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Tio vs. Videogram

151 SCRA 208

FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987
entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the
National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as
it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for
the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and
that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board"
is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as
to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board

(270 SCRA 538)

Facts: Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer issued a notice of hearing directing Grand
Air to serve a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators.
Grand Air filed its compliance and requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL filed
an opposition to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the
application until Grand Air first obtains a franchise to operate from Congress. The Chief Hearing
Officer denied the opposition and the CAB approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3
months. The opposition for the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its assumption of
jurisdiction over Grand Airs application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the
specific power to issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.

Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or
TOP even though the prospective operator does not have a legislative franchise?

Held: Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under Republic Act 776 and a
legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do so, since Congress has delegated the
authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the CAB, an
administrative agency. The delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress had
set specific standard and limitations on how such authority should be exercised.

Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want
of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford.
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Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has jurisdiction
over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements of the law.

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is
a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH
telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17
March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in
Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent
filed a letter-complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for
poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the
company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and
set the initial hearing.

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under
Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from
receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos.

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to
impose fines

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC
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to render it.

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure
by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so
there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner
that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the
Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit
grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic
agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded
the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no
alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any
order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it
will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
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prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before
the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.