PEOPLE V.

SEVILLANO

G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR SEVILLANO

(Evidence: positive identification of witnesses, denial, alibi, testimonies of

witnesses; Criminal Law: Self-defense)

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_200800_2015.html)

FACTS

Pablo Maddauin was having their usual chit-chat with two other people at a vacant
lot. While conversing, they saw Oscar Sevillano coming toward them who could not
walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, Sevillano pulled out a
knife from his waist and stabbed the Maddauin on the chest. Maddauins
companions tried to restrain the Sevillano from attacking, but one of them
experienced leg cramps and lost his hold on Sevillano. Sevillano turned again on
Maddauin and continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard
asking appellant, "Bakit?" The victims wife came to the scene and embraced
appellant as she wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, the victim was brought to the
hospital; but unfortunately, he died that same day.

Sevillano interposed self-defense to absolve himself from criminal liability. He

averred that he went to the vacant lot simply to feed his chicken. While doing so, he
claims that Maddauin, who looked drunk, came at him with a drawn knife but
missed his target; that they grappled for the knife and that the latter was
accidentally stabbed.

ISSUES

1. Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt;

2. Whether the accused is guilty of homicide instead of murder; and
3. Whether the accused acted in self-defense.

RULING

1. Yes, the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The court found no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of the witnesses

considering that their narration of facts were straightforward and replete with
details that coincide with the medical examination conducted on the body of the
victim. The court was not persuaded by the appellants defense of denial as this
cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses positive identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law.

2. No. The accused is guilty of murder.

In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established by the
prosecution:

(1) that a person was killed;

(2) that the accused killed that person;
(3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and
(4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.10

The court found that in the case these elements were clearly met. The
prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed
Pablo several times on the chest which eventually caused the latters death.

Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance,

the prosecution was able to establish that the attack on the unsuspecting victim,
who was merely seated on a bench and talking with his friends, was very sudden. In
fact, the victim was able to utter only "Bakit?". The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the
crime, depriving the former of any chance to defend himself or to repel the
aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without
any provocation on the part of the victim.

3. No, the accused did not act under self-defense.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be
present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a
person from criminal liability:

First. Unlawful Aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.

Appellants version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and
threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. Assuming
arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to
wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former
aggressor. The Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The
fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise,
and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-
defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
PEOPLE V. OBANDO, et al.

G.R. No. 72742 February 12, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEOFILO OBANDO, DOMINADOR OBANDO,

RECTO CABANBAN, FRANCISCO CABANBAN and VICTOR CABANBAN

(Evidence: denial, alibi, character evidence)

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/feb1990/gr_72742_1990.html)

FACTS

Oscar Magarro, his wife Virginia and son Woody were riding on their tricycle. While
nearing an acacia tree, Cipriano Obando and Dominador Obando suddenly appeared
on the road and held the steering wheel of the tricycle. Thereupon, Gregorio Vicente
appeared with a gun and fired at Magarro. The latter got his gun behind his seat,
alighted from the tricycle and returned fire. In the ensuing gunfight, Gregorio
Vicente was hit and fell. Meanwhile, Oscar's gun jammed and while he was cocking
it, somebody threw a stone at him, causing him to fall. While in this vulnerable
position, Cipriano Obando got Oscar's gun and shot him several times. Teofilo
Obando, Cipriano Obando, Francisco Cabanban, Recto Cabanban, Victor Cabanban
and Dominador Obando then dragged Oscar towards the house of Felix Vicente and
Felising Cabrera, where they continued to inflict bodily harm on the victim. Cipriano
Obando shot him several more times, while Teofilo Obando stabbed him with a
knife. Recto Cabanban struck him with a stone; Victor Cabanban, with a dustpan;
and Dominador Obando, with a shovel. Francisco Cabanban took an iron harrow and
a big piece of wood. He hit Oscar on different parts of his body with the iron harrow
and used the piece of wood in crushing Oscar's head. Candido Vicente hacked
Oscar's neck with a bolo, Teofilo Vicente hit his leg with an iron bar and Benjamin
Vicente used a piece of wood in striking the victim on different parts of his body.

All the accused deny the allegations and interpose the defense of having an alibi.

ISSUE

Whether the accused herein were present and aided one another in killing the
victim.

RULING

Yes. The accused were all present during the crime and aided one another in killing
the victim.
After studying and evaluating the narration of facts made by these two
eyewitnesses in relation to the other evidence, physical, documentary and
testimonial adduced by the prosecution, the Court is fully convinced that the herein
accused confederated, helped and aided one another in snuffing the life of the
victim, Oscar Magarro. The narration of facts made by both Virginia Magarro and
Woody Magarro as to the manner the killing was done and the individual
participation of each of the herein accused, convinces the Court satisfactorily that
they (accused) really committed the offense imputed to them. These witnesses
were frank, and straightforward in answering questions, bereft of any artificiality
and hesitancy that is easily detected in one who tells a false and concocted story.
PEOPLE V.MAPAIT

G.R. No. 172606 November 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELANIO MAPAIT

(Criminal Law: Self-Defense; Treachery)

*Read full text:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/nov2011/gr_172606_2011.html)

FACTS

Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife, Nila Remigio (Nila), and their two young children,
Raymond and Genevieve, were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw
FX, along a highway. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right because
their children sat between them. They picked up two hitch hikers, named Nugas and
Araneta, when they passed a village. Later, the hitch hikers pointed knives at Glen
and Nilas necks demanding that they be brought to a mall. Upon the vehicle
reaching Kingsville Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the
neck. Thereafter, the two men alighted and fled.

Despite undergoing treatment, Glen died and his body was brought for autopsy
which revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left side of his
neck. It was opined that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the
assailant used his left hand, he was probably directly behind the victim.

Admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did so in self-defense. He

claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family
vehicle; that when he was about to alight in front of Rempson Supermarket after
arguing with Glen on the overcharged fees, Glen punched him and leaned forward
as if to get something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking
that Glen was reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left
hand from where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya);
and that when asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for
protection because he was living in a squatters area.

ISSUE

Whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as to justify self-
defense.

RULING

No. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as to justify
self-defense.
 Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be
no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put
in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril
must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.

Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements

of unlawful aggression, namely:

(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault;

(b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and

(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:

(a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and

(b) imminent unlawful aggression.

Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or

with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury.

Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the

point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it
be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as
if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude
of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

In the case, Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him
and then reached for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that
he had a gun there. For one, as the Court Appeals pointed out, Nugas admitted not
actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag.

It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-appellant

Nugas position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the
drivers seat and seated between him were his wife and two children. Second, the
victim was driving the FX vehicle. Third, accused-appellant Nugas was seated
directly behind the victim. All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for
the victims family, for him to launch an attack.

Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense

because he had not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life.
He had nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful
aggression towards him.

With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not

having been established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the
remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant. As the Court made clear in
People v. Carrero:

Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support

the theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from
criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain
that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under which unlawful
aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions named in article 8, No.
4, of the Penal Code. When an act of aggression is in response to an insult,
affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as the punishment
which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a
case the courts can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but
never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the
Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)

Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely:

(a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and

(b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.

The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and
the attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its
accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be
appreciated when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is
defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.