we
would have the tense-pattern future perfect/future.) In any case, this would alter the
picture only inasmuch as on this second reading the speech would provide advice for a
time in thefuture when the addressee faces death, that is, for a time in the future when
continuing life will not be an option. This 'temporal ambiguity' may well be deliberate,
because through it the reader is able to apply the dilemma to himself: the aliquis
nostrumaddressed may well be facing death right now and may be receiving advice for
this situation, while the reader is free to take Nature's words as advice applying for a
time when he himself faces death. The latter reading is attractive also because it neatly
shows in what sense Nature is addressing the human race in general (rather than the
quite exclusive club of people who at any given time are about to die).
In the second part of the speech, Nature turns against an old man-or against
aliquis nostrum conceived as being old.26In 3.959 we read: nec opinanti mors ad caput
philosopherson euthanasiaand suicide',in id., ReasonandEmotion-Essaysin AncientMoral

PsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton,1999),515-41;W.Englert,'Stoicsand Epicureanson
the natureof suicide',Proceedingsof theBostonAreaColloquium inAncientPhilosophy10(1994),
67-98.
23 Finemuitaefacere can also mean 'to end one's life' in an objectivesense(whichdoes not
work in English,where one would rathersay that one's life ended, without an implication
as to how it ended);but in our passagethis meaningis ruledout throughthe second person
offacis.
24 Cf. Heinze,ad loc.; Stork(n. 9), at 82. H.-T.Johann,Trauerund Trost.Eine quellen-und
strukturanalytischeUntersuchung derphilosophischen TrostschrifteniiberdenTod(Munich,1968),
at 88, n. 403,arguesforthemeaning'to commitsuicide'on the followinggrounds:'. .. Zudemhat
potiusnurSinn,wennfinemfacisals Steigerungvon curampliusadderequaeris(v.941)verstanden
wird,die aberbei einerBedeutungwie "sterben","denTod akzeptieren" nichtgegebenist'. The
linguisticargumentfrompotiusis inconclusive,becausethe word(likemagis)mayjust as well be
contrasting.
25 The only scholar to have suggestedthis so far is C. Rambaux,'La logique de l'argu-
mentationdansle De RerumNatura,III, 830-1094',RevuedesEtudesLatines58 (1980),201-19,
at 204, who,however,does not proveor explainit, or drawanyfurtherconsequencesfromit.
26 Is Natureaddressinga secondperson,a senex?Or is she still addressinga token repres-
entativeof the humanrace,now conceivedas old?The latterwouldmakemoresense;afterall,

300 T. REINHARDT
adstitit, which is not a natural way to describe the fact that death has merely come
nearer;rather,death is very close, it is there(notice also the nunc in 3. 961).27 This could
mean that death is very close for him in the sense in which death is very close for senes
in general; alternatively, and perhaps more probably, it means the senex addressed is
actually facing death. Concede in 3.962, whatever it is that the senex is supposed to
concede to (my personal favourite for the corruption magnis is fatis, which would
parallelfinem uitaefacere),28points in the same direction.
There are two further features of the speech suggesting that it is about the problem
of imminent death. First, its legal stylization, inherited from the tradition of diatribe
and consistently maintained in the whole speech, would actually have a function then
(rather than being a relic from a possible diatribal source which has been preserved as
an embellishment): a trial culminates in a moment when a decision is made, and the
legal language here assists the creation of the atmosphere of an endgame, that is, of the
time when death is imminent.
Second, the deniquewhich introduces the passage (3.931). Above I offered an argu-
ment from the context why the meaning 'finally' seems the most natural here.29 And it
would be an emphatic 'finally', and a 'finally' in more than one sense: finally, Nature
herself makes her appearance in the narrative;finally, we are talking about how to deal
with imminent death, and not with fear of death as a frightening but nevertheless
remote event, as yet indiscerniblein the future, as was the subject of the text leading up
to the speech. So it seems to me that the attentive reader is guided to the suggested
reading of the speech already by the denique in 3.931.
Yet there is one section that fits this situation less obviously than the rest:
946 si tibinonanniscorpusiammarcetet artus

confectilanguent,eademtamenomniarestant,
omniasi pergasuiuendouinceresaecla,
atqueetiampotius,si numquam sis moriturus,
948pergasLambinus:pergesOQ
Editors are divided over the reading in 948; some adopt Lambinus' conjecture
(Lachmann, Giussani, Munro, Ernout, Bailey in the OCT), others go for the reading
933-45 applyto humanbeingsin general.And it wouldshow that Lucretiushas not just taken
overthe traditional'butt'knownfromdiatriballiterature,but has turnedthis butt into a quite
sophisticatedconstruct.Are we to makesomethingof the wayin whichthe age descriptionsare
introduced?Is it meaningfulthatthe firstage descriptionis introducedas a conditional(946ff.)?
Are grandiorand senior (955) used as nouns or as predicativelyconstruedadjectives(thus
allowingthemto be specificationsof aliquisnostrumin 932)?
27 Heinzenoteson 3.959:'DerTodadstititad caput,wie im Miirchenvom GevatterTod:man
tritt an das Kopfendedes lectus,wennman mit dem Liegendenzu redenhat. Zugleichist die
Gefihrdungdes caputGefahrdungder Existenz,worauf die Wendungsupracaputesse (s. d.
Auslegerzu Sall.Cat.54, 24;Liv.III 17,2) fiirdie dringendsteGefahrberuht;Tib.I 8, 72 nescius
ultorempost caputessedeum.'
28 The conjecturefatis was suggestedby W.Richter,Textstudien zu Lukrez(Munich,1974),at
50-2; G. Kloss,'ZumTextvon Lukrez3.962',RhM 139(1996),360-3 finds'fatis'implausibleon
palaeographical grounds-and thensuggestsintegris.
29 The argumentfrom the contextcould be broadenedfurtherwith respectto what follows.
WhenI look at the sequence(i) Nature'sspeech,stylizedlike a trial(931-77),(ii) sinnersin the
underworld(978-1023),(iii) showof heroes(1024-52),(iv) returnto the upperworld(1053ff.),I
cannothelpseeinga virtualKar7faaLsbeingundertakenby thereader.(i) wouldbe thelast stage
beforethe descentto the underworld,fittinglymarkedby denique= 'finally';to use themotif of a
KardT in a passagearguingagainstthe existenceof the underworldwouldof coursebe just
anotheraoLs
exampleof a typicallyLucretianstrategy.

of the two main manuscripts O and Q (Heinze, Diels, Bailey in the editio maior,
Kenney). It is clear that pergas makes the first part of the si-clause hypothetical like
the second part, while perges would result in an actual possibility being considered.
So perges would be difficult to reconcile with the speech's being about imminent
death; rather, if we read perges, this would result in the whole sentence being about
the scope of eadem sunt omnia semper. Compare the translation by Rouse and
Smith:30
If your body is not alreadywitheringwith years and your limbs worn out and languid,yet
everythingremainsthe same,evenif you shallgo on to outliveall generations,and evenmoreif
you shouldbe destinedneverto die.
With the reading perges, the sentence says that eadem sunt omnia semper holds true
regardless of whether one is young or will live very long or indeed for ever. Note that
on this reading restant in 947 has the force of a future tense. If we read pergas, by
contrast, the paragraph would be consistent with the speech's being about imminent
death in the sense outlined above; the paragraph would then say that, if we are young,
we can console ourselves with the thought that everything would remain the same,
however long we lived; restant would thus have the force of a subjunctive.3'On either
solution, the epigrammatic quality of eadem tamen omnia restant would account for
the indicative mood or, respectively, present tense of restant.
The first thing to be taken into account is that omnia uiuendo uincere saecla is
something which is not actually possible; I therefore paraphrased the expression above
as 'to live superhumanly long'. This point is, as far as I can see, uncontested,32and the
champions of perges have to interpret the phrase as a strongly hyperbolical manner of
speaking, amounting 'to become very old indeed'. Two considerations tip the balance
in favour of pergas. The first one is that of coherence; anyone who accepts the earlier
arguments about the situation in which Nature speaks should be prepared to favour
the reading pergas, on the grounds that otherwise there is no longer an identifiable
situation in which Nature speaks. The second one is of the broader philosophical issues
involved: if we want the speech of Nature to have a decisive role in the arguments
against fear of death qua curtailment of pleasures, then we will need to have premature
death addressed as a distinct issue.33And, clearly, reading perges would blur this issue
completely.
It is thus arguable that Nature's arguments are phrased and apply only for the time
when human beings, young or old, actually face death and when continuing life is not
an option for them.
30 W. H. D. Rouse and M. F Smith, Lucretius-De RerumNatura(Cambridge,MA and

London,1992).
31 On this use of the indicativefor the subjunctivein the apodosisof conditionals,cf. R.
Kiihner and C. Stegmann,AusfiihrlicheGrammatikder LateinischenSprache2 (Darmstadt,
1992),?214.1b.3,and Kenneyon si in 946, 948. Or should restantbe emendedto restent,as
ProfessorWinterbottomsuggeststo me?
32 'To becomevery old' is multauiuendouinceresaecla;cf. Serv.In Verg.Aen.
11.160:'..
uiuendovici id est superuixi:ueteresenim "uiuendouincere"dicebantsuperuiuere,ut "multa
uirumuoluensuiuendosaeculauincit"'.Therefereepointsout thatat 1.202multauiuendouincere
saeclais introducedas an adynaton,andthatomniauiuendouinceresaeclashouldbe impossiblea
fortiori.
33 The topic usuallylooms largein Epicureantexts concernedwith this problem,e.g. Philo-
demus'De morte.

302 T. REINHARDT
IV
It seems now possible to say more preciselywhat the purpose of the speech is. I
suggest that the speechis meant to coerce the readerinto an attitudeabout death
(quacurtailmentof pleasuresand, by extension,quafrustrationof projects)whichis
in crucial respects similar to that of the Epicureansage, thus compensatingfor
the fact that Lucretiuscannot in his argumentsrely on the reader'shavingalready
accepted the Epicureantheory of pleasure.Further,that Lucretiushas carefully
selectednon-Epicureansource-materialto serve as a partialmodel for his speech,
because this material conveys in an oblique way attitudes and views one could
otherwisearriveat only throughthe Epicureantheoryof pleasure.Finally,that what
sets this bypassin operationis the peculiarperspectiveof the speechwhich I high-
lightedabove.
Let us look againon whatmightbe calledthe argumentative coreof the speech:
935 namsi gratafuittibiuitaanteactapriorque

et nonomniapertusumcongestaquasiin uas 1. Rightattitude
commodaperfluxereatqueingratainteriere,
curnonutplenusuitaeconuiuarecedis
aequoanimoquecapissecuram,stulte,quietem?
940 sin ea quaefructuscumquees periereprofusa 2. Wrongattitude
uitaquein offensast,curampliusadderequaeris,
rursumquodpereatmaleet ingratumoccidatomne,
nonpotiusuitaefinemfacisatquelaboris?
namtibipraetereaquodmachinerinueniamque,
945 quodplaceat,nil est: eademsuntomniasemper
Or:
(i) Either you have enjoyed life or you have not enjoyed life.
(ii) If you have enjoyed life, and pleasant memories are securely stored in your mind,
part with life gratefully and contentedly.
(iii) If you have not enjoyedlife, part with it willingly,for nothing new is to be expected.
It is a typicalfeatureof this argumentformthat it narrowsdown complexsituations

or choices to a simple twofold alternative.Craig'sstudy on dilemma documents
this with a wealthof examplesfrom Cicero'sspeeches.34 We might, for example,be
ambiguousabout our lives, saying that while there was much boredom or toil or
horror in it (so far), there have been a numberof fine moments too. Lucretius'
dilemmadoes not reallyallow for this type of ambiguity.Eitherwe havenot enjoyed
our life; then therewas not a singlefine momentin it. Or we are able to recallsome
fine moments;thenwe haveenjoyedit (sc. in termsof the choicesoffered).As soon as
we side with the latterview,as, I take it, everyonewould,we are urgedto be grateful
for what we havereceived,for appreciatingthat our soul is sufficientlyfilled (like a
vessel) with pleasantmemoriesto make us part with life contentedly.And it is the
suggestiveimage of the filled vessel which is supposed to help us translatethese
memoriesinto a state of grateful and satisfied calm that resembleskatastematic
in Cicero'sSpeeches(Atlanta,1993)andthereviewby
34 SeeC. P.Craig,Formas Argument
D. H. Berry,
JRS86(1996),201-7.

pleasure and issues in i-tapap(a.35To be more precise about this would require a
general discussion of how Lucretius and other Epicureans thought metaphors could
communicate and lead to certain states of mind.36
But only if we have seen nothing pleasant whatsoever (a possibility we are dis-
couraged from envisaging for ourselves through the negative formulation of the second
horn) will the second horn apply to us. And only then eadem sunt omnia semper indeed
has a sort of subjective plausibility because, for someone who hastens from one sup-
posedly pleasant experience to the other without appreciating a single one of them,
there is little that can positively discriminate these experiences in retrospect. And as
soon as one objects that it is not all the same and that some things do stand out, one is
referredto the first horn.
How does the peculiar perspective of the speech, its being formulated for a time
when death is imminent, come in and what does it contribute? Unlike the Epicurean
sage who 'measures the limits of pleasure by reason' (KA 20) and thus becomes
indifferent to the duration of his life, the reader who is implied by D.R.N may be
expected to have a non-philosophical view of pleasure, and thus will fear that his death
will, at some time in the future, curtail his ability to experience sensory pleasure. To
focus on the moment when death is imminent and to argue against its actually func-
tioning in the way envisaged by the fearful person seems therefore a natural thing to do.
Further, the two alternative attitudes about our life considered in the dilemma can
only be convincingly presented as exhaustive if the point in time when I make an
assessment of my life is located immediately before my death. For otherwise I might be
hesitant to settle for one horn or the other, given that much more can happen in my life.
As I said above, we might be ambiguous about our life now that its end does not seem
imminent (citing Soph. O.T 1527-30), but much more inclined to make an overall
assessment when we actually reach the end of our life. Likewise, we might be able to
anticipate now that we will be able to make this assessment whenwe are about to die (the
plausibility of the alternatives' being just two crucially depends on us being able to
anticipate this). It is at the time when death is finally imminent that we are pushed by
Nature towards the calm indifference which resembles katastematic pleasure, either by
being grateful for the good we have received or by not caring about death.
But the perspective of the speech works on yet a further level: by providing us with
a procedure of dealing with imminent death at some time in the future, it allows us to
live an unperturbed life in the now. That is, we are meant to suspend worrying about
death (qua curtailment of pleasures and, by extension, qua frustration of projects) now,
because we can deal with the problem when it arises, by telling ourselves what Nature
says when we are about to die.37In a way, we are urged to think about death while not
thinking about death-which is in tune with Epicurean criticisms of the Stoic
35 Clearly,thereis also a connectionwiththe Epicureantenetthathappinessis easilyachieved.

36 Some remarkson Philodemus'views on metaphorsare in M. Wigodsky,'The alleged
impossibilityof philosophicalpoetry',in D. Obbink(ed.), PhilodemusandPoetry(Oxfordand
New York,1995),58-68, at 62-3.
37 A notoriousfeatureof Epicureanphilosophyin generalis an emphasison certainmental
routines.Epicurushimself encouragedmemorizationof the crucialtenets (KA) phrasedin a
suitablyaphoristicway,in orderto let them becomesecond natureand to havethem readily
availablewhenthey areneeded;similarthingscan be said aboutEpicurus'lettersor abouttexts
by otherEpicureans, e.g. Diogenesof Oenoanda.The ideaof memorizationis verypresentin the
D.R.N itself,too. Thereis now almostuniversalagreementthatrepetitionsof phrases,versesor
completepassagesshouldnot be attributedto artisticineptnesson the partof the author;rather,
theyareto be takenas one in a seriesof measuresLucretiustakesto facilitateandencouragethe

304 T. REINHARDT
meditatio mortis (Cic. Tusc. 3.32ff.), that is, the continous mental anticipation of the
horrors of death in order to make them wear off.
Let me be clear about this: of course Nature does not provide us with an argument
why it is irrational to have this type of fear of death, as Lucretius was able to provide
in the case of fear of being dead. She could argue that only if the reader accepted the
Epicurean theory of pleasure and yet was still afraid of death. But Lucretius did not
discuss at length the Epicurean theory of pleasure, perhaps because it is highly
complex,was castigatedas stronglycounterintuitive and could be
by anti-Epicureans,
deemed too esoteric, given the overall pitch of the D.R.N. But he nevertheless took the
orthodox Epicurean view that one can be freed from certain types of fear of death only
by reaching the state of &rapa~'awhich the correct view about pleasure is supposed to
induce. And so he shopped around in the diatribal tradition in order to find an
alternative method of inducing something like unperturbedness of the soul, a method
which crucially relied on the persuasive power of images like that of the soul as a filled
vessel or of a man as a contented conuiua.
Merton College, Oxford TOBIAS REINHARDT
tobias.reinhardt@ccc.ox.ac.uk
mentalabsorptionof the poemthroughthe reader.It is crucialthat,likeits context(cf. 3.1024),

the speechof Natureis to be absorbedby the reader'smind.We are to carryit with us, to have
it available.Naturecan thus be calledupon whenwe need her. On this aspect of the D.R.N,
cf. P.H. Schrijvers,
'Elementspsychagogiques dansl'oeuvrede Lucr6ce',Actesdu VIIIeCongres
de l'Assoc. G. Bud (Paris, 1969), 370-6; D. Clay, Lucretius and Epicurus (Ithaca, 1983), 176-85;
A. Schiesaro,'The palingenesisof De RerumNatura',PCPhS 40 (1994), 81-107; M. Erler,
'Einiibungund Anverwandlung.ReflexemiindlicherMeditationstechnikin philosophischer
Literaturder Kaiserzeit',in W Kullmann,J. Althoff,and M. Asper(edd.), Gattungenwissen-
Literaturin derAntike(Tilbingen,1998),361-81.
schaftlicher


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