PART I: COURTS AND ITS JURISDICTION
1. Pilipinas Shell Full Title: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation, Petitioners, vs.
v. Romars ROMARS International Gases Corporation, Respondent.
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell received information that RAMARS International Gases Corp [RAMARS]
was selling, offering for sale or distributing LPG by illegally refilling the steel cylinders
manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of Petron.
Pilipinas Shell requested NBI to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of
apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or
sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a
violation of Section 168, in relation to Sec 170 of the Intellectual Property Code and/or
Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or
Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of
Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at RAMARS' warehouse. They also
witnessed trucks coming from RAMARS refilling facility loaded with Gasul, Shellane and
Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places, one of them a
store called Edrich Enterprises located in Iriga City. The investigators then bought
Shellane and Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official
receipt.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant for Violation
of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of Intellectual Property Code against RAMARS
and/or its occupants.
RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting the said Applications and issued
2 search warrants. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
respondent's premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items
described in the warrants were seized.
RAMARS filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants only on the following grounds:
1. There was no probable cause;
2. There had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test- buy to the
date of the search and seizure operations;
3. Most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third
person; and
4. Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame.
RTC Order: denied the Motion to Quash.
RAMARS new counsel filed an Appearance with MR. It was only in said motion
where RAMARS raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the
Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was
committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
RAMARS pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any
compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have
territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by Section
2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RTC-Nagas Order: granted RAMARS MR, thereby quashing Search Warrants.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
ISSUE #1: w/not the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search
warrants YES!
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule
9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said
objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
SC has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions
to quash search warrants. In Abuan v. People, SC held that the motion to quash the
search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress.
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take
cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was
not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2)
the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
ITC:
Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time
of filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised
issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE #2: whether or not venue in an application for search warrant is
jurisdictional NO!
Relevant Provision:
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
(Emphasis supplied)
Wordings of said provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling
reasons if the application is filed in a court, which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state
authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants.
ITC:
1
Pilipinas Shell then appealed to the CA. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant in this case
CA Ruling: affirmed RTC-Naga. should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the
CA held that the issued raised for the 1st time in RAMARS MR was an issue of jurisdiction. RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court
It justified its ruling by saying that the the concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced.
not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
Pilipinas Shells application for a search warrant was indeed insufficient for
MR filed but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 by
failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons
Pilipinas Shell arguing that it was already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding
why they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial
the venue of the filing of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.
the Omnibus Motion Rule.
DOCTRINE:
[BUT!!!!] Venue in an application for search warrant is NOT jurisdictional.
An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a
criminal action. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is
only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts,
as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process.
Search warrant an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions
on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to
be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
Hence, an application for search warrant is NOT a criminal action.
ITC:
CAs ruling was incorrect. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications
for search warrants with criminal actions themselves. Evidently, the issue of whether
the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to
issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, SC held it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken
into consideration an issue, which RAMARS failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it
did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite clear that the
RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No.
80643 are REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to quash, is
REINSTATED.

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 2

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
2. People v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE
Taroy Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) was charged with two counts of rape before the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet.
The complainant Des is the daughter of Mila (Taroys wife) by her first marriage. The couple
lived with MILAs children in Pucsusan Barangay, Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of
Baguio City. Des alleged that Taroy raped him on two occasions (in 1997 and in 1998). On
both occasions, Taroy was armed with a knife which forced DES to submit to Taroys
bestial desires. Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He averred that the
testimony was a fabrication made upon the prodding of her aunt who disliked him.
RTC: found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and awarded damages.
Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having
testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan
Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony that their
residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he
waived the jurisdictional requirement.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also held that the prosecution has
sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of MILA, DES,
and Alumno (first time that this name was mentioned).
3. Pestilos, et al An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
v. Generoso and Generoso). When the police arrived at the scene of the crime, they saw Atty. Generoso
People badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted
the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.
In an Information, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground
that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took
place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the
inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation
should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.
Petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari.
CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. CA ruled that the word
"invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a
command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases of rape against Taroy YES.
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to
stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction
to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the
municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients took place.
ITC: The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were
committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of
Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the
subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of MILA and
DES as well as the affidavit of arrest point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated
assertion that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief.
Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad
that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear
the case is beyond dispute.
WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03510 dated January 19, 2010 with the
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages be increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00.
Issues:
1. WON THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT. -YES
2. WON THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN
THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT. -YES
3. WON THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND
THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED. -NO
(Na-BV yung Court, bakit daw umabot sakanila yung ganitong issue for Resolution. Kaya
naglecture nalang sila, para hindi daw sayang. Lol)
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in
their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure. This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial
warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered
a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113,
Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante delicto);
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
3
 be arrested has committed it (hot pursuit); and [THE CASE FOCUSED ON
THIS PROVISION]
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
(Pre-1940 Rules) Prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought
to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion
and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has
limited this discretion.
(1940 and 1964 RoC) Under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required
that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the
arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally,
the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the
determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other
words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in
warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
(1985 RoC) Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions
introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed"
but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the
word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the
warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to
be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination
of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were
adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
III. The Elements of Hot Pursuit
1. First Element; Probable Cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how
the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 4

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 committed the crime.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore,
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished
from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest
PI by Prosecutor PI by Judge

The purpose of a preliminary the judge must be satisfied that based on

investigation is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty of the crime and
should be held for trial
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient
proof that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof.

the finding of the existence of probable
cause as to the guilt of the respondent
was based on the submitted documents
of the complainant, the respondent and
his witnesses
the judge is not yet tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates the evidence
in determining probable cause63 to issue a
warrant of arrest.

2. Second and Third Elements; The crime has just been committed;
Personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
The clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers
have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame.
This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause
finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are
prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated
facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
We hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime
should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 5

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge.
IV. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest.
We conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest
against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime
less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired
These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers'
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.
Second Issue: Held: The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint
or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not
but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account.
SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the
petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other
words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had
exhibited resistance.
Third Issue: Held: The Order denying the motion for PI is valid.
The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the
record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for
the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a
motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 6

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]

4. Uy v. Javellana Gerlie Uy and Consolacion Bascug v. Judge Erwin Javellana MTC La Castellana,
Negros Occidental
This administrative case arose from a verifled complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper unbecoming of a judge,
grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug.
They alleged that Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure citing several examples, to wit: (a) In Crim. Case for Malicious Mischief (People v.
Cornelio), Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section
16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case for Trespass to Dwelling
(People v. Celeste), Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance
with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading, and also refused to dismiss
outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the
affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (c) In
Crim. Case for Malicious Mischief (People v. Lopez), Judge Javellana did not apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and
preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then
set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and
her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits,
which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
They also alleged that Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions
to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused
under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when
the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been
effected.
In his Comment, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of the rules of
procedure and explained his actions in particular cases: (a) In the Malicious Mischief case, he
issued a warrant of arrest for the two accused in the exercise of his judicial discretion, and
the necessity of holding the accused in detention became evident when it was revealed
during trial that the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in another Crim.
Case; (b) In the Trespass to Dwelling case, Judge Javellana insisted that referral of the
dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a
jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; and (d) In the other case for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that MTD is a prohibited pleading under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss the case outright
since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.
Further, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary examination, asking the
complainants and their witnesses searching questions, before issuing warrants of arrest.
According to Judge Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of arrest right
after the preliminary examination. In some cases, he was not aware that the accused had
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened
to this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby
AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following criminal cases:
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. pending before Judge Javellana were
both for malicious mischief.
The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes
damage to the property of another through means not constituting arson. There are
special cases of malicious mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any person who shall cause damage to
obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive
substance; or
spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the
property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry,
waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by the public, shall be
punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
Xxx
All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article 329 of the same Code,
which reads:
ART. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article shall
be punished:
7
already voluntarily surrendered or was already taken into custody by virtue of a warrantless
arrest because police officers did not timely inform the court of such fact.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Javellana liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule. OCA recommended that the instant
administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter. SC agreed with the
findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for the penalty imposed.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos; xxx
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were
charged with the special cases of malicious mischief then Article 329 of the RPC should
be applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al., P6,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively, are proven, the appropriate
penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which
under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating
that [t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to
appear whenever required. Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to
appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of
attempted homicide, being tried in another case is totally unacceptable and further
indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court
as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from
Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved
the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when
it was not required or justified.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within
the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies
for the courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from
date of filing, the case may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court.
(a) If commenced by complaint. On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other
evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being
patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by information, or is not
dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which,
together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution,
shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant
or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the
defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint
or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to
8
 hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court
shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and
if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established
herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is
just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of
cases.
We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying
the MTD filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion
was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure read:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance
with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only
after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to
criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section[.] (Emphases ours.)
A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be
dismissed without prejudice. MTD on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon
requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the Lupon is not
a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was
not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this
ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit
without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It
finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases pending before Judge
Javellanas court. Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same.
Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious intent as a
defense. His repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases
so obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient
administration of justice, for which we hold him administratively liable.
There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana administratively liable for the
other charges against him contained in the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellanas

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 9

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]

5. Malabed v. ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEA,
Dela Pena Respondent.
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Complainant
Malabed alleges the following against respondent:
1. [Important allegation] The Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent
refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against
Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for
the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client
Fortunato Jadulco;
2. Respondent did not furnish her with a copy of the free patent in their case, but he
forwarded a copy of the CA. Furthermore, the title presented by respondent was fabricated;
3. Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot
owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman
Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized;
4. Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with RTC of Naval Judge Enrique
C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor;
5. Respondent also defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent
worked as an Associated Dean at Naval Institute of Technology, a public institution, and
received salaries therefore, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
Respondent denied the charges. As for the first allegation, respondent alleged that "the
[Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of
title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of
Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."
Ruling of the IBP Commissioner: Respondent is guilty of the charges as evidenced by the
numerous documents attached in the complaint. IBP recommended his suspension from the
practice for one year.
IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting IBP Commissioners
recommendation. [No mention of how the case went straight to the SC]
6. Hold Full title: Hold Departure Order Issued by Acting Judge Aniceto L. Madronio, Municipal
Departure Order Trial Court, Manaoag, Pangasinan In Criminal Case No. 5275.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
attention to several matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may again
result in another administrative complaint against the judge: (1) notices of hearing issued
by Judge Javellanas court must state the specific time, date, and place; (2) in case Judge
Javellana is unable to attend a hearing for any reason, he must inform his Clerk of Court
as soon as possible so that the latter can already cancel the hearing and spare the parties,
counsels, and witnesses from waiting52; and (3) he must take care in ascertaining the
facts and according due process to the parties concerned before levying charges of
incompetence or indifference against the PAO lawyers appearing before his court.
Issue: w/n respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct - YES.
I. The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-
conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a
complaint in court.
ITC: Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118
was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which
respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118,
was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is
apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in
Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's
allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of
the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action
when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
II. Failure to furnish opposing party with copy of title does not constitute
dishonesty. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of
Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and
her counsel could examine the same.
III. Complainant failed to substantiate her claim that respondent and Judge Asis
connived with each other. Furthermore, complainant accuses respondent of conflict of
interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of land
executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually,
respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are
occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply
performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely,
acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a
party as counsel in a court action.
IV. Respondent defied his disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Pea GUILTY of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years
with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
ISSUE: w/not an MTC judge has the authority to issue hold-departure orders NO!
10
issued by Judge
Madronio FACTS:
This refers to the indorsement, dated January 15, 1999, of the Secretary of Justice
concerning a "hold-departure" order issued on December 22, 1998 by Acting Judge Aniceto
L. Madronio, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Manaoag, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. 5275,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Christopher Castrence," which is for forcible
abduction with rape and homicide. The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the fact that
the order in question is contrary to Circular No. 3997, dated June 19, 1997, of this Court.
7. Mupas v. Mupas v. Espanol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1850, July 14, 2004
Espanol Facts: In a letter-complaint dated October 29, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
SC Circular No. 39-97, dated June 19, 1997 limits the authority to issue hold
departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their
exclusive jurisdiction.
Guidelines on the issuance of Hold Departure Orders:
1. Hold Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold Departure Order shall furnish the
DFA and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the Department of Justice with a
copy each of the Hold Departure Order issued within twentyfour (24) hours
from the time of issuance and through the fastest available means of
transmittal;
3. The Hold Departure Order shall contain the following information:
a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place
of birth and the place of last residence of the person against whom a
Hold Departure Order has been issued or whose departure from the
country has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in which the
Hold Departure Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold Departure Order.
e. If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a Hold
Departure Order has been issued or whose departure from the
country has been enjoined should also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed,
the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the
cancellation of the HoldDeparture Order issued. The courts concerned shall
furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration
with a copy each of the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the order of
dismissal twentyfour (24) hours from the time of promulgation/issuance and
through the fastest available means of transmittal.
All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs with
their respective lists of active Hold-Departure Orders are hereby directed to conduct an
inventory of the Hold Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform the
government agencies concerned of the status of the Orders involved.
ITC:
Judge Madronio admits his mistake, stating that he signed the hold departure order
through oversight and pleading for leniency in view of his cardiac illness which required
surgery and his assignment to three salas in addition to the Municipal Trial Court in
Manaoag.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, Judge Aniceto L. Madronio, Jr. is REPRIMANDED with WARNING
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
Issue: W/N respondent executive validly issued the HDO No.
Held: No.
11
Administrator (OCA for brevity), Judge Lorinda T. Mupas (complainant Judge for brevity)
of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite (MTC for brevity), charges Judge Dolores
L. Espaol, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmarias, Cavite (RTC for brevity), in her
capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
On August 24, 2001, herein complainant Judge conducted a preliminary investigation in an
estafa case between Bituon et al (private complainants) and Malihan et al.[4] On the same
day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and recommended no bail for their
provisional liberty.[5]
On August 28, 2001, private complainants filed a motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan
from the municipal jail to the provincial jail. OnAugust 29, 2001, complainant Judge
required the Chief of Police of Dasmarias, Cavite to comment on the motion to transfer
within five days from receipt of the order.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, accused Eva Malihan filed an urgent petition for bail.[8]
On September 3, 2001, the private complainants filed a supplemental pleading to support
their previous motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan.[9]
Invoking that the Executive Judge has authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal
jail of Dasmarias, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the private complainants sent copies of the motion to transfer and supplemental
pleading to respondent.
On September 4, 2001, complainant Judge required the private complainants in the criminal
case to file their comment or opposition to the petition for bail.[10]
However, on that same day, respondent issued two orders in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487.
The first Order directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from the Municipal Jail to
the Provincial Jail,[11] while the second Order directed the Commissioner on Immigration
and Deportation to hold and prevent the departure from the Philippines of the accused Eva
Malihan while the cases are pending.[12]
Complainant Judge alleges that respondents act of issuing said assailed orders, despite the
fact that the cases are pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
usurpation of authority.
As regards the hold-departure order, respondent argues that she is authorized under
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97, which does not require that the subject criminal cases be
in her court for the issuance of a hold-departure order. She argues further that she issued the
questioned hold-departure order based on the allegation of the complaining witnesses that
accused is trying to abscond from prosecution in the criminal case. Furthermore, she
decided to act on the motions because of the fact that complainant chose to ignore said
motions to the prejudice of the complaining witnesses.
OCA: With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that the same cannot be
sustained since it is contrary to the mandates of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97
inasmuch as at the time of its issuance, no case has yet been filed in the RTC. It adds that
while Section 1 of said circular states that Hold- Departure Orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court the same should
be read that the subject criminal case has been filed and pending with the RTC. In the
criminal cases subject of the present administrative case, there is even no final determination
yet of a prima facie case that would warrant the filing of an information in court. The
determination made by an MTC would still be reviewed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The OCA concludes that respondent went against the injunction in Circular No.
39-97 that judges of the RTCs should be cautious and avoid the indiscriminate issuance of
hold- departure orders as this results in inconvenience to the parties affected and is
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.
The executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of
detainees in cases handled by other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant
hold-departure orders in cases not assigned to her sala.
With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue
hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.[23]
Criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the
ambit of the circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in the
sala of the RTC concerned.
In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases were
only in the preliminary investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the offense charged
and should be held for trial.Complainant Judges findings had not yet been elevated to
and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Respondents issuance of the hold-departure
order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No. 39-
97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All
told, respondents claim of good intention finds no convincing justification.
Considering the respondents ten years of service as a judge, her judicial mind should
have been tempered with the delicate intricacies of the law and procedure. Respondents
confusion between her administrative and judicial functions betrays the degree of her
competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic procedural rules. Respondent ought
to have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure proper
administration of justice with due regard to her jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound
to discharge her duties with competence, prudence, caution and attention inasmuch as
she is a reflection of the entire judiciary.
Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand recommended by the
OCA to be too lenient. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found
guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to
be deducted from whatever retirement benefits due her. With regard to the supplemental
complaint, the same is incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01- 1348 entitled Judge Dolores
Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas.
12
 tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel.
PART II: JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
1. Inding v. SB RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 as follows:
X X X while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the operation against
drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to
enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of
P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust
operations X X X
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the
referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for
appropriate proceedings. He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try cases
involving crimes committed by officials of local government units only if such officials
occupy positions with SG 27 or higher.
Sandiganbayan: Denied the omnibus motion. MR denied. According to the court, the
Information alleged that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27.
The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
Petitioner: The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly
committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with
SG 25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the
RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him.
Respondent: Respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, contend that
Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep.
Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
without qualification and regardless of salary grade.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
Whether the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 YES. The officials enumerated under
Section 4 (a)(1)(a-g) are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SB regardless of the salary
grade.
I. Rep. Act No. 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the
cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act
No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249. The amendatory law took effect on
February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No.
8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense. Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the crime. However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249,
constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning
period is the time of the commission of the offense.
ITC: As gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged
was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997.The applicable
law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975.
II. [See Sec. 4(a)(1) of RA 7975]
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials (a-g) constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. In other words, violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, and the officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their
salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a.
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase
officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. Or the category in paragraph (5) of the same provision
relating to [a]ll other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 would have sufficed. Instead, under
paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary grades.
Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary grades, to
13

2. People v. SB PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
(2009) DIVISION) and VICTORIA AMANTE,
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu. Amante was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of
P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on
Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she
obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made.
As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to Amante asking
the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours from receipt of the same
demand letter. COA submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under P.D.
No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds against Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
be specifically included within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction, for had it been
otherwise, then there would have been no need for such enumeration. The SC looked
into the deliberations to determine the intent.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in
(a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management
in 1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. Moreover, the
consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also
specifically included within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction. As correctly posited
by the respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into
account, these officials respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the
amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
Thus, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction,
all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher.
ITC: There is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among those within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249 for
that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioners
case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Issue: w/n Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction YES.
GR: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
EX: If the law provides otherwise, e.g. Sec. 4(a) of RA 7975 and RA 8249.
ITC: The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense,
as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the
Information was on May 21, 2004. While RA 7975 and Ra 8249 contain an exception,
such is not applicable to this case. Sec. 4(a) provides that the SB shall exclusive and
original jurisdiction over violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense. The present case falls under Sec. 4(b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. The
present case involves a violation of the Auditing Code, not AGCP Act or RPC. There is
no exception under Sec. 4(b), so the general rule applies.
14
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed
with the said court a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Motion for Reinvestigation
stating that
a) the Decision of the OMB-Visayas arose from an incomplete proceeding in so far as
Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash
advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation
papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City;
and
b) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because
Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26,
whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition arguing that Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of
the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too
plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
officials/heads.
Sandiganbayan: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
PD No. 1606, as amended provides that the SB shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public
officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only
be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are
broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in
the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
15

3. Serrana v. SB Quick Facts:
SERRANA, a student regent of UP, discussed with former Pres. Estrada the of Vinzons
Hall in UPD. She then formed OSRFI with her relatives and under OSRFIs name. The
funds was allegedly sourced from the Office of the President for the proposed renovation.
The next student regent along with other students file filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. SERANA was indicted. She
moved to quash the information on the ff. grounds: (1) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (2) she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her
tuition fees; (3) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (4) the
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Full Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana (SERANA) was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada (ESTRADA) as a student regent of UP.
SERANA discussed with ESTRADA the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in
UP Diliman. SERANA, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
ESTRADA gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the
Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding
student regent and the Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide
alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
SERANA and her brother for estafa.7 SERANA moved to quash the
information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
o SERANAs arguments: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
estafa; (b) she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid
her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
ITC: Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, etc. Applying the provisions of
the pertinent law, Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the
time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Quick Issue+Ratio:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction in this case? YES
1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. Estafa is one of those other
felonies included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
2. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. While the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with
S.G. 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of S.G. 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. This includes Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. SERANA falls under this category.
The Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation.
3. Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. The
information alleged in no uncertain terms that the offense was committed in
relation to her office.
4. Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits.
Full Issue + Ratio:
ISSUE: w/not Sandiganbayan has JD over the person of Serrana and the offense
charged in the InformationYES!
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. (not
the issue in this case, so brief lang)
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice
to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures
as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts
16
 to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.
o Ombudsmans arguments: Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office". As
a member of the BOR, SERANA had the general powers of
administration and exercises the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances.
The Sandiganbayan denied SERANAs motion for lack of merit. Accused-
movants claim is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249.
o It is very clear from the said provision that the Sandiganbayan has
original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the
nature of their responsibilities and functions.
o A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the UP reveals that the
Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in
the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. It is unmistakably
evident that the Board of Regents of the UP is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation.
This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
SERANA undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon
whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless
of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary
Grade 27 or higher.
o Finally, this court (Sandiganbayan) finds that SERANAs contention
that the same of P15M was received from former President Estrada and
not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that
should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.
SERANA filed a MR which was denied with finality.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is set by PD No. 1606, as amended, not by RA
3019, as amended.
SERANAs contention: the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4
of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. It
does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan Has Jurisdiction over the Offense of Estafa
SERANAs contention: Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
SC noted, however, that in hoisting this argument, SERRANA isolated the
first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
o The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut
evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed
by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible
reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of
P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
SERANAs contention: She is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent
SC RULING:
o The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different
statutes and jurisprudence.
o In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: A public office is
the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which
17
 for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him
for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,]
Sec. 1). In Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of
Mechem of a public office above.
SERANAs contention: She is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student.
SC RULING:
o This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated
in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher
but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
o Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government- owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
o Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.
o Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office.
An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public makes one a public officer.
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional
and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the
Information.
SERANAs contention: Even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in
relation to her office. According to her, she had no power or authority to act without the
approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 18
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]

4. Garcia v. SB Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Prosecution Officer of the OMB, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner
with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec.
11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law.
Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and
Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A.
No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in
receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment6 against petitioner, his wife, and
three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379, as amended.
Sandiganbayan issued the questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued upon the filing of a
bond by the Republic.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner
filed the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner contends: Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the "civil action" for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such
jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law,
and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate
actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family,
and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a
private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that SERRANO, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring
with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits.
SERANAs contention: The amount came from President Estradas private
funds and not from the government coffers.
SC RULING: The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of
the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the
P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on
the merits of the instant case.
Issues:
1. whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture
under R.A. No. 1379; -YES
2. whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate,
initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and -YES
3. whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. YES
I. Jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the
Sandiganbayan.
[T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in
nature.
A forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence of a
default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as
thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the
parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a
method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and
to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer
the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power.
A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited acts the
commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides
the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only
imposed upon the public officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully
acquired property;
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
19
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this
fatally defective for failing to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such
No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation conducted by the forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379
prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that there is was committed during the respondent officer or employees incumbency and in relation
reasonable ground to believe that there has been violation of the said law and that to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as
respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.
Republic of the Philippines.15 He argues that only informations for perjury were filed and II. The OMB has authority to investigate, file and prosecute petitions for
there has been no information filed against him for violation of R.A. No. 1379. forfeiture under RA 1379.
Respondent contends (Comment): the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to
have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there is no initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree
issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the No. 1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
Sandiganbayan."18 Respondents argue that under the Constitution19 and prevailing statutes, over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief
the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be taken
under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First
1606 Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under
PD 1606- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the
cases involving: Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the the forfeiture proceeding and the authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No.
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
6758), specifically including: Special Prosecutor, the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
. exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with each other and the former should be deemed
higher ranks; to have repealed the latter.
. Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of
OMB filed a Separate Comment: likewise relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue that the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against petitioner. jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the
The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation
of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the amendments of R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
No. 829424, although it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as Special Prosecutor.
enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A.
other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner belongs. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to investigate
OMB further alleges that the present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum- and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the petition for restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the
Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the instant Petition raising exactly the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such
same issue, even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending forfeiture actionsince the authority to file forfeiture proceedings on or before 25
resolution.1avvphi1 Worse, it appears that the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were February 1986 belongs to the Solicitor General
filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. ITC: It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its
Petitioners Reply: the Sandiganbayans criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from authority in conducting the investigation of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in
its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been filing the petition for forfeiture against him.
removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction. His III. Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.
thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, Petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss. A scrutiny of
the clear intent of which is to separate the prima facie determination in forfeiture proceedings the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and
from the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition.
No. 1379 which grants the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of
being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A.
to the Solicitor General. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated
The use of the phrase "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004.

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 20

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or penal in nature
because the concept of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of
imposition of penalties for such violation.
5. People v. SB People v Sandiganbayan (Perez)
(2013) [recit-ready from Scribd]
Facts: The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify,
in G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayans dismissal of Criminal Case SB -08-CRM-0265
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violationof Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063, the Sandiganbayans dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S.Perez, Ernest Escaler,
and Ramon A. Arceo , for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of the
Revised Penal Code .The relevant case for this topic is G.R. No. 189063. Where upon
Sandiganbayans finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, it dismissed
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 (involves robbery) mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case. The State contended that the
delay in the resolution of the case against the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely
attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v .Sandiganbayan
,wherein the Court held that the speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with
reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had
caused the delay in the investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents
themselves.
Issue: WoN Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the case due to
the violation of the respondents constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases
Held: No. Sandiganbayan was right in dismissing the case upon finding that there had been
an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0266.The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of
the Constitution. It is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. The fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months. The
Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the
criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the
Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the
peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents right under the
Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. The guarantee of speedy disposition
under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution would be defeated if the States argument
that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the preliminary
investigation (because the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss
have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife
and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking.
The brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that
both the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004.
Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting
to the petition at hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty.
Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from the
finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against petitioner.
W/N SB committed GADALEJ when it dismissed the criminal case due to the
inordinate delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action
against respondents as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of cases.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that
there had been an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the
charge in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266.
SC: Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against
the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, in which the Court held that speedy
disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State supported its
contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the investigation,
and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.
The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the
Constitution, which declares: Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi- judicial hearings. While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible,
such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right
to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, inordinate delay in resolving a criminal
complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.
ITC: The delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman was vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had
supposedly occurred in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet,
21
period spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted
to the preliminary investigation) is accepted. It is incumbent for the State to prove that the
delay was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State
failed. There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of
more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper
court.
FULL digest:
On November 12, 2002, Congressman Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech in
the House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high
ranking government official whom he then called the 2 Million Dollar Man. In response
to the inquiry by the Presidential Anti-Graft and Commission (PAGC), Villarama confirmed
that Secretary Perez was the government official who ha[d] knowledge or connection with
the bribery subject of his expose. On November 25, 2002, Cong. Jimenez delivered a
privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong. Villaramas expos, and
accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in February 2001.
On December 23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the same day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Research Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong.
Jimenezs complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and to
the Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the Ombudsman, for
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication, respectively.
On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding
investigation.
On June 4, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30, 2003 from
the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting the supplemental complaint- affidavit dated April
4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez.
On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate the
complaint, and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and preliminary investigations,
thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2, 2003.
On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact- finding
investigation and filed criminal and administrative complaints against Former Justice
Secretary Hernando Perez, et al.
On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file
their counter-affidavits.
On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counter-
affidavits until December 14, 2005.
On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol created a new team of investigators to
assist in the preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication of the administrative
case and the forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379.
On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent
motion to be furnished copies of the complaints. On December 13, 2005, they submitted a
consolidated joint counter-affidavit.
On December 20, 2005, Escaler (Perezs co-respondent), instead of filing his counter-
affidavit, moved to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the
preliminary investigation, and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to
the DOJ.
[marami pang ganap in between]
On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution, finding probable cause
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
the criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when
Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents
relevant to the expos of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December 23, 2002, Cong.
Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It was only
on November 6, 2006, however, when the Special Panel created to investigate Cong.
Jimenezs criminal complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal
informations be filed against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint
Resolution only on January 5, 2007. The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution
denying the respondents motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and
Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the
informations charging the respondents with four different crimes based on the complaint
of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement
of Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In
sum, the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually
long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether
to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was
inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case
an outright violation of the respondents right under the Constitution to the speedy
disposition of their cases.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or
that the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.
For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court
primarily because of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, like
not having a document showing that the funds had reached Secretary Perez; and that it
could not obtain the document, and to enable it to obtain the document and other
evidence it needed to await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region and
the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT).
To us, however, the States dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a
sufficient justification for the delay. The fact-finding investigation accounted for a total
of two years and 10 months. For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the
HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would
proceed with the preliminary investigation was oppressive, capricious and vexatious,
because the respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.
We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would thereby
deliberately gain an advantage over the respondents during the preliminary investigation.
At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation of a criminal
case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would
provide to the prosecutorial arm of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in
terms of its resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a
part of the preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation
to the latter; and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the
computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the
22
and recommending that criminal informations be filed against the respondents. Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez, who had meanwhile replaced administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the
the resigned Ombudsman Marcelo, approved the joint resolution of the Special Panel. hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding
On January 11, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the
resolution, and supplemented their motion for that purpose with additional arguments on Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the
January 15, 2007. respondents right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated.
On April 18, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of
informations against respondents, namely: more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper
. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended; court. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of the Revised
. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code; Penal Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more than five years to
. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. The basic elements of the offense, that is,
Code; and the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by which
. for violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 8, Rep. the money extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been identified as the
Act 6713. perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
The relevant case is Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266 [Robbery under Art. 293, in obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable cause to
relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code]. charge them with the offense.
Second Division of the Sandiganbaya, upon MR, quashed the information charging In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents right to due process
respondents with robbery, and dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266, holding as as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.
follows: WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of
xxx The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand, is persuaded. merit.
Extant in the record and which the prosecution admits or at least does not deny are the
following:
. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on February 13, 2001 (Joint
Resolution signed by members of the Special Panel and approved by the Ombudsman)
. On February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965.00 was transferred to Coutts
Bank Hongkong in favour of the beneficiary of Account No. HO 13706, from Trade and
Commerce Bank, Cayman Island through the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York.
Subsequently from March 6, 2001 to May 23, 2001 funds were transferred from Coutts Bank
to other accounts, among them a $250,000.00 bank draft/cheque issued to Ramon C. Arceo
(pp. 10-11 Records).
. On December 23, 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the
Ombudsman charging Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo and several John
Does (Mrs. Rosario Perez was not among those charged) with criminal offenses of Plunder,
Extortion, Graft and Corruption, Obstruction of Justice, Violation of the Penal Provision of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards R.A. 6713, and Administrative Offenses of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-
Graft Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service, and Violation of Section
5 (2) of R.A. 6713. It was subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December 2002.
. On December 23, 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office)
recommended that the case be referred to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau.
. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18, 2008.
Having established, or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark Jimenez, that the Robbery
(extortion) took place on February 13, 2001, the Ombudsman should have demanded a
reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman, wealthy and
influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he was filing the
complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18) months. This
should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing the complaint.
With the Ombudsmans finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 23

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 on
February 23, 2001 in favour of the accused, there is no reason why within a
reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of
intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of February 23, 2001 why
was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery
there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor
a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or to dismiss it are on hand. The
case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of
the constitutional rights of the accused.
The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable motive and has
unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy disposition of the
case. This is an impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes.
The Constitution of the Philippines provides: Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial(,) quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled to a speedy
resolution of their cases be it civil, administrative or criminal cases. It is, in criminal
cases however where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is more
pronounced. It is so, because in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and reputation but
even the liberty of the accused (even life itself before the enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.
The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not involve complicated and
factual issues that would necessitate painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the
part of the Ombudsman.
The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the earmarks
of inordinate delay, making the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in Anchangco Jr. and
Duterte cases cited in the parties pleadings irrefragable.
Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused, the
prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the information and we hereby order the
quashing of the information and the consequent dismissal of this case.

The State filed MR, but the SB denied.

PART III: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

1. DOJ v. Liwag ER:
Mary Ong filed with the OMB a complaint affidavit against Lacson et al for kidnapping and
murder. The OMB ordered Lacson et al to file their counter-affidavits. Lacson et al filed the
counter-affidavits and prayed that the case be dimissed.
Months later, Mary Ong executed a sworn statement before the NBI regarding the same
matter. NBI Director ordered DOJ Sec. Perez to form a panel of prosecutors. The panel
sent a subpoena to Lacson et al with an order to submit counter-affidavits. Lacson et al filed
a MTD citing the pending case with the OMB.
DOJ panel denied so Lacson et al filed Petition for Prohibition at RTC on the ground that
the DOJ has no jurisdiction over the matter.
Judge Liwag granted so DOJ appealed to SC
ISSUE: Whether DOJ has authority to conduct prelim investigation even if there is pending
case in OMB about same subject matter and same parties
HELD: DOJ has no jurisdiction. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent jurisdiction
Whether the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite
the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused,
facts, and circumstances. - No. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent jurisdiction with
DOJ.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
DOJ appealed to the SC without filing an MR of the RTC order on the ground that it
was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and
that this is all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-
ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted
nationwide attention.
SC RULING: Allowed since time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not
only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the
authorities, but also the rights of Lacson et al who may need to clear their names and
reputations of the accusations against them. The rules of procedure are not to be applied

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 24

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
RATIO:
Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at
any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to
the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo
M. Lacson, and other high-ranking officials of the PNP for kidnapping and murder.
She alleged that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group,
The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit sufficient in form and substance and
required Lacson et al to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. Lacson et al submitted
their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI,
alleging the same facts and circumstances she revealed in her complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman.
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco wrote a letter to Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials.
Thus, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et al. The subpoena
required Lacson et al to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI at the DOJ Multi-
Purpose Hall.
Prior to the preliminary investigation, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter that:
1. the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed since there was
also a pending case before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against
the same respondents.
2. according to the Courts ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving
public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondents.
The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and denied such on the basis that
under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an MTD is not allowed.
Lacson and Aquino filed before the RTC Manila a petition for prohibition arguing that the
DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted
by Mary Ong and the other witnesses.
This was granted by Judge Liwag who issued an Order that prohibited the DOJ from
conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court.
Judge Liwag reasoned that since the OMB has assumed jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter, the DOJ cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same
matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the
resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. Thus, the other investigative agencies
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and
existence.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall
have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system;
...
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of
the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases; .
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-
feasance of public officers or employees.
To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling,
investigate bodies.
1. The OMB is independent and insulated from the intrusions of partisan
politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent qualification
requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they
should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and
salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary
25
of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans during their term of office. They were given a fixed term of seven years,
investigation. without reappointment. Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited
Furthermore, Judge Liwag argued that rudimentary common sense and becoming respect from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.
for power and authority would require the DOJ panel to desist from interfering with the Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office
case already handled by the Ombudsman. The DOJ panel consists of deputized prosecutors of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy. Clearly, all these measures are intended
by the Ombudsman. Since that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers to enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The 1. The OMB serves as the principal and primary complaints and action center for
hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled. the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. It was
DOJ appealed directly to the SC on the basis of GADLEJ. vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or
officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.
It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on
reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources
other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the
Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be
required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal or
improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become
increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal expense and
difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Vis--vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to
investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
1. Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such
cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other
investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with
other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can
delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of
cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot
diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted
to the Ombudsman.
The Doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is not applicable. While the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the
settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In the present case, initial complaint
was filed with the OMB. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
OTHER MATTERS (I included the listing of other cases mentioned just in case Atty.
Tranquil asks)
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the
Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation
of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President
Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power
of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not
exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 26

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]

2. Ombudsman THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON C. GALICIA,
v. Galicia RESPONDENT.
Respondent was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School in
Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted, Galicia graduated from
FEU with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass the board examinations. He also
represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in education in school year 1985-
1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from the Caloocan City
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court
recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all
ill-gotten wealth cases. In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against
petitioners assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint
with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary
investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were
filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman
who has the power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like
him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and
prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman
but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary
investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the
DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The
pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said
Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the
affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to
investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was
addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.
NOTE: SC said none of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual
situation similar to that of the present case.
In the past, the complaint was never filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between
two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders
PLUS: Allowing the DOJ to assume jurisdiction over the case would not promote an
orderly administration of justice. It would go against the multiplicity of proceedings,
cause undue difficulties to the respondents who would have to appear and defend his
position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed, and leave
hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. Should
the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time come up with conflicting
resolutions, this would be greatly problematic. Also, the second investigation would
entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.
Issue: w/n OMB has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school
teachers NONE.
The duty and privilege of the Ombudsman to act as protector of the people
against the illegal and unjust acts of those who are in the public service, emanate
from no less than the 1987 Constitution. Under Section 13, Article XI, the
Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on its own or upon complaint by
any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also
27
 Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers' Professional Board
Examination (TPBE) given on November 22, 1987.
Subsequently, on December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of the MBASHS,
reviewed the files of his teaching staff. He took note that the TOR submitted by Galicia
was not an original copy. Yamsuan proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR
by requesting for confirmation from the school. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply
from Marilyn Torres-De Jesus, College Registrar of CCPC, stating that they had no record
of the said TOR, and more importantly, that they had no records that Galicia, indeed, took
up eighteen (18) units of education in SY 1985-1986.
Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
OMB: found Galicia guilty of dishonesty. While stating that Galicia presented the original of
the questioned documents during the preliminary conference, the Ombudsman nevertheless
found that the absence of a certification from the College Registrar destroyed the TOR's
credibility.
Galicia filed MR, raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He argued that it is
not the Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the School
Superintendent, which has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school
teachers, as mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, or the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.
OMB denied the MR, stating that there is a concurrent jurisdiction between the School
Superintendent and OMB.
Galicia elevated the case to the CA (no mention of rule). CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the OMB. The CA held that jurisdiction over public school teachers belonged
to the School Superintendent as mandated by R.A. No. 4670. It also ruled that the schools
lack of certification did not establish that the TOR was fabricated.
OMB raised the case to the SC via Rule 45.
3. Angeles v. Doctrine: The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there
Gutierrez exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
Emergency Digest:
Facts: Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against Velasco before the Ombudsman.
- 1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal
case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness; 2. Engaging in private
practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner; 3.
Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child
abuse Complaint was conducted
- Ombudsman dismissed the complaint without preliminary investigation. Judge
Angeles filed a petition for certiorari before the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public
officials and employees.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and
The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with
the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in
1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the
President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local
elective officials. In the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full
administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving,
processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents
under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee.
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
reveals an apparent overlapping of jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers. Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers grants
jurisdiction over erring public school teachers to an Investigating Committee headed by
the Division School Superintendent. The SC holds that original jurisdiction over
public school teachers belongs to the school superintendent by virtue of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
ITC: The SC, however, ruled that the OMB properly exercised jurisdiction in this case.
Records show that Galicia was given the right to due process in the investigation of the
charges against him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his defenses in
the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him was
rendered did he question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Under the principles of
estoppel and laches, the SC rules that it is now too late for Galicia to assail the
administrative investigation conducted and the decision rendered against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the complaint
outright? NO
Ratio:
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such
reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
In Esquivel v. Ombudsman, the Court explained thus:
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
28
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the complaint
outright? NO
Ratio: As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons
are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory. The Ombudsman has full
discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a
preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the
Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the
criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco.
Complete Digest:
Facts:
Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the
Ombudsman alleging the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case
for smuggling by failing to present a material witness; 2. Engaging in private practice by
insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner; 3. Falsifying a public
document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was
conducted.
In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against
respondent Velasco. It found that after evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by
complainant, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative
adjudication with regard to the charges.
MR was filed. Denied by Ombudsman. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging
gadlej on the part of the Ombudsman.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon
the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss
a complaint by a private complainant. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, the Court further
clarified the plenary powers of the Ombudsman. The Court emphasized that if the latter,
using professional judgment, finds a case dismissible, the Court shall respect that finding,
unless the exercise of such discretionary power was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists
a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure), specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to
respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which
has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded
to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for
administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of
a complaint. Should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they
may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to
determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted.
The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss
a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed,
including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives
due deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary
investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari filed by Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles. We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman in Case Nos. OMB-C-
C-07-0103-C and OMB-C-A-O7-0117-C dated 21 March 2007 and 30 June 2008,
respectively.
29
4. Gonzales III Summary: This is a resolution of the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for
v. OP reconsideration of the SCs 2012 Decision which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their
petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770
(granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President).
Basically, in this case, Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales was dismissed by the OP while
Special Prosecutor Sulit was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. The main issue in this
case was W/N the OP has the power to discipline the Deputy OMB and the Special
Prosecutor. In the ratio, SC discussed that both the OMB and the Special Prosecutor
must be independent. Thus, the OP cannot discipline them since this is repugnant to the
constitutionally-mandated independence of the OMB. However, upon voting, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 was declared unconstitutional only with respect to the Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales but constitutional with respect to the Special Prosecutor Sulit.
According to the SC, The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. (Yep, medyo malabo but thats it.
Haha)
Antecedent facts:
I. Dismissal of Deputy OMB Gonzales for delay in resolution of the MRs filed by
Mendoza
Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs
Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutors Office against Manila Police
District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for
robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury. Gonzales, Deputy
Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO), directed the
NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendozas case to his office. In his draft
decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on
them the penalty of dismissal from the service. Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the
Ombudsmans decision that approved Gonzales recommendation. Mendoza, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.s case, Mendoza hijacked a
tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board
as hostages. It ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on
board the hijacked bus. PNOY created an Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC). The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross
negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." The IIRC stated
that the Ombudsman and Gonzales failure to promptly resolve Mendozas motion for
reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking."
OP Ruling: Gonzales was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the
Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office and was dismissed from
service. According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendozas] Motion for Reconsideration [that spanned for nine (9) long months] xxx
amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of
the Ombudsmans own Rules of Procedure."
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
W/N Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is constitutional? Or W/N the OP has the
power to discipline the Deputy OMB and the Special Prosecutor? - The Court
votes to grant Gonzales petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this
conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect
to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Constitution.
I. Re: OMB
SC discussed the history of the Constitution with regard to the OMB (formerly
Tanodbayan) and the Constitutional intent to institute it as an independent body (See
doctrines re OMB below).
[Important] Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the
President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President,
whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them
tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her
subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. For these reasons, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.
The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd
situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate
on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or
suspend its members. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking
official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the Presidents favor, would be
discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the
complainants impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be
susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression
would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as
champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
The mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their suspension and can
30
The petition: Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770,
it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the
Deputy Ombudsman.
II. Disciplinary proceedings on Special Prosecutor Barrera-Sulit for alleged one-
sided plea bargaining agreement concluded with Carlos Garcia
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. The Office of the
Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining
agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.
The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After
public hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust grounds for removal
under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770. The Committee recommended to the President the
dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing of appropriate charges against her
deputies and assistants before the appropriate government office.
OP: The OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. Sulit filed
her Written Explanation, questioning the OPs jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction
notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation, prompting Sulit to
seek relief from this Court.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of
the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy
Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to
the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen
and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional
bodies.
DOCTRINES RE OMB (jic sir asks and review na din ng Poli lols):
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was
created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was
expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy
in Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman
is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and
corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.
This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the
Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision
of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsmans broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members
of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these
broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman
from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5, Article XI of the
Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed.
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsmans
31
 independence

The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the

Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the
impairment of their core functions.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based.

Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human

Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal
autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional
commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987
Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep the Commission independent from
the executive branch and other political leaders:

These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent

constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be
independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence.
At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions,

which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not
under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive
in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the Presidents act of temporarily
appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however
well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga, the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be
placed under the discretionary power of the President.

In Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec, the Court considered even the mere review of the
rules of the Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional
mandate of independence of this body.

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot
be inferior but is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly

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 guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these
offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning.

[Not so important] At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its decision finding Gonzales guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public
trust is patently erroneous.

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of
the case were already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case of public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted
on the case forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP
relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling
that Gonzales should have acted on Mendozas Motion for Reconsideration within
five days.

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot

apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review
the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the
motion. The period for resolving the case does not cover the period within which it
should be reviewed. Thus, the OPs ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent
for taking nine days, instead of five days, to review a case was totally baseless.

The OPs claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly
act on Mendozas motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving
the same are similarly groundless.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles
numerous cases that involve the potential loss of employment of many other public
employees. We cannot conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that
Mendozas case should have been prioritized over other similar cases.

The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the
Office of the Ombudsman. This consideration certainly militates against the OSGs
observation that there was "a grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay" on the part of
Gonzales.

The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendozas case by
having the case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against
Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim,

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 Kalaw.

The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act

promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against any public official
or employee of the government. Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not
resolve the complaint only on the basis of the unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on
the prosecution officers recommendations, the finding of guilt on the part of
Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al. admitted that
they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to stay the
whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning,
Kalaw was allowed to leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and
based merely on his promise to return with the proper documents. These admissions
led Gonzales and his staff to conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in
apprehending Kalaw, since the proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic
violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when appropriate.

II. Re: SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Given the legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against
an interpretation that would insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary
authority of the OP and yet expose the Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant
of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman was designed for.

Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary

adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office
of the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and by granting the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office. This
power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman
with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem fit.
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise
of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the
Executive Department.

Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution
of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial
authority includes high-ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the
Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

!!! Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part
of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an
organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment
between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor
himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true,
not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who

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 act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her
duties.

!!!! Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the
Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least
insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also
enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.

Doctrines Re Special Prosecutor:

Under the 1987 Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created.

The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by
law."

Other than the Ombudsmans Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other
officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 13(8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to
this constitutional command, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to provide for the
functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
extent of its disciplinary authority.

In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the

Office of the Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several
Deputy Ombudsmen but the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of
appointment, the law gave the President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman,
his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor, from a list of nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law requires that
the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence.

The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on
the Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies. Their terms of
office, prohibitions and qualifications, rank and salary are likewise the same. The
requirement on disclosure is imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the
Special Prosecutor as well. In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President may
designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman. The
power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other government
agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by
the Special Prosecutor.

III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

By a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar
as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President
over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

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5. Morales v. CA A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11
and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases)
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public
officer are present,54 finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati
City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building
project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
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However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not
consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office
of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys
under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to
the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if
warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition
for certiorari ;(IMPORTANT)
2. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or
WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman; (IMPORTANT)
3. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine;
I.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of
Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except
the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a
judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from
doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action."
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the
Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
36
(b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
(2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
(3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them
to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the
Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.
On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60
(Binays contention) Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of
the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and
that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned
his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against
him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented
against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a
clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010
and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly
deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
CA issued a Resolution65 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
CA ruled that, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then,
applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for TRO.
The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for
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government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only
of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the
Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no
appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This
paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court
which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is
vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or
the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law
This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive
nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence
(third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest
of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three
(3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
37
a TRO, citing Section 14 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which states that no injunctive
writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's
directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and
improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot
be subjected to contempt proceedings.
(1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsiderationin accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range
of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal
against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy"
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for
remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term
"appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense.134 By the same
principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the
disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether
final or provisional), except a decision.

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of
Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic
procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of
judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c)
questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in
the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed,
it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to
have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject.
Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws
to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135There should then be no confusion that the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other.
In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all
remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the
above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes
away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the
judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing,
however, that it gave its consent to the same

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by
Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable in Dagan v. Office of the

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 Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a
final and unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case,
the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case,
i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it
stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be
initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was
ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA.

II. Independence of the Ombudsman

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the
CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin
its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution.
She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA
6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive
reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work
"just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of
the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad
powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from
the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an "independent" office

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently,
the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment
of their core functions"163

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express
mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our

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 constitutional system is based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for
independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the
1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission,
instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is
dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on
Audit from political pressure."

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant
freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished,
nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or
modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is
made;cralawlawlibr
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from
[its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics.

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in light of the powers of Congress and
the Court under the 1987 Constitution. Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme
Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of
powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a
case." It includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case

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 conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated
by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power
is exercised. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in
certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.

As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by
deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in
one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary. Identifying the
appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every
court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its
inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary
to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or

jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the
latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary
to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the
action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which
the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic
authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the
invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are

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 reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is
sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally
mandated functions.

Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of

the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of
Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that
the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of
belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's
certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended,
and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case issue of
whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting
objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court
first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

III.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive

measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction,
stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public

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 officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct,

thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life
and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust."
Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to
the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and
adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in
the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the
regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all
times:

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off
by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply
no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now
rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed
in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying
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6. Antonino v. Antonino v. Ombudsman Desierto
Desierto DOCTRINE:
While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order
to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court
ER:
Presidential Proclamation 168 reserved a parcel of land in General Santos for recreation and
health purposes to be administered by the city, and also prohibiting its alienation. This land
was subdivided into 3 (Lots Y-1; Y-2 and X)however, Prez. Marcos issued Proclamation
2273 which stated that lots Y-1 and Y-2 are open to disposition under CA 141 (Public Land
Act). After this, 16 people (private respondents), applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patents
over Lot X. The city mayor and the DENR executive Director for General Santos approved
the applications, and TCTs were issued to the private respondents.
Antonino, the former Congresswoman of the 1st district of South Cotabato filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019 + malversation of public
funds thru falsification of public documents. OMBUDSMAN DECISION: Mayor
Nunez, et al. regularly performed their duties aka CHARGES DISMISSED [January
20, 1999]. The MR [filed: Feb 4, 2000] of Antonino was also denied, because the OMB
already lost its jurisdiction. Antonino files a 65 petition on the issue of W/NOT the OMB
committed GADLEJ.
HELD: NO GADLEJ. Antonino loses. WHY?
1. [Procedural] Antonino failed to establish that she timely filed her MR. Section 27 of
RA 6770 (OMB Act) provides MRs must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice. Antonino failed to establish in her MR why she didnt file her MR within 5 days from
receipt of the decision. Petition dismissed.
2. [Substantive] Although the OMB is granted the power to investigate and prosecute the
act of any public employee, it can still be reviewed if its GAD. While the Ombudsman's
discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless,
petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the
reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
FACTS:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal
on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:
o do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site
purposes, under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any
there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain
The property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter subdivided
into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing
15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square
meters which is still equivalent to the original area.
o However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
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or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON the OMB committed GADLEJ in denying the MR. (NO)
HELD:
All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal complaint against respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
RATIO:
- Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22] provides:
o SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
o A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
o (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;
o (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
- Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she
received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21,
2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed
on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the
aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed
Resolution on February 24, 1999.
- There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest
of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the
late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
- After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond
and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained
the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.
- [Substantive]
o Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A.
No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise.
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for
44
 Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168, which excluded Lots Y-1 and Y-2 certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is
from the recreational and health purposes. tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what
the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo
On July 23, 1997, the 16 private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent
over portions of Lot X. While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez, assisted by respondent City order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issuedo 1st Indorsements (refer to application
documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X
applied by private respondents and stated therein that this office interposes no objection to whatever
legal proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions thereof after the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the
Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said courts order dated July 22, 1997.
o The parcels of land were sold.

Antonino (former 1st district congresswoman) filed a complaint-affidavit with the

OMB.

o Against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera
(Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan,
Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar,
Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose
Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal),
Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation
of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and
for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents.

OMB RESOLUTION on JANUARY 20, 1999: CHARGES DISMISSED

o The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in
accordance with the facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were
found to have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against
the respondents were dismissed

On FEBRUARY 4, 2000, Antonino filed an MR. It was DENIED.

o The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed
against the aforementioned indicted and the cases were already pending before the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost
jurisdiction over the said case.

Antonino files the 65 petition.

7. Enemecio v. AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OMB (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE, respondents.
Petitioner is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of
Fisheries Technology, Cebu. Private respondent Bernante is an Assistant Professor IV of the
same school.
Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of
public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante before
Issue: w/n a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the CA is the proper
remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the
Ombudsman NO.
Where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal
cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court under Rule 65.

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 the Office of the Executive Dean. The Dean indorsed the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document. The administrative complaint and criminal complaint
was jointly tried by the Ombudsman. Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-
painting of obscene and unprintable words against her on the walls of the Carmen Campus
of the school. Enemecio claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her
while she was inside the school premises. Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it
appear in his leave application that he was on forced leave and on vacation leave for a
certain time but in truth he was serving a 20-day prison term because of his conviction of
slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to receive his salary during that time since his
application for leave was approved. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to
receive salary for that period because of his falsified leave applications.
Bernante did not deny that he was in prison. He maintained that he received his salary for
that period because of his duly approved leave applications. He further alleged that
Enemecio filed the criminal and admin complaints against him in retaliation for the case he
filed against Enemecios friends. Bernante denied he was behind the spray-painting of
obscenities against Enemecio on the walls of the school campus.
OMB dismissed the administrative complaint. It said that that there is no regulation
restricting the purpose or use of an employees earned leave credits. Considering that the
application for leave was duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not
how he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on
leave be spelled out in such application. It further said that the evidence is insufficient to
prove that Bernante was the one who sprayed on the wall, there was no witness.
Regarding the complainants allegation that Bernante defamed the former by uttering slanderous words, it
appears that only the incident occurring on March 10, 1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness
Delfin Buot. Witness Buot testified that he was about (3) meters from the BERNANTE when the latter
shouted the words buricat (whore) putang ina and maot (snob) to Enemecio. However, the circumstances
of the utterance, particularly the time and the relation of the protagonists involved, leads us to conclude that
the same is removed from the official functions of the respondent as a professor of the school. Stated otherwise,
the act of the respondent was not in relation to his official functions.
Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in Cebu, the matter of BERNANTEs administrative culpability is still
premature to be determined.
On the same date, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante finding
no probable cause for falsification of public document.
Enemecios MR was denied. He filed certiorari with the CA. it was dismissed for being
filed out of time. They also stated that the proper remedy was petition for review under Rule
43 and not certiorari under 65. CA denied the petition.
8. Baviera v. Full Title: MANUEL BAVIERA, petitioner, vs. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, in his capacity
Zoleta as Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II; MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO, in her
capacity as Director, Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B;
PELAGIO S. APOSTOL, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
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ITC: Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of
the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum.
Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions
should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
ITC: Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the Ombudsmans Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28
February 2000 dismissing the criminal case against Bernante. The Resolution dated 13
January 2000 dismissed the criminal complaint for malversation and falsification of
public documents filed against herein Private Respondent while the Order dated 28
February 2000 denied herein Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine
copies of the aforesaid Resolution and Order are hereto appended as Annexes A and
B respectively. (Emphasis supplied) The CA dismissed Enemecios petition and denied
her MR. Enemecio now comes to this Court via this petition for review, claiming that
what was involved in the petition before the CA was the administrative, not the criminal
case. Enemecio thus stresses that there is no reason for the Court of Appeals to say
that the petition concerned the criminal case.
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her
counsel, Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandezs conduct has fallen far too short
of the honesty required of every member of the Bar. It is clear from the records that
Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the
Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative
case against Bernante. For this reason, the CA in its 7 December 2000 Resolution
rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios petition as the Fabian
ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary actions.
Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the
dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail. The only
provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the
proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in Section
27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman,
remain valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
Quick Doctrine:
Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause or lack of
probable cause involving criminal cases are filed with the Supreme Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.
46
Enforcement Offices; and MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ (Then) Undersecretary,
Department of Justice, respondents. October 12, 2006.
Quick Facts +Issue:
In connection with several civil and criminal complaints filed by Baviera against individuals
from Standard Chartered, Baviera applied for and was granted a Hold- Departure Order
against the individuals, including Sridhar Raman (CFO of Standard Chartered). Raman was
able to fly out of the country despite the HDO due to the verbal order given by Acting
Secretary Merceditas Guiterrez. Because of this, Baviera initiated a criminal complaint
against Gutierrez for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Act. The Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Baviera filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA dismissed this on the ground that the proper remedy is
certiorari under 65 filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the proper appeal was a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed before
the SC? YES!
Background Facts:
Manuel Baviera filed several complaints against the officers or directors of
Standard Chartered Bank, including Sridhar Raman (Indian national, Chief
Financial Officer of Standard Chartered) before the SEC (violation of Securities
and Regulations Code), BSP (violation of banking laws), AMLC (money
laundering), NLRC (illegal dismissal), (syndicated estafa) and BIR (tax fraud).
Baviera was a former employee and an investor of the bank, and he alleged that
Standard Chartered defrauded him and others by soliciting funds in unregistered
and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.
On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice to issue a
Hold-Departure Order (HDO) against respondents in those cases, including
Raman.
On September 26, 2003, Secretary Datumanong of the DOJ issued the HDO,
which was served on the Bureau of Immigration and the HDO was implemented.
Secretary Datumanong left for a conference in Vienna, Austria and
Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez was designated as Acting Secretary.
On September 28, 2003, Raman was supposed to go to Singapore but he was
apprehended in NAIA pursuant to the HDO. But the next day, Raman was able
to leave on an 8:15am Singapore flight.
This was because Acting Secretary Gutierrez had verbally allowed the departure of
Raman because of the strong representations of Ramans counsel.
Criminal Complaint of Baviera filed before the Ombudsman:
Because of this, on October 3, 2003, Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the
Ombudsman, charging Undersecretary Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e),
and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.
Baviera alleged that the acts of Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular and
questionable: she interceded on behalf of the Indian national, gave the verbal
instructions on September 29 (6:15am) when the office was still closed, there was
no written application for the temporary stay of the HDO, among others. All in
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
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Full Issue+Ratio:
ISSUE #1: Whether the proper appeal in criminal cases decided by the Office of the
Ombudsman was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
YES
RATIO:
In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court reiterated its ruling in Kuizon v.
Ombudsman. There, the Court cited Fabian v. Desierto where it was stated
that the CAs jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. Thus:
o In appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec. 27
of R.A. 6770 that stated that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is
taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action is
unconstitutional.
o It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial
review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we
hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court.
Kuizon and Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudmsan reiterated the rule that the remedy
of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with
the SC. Perez v. Ombudsman stated the rule that in cases when the aggrieved
party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsmans finding of lack of
probable cause, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed with the SC.
ISSUE #2: On whether there was grave abuse of discretion? NO!
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner, which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Bavieras petition failed to establish probable cause for violations of R.A. No.
3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court
will not interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsmans discretion, who, based
on his own findings and deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a
complaint or proceeds with it.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
47
 all, the acts of Gutierrez show arrogance of power and insolence of office,
thereby extending unwarranted preference, benefits and advantage to Raman.
In her Counter-Affidavit, respondent Gutierrez denied the allegations against her.
She averred that she did not violate any law or rule, in allowing Raman to leave
the country. She merely upheld his rights to travel as guaranteed under the
Constitution. Moreover, the DOJ may allow persons covered by HDOs to travel
abroad, for a specific purpose and for a specific period of time. In fact, no
prejudice resulted because Raman immediately came back to the Philippines after
his business trip on October 2, 2003.
In his Reply-Affidavit, Baviera alleged that the complaint stemmed from
Gutierrez abuse of her discretionary powers in allowing an individual to travel
despite the HDO.
On October 5, 2003, Raman et. al. filed a MR of the HDO. On October 17, 2003,
Secretary Datumanong lifted the HDO.
On June 22, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Rolando Zoleta
recommended that the criminal complaint agaisnt Gutierrez be dismsissed for
insufficiency of evidence. According to the Senate deliberations on Sec. 3(a) of
3019, consideration is required before a criminal complaint for influence peddling
can prosper. No proof was shown that Gutierrez received consideration for
allowing Raman to leave despite the HDO. No injury likewise resulted to any
party because Raman immediately returned to the Philippines.
Because the recommendation that the case be dismissed was approved, Baviera
filed a MR of the resolution on Aug. 2, 2004. Zoleta recommended that the MR
be denied for lack of merit, and Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro approved this.
Thus, on November 16, 2004, Baviera filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the CA, assailing the resolutions of the
Ombudsman.
Improper Appeal
On January 7, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition because the proper appeal
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
pursuant to Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, reiterated in Perez v.
Ombudsman and Estrada v. Desierto.
Baviera filed a MR, contending that petition before the CA is proper pursuant to
Fabian v. Desierto. This is because the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-
judicial agency, and under BP 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC
over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 (following the heirarchy of courts).
The CA denied the MR. The ruling in Fabian is only applicable in appeals from
resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The remedy of
the aggrieved party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file
a petition for certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA. The applicable rule is that
enunciated in Enemecio v. Ombudsman, later reiterated in Perez v. Office of the
Ombudsman24 and Estrada v. Desierto.

Baviera went to the Supreme Court with a petititon for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the CA rulings.

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 48

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 PART IV: POWER OF THE DOJ
1. Dino, et al v. *Yung 2nd issue pertinent. I included the 1st issue because they also talk about the actions of
Olivarez the prosecutor and Im not sure Sir will ask about it or not but I wont include it in the
emergency.
Emergency Recit:
Dino filed a complaint for vote buying against Olivarez. There was a finding of probable
cause as stated in a Joint Resolution. Olivares filed before the Law Department of
COMELEC an appeal of the Resolution and a motion to revoke the authority of the
prosecutor. The Law Dept agreed with him and sent a letter to the city prosec ordering it to
send the records to it and supend the implementation of the resolution. Olivares filed a
motion to quash (information contained more than one offense) which was opposed by the
prosec and the prosec filed an amended complaint. Motion to quash was denied. He did not
appear for arraignment. The judge ordered his arrest (issued bench warrant and cancelled his
bond).
Issue: Whether the judge properly ordered the arrest of Olivarez. Yes.
Ratio: The judge properly ordered the arrest because there was failure on the part of the
accused to appear for arraignment. The filing of an information initiates criminal action.
When the accused is arrested the court acquires jurisdiction over the person.Arraignment
would then follow. Rule 116, Sec 11: Arraignment may be suspended upon motion of the
proper party: a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
DOJ, or the Office of the Pres. Provided the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. So, the
suspension is not indefinite in case of an appeal before the DOJ (in this case its the
COMELEC). In this case, the appeal was filed on October 7, 2004. The arraignment was re-
scheduled to February 1, 2005 due to motion to quash. Respondent failed to appear. Reset
arraignment to March 9, 2005. It was only on March 9, 5 MONTHS AFTER APPEAL
WAS FILED when the Judge held arraignment and ussed the Bench Warrant of Arrest.
Facts:
Dio and Comparativo filed a complaint for vote buying against the respondent
Pablo Olivares. Assistant City Prosecutor Pablo Medina (Pablo) found probable
cause. Two informations were filed in the RTC of Paraaque against Pablo
Olivares charging him with violation of Sec 261, paragraphs a,b and k of Article
22 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Olivares filed before the Law Department of the COMELEC an appeal of the
Joint Resolution of the Porsec with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority.
They argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution should
prevent the filing of the Informations until the COMELEC had resolved the
appeal.
The Law Department sent a letter to the city prosecutor ordering the latter to
transit the records and suspend the implementation of the Joint Resolution until
the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC. (Medyo naignore siya)
Olivares filed a Motion to Quash (more than one offense charged in information).
Pablo filed an Opposition and Motion to Admit amended Informations. (Article
261 par a in relation to b na lang).
Olivares filed and opposition raising the fact that the city prosec was no longer
empowered to amend the information since COMELEC already ordered it to
transmit the records and suspend the hearings of the cases in the RTC.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
1) Whether the city prosec still had authority to file the amended information.
2) Whether it was proper for the judge to issue the warrant. IMPORTANT
FIRST ISSUE:
COMELEC is empowered to investigate and prosecute election offenses and that Chief
State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city prosecutors, acting on its behalf,
must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that the
COMELEC is empowered to revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. (By appeal within 10 days from receipt of
their resolution. Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in filing
the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC.
o The Resolution of the COMELEC revoking the deputation was issued on
April 4, 2005.
o The Amended information was filed on October 28, 2004.
o Although a letter was earlier sent by the Law Department, it did not
revoke the continuing authority granted to the city prosec.
o Letter:In this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit the entire
records of the case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections,
Intramuros, Manila by the fastest means available. You are further directed to
suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc.
The filing of the Amendment was not made in defiance of the instructions of
COMELEC.
o If it had not filed the amended informations, the case would have been
dismissed.
o The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow
sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution and not to have
the prosec abandon the case.
o If the case were dismissed, the appeal before the COMELEC would also be
dismissed and the COMELEC would only be forced to re-file the case (waste
of time and money, delay in administration of justice).
o The actions of the prosec were not intended to disobey the COMELEC.
SECOND ISSUE:
The judge properly ordered the arrest because there was failure on the part of the
accused to appear for arraignment.
o The filing of an information initiates criminal action. When the accused is
arrested the court acquires jurisdiction over the person.
o Arraignment would then follow. Rule 116, Sec 11: Arraignment may be
suspended upon motion of the proper party: a petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the
Pres. Provided the suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
o So, the suspension is not indefinite in case of an appeal before the DOJ.
o In this case, the appeal was filed on October 7, 2004. The arraignment was
re-scheduled to February 1, 2005 due to motion to quash. Respondent failed
49
 Judge denied Motion to Quash. Olivares failed to appear before RTC for
arraignment. Warrant issued.
Law Department of Comelec filed a Manifestation and Motion revoking the
delegated authority to the city prosec. COMELEC Resolution also directed the
Law Dept to handle the prosecution of the case and to hold abeyance proceedings
until the appeal has been acted upon by the Commission. (Walang sinabo anong
ginawa ng court. Certiorari lang agad si Olivares).
Olivares filed Certiorari before the CA. CA agreed with Olivares (wala nang
powers si prosec to continue with the case. Lack of power= lack of legal basis for
the judge to admit amended infos and order to arrest).
2. Viudez v. CA ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH 11, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALOLOS, BULACAN,
RESPONDENTS.
Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot on June 9, 2000 in San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Mayor Galvezs widow filed a complaint for murder against petitioner Enrique Viudez II
(Viudez) for the killing of Mayor Galvez and his driver.
On September 19, 2001, two (2) Informations for murder were filed with the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued warrants of arrest on the same day.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation of the
Warrant of Arrest, Pursuant to DOJ Department Circular No. 70 arguing that all the
accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice and, pursuant to Section 9 the said circular, the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said
petition for review.
RTC: Denied petitioner's Motion stating that, insofar as the implementation of the warrant
of arrest against petitioner was concerned, said warrant had already been issued for his
apprehension; that there was no way for it to recall the same in the absence of any
compelling reason; and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it;
hence, petitioner had no personality to file any pleading in court relative to the case until he
was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Petitioner filed MR. Denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
TROand/or writ of preliminary injuction arguing that RTC committed GADALEJ.
Petitioner claims, among others, that:
- "the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even
after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable
conflict with the 30-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act."
- the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Prosecutors is recognized by Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
- Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly recognizes the
authority and power of the Department of Justice to prescribe the rules to be followed in
cases of a petition for review of a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor, Provincial or City
Prosecutors.
- Pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Justice, Department Circular
No. 70 was promulgated by the Secretary of Justice providing that "the appellant and
the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
to appear. Reset arraignment to March 9, 2005.
It was only on March 9, 5 MONTHS AFTER APPEAL WAS FILED when the Judge
held arraignment and used the Bench Warrant of Arrest.
W/N a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in
the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest. NO!
Petitioner cites DOJ Department Circular No. 70, specifically paragraph 2 of Section 9
thereof, which provides that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that,
pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
Somehow, petitioner is of the opinion that the suspension of proceedings in court, as
provided in the said circular, includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants
of arrest issued by the court. This contention is wrong!
There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary investigation proper,
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is
made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged - is
the function of the investigating prosecutor.
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People, the task of the presiding judge when the Information
is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to
first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very
start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial.
DOCTRINE: The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the
determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent
implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution
of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable
cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the
warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the
judge.
It must be noted that there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice
of the petition for review that he filed citing the following directive contained in Section
9 of DOJ Department Circular: x xxx The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to
it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant
50
 proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
- The implementation of the warrant of arrest issued against the petitioner is part of the
proceedings in court. Since the circular unequivocally provides that the "proceedings
in court are held in abeyance" pending resolution of the petition for review or
appeal, it follows that the lower court committed GADALEJ when it denied the
motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest.
CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and found no whimsicality or
oppressiveness in the exercise of the respondent Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged
Orders. CA ruled that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in any
circular of this Court, even in any of its decision was it ever pronounced that when a petition
for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor -- finding probable cause to
indict a respondent -- is filed with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, the court which
earlier issued warrants of arrest, should suspend their enforcement.
Respondent (RTC) Judge ordered the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioner by virtue of the expiration of the effectivity of the TRO issued by
the CA.
Petitioner filed MR. Denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45.
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the Decision of the CA was issued with GADALEJ
when it ruled that DOJ Department Circular No. 70 was plainly a directive of the Secretary
of Justice to the accused and the trial prosecutor to ask the Court to suspend the
proceedings thereon during the pendency of the appeal. According to petitioner, the said
department circular had the force and effect of law.
In its Comment, the OSG stated that the determination of whether to issue a warrant of
arrest after the filing of an information was a function that was exclusively vested in
respondent Judge. Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way obliged to defer the
implementation of the service of the warrant simply because a petition for review was filed
by petitioner before the Secretary of Justice to question the filing of the information against
him.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the SC that the Secretary of Justice
had already sustained his petition for review, to wit: the Chief State Prosecutor is directed
to move, with leave of court, for the withdrawal of the information for murder (2 counts)
against Mayor Enrique V. Viudez II and Eulogio Villanueva immediately.xx
These developments would necessarily render the instant petition moot and academic;
however, as implored by petitioner, this Court will render its decision on the merits of the
case in the interest of justice.
PART V: ROLE OF THE OSG IN CRIMINAL CASES
1. People v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ARTURO F. DUCA,
Duca RESPONDENT.
Respondent and his mother Cecilia Duca were charged of falsification of official
document in the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
The criminal case stemmed from an ejection case filed against mother and son. In the civil
case, the MCTC decided against respondent and his mother, and when the writ of execution
was to be executed, Cecilia filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Execution and
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does
it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion
of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of
the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor,
remains unhindered. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it.
ITC: The RTC judge merely exercised his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's
motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA
was correct when it found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial
judge's discretion in issuing the challenged orders.
Neither does this Court find any applicability of the cases cited by the petitioner to the
instant case. A close reading of the factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a common issue among them is
whether the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending resolution by the
Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to which
this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere in the said decisions did it state that the
implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended,
as herein petitioner prays for.
Issue: w/n CA committed GADALEJ when it acquitted respondent without
giving the People the opportunity to be heard through the OSG YES.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
(Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; Sec. 5, Rule 110,
ROC) The Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of
the People.
51
 Damages with TRO, alleging that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case
was owned by her son Aldrin Duca. She presented a Property Index, at the back of which
was a sworn statement showing that the current and FMV of the property is 70,000.00.
Aldrins name appeared on the sworn statement, but the signature was that of
respondent, since Aldrin was out of the country at that time. Because of this, they were
able to mislead the court to grant them the TRO. Respondent avers that his signature
appeared on the sworn statement only for the purpose of authorizing Aldrin to procure the
tax declaration.
The MCTC found Arturo guilty beyond reasonable doubt; Cecilia was acquitted for lack
of evidence. Respondent appealed before the RTC, which affirmed MCTCs decision.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA acquitted
respondent for failure of the prosecution to establish that respondent was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
2. Republic v. Full Title: Republic of the Philippines v. Crasus L. Iyoy
Iyoy FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Fely before RTC-
Cebu City, alleging that Fely was psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital
obligations of marriage under Art 36 of the Fam Code.
Crasus and Fely were married in the PH and had 5 children.
[Not so important] Crasus alleged that after the celebration of their marriage,
Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. Fely left
the Philippines for USA leaving all of her 5 children to the care of Crasus. Crasus
received a letter from Fely requesting that he sign divorce papers, which he
disregarded. Then, Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. She eventually became an American Citizen. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Ph and in USA.
Fely countered saying that she already secured a divorced from Crasus when she
married her American husband and acquired American Citizenship. She also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to Crasus null and void.
RTC Ruling: declared their marriage null and void ab initio.
[!!!] Republic, believing that the judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling: affirmed appealed judgment of the RTC and even offered additional
justification for declaring their marriage null and void [no longer included the additional
ground as it is not relevant].
MR denied. Republic filed this petition for review on certiorari under rule 45.
Crasus questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
ITC: The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment on respondent's petition. A copy of the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004
which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel
for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC
Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been
furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor
General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case.
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine
consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process
is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case
with dispatch.
[omitted the other issues because not related to the topic basta, the court said that the
marriage was valid because there was insufficient evid to support the ground of
psychological incapacity of Fely]
ISSUE: w/not the Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriageYES!
ART. 48 of the Family Code: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him
or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages.
Admin Code of 1987 appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government.
His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers.
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is
the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
52
 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on
behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when
the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while
the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
Lastly, SC had already recognized and affirmed the role of the SolGen in several cases
for annulment and decla of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it.
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, the SC provided the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art 48 of the Fam Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney and the SolGen to appear as
counsel for the state:
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095
Lastly, the issuance of SC of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15
March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor
General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the
authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal
to higher courts.
ITC:
1. SolGen has personality to institute this instant petition.
2. SC arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the CA, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus
for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 53
Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]
 The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue 54

Remedial Law Review (CrimPro) Atty. Tranquil Salvador | 2017
[some digests were lifted from Yori]