Teves v.

Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Edgar Teves, Mayor of Valencia, Negros Occidental and his wife Teresita Teves was charge of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act. While in the performance and taking advantage of
his official functions and conspiring with his wife, issued a license in favor of Daniel Teves to operate Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center, said accused having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the
fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and a wife Teresita.

On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita Teves of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all
their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in
favor of the Government, as well as perpetual disqualification from public office

Issue:

Whether Teves interest in the cockpit was sufficiently established

Under what law should Teves be penalized

Ruling:

Yes. The prosecution has established that Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit
in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated
that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership
over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as
long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January
1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no
longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he
divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita
Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a
direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other
from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be
owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore,
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government
official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

xxxx

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.

Teves should be penalized under the LGC 1991.

The Anti-Graft Law, particularly Section 9, provides as follows:

SEC. 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public official or private person committing any of the unlawful
acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not
 less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office,
and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest.

On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991 prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:

SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary Interest. Any
local official and any person or persons dealing with him who violate the prohibitions provided in Section
89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with imprisonment for six months and one day to six years, or a fine
of not less than Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or both
such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals
with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any
conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute.[23] Or where two
statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail over the other.

Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from possessing
pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and which, in itself, prescribes the punishment
for violation thereof, is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a
general manner. Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former became effective on 1 January
1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of
legislative will.

Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta

Facts:

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the
preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel
involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million.
APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the
citys Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno
with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. For Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
Answer with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing
to sue.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City In its Order dated
September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted
the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and
admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the
citys complaint.

It also granted Capalads motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped
as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of
Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

Issue:

Whether Lazaro Law Firms representation of the City Government was proper.

Held:.

No. Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer.
Under Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as
in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,
269 SCRA 34 (1997), we cited that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185, city governments may already
create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and
officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal
officer is still vacant, although its charter was enacted way back in 1998. Because of such vacancy, the City
Prosecutors appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the citys legal
adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the
circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City
Prosecutor. Notably, the citys Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City
Prosecutor prepared the citys pretrial brief and represented the city in the pretrial conference. No question was
raised against the City Prosecutors actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the
city lacked adequate legal representation.

The appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the
LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component
city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and
the Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by
private counsel as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be
spent to hire private lawyers. Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor
has not even been allowed.
Social Justice Society v. Lina

Facts:

Petitioner is a political party and respondent is then the Secretary of Interior and Local Government. Sometime in
2002, Petitioner filed a petition for Declaratory Relief against respondent praying for the proper construction of Sec.
90 of R.A. No. 7160 (LGC). The pertinent provision provides that Sec. 90 Practice of Profession. xxx (a) All
governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. Petitioner points out that, actors, who were
elected as public officials, should be disallowed to appear in movies and TV programs for it will give them undue
advantage over their political opponents and considerably reduce the time that they must devote to their constituents.
Petitioner further impleaded respondents Mayor Vilma Santos (Lipa), Pampanga Gov. Lito Lapid and Paranaque
Mayor Joey Marquez.

Respondent DILG thru the Sol. Gen. moved for the dismissal on the grounds that (1) it had no legal standing as it
was not the party affected by the statute; (2) not the real party in interest; (3) no judicial controversy; (4) no need for
construction of said provision; (5) there is already a breach of the statute alleged in the petition; and (5) declaratory
relief is not the proper remedy. RTC dismissed the petition for Declaratory Relief. Petitioner filed a petition for
review on Certiorari. Petitioner alleges that it has locus standi as being a registered political party composed of
citizens having legal interest to be informed and enlightened WON public officials can appear in TV shows during
their tenure.
Issue:

Whether petition for Declaratory Relief should prosper.

Held:

No. SC found the dismissal by the RTC proper for being an inappropriate remedy for enforcing compliance of said
Sec. 90 of R.A. 7160 or LGC. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a
will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written
instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. For the action to prosper, it
must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination. In the case at bar, SC said that petitioner failed to allege the ULTIMATE FACTS which
satisfy these requisites. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner, the said provision (Sec. 90, LGC) to which
interpretation is sought HAS ALREADY BEEN BREACHED, therefore DR cannot be availed of.

People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Villapando

Facts:

Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was
committed. On July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal
Administrator of the said municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does
not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Held:

The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted
with grave abuse of discretion.The legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule
in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be
no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code where any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in
any of their subsidiaries. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, and
thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.

Hermo v. Dela Rosa and Republic v. Dela Rosa

Facts:

G.R. No. 104654

On September 20, 1991, Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the
RTC Manila. On October 7, 1991, Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.

On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was
moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order. The hearing proceeded and on February
27, 1992 Judge dela Rosa rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.

G.R. No. 105715

Raul Lee was the official candidate of LDP and Frivaldo the official candidate for Lakas-NUCD for the position of
Governor of Sorsogon

Lee filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation: the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers were not in accordance with law; Frivaldo is an alien whose citizenship is under question in G.R. No.
104654; Frivaldo is not a duly registered voter. Lee prayed that votes for Frivaldo be considered as stray votes; Lee
be proclaimed the winner The COMELEC En banc dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time
Lee then filed a Petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction with Prayer for TRO and to annul the en banc
Resolution of COMELEC; annul the proclamation of Frivaldo as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon; delete
of Frivaldo's name from the list of candidates; proclaim of Lee as the winner; enjoin Frivaldo from taking oath and
assuming office; and compel COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case against Frivaldo

G.R. No. 105735

Quiteria filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for TRO and immediate resolution by the COMELEC of the
Petition for Cancellation of Frivaldo's Ceritificate of Candidacy

Quiterias Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy alleged that Frivaldo is an American citizen and so,
ineligible to run; RTC decision was full of legal infirmities rendering it null and void; the RTC Decision violated
R.A. 530; Hearing was held less than four months from the last date of publication of the Order and Petition for
Hearing

Issue:

Whether Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

Ruling:

No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and
to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:

(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;

(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;

(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and

(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between
an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a
woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to
comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation
respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
terms.

Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We
can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he
had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that
he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate
the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they
voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that
he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner

Bautista v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. TheElection Officer, Josefina P. Jareo refused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus
against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court, which the Trial Court granted on 1 July 2002, ordering
Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for
Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election
Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs
otherwise.

On 11 July 2002, however, the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate
of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the
COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002. Bautista obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winner. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as
Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain of the First District of Batangas. On 16 August
2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered by Nasugbu
Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.

Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August 2002
(COMELEC Resolutions). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautistas certificate
of candidacy. On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELECs policy regarding proclaimed
candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their election

COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista
from the official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers
of Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all
candidates concerned; and (3) direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking
his oath of office or from assuming the position which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution Nos.
5404 and 5584.

Consequently, Election Officer Jareo issued on 20 August 2002 an Order[10] deleting the name of Bautista from the
list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The Order also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and
discharging the functions of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan pursuant to the COMELEC Resolutions.

The Board of Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and after making the necessary corrections in the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay.[11] Alcoreza thus assumed
the post of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.
On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for reconsideration of the COMELEC
Resolutions. On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC,
Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order.

Issue:

Whether a candidate for Punong Barangay should be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run.

Held:

Yes. Under the Local Government Code of 1991an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not
only be a qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a registered voter.

These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which
prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections.
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates
are registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate.

It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the
barangay where he intends to run for office.

Bautista admitted that he was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbanga. It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss
in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already aware that
his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year
despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong Barangay.

Bautista alleged that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan was due to the refusal of Election
Officer Jareo to register him sometime in January 2002 but did not offer any other proof like a duly accomplished
application form for registration to substantiate his claim that he indeed attempted to register anew.

Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one
of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a
misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office
should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid
certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation
of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications
for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from
serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the peoples choice expressed in the local elections
deserves respect. Bautistas invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. As held in Aquino v.
Commission on Elections:

Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The fact that Bautista,
a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he lacks
one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay.
Cayat v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias
Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues
that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is
not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied
because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice
mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

Issue:

Whether the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

Held:

The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before
the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions
concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the
presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats
disqualification became final only after the elections.
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the
office he seeks to run.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1 st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd
term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by
the RTC due to an election protest.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory
on May 14, 2004.

Issue:

Whether Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

Held:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to
wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor
until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which
enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest
number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who
should be declared as the mayor.

Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship.
On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship
in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted
by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said
petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one
year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and
failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

Ruling:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency
requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of
origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim
that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying
at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly
held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a
particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of
making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in
San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and
national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not
prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will
respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to
breathe life to their manifest will.

Jalover v. Osmea

Facts:

On October 3, 2012, Osmea filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu.
In his COC, Osmea indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for 15 years prior to the May 2013
elections.

Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification."

The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmea made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters
COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. In
particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmea falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a
resident of Toledo City 15 years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections.
In his defense, Osmea argued that even prior to his actual transfer of residence to Ibo, Toledo City, in 2004, he had
been able to establish ties with Toledo City in view of his familys business interests and his political linkages.

According to Osmea, in 1995, he bought a piece of land in Ibo, Toledo City, where he built two (2) houses from
1998 to 2002 and became a permanent resident thereof in 2004. Osmea further averred that he became a registered
voter of Toledo City in 2006 and that he leased at least 2 properties in Toledo City for his headquarters. In addition,
he claimed that in December 2011, he bought a 5 hectare parcel of land in Das, Toledo City.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmea did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC.

The COMELEC en banc subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and stated that it is not
required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place.

Issue:

Whether Osmea committed misrepresentation in his certificate

Held:

No. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative
of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.

Osmeas actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo
City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeas
substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only
by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but
also his participation in the communitys socio-civic and political activities.

To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.

Where a material COC misrepresentation under oat his made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws,
we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice
between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in
any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorates will.

With the conclusion that Osmea did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, the Court sees no
reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will.
Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo
warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was
naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not
make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became
an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his
lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who
voted for him by a vast majority.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the
event Labo is disqualified.

Held:

1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian
in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently
swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be
said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when
he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the
will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would
Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.

2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would
be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.

Facts:

For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of
Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed
his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the
ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labos COC.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated
on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5)
days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on
May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either
on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he
wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment
declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event
he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement
its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final
and executory.

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already
become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Issue:

Whether Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.

Whether disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

Held:

No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on
May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e.,
May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.

The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having
acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly,
petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the
majority of the electorate is of no moment.

No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the
next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains
that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the
office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec seeking to
deny due course to petitioners candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
De la Torre v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime
becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for
an offense involving moral turpitude.

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the
probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements
of the crime of fencing.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.

Held:

Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the
accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received as stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or
theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process private duties they owe
their fellowmen in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals.
Mercado v. Manzano

Facts:

Respondent Edu Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections.

However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by Comelec on the
ground that he is a dual citizen.

Issue:

Whether Manzano is eligible to be Makati Vice Mayor even if he is a dual citizen.

Held:

Sec.40 of the LGC provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective position.

However, the court ruled that dual citizenship under Sec.40 must be understood as dual allegiance. The former arises
when different laws of citizenship of different countries are applied to a person without any voluntary act (jus soli,
jus sanguinis) while the latter arises out of a positive act of a person who simultaneously owes loyalty to different
countries.

To terminate the status of dual allegiance, it must conform with the strict processes of law while in dual citizenship,
the mere election of Philippine Citizenship upon filing of the COC is sufficient to terminate the previous status.

By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with
the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as USA-American. The COMELEC First
Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US passport after his
renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling, another candidate for mayor
of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case
and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of a US
passport. does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to unrenounce what he has earlier on
renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

Issue:

Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run
for public office.

Held:

Yes. Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed
his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

COMELEC En Banc was correct in holding that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of
using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

Therefore Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

Jacot v. Dal

Facts:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division2 disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May
2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United
States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989.

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los
Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner
took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as
a citizen of the Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number
of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his
US citizenship.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

Held:

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before
the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with
for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No.
9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his
foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy
which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship
or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.20

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.

De Guzman v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the
June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from
running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.

Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA
9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights.
As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

Held:

Yes. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:

1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country;

2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign
country.

The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance.

Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which
further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running
for vice mayor.

Valles v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez who was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother,
ran for governor of Davao Oriental.

Petitioner Cirilo Valles filed a petition for disqualification against Lopez on the ground that she is an Australian
Citizen.

Issue:

Whether Lopez is eligible to run as governor.

Held:

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the laws effective at the time of birth of Lopez before the 1935
Constitution, her father is considered as Spanish subject and a Filipino citizen. As such, she is also a Filipino
Citizen.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The principle of jus sangguinis has been adopted also by the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Hence, Lopez is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Also, the mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.

Coquilla v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla is a Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American Citizen after joining the US
Navy.

He then applied for repatriation and on Nov.2000, his application was approved and he took his oath as a citizen of
the Philippines.

On February 2001, he filed his COC to run as a mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar where he stated that he has been
residing in the place for two years.

Another candidate Neil Alvarez filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Coquilla but the Comelec failed to
resolve the issue so the petitioner later on was declared the winner.

Alvarez argues that Coquilla has not complied with the residency requirement for the position of mayor.

Issue:

Whether Coquilla complied with the residency requirement.

Held:
Although Coquilla was born and grew-up in Oras, Eastern Samar, he is deemed to have lost his residence together
with his citizenship when he was naturalized as American citizen.

He is only deemed to have acquired his citizenship and residence until his re-acquisition of his Philippine citizenship
when he took oath on Nov.2000.

As such, when he filed his COC, he is considered as resident of the place for a few months and not two years as he
stated therein. Hence, his disqualification is valid on the ground of misrepresentation.

Coquilla cannot invoke the ruling in Bengzon v. HRET that upon repatriation, he is deemed to have reacquired his
original status. This is because the issue here is his false statement in his COC.

Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner Pricila Justimbaste filed a disqualification case against Rustico Balderian, a mayoralty candidate in
Tabobtabob Leyte on the ground of material misrepresentation in his COC and that he is not a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner argues that Balderians real name is CHU TECK SIAO but it was not the name reflected in his COC.

Comelec denied the disqualification case and Balderian won the election. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether Balderian committed misrepresentation in his COC.

Held:

The petition is without merit because SEC. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that cancellation of COC is
allowed only if any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false

Although the birth name of the respondent is CHU TECK SIAO, there is already a decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) granting his change of name to Rustico Balderian.

The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material
misrepresentation" under Sec.78 refers to "qualifications for elective office."

There was also no intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondents identity, nor that by using his Filipino
name the voting public was thereby deceived.
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which
he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Kare v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Salvador Moll and Avelino Ceriola are candidates for mayor in Malinao, Albay.

Ceriola filed a petition for disqualification against Moll on the ground that he was previouslt sentenced by final
judgment to suffer the penalty of 6 months to 1 year and 9 months for the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions.

Moll won the May 2001 election but on March 2003, Comelec issued a resolution disqualifying him from office and
declared Ceriola to be the mayor.

The vice-mayor Emiliana Kare filed a petition to against the resolution on the part of the proclamation of Cariola.
She argues that she is the rightful successor the the position of mayor.

Issue:

Whether the proclaimation of Ceriola is valid.

Held:

Moll argues that his judgment is not yet final but since he was not able to seasonably file his MR, it did not stay the
implementation of the judgment.

On the issue of who should be the mayor, the court ruled that Comelec was wrong in proclaiming Ceriola because
the resolution disqualifying Moll took effect after the election, that is on March 2003.

Comelec argued that under the OEC Sec.24, any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by
final judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot." Moll,
according to Comelec, was disqualified when he was convicted by final judgment long before the election and so
Ceriola is the lone candidate in the election.
The court however disagrees. The court said that it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en
banc issued Resolution to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the
electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that
they agreed to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.

To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy
and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice. As such, in case of permanent vacancy, the elected vice
mayor should be proclaimed as the mayor.

Amora v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol.

To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition fielded Trygve L. Olaivar for the mayoralty post. Respondent
Arnielo S. Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality.

On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria
alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely
presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead
of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.

Atty. Granada counters that while he normally requires the affiant to show competent evidence of identity, in
Amoras case, however, he accepted Amoras CTC since he personally knows him.

Amora was victorious in the local elections. A week later, COMELEC en banc granted Olandrias petition. Thus, this
case.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified by presenting his community tax certificate as competent evidence
of identity in executing his COC.

Held:

No. An improperly sworn COC is not equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in
the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a
petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to personally know
the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that according to the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the
Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC.
He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the
League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged
defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this
instance.

Laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility.
Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public,
which is the case herein.

The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.
People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Villapando

Facts:

Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was
committed. On July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal
Administrator of the said municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does
not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Held:

The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted
with grave abuse of discretion.The legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule
in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be
no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code where any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in
any of their subsidiaries. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, and
thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.
Borja v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Respondent Jose Carpo is the vice-mayor of Pateros for a term ending June 1992. When the mayor Cesar Borja died,
Carpo became the mayor by operation of law.

In 1992, Carpo ran and elected as mayor and in 1998 he again filed his COC for re-election but petitioner Benjamin
Borja Jr. contested it on the ground that he had already served the three-consecutive term allowed by law.

Issue:

Whether Carpo has already served three consecutive terms.

Held:

The contention of Borja is unmeritorious.

The three term limit of local officials must be taken to the right to be elected and the right to serve the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms but he must also be
elected in the to the same position in the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

In this case, the first term of Carpo cannot be included in the computation because he was not elected in that
instance but rather only served the remaining term of the deceased mayor by virtue of operation of law.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was the mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for two consecutive terms. In 1995, he ran again for his
third term and won. However, after an election protest has been filed by his opponent Juan Alves, the Comelec
declared a failure of election and the position vacant but Lonzanida still continued to function as such.

After the recounting of votes, Comelec declared Aves as the winner of the election and issued a resolution for such
in February 1998, a few months after the next election. Lonzanida acceded to the resolution and Aves took over the
position.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his COC to run as mayor of the place but his opponent this time,
Eufemio Muli filed a disqualification case on the ground that he has already served his three-term limit.

Muli contends that even though Aves has been declared as the winner in the 1995 polls, Lonzanida still functioned
as the mayor for almost the entire term.

Issue:

Whether Lonzanida has already served his three-term limit.

Held:

The argument of Muli is without merit.

The three-term limitation provided by the Constitution and the LCG provides that The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

In the present case the assumption in office of Lonzanida in 1995 cannot be considered as part of the three-term
limit because of the absence of two requisites. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected
to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Montebon vs. Comelec

Facts:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and
2004 elections. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of
vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as
municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term
limit rule. In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule
because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of
elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

Issue:

Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?

Held:

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides
that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall
become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of
the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to
succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the
official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the
successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do
so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public
functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.
Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office
as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
180444. April 9, 2008)

Note:

Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his
occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.
Dizon vs. Comelec

Facts:

Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify
Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served
three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that
Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he
was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus,
he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that
his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SCs ruling
in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of
Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the
LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004
elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Issues:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on
May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:

1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We
cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1995-
1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004
elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation for the
1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales service with respect to the 1998-
2001 term because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001
term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007
term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of
mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1995-1998

1998-2001

2001-2004

2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither
did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)
Bolos vs Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms
(1994,1997, 2002).

In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July
1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay.

After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a
candidate for the same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.

Cinconiegue contended that Bolos relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary
on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14,
2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there
would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.

In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post
as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of his last term of service.

Pending the resolution of the case before the COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.

The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum
three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered that the
proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he assumed
the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.

Held:

YES. The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the
sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular
election of barangay officials.
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more
than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term.

In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their electedofficial full service of a
term. The Court held that two conditions for theapplication of the disqualification must concur: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying
the first condition for disqualification.

What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong
Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioners relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking,
Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July
1, 2004, is avoluntary renunciation.

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned.
Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and
readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the
municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former
position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he
intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as
Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.

The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that
rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected." Black's Law
Dictionary also defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve
upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or
cooperation of the party himself.

An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Comelec and
Borja vs. Comelec. In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang
Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Raymundo Adormeo filed a petition for disqualification against the incumbent mayor of Lucena City, Ramon Talaga
Jr., from his re-election bid for the 2001 polls on the ground that he has already served three consecutive terms.

Talaga was the mayor of the place in 1992-1995 and again on 1995-1998. In his re-election bid in 1998, however, he
lost to Bernard Tagarao. In a recall election in 2000, Talaga run against Tagarao and won and he served the
unexpired term of the latter.

The Comelec first denied the petition of Adormeo but granted it after a motion for reconsideration has been filed.

Issue:

Whether Tagala already served for three consecutive terms.

Held:

Talaga served two consecutive term at most and then lost. After two years as a private citizen, he ran again in the
recall election and won. As such, his term cannot be considered as consecutive although he merely served the
unexpired term of Tagarao after the recall polls. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections.

The comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision
that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will
be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed is only applicable to
members of Congress where there is no recall election provided.
Latasa v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995 and 1998.

In September 2000, a plebiscite was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of
the term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality. However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay
in position in a hold-over capacity until the next election.

In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three
consecutive term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor.

His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga filed a disqualification case against Latasa in the Comelec on the ground
of violation of the three-term rule. Comelec granted the petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not acted upon until the
day of election and hence, he won and proclaimed as the mayor.

Issue:

Whether Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos.

Held:

The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

The Court believes that Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has
been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor,
he also assumed office as city mayor unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office. In this case, there was no interruption in the holding of office and hence, the three
consecutive term is completed.

Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on disqualified, the second placer Sunga, cannot assume the position but the
vice mayor.
Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-
day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently
lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can
pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the
three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.