BEFORE THE BOARD OF ELECTIONSIN

OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY

EDWIN DAVILA, :

Protester, :

-vs.- :

JEFFREY D. JOHNSON, :

:
Respondent.
:

POSITION STATEMENT OF PROTESTER EDWIN DAVILA

SEEKING DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNCILMAN JEFFREY D. JOHNSON
AS A CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND

This document is being filed pursuant to paragraph two of the letter dated April 27, 2017

from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections to Protester Edwin Davila ("Davila"), wherein it is

stated:

"The agency has set a deadline of 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 4, 2017 for the filing of all

position papers and other documents regarding this protest with the Candidate and Petition

Services Department on the 2nd Floor of the Board of Elections."

On his own behalf, Davila files this Position Statement ("Davila's Position Statement") to

demonstrate that Candidate Jeffrey D. Johnson ("Johnson") is not qualified to run for Mayor of the

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City of Cleveland because he is barred from holding the position and he is also barred from holding

his current council seat under the provision of Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02(H).12

Although Johnson has publically stated he was not convicted of bribery but was convicted

of extortion (as if that should exonerate him) his reasoning makes no sense after a careful review

of the facts and law of his conviction. If he is allowed to use this excuse and run for office or hold

office despite his Hobbs Act violation then many public officials, such as Jimmy Dimora or others

convicted under the Hobbs Act, would be able to get his or her records expunged and would be

eligible to run and hold office using the same reasoning. The Ohio legislature certainly did not

intend to allow such a ridiculous result.

Furthermore, an expungement is irrelevant in this case as the more specific statute prevents

him for holding office. Johnson is free to practice law and also have his previous consulting

business but he is forever barred from holding public office by specific Ohio statute.

I. THE GENESIS OF THIS MATTER

In the beginning, Johnson began his political career under the mentorship of former Mayor

Michael White, who now operates Yellow Butterfly Winery and an alpaca ranch near

Newcomerstown, Ohio. In 1984, as then-Councilman Michael White ("White") was appointed to

the Ohio State Senate, Johnson succeeded White and was appointed Councilman for Ward 8.

1
Davila recognizes the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections is without authority to remove
Johnson from his current council seat, which Davila intends to address in a separate civil
proceeding.
2
It is important to note that this statute does not limit a conviction of bribery to a conviction
only under the Ohio Revised Code.
Page 2 of 18
 Ninety days after his appointment, Johnson as Councilman for Ward 8, Johnson won re-

election and again was re-elected in 1985 and 1989.

Following the election of Michael White for Mayor of the City of Cleveland, in January,

1990, Johnson was appointed to the Ohio State Senate seat vacated by White. Johnson served as

State Senator until he was criminally convicted in federal court and sentenced to 15 months in

prison in 1998.

A. Johnson's Federal Conviction Was Premised upon His Solicitation and

Receipt of Property from Arab Store Owners With Their Consent Under Color of
Official Right, Often Using Profanity Laced Rhetoric.

The background facts regarding this matter are set forth in the September 5, 2000 decision

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, namely, United States v. Johnson, 230

F.3d 1360 (6th Cir. 2000) (For the sake of convenience a copy of the opinion is attached.) The

factual recitation set forth in the opinion of the Sixth Circuit is replete with instances where

Johnson solicited and accepted offers of funds from the Arab store owners. The specific events

highlighted by the Sixth Circuit are as follows:

Johnson first met Cleveland grocer Aly Hamed, who raised more than $10,00 in

campaign contributions from other Arab-American grocers, during his 1992 campaign for

Cuyahoga County Commissioner..

Thereafter, in 1992, Johnson agreed to help Hamed obtain a county contract and in

1993, Johnson appeared at Hamed's administrative appeal hearing in order to assist Hamed

in receiving a state Women, Infants and Children("WIC") Program contract. In late 1993,

Hamed approached Johnson for assistance in overturning the Department of Health's

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decision to close two stores owned by a relative of Hamed. Hamed alleges that Johnson

told Hamed to collect campaign contributions for him in exchange for his help. In January

of 1994, Johnson gave Hamed's relative an affidavit attesting to the cleanliness of one of

the stores in question. Hamed and his relative collected money and gave it to Johnson in

early 1994. Hamed alleges that Johnson continued his demands for money after that.

Hamed had cooperated with the FBI in the investigation of one of his competitors

since 1992. In early 1994, Hamed, who felt "squeezed" by Defendant's demands for money,

told the FBI about his dealings with Johnson. The FBI asked Hamed to record

conversations with Johnson, using the equipment from the earlier investigation.

At trial, the government presented the jury with portions of multiple audio and video

tapes of conversations between Hamed and Johnson dating from February of 1994 to

March of 1996. The tapes recorded a series of conversations between the two concerning

the following events.

In mid, 1994, at Johnson's request, Hamed compiled a list of grocers who needed

assistance obtaining WIC contracts based on each grocer's ability to pay Johnson for

assistance. On July 26, 1994, Johnson said he would "check on" those stores and asked

Hamed "Where's my money at?" Johnson later wrote a letter to and met with the WIC

program administrator and testified in the stores' favor at administrative appeal hearings.

On August 11, 1994, Johnson testified at a hearing for a store named Midtown

Savmor, after which he told Hamed that he had intimidated the attorneys representing the

Department of Health. On September 6, 1994, Johnson asked Hamed "how much Midtown

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contribute to my campaign." Hamed said that Midtown's owners had given him two

thousand dollars to give to Johnson, the same as had been paid to Midtown's attorney.

On September 23, 1994, Hamed offered Johnson $4,000 on behalf of grocery stores

named Mike's Discount No. 4 and Wade Park Shoprite. Johnson told Hamed to put the

checks into Hamed's business account and then make out money orders for Johnson. At the

same meeting, Hamed offered Johnson $4,000 in cash as payments from Midtown Savmor

and Forest Hills Savmor. Johnson asked Hamed to deposit the $4,000 in Hamed's personal

checking account and to give Johnson a personal check as a "loan" of $5,000. Johnson told

Hamed to tell the donors that the monies went to his campaign.

On October 21, 1994, Hamed told Johnson about a hearing for Bowie's Mini-Mart to

enable it to receive a WIC contract. Johnson told Hamed "I ain't doing shit, you supposed

to be giving me my shit." On October 26, 1994, Johnson told Hamed that he was appearing

at the hearing for Bowie's but that he was displeased because "this store is smaller than the

other stores and I gotta go in here and sell this store as a hardship case." Johnson told

Hamed that Hamed was "gonna pay dearly." Johnson testified at the October 27, 1996,

hearing for Bowie's. In December of 1994 Hamed gave Johnson $500 in money orders

payable to Johnson's campaign committee from Bowie's.

On January 14, 1995, Johnson complained to Hamed about a check from Wade Park

Shop-Rite bouncing, and said "I'm being pimped. He lost that case that's why he don't

wanna give me no fucking money." Hamed gave Johnson $1,000 in money orders as partial

payment for the bounced checks, and Hamed further gave Johnson a $1,000 check on

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January 24, 1995, and $1,500 in money orders on March 5, 1995, all payable to Johnson's

campaign committee.

On February 15, 1995, the tapes revealed that Johnson agreed to call state officials to

help the family of grocer Moe Rabah effect a beer and wine license transfer. On March 5,

1995, Hamed told Johnson that Johnson would receive a $2,000 contribution from the

family. Johnson stated that such a contribution was "cheap. That's cheap. Cause how much

you gonna make off of that bullshit?" Johnson further said that the transfer application had

"been dead, dormant. I make one fucking phone call starting to crack the ice.... And then

all of sudden he, they gonna, they gonna contribute two thousand dollars."

On March 30, 1995, Johnson stated to Hamed that "these guys supposed to be

contributing, eh, to my campaign and they ain't gave me a motherfucking thing." (J. A.357).

Johnson said that since he didn't have the money "in [his] pocket," that "it'll take six months

then." Id. He continued, F them motherfuckers better give me, contribute two thousand

dollars." He also said that "[t]hese motherfuckers who don't even know me ain't gave me

shit in their life, want me to help them with a fucking liquor permit that will help them

make I don't know how much fucking money. And they can't even give me two thousand

dollars of contribution."

On April 8, 1995, Hamed gave Johnson a $1,000 campaign contribution from Moe

Rabah. Johnson said that Rabah owed him another $1,000. Hamed asked Johnson about

another liquor license and Johnson said that those "guys, I don't even know who the hell

they are, you know, they can kiss my ass....They ain't never gave me a contribution." (J.

A.362). Johnson warned Hamed, "[n]ow let Mo know his name is on the shit 'cause I don't

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want nobody callin' and sayin' did you contribute to Jeff Johnson and he say 'hell no' [sic]

."

On April 25, 1995, Johnson told Hamed that the store was "gettin' off light" (sic) by

contributing $2,000. (J. A.365-66). Johnson further said that Hamed knew "what they are

capable of giving and ... what a license is capable of providing for them if they don't get it

or if they do."

On May 2, 1995, Johnson told Hamed that Hamed "should be raising $5,000 from

people. They should be contributing at least $5,000 to a person who has helped them to

keep their main item in their store." On May 22, 1995, Johnson told Hamed that $1,000

paid so far was "not good enough," because he had "helped them to clear a liquor license."

On June 1, 1995, Johnson said that he done "enough favors," and that he wanted to

"see some money." He said "if I wouldn't have made no phone calls their shit would still

been red taped," and added that the grocers should pay him another $4,000. On July 19,

1995, Johnson told Hamed that "I believe that anyone who gets such help from a senator

that they now have liquor permit that they should be talkin' about contributing $5,000."

That day, Hamed gave Johnson $4,000 in money orders payable to his campaign committee

as a result of the beer and wine permit.

On October 20, 1995, Hamed agreed to give Johnson a $5,000 personal loan and

Johnson immediately called the office of a county commissioner to endorse the bid of an

associate of Hamed. When Hamed's associate became the sole bidder left. Johnson credited

his own phone call in a conversation with Hamed.

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 On March 16, 1996, Johnson met with Grocer Sam Salem who asked if Johnson could

help him get a lottery contract, and gave Hamed a $300 check made out to Johnson's

campaign committee. Johnson told Salem that "it's hard to know before I know the

problem," but added that "I have access to it." After Salem left, Hamed asked Johnson to

help obtain lottery contracts for Salem and for another store. Johnson said: "I don't know

if I wanna help. I haven't seen the envelopes yet." Johnson continued, "You know I haven't

seen my $5,000 yet. So I don't know if I wanna help." Id. Johnson then said, "I might, I

might go on vacation." Hamed replied, "$3,000 for Sam Salem's." Johnson answered him,

"I might be around. But that's for Sam Salem."

On March 19, 1996, Hamed asked Johnson about the lottery. Johnson said he had

done nothing as Hamed had not raised money for him. Hamed gave Johnson the $300 check

from Salem and an additional $700 in money orders payable to Johnson's campaign.

In addition to the evidence on the tapes, the government also presented evidence that in mid 1994

Johnson had told the attorney for Forest Hills Savmor that his clients should pay Johnson $2,000.

When the attorney told Johnson that such a payment was not possible, Johnson told the attorney

that he didn't know how much more he could help by testifying in hearings to obtain WIC contracts.

B. Johnson was Indicted, Inter Alia, on Four Counts of Hobbs Act Extortion Under
Color of Official Right in Violation of 18 United States Code Section 1951.

More specifically, Johnson was indicted on March 4, 1998, in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Ohio on four counts of Hobbs Act extortion under color of

official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 and two counts of mail fraud by defrauding his

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constituents and the State of Ohio of his honest services under 18 U .S.C. 1341 and 1346. The

district court dismissed the counts of mail fraud on October 22, 1998, for failure to state an offense.

A jury trial began in November of 1998. At the close of the government's case in chief,

Johnson's motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied. Johnson did not testify in his own

defense.

The jury found Johnson guilty on Counts One, Two, and Four of Hobbs Act extortion under

color of official right and not guilty on Count Three of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official

right. The district court denied Defendant's motions for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and

for a new trial.

Johnson was sentenced, to among other things, fifteen months incarceration. (A copy of

the docket of the United States District Court for his case is attached and a copy of the United

States Bureau of Prison Inmate Locater Website Entry regarding Jeffrey Johnson is attached.)

C. Johnson Returned to Politics After His Incarceration And Despite the Fact
Ohio Law Barred Him Permanently Barred From Holding Public Office.
After serving 9 months, he completed a 4 month halfway house program in 2001. in 2002,

Johnson was hired as an assistant to then Mayor Jane Campbell. He was promoted to the Mayors

Cabinet a year later as Director of the Department of Community Relations. After Mayor

Campbells election loss in 2005, Johnson started his company, Prime Strategy Group, a political

consultant firm. In 2008, he received from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas an

expungement. In 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously reinstated his law license. (A copy

of the Ohio Supreme Court reinstatement is attached.)

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 Thereafter, Johnson became a candidate for the Cleveland Ward 8 City Council position

in 2009, and was elected in November of that year. In 2013, he won again after being forced to

seek reelection in a new redistricted Ward 10 after his previous ward was removed.

II. PROTESTER'S POSITION:

A. As the Federal Conviction Constitutes a Bribery Conviction, Johnson Cannot

Continue to Hold Now His Position of Councilman and He is Not Qualified for the
Position of Mayor of the City of Cleveland and His Petitions for Mayor Should
Therefore Be Voided.

Johnson publicly claims that he was not convicted of bribery. He publicly defends himself

by claiming he was convicted of extortion, not bribery. His claims are without merit. More

specifically, he was convicted under the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 of "the obtaining property

from another with his consent . . . . under color of official right."

The nonsense of Johnson's position is best explained by the attached copy of the relevant

page of the U.S. Attorneys Manual, Criminal Resource Manual, CRM 2000-2500 and 2401-2499

wherein it explains that this provision has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as

the equivalent of "taking a bribe".

Specifically the language in the U.S. Attorneys Manual states:

"In fact, the under color of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common

law meaning of extortion. As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding

the Hobbs Act,"

"[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who

took 'by color of his office' money that was not due to him for the performance of

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 his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of

what we would now describe as 'taking a bribe.'"

Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).

In order to show a violation of the Hobbs Act under this provision, the Supreme Court

recently held that "the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a

payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for

official acts." While the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act with regard to force,

violence or fear requires the obtaining of property from another with his

consent induced by these means, the under color of official right provision does not require

that the public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment: It can be said that "the

coercive element is provided by the public office itself." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S.

255 (1992); see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

461 U.S. 913 (1983) ("[t]he public officer's misuse of his office supplies the necessary

element of coercion . . . .").

Thus, a public officials efforts to extort money for services, as Johnson did, has been judicially

determined to be "taking a bribe." His defense is therefore without merit.

B. Similarly, Johnson's Expungement is of No Value as It Relates to His Federal

Conviction and as It Relates to Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02(H).

Davila agrees Johnson may have obtained an expungement, although the evidence of his

expungement is not on the website of the Clerk of Courts of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas

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Court. Any claimed expungement would have no effect as to a federal conviction and no impact

as to the validity of Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02(H).3

1. Any Claimed Expungement Has No Effect as to Johnson's Federal

Conviction.
Ohio law allows for the expungement of convictions generally. See, Ohio Revised Code

Section 2953.32 (A)(1). The State of Ohio has provided in this Code section a method by which

even a federal conviction or a conviction in another state, may be sealed under Ohio law for

purpose in Ohio only. Ohio's expungement statute provides that an expunged conviction does not

need to be reported on an application for employment, or any other right or privilege.

There are important limitations on the ability to have a federal conviction expunged.

Because of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, an Ohio court cannot order

the sealing of records in the custody of federal courts, agencies, or officials. Nor can an Ohio court

order the sealing of records kept by the state if the state maintains or uses those records pursuant

to federal law.

Equally, Ohio law allows state agencies or officials to obtain access to sealed records under

specific circumstances. Ohio Revised Code Section 2953.32(B) permits inquiries about expunged

convictions where "the question bears a director and substantial relationship to the position for

which the person is being considered."

3
Several Ohio cases support the finding that the general expungement provisions set forth
in Ohio Revised Code Section 2953.32 cannot be construed as affecting federal records maintained
or in the custody of federal officers. See, for example, In re Pacifico, 129 Ohio App. 3d 152, 157
(8th Dist. 1998).

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 This provision has been utilized to allow the consideration of a sealed conviction to allow

the consideration of the ability of an individual to hold public office. See State v. Bissantz, 40 Ohio

St.3d 112 (1988).4

Consequently, expungement of a federal conviction by an Ohio court does not eliminate

disabilities resulting from a federal conviction and therefore as in this case, the federal conviction

continues to act as a bar.

4
Ohio law contains other examples of convictions which cannot be expunged. For example,
under the Ohio Expungement Statute, felonies in the first or second degree are precluded from
expungement. Also precluded from being expunged are convictions of an offense in
circumstances in which the victim of the offense was under eighteen years of age when the offense
is a misdemeanor of the first degree or a felony (O.R.C. Section 2953.36). Crimes of violence,
when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree or a felony are not able to be expunged, with
the exception of first degree misdemeanor convictions for violations of O.R.C. 2917.03 (riot),
O.R.C. 2903.13 (assault), O.R.C. 2917.01 (inciting to violence), or 2917.31 (inducing panic).

There are a number of specific crimes that cannot be expunged. Individuals convicted under any
of the following statutes, O.R.C. 2907.02 (rape); O.R.C. 2907.03 (sexual battery), O.R.C. 2907.04
(corrupting a minor), O.R.C. 2907.05 (gross sexual imposition), O.R.C. 2907.06 (sexual
imposition), O.R.C. 2907.321 (obscenity involving a minor), O.R.C. 2907.322 (pornography
involving a minor), or O.R.C. 2907.323 (illegal use of a minor in pornography), or convictions
under former O.R.C. 2907.12 (felonious sexual penetration) cannot be expunged. Additionally,
convictions on or after October 10, 2007 under O.R.C. 2907.07 (importuning) or a conviction on
or after October 10, 2007 for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to
that section, cannot be expunged. Convictions which occurred on or after October 10, 2007 under
O.R.C. 2907.08 (voyeurism), O.R.C. 2907.09 (public indecency), O.R.C. 2907.21 (compelling
prostitution), O.R.C. 2907.22 (promoting prostitution), O.R.C. 2907.23 (procuring), O.R.C.
2907.31 (disseminating matter harmful to juveniles), O.R.C. 2907.311 (displaying matter harmful
to juveniles), O.R.C. 2907.32 (pandering obscenity), or O.R.C. 2907.33 (deception to obtain matter
harmful to juveniles) when the victim of the offense was under eighteen years of age are precluded
from expungement as well.

As set forth under the Ohio Expungement Law, ORC 2953.36, no convictions under O.R.C.
Chapter 4507 (Drivers License Law), O.R.C. 4510 (Drivers License Suspension, Cancellation,
Revocation), O.R.C. Chapter 4511 (Traffic Laws Operation of a Motor Vehicle), or O.R.C.
Chapter 4549 (Motor Vehicle Crimes), or for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is
substantially similar to any section contained in any of those chapters, qualifies for an
expungement. Similarly, bail forfeitures in traffic cases cannot be expunged.

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 2. Despite the General Claimed Expungement, Ohio Revised Code
Section 2921.02 (H) Prevents Johnson from Holding Public Office.

Initially, it is important to note that the general expungement Johnson claims to have

received is not currently available on the website of the Clerk of the Courts of the Court of

Common Pleas. Assuming there is a general expungement, of greater relevance is the specific

provisions set forth in Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02(H).

In whole, Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02 (H) provides:

"(H) A public servant or party official, or director, officer, or employee of a

municipal school district transformation alliance established under

section 3311.86 of the Revised Code, who is convicted of bribery is forever

disqualified from holding any public office, employment, or position of trust in this

state."

Under this statute, Johnson is forever barred from holding public office and other positions of trust.

The proposition that despite his expungement Johnson is forever barred by Ohio Revised

Code Section 2921.02 (H) as he has been convicted of bribery is supported by the Ohio Supreme

Court's decision in State v. Bassantz, 42 Ohio St.3d 112 (1988) (For the sake of convenience a

copy of which is attached.) 5

5
In contrast, in State, ex rel Gains, v. Rossi, 86 Ohio St. 3d 620 (1999), the candidate was
allowed to continue to hold office once he obtained an expungement where his federal conviction
was tax evasion and not bribery, as in this case.
Page 14 of 18
 In State v. Bissantz, 40 Ohio St. 3d 112, 532 N.E.2d 126 (1988), the Ohio Supreme Court

determined that, pursuant to R.C. 2921.02(F), a person convicted of bribery in office is forever

barred from holding public office in this state, even though the conviction was expunged or sealed

pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. R.C. 2921.02(H), which provides that a public servant or party official

convicted of bribery in office is forever ineligible to hold a public office in this state. In reaching

its conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court explained as follows:

"In our view, the expungement of this particular offense would not prevent his

conviction from being considered in determining his eligibility for public office,

notwithstanding the general language of R.C. 2953.33(A). Thus, we uphold the

clear mandate of R.C. 2921.02(F) to the effect that Bissantz is forever barred from

holding office in this state."

Historically, a convicted felon is incompetent to be an elector or juror or to hold an office of honor,

trust or profit. The right to vote is restored when such a person is granted probation, parole, or a

conditional pardon. In depriving a convicted felon of his right to hold public office, the primary

aim of this statute is to impose an additional penalty for the commission of a felony. The power

to disqualify a convicted felon from holding public office is specifically granted to the

General Assembly. Thus, it is apparent that the General Assembly may impose certain

qualifications upon those who seek public office.

In this particular instance, the legislative classification is clear, rests on reasonable grounds,

and affects all persons in the class equally. The prohibition here reflects an obvious, legitimate

public policy which states in effect that felons convicted of bribery arising out of their

position of public trust should not ever again be entitled to enjoy such a position.

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 It is a well-established rule of construction that specific statutory provisions prevail over

general provisions. R.C. 2921.02(H), being a specific provision, therefore prevails over the more

general provisions of R.C. 2953.33. While R.C. 2953.33 provides the general effect of

expungement, it cannot prevail over the compelling public policy specifically declared in R.C.

2921.02(H).

It is thus apparent from the foregoing that, when a statute indicates an obvious legislative

intent to prohibit the holding of a license or public office by a person who has been convicted of

or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense, government officials and boards are not prohibited from

using official records pertaining to the person's conviction or guilty plea that have been ordered

sealed by a court so as to prohibit the person's holding of the license or public office. See State v.

Bissantz, supra.

Generally, speaking the "sealing of a record" does not pursuant to R.C. 2953.33(B), prevent

questioning, even though a record has been ordered sealed, in any application for a license, a

person may be questioned with respect to convictions that are ordered sealed when "the question

bears a direct and substantial relationship to the position for which the person is being considered."

See generally Szep v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 106 Ohio App. 3d at 625, 666 N.E.2d 662

("R.C. 2953.33(B) simply provides that when a person files an application for a license, a state

board may question that person concerning a sealed conviction if the questions are relevant to the

issue of whether the license should be granted"); Jackson v. Bd. of Nursing Educ. and Nurse

Registration (R.C. 2953.33 does not prohibit inquiry concerning records sealed before a person

applies for a state license); Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Friendly Drugs, 27 Ohio App. 3d 32,

499 N.E.2d 361 (the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy may question an applicant for licensure as a

terminal distributor of dangerous drugs with respect to expunged drug convictions).

Page 16 of 18
 Therefore, in light of the plain language of Ohio Revised Code Section 2921.02(H), it is

obvious the General Assembly intended to permanently prohibit individuals convicted of bribery

from holding public office even though as in this case a court may have entered an order under

R.C. 2953.32 sealing the official records pertaining to the conviction.

III. CONCLUSION:

Allowing Johnson to run for Mayor of the City of Cleveland would set a dangerous

precedent. Not only would the Cuyahoga County Board of Election be acting in contravention of

state law by allowing Johnson to run for Mayor of the City of Cleveland despite having been

convicted of the federal statute determined by the United States Supreme Court to be best

construed as "taking a bribe", in addition allowing Johnson to run for office would open the

floodgates for all similarly situated individuals who have been convicted of bribery to hold office

after obtaining a state court expungement. Such individuals would include Jimmy Dimora and

others convicted in the massive Cuyahoga County corruption scandal. This result has clearly by

the state legislature been determined not to be acceptable and not in the best interests of the people

of this state. More importantly, such a result would be a disservice to the people of this

community.

Johnson has his law license and can continue a lucrative law practice, or consulting

business, as he did in the past, or a other activities. The law is clear, he just cannot serve as a

public official, by virtue of his past misconduct and so disallowing his mayoral candidacy is

appropriate.

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 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

____________________________________
EDWIN DAVILA
Pro Se - Protester

Telephone: (330) 412-2605

Email: davilaed70@aol.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent by ordinary U.S. mail and/or by

electronic mail transmission on this ___ day of May, 2017 to the following:

COUNCILMAN JEFFREY D. JOHNSON

Cleveland City Council
601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 220
Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Respondent

_____________________________
EDWIN DAVILA
Pro Se - Protester

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