Conceptions of Self, No Self and Modes of Connection - Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical Chinese Thought

CONCEPTIONS OF SELF/NO-SELF AND
MODES OF CONNECTION
Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical
Chinese Thought
Mark A. Berkson
ABSTRACT
This essay examines the ways that the terms self and no-self can il-
luminate the views of classical Chinese thinkers, particularly Confucians
such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, and the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi.
In particular, the use of the term no-self to describe Zhuangzis position
is defended. The concepts of self and no-self are analyzed in relation to
other terms within the thinkers concept clustersspecifically temporal-
ity, nature, and social rolesand suggestions are given for constructing
typologies that sort out the range of meanings of self and no-self based on
the characteristics of the relations among terms within the concept clus-
ters. The essay focuses on the way that the Confucians and Zhuangzi use
concepts of self and no-self, respectively, as soteriological strategies that
aim at making connections with larger systems or wholes, and it concludes
that different connections are emphasized by the Confucians and Zhuangzi
precisely because the various connections are made possible and sustained
by different conceptions of self, temporality, nature, and social roles.
KEY WORDS: self , no-self , temporality, nature, Zhuangzi, Confucian ethics
1. A Problem in Comparative Religious Thought

Scholars who undertake projects in comparative religious thought in-
evitably face a major challenge: Selecting terms that will constitute the
categories to be used in the comparative analysis. The word self is of-
ten used to group together a range of concepts in different traditions and
languages for the purposes of comparison (as seen in articles and courses
with titles such as Eastern and Western Conceptions of the Self). This
can be a very fruitful exercise, yielding insights about different traditions
and thinkers. However, there is a risk of bringing varied concepts under
the comparative umbrella in such a way so as to lead to more obfuscation
than illumination.
In my own work, I have often found self to be a useful term in carrying
out comparative analyses, and have used the terms self and no-self in
JRE 33.2:293331.
C 2005 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
294 Journal of Religious Ethics
writing about the views of Chinese thinkers of the classical period. For
example, I have written about the no-self position of the third century
BCE Chinese thinker Zhuangzi.1 This way of describing Zhuangzis views
was directly challenged in an article by Chris Jochim entitled, Just Say
No to No Self in Zhuangzi (Jochim 1998). According to Jochims argu-
ment, the use of the term no-self in Zhuangzi is extremely misleading,
particularly because self carries certain meanings in the modern West-
ern context not present in the classical Chinese.
The meaning of no-self in the context of any thinker or tradition will
depend, of course, on the notion of self against which he or she is react-
ing. Two thinkers can both hold a position that can accurately be defined
within their specific dialectical contexts as no-self but hold very differ-
ent positions from each other because the self each denies is different.
So, Jochim is right to point out that it can be misleading to apply the
term no-self to Zhuangzi, for we may be taking him to deny something
that he is not. However, I will show that, at the same time, there are
ways in which no-self is an appropriate and illuminating term to de-
scribe his position. By examining the various positions articulated by
Confucian thinkers (Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) and Zhuangzi, usu-
ally described as a Daoist, during the Warring States Period in China
(from the sixth to the third centuries BCE), I hope to shed some light
on the way concepts such as self and no-self can be used in partic-
ular soteriological contexts, and how using such terms in comparative
projects can be both productive and problematic.2 In the process, I will
1 I am certainly not the first to ascribe such a position to Zhuangzi. Burton Watson,
A. C. Graham, and Victor Mair, among others, have all used locutions such as no-self
or selfless in translating terms in Zhuangzi (particularly wu ji) and in making sense of
Zhuangzis ideal way of living. See the translations of Zhuangzi by Watson (1968), Graham
(1989), and Mair (1994).
2 From a historical perspective, it is more accurate to use the word Ru (it means some-
thing like erudite, and refers to experts in scholarly and ritual matters) to describe Con-
fucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. However, the better known term Confucian is not misleading
if we take it to refer to the views put forth by Confucius (even if he did not see himself
as starting a new philosophical movement), and then self-consciously defended by Men-
cius and Xunzi. Daoism is a contested category, and there has been much debate about
how to apply the term. Because Zhuangzis vision, in many ways, is quite distinct not only
from many later developments in institutional and liturgical Daoism, but also from other
philosophical Daoist texts, I prefer to use Zhuangzian rather than Daoist when dis-
cussing his views. Furthermore, while I use the names of the thinkers, I am in actuality
referring to the texts that bear their names without speculating on whether or not the
texts accurately reflect the views of the historical people. Whatever the facts about the
historical individuals, these texts have had an enormous influence on Chinese culture for
around two millennia. Therefore, I generally deal with these texts as wholes, looking for
the dominant, compelling voice. Given the tensions within the Zhuangzi, that voice comes
from the inner chapters and those other chapters with points of view that reflect that of
the inner chapters. For a defense of this approach, see Berkson 1999, xxiiixxvi.
Conceptions of Self/No-Self and Modes of Connection 295
engage in some metalevel reflection on the process of comparison itself

and attempt to gain insight into both the views of these Chinese thinkers
and the various ways we can understand selfhood.
2. Intracultural Comparison
It is worth noting that, whereas the other articles in this series focus on
comparisons between cultures and often across vast historical distances,
this one looks at a group of thinkers who lived, to a large degree, in the
same cultural sphere and within a few centuries of each other. There
are clearly challenges present in the former type of exercise that do not
arise in the latter. For example, the cross-cultural comparativist is, in
many cases, forced to come up with terms from outside both traditions
and languages to act as bridge concepts, for if the terms come from one
of the traditions or thinkers being studied, the comparison will be driven
in a biased way.
However, there are particular challenges that arise in an intracultural
comparison even in the case of near contemporaries.3 To begin with, we
must keep in mind that differences within traditions or cultures can be
as great as, or greater than, differences among them. There can be a
potentially misleading level of confidence in the assumption that when
two thinkers use the same word, they mean the same thing. For exam-
ple, the differences among what the various Chinese thinkers thought
the word tian (Heaven or nature) referred to might be greater than
the differences between what a thinker using a Latin or German word,
and a thinker using an analogous Chinese term, meant. One job of the
comparativist is unpacking terms of art in thinkers (whether within the
same tradition and culture, or among different ones) to see in what senses
these terms are analogous and in what senses they are not.
Before proceeding with this examination, I want to note that neither
the Confucian thinkers nor Zhuangzi engage in any systematic theoriz-
ing about what a self is. (The closest we get are Xunzis discourses on
human nature and self-cultivation.) In writing about comparative no-
tions of the self among classical Chinese thinkers, I am attempting to
excavate conceptions of the self that lie implicit under the pedagogical,
ethico-political discourses of Confucians and the antirational, whimsical
musings of Zhuangzi. I then construct theoretical frameworks for un-
derstanding and comparing them. This process requires great caution,
3 While a couple of intervening centuries may not seem that long when compared, for
example, to the approximately two millennia that separate thinkers such as Hegel and
Xunzi, there is a great deal of cultural and philosophical change that occurs in that time,
particularly in a period as politically volatile and intellectually rich as the Warring States
Period.
and the road to comparison is littered with caveats. At the same time, it
is precisely here that the comparativist can make a contribution. While
conclusions are always tentative, the attempt at comparison is always
worthwhile as long as there is a possibility of further illuminating the
view of any thinker and/or giving us new angles from which to under-
stand the subject of comparison, in this case, the self.
3. Self Defense
Some scholars, including the authors of two articles in this series, ar-
gue that self is too loaded a term to be productive in the comparative
context. Why not instead use a more neutral term like person or an-
thropos? To begin with, every term carries baggage with it, and there
are advantages and disadvantages to the choice of any term used as a
bridge concept. The comparativists choice is influenced, in part, by
the traditions or disciplines in which he or she works and the nature
of the particular project and thinkers in question. What is important is
to define how one is using a term in a particular context as precisely as
possible, noting the limitations and tensions that accompany the term. It
is not the case that one term will always be preferable to the others. The
best comparativists can do is to ensure that metalevel reflection on the
choice of terms and categories accompanies all substantive comparative
work. The criterion of selection should ultimately be pragmaticWhat
is going to be most fruitful given the particular issues and traditions that
I am addressing?
In this case, the central question is, Why is self/no-self a good candi-
date for use as a dyadic bridge concept in comparative studies involv-
ing ancient China? In the context of Warring States China, Confucius
is a starting point, either against whom others argue (Mozi, Zhuangzi),
or whose worldview others see themselves as developing and defending
(Mencius and Xunzi). For this reason, I let Confucius (and his followers)
set the terms of the conversation within this dialectical context. Their
conception of what kinds of beings we are, what it is we cultivate and
how we cultivate it, will shape the understanding of how self is under-
stood. It is the Confucians who are making the initial claims to which
Zhuangzi will respond, frequently through the rhetoric of negation, as in
terms such as wu ji (no-self), wu ming (no-name), and wu yong (no-use).
In this context, then, Confucians put forth an understanding of self and
Zhuangzi, since he denies precisely what the Confucians assert, can be
seen as having a position of no-self.
Keeping in mind that, as Douglas Allen reminds us, specific con-
ceptions of self must be historically and culturally situated, I make
no claims about any ahistorical or cross-cultural notion of the self here
(Allen 1997, xixv). There is enough disagreement about selfhood in this
context, both between Confucians and Zhuangzi, and among Confucians

themselves, to militate against any such essentialist claim, and these dif-
ferences will multiply once cross-cultural or trans-historical comparisons
are made. Only after specific conceptions of self (and no-self) are exam-
ined in particular dialectical contexts can further comparisons be made
and typologies of different meanings created. In the process, we may
discover that conceptions of self held by thinkers in different cultural
spheres (Aristotle and Confucius, for example) have far more in common
than conceptions held by those in the same cultural sphere (Confucius
and Zhuangzi).
There are a number of grounds on which the use of the term self has
been called into question. The first, as we have seen, is that terms such as
person or anthropos are more neutral terms and thus more useful for
comparative purposes (because they carry less baggage). In the case of
this essay, I believe self to be the best choice, in part precisely because
these other terms can be seen as more neutral. If person or anthropos
is used to refer to the neutral locus of the subsequent analysis, the mere
being there of the subject or locus of consciousness, then self can
refer to some kind of achievement. Selfhood, as fully achieved in the
Confucian tradition, is an honorific category. In addition, it is important
for this study that self is something that can be denied or rejected. This
term, perhaps better than person or agent, for example, can capture
the opposite sides of important religious debateswhat would be called
the self/no-self dialectic within a culture.4
The second criticism is that self places too much emphasis on re-
flexivity. However, this notion of reflexivity is useful in the Confucian
context, for self-cultivation requires reflexive self-awareness.5 The term
fan xing, used in the Analects to indicate self-examination, and si, used
by Mencius to describe the practice of introspection or inward concen-
tration, are examples of practices essential to self-cultivation.6 In their
study of metaphor, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson speak of a com-
monly held subject/self distinction, in which the subject is the locus of
4 The problem with using person or agent to translate the term that will be negated
is that non-person and non-agent have the sense of legal status, and would not work
well in contexts such as the Zhuangzian response to Confucians (or the Buddhist response
to Vedantans, for that matter). Scholars have pointed out that in many debates over issues
such as abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights, a key factor is whether or not the status
of personhood is granted to fetuses, those with severe brain damage, or mammals, for
example.
5 This calls into question Aaron Stalnakers claim that an emphasis on reflexivity will
privilege Augustine over Mencius. See page 192.

6 This shows the deep problems with Herbert Fingarettes treatment of Confucians in
Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, as at times he essentially denies the Confucians any
inner life at all (Fingarette 1972, 4546).
consciousness, whereas the self, which refers to our bodies, our social
roles, our histories, and so on, is what is crafted or worked on (Lakoff
and Johnson 1999, 268). The self is seen as being on a path of develop-
ment, and there are quite a few expressions in English in which self is
the object of evaluation (I am disappointed in my-self, I am proud of
my-self). This would fit well with the Confucian conception of selfhood.
Another criticism is that self involves a notion of some ambiguously
defined other. However, the involvement of the other in the conception
of self is quite useful in the Confucian context. Whereas person and
agent are often understood as focusing on the autonomous individual,
and have connections with notions of legal status, the use of the term
self invites reflection on the relation with others. The Confucian em-
phasis on character cultivation as occurring within a nexus of relations
with others makes self-other a useful dyad.7 As Tu Weiming puts it,
Confucian selfhood entails the participation of the other (Tu 1985, 231).
M. Brewster Smith defends the use of the term self by pointing to some
common features of that term as it has generally been usedSelfhood
involves being self-aware or reflective; being or having a body . . . placing
oneself in a generational sequence and network of other connected selves
as forebears and descendants and relatives . . . (Smith 1985, 60). As we
will see, the importance of embodiedness, social relationships, and re-
flexivity in the process of Confucian self-cultivation makes self an ap-
propriate term to use in this particular context.
4. Typology Creation and Concept Clusters

When undertaking a comparative analysis, one can gain insights into
the various meanings a word such as self can carry through an empir-
ical investigation of the way the word has been used by scholars writing
in English (whether as their own philosophical term of art or as a render-
ing of a word used by thinkers working in another language). The word
has a history, and rather than searching for some normative or essential
meaning, we can see how the term has been used and, grouping similar
usages into categories, create a typology of meanings.8 Typology creation
can both shed light on the various thinkers and traditions being studied
and provide new insight into the concept (self, for instance) itself. Of
course, typologies must be continuously revisable in light of the insights
produced by the comparisons.
7 Harold Oliver argues, the true self is to be understood relationally, that is, in terms
of a relational metaphysics according to which only relation, or relating, is real (Oliver

1992, 44). He states, the relational self is the self of self-other (45).
8 An example of this approach can be seen in Lee Yearleys examination of the notion of
mysticism (Yearley 1982).

For example, a cursory examination of uses of the term self in reli-

gious texts reveals a wide range of possible meanings that can initially
be sorted, as one way among many, by the attitude taken toward (or val-
uation of) what is defined as self. Religious traditions view terms that
we translate as self in one of three ways: positive, negative, or neutral.
(1) Self can be applied honorifically, whereby one of the main purposes
of life is to cultivate a fully realized self or discover a true self under
whatever barriers obstruct it. In this category, a key distinction will be
made based on whether that self is unchanging and eternal, or malleable
and cultivable, for example. (2) Self can also be used negatively, and
in the case of most religious traditions, this points to what we might
label self-centered, selfish, or ego-based conceptionsthe narrow
interests of the individual.9 (3) Self can also be neutral (although even
neutral conceptions contain ethical dimensions and implications), de-
scribing psychological structures or modes of awareness, or experiences
of subjectivity (for example, the speaking subject in a reflexive mode).
One way to proceed with developing the typology is by asking a set of
questions about each conception of the self being examined. The set of
questions that will be most helpful in developing a typology of self (or
any term) is determined by examining the key concepts with which self is
connected in the traditions being studied. No complex philosophical term
can be examined in isolation. Any conception of self, for example, is linked
to a cluster of other concepts that inform or shape it; these other concepts
are, in turn, informed by the conception of self. This grouping can be un-
derstood using a term such as conceptual apparatus, except that the
word apparatus suggests a systematicity that is sometimes lacking in
religious thinkers (Zhuangzi, for example); in these cases, the appara-
tus/structure is often provided by the scholar writing about Zhuangzi.
Perhaps a slightly broader term would be concept cluster, the set of in-
terrelated terms most central to the worldview of a thinker or tradition
(see Rosemont 1988). The comparativist explores differences and simi-
larities in concept clusters among different traditions (the other authors
focus here), as well as the various ways that different thinkers within
a tradition or culture relate the notions within the cluster to each other
or interpret them (my focus). What often occurs in the comparative pro-
cess is that concepts within a cluster are, to use Rosemonts terms, at
9 In some traditions (for example, when East Asian Buddhist discourse is rendered in
English), the distinction between the first two categories is marked by whether or not the
s in self is capitalized (an interesting choice, given that capitalization is not an option
in the original languages of East Asia). In such cases, the key distinction is between the
small-s self and the capital-S Self. The primary soteriological move is often described
as the transformation from small-s self to capital-S Self, from the self led by personal
appetites and desires, to the larger Self that exists when all boundaries are erased.
least partially decontextualized and then recontextualized by contrast-

ing them with another cluster (Rosemont 1988, 168).10
Within the particular discourse of classical Chinese religious thought,
one prominently featured concept within the cluster would be nature. For
Confucians and Daoists alike, human beings are understood as largely
natural beings. When mapping out the terrain of concepts of self, one key
question to ask, then, is: In what sense is the self embodied (in nature)?
How is nature valued? What, if anything, is to be done with nature? (Is
it to be nurtured? Reshaped? Freely expressed?)
Another key notion in unpacking conceptions of the self is temporal-
ity. In creating typologies of different notions of self, questions in this
category would include: Is the self an eternal, timeless self? Or does
it change? Is it an example of what Robert Jay Lifton would call the
Protean self, always in some degree of flux? Or is it unchanging and
immutable?
The third category I am addressing is that of social roles, the extent
to which the self is characterized by roles and involved in everyday life.
The question here would be: To what degree is the self essentially char-
acterized by sociocultural roles, categories, obligations, etc.? Is the self
expressed by such roles or obstructed by them? Related to this is the
question of what role language plays in understandings of the self.11
Finally, there are critical questions related to the valuation of the self
that will arise in any ethical or soteriological context: Should the self
be expanded or contracted? Cultivated or eliminated? In the following
analysis, I apply all of the above guiding questions to the Confucian and
Daoist thinkers.
We must keep in mind that the comparativist is always working with
multiple concept clusters. First, there will be a concept cluster for each
10 Rosemont argues that if we are to create a concept cluster that is more universally
applicable, this is a necessary process. In his own work, he argues that in order to develop a
concept cluster within which both ethical statements and ethical theory can be articulated
which can be applicable to, and appreciated by, all of the worlds people, this process is
essential (168). Specifically, he wants to point the way to creating a cluster that incorporates
the insights of the rights language of Western industrial democracies with the ethical
worldview of classical Confucianism, described below.
11 Contrast the Confucian self with the Self that many thinkers ascribe to the Indian
traditions of Vedanta and Sankhya. Although the term self is frequently used in both
cultural contexts, the conceptions occupy very different places on the typology because they
differ in all categories (nature, temporality, social roles). In stark contrast to the Confucian
self that will be described below, the Indian Self (Atman, Purusha) is radically divorced
from the natural world, eternal and immutable, and disengaged from, not identified with,
social roles. In both cases selfhood can be seen as an achievement, but in one case it
is crafted and in the other it is discovered through discrimination from other elements.
Later Neo-Confucians hold a discovery model, influenced by the notion of Buddha nature
developed by Chinese Buddhists.
thinker or tradition being studied.12 Second, if the comparativist is work-

ing in a language other than that of the subjects of study, there will be con-
cept clusters in more than one language. In this study, for example, the
Confucians have a concept cluster important to conceptions of selfhood
that includes terms such as xiushen (self-cultivation), xing (human na-
ture), qi (vital force), li (ritual), yi (righteousness), tian (Heaven/nature),
and dao (way). Zhuangzis cluster would lack terms such as xing, li, and
yi; share terms such as qi, tian, and dao (although these will be under-
stood differently); and focus on terms not prominent or completely absent
among Confucians, such as xin zhai (the fasting of the mind), wuming
(no-name), and you (wandering).
The comparativist must both work with these sets of terms, and also
develop a set of terms in the language of his or her scholarship that pro-
vides insight into both sides in a systematic way. Some of these terms
will be attempts at translating terms in the original languages into the
scholars language (for example, nature, social roles), but some will
be terms that none of the thinkers themselves used. In this study, for
example, the word temporality will be employed in a way that has no
precise analogue in classical Chinese. While the comparativist must pro-
ceed with caution when doing this, there is the possibility of illuminating
and clarifying ideas on both sides using such a term. Using the metaphor
of bridge concept, we can say that some bridges are made by extending
concepts found on both sides of the divide until they meet in the middle,
while others are set down from the outside. What is essential is that the
bridge makes a connection, allowing a conversation to occur on an is-
sue that neither side might have addressed systematically (temporality,
for example), but that shaped their thinking in important ways, even if
implicitly.
Typologies are useful in comparative studies because they attempt to
do justice to both similarities and differences among different versions
of a complex term. All of the versions of the term are connected in certain
ways; their location in a single typological structure points to some un-
derlying commonality. At the same time, there are some features shared
only by some versions of the term and not others. The key to typology
creation is determining in precisely what way some versions of a concept
are analogous, and the ways in which they are not. In the remainder of
this essay, I attempt to flesh out the conceptions of self and no-self
found in the classical Chinese context, both so that the specific features
of these terms within this dialectical context can be understood, and
so that the versions of these terms can take their place within larger
12 Scholars will differ over how much weight to give various concepts within a thinkers
cluster (or even what to include). Furthermore, over a thinkers career, the constituents of
a cluster will change over time.
typologies of self and no-self that can be developed through cross-

cultural and trans-historical comparisons.
5. The Classical Chinese Case

The reason that some scholars have argued that it is not appropriate
to use the term self in the classical Chinese context is that self is a
uniquely modern, Western concept. One common way of defining it draws
on Descartess picture of the disengaged reasoning subject. Chris Jochim
argues that using a phrase such as no-self to describe Zhuangzis posi-
tion (as I will do in a moment) is not justified because Zhuangzi does
not even have a conception of self to reject or deny (Jochim 1998,
3637). In making his argument, Jochim draws on Frank Johnson,
who lists four qualities that describe the self in the modern West
analytical, monotheistic, individualistic, and materialistic/rationalistic
(Johnson 1985).
If that is how self is understood, then Jochim is surely right. None
of the thinkers or schools involved in the Warring States philosophical
debates conceived of such a self. However, there is another way to un-
derstand self that is more useful to employ in this analysis. On this
understanding, self is seen more broadly as an achievement word.
While we are born with our nature, we come into selfhood; it is fully
realized only with our effort and over time. Everyone has a nature; not
everyone has a fully developed self.
The achievement of selfhood in Confucian thought occurs as we come
to understand and cultivate ourselves in a variety of situations, as we
see what aspects of ourselves are stable (our character), as we enter into
lasting relationships and projects, and as we see how we have developed
over time. This Confucian notion of selfhood rests, therefore, on narrative
temporality.13
5.1 Confucian conceptions of temporality and self

When I talk about a thinkers notion of temporality here, I mean how
he understands a human life unfolding through time. The Confucian no-
tion of temporality, which is first encountered in the Analects, sees the
13 This is a theme that is explored in the work of thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre
and Charles Taylor. MacIntyre, for example, writes, In what does the unity of an individual
life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single
life. To ask, What is the good for me? is to ask how best I might live out that unity and
bring it to completion (MacIntyre 1984, 218). Taylor explains, I can only know myself
through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. My self-
understanding necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narrative . . . . We must
inescapably understand our lives in narrative form . . . (Taylor 1989, 50, 52).
human life in terms of narratives. A life unfolds in stages, which are

marked by rites of passage (for example, the capping ceremony, mar-
riage, the sixtieth birthday). There are roles, duties, and virtues appro-
priate to the different stages of life because our body-mind itself develops
in stages.14 The process of cultivation, which is the process of developing
the body-mind, has to take into account the changes that we undergo
throughout our lives. Much of this is explained in terms of changes in
our qi over time, and for Confucians and Daoists alike, working with the
qi is a fundamental task.15 A passage in the Analects states:
There are three things the gentleman should guard against. In youth, when
the blood and qi are still unsettled, he should guard against the attraction
of feminine beauty. In the prime of life when the blood and qi have become
unyielding, he should guard against bellicosity. In old age when the blood
and qi have declined, he should guard against acquisitiveness [16.7].
In other words, because the characteristics of our qi change over time,

we are faced with different challenges and tasks in these various stages.
Put simply, the task of self-cultivation will require different approaches
for the hormone-driven teenager and the miserly octogenarian. The story
of Confucian progress is one of a more or less orderly series of discrete
stages based on the changes in qi and body-mind over time. The shaping
of body, mind, and qi occurs through ritual, learning, music, and dance,
among other things. Confucian thinkers believe that the cultivation of
the self through these activities, which are preserved and transmitted
through education and constitute the essence of the tradition, is the es-
sential humanizing activity.
In self-cultivation traditions, the formation of the self involves iden-
tifying an aspect of the person that is able to perform the controlling,
shaping, and regulating function vis-a-vis
` the rest of the individual (for
example, the body and its appetites). In the West, this function is often
given to reason or will. Confucian thinkers locate this function in the xin
14 I use the term body-mind here because, unlike Western thinkers who inherit various
types of mind-body dualisms from Plato, Descartes, and others, Chinese thinkers never
fully separated mind and body. Roger Ames, through analyzing terms such as shen and ti in
the classical Chinese context, argues that in the classical Chinese tradition, the correlative
relationship between the psychical and the somatic militated against the emergence of a
mind/body problem . . . person was seen holistically as a psychosomatic process (Ames
1993, 163).
15 There are no English words that correspond directly to qi. Various optionseach
acceptable, but not perfectinclude psychophysical energy and vital breath. Because in
the general Chinese understanding, qi is both circulating within the body and also found
outside of it, and can take different forms, it is best left untranslated. The metaphysics of
qi becomes highly developed in the Neo-Confucianism of the later imperial period (Song
through Qing dynasties).
(heart-mind). Mencius is explicit about the guiding function of xin, which

he considers the highest part of us.16 Xunzi writes, The xin is the ruler of
the body and the master of its (spiritual) intelligence. It gives commands,
but it is not subject to them . . . . Although the objects it perceives may be
many and diverse, if its acuity is of the highest level, it cannot become
divided within itself (W129).17 Tu Weiming explains, Even though the
body is a constitutive part of our nature, it is the heart-mind that is truly
human . . . . Learning to be human means that the self-consciousness of
the heart-mind initiates a process by which the body is transformed and
perfected (Tu 179).18
One of the philosophical divides that occurs in the Chinese tradition
is the role that human nature plays in the cultivation of self. In the fash-
ioning of selfhood, nature is worked on in some way, although this way
differs. For Mencius, who believes that our nature is naturally oriented
toward the good (for example, toward concern for others), the work can be
described as nurturing, as tending to nature while it grows. Agricultural
metaphors are employed to describe the process. For Mencius, sagehood
is realized when we have fully cultivated our nature. In other words, self
is understood as the full realization of nature.
For Xunzi, on the other hand, who believes that our nature is com-
posed of selfish appetites which will, if left unchecked, bring us into
inevitable conflict with one another, the work of coming into selfhood
can be described as reforming or reshaping nature. Unlike Mencius, who
uses agricultural metaphors, Xunzi uses metaphors of craftsmanship to
describe the process. For Xunzi, in contrast to Mencius, nature is not
a moral force, but is rather an amoral reality that forms the basis for
self-cultivation. It is the disordered raw material which must be shaped
and molded into something harmonious and beautiful, a task accom-
plished through learning and ritual. For Xunzi, then, self is understood
16 According to Mencius, Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The
common man loses the distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it (4B19).
Mencius is referring to the heart-mind (xin), the organ of Heavenly origin that separates
humans from other animals. Simply having the xin, however, is not enough; one must use it,
and using the xin means thinking, introspecting, or concentrating. Mencius, in describing
what makes a great person, explains, The office of the heart/mind is si to think. When
it thinks, it gets things right; if it does not think, it cannot get things right (6A15). The
ability to reflect and concentrate is all that distinguishes the heart from the other sense
organs, which are passively attracted to their objects.
17 Xunzi quotations are taken from the Knoblock translation, Xunzi: A Translation and
Study of the Complete Works, unless the page number is preceded by a W, in which case
they are from the Watson translation, Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings.
18 As we will see, when Zhuangzi denies the primacy of the xin (or any single faculty),
while at the same time acknowledging that it is the activity of the xin that makes us
distinctly human, he is advocating that we, at least to some degree, let go of that which
sets us apart as humans. (See page 307.)
as the overcoming (reforming) of nature. Because their conceptions and

valuations of nature differ, different metaphors for self-cultivation are
employed.
The differences in Menciuss and Xunzis understanding of human na-
ture and self-cultivation are reflected in their views of how one should
work on ones qi. For Mencius, becoming a fully moral person involves the
building up of ones qi through moral action (accumulated rightness)
until it becomes what he calls flood-like qi, qi which connects Heaven
and Earth and is unyielding in carrying out moral action (2A2). Men-
ciuss nurturing and cultivation of qi contrasts with Xunzis emphasis
on controlling or governing ones qi (zhi qi). Our qi (like our xing) must
be ordered and regulated, and the way to do this, according to Xunzi, is
largely through rituals and good teachers. Xunzi gives specific instruc-
tions on how to control and cultivate the qi: for example, If the blood qi
is too strong and robust, calm it with balance and harmony (2.4).
The transformation of body and mind over time, in a cumulative, or-
derly way, is the essence of the Confucian narrative of self-cultivation.
Xunzi proclaims, There is no spirit so great as the transformation of
the self with the Way (1.2). One is considered cultivated when one has
truly embodied the way (ti dao zhe). According to Xunzi, If the body is
wholly one with the Way, the person is refined (21.6a). The following
passage is a clear illustration of Xunzis conception of the cultivation of
the body-mind:
The learning of the gentleman enters through the ear, is stored in the mind,
spreads through the four limbs, and is visible in his activity and repose.
In his softest word and slightest movement, in one and all, the gentleman
can be taken as a model and pattern [1.9].
5.2 Zhuangzian temporality and no-self

We can contrast the Confucian narrative picture with Zhuangzis
understandings of temporality. According to Zhuangzi, all narratives are
based on constructions given to us by societyfor example, about the ap-
propriate time to do certain things, about which roles should be occupied
when, etc. For Zhuangzi, these are not natural, but constructed overlays
on top of, and often obstructing, what is actually there: a ceaseless flow of
life that can be experienced in its immediacy at any time. Social conven-
tions, abstract categories, and constructed narratives serve to cover up
our connection with the dao (the natural Way); these must be stripped
away if we are to live in accordance with it. At times, Zhuangzis per-
spective focuses on moment-by-moment existence, not emphasizing the
past (thus, ancestor worship is not spoken of) or the future (the notions
of achievement, success, and failure must be forgotten).
Zhuangzi, particularly in what Lee Yearley describes as his radical

mode, holds what might be called a momentary picture that focuses
on continuous, moment-by-moment transformation (Yearley 1983). This
might also be called a ceaseless change picture, because it emphasizes
the endless transformation of things. Zhuangzi reminds us that nothing
stays constant from one moment to the next. The life of things is a
gallop, a headlong dashwith every movement they alter, with every
moment they shift. What should you do and what should you not do?
Everything will change of itself, that is certain! (W103).19 As a result of
this awareness, the sage lives entirely in the ever-changing present.20
Given that life consists not of stages of development but rather
moment-by-moment transformation, the best way to live does not involve
cultivation or development; instead, Zhuangzi tells us to just ride along
with things and let ourselves wander (you) rather than progress on a
well-formulated path. Metaphorically, these temporal differences can be
expressed through different understandings of movement through space.
Whereas the notion of narrative is often expressed through the metaphor
of a journey on a directed path (for the Confucians, a path laid out by the
tradition), Zhuangzis momentary temporality is connected with a lack
of direction, an aimless wandering.21
The Confucian conception of self, as we have seen, indicates an
achievement that requires cultivation over time, is grounded in narra-
tive temporality, and involves categories by which we understand who we
are (our roles, commitments, status, occupation, and name), categories
which in turn reflect and refer to values by which we judge ourselves. If
self is understood in this way, then Zhuangzi, as opposed to Mencius
and Xunzi, does have a picture which can be described as no-self. For
Zhuangzi, the roles by which we define ourselves and which produce our
ritual and ethical obligations are social constructions which, if adhered
to with full commitment (if we allow them to define ourselves) ultimately
obstruct (rather than, as the Confucians would say, express) the dao.
For Zhuangzi, when we act not according to the judgments of our
discursive minds but rather follow along with the movements of our qi,
19 Unless otherwise noted, all citations for Zhuangzi quotations refer to Victor Mairs
translation. When A. C. Grahams translation is used, a G will precede the page number;
if Burton Watsons 1964 translation is used, a W will precede the page number.
20 In Lee Yearleys formulation, Each new moment is grasped as it comes and surren-
dered as it goes . . . Life is a series of new beginnings. Everything is unstable . . . Change is

the final reality . . . (Yearley 1983, 135).
21 The narrative conception of self-cultivation leads many Confucians to employ the
genre of travel accounts in telling their stories. Pei-yi Wu gives numerous examples in The
Confucians Progress: Autobiographical Writing in Traditional China (Wu 1990). He writes
that for the Confucians, Spiritual autobiography can and has been narrated as a travel
account (95).
we will naturally harmonize with tianli, the patterns of nature. Qi is

our link with the dao, which is why Zhuangzi tells us, in stark contrast
to MenciusDont listen with your xin/heart-mind, listen with your qi
(W54). The goal for Zhuangzi, then, is not that we guide qi with our xin,
or that we shape and control qi through ritual, but rather that we let qi
flow freely and act as our guide.
Whereas we have seen that Confucians elevate a particular faculty
that acts as a guide in the process of self-cultivation, Zhuangzi explicitly
undermines this attempt to assert control by calling into question the
notion that there is any element of the human being that can be seen
as the controller and unifier of the rest. In one famous example from
the Inner Chapters, which seems to be a parody of a passage in which
Mencius gives the xin pride of place among human organs, Zhuangzi
poses a series of questions: The hundred joints, the nine openings, the
six organs, all come together and exist here (as my body). But which part
should I feel closest to? . . . Are they all of them mere servants? But if they
are all servants, then how can they keep order among themselves (W
33)?
By denying the existence of a faculty that guides the process of self-
cultivation and rejecting narrative temporality, Zhuangzi undermines
the Confucian conception of selfhood. Characters often associated with
the sense of a cultivated self in the Zhuangzi include ji and ming (ones
name), and both are negated.22 When a person does not have a self to
defend or build up, he cannot be injured by others criticisms, judgments,
or insults and he cannot be moved by flattery or greed. A passage from
the Inner Chapters captures this picture well: The whole world could
praise Song Rongzi and it wouldnt make him exert himself; the whole
could condemn him and it wouldnt make him mope . . . . Therefore I say,
the Perfect Man has no self (zhi ren wu ji); the Holy Man has no merit; the
Sage has no fame (wu ming, no name) (W26). Another passage describes
a sage as having abandoned knowledge and rejected self (qu ji) (340).
The self that Zhuangzi wants us to reject is what Judith Berling la-
bels the socialized self (Berling 1985). The categories that are used to
understand and value the self are often related to the notion of social
usefulness. For the Confucians, becoming a self requires successfully
fulfilling the obligations generated by ones roles (yi). Another way that
Zhuangzi undermines this notion of selfhood is through his numerous
22 Livia Kohn concludes, from an etymological analysis of ji, that it is something that
can be made and controlled. She contrasts this organized and object-oriented selfhood
with zi, which never occurs in the object position, and indicates the receptive and
spontaneous dimension of selfhood. See Kohn 1992, 127, 130. See the discussion of the
Zhuangzian self below, which draws on the notion of ziran (a compound using zi), natu-
ralness or spontaneity (317318).
stories about the importance (and usefulness) of uselessness. By reject-

ing any criteria of social utility as not only unimportant, but dangerous
(making oneself useful in a political context could lead to ones getting
killed), Zhuangzi shows that one need not craft oneself into anything
other than what one naturally is. Zhuangzis praise of uselessness itself
is another tool to dismantle notions of selfhood.
In one passage, a carpenter criticizes an oak tree as worthless. The
oak tree responds: [Fruit trees] utility makes life miserable for them,
and so they dont get to finish out the years Heaven gave them, but are
cut off in mid-journey . . . . If I had been of some use, would I ever have
grown this large (W60)? The fact that there is no purpose to the tree
allows it to just be what it is and live out its years.23
5.3 Techniques for realizing no-self

For Zhuangzi, the self is something that is constructed by the mind;
when all of the concepts and categories used by the mind to label and
identify ourselves are gone, the mind itself is clear, like a mirror. In such
a state, there is no place for the self to reside. How can we rid ourselves
of these remarkably ingrained habits of the mind, the concepts and cate-
gories which we have internalized over a lifetime? The Zhuangzi points
to a number of ways this can happen, including the use of deconstructive
language, meditative techniques, and skillful absorption. The meditative
techniques include sitting in forgetfulness and the fasting of the mind
through which we let these mental patterns fall away (see Ivanhoe 1993;
and Jochim 1998).
The contemplative practices and skillful activity described in the text
can best be understood with the momentary modelwhen one is able
to experience the world as a continuous flow of moment-by-moment
transformations, all notions of achievement (including self, the ulti-
mate Confucian achievement) disappear. As the self depends on narra-
tive, so Zhuangzis undermining of narrative temporality with momen-
tary temporality (in Zhuangzis words, no before/after) has the effect
of deconstructing the self. Zhuangzis stories are designed to show us
that life is better understood as wandering rather than orderly pro-
gression, and that there is no structural unity underlying the flux of
experience. Whereas Confucians see life as a teleological progression
23 Zhuangzis version of no-self involves an undermining of instrumentality in such a
way that life, the ongoing expression of nature, becomes an end in itself. Benjamin Schwartz
writes, [A]ll the varied expressions of the daos creativity in nature are to be regarded as
ends in themselves and need no justification as instruments to other ends (Schwartz
1985, 236). For Zhuangzi, then, we look not for a purpose in life, but rather come instead
to celebrate simply the ongoing expression of life.
through stages, Zhuangzi sees it as a rambling with no destination.

The result of Zhuangzis deconstructive activity is captured well in Mark
Freemans statement: Alongside the attempt to question the orderli-
ness of the process of development, therefore, the very idea of self
as integrated, consistent, and enduring identityis rendered suspect
(1992, 16).
As the self relies on cultivation over time, and draws on the narra-
tive conception, so no-self is based on an experience of the momentary
nature of existence, continuous change, and aimless wandering. Aware-
ness of momentariness, along with the absence of any structure, stages,
or goals in the life journey, deconstructs the selfthere is no stable tem-
poral foundation on which it can be built.
5.4 Zhuangzian cultivation narratives

I have argued that Zhuangzi emphasizes the momentary dimension
of life while the Confucians highlight the narrative dimension. At the
same time, there are elements of cultivation narratives found in the
Zhuangzi.24 Ultimately, however, Confucian and Zhuangzian cultivation
narratives are expressed and used in very different ways.
24 There also appear to be elements of a momentary model of temporality in Confucian

thinkers, particularly Xunzi. Although ritual can be understood through the narrative
model (e.g., rites of passage connected with stages of life, ritual cultivation employing a
narrative model of temporality), ritual participation can produce the kind of absorption
in the present moment and equanimity illustrated in Zhuangzis skill stories, which may
illustrate the influence that Zhuangzi had on Xunzi. In a passage that resonates with
Zhuangzis vision, and is a clear expression of a momentary model in a Confucian text,
Xunzi writes, Do not allow (distress and anxiety) to thwart you; do not allow them to
stir in your breast for even a moment. Do not think longingly over what has gone by; do
not worry over what is to come . . . . If it is the proper time, act. Respond to things as they
arrive (21.9, emphasis mine). Ritual consciousness can be fully absorbed (sensuously,
somatically, and cognitively) in the present, for ritual engages all of the senses. Xunzi
recognizes how an agitated mind can prevent this. If the mind is anxious or filled with
fear, then although the mouth is filled with fine meats, it will not be aware of their taste.
Although the ear hears bells and drums, it will not be aware of their sound . . . (22.6e).
Although this state shares elements with that achieved by Zhuangzis sages in the midst of
their skillful activities, there are important differences. For Xunzi, the rituals are embedded
in a narrative structure, and, through symbols, gestures, and words, refer to past (and
future) events. The full engagement in the ritual process is directed by symbols and their
meanings (which Xunzi analyzes at length) toward history and tradition, with the aim
of cultivating Confucian virtues. Furthermore, whereas for Zhuangzi the nature of the
skillful practice is important only for the state it produces, and thus many kinds of skillful
practices work (from diving, catching cicadas, and butchering, to making wheels and bells),
the particular form of the Confucian rituals is essential, which is why preserving and
transmitting the tradition is necessary. In other words, Confucian experiences of ritual
absorption, unlike Zhuangzis experiences of skillful absorption, are inextricably embedded
in the larger historical narrative context.
It is clear that narrative temporality plays a role in the Zhuangzi,

although the type of role it plays differs from the Confucian case. While
we encounter the use of narrative throughout the Zhuangzi, it is used
in what might be called a deconstructive fashion. We have seen that
Zhuangzis exemplars are often involved with contemplative practices
or embodied skillful activities that produce a nondual present-moment
experience. However, because human thought-habits so often conspire
to prevent this kind of full absorption in ongoing momentary activity,
Zhuangzis sages need to cultivate their skill in order to reach that state.
The practices that lead to the forgetting of selfwhether contempla-
tive or skillful (ultimately, meditation can itself be seen as one form of
skillful activity)are difficult and require time to master. There are
stages of accomplishment along the way. In other words, skill acquisi-
tion requires a narrative conception of cultivation, a sense of develop-
ment over time. While Zhuangzi does not emphasize this aspect, he does
allude to it a number of times, particularly in the context of the skill
stories. For example, Cook Ding, when asked about his skill, replies,
When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself.
After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And nownow I go at
it by qi and dont look with my eyes (W46). The cicada-catcher explains
his skill this way:
For the first five or six months I practice balancing two balls on top of each
other on the end of the pole and, if they dont fall off, I know I will lose very
few cicadas. Then I balance three balls and, if they dont fall off, I know Ill
lose only one cicada in ten. Then I balance five balls . . . . No matter how
huge heaven and earth, or how numerous the ten thousand things, Im
aware of nothing but cicada wings . . . how I can I help but succeed [W121]?
The highest state is one of complete absorption in and awareness of
the ongoing stream of present moments (aware of nothing but cicada
wings). However, to learn this present-moment awareness takes time.
Thus, we see a narrative of development through time culminating in a
momentary experience of timelessness.
Here, we see a paradoxical dimension of Zhuangzis thought: The
achievement of the very momentary awareness that enables the undoing
of narrative temporality (and thus the realization of no-self) depends on
cultivation which can only be understood through narrative temporality.
Despite the fact that both Confucianism and Zhuangzian Daoism place
an emphasis on the cultivation of perfected states, the type of cultivation
remains very different because the conceptions of the perfected states
are so divergent. Whereas for the Confucians, narrative temporality is
the framework for self-cultivation, for Zhuangzi, it is the framework for
cultivation of no-self.25
25 I am indebted to Mark Unno for this formulation.

5.5 Zhuangzi and nature

A crucial question still remains: Without a self, what motivates our
action? Since much of our motivation, desires, hopes, and actions arise
out of our conceptions of self (the whole notion of acquisition, of what
is mine, is based on this; fame, wealth, success, status, etc.), on what
basis do we act after the whole notion of self is dissolved? I would argue
that for Zhuangzi what guides us rather than self is nature.26 How-
ever, there is a problem regarding what Chinese terms in Zhuangzi ac-
tually correspond to nature, and what exactly nature means in the
Zhuangzian context. In the Confucian case, there is a central term of art,
xing, that refers to human nature, yet this term never occurs in the In-
ner Chapters of Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi did not, as the Confucians did, focus
on human nature, on describing the characteristics of our species. His
notion of nature can be found at two levels, one on each side of species.
On the one hand, he emphasizes the unique nature of each living thing;
on the other, he talks about nature as that which creates, harmonizes,
and connects all life, Nature in the larger sense. So, he does not speak
so much of a human nature except to point out how we tend, as a species,
to put ourselves in a state of disharmony from the dao which leads to all
kinds of suffering. While he lauds individual human beings, he does not
give too much praise to the species as a whole.
While Zhuangzi does not use the term xing, he uses other language to
describe what we mean by natureterms which include the following:
(1) tianoften translated as Heaven, but for Zhuangzi, not an interven-
ing personal Heaven, but rather the impersonal, amoral source of tianli,
the patterns found in the natural world;27 (2) zi ranthat which is so
of itself, the spontaneous movements associated with nonintentional,
effortless action (wu wei, action without the intervention of the concep-
tualizing, consciously intending mind); (3) qi suo shouthat which is
received; (4) gu ranwhat is given.
While Zhuangzis conception of nature is difficult to pin down, by sur-
veying the semantic field we get an overall sense of what he means and
what matters to him. These terms all point to the notion of a given endow-
ment, what we receive from tian. Generally speaking, what is natural
for Zhuangzi is the set of spontaneous inclinations, tendencies, desires,
preferences, and capacities with which each being is born. It is clear from
the text that Zhuangzi believes different beings have different natures;
he often contrasts the natural tendencies, likes, and dislikes of different
26 This line of interpretation perhaps originates with Guo Xiang. I have been influenced
by a contemporary version of this picture, given by P. J. Ivanhoe (Ivanhoe 1996).

27 I believe that in Zhuangzi, tian is better translated nature rather than Heaven,
which carries with it too many misleading theological connotations from the monotheistic
traditions of the Near East.
beings. For example, Creatures differ because they have different likes
and dislikes. Therefore, the former sages never required the same abil-
ity from all creatures or made them do the same thing (Zhuangzi 1968,
195).28 The unique nature of each being should be respected and allowed
to manifest itself.
Thus, when we can free ourselves from the domination by self, what
occurs is the manifestation of our nature. When all things can simply
express their natures, they are harmonized within the framework of
nature (he zhi yi tian) (23; see also 171).29 This is why Zhuangzi coun-
sels, Attentively guard your true nature (321) and says of the wise
person, If he believes that something may be harmful to his nature, de-
clining, he will refuse to accept it (310). Whereas Menciuss picture is
self as realization of nature, and Xunzis self as reformation of nature,
Zhuangzis vision is of the manifestation of nature through forgetting of
the self.30
A story in the Outer Chapters that clearly illustrates this view is that

of the diver at the Lu-Liang waterfalls. Explaining how he was able to
stay afloat in the roaring swirls, he replied, I began with what I was used
to, grew up with my nature and let things come to completion with fate.
I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along
the way the water goes and never thinking about myself. Thats how I
can stay afloat (W126). The connection here is explicitwhen selfish
concerns do not obstruct, nature emerges. The key is getting the mind
out of the way. Elsewhere, we read, Artisan Chui could draw as true as
a compass or a T square because his fingers changed along with things
and he didnt let his mind get in the way . . . . Understanding forgets right
and wrong when the mind is comfortable (W128). We are used to seeing
things in terms of categories provided by the mind, but there are no such
categories in natureonly each unique, existing phenomenon. The sage
does not subscribe to [the view of absolute opposites] but sees things in
the light of nature, accepting this for what it is (15).
28 See also the passage about the seabird of old on 171.

29 P. J. Ivanhoes interpretation accounts for this harmonization: Zhuangzi implies that
certain ways of being are contrary to our nature and the nature of the world in which we
live . . . . If a given action or activity accords with Natures pattern and processes then it is
fitting and proper, it is in harmony with the dao (Ivanhoe 1996, 201).
30 This Zhuangzian picture influenced the shape that Buddhist no-self took in
China, and East Asia in generalthe detached awareness that South Asian Bud-
dhism shared with other Indian contemplative traditions was combined with the ex-
pression of nature found in Zhuangzian Daoism. In a sense, a new kind of no-self
emerged in East Asian Buddhism. While it was different in important ways from In-
dian Buddhist anatman, it shares some important features (such as an emphasis on
impermanence).
5.6 Relationship of tian (the natural) and ren (the distinctly human)
The meaning of tian in Zhuangzi emerges in contrast to the term with
which it is often paired, ren. While ren normally refers to human being,
here it seems to mean the distinctly human. The following passage
illustrates the opposition between the two terms:
Therefore it is said, Tian is within, ren is without; integrity lies in tian.
When you know the operation of tian and ren, you will root yourself in tian
and position yourself in contentment . . . . Oxes and horses having four feet
is what is meant by tian. Putting a halter over a horses head or piercing
an oxs nose is what is meant by ren. Therefore, it is said, Do not destroy
tian with ren, do not destroy destiny with intentionality [159].
If one reads tian as nature, as I do, then it seems as if Zhuangzi is

saying that the human (ren) is other than the natural, which leads to a
question: Why is the heart-mind not a natural entity (as Mencius argues
it is)? If we are natural beings, how can we act unnaturally? The most
radical challenge can be seen when we look at Zhuangzis recommended
way of living. At the highest level, when we are simply a manifestation
of dao, when we follow what is tian rather than ren, in a sense we are no
longer human. Zhuangzi explicitly claims that one canand shouldbe
without the essentials of the human being (ren qing):
Said Hui Shi to Zhuangzi, Can a human being really be without the es-
sentials of a human being?
He can.
If a human being is without the essentials of human being, how can we
call him a human being?
The Way gives him the guise, tian (nature) gives him the shape, how can
we refuse to call him a human being?
But since we do call him a human being, how can he be without the es-
sentials of a human being?
Judging thats it, thats not is what I mean by the essentials of a human
being. What I mean by being without the essentials is that the human being
does not inwardly wound his person by likes and dislikes, that he constantly
goes by the spontaneous and does not add anything to the process of life
[G82].
Here, Zhuangzi seems to acknowledge what Mencius and Xunzi argue
forthe ability to judge and distinguish (shi/fei) is essential to what
we are as human beings.31 The difference between Zhuangzi and the
31 Xunzi argues that what separates human beings from other kinds of animals is our
ability to make distinctions. He writes, [A human being] is not as strong as the ox, nor as
swift as the horse, and yet he makes the ox and the horse work for him. Why? Because he
is able to organize himself in society and they are not. Why is he able to organize himself in
society? Because he sets up hierarchical distinctions (W45). Zhuangzis sages are able to
make distinctions as well, but they lodge in them only temporarily, holding them lightly
and for pragmatic purposes.
Confucians is in how they value this capacity.32 We cannot imagine a rec-

ognizable human being who does not make distinctions, does not judge,
does not conceptualize. While the sage is given a particular human
form by nature, and will therefore always look human, and will have cer-
tain tendencies given his body and senses (such as the tendency to avoid
living in trees, to eat certain foods), once he is able to do without the
essentials, he will no longer function in a way that is typically human.
In other words, Zhuangzi might agree with the Confucians that what
makes us human is that we distinguish, think, and grieve. His response
would bethe less human, then, the better. One passage explicitly ac-
knowledges this when it speaks of someone who is so absorbed that he
seemed non-human (fei ren) (201).33
The above passage from Autumn Floods concluded, Do not destroy
tian with ren, do not destroy destiny with intentionality (159). The
idea here is the same as that represented by gu ran or qi suo shouwe
are given a nature that provides the basic direction of our spontaneous
predilections. We stifle or act against this at great risk to ourselves. Al-
lowing ourselves to be who we really are is an example of accepting our
fate, according with the inevitable. We do not consciously strive to
realize an ideal; we yield to our nature. It is not, as with the achieve-
ment of selfhood in Confucian thought, a type of self-mastery. In fact,
there is not even self-conscious control involved. There are frequent il-
lustrations of this point in the text. For example, a millipede cannot
even explain how he coordinates his numerous feet. He replies, Now,
I just move by my natural inner workings but dont know why it is so
(159).
Perhaps one reason, then, that Zhuangzi avoids using the character
xing when it is in such prevalent use as part of the philosophical debates
of the period is that he is focusing not on the nature of the human
species, but on all living beings as natural beings (which would downplay
what makes us different from non-human beings), and on each living
being as a unique natural being (which would highlight what makes each
of us different from any other being, other human beings included). We
do not want to cultivate what sets us apart from other natural beings, as
Mencius advises us; we want to eliminate it. Confucians sanctify what is
32 Ted Slingerland writes, Indeed, the tendency to fall under the sway of shifei distinc-
tions seems to Zhuangzi to be a deeply rooted human disposition: he refers to it as the

essence (qing) of human beings (i.e. that which distinguishes human beings from other
living beings), and describes it as something that the Daoist sage must learn to do with-
out (Slingerland 1998, 283). One might conclude, then, that Zhuangzi is conceding that
the sage will no longer be recognizably human.
33 Contrast Zhuangzis use of the term with that of Mencius, for whom non-human is
the most severe form of moral condemnation (see Mencius 1970, 2A6).
distinctly human, what sets us apart from the rest of the natural world,
while Zhuangzi criticizes it: How insignificant and small is that part
of [the sage] which belongs to ren! How grand and great is his singular
identification with tian! (4849).
5.7 A Zhuangzian metaphor: the pipes of nature/Heaven

A good metaphor we can use to understand this position is that of
the pipes of Heaven (which, I argue, is better translated pipes of na-
ture), which is found in the Inner Chapters. Zi Qi, who is described as
having lost himself, describes the pipes this way: The myriad sounds
produced by the blowing of the wind are different, yet all it does is elicit
the natural propensities of the hollows themselves (shi qi ziji ye) (12).34
In this metaphor, each pipe is unique; because of the material it is made
of, its size, and the way it is shaped, it will sound unlike any other pipe.
Each pipe sounds only like itself (qi ziji). However, it will only sound
like itself when the great breath that blows through all pipes can blow
through it without obstruction. We can realize that, despite the different
sounds we make, the same breath blows through us all (we are all sim-
ply manifestations of dao/nature). It is this very realization that allows
the obstructions that block up the pipe (and prevent it from sounding
like itself) to be removed. The pipe, then, makes its own unique sound, a
sound that is not in unison with (which would be conformity), but in har-
mony with, the other pipes. It is the obstructions that cause some pipes
to squeak or play flat in a way that spoils the sound for everyone (this
can refer especially to the people who blow their own horn (pipe)).35
There is a seemingly paradoxical understanding reflected hereit is
only when experiencing the essential unity of things (the same breath
blows through us all), by seeing through the boundaries we set up
(most importantly between self and other), that our truly unique
natures can emerge. This play of unity and multiplicity, the emphasis
on selflessness alongside the prominence of idiosyncratic personalities
and the panoply of diverse individual natures, are central themes in
Zhuangzi. When we are no longer separated from the dao, when artificial
34 Watsons translation is Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so
that each can be itself (32).

35 This metaphor is further developed in the outer and miscellaneous chapters, where
we see examples of the natural expression of the dao being blocked up by occlusions. It is
crucial that we stay open in order to be able to realize our nature. In all things, the Way does
not want to be obstructed, for if there is obstruction, there is choking, if the choking does
not cease, there is disorder; and disorder harms the life of all creatures (W138). Elsewhere
we see warnings to those who obstructHe who is heedless of his nature . . . will find his
nature choked with reeds and rushes . . . (260).
boundaries (the only kind there are) dissolve, then we experience the
oneness of all things. This is not the kind of oneness that involves
any kind of absorption in some undifferentiated unity, for it is at this
point, when we feel the greatest connection to all other beings, that we
are most ourselves in all of our uniqueness. Nor is it a union with some
transcendent other. Rather, it is a recognition that there are no bound-
aries between ourselves and the dao.36 In other words, when I am without
self, the barrier that my mind falsely constructs between me and the
dao disappears and I can experience myself as nature in a particular,
unique instantiation. Insofar as I have not reached a perfected state, the
explanation lies here: it is my self that is obstructing my nature.
6. A Zhuangzian Self?
Given the range of meanings that can correspond to the word self, it
is often the case that a thinker who rejects one understanding of self,
thus holding a no-self position within a particular dialectical context,
will, at the same time, have some understanding of the kind of beings
we are that can be captured by another sense of the word self.37 In
Zhuangzis case, it is clear that if there is to be any kind of self, it must
be seen as a natural self. As we have seen, Zhuangzi rejects terms such
as ji and ming, terms that focus on our social roles, names, etc. What
Zhuangzi wants to nourish and preserve is the shen. In its narrowest,
and probably most original, sense (and still a sense used in modern Chi-
nese), it means body, although for both Confucians and Zhuangzi the
term came to mean the entire psychophysical complex of the individual.
Zhuangzian self would involve our nature, qi, and bodies, and fully realiz-
ing ourselves would mean expressing these. Given Zhuangzis emphasis
on the manifestation of ones unique nature, we could use a notion such
as a spontaneous natural self for Zhuangzi, thereby contrasting it with
the Confucian cultivated social self.38
36 This would make Zhuangzis a form of intra-worldly mysticism, rather than union
or unity mysticism, on Lee Yearleys typology (Yearley 1982).

37 For example, while Buddhists deny atman (self or soul), there are other elements
of relative stability and (karmic) continuity of the individual that result in some form of
selfhood. Such a notion would be necessary for understanding how virtues or perfections
(paramitas) could be cultivated in Buddhism. For a discussion of what kind of Buddhist
self is possible while maintaining the notion of anatman (no self) and an emphasis on
impermanence, see King 1986.
38 One way to illustrate the difference would be to draw on David Halls distinction
between being a self and having a self. Hall writes that one may be a self in some
inchoate sense without having a self (Hall 1994, 221). The distinction, according to Hall,
is self-consciousness, for consciousness is the manner of holding onto, of owning, a self
(222). As Confucians continuously reflect on the developing self (fan xing, si), they have this
kind of self-consciousness. Introspection is not a prominent element in Zhuangzi, whose
My understanding of what a Zhuangzian self would look like is in

stark contrast to scholars such as Lao Siguang and Judith Berling, who
have an explicit or implicit dualism between spirit and body and ar-
gue that Zhuangzi has a notion of a true self that is separate from
the body. Lao writes, The self does not take the physical form as its
own body . . . . The self is a subject transcending the (material) series of
events; thus, life and death of the physical form cannot change the self
(Jochim 1998, 41). Berling portrays Zhuangzi as advocating letting the
inner self shine through . . . . The accident of having taken on human
form provides a person with the capability to understand that such a
form is only one perspective; the autonomous, perfected self is free even
of the limitations of humanness and physical existence because it has
the courage of imagination. Elsewhere, she writes that spirit is that
core of consciousness not tied down by the physical self (Berling 1985,
10809, 12).
It is unclear how one can call our human form an accident, since this
is precisely what Zhuangzi says we receive from tian (our xing, shape, or
form, and shen, body). At one point, contrary to her locating of the inner
self separately from physical existence, Berling states, The openness of
the Daoist is not openness to the pressures of society, but to what comes
naturally from living (116). Natural living is, if it is anything, embod-
ied, physical living. It is also puzzling how she can at the same time
claim that spirit is separate from the physical self and also acknowl-
edge that in the text spirit is explicitly identified with inborn nature
(112).
Therefore, the only self that might be worth the name in Zhuangzi
is the natural self, which is the embodied self.39 It makes sense,
then, that the term Zhuangzi uses to describe the aspect of the per-
son that should be cultivated (xiu), preserved (bao), and nourished
(yang) is shen, which, when it does not mean body, always is em-
bodied.40 Zhuangzi states, A man should not inwardly harm his shen
with good and bad, but rather should accord with the spontaneous
sages are focused much more on the task in which they are involved. At the highest level
of skill, one has completely forgotten oneself and is aware only of the activity.
39 For an examination of the role played by the body in the later Daoist traditions, see
Schipper 1993. It is revealing that most Daoist portrayals of perfected people, the long-lived
and/or immortal beings who have freed themselves from the sources of decay and dissolu-
tion, still show these people as having bodies (often described as embryo bodies, spirit
bodies, or golden bodies). There is generally no conception of a disembodied eternal soul
that is the guarantor of immortality. Daoist transformation is primarily a transformation
of the body.
40 This is a point that Chris Jochim makes. He explains that for Zhuangzi it is almost
always a bad idea to lose or forget ones shen, and the same goes for putting it in danger or
taking it lightly (Jochim 1998, 47).
and not add to life (49). Our bodies are what we receive from tian;
it is through embodied experience freed from the control of the judg-
ing (good and bad), categorizing mind that we can accord with the
dao.
Beyond this, if we want to talk about the presentation of self in
Zhuangzi, we end up with what Robert Jay Lifton calls the protean
self. While self as understood in the Vedantan context is immutable,
and in the Confucian or Greek context involves stability (such as the reli-
able dispositions of character), any self that we might find in Zhuangzi
would be characterized by continuous change. As stated earlier, such
a self would be embodied, would not be controlled or guided by xin,
would be fully open to each new experience (qi is empty and waits on
all things), and would respond in an appropriate and harmonious way,
fitting in effortlessly. Zhuangzi gives an example of a sage who could
not be read by a master of physiognomy because he was continuously
transforming himself.41 Lifton writes, The protean self is characterized
by fluidity and many-sidedness . . . behavior tends to be ad hoc, more or
less decided upon as we go along (Lifton 1993, 63). This is the way any
Zhuangzian self might be characterized.
This does not, however, leave the sage in an aimless, nihilistic state.
Lifton writes that we can conceive of the protean self as both fluid and
grounded, however tenuous that combination (1993, 9). For Zhuangzi,
fluidity is a product of not getting stuck in the linguistic, conceptual
realm. The grounding that guides action and provides some relative
stability is provided, as we have seen, by nature. The Zhuangzian self
would refer to a being that is true to her own nature and, in that sense,
acts in a way so of herself (ziran, spontaneous).
While it is possible, then, to describe some kind of Zhuangzian self,
I believe it is best to avoid using self to describe Zhuangzis position
in the context of ConfucianZhuangzian debate since Zhuangzi himself
focuses on negating the conception of selfhood put forth by Confucians.
Since in the Western discourse, we speak of Confucian self-cultivation,
which is a useful term, and we have seen that Zhuangzi wants to negate
precisely what the Confucians are cultivating, no-self serves a useful
purpose here. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that, given the wide
range of meanings that can be expressed by the term self, even those
positions that can be described as no-self usually have some form of
selfhood, personhood, or agency, however, protean.
41 The physiognomist exclaims, I have no way to physiognomize him! If he will try to
steady himself, then I will come and examine him again. In the end, the physiognomists
wits leave him and he flees. The sage explains, I came at him empty, wriggling and
turning, not knowing anything about who or what, now dipping and bending, now flowing
in wavesthats why he ran away (W94).
7. Soteriology and Modes of Connection

In religious thought, conceptions of self and no-self always occur
within soteriological contexts (soteriology understood in its broadest
sense). John Hick describes the basic soteriological move as that which
takes a person from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness (Hick
1980). This is a strictly formal structure that can lead in very differ-
ent directions once the notions of self and Reality are fleshed out.
Despite this, I think a basic truth remains: Religious traditions aim to
move people beyond the narrow conception of a separate self serving
its own appetites, desires, and interests, toward connections with larger
realities or systems, larger wholes that both transcend and include the
individual. This is essentially a process of making connections. Self and
no-self doctrines can be seen as strategies occurring within any sote-
riological system, because the making of connections can be done both
through ways in which the self is continuously expanded until it includes
all things, or the self is contracted (or seen through) until it is elimi-
nated, forgotten, or dissolved. In both cases, boundaries are eliminated
and one attains ones proper place (one feels at home in/ harmonized
with) the larger realities that constitute and sustain one.
7.1 Self-expansion and self-dissolving

For the Confucian, as we have seen, connections with others are made
through the categories that constitute selfhood (yi, the social roles and
obligations given by the tradition). Relationships exist on a self-to-self
basis. This is why ones role in a situation and status in a hierarchy (as
well as the role and status of the other) have a profound impact on how
one should act or feel. It is not that the authentic experience of the other
(or of the dao itself) is somehow mediated by categories. Rather, the dao
manifests itself in just these ways, with these distinctions.
Therefore, the Confucian conception of self is fundamentally so-
cial, and the self can be understood as a nexus of relationships. The
Analects states, Wishing to establish oneself, one establishes others
(6.4). Tu Weiming writes, Strictly speaking, to involve the other in
our self-cultivation is not only altruistic; it is required for our own self-
development (232).
The central virtues of Confucianism, which include li (ritual, propri-
ety), yi (righteousness, obligations as dictated by social roles), and ren
(benevolence, co-humanity), can only be understood in relation to oth-
ers. Clearly, this self is quite different from the modern, Western self
described by Frank Johnson and used by Chris Jochim. For one thing,
there is not the sense that there is a true self underneath all of the
roles that we play, but rather that selfhood is manifested only in these
relational roles (parent, child, teacher, student, friend, etc.). One comes
into selfhood by learning how to act, feel, and think well in the contexts
of these relations (Rosemont 1997, 71).
The Confucian project involves a continuous expansion of self. The
scope of the self is widened to encompass larger contexts and rela-
tionships; for Mencius, this is described as the process of extending
ones moral feelings from situations in which they occur spontaneously
(for example, with family members) to more distant situations (with
strangers). The cultivation of the self involves the ever deepening aware-
ness of how the self is constituted by others. The self is extended not only
through relationships with other people, but by creating cultural objects.
These objects, as extensions and manifestations of ourselves, allow for
the connection with other people across distances and over time. Human
beings, then, overcome separateness and alienation through relating and
creating.
The boundaries of the self are continuously extended until it encom-
passes the entire world, a vision presented in the Da Xue (Great Learn-
ing), in which cultivation of the self is linked, step by step, with peace
throughout the world.
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world
would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order
to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to
regulate their families would first cultivate their selves (shen). Those who
wished to cultivate their selves would first rectify their minds. Those who
wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those
who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowl-
edge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things.
When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is
extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is
rectified; when the mind is rectified, the self is cultivated; when the self is
cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the
state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace
throughout the world [Chan 1973, 8687].42
This passage makes clear that self-cultivation has cosmological as well

as ethical dimensions (Tu Weimings term is anthropocosmic). Later
Neo-Confucians, such as Cheng Hao, used the phrase forming one body
with Heaven, Earth and the myriad beings (Chan 1973, 523). The cul-
tivation of self is the root of the order of the family, state, and cosmos; at
the same time, the self can only be cultivated through the connections it
has with family, state, and cosmos. This is why the Da Xue begins with
42 For reasons given above, I translate shen as self here. I use their selves rather
than themselves both for emphasis and to maintain parallel construction.

the world, moves step-by-step back to the self (to show how cosmic order
is rooted in self-cultivation), and then moves back out again. It must be
remembered that, for Confucians, one never finishes the task of becom-
ing a fully realized self. As the path of cultivation ends only with death,
one can see selfhood as a process rather than a thing.43
While the Confucians expand, enhance, and cultivate the self in or-
der to get in proper relation with others and the cosmos, Zhuangzis
way is one of forgetting the self in order to move in accordance with
the natural dao. When one engages in the fasting of the mind, ones
very identity dissolves. What one is doing is forgetting all of those
labels and categories (like our social roles) with which we normally
falsely identify ourselves. Yan Hui, who first forgets moral terms
such as benevolence and righteousness (virtues dear to Confucians),
finally says, I . . . drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do
away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great
Thoroughfare. Zhuangzis Confucius responds, If youre identical with
it, you must have no more preferences! If youve been transformed,
you must have no more constancy (W87). Zhuangzi is saying that the
terms by which we understand the self lock us into constructed (not
natural) roles, ways of acting, and obligations. They have a false con-
stancy which is at odds with the continuously changing nature of the
world.
When one has forgotten the labels and categories through which self
is constructed, one is guided by ones nature. As a natural being act-
ing in an effortless way, one will be harmonized with the larger natural
world. Harmonization is the activity of the dao, but, as illustrated by
the Pipes of Tian metaphor, one can only find ones place in the har-
monized whole when one eliminates those elements that obstructs ones
nature (e.g., through forgetting or mental fasting), allowing ones na-
ture to manifest itself. A passage that illustrates this process describes
how a master woodcarver fashions his creations: When I have fasted
for three days, I no longer have any thought of congratulations or re-
wards . . . when I have fasted for five days, I no longer have any thought
of praise or blame . . . . My skill is concentrated and all outside distrac-
tions fade away . . . . I then examine the nature of the tree . . . and match
up tian with tian (nature with nature) (W127).44 In other words, when
he gets his self-driven discursive mind out of the way (e.g., no concern
for reward and punishment, success, or failure), his nature is allowed
to emerge fully. Since the tree (as is generally true of the nonhuman
43 Tu Weiming uses the term the ceaseless process of human flourishing (Tu 1994,
183).
44 I am translating the word tian as nature here, as opposed to those translators who
use the word heaven. For a justification of this translation, see Berkson 1999, 22337.
natural world) is always the true expression of its own nature (no notion
of self, no discursive mind, to interfere), then an encounter of the selfless
Woodcarver and Tree can be the meeting of nature with nature. When
all things can simply express their natures, they are harmonized within
the framework of nature (he zhi yi tian) (23).
For the Confucians, then, proper cultivation of the self is the only way
to fit in with nature and the cosmos; for Zhuangzi, as long as one contin-
ues to rely on the categories and structures of selfhood, one will never fit
in properly with the dao. While both soteriologies are grounded in the
making of connections, and harmonization is the goal of both, Confucians
achieve it through the vehicle of self, Zhuangzi through the vehicle of no-
self. Confucian connections are self-to-self, Zhuangzian connections are
nature-to-nature.45
8. Modes of Connection
While it would seem as if expansion and contraction of self lead in op-
posite directions, an interesting question emerges: If the self is expanded
to include the entire cosmos, or eliminated so that there is no separation
between self and other, is there any difference in the end? After all, in
both cases one eliminates boundaries and overcomes separation so as to
achieve connection with larger realities, ultimately with reality itself. As
we will see, however, crucial differences can remain. These differences
can be put in terms of what kinds of connections (which larger reali-
ties/wholes) are emphasized and how such connections are made and
sustained.
Both Confucian and Zhuangzian thought teaches that flourishing
depends on overcoming separation and self-centeredness and making
connections with larger realities. These connections are what provide
45 Losing (or dissolving, eliminating, seeing through) the self is a move common to many
religious traditions, but despite the structural commonality, there can be many different
ways to lose a self (or different kinds of self to lose), with profoundly different implications.
Just as a typology can be created for different notions of self, so can one also be created for
the various conceptions of no-self. The Christian saint, as described by Edith Wyschogrod,
is motivated simply by the suffering of the other, with selflessness connected with self-
sacrifice (Wyschogrod 1990). Wyschogrods notion of the saint certainly does not correspond
to Zhuangzis sages, if for no other reason than that Zhuangzis exemplars are certainly
unwilling to accept the pain and sorrow of saints. Zhuangzian no-self is quite different
from the Christian saint (or Mahayana Bodhisattva), because the self is not given up for
the sake of the other, but rather for the sake of natural, easy, skillful living. In a sense,
then, we thus have the beginnings of a crude typology in these three categories: 1. Self for
the sake of (and constituted by) others (Confucians); 2. Selflessness for the sake of others
(Christian saint, Buddhist Bodhisattva); 3. Selflessness for the sake of natural, skillful
living (Zhuangzi).
meaning in life and solace in death. There are a number of types of con-
nection that are emphasized in Chinese thought:46
1. The first is biologicalfamilial.47 This recognizes our continuity
through the family. The Confucian (but not Zhuangzian) emphasis
on the family and lineage, and its elevation of filial piety with its de-
mand not only to honor the parents but also to provide descendants, is
a clear example of this recognition. Throughout East Asia, the ances-
tral altar within the home serves as a visible reminder of our place in
the extended family line. Chinese families will often consult the an-
cestors on important matters and inform them of significant passages
or decisions. The practice of feeding the ancestors and giving them
money and other useful objects (through ritual burning) symbolically
conveys the sense that the survival of our ancestors depends on our
remembering.
2. The second category is the creative, that in which we are connected to
our work. This can be seen both in what we individually produce, and
also in our participation in and contribution to an ongoing creative
community or tradition. We are engaged in larger projects that tran-
scend and survive us. Confucians, but not Zhuangzi, emphasize this
dimension. The point here is this: In most cases, it matters to us what
happens to our work, values, and ideas (which, at some level, we feel to
be an extension or dimension of our self) after our deaths. This fact
allows us to see that we have a conception of selfhood that involves
more than individual subjectivity or consciousness. Feeling responsi-
ble for the world that survives us requires us to feel connections with
a world that will exist without us, connections which depend on (and
bring about) an expansion of our notion of self.
All of the Confucian thinkers emphasize that while the body does
not remain, the name (ming) does. The Master said, The gentleman
hates not leaving behind a name when he is gone (15.20). In addi-
tion, the tradition of which the deceased was a part, and which he
has done his best to preserve and transmit, remains. Confucians saw
themselves as the keepers of the humanizing tradition. Mencius said,
46 This list, and much of my understanding of the importance of various kinds of con-
nections, draws on the work of Robert Jay Lifton in The Broken Connection (Lifton 1983),
although I depart from his categories in a number of ways.
47 I add familial to Liftons biological, for we should include adopted children and
other forms of non-biological family relationships. One could argue, however, that non-
biological relations would belong in the third category, human relatedness, which would
allow this to be a separate category for biological connections, which are deeply important
for Confucians. If we extend this category, we could include larger structures that pro-
vide a sense of membership and belonging, such as tribes, ethnic groups, or even nations.
The Confucians themselves see the ideal society as a family writ large, and use familial
metaphors to describe the proper relationship between rulers and subjects.
All a gentleman can do in starting an enterprise is to leave behind a

tradition which can be carried on (1B14).
3. The third category is human-relatedness, the reciprocal influence peo-
ple have on each other through their relationships. This form of con-
nectedness looks at the effects we have on the lives of people such
as students, family, and friends. Our influence creates ripples felt in
ways that we cannot begin to predict. Because the relationships are
not only with the living, but also with the dead, the connection with a
tradition and its sages could also be included in this category. These
themes are richly developed in the Confucian tradition, which deals
extensively with human relationships (in the Analects, it is seen often
in terms of the teacherdisciple relationship).
4. The fourth category is nature itself, and looks at our participation in
the natural world. While this is largely a Daoist theme (as we have
seen, it is a prominent feature of Zhuangzis thought), it is a strain also
found in Confucian thought, most prominently in Xunzi (see Ivanhoe
1991). In Zhuangzis deathbed experience, it is this form of connect-
edness that provides solace. Human beings can take comfort in the
fact that our lives and deaths are intimately bound up in the cyclical
processes of nature. In the Zhuangzi, there is a passage that expresses
this directly: Human beings return to enter the wellsprings of nature.
The myriad things all come out from the wellsprings and all reenter
the wellsprings (173).
5. Finally, the fifth category is the category of experience of oneness or
nonduality, the realm of the mystical, seen most clearly in Zhuangzi.
The actual experience is often equated with a particular psychic state,
what might be called an expanded state of consciousness. Such a
state is described in almost every religious tradition, and normally
has the qualities of nonduality, where the boundaries between self and
world, subject and object, disappear. There is a sense of radical pres-
entness and immediacy; the state brings illumination and insight.48
The differences between the Confucians and Zhuangzi lie in their
conflicting views of the self, temporality, and nature. Beyond these
differences, however, we have seen a similarityboth Confucian and
Zhuangzian soteriologies involve an emphasis on connection and on
cultivating awareness and appreciation of these relationships that
48 Often, one result of such an experience is that because the self is no longer seen as
separate, one no longer fears its loss. There has been an identification with the boundless
and timeless. Then, the issue becomes how to properly integrate this insight into ones life,
which means turning a mystical experience into a selfless life. The means to do this seem
to lie in connecting this experience with the more enduring sense of participation found in
the other modes of connection (for Zhuangzi, the no-self experience brought about by this
awareness leads to a sense of connection with the rest of the natural world).
constitute us and from which we are not ultimately separate. We thus

have a similarity within the differences. However, to go a step further,
the differences come back again within the similarity: Different connec-
tions are emphasized by the Confucians as opposed to Zhuangzi precisely
because the various connections are made possible and sustained by dif-
fering temporalities and notions of self.
The modes of connectedness and continuity emphasized by Confu-
cians are family, work, human-relatedness, and tradition/history. They
are sustained by learning, ritual, and text. All of the Confucian forms of
connection and ways of connecting are grounded in the narrative concep-
tion of temporality and selfhood, and depend on our ability to remember.
Confucians believe that we are who we are largely because of whom we
have lived with, loved, and learned from. Ones life is irreducibly social,
and the deepest human connections are made between highly cultivated
selves.
We also understand that we are part of a tradition that shaped us
and to which we owe our very humanity itself. By placing ourselves in
the context of the larger connections that constitute and sustain us, we
understand how our life and death fit into larger systems of meaning,
systems which existed before our birth and which will continue after
our death. We understand that our name, our character and accom-
plishments, will persist after our death and will continue to (hopefully)
educate and inspire others.
In contrast with the Confucian picture, the connections at the heart of
Zhuangzis vision are grounded in momentary temporality and no-self,
and depend on our ability to forget. The primary connection is with na-
ture itself. It is a connection with no boundaries (wu jing)we are,
at the root, nature. Whereas Confucian connections are made between
selves, Zhuangzian connections are made when we match up nature
with nature. The more we learn to forget ourselvesand forget tradi-
tion, norms, roles, and languagethe freer and easier our lives will be.
A powerful awareness of transience and change helps us to avoid the
errors of ossification and holding on.
One way to understand Confucian and Zhuangzian conceptions of
self and no-self is through the lens of remembering/forgetting. Anal-
ogous terms that might be employed include holding on/letting go or
accumulation/fasting. Within the Chinese context, it becomes clear that
the achievement of selfhood depends on remembering, while no-self is
achieved through forgetting.
The Confucian conception of selfhood, which, as we have seen, is
based on narrative temporality, depends on memory.49 There are multiple
49 William James, who deeply probed the nature of selfhood, also came to this conclu-
sion. He writes, The identity which the I discovers can only be a relative identity, that
senses in which memory plays an important role in Confucian thought.

Memory is essential for the individual to construct a self over time
(keeping in mind that this individual life narrative is embedded within
the family narrative, which is why Confucians are connoisseurs of ge-
nealogy). Beyond this, the cultural memory, preserved through texts
and ritual, is our collective endowment that allows us to realize our
humanity.50
Zhuangzis Way, on the other hand, is a way of forgetting. Most explic-
itly in the form of zuo wang, sitting in forgetfulness, but also through
the fasting of the mind and absorption in skillful activity. The ability to
forget (which does not mean flout or reject) what society dictates (val-
ues, norms, categories), what tradition has passed down, ones roles,
and ones very self, allows one to live with freedom. Zhuangzi advises,
Forget things, forget Heaven, and be called a forgetter of self. The man
who has forgotten self may be said to have entered heaven (W133). Fish
forget themselves in the rivers and lakes; people forget themselves in the
arts of the Way (61; see also 4849).
Conscious rememberingthrough ritual, tradition and textis es-
sential for creating the Confucian good life and is an impediment to
living well for Zhuangzi. As we have seen, Confucian remembering and
Zhuangzian forgetting both provide means by which human beings can
experience profound, life-enhancing connections. These radically differ-
ent means lead, however, to different types of connection.
9. Conclusion
Thus, the Confucian and Zhuangzian approaches represent two ways
to look at the narratively constructed self: As that which connects and
harmonizes or as that which separates and disrupts. We can see the
of a slow shifting in which there is always some ingredient retained. The commonest ele-
ment of all, the most uniform, is the possession of the same memories (James 1950, 372).
Commenting on James, Mark Freeman explains, [T]he idea of self qua identity depends
on memory above all else . . . . The memories which we possess are primary foundation for
the construction of self. Simply stated, without a past to look back upon and to identify as
ones own, there would be no self (Freeman 1992, 1920).
50 The child in a Confucian home was educated by memorizing the classics. The im-
portance of history for Confucians demonstrates the role that cultural memory plays. As
Confucius explicitly acknowledges, preservation and transmission is more important than
innovation. Since, for Confucians, the ideal way resides in a past Golden Age, preserving
the cultural memory is a sacred obligation. Furthermore, ritual is a way of inscribing mem-
ory on the body. The body is humanized through, crudely put, a type of muscle memory so
that one moves, feels, responds according to the Way that has been passed down. In other
words, the expression of memory is itself a bodily phenomenon.
tension represented by the perspectives of the Confucians and Zhuangzi

as one of cultivating or forgetting the self; of seeing the everyday social
realm and its roles as the manifestation of the dao or the obstructer
of it.
Both Confucian and Zhuangzian soteriologies are attempts at over-
coming division and separation and bringing about a sense of harmony
and unity. For the Confucians, given the kinds of beings we are, the realm
of self (roles, names, concepts, tradition, ritual) is that which makes us
truly human; it is that arena in which we connect with others, in which
proper relationships and action are possible. For Zhuangzi, such cate-
gories obstruct and damage the harmonizing activity of nature. They are
divisive, creating artificial boundaries. When these are forgotten, true
connection becomes possibleamong people to some extent, but primar-
ily with nature as a whole. The relatively thin picture of friendship and
family (and human relationship in general) Zhuangzi presents may be
understood as a silent concession that the Confucians are rightdeep
human relationships only occur among selves. Zhuangzis friends might
enjoy each others company, and might see the world in a common way,
but they are missing the connection that is only possible with a shared
history; furthermore, a history is something that can only be shared by
two selves.
Despite Jochims warning, I am going to say yes to no-self in
Zhuangzi. However, when using such terms, we must always properly
qualify them (some version of such a qualification must be made in ev-
ery comparative exercise). The selfless Zhuangzian sage does not re-
semble the Christian saint or the Mahayana Bodhisattva. Yet, Zhuangzi
does have a version of what we can justifiably describe as no-self, for
he specifically denies the Confucian self, a conception of self based on
narrative, shaped by learning and ritual, and related to others through
particular roles and obligations. He offers a picture of freedom from that
self that allows for a manifestation of nature and harmonization with
the dao.
The differences between the most important thinkers of the classical
Confucian tradition and Zhuangzi illustrate the terms of one debate. The
dialectic of self and no-self always arises within a particular cultural and
soteriological context and may not translate seamlessly to others. Rather
than attempting to reduce the notion of self or no-self to one meaning
that can work in any comparative project, we can instead use the insights
gained from comparative study to create typologies that help us sort out
the various versions of these multivalent terms. By doing this, we are
led to ever deeper reflection on what it might mean to gain or lose a self,
what connections become possible through these movements, and what
is at stake in the process.
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Conceptions of Self, No Self and Modes of Connection - Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical Chinese Thought

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Conceptions of Self, No Self and Modes of Connection - Comparative Soteriological Structures in Classical Chinese Thought

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CONCEPTIONS OF SELF/NO-SELF AND

1. A Problem in Comparative Religious Thought

engage in some metalevel reflection on the process of comparison itself

context, both between Confucians and Zhuangzi, and among Confucians

privilege Augustine over Mencius. See page 192.

4. Typology Creation and Concept Clusters

of a relational metaphysics according to which only relation, or relating, is real (Oliver

mysticism (Yearley 1982).

For example, a cursory examination of uses of the term self in reli-

least partially decontextualized and then recontextualized by contrast-

thinker or tradition being studied.12 Second, if the comparativist is work-

typologies of self and no-self that can be developed through cross-

5. The Classical Chinese Case

5.1 Confucian conceptions of temporality and self

human life in terms of narratives. A life unfolds in stages, which are

In other words, because the characteristics of our qi change over time,

(heart-mind). Mencius is explicit about the guiding function of xin, which

as the overcoming (reforming) of nature. Because their conceptions and

5.2 Zhuangzian temporality and no-self

Zhuangzi, particularly in what Lee Yearley describes as his radical

dered as it goes . . . Life is a series of new beginnings. Everything is unstable . . . Change is

we will naturally harmonize with tianli, the patterns of nature. Qi is

stories about the importance (and usefulness) of uselessness. By reject-

5.3 Techniques for realizing no-self

23 Zhuangzis version of no-self involves an undermining of instrumentality in such a

through stages, Zhuangzi sees it as a rambling with no destination.

5.4 Zhuangzian cultivation narratives

24 There also appear to be elements of a momentary model of temporality in Confucian

It is clear that narrative temporality plays a role in the Zhuangzi,

25 I am indebted to Mark Unno for this formulation.

5.5 Zhuangzi and nature

by a contemporary version of this picture, given by P. J. Ivanhoe (Ivanhoe 1996).

28 See also the passage about the seabird of old on 171.

If one reads tian as nature, as I do, then it seems as if Zhuangzi is

Confucians is in how they value this capacity.32 We cannot imagine a rec-

tions seems to Zhuangzi to be a deeply rooted human disposition: he refers to it as the

5.7 A Zhuangzian metaphor: the pipes of nature/Heaven

34 Watsons translation is Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so

that each can be itself (32).

or unity mysticism, on Lee Yearleys typology (Yearley 1982).

My understanding of what a Zhuangzian self would look like is in

41 The physiognomist exclaims, I have no way to physiognomize him! If he will try to

7. Soteriology and Modes of Connection

7.1 Self-expansion and self-dissolving

This passage makes clear that self-cultivation has cosmological as well

than themselves both for emphasis and to maintain parallel construction.

All a gentleman can do in starting an enterprise is to leave behind a

constitute us and from which we are not ultimately separate. We thus

senses in which memory plays an important role in Confucian thought.

tension represented by the perspectives of the Confucians and Zhuangzi

Hall, David, and Roger Ames

Marsella, Anthony, George DeVos, and Francis L. K. Hsu

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