EMINENT DOMAIN

DEFINITION ; SCOPE
o Also called: POWER OF EXPROPRIATION.
o It is the inherent power of the State to forcibly take property for public
use, upon payment of just compensation.

o Art. III, Sec. 9 Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.

o Art. XII, Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national
welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities
and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.

Who exercises the power of eminent domain?

1. Primarily lodged in the NATIONAL LEGISLATURE

Maybe delegated to
i. The President
ii. Various Local Legislative bodies or Municipal govts.
o Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

iii. Certain Public Corporations, (Land Authority, NHA)

iv. Private Corporations or so-called Quasi-public corporation serving public
needs or operating public utilities (like Phil. National Railways, PLDT,
Meralco...)

JUDICIAL REVIEW of EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN:

Q. Can the Court question the necessity, or wisdom of the purpose of the act of
eminent domain enacted by the Legislature?

A. No. These are essentially POLITICAL QUESTIONS NOT subject to judicial review.
These are matters that the legislature can decide on its discretion.
o Eminent domain when exercised by the legislature is an inherent power; it is
broad.

POLITICAL QUESTION question which under the constitution is to be decided

by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the govt.
(Macapagal & Tanada v. Cuenco, GR No. L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)

JUDICIAL REVIEW issue

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 However, in cases where it is a delegate of the legislature (such as a LGU,
or, even the President) that exercises the power of eminent domain, a
censorius attitude is adopted by the Supreme Court.

It probes into the issues/questions of: NECESSITY and the LAWFUL EXERCISE
of the authority and conditions, or requisites for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain.

What ASPECTS of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subjected to

judicial scrutiny?

1. Adequacy of Just Compensation

2. Public Use Character of the purpose of taking
3. Necessity of Taking the private property

Study CASES:
o City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919)
o Moday v. CA, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)
o RP v. La Orden de PP Benedictinos de Filipinos, 1 SCRA 646

What are the Constitutional Limitations of Eminent Domain?

o Art. III, Sec. 9 Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.

o Art. XII, Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government.

LIMITATIONS:

Inherent power to take property is limited by the requisites of:

1. PUBLIC USE purpose,
2. JUST COMPENSATION payment (Sec. 9, Art. III, 1987 Phil. Const.)

The exercise of eminent domain is strictly interpreted against the expropriator,

and liberally in favor of the property owner, for it is in derogation of private
rights.

How is the exercise of Eminent Constructed?

Strict construction; Burden of proof

o The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights.
o It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law.
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 o Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or
agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the
power.

Read: JIL v. Mun. Of Pasig, GR No. 152230, Aug. 9, 2005

o The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and

against the condemnor.

o When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited
to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is
contained.

o The Condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show
the right of condemnation.

o It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the
requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

What is the difference between EMINENT DOMAIN and EXPROPRIATION?

Eminent Domain refers to the RIGHT of the State.

EXPROPRIATION refers to the ACT or PROCEDURE, or PROCESS OF TAKING THE
PROPERTY thru which the right of eminent domain is exercised.

Refer to: Rule 67, Secs. 1-14, of the Rules of Court

What are the ESSENTIAL REQUISITES in the exercise of Eminent Domain?

1. Taking by COMPETENT AUTHORITY
2. Observance of DUE PROCESS
3. Taking is for PUBLIC USE
4. Payment of JUST COMPENSATION

OBJECT OF EXPROPRIATION; What can be expropriated?

REAL and PERSONAL PROPERTIES, tangible or intangible may be expropriated.

Exceptions:
a. Money for just compensation in this case is futile
b. Chose in action - as this is speculative both to its real value and validity.

Meaning of Chose in action - personal right, not reduced into possession but
recoverable by a suit at law, such as: a right to receive, demand or recover a
debt, demand or damages on a cause of action, or for a tort or omission of
duty.

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 Can SERVICES be included in the concept of property subject to taking or
expropriation under eminent domain power of the State?

A. YES. See RP v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 - Govt. compelled PLDT to allow

interconnection of the Govt. Telephone System and that of PLDT, subject to
just compensation.

PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 where PLDT was compelled to interconnect with
a private communication company.

Can Property that is already subject of public use still be expropriated?

Property that is already subject of public use may still be expropriated

provided:
o It is done directly by national legislature or thru a specific grant by the nat.
Leg. to the delegate.
o A gen. authority will not suffice and courts in this case may inquire into the
necessity of the expropriation. If none, the court may disallow the
expropriation.

See: City of Manila v. Chinese Cemetery, 40 Phil. 349

Q. What is TAKING in eminent domain?

Physical dispossession of the property from the owner
It can also include the limitation or restriction of an owner to fully enjoy all of
his rights to the property such as:
o Deprivation of use, of its fruits or right to dispose
o Imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. (City Government of Quezon City vs.
Ericta, GR L- 34915, 24 June 1983, 122 SCRA 759)

In these cases, the owner of the property affected is entitled to just

compensation.

What are the REQUISITES of TAKING in eminent domain?

In REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, 58 SCRA 336 -- TAKING to be VALID provides that:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period (that is, for a permanent
or indefinite period).
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner or deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
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 Note: In RP v. PLDT - PLDT was not ousted as owner, but govt. is deemed to
have expropriated the property of PLDT when the govt. demanded that
it be allowed to interconnect with the PLDT lines for telephone services.

When is property deemed taken in eminent domain?

What is the reckoning period for the purpose of determining fair market value
of the property to be paid as just compensation?

REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, 58 SCRA 336 -

RP Govt./AFP rented on a yearly basis & occupied the land of Castellvi in 1947.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the AFP sought
to renew the lease. But Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the
land, Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the AFP. RP Govt./AFP then filed
on June 26, 1959 an expropriation case vs. Castellvi.

In the expropriation case, there was dispute as to when the property was taken
in relation to the computation and determination of the fair market value to be
paid as just compensation. AFP contended that the land was taken in 1947.
Castellvi argued that it was only in 1959 when the expropriation case was filed.

The "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be

considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof. The two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, are:

(1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and;
(2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. Under Section 4 of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.

Q. What is TAKING in eminent domain? Illustrate: Examples

1. Imposition by the city of a Right of Way Easement over a 3-meter strip of

land owned by plaintiff. (Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil. 215)

2. The right of way easement over the land traversed by the transmission lines
falls under taking or expropriation. (National Power Corp. v. Aguirre-
Paderanga, 464 SCRA 481)

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3. An exhaust fan is installed in a tunnel for the train to clear the smoke after it
passed. Most of this smoke is blown directly into the house of Mr. Richards,
causing damage to his property. US Supreme Court held that this is equivalent
to taking under the power of eminent domain for which Richards is entitled to
just compensation. (Richards v. Washington Terminal, 233 U.S, 546)

4. Comelecs resolution directing newspaper to provide free Comelec space of not

less than page for the common use of political parties and candidates is
unconstitutional as this compulsory donation is taking of private property
without payment of just compensation in expropriation cases. (Philippine Press
Institute v. Commission on Elections, 244 SCRA 272).

5. Mun. Ord. Prohibiting construction of any building that would obstruct the view
of the plaza from the highway. (People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443)

Deprivation of Use : Equivalent to Taking Without Just Compensation

PEOPLE v. FAJARDO, 104 Phil. 443

Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur, to issue a building permit
on the ground that the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an
undue deprivation of the use of the property in question, and thus a taking without due
compensation.

HELD: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and Babilonia
was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the
public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted,
the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of
police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation.

While the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardo's land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo
would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that
result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity to be
heard.

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 Taking in Eminent Domain must be for PUBLIC USE

MEANING ; CHARACTERISTICS :

Traditional Meaning of Public Use: Any USE directly available to general public as a
matter of RIGHT, and not mere forbearance or accommodation.

If property is devoted to basic public services administered by privately-owned

utilities like the telephone, or light or water companies. Here, the services are
demandable as a matter of right by any one prepared to pay for them.

Examples: construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and

telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control
or irrigation systems

HAS EVOLVED & EXPANDED:

"PUBLIC USE" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.

The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. The
term public use now also includes the broader idea of indirect public benefit or
advantage.

What ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as

"public welfare, public interest , public benefit or convenience. (Reyes v. National
Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494)

Example: expropriation of land to provide services, technical know-how,

economic stimulation, conversion of slum area into model housing
community
thus promoting social justice, equity to the underprivileged

Q. What constitutes PUBLIC USE for eminent domain to be valid?

Illustrate; examples:

1. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1983)

The establishment of a center for technical know-how on agriculture, fishery and
cottage industry for the people in the Province of Camarines Sur and a socialized
housing project for the employees of the Camarines Sur Provincial govt. is considered
a public purpose which makes valid the expropriation of the property authorized by
the questioned resolution.

2. ESTATE OF JIMENEZ v. PEZA, GR No. 106804, Aug. 12, 2004

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2. MANOSCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 106440, 29 Jan. 1996]

FACTS: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land with an area of
about 492 square meters located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila.

The National Historical Institute (NHI) had ascertained that this was the birth site of Felix
Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant
to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical
landmark. This was approved on 6 January 1986, by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS). Also, the legality of the measure was affirmed by the DOJ Sec. in his
Opinion 133, Series of 1987.

On 29 May 1989, the Republic, thru the office of the Solicitor-General, filed a complaint for
expropriation before the RTC of Pasig in behalf of NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed
an urgent motion for the issuance of an order for the immediate taking of the property.

The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3
August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market value of P54,120.00 and assessed
value of P16,236.00 value of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the
property once the required sum is deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro
Manila.

The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution.

The trial court and the CA both denied the motions to dismiss and the subsequent motion
for reconsideration by the Manoscas. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court in 1992.

ISSUE: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the
founder of the religion Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes public use.

HELD: The term "PUBLIC USE," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,
must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be
restricted to such traditional uses.

The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long
been discarded.

The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive

contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give
some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from,
the exercise of the power.
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 That greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most
others could well be true. But such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use.

Objects of Expropriation
RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

Where Expropriation Suit is Filed

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000

Taking
Definition and scope

Requisites of Taking
Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)
Memorial Park v. DSWD Secretary, G.R. NO. 175356, 03 December 2013,

Deprivation of Use
Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)
Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006
U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

Priority in Expropriation
Filstream International v. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)
City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
JIL v. Mun. of Pasig, G.R. 152230, August 9, 2005

Public use
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)
Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001

Government Withdrawal
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003
NPC & Pobre v. CA, G.R. No. 106804. August 12, 2004

Recovery of Expropriated Land

Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 17540, 23 July 1921, 42 Phil. 28.
MCIAA v. CA, G.R. No. 139495, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
ATO v. Gopuco, G.R. No. 158563, June, 30 2005
Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Genuine Necessity
Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990
De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
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JUST COMPENSATION
Defined
Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
RP vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990

Determination of Just Compensation

EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

When Determined
Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147 August 3, 1990
NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846, February 6, 2007
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142 971, May 07, 2002

Manner of Payment
Assoc.of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)
DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995)

Trial with Commissioners

Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998
Napocor v. Sps. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007
Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, September 27, 2006

Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases

NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992)
Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004

Writ of Possession
City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001
Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005

Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estates and Municipal Property

Art. XII, Sec. 18
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
Art. XIII, Sec. 9
City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 114 (1959)
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

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