Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
http://www.jstor.org
Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul'
GEORGE BOYS-STONES
ABSTRACT
Phaedo of Elis was well-known as a writer of Socratic dialogues, and it seems
inconceivable that Plato could have been innocent of intertextualitywhen, excus-
ing himself on the grounds of illness, he made him the narratorof one of his
own: the Phaedo. In fact the psychological model outlined by Socrates in this
dialogue converges with the evidence we have (especially from fragments of the
Zopyrus) for Phaedo's own beliefs about the soul. Specifically, Phaedo seems to
have thought that non-rational desires were ineliminable epiphenomena of the
body, that reason was something distinct, and that the purpose of philosophy was
its 'cure' and 'purification'.If Plato's intention with the Phaedo is to assert the
separability and immortality of reason (whatever one might think about desire
and pleasure), then Phaedo provides a useful standpoint for him. In particular,
Phaedo has argumentsthat are useful against the 'harmony-theorists'(and are the
more useful rhetorically speaking since it is only over the independence of rea-
son that Phaedo disagrees with them). At the same time as allying himself with
Phaedo, however, Plato is able to improve on him by adding to the demonstra-
tion that reason is independenta proof that it is actually immortal.
Reliquiae [SSR] (Naples, 1990), IIIA, with discussion at vol. 4, 115-27. Giannantoni
is rigorous in excluding texts that do not name Phaedo; a more generous collection of
testimonia for the Zopyrus is presented and discussed in L. Rossetti, 'Ricerche sui
seem to be several reasons for this level of interest in him. First, the
Phaedo is one of Plato's most poignantdialogues:the dramaticcontext
evoked aroundthe impendingexecution of Socrates asserts itself with
unusualforce. Secondly, Phaedo's role as the ostensible narratorof the
dialogue is given an unusual emphasis by Plato. The Phaedo not only
opens with an emphaticassertionof Phaedo's right to narrateas a wit-
ness of Socrates' last hours (ac'T6, J, Dai86wv, xapry6vov...; aryo , X
'EXC'pate;),but also, extraordinarily,makes a point of explainingwhy
Platocould not narrateeventshimself:he was off sick at the time (HX6rov
8&oloat 19a0vEVt:59blO). Finally, it happens that evidence about Phaedo's
backgroundfromoutsidethe Phaedo providesa readyanswerto the ques-
tion of why, from a dramaticpoint of view, Plato shouldhave chosen to
speak throughPhaedo ratherthan one of the other Socraticswho were
supposedto have been presentwith him in Socrates'cell. Phaedo,we are
told, had been a prisonerof war, and made to work as a prostitute.The
analogy with the soul as Socratesdescribesit in the Phaedo is not hard
to see: for it too, duringlife, is imprisoned,trappedin pollutingservice
to carnality.And just as the soul is eventuallypurifiedand releasedfrom
attachmentto corporealitythroughthe practiceof philosophy,so Phaedo
was liberatedfromhis enslavementat the instigationof Socrates;became,
indeed,a philosopherhimself, and the founderof his own school at Elis.4
1982), 9-10, 89. For the various accounts of Phaedo's life, see SSR IIIA 1-3. E. I.
McQueen and C. J. Rowe have shown that his capture in war is at least historically
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 3
possible: 'Phaedo, Socrates and the Chronology of the Spartan War with Elis',
Methexis 2 (1989), 1-18 (cf. also Dusanic, 'Phaedo's Enslavement and Liberation').
Whether it is plausible that he was prostituted is another question (it is denied by
Montuori:'Su Fedone di Elide', 36-40; 'Di Fedone di Elide e di Sir Kenneth Dover',
Corolla Londoniensis 2 (1982), 119-22). Other explanations for Plato's choice of
Phaedo as narratorof the Phaedo have been suggested. In the view of L. Parmentier,
Plato was paying a simple homage to a dead friend ('L'age de Phedon d'Elis', Bulletin
de l'Association GuillaumeBude 10 (1926), 22-4 at 23). W. D. Geddes (Plato, Phaedo
(2nd edn.: London, 1885), xiii-xiv) suggests that Phaedo was chosen as being known
for having the right balance of artistic sensitivity and philosophical acumen for the
occasion. Giannantoni,by contrast, thinks that the choice of Phaedo is motivated pre-
cisely by his insignificance for the circle of Socrates: by choosing Phaedo as his nar-
rator, Plato ensures that our view of Socrates at such an importantmoment will not
be clouded by association with a Euclides, Antisthenes, or Aristippus (SSR 4.119).
There is always the possibility that Phaedo was in fact Plato's source for events on
that day: one would not have to assume just because of this that the discussions in
the dialogue were mere transcripts.Cf. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge,
1955), 13; and the cautious remarksof J. R. Baron on the last words of Socrates: 'On
Separating the Socratic from the Platonic in Phaedo 118', Classical Philology 70
(1975), 268-9. D. N. Sedley is unusual in looking to Phaedo's philosophical position
for an explanation of his presence, observing a 'philosophical kinship' between the
Zopyrus and the Phaedo: 'The Dramatis Personae of the Phaedo' in T. Smiley (ed.),
PhilosophicalDialogues. Plato, Hume,Wittgenstein.Dawes HicksLectureson Philosophy
- Proceedings of the British Academy 85 (Oxford, 1995), 3-26, esp. 8-9.
5 Out of a longish list of dialogues attributedto him (DL 2.105; Suda s.v. od6owv),
Diogenes Laertius (loc. cit.) thinks these two genuine. The Simon seems to be behind
the invective of one of the 'Letters of Aristippus' (no. 13 = SSR IVA 224; cf. Letter
12 (part) = SSR IVA 223, with K. von Fritz, 'Phaidon von Elis und der 12. und 13.
Sokratikerbrief',Philologus 90 (1935), 240-4). Since these letters are later composi-
tions than they pretend to be (cf. e.g. Giannantoni, SSR 4.165-8), this indicates an
interest in the Simon somewhat later than the generation after Socrates. The more dis-
tinguished sources of testimonia for Phaedo include Cicero, Seneca and (into the 4th
century AD) the EmperorJulian.
4 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
The Phaedo seems to stand apartfrom other Platonic texts in the psy-
chological model with which it works. It stands apart, in particular,
throughits treatmentof desire - desire, that is, for corporealstimulation
or satisfaction.Accordingto the 'standard'Platonicaccount,this sort of
desire forms a distinct 'part' of the soul, of which anotherpartis reason.
Like reason (with which it may conflict), such desire is a psychological
determinantof action. What makes this a plausibleaccountof desire is,
first, the very fact that it is one source of impulse for a body whose life
and activity dependson the presenceof the soul; and, secondly, the fact
that the pleasure which is positedby desire as the end of humanactivity
is itself something that registers in the soul.7 In the Phaedo, however, Plato
appearsto be tryingsomethingdifferent.Accordingto the Socratesof the
Phaedo, desire is not of the soul at all, but of the body. It has an impact
on the soul (which in essence is pure reason);but as an externaldistrac-
tion to it, not as a waywardpart of it. The idea seems to be that, once
animatedby the directivepresenceof reason,the needs and the satisfac-
tion of the body assertthemselvesas appropriateobjectsof reason'scare.
In manycases, reason(broughtto forgetfulnessof its proper,divine sphere
at the momentof incarnation)actuallygoes so far as to identifyits own
interestswith those of the body. Nevertheless,the body, and the desires
that come from it, are properlyalien to the soul, which standsto them as
a guardto his post (cf. 62b), or a man to his cloak (cf. 87b-e) - or a con-
demned prisonerto his cell, or, if you like, a noble P.O.W. to his igno-
minious bordello.
It would be wrong to deny the familial resemblance between the
Phaedo and otherdialoguesin which Plato discusses the characterof the
soul. In particular,Plato never denies the primacyof reason;8and if, in
6 The Phaedo is not the only case of this: the Theaetetus is narratedby Euclides,
founder of the Megarian school (cf. DL 2.108 for his dialogues).
I Compare esp. Philebus 21a-d (for the mental dimension to pleasure); 35cd (for
the location of desire and impulse in the soul).
I T. Johansen notes references to our rational nature as 'original' in the Republic
(61 Id) and Timaeus (42d, 90d): 'Body, Soul, and Tripartitionin Plato's Timaeus',
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19 (2000), 87-111 at 109 with n. 34.
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 5
the Gorgias and Phaedrus,desire is so far from being alien to the soul
thatit seems to be an essentialandeternalcomponentof it, in the Republic
and TimaeusPlato takes what might be thoughtof as the middle ground
between this view and that of the Phaedo. Accordingto these dialogues,
desire is of the soul, indeed,but as accidentnot essence, so thatit becomes
a 'mortal'accompanimentto immortalreasonwhich might(in imagescon-
vergent with the dominanttheme of the Phaedo) eventuallybe 'purged'
of it.9
Just as importantly,Plato never denies the crucial role played by the
body in shapingdesire,or the irrationalsoul more generally.'0Even if the
desirefor pleasurespringsfrom the soul, the body, as the meansby which
the pleasure is attained,naturallyhas a significantinput into the shape
taken by an individual'sdesires. In exploringthis aspect of the question,
Plato sometimessails quite close to the positionof the Phaedo - the posi-
tion that desires spring from the body in the first place. It has recently
been arguedfor the Timaeusin particularthat Plato sees the characterof
the soul therein reductionistterms,as 'following' the temperamentof the
body; as a straightforward function of the body's physiological state in
terms very similar to those of the Phaedo. This is how Plato can say, in
the Timaeus,that no-one errswillingly:vice is a resultof bodily disease."
It seems to me, however,thatthis cannotbe quiteright- and thatPlato
never (i.e. outsidethe Phaedo) commitshimself to anythingstrongerthan
the claim that the body is one influenceon the characterof the irrational
9 Republic esp. 10, 61 lb-612a; Timaeus esp. 41d, 69cd (42b for the escape of the
just soul from incarnation).
10Themes in the dialogues which reflect Plato's interest in the scope of the body's
effect on the characterof the soul include speculation about the psychological impli-
cations of the physical environment (e.g. for the characterof the Greeks at Timaeus
24c; for the Atlantans at Critias 1Ile; for Northern races such as Thracians and
Scythians at Republic 435e; cf. also Laws 747de). Or, again, his discussions of the
inheritanceof character(e.g. Charmides 157d-158b;Cratylus394a; hence also the pos-
sibility of breeding for good character:Republic 375-6, 459; Politicus 310 and Laws
773ab; cf. Critias 121b). Neither theme contradictswhat I shall go on to argue, namely
that Plato's standard position is that the body does not determine character: both,
rather,operate on the assumption that the natureof the body might predispose some-
one lacking the appropriatecontrol of reason to acquire a certain sort of character.
11 Timaeus 86e. See Christopher Gill, 'The Body's Fault? Plato's Timaeus on
Psychic Illness' in M. R. Wright(ed.), Reason and Necessity. Essays on Plato's Timaeus
(London, 2000), 59-84. Gill invokes Galen to his aid; and the language of 'following
[bodily] temperament'('E'?caOtKcpiaeal) is taken from Galen's reductionistinterpre-
tation of Plato in his QAM (Quod animi mores; or, to give it its full title and in Greek:
"OTt tacl ToV OaTo; Kpaevotv ati Tiw vXii vvaiget; 'tovtaQ).
6 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
12 Gill
recognises ('The Body's Fault?', e.g. 60), but plays down (61) the signi-
ficance of educational and political influences on psychological development, partly
because he assumes that one's mental capacities are determinedby the body as well.
This itself seems to me mistaken. It is true that 'madness and ignorance' can be
explained by physical disease (86bc); but the point is that the mind's naturalactivity
here is disturbed by an unusual degree of turmoil in the body, not that it is in gen-
eral a function of physiological state. Cf. e.g. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology
(London, 1937), 346-9; D. J. Zeyl, Plato, Timaeus(Indianapolis,2000), lxxxv-lxxxvi.
1' It should be emphasised that both doing and being receptive to philosophy are
entirely natural human functions. (For the place of philosophical education in one's
development, see 44bc; cf. 88bc.) Indeed, both are inscribed in the body, every bit as
much as the tendency towards irrationalvice: so man's philosophicaldestiny (cf. 42ab)
is an explanatoryfactor behind, for example, the structureof the sense-organs(47b-e),
the mouth (75e), and even the gut (72e-73a). Cf. Johansen,'Body, Soul, and Tripartition
in Plato's Timaeus', 109-10; C. Steel, 'The Moral Purpose of the Human Body. A
Reading of Timaeus 69-72', Phronesis 46 (2001), 105-28. I take it that all of this
allows us to say that even someone who was 'constitutionally'mad or ignorantshould
in the natural course of things be under the care of others, whose reason would be
substitutefor his own in counterbalancingthe effects of excessive physical disorder.
14 A common way of doing this is to say that the soul manifests its nature differ-
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 7
Our evidence for Phaedo's views about human psychology comes from
the fragmentsof his lost work, the Zopyrus,and in particularfrom what
seems to have been the centralepisode of that dialogue in which a visi-
tor to Athens named Zopyrus was prevailed upon to demonstrateon
16
The premise of the Zopyrus might, then, be comparedwith the starting-pointfor
some of Plato's dialogues: in the Protagoras too, for example, or the Ion, a foreigner
arrives in Athens with a claim to special expertise. That Zopyrus was a foreigner is
clear from fr. 9 Rossetti ('When he [sc. Socrates] was alive, a man called Zopyrus
came to Athens...'). It has been suggested that Zopyrus was, more specifically, a
Persian, partly because of his name (cf. e.g. Herodotus 3.153-60) and partly through
the circumstantialdetail that someone in the dialogue told a story concerninga Persian
prince (quoted below in the text; for the argument,cf. Rossetti, Aspetti della lettera-
tura socratica antica 145-6). Neither piece of evidence is unassailable, however: the
latter is merely circumstantial(and cf. next note); and we know that the name Zopyrus
was not confined to Persians (Plato, Alcibiades 122ab and below note 20).
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 9
Phaedo. .. supposed that nothing was beyond the cure of philosophy, but that
everyone can be cured of any kind of life throughit - of their behaviour,desires,
everything, in a word, of the sort. If it helped only the well born and well
brought-upthere would be nothing amazing about what it did, but if it brings
people in such a bad state to the light, it seems to me surpassingwonderful.
as an indication that he was the narrator;and then again, it could be incidental (since
the identificationof Zopyrus' nationality itself rests in part on the reference to Persia
here). Socrates himself is not ruled as the narratorof the story by the fact that it is
addressed to him: the Platonic Socrates, anyway, is quite capable of relating narra-
tives as told to him, or discussions he has had with others (as with Diotima at
Symposium201d ff., for example) in which he himself is addressed.
18 The Zopyrus is a possibility (so von Fritz, 'Phaidon', 1540; Kahn, Plato and the
Socratic Dialogue, 12); but Nails pessimistically wonders (The People of Plato 231)
whether he has read any genuine works of Phaedo at all.
'9 Alcibiades' leonine nature is suggested by Plato (Alcibiades 122e-123a: cf.
N. Denyer, Plato, Alcibiades (Cambridge, 2001), 186), Aristophanes(Frogs 1431-2),
and Alcibiades himself at Plutarch,Alcibiades 2.2.
10 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
the fact that Alcibiades had a tutorwho sharedhis name with the dia-
logue's eponym:Zopyrus.Indeed,it might not be too fanciful to suggest
that the first readersof the Zopyruswere supposedto assume from the
title that they were purchasingyet anotherdialogue aboutAlcibiadesand
his education.20
Whateverthe truthof the matter,the importantconclusionfor now is
that such evidence as we have for the Zopyrusaside from the physiog-
nomicalepisode hints at a remarkabledegreeof convergencewith a read-
ing of the physiognomicalepisode that treatsit seriously,not ironically;
that at least one of its themeswas the transformingpowerof philosophy.
It starts,in otherwords,to look as if the Zopyrusas a whole is best served
if Zopyrus really did get Socrates right; and Socrates (as written by
Phaedo)was not being ironicin defendinghim and confessingto a wicked
nature.The point is his reformthroughphilosophy.But if this shouldbe
accepted, then we can surely go furtherand ask by what mechanism
Phaedomight have explainedall this. What might Phaedohave believed
aboutthe soul to lead him to the conclusionthat 'natural'characterman-
ifested itself in physicalappearance,but was the kind of thingwhich phi-
losophy could overcome?
Thereis, of course,no reasonat all to supposethat Phaedoascribedto
Zopyrusa theoreticalview of the soul's relationshipwith the body, or that
Socrateswas supposedto be in agreementwith him about this. In fact,
the dynamicof the dialoguewould be betterexplainedif Zopyrushad no
theoryat all. If Phaedo'sdialogueswere anythinglike Plato's, it is a fair
bet that Socratesspent a good deal of his time talking preciselyto peo-
ple whose abilities ran ahead of their capacityto give them a theoretical
underpinning- whose 'skills' and 'virtues' were empirical,where they
should have been knowledge-based.2' PerhapsZopyrus was like this: a
20 Rossetti supposes that Alcibiades' tutor (for whom, see Plato, Alcibiades 122ab)
was the dialogue's eponym ("'Socratica"in Fedone di Elide', 371; more cautiously at
Aspetti della letteraturasocratica antica 145; cf. also Nails, The People of Plato 305
s.v. 'Zopyrus'). But this seems unlikely if Phaedo's Zopyruswas a strangerin Athens
at the time of his encounterwith Socrates - and especially if he really was a Persian
(cf. note 16): Alcibiades' tutor was Thracian (Alcibiades 122b). For Alcibiades as a
stock figureof the Socraticdialogue,cf. Denyer,Plato, Alcibiades5, notingthatAeschines
(DL 2.61), Antisthenes (ib.; also DL 6.18), and Euclides (DL 2.108) as well as Plato
and Phaedo himself (Suda s.v. 'Dalci8v) are all credited with dialogues named after
Alcibiades.
21 The bravery of Laches, despite his inability to define bravery in the Laches,
would be a good example. Cf. for the theoretical point the two types of physician at
Plato, Laws 720ab, who share the same title 'whether they are free men - or whether
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 11
The fact that Zopyruswas able to get at the naturewith which Socrates
was born would suggest that the body is somehow or other a force that
predisposesone's irrationalnatureto develop in a certain way, or lays
down its 'default';but it cannotdetermineone's nature,which is open to
the healing influenceof reasonas well. Cicero, in fact, ascribesto Phaedo
somethingnot unlike the psychology I arguedwas championedby Plato
in the Timaeus- with the differenceonly that the irrationalsoul (or its
equivalent)starts,not as a blank sheet subjectto the influencesof body
they are slaves and acquire their skill by following their masters' orders, and by obser-
vation and experience. They do not acquire it from [an understandingofl nature, like
the free men, who learn it themselves and teach it this way to their own sons.'
12 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
'I am', says Socrates(frr.8, 11); 'I do incline' (fr. 9); Socrateshas become
better than a naturewhich he neverthelessretains(fr. 10).
The evidence, I am suggestingthen, attributesthe following claims to
Phaedo:(1) that each personhas a 'nature'which encompassestheirirra-
tional impulses;(2) that this 'nature'is relatedto the body in such a way
that an expertin the mattercould deduce the formerfrom the appearance
of the latter;and (3) that one's 'nature'does not determinebehaviour.If
we assume, as seems likely, that what determinesbehaviour in cases
where naturedoes not is reason, then Phaedo is workingwith a bipartite
model of behaviour familiar enough from Plato and Aristotle. Where
Phaedonow seems to differ,however,is in the claim that irrationalurges
are no more susceptibleto trainingor rehabituationthan the set of the
eyes or the shape of the neck. How could he claim this?
One possibilityis thatPhaedobelieved somethinga little bit like Plato:
at least that there are rationaland irrationalpartsto the soul; but that he
believed in addition(and unlike Plato) that the irrationalpart automati-
cally throwsits lot in with the body and remainsthroughoutdeaf to rea-
son. Possible but, it seems to me, unlikely:such a model has no parallels
in antiquity;and one might wonderin a case where the irrationalwas so
fully determinedby the body what advantagethere might be in claiming
that it was differentfrom the body at all.
Anotherpossibility,then, is that Phaedoheld somethinglike an 'emer-
gentist' view of the soul. The idea would be that 'psychological' func-
tions (includingdesire and reason) somehow superveneon physiological
activity,but thatreasonacquiresin its turna causalefficacywhich is inde-
pendentof the body. Philosophically,this is undoubtedlya more attrac-
tive view; and I think it cannotbe positivelyruled out for Phaedo.But it
also has historicalproblemsto contendwith: for the only (other)evidence
for emergentisttheories of soul in antiquitysuggests that they post-date
Aristotle and, more than this, makes it look as if they were inspiredby
him.25The form of psychological reductionism known to Plato and
26 For Plato, see Phaedo 85e-86d (where such a theory is outlined by Simmias) and
91b-95a (where it is refuted by Socrates). For Aristotle, see de anima 1.4, 407b27-
408a30; also fr. 45 Rose3 (from his Eudemus). Argumentsex silentio are never ideal;
but if Phaedo had been an emergentist,and Plato knew it, the decision to make Phaedo
the narratorof the Phaedo would have been very strangeindeed. The attack on reduc-
tionism so important for establishing the immortality of the soul would be fatally
underminedby the constant reminderthat Phaedo himself held an alternativeform of
epiphenomenalismless vulnerable to much of Socrates' argument.
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 15
The soul, insofar as it can take the lead - and 'especially if it is wise',
i.e. especially insofaras reason is engaged- can conflictwith and over-
come bodily urges;hence the soul (especiallyreason)cannot,afterall, be
a 'harmony'of physical elements. Note, by the way, that this argument
does not ultimatelyhave to rely on a belief that the desires themselves
are bodily (though I have arguedthat Phaedo himself happensto have
thoughtthat):the phenomenonof psychologicalconflictin generalwould
by the same line of reasoningdemonstratethat at least part,but perhaps
the whole of the soul is distinct from the body. But it is clearer as an
argumentagainst the harmony-theorists if one phrasesit as if from such
a position;and, as concedingmore to the harmony-theorists (namely,that
desiresat least are functionsof bodily state),is arguablymorerhetorically
effective againstthem.
Someone resistant to my suggestion that Plato deliberately invokes
Phaedo'spsychologyin the Phaedo (or adoptsa Phaedonicperspectivein
his own explorationof the soul there)will naturallysupposethat the co-
incidencebetweenPhaedo'sown assertionsaboutreason'srelationshipto
desire in the Zopyrus and the argumentagainstSimmiasin the Phaedo is
no morethanthat- coincidence.But it is not merelywishful thinkingthat
leads me to make the comparison.There is a powerfulsuggestionin the
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 17
text itself that Plato might have had Phaedoin mind duringhis attackon
the harmony-theorymooted by Simmias. My argumentso far has dealt
withtwo Phaedos:thehistoricalPhaedo,philosopherof Elis, andthePlatonic
character,Phaedo, who narratesthe Phaedo and Socrates' argumentsin
that dialogue. But there is a third Phaedo to be reckonedwith here as
well. For Phaedo is also an interlocutorin the Platonicdialogue he nar-
rates,and Phaedothe interlocutorbecomes importantpreciselyas Socrates
is about to make his final assaulton the crucialobjectionsto the hypoth-
esis of the soul's immortalitymade by Simmias and Cebes.
Phaedo'sappearancewithin the frameof the Phaedo can be easily sum-
marised- they are not, as it happens,very many. We learn, first of all
and early on, that on the day of Socrates'executionhe was suffering,not
pity for Socrates,but a strange'mixture'of pleasureand pain (58e-59a).
His next appearanceis 30 Stephanuspages later, when we are told that
although,along with the others,he had been convincedby Socrates'ear-
lier argumentsfor the immortalityof the soul, he was 'unpleasurably'dis-
turbedby the objections of Cebes and Simmias and thrown into doubt
again (88c). Socratesteases him for his long hair, and correctlyguesses
that Phaedo was expecting to cut it in mourningfor him (89ab). But
Socrates thinks that he should cheer up: the argumentscan be defeated,
that therewill be nothingto mournfor. Indeed,Socratespledges to help
Phaedodefeat them:Phaedowill be Heracles,Socrateshis Iolaus (89c).29
Phaedoreversesthe roles (he will be lolaus; Socratesshouldbe Heracles);
Socratessays thatit will be all the same, and goes on to addressto Phaedo
his remarksabout 'misology'. Once again, Phaedodrops out of the nar-
rative until very near the end (at 117c), when he breaksdown in tears-
not, he says, for the fate of Socrates,but for his own misfortunein losing
such a friend.
That Phaedothe interlocutorhas such a small role might not seem too
disturbingat first.It might be assumedthathe is mentionedat all only to
remindus that Phaedo the narrator was presentat the events he is nar-
rating;an assertionof his rightto narrateequivalentin its own way to the
repeateda{t6; [sc. napt_ysv6pgvJ with which the dialogue opens. In this
case, we would not expect him to intrudehimself into the conversation
more than necessary. But there is, in fact, a good reason to think that
Phaedo'srelativelack of involvementas an interlocutorin the discussions
about the soul has a positive significance.The reason is that is that his
relativesilence problematiseshis one small momentof glory. For rightat
the heart of the dialogue, after the crucial challenges by Simmias and
Cebes,justbeforetheargumentative climaxwhichis theirrefutation,Socrates
appointsPhaedoas the Heracleswho will tackle them (89c):
'If I were you and the argumentfled me I would swear an oath like the Argives,
not to allow my hair to grow before I had fought and defeated the argumentof
Simmias and Cebes.'
[Phaedo replies:] 'But,' I said, 'even Heracles is said not to have been able to
deal with two.'
'Then, while there is still light, call me to your aid as Iolaus,' he said.
'I call you to my aid, then,' I said: 'not as if I were Heracles, but as if I were
lolaus calling Heracles.'
'It won't make any difference,' he said.
invoke the comparison?And why does Phaedo accept it, albeit with a
modificationof parts?
The answer is not in the text: Phaedodoes nothingat all. So perhaps
Socratesis looking to a futurethat lies outside of the text? Phaedomust
have been a young man at the time of Socrates' death;it has been sug-
gested that the long hairremarkedon by Socratesin the immediatelypre-
ceding passageis meant,one way or another,as an indicationof the fact.30
Certainly,he is not within the text ascribeda 'mature'philosophicalposi-
tion:he is, for example,convincedand then throwninto doubtagain about
the immortalityof the soul. Now Plato quite often (presumablyrather
more often than we can tell) plays with his reader'sknowledge of what
was to become later on of charactersin his dialogues- the historicalfate
of some;3 the philosophicalfate of others.32Consider,in particular,the
differenceit makes to our readingof Socrates'commentson Isocratesat
Phaedrus278e-279a that we possess so much of his work. Perhaps,then,
the suggestionthatPhaedowill performHeracleandeeds in supportof the
positionSocratesgoes on the developagainstSimmiasand Cebes is meant
to make us look forwardto Phaedo'sfutureachievements.If Phaedowas,
in his own philosophicalcareer,known preciselyfor the developmentof
argumentswhich could be used againstpositionssuch as that of Simmias
(the position that the soul, reason and all, was an epiphenomenonof the
30 It has been taken to indicate that Phaedo was still a boy (e.g. Burnet, Plato,
Phaedo, ad 89b2; R. S. Bluck, Plato, Phaedo (London, 1955), 34); or, since Socrates
'used to tease' him for the length of his hair, it might indicate that he had, by Athenian
conventions, outgrown the style, and was a young man. So L. Robin (Platon, Phedon
(Paris, 1926), p. x) followed by Rossetti (Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica
122-6), and Rowe (Plato, Phaedo, 212 ad 89b3-4). (McQueen and Rowe argue in fact
that Phaedo must have been around 20-22 at the time of Socrates' death: 'Phaedo,
Socrates and the Chronology of the SpartanWar with Elis', 2 n. 7 with 14 n. 65.) It
should be noted that not everyone thinks the hair significant (Giannantoni,SSR 4.119),
and of those who do, not everyone reads it as a sign of Phaedo's age. Some see pro-
Spartanaffiliationin it (e.g. Parmentier,'L'age de Phedon d'Elis' 22-3; Montuori,'Su
Fedone di Elide' 35-6; Nails, People of Plato 231); J. Davidson (Courtesans and
Fishcakes: The Consuming Passion of Ancient Athens (New York, 1998), 332 n. 56)
suggests an allusion to Phaedo's time as a prostitute.
31 E.g. on Cephalus, M. Gifford, 'Dramatic Dialectic in Republic Book 1', Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001), 35-106 esp. 52-8.
32 There are ways of twisting the trope too: the 'might have been' of Theaetetus
(Theaetetus 142c), for example, is already negated by his impending death (142b); the
promise of the youthful Socrates in the Parmenides, on the other hand, seems alto-
gether too great, since he seems to have Plato's theory of forms well on the way to
completion.
20 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
3 The implication, in this case, would be that Plato has outdone Phaedo - an impli-
cation present already, perhaps, in the very fact of his appropriationof him. If G. W.
Most is right that the Phaedo (at least the end of the Phaedo) is intended to secure
Plato's claim to be Socrates' legitimate heir, there might be a sharperpolemical edge
to the suggestion ("A Cock for Asclepius", CQ 43 (1993), 96-111; cf. G. Tanner,
'Xenophon's Socrates - Who were his informants?',Prudentia 28 (1996), 35-47, esp.
42-3, arguing that there was rivalry between Plato on the one hand and Phaedo and
Xenophon on the other). But see note 36 below for an alternativeinterpretationof the
last words of Socrates, on which Most bases his argument.
5 There might even be a hint at this position in Phaedo's description of himself at
22 GEORGE BOYS-STONES
the beginning of his narration.For he tells us that he was, on the day of Socrates'
execution, in the grip of a 'mixture' of emotions. The word for 'mixture' is Kpaat;
(59a5), the standardword in medical contexts for the 'temperament'of the body - i.e.
the particularblend of corporeal elements or parts which underlies a given physio-
logical or pathological state (already in the Hippocraticcorpus e.g. Nature of Man 4).
The very same word is used later on in the dialogue as a synonym for the 'harmony'
of corporeal elements which is said by the harmony-theoriststo constitute the soul:
Otiat Ey? yE. . . 1cpatV EiVat Sat apjovtav avOT6,vToUTCOv'rv ijUXI1v Tlg(.v (Phaedo
86b; cf. d2). Phaedo's 'mixture' of emotions might well have had a basis in his phys-
iological 'harmony'.
36 And perhaps it was Phaedo who originally spoke of the soul's 'purification'
(Kca&expa;t;)in much the terms used by Socratespassim in the Phaedo, and of its 'cure'
in the terms implied by Socrates' dying wish to have a cock sacrificed to Asclepius.
In any case, we have the evidence of Julian (as cited above) that Phaedo believed in
the curative and purifying power of philosopher (o&&ev&viarov Elvat M (ptXoaopti,
ncavcxa;8? Eicvtwv
K urs' awtij; KcaOaipea0atiMwv).This is not, by the way, to say
that either Phaedo or Plato saw death as the purificationor cure of the soul (which is
Most's objection to reading the last words of Socrates as a referenceto his own 'cure':
"'A Cock for Asclepius"', 100-4). The point, more generally, is about the freeing of
one's rationality from service to the body - something for which death might itself
stand as a metaphor.
PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL 23
University of Durham