Collado vs. CA G. R. No.

107764 October 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a
parcel of land with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is
situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620.
Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an
Amended Application to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants
joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
petitioners application.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession
has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the
name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
belong to the State. Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State.

It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and
disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show
that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a
watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio

We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over
technicalities and rules of procedure.

In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the registration of public lands,
specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:

It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government
sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would
involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.

The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition
does not prescribe.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the
RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of
71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons
from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of
Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Petition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence
the Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO

FACTS:

On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La
Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration of a parcel of
land, located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of
the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In
support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration for the year 1994 in his
name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of
the application.

On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition. The MTC of
Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its Decision, approving
respondents application. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of
Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision,
affirming the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with all the
requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has become
private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required
by law.

HELD:

NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report dated July 17,
2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land area in question
is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21, 1987.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The
MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question.

However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since
1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina
Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in the name of
Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming that the
1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be
taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation
and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to
signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified
as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on
December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30)
years under existing laws on prescription.

Republic vs. Metro Index Realty & Devt Corp

Facts:

1. Respondent filed w/ the RTC of Cavite an application for judicial confirmation of title
over 3 parcels of land located at Brgy. Mataas na Lupa, Indang Cavite

a. During the hearing it presented 2 witnesses

i. Dimayuga Project Documentation Officer who testified that respondent bought the
property from Herminia, Melinda & Hernando Sicap & that it was declared for taxation in the
respondents name in 2006 &&& the property is alienable & disposable land evidenced by the
certification issued by DENR

ii. Herminia testified that she & her siblings inherited the land from their parents who
had been in possession of the land since 1956 as shown by the tax dec & at the time they
inherited the property, they had been religiously paying taxes thereon & planted coconut,
banana, santol, palay & corn

2. RTC granted the application w/ CA affirmed ruling that the number of trees found in
the land is not the determination of ownership of the land (even only few trees are there, does
not mean that they did NOT own the land) & constructive possession

3. SC reversed the CA decision for failure to comply w/ the requirements of sec 14, PD
1529 (1st & 2nd par)

Issue:

W/N respondent had proven that he is entitled to the benefits of PD 1529 on confirmation of
imperfect titles?
Held: NO!

1. Although respondents might be in open & continuous possession of the land, still it is
part of the public dominion

a. Public lands become only patrimonial not only w/ a declaration that these are alienable
& disposable lands but there must be an express govt manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the devt of the national wealth
&&& only so will prescription run against it

2. The classification of the land to be public or alienable should have 1st been addressed
to but was regrettably neglected

3. Public Land Act requires more than constructive possession & casual cultivation ---- a
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under a claim of ownership

a. In this case lot 1 = 2k coconuts = 119 hectares

b. Lot 2 = 1k coconuts = 19 hectares

c. Reality = 1 hectare = 114 coconuts w/c means that only 25 hectares out of 138
hectares being applied for was in fact cleared, cultivated & planted w/ coconut w/c need not
be tendered or watched

d. This only showed that casual or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in
question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to
give rise to a presumptive grant from the govt

City Mayor of Paranaque vs. Ebio [G.R. No. 178411 : June 23, 2010]

Doctrine:

Facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406
square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez,
Paranaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of
respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert
that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From
then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot.

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro's
advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. Ebio got his construction permit of
their house in the City government of Paranaque.

On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the
entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's
name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No.
08, series of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paranaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay traversing
the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition
thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.

Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the
Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.

On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said
property
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paranaque City on April 21, 2005
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending
application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Contention of the Respondent:

The land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Which was acquired by their great grandfather as
the original occupant and possessor of the land.

Contention of the Petitioner:

Petitioner, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is
classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks
through time should also be considered as part of the public domain.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent established his right to the property despite his
application
for the sales patent has not yet been granted

Held: RTC Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit.

According to the RTC:

The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have
an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation
of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied

CA Ruling: Favored the respondents and reversed the decision of RTC.

According to the Court of Appeals--

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was]
duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their
predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject
property and starting 1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their
construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have
acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was
subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes.
SC Ruling: AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF CA

According to SC:

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, but the land which is formed
by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form
part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or
derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales
patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since
ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them
by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to
convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public
land

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ABAIRO 90 SCRA 422 (1979)

FACTS:

Petitioner contended that CFI of Isabela should have dismissed the application for registration
based on an imperfect or incomplete title because it has no jurisdiction over it inasmuch as it
was filed on March 1, 1971, that is, after December 31, 1968, the expiry date for filing such
kind of application under RA 2061. The latest extension of the period to December 31, 2020
within which to file said applications, as provided in Section 2, RA 9176, shall apply where the
area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application is valid despite being filed after the period expired and before
the extension was granted.

RULING:

Yes. It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their title
at any time prior to the cut-off date of December 31, 1976 did so on time, even if such
application was filed during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971.
Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for
filing such applications time and again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified
under the law to own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of
landless among the citizenry.

**director of lands vs "dano" case digest 96 scra 161

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC) 146 SCRA 509 December
29, 1986
Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the
complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the
former owners thereof.
2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the
answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of
the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner
of the land as he bought it from the plaintiffs parents while they were still alive.

3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendants ownership of the land. On appeal, the
plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original
answer.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from
the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said
pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in
order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CA

FACTS:

On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title
over three parcels of land, more particularly described as fol lows:

* Lot 9895 Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situate d in
the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;

* Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situa ted in
the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;

* Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situat ed in
the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas.

Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned
lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the co responding Deeds of Sale;
that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it ha d been in actual possession of the lots since
the time it acquired the same fromthe previous owners up to the present; and that its
possession and occupation a s owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been
open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.

Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the
tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots,
Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax De clarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances.

On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial C ourt for the
applicant s failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22,
1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority.

On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to s et the case for
initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Co urt on June 7, 1994 and initial
hearing was set on September 1994.
On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on
March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. In due tim e, petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the ap pealed
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over thre e (3) parcels
of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.

RULING:

The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable ti tle over three
(3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied f or.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration
of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The rul ing is erroneous.

An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show tha t he is the
owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that al l lands belong to the
public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Gover nment either by purchase or by
grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the pr esumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.

The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. It s claim of
acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for
were declared public land by decision of the Cadastr al Court. Such being the case, the
application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 is barred by the prior judgment of
the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the
Cadastral Act and dec lared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by
voluntary appl ication under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by
res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or o wnership over
the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its
predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate
the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than
factual evidence of possession. Actual po session of land consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of su ch a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and
continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this natu re. In other words, facts constituting
possession must be duly established by competent evidence.

The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application for
registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the subject parcels of
land to be public land belonging to the public domain.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA G.R. No. 171514 July 18,
2012

Facts:

- March 3, 1999, R filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
(5,525sqm) in Consolacion, Cebu; alleged that: (a) property is A&D; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa, on July 4, 1970; and (c) he and his PII had been in
possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years

- R submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan, 2 tax dec for the years 1965 and
1974 in Isabels name, Certification issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu
and 3 tax dec for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985

- P opposed: (a) Sec 48(b) of CA141had not been complied with as Espinosas PII
possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) tax dec do not prove that possession
are in the character and for the length of time required by law

- MTC granted Espinosas petition: Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and
possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by DENR as A&D; applicant
has been in OCEN and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14,
sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529)

- CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed MTC: possession for at least 30 years,
despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to
private.

Issue: WON Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy
of confirmation and registration.

Held: NO

- Erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA

- Sec 14(2) of PD 1529: The following persons may file an application for registration:
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

- Sec 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Those who by themselves or through PII have
been in OCEN possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July 26,
1894, except when prevented by war or force majeure.

- June 22, 1957: RA 1942 amended Sec 48(b) of the PLA by providing a 30-year
prescriptive period for JC of imperfect title

- Jan 25, 1977: PD 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and
occupation for a period of 30 years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or
earlier

- PD 1073, in effect, repealed RA 1942 such that applications under Sec 48(b) of PLA filed
after the promulgation of PD 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier
- For one to invoke Sec 48(b), it must be demonstrated that such possession and
occupation commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and 30-year period was completed prior to the
effectivity of PD 1073.

- There is nothing on record showing that as of Jan 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of
PD 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the
property for 30 years

- it is Sec 14(2) of PD 1529 categorically provides, only private properties may be

acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private.

- There must be an express declaration by the State that PUBD property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription.

- As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title
thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Sec 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.

- Notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would
overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain: a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 154953 June 26,
2008

FACTS:

T.A.N. Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title for a land located at Sto.
Tomas, Batangas.

During the trial, the only oppositor is the Republic.

The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy)
had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an
owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio
Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering
the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however,
Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a
Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children,
Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land
provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or
more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession
converted the land to private property.
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred
in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as
required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general
in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should
have been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.

ISSUE:1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945
or earlier; and

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land
Act.

HELD: YES.

On the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable
and disposable rests with the applicant.

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that "lot 10705,
Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with
an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional
Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the
subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May
1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No.
20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated
19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of
Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters).
The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters
which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to
issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by

respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19 (a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputyThe CENRO
is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an
official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.

As to the second issue, The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the
testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find
Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. The Court cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres
testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be
related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did
not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.
Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid
starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the
land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption
that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

As to the third issue, the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x
was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case,
respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his
predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous,
and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when
respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and
disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already
a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous
and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12
June 1945.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate
applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was
already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period
of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only
an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the
doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the Public
Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31
December 2020. Thus:

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may
only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent,
as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of
land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application
for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-
in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation
acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land
by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the
land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

Director of Lands v. CA (106 SCRA 426) ???

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

Topic: Notice of Initial Hearing Publication, Opposition of and Default (Section 23)

FACTS:

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction.
 Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired
jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated
November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that a newspaper publication of the notice of
initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?

HELD:

YES. The petition was granted.

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who
have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there
is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by
private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
These are separate appeals of the parties via certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting the application for confirmation and r egistration of title of
Natividad Alio, substituted by her heirs, to five (5) par cels of land, with an area of 377,216
square meters, situated at Mamburao, Occid ental Mindoro.

FACTS:

"On December 16, 1976, Maria Natividad Alio filed L. R. C. No. N-72 seeking the registration
of five parcels of land containing an aggregate area of 37,7216 hectares under the Land
Registration Act and/or Section 48(b), Chapter VIII of Act 1 41 as amended in lieu of a previous
application docketed as L.R.C. Case No. N-67 which was ordered amended by the Court.

"In her application Maria Natividad Alio claims that she is the owner in fee simple of the
parcels of land situated at Sitio Tagun, Barrio of Taguan, Municipalit y of Mamburao, Province
of Occidental Mindoro.

"She further asserts that the aforesaid parcels of land are covered by Tax Declaration No. 262;
that, applicant being the only surviving daughter of Patricio Alio obtained her title over the
said parcels of land by way of inheritance from he r father; that, applicant has exclusive
possession of said parcels of land and, together with her predecessor-in-interest, her
possession is peaceful, continuous, public and adverse to the whole world and in the concept
of an owner since ti me immemorial, i.e. even prior to 1890; that they have used the said
parcels of land for residential and agricultural purposes up to the present time.

"Maria Natividad Alio s application was opposed by Attorney Amando Y. Azul, Honofre
Cobarrubias, Estanislao Temenia, Benigno Olleres, the Bureau of Forest Development and the
Republic of the Philippines.

"Oppositor Amando Y. Azul, claims that he is the actual occupant of a parcel of land containing
an area of eight (8) hectares more or less which is included in the application for title under
LRC No. N-72; that, he acquired the said parcel of land from a certain Estanislao Temenia, who
was the previous occupant for mor e than thirty (30) years; that, he has caused the survey of
the land which was r ecorded as Psu-230336, which is pending approval before the Bureau of
Lands; tha t, he has commenced occupying the said land since 1963, continuously up to the p
resent without having been molested, disturbed or questioned by anyone, includin g
registration applicant; and, that applicant Maria Natividad Alio has never set foot in the area
covered by his opposition nor introduced a single improvement t herein. Attorney Amando Y.
Azul, therefore, prays that the application for regis tration be denied so far as it includes the
eight (8) hectares he has actually o ccupied and improved.

"Oppositor Honofre Cobarrubias, for his part avers that the application for regi stration
includes a parcel of land with an area of six (6) hectares more or less situated at sitio Ligang,
barrio of San Luis, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, whi ch parcel of land he has actually
occupied and improved without having been mole sted, disturbed or questioned by anyone,
including the registration applicant, s ince 1958 when he purchased said land from Mr.
Estanislao Temenia; that, at the time of the sale in his favor the said land has been fully
cultivated to upland riceland by the vendor whose occupation has been open, peaceful,
adverse and in the concept of an owner since the last thirty years; and, that applicant Maria N
atividad Alio has never set foot in the area covered by his opposition nor introd uced a single
improvement therein. Honofre Cobarrubias, therefore, prays that th e registration application
be dismissed in so far as it affects the area of six (6) hectares which he owns.

"Oppositor Benigno Olleres contends that he is the actual physical possessor of a parcel of
agricultural land situated in Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis, Mambura o, Occidental Mindoro
embraced under the plans submitted by the applicant, with an area of more or less 17,7759
hectares declared for taxation purposes under Ta x Declaration No. 1547 in his name; that, he
has possessed the said property ope nly, publicly, continuously and adversely against the
whole world and under a bo na fide claim of acquisition of ownership by himself and his
predecessor-in-inte rest for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
ins tant application without having been disturbed by anybody much less the applican t,
except only sometime June of 1977 when a certain Conrado Alvarez, alleged car etaker of the
applicant tried to gain a foothold on his property, resulting in h is filing of a Forcible Entry case
against said Conrado Alvarez, which case is s till pending trial in the lower court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro; that, whe n he first entered the land it was forested and cogonal and
thereafter, he has u prooted the trees thereon, planted fruit trees and has converted a portion
of th e same to an irrigated field; that, he has been religiously paying the taxes due the
government for the land subject of his opposition. Benigno Olleres, thus, p rays that the
application be dismissed and the land subject of his opposition be decreed in his favor. (pp.
83-84, Records)

"Oppositor Estanislao Temenia, alleges that he is the actual and physical posses sor of a
parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, with an area of 154,460 square meter; that, he inherited the said parcel of land from
his parents and that he and his predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession a nd occupation thereof since the time immemorial under
a bonafide claim of acquis ition of ownership without being disturbed by anybody; that, he has
declared the said parcel of land for taxation purposes lunder Tax Declaration No. 2411; that ,
the said land was still a primeval virgin land when he and his predecessors-in -interest first set
foot on it, which thereafter they converted into a rich agri cultural land; that, the aforesaid
parcel of land is included in the land sought to be registered by herein applicant under plans
Psu-04-005173, Psu-4A-000231,

Psu-4A-000232, Psu-04-000233; that, Maria Natividad Alio has never taken possessi on of
the land which are objects of her application whether actual or constructi ve and therefore,
not entitled to a registerable right over the same. Estanislao Temenia therefore prays that the
application for registration with regard to th e parcels of land subject of his opposition be
denied and that he be declared th e lawful possessor thereof.

"As for the Bureau of Forestry, psray that the application for registration with regard to the
lands subject of their opposition be denied and that the same be declared part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

"Finally, for its part the Republic of the Philippines, opposes Maria Natividad Alios application
on the following grounds:

"1. That neither the applicant/s nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 (b), C.A. 141 , as amended by P. D. 1073);

"2. That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of
applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/e s not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for, or of his/her/their
open, continuous, exclusive and noto rious possession and occupation thereof, in the concept
of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not appear to be
genuine and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended po
ssession of applicant/s to be of recent vintage;

"3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or g rant can no
longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an a ppropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed
on December 16, 1976.

"5. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation." Meantime, the original applicant,
Natividad Garcia Alio, died on May 26, 1985, an d was substituted by her heirs Nieves, Elisa,
Bienvenido, Antonio, Renato and Leonardo, all surnamed Alio-Buhay.2

"After trial, on September 17, 1990, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, which in
part states:

"Documentary evidence presented consists of the application requisites from stag e to stage,
until the application was filed, on December 16, 1976, Survey Plans, Technical Descriptions,
Tax Receipts, and Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle.

"The individual oppositors likewise submitted Tax Declarations and Tax Receipts and copies of
deed of sale.

"The pleadings, the evidence on file as above outlined and all the papers of rec ord now
render it justifiable to maintain oppositor-parties in possession of the areas claimed by them.
An additional ground for this exists with regard to those cases where some papers have been
filed with the Bureau of Lands. (Atty. Arman do Azul and Honofre Cobarrubias)

ISSUE: Whether respondent heirs of Natividad Alio have registerable title as owne rs of the
five (5) parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square meters, situated at sitio
Tagum, Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

RULING:

No the respondent heirs of Natividad Alio have registerable title as owners of th e five (5)
parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square meters, si tuated at sitio Tagum,
Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must conclusively show that he is the
owner in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the State, unless
acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an
occupant and his predecessors since time i mmemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had n ever been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.

"The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the Stat e, and any
person seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner."
In this case, the land in question is admittedly public.1wphi1 Neither the applicant Natividad
Alio nor her predecessors in interests had any title or grant from the Spanish sovereign not
even an imperfect or incomplete title and the only basis o f her claim of ownership is
possession allegedly since time immemorial. Nonetheless, applicant anchors her application
for registration on the provisions of Act No. 496, or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141,
Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application" to apply for judicial confirmation and registration of title.10

However, applicant and her predecessors in interests had not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application.

Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of
possession by herself and her predecessors in interest since June 12, 1 945 before the filing of
the application.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession of her
predecessors in interest. "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property."

11 "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence
of possession."

12. The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse
and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.

13. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence.

14. In fact, applicant s possession over subject parcels of land was contradicted by several
oppositors, who claimed that they were in open exclusive, adverse and continuous possession
of the areas respectively claimed by them, and said parcels o f land were personally cultivated
by them. The land applied for even encroached on the pasture land of Mary Y. Azul.1wphi1

While it may be true that applicant purchased the subject property in 1913, the same could
not have ripened into ownership because only fourteen (14) years ther eafter, portions of the
land were classified as forest land. The possession of f orest land, however long, never confers
title upon the possessor because the sta tute of limitations with regard to public land does not
ran against the State, u nless the occupant can prove a grant from the State.16

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. C V No.
30605, DENIES the application for registration filed by applicant Nativida d Alio, substituted
by her heirs Nieves, Elisa, Bienvenido, Antonio, Renato and L eonardo, all surnamed Alio-
Buhay, and declares the subject parcels of land to be public lands belonging to the State.

SPS. GABRIEL LLANES and MARIA LLANES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
177947 November 27, 2008
FACTS: The Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of land
located in Malvar, Batangas. The land had been in the possession of Gabriels grandmother
since the 1930s and declared the said property for taxation purposessince 1948. It was
classified as agricultural land and was being cultivated by Eugenias son and Gabriels father.

On 29 December 1995, the subject property came into the possession of the Spouses Llanes
when they purchased the same from Servillano (Gabriels brother) and Rita as evidenced by a
Kasulatan ng Bilihan. Gabriel himself cultivated the subject property and religiously paid real
property taxes.

In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to ICTSI Warehousing,
Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

ICTSI filed an application for registration of title over the subject property before the RTC of
Batangas, but has to amend the application due to the alleged technicality that the sale
between ICTSI and the Spouses Llanes could not push through because the tax declaration
covering the subject property was still in the names of the Spouses Llanes and could not be
transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI.

The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition to the Spouses Llanes application.

On 21 April 1993, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 64-93 delegating to first level
courts the jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases. Pursuant
thereto, the RTC issued an Order remanding the entire records of the Spouses Llanes
application to the MCTC.

The Spouses Llanes filed their formal offer of evidence before the MCTC. Among the evidence
they submitted were the Certifications issued by the DENR IV, Forest Management Bureau
(FMB) dated 9 March 2000 and by the CENRO, Batangas City dated 15 June 2000, both
declaring the subject property as alienable and disposable.

The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses
Llanes.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the
Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to comply
with the statutory requirement of possession for 30 years, the subject property becoming
alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997 per the CENRO Certification.

It was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the Certifications issued to them
by the government agencies concerned stated different dates when the subject property
became alienable and disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB Certification, the subject property
became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. However, according to the CENRO
Certification, the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 December
1997. The Spouses Llanes then verified the correctness of the CENRO Certification and found
that CENRO committed a mistake therein. CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by issuing another
Certification dated 20 July 2004, consistent with the DENR Certification, that the subject
property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The Spouses Llanes attached
the corrected CENRO Certification as Annex "A" to their Appellees Brief submitted to the
Court of Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing any reason, did not consider the
same.
Hence, the present petition.

The CA granted the appeal of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the grant by the
MCTC of the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title based on its finding that the
subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997.

HELD: YES. The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title are: (1)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession
has been under abona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. A certification by the CENRO of the
DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and
disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real
character of the land subject of the application.

In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from DENR
Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject
property. However, the two Certifications contained different dates as to when the subject
property became alienable and disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR Certification, but 22
December 1997 according to the CENRO Certification. The discrepancy between the two
Certifications was overlooked by the parties during the trial stage of the case before the
MCTC. The MCTC granted the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title without
mentioning the said discrepancy between the two Certifications. The discrepancy was
discovered only when the present case was already before the Court of Appeals. The Spouses
Llanes immediately verified and secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which
confirmed the DENR Certification that the subject property became alienable and disposable
on 26 March 1928. The appellate court, however, did not consider the corrected CENRO
Certification and, in ruling against the Spouses Llanes application, still relied on the first
CENRO Certification which incorrectly stated that the subject property became alienable and
disposable only on 22 December 1997.

Since the determination of the true date when the subject property became alienable and
disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this Court, in the interest of
substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even
though it was only presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Vicente Yu Chang and Soleda Yu Chang VS Republic of the Philippines February 23,
2011

FACTS:

Petitioners father L. Yu Chang executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property with the
Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, Justo Casuncad. Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
opposition, saying that the land is legally classified as Public Domain, forest land.
HELD:

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended by PD 1073 provised that: The following
described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose title have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title thereof, under the Property
Registration Decree.

In order that petitioners application for registration of title my be granted, they must first
establish the following:

1. That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the Public
Domain

2. That they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Jose Amunategui vs Director of Forestry provides that: A forested area classified as forest land
of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover.

The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

** Jean Tan, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012

**republic vs ching case digest 2010

Vda de Barroga vs. Albano, 157 SCRA 131

FACTS: CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the
oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the
decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of 14 years or so (October 14,
1955). It was only after 24 years (November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name.

1970 - after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina
Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual appellants Eufemia Barroga and
Saturnina Padaca-brought suit against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino appellees
Angel Albano, et al.

Barroga et.al.: had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners
thereof; they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled and that a new title
be made out in their names.

Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining Lot 9822,
belonging to Cesar Castro. Castro filed complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof.

CFI: DISMISSED Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of
the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title.
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's
and Padaca's suit for recovery of Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior
judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property,
and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part
as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one
"against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing.

On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel
Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. Writ of possession dated
August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of
possession by Angel Albano, et al.

They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of
Possession Issued.

Their argument: as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a
mere motion for writ of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not they can be ejected.

HELD: Yes. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of
time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same
does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and
Lucero v. Loot, It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot
9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos'
right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the
judgment in the cadastral case.

Conformably with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion,
the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over
Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in
favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced
against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who
was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q.
Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of
possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at
least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-
interest. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long
enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

Director of Land vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557

In a previous cadastral proceedings, respondents were declared owners of lot 2457 in

Tacloban Leyte 14.5k sq/m. After 26yrs, the respondents under the same cadastral court and
under Republic Act 931 claims that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a
portion of said Lot No. 2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the
original survey. the court a quo issued an order admitting the petition, ordered that copies of
the original as well as of the amended petition be furnished the Solicitor General, the
Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds of the
province, setting the case for hearing on October 18, 1958. The court then declared the
petitioners the owners of the said misplaced lot. The spouses then moved for a write of
execution and possession, but the 62 people who were already occupying the said additional
lot opposed saying that they were granted the land by Dir of Lands. Subsequently, the Dir of
lands made a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground, among others, that said
decision was a nullity for the reason that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to act on
the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for the reopening of the cadastral proceedings for
lack of the requisite publication and notice as required by law. This was denied, and hence this
petition.

Issue: is the re-opening of the cadstral proceedings legal?

a) due to lack of publication

b) there were already legal existing claimants at that time.

Held: There is no question that respondents Emilio Benitez and his wife may file a petition for
reopening of the Cadastral pursuant to Republic Act No. 931 with a view of claiming such
portion of land which they may have failed to include in their original petition for survey and
registration as authorized by the Cadastral Act provided that the petition be filed within the
period prescribed by said Republic Act No. 931. HOWEVER

a) An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include
land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a
preliminary to such step. Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
court in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by
amendment of the plan without new publication

b) Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to have an additional portion
of land registered in his name is concerned in the sense that it can only be entertained if it
does not refer "to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted,
or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." Here it appears
that the additional portion of land claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons
who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to them by the
Bureau of Lands

** Valismo v. Plan 143 SCRA 502

Merced vs. CA, 55 SCRA 240

FACTS:

Ezequiel Santos was claiming ownership of Lot 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an
adjudication of the cadastral court in favor of his father. He sought recovery of ownership and
possession of the land from De la

Merced and of the landlords share in the harvests for 6 years.

De la Merced, on the other hand, asserted her ownership over the property as evidenced by
an OCT issued to her predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the
land for more than 30 years.

1957 - RTC ruled in favor of Santos as evidenced by the OCT issued in the name of Santos
father.

That in 1926, TCT was issued in the name of Ezequiel Santos

 That in 1926, the cadastral court declared lot 395 public land, and as a consequence,
De la Merced was able to obtain an OCT after filing a homestead application

That the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to declare lot 395 as public land and
ordered the cancellation of the OCT in the name of De la Merced

Directed De la Merced to vacate the property

CA affirmed RTCs ruling

That upon the finality of the decree of the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of
the land, the title becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription.

As the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was
obtained by De la Merced, it cannot prevail over the cadastral courts decree of registration of
Lot 395 in favor of Santos

ISSUE:

What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos
and the subsequent order directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Santos?

Did these orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding
certificate of title has not been issued? - YES

Could the property still be lost by adverse possession? - NO

RULING:

1) These important facts must be considered first:

a) 1923 final decision was rendered in the cadastral case = Santos title was confirmed
as against the whole world, including the Government

b) 1925 the cadastral court issued a decree and directed the Land Registration Office to
issue the certificate of title, although no such certificate was actually issued

c) 1926 the same cadastral court declared the same lot public land and as a result, de la
Merced applied for a homestead patent

d) 1931 De La Merced obtained a homestead patent

e) De La Merced was the overseer of the Santos lands therefore, he was a trustee at the
time he applied for a homestead

f) 1952 complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed

2) With regards to public lands, the act of registration is the operative act to convey and
affect such registration. It shall be made in the office of the RD. THEREFORE, the property is
not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the RD had
been accomplished.

3) Decree of registration and certificate of title are two different things.

It is the decree of registration, to be issued by the LRC which shall be the basis of the
certificate of title that quiets the title to the land.

HOWEVER, this only applies to VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION under the Land Registration Act
4) WHEN IS A TITLE TO THE LAND IN A CADASTRAL PROCEEDING VESTED?

The court cited Govt. vs. Abural =

After trial, 3 actions are taken:

i. Adjudication of ownership in favor of one of the claimants constitutes the decision,

judgment, the decree of the court

ii. The declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the
certificates of title

iii. The Land Registration Offices duty to issue the certificates - a ministerial act

Registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the
passage o f the 30-day period allowed for an appeal

5) The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the
period to appeal from the decision of adjudication by the court.

6) THEREFORE, the decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Santos
of the certificate of title over Lot 395 had already become final. From that moment, the land
had become registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.

Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210

Doctrine: A land subjected to cadastral adjudication under the Land

Registration Act cannot be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, except where the
applicant can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Facts:

This case involves two petitions for review.

G.R. No. L-35778

Respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court of Bataan an application for registration
under Act No. 496 of one parcel of land situated in Mariveles, Bataan. The Republic opposed
the application claiming that the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public
domain, thus not subject to private appropriation. Commission of Land Registration (LRC)
issued a certificate that such land is inside Lot 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles.

G.R. No. L-35779

Respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration before the same court for
two parcels of land described as portions of Lot 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre. The Chief
Surveyor of LRC filed a report in the lower court that such parcels of land do not appear to
have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands, and further examination will
be conducted in order to determine whether or not a patent or title has been issued in order
to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles.

The Republic opposed the registration claiming that the land applied for are portions of the
public domain thus not subject to private appropriation.

**********************
In both cases, the lower court ruled in favor of applicants Martinez and Tanalega, hence this
petition. Republic argued that Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of
the Cadastral Court in 1937, thus the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter for voluntary registration under Act 496. The Republic also claimed that the lands in
question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have
already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

Issue:

W/N lower court has jurisdiction over application of registration of land which was already
subjected to cadastral Held:

NO, the lower court does not have jurisdiction. In cadastral proceedings any person claiming
any interest in any part of the land object of the petition is required by Act No. 2259 to file an
answer on or before the return date or within such time as may be allowed by court. In the
instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the cadastral
proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision
had already become final and conclusive.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land,
under the doctrine of res judicata.

. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties
are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment.

Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the
same must necessarily fail. In the instant cases, evidence for the respondents themselves
tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. Mere cultivation
of portions of land does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.

In addition, the survey plans submitted by private respondents were not approved by the
Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). The LRC has no authority to
approve original survey plans. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical descriptions are duly approved the
by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.

* Respondents should have filed a petition to reopen the cadastral case under RA 931.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION INC., (WIDORA) VS. CA, ORTIGAS & CO., 201
SCRA 165 (1991)

Facts: Widora filed an application for registration of a land they acquired from the heirs of
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

Molina and Ortigas & Co. separately opposed claiming ownership. Ortigas filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction, the land being applied for having been
already registered under the Torrens System (TS). MTD denied and the case was set for
hearing.

TC believes Ortigas TCTs were derived form OCT 337, 19, 336, 334 (as it appears on its face)
pursuant to Decree 1425, NOT OCT 351 as claimed by Ortigas. If it were really derived from
OCT 351 then why didnt Ortigas have the same corrected? And besides, Decree 1425 covers
land which is 4 kms. away from the land being applied for. So if there was no valid decree of
registration, Ortigas TCTs cannot be valid.
Ortigas brought the case to the CA on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and the CA
reversed the TC decision and dismissed the case. The CA believed Ortigas TCTs are actually
derived from OCT 351, the latter being issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT
351 is a copy of Decree 1425, even though a copy of Decree 1425 cannot be presented in
court does not mean Decree 1425 was not issued and OCT 351 would suffice to show that a
decree of registration was made. So according to the CA, as far as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned
Ortigas TCTs refer to OCT 351 and the CA ordered that the mistake in the TCTs be corrected.

Issue: WON Ortigas TCTs are valid despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration.

Held: No. CA judgment set aside.

Ratio: The evidence presented by Ortigas to prove the existence of a decree of registration is
merely secondary (i.e. the plan, testimony of surveyor and OCT 351). Ortigas must satisfy
requisites to justify admission of secondary evidence (1. Execution 2. Lost or destroyed or
possession of adverse party). Ortigas evidence should not have been admitted in the first
place.

A ground for dismissal based on disputed facts (WON the TCTs of Ortigas was
supported by a decree of registration specifically by Decree 1425) is not a ground for
dismissal. The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial to afford the parties a
day in court.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory thus not proper for the
extraordinary writ of prohibition. Interlocutory orders cannot be reviewed by the CA until the
LC shall have decided the merit of the case.

The mistakes that appear in Ortigas TCTs cannot be corrected except by order of the
court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered. The court is not authorized to alter or correct a certificate of title if
it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law.
Respondent court committed a procedural lapse.

The rule that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by certificate of Title applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the
certificates authenticity vis-a-vis the land covered therein.

GABRIEL VS. CA 159 SCRA 461 (1988)

Facts: A survey was made for Santiago Quimson. Land was registered under his name and an
OCT was issued by the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently a cadastral survey (Orani survey)
was conducted which resulted in an increase in the land. The Cadastral court confirmed
Quimsons title. The lot was subdivided and subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval.
Potenciano Gabriel had a parcel of land surveyed (2,792,712 sq m designated as Psu 9742)
and later it was amended to exclude portions of land owned by Quimson. OCT 1264 with a
reduced area (2,436,280 sq m) was issued to Gabriel. Another cadastral survey was
conducted (Hermosa survey) and Gabriels lot covered by Psu-9742 became Lot No. 557 with
a further reduced area (2,096,433 sq m) but no new certificate of title was issued such that
the OCT 1264 continued to subsist with an area of 2,436,280 sq m. Gabriel passed away and
his heirs (petitioners) divided the land according to Psu 9742 under OCT 1264 (includes land
owned by Naval). Petitioners filed a complaint against Pascual and Santiago (administrators
of Naval estate) claiming that respondents usurped the land and that the land was merely
loaned to the respondents for dike and water control purposes of the latters fishpond. The TC
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the land was in the possession of Naval in the
concept of an owner and the petitioners claim that the land was loaned to Naval was not
supported by sufficient evidence. Further the TC found that the right of petitioners was lost
by prescription and that they were guilty of laches. TC ORDERED THE NECESSARY
CORRECTION OF THE TECHINICAL DESCRIPTION TO MAKE IT CONFORM TO THE CORRECT
AREA.

CA affirmed.

Issue: WON the courts have the authority to order the necessary corrections of an erroneous
technical description and make it conform to the correct area.

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.

Ratio: In cadastral cases, jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to
the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of lands, provided such
corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. The court also has the
power to determine the priority of overlapping or over-laying registered title. This power is
necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings. Furthermore, in the case at bar, it was not as if the court reopened or
set aside a final decree. Therefore the action of the lower court in correcting the error in the
technical description appearing in Psu 9742 is well within its jurisdiction.

The fact that Gabriel did not own the land is shown by the Hermose and Orani
Cadastre, and by the behavior of Gabriel himself (even after discovering occupation he
allowed Naval to use and occupy the land). The claim that the land was loaned was
supported by mere oral evidence which the SC believes to be insufficient to defeat title and
possession of registered owners.

For failure to prosecute their claims for 20 years, petitioners have lost by laches their
right to recover their property.

** republic vs abacite case digest

Avila v. Tapucar August 27, 1991

Facts:

In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of
coconut land. Said property was inherited in 1965 by private respondents, as successors-in-
interest. In 1960, petitioner Avila bought a 4,371 square meter parcel of land which is part of
the subject property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor, under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free
Patent Application for a lot which has a total area of 6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Sometime
later, private respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from the land
purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila. They filed an action for quieting of title and
damages against the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense of
having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open,
continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. The Avilas filed a
motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and ordered to
refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy
until the termination of the case. In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was
approved and the free patent was issued , and on the same date an Original certificate of title
was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.

Issue:

W/N the subsequent approval of the application for free patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of
the Bahans (the land which rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included
therein), the issuance of free patent and original certificate of title in favor of the Bahans
during the pendency of the case for quieting of title is proper

Ruling: No.

The free patent that was issued to the Bahans is erroneous as it embraced and comprised in
portions thereof lands which belong to the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion
of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the latter owners thereof. A
cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in
any claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of
title issued under the circumstances to such persons would be declared null and void subject
to the right of innocent purchasers for value. While land registration is a proceeding in rem
and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens
Systems does not necessarily make the holder atrue owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or
oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of
the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included. Registration does
not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over
a particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has,
especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration
was made at all.

** heirs of cornelio labrada vs monsanto case digest