Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I JAN/FEB 1967
INTRODUCTION
IN RECENT YEARS, power distribution engineers have
reported many cases of low-voltage electrical equip- Fig. 1. Burndown damage caused by arcing fault. View shows low-
voltage cable compartments of secondary unit substation.
ment burndowns, often without explanation of the causes
underlying such disasters. More recently, many of these
"unexplained" burndowns have been analyzed, their nature burndowns have caused most concern in recent years,
determined, and effective measures developed to provide that the area of greatest exposure to this type of trouble
protection against these occurrences. exists in the average installation, and that the least recogni-
At the outset, it is necessary to understand that the tion has been given by system designers and operators to
term "burndown" used in this paper does not mean the the necessity for deliberate action to minimize the prob-
loss of equipment primarily through combustion of flamma- ability of equipment burndowns.
ble materials--that is, by fire. It may be noted, however, The 1965 National Electrical Code draws particular
that contingent loss by fire also occurs in many cases of attention to the need for adequate circuit protection
equipment burndown. against this as well as other types of faults in a new article
Burndown, as the term is used here, means severe dam- (NEC 110-10):
age to electrical equipment caused by the energy of arcing- Circuit Impedance and Other Characteristics. The over-
fault currents. The energy released in the fault arc during current protective devices, the total impedance, and
a burndown is so intense that it vaporizes copper or alu- other characteristics of the circuit to be protected shall
minum conductors and surrounding steel enclosures, and be so selected and coordinated as to permit the circuit
distills toxic and flammable gases from organic insulation protective devices used to clear a fault without the occur-
rence of extensive damage to the electrical components of
systems. Figure 1 is an example of such a burndown which the circuit. This fault may be assumed to be between two or
occurred in a secondary unit substation. Although burn- more of the circuit conductors; or between any circuit con-
downs have been experienced at all voltage levels used ductor and the grounding conductor or enclosing metal
for enclosed equipment in industrial and commercial raceway.
power systems, this paper is concerned chiefly with this It is important to observe that equipment burndowns
problem as it occurs in low-voltage systems-those op- are much more serious than the usual short circuits en-
erating at 600 volts or less. It is at these voltage levels that countered in power system operation. The ordinary variety
of short circuit results in a shutdown of the circuit in-
Paper approved by the Industrial and Commercial Power Systems volved, but the damage attributable to the short circuit is
Committee for presentation at the 1966 IEEE Industry and General usually localized to the point of fault, the fault itself is
Applications (roup Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill., October 3-6.
The author is with General Electric Company, Schenectady, N.Y. promptly removed by the operation of circuit protective
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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS JAN /FEB
reported have involved both industrial and commercial ring during an arcing-fault burndown is quite similar to the
building distribution equipment, without regard to manu- process which takes place in an electric arc furnace. The
facturer, geographical location, operating environment, energy released in the fault arc vaporizes the metallic con-
or the presence or absence of electrical system neutral ductors or enclosures on which the arc impinges, and if the
grounding. Also, the reported burndowns have included a fault arc is not quickly extinguished, the final result, as
variety of distribution equipment-load center unit sub- shown in Figs. 1-4, is extensive damage and sometimes
stations, switchboards, busway, panelboards, service- complete destruction of equipment.
entrance equipment, motor control centers, and cable in When an arcing fault is established, it may or may not be
conduit, for example. quickly self-extinguishing, particularly on 208-volt sys-
It is obvious, therefore, when all the possible effects of tems [2], [3]. On the other hand, at 480 and 600 volts, the
arcing-fault burndowns are taken into consideration, that arc is usually self-sustaining, even under single-phase
engineers responsible for electrical power system layout conditions. If initiated single phase among metal-enclosed
and operation should be anxious both to minimize the bare buses, the arc will promptly develop into a 3-phase
probability of arcing faults in electrical systems and to fault, within a fraction of a cycle. In grounded systems,
alleviate or mitigate the destructive effects of such faults ground will usually be involved in the fault. When the bus
if they should inadvertently occur despite careful design system is insulated and the fault is initiated single phase,
and the use of quality equipment. The first objective may it may be expected to remain that way, provided the cur-
be secured in a variety of ways which will be briefly dis- rent is interrupted promptly. If the current is not inter-
cussed later; the second objective requires the application rupted promptly then the continued arcing at the point of
of arcing-fault protection in low-voltage power distribution fault will develop heat and ionized gases, resulting in the
systems and this will be discussed in some detail. breakdown of the insulation on the unfaulted phases, after
a moderate delay, and the escalation of the fault into a 3-
THE NATURE OF BURNDOWNS phase condition.
The exact nature of arcing faults has been adequately As long as the arc is self-sustaining, it is capable of
covered in the available technical literature [2], [3]. Two releasing tremendous energy at the point of fault. Even at
concepts presented in these references are of particular low current levels, as noted previously, this energy release
value in understanding and accepting the protective meas- is sufficient to burn down equipment, and it is this charac-
ures proposed in this paper. The first is that the fault-arc teristic, energy release at the point of fault, which makes
voltage drop may substantially reduce the magnitude of the arcing fault so destructive. The bolted fault, in con-
fault current below the bolted 3-phase value. The second is trast, dissipates energy throughout the distribution system
that when the arcing fault becomes single phase, a further resistance elements and does not produce the concentrated
reduction in the rms value of fault current may occur, since devastating energy release of the arcing fault.
a recovery voltage considerably greater than the normal
arc voltage drop is required to reignite the arc after each MINIMIZING THE PROBABILITY OF ARCING FAULTS
current zero. Kaufmann [3 ] indicates that under favorable The initiation of arcing faults can occur in a variety of
conditions the probable minimum value of single-phase ways: through the presence of vermin or rodents in equip-
rms line-to-ground arcing-fault current, expressed in per- ment; the intrusion of metallic or conducting objects, such
cent of bolted 3-phase short-circuit values, is only 19 per- as fish tapes or tools, into bare bus systems; loose connec-
cent for 480-volt systems and 40 percent for 600-volt sys- tions arising from poor installation, heat cycling, or the
tems. Unfortunately, these minimum values are not mechanical effect of high current surges; and the deteriora-
"sacred," since under adverse conditions, such as the single- tion of insulation as a result of mechanical or chemical dam-
phase operation of fuses in the arcing fault circuit [4], or age, voltage surges, heat, aging, or the accumulation of
possibly the presence of a highly inductive ground-return moisture, dust, and contaminants. Whatever the causative
(zero sequence) circuit [3], a further reduction of arcing- agent of arcing faults may be, such occurrences may be
fault current may occur. The lower limit of arcing-fault minimized by the selection of adequately rated quality
current is, therefore, unpredictable, but theoretical con- equipment, proper supervision of installation, operation
siderations and field experience both show that it can have within equipment ratings and limitations, protection of
values whichwill not operate the instantaneous tripson low- equipment from unusual operating or environmental condi-
voltage protective devices and may even be below the full- tions, execution of regular and thorough maintenance pro-
load current ratings of these devices. As Kaufmann [41 and cedures, and the carrying out of daily good housekeeping
Fisher [5 ] point out, however, prolonged duration of even a practices. In addition, improved equipment design can
modest fault current can produce catastrophic effects; make important contributions to minimizing arcing faults
a single-phase arcing fault of 600 amperes and an arc volt- by isolating and compartmentalizing live parts within
age of 200 volts represents heat liberated at the rate of 120 grounded metallic enclosures, by providing insulation
kW. This high rate of energy release can melt a lot of systems, and by incorporating equipment and distribution
copper, aluminum, or steel if the current flow continues for system features, such as draw-out, rack-out, or "stab-in"
five or ten minutes. construction, which make it unnecessary to work on
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the action occur- energized equipment.
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18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS J A\N /FEB
SOURCE LOAD
No matter what preventive measures may be taken [
against arcing faults, their complete elimination is A B _ 'OLOAD)j
not possible in practical distribution systems. Arcing LCN4 .,>FUSE
faults in equipment, therefore, can be expected to occur,
(M-TO LOAD))
AC-ARCINGGROUND
FAULT VOLTAGES AT
and the engineering of distribution systems protection - _ _ AT81TO
__- FAULT POINT
should take this into account. ARROWS SHOW FAULT CURRENT PATH
;(C-PHASE FUSE
OPEN)
ARCING-FAULT PROTECTION Fig. 5. Illustration showing how reduced single-phase fault current
may flow to arcing fault after a fuse has blown.
The peculiarities of arcing faults, i.e., high rates of energy
release, and possible low fault current levels, make it very
desirable that arcing-fault protection be characterized by fault is an arcing one, severe equipment burndown may
two important features; a high degree of sensitivity to de- occur.
tect low-level arcing-fault current, and fast speed of opera- For the reasons cited, fuses alone are not considered self-
tion-in the order' of cycles rather than seconds-to limit sufficient agents for arcing-fault protection. It should be
the destructive effects of the arc. The requirements of noted, however, that certain fast-Qnirating shunt-tripped
selective operation of circuit protective devices-in which fusible switches, which provlde 3-pole circuit disconnection
only the device nearest the fault on its supply side operates promptly on the occurrence of a single blown fuse, may be
to remove the fault, and thus secures maximum power coupled with supplementary relaying to furnish protection
service reliability for important system loads-may force against arcing faults. The 3-pole disconnection, or anti-
a reduction in both the maximum speed of operation and single-phase feature of suitable fused switches, prevents the
maximum sensitivity available in arcing-fault protection. fault point from remaining energized via the back-feed
Conversely, to limit the destructive effects of the arc a circuit and furnishes prompt quenching of the arcing
compromise in the extent of selective operation achieved fault.
may be required. In any case, the adequate arcing-fault The antisingle-phase feature alone, however, does not
protection system'must be relatively sensitive and fast, mean that shunt-tripped fusible switches nmay be safely
and the various proposals advanced as arcing-fault pro- applied for protection against arcing faults. Good engineer-
tection should be measured against these criteria. ing also requires that the switch contacts must be able to
Since phase-overcurrent protective devices of either the interrupt, without distress, any moderate arcing-fault cur-
circuit breaker or fuse type are almost universally used on rent on which the switch is called to operate by the supple-
low-voltage distribution systems, it is sometimes suggested mentary relaying before the fuses blow. Since the majority
that these alone may provide adequate protection against of fusible switches have a limited contact interrupting
arcing faults. The fact that equipment burndowns have ability, this last requirement is a very significant one, from
occurred is, however, evidence that complete reliance for the viewpoint of personnel safety. MIany fusible switches
arcing-fault protection cannot be placed on these phase- cannot meet the necessary performance requirements for
overcurrent devices. The reason for this is simple. Fuses protection against arcing faults. The exceptions to this
and circuit breakers will operate only after a relatively statement generally include the shunt-tripped fusible
long period of time on moderate short-circuit currents and switches, available from a few manufacturers, which are
will not operate at all on currents less than their contin- fundamentally nonautomatic circuit breaker mechanisms
uous current ratings, yet currents of such low orders of and contacts coupled with appropriate fuses.
magnitude may occur in arcing faults. The direct-acting trips on molded-case and low-voltage
Fuses are single-phase devices, and when used alone in power circuit breakers will provide time-delay or in-
polyphase systems, without supplemental aids to provide stantaneous tripping of the circuit breaker on overcurrents
polyphase circuit disconnection, they retain their charac- which exceed their settings. In practice, circuit breaker
teristic of furnishing only single-pole interruption of fault time-delay trips must be set above the maximum expected
current. Case histories and theoretical analyses have shown continuous current in the circuit. On the larger industrial
that such single-pole operations mav not extinguish the unit substations and the high-capacity commercial build-
fault, but often permit it to be backfed with reduced cur- ing electrical services frequently encountered today, the
rent from the other energized phases [4]. Therefore the circuit continuous-current rating may exceed the minimum
opening of the first single-pole device will modify the cir- values of arcing-fault current which can occur in the circuit.
cuit geometry in such a way that the fault continues to be In addition, as a practical necessity, the circuit breaker
supplied with fault current, generally of considerably instantaneous trips must be set above the offset value of
diminished magnitude. transformer or motor inrush currents to avoid false trip-
This current flows via a circuit consisting of the other ping. Consequently, it has become a widespread but unwise
phase conductors, the line-to-line connected load, and the practice to set breaker instantaneous trips as high as their
conductor on the load side of the fault point (Fig. 5). Be- range permits, and many instances have been observed
cause of the reduced' fault current value the remaining where such settings exceeded even the maximum short-
phase-overcurrent devices are either inoperative or will circuit current (3-phase bolted value) available in the
operate only after a long time delay. In either case, if the circuit.
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967 SHIELDS: POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS19 19
In view of the probable low levels of arcing-fault cur- system, through the use of a neutral resistor, controls the
rents, these high instantaneous trip settings cannot provide, ground-fault current to a relatively low value-commonly,
with an acceptable degree of certainty, detection and inter- 15 amperes or less and normally provides only an alarm
ruption of destructive arcing faults. Nevertheless, the singleor indication, without tripping, on the occurrence of a
most important measure which might be taken, in any fault to ground. The low-resistance grounded system con-
power system and without product expense, to improve trols the ground-fault current to a value in the range of
system protection against arcing faults would be to lower several hundred to a thousand amperes or so, and with the
circuit breaker instantaneous trip settings to a level no use of sensitive ground-fault detectors can provide auto-
higher than that required to avoid nuisance tripping under matic circuit interruption on the occurrence of a ground
normal conditions [5]. Setting of instantaneous trips on fault. Though little used in low-voltage systems today, this
this basis should become a general practice in distribution type of system grounding limits the damage which can
systems. In addition, the use of short-time trips to supple- occur during an arcing fault to ground and may see more
ment or replace instantaneous tripping wherever possible extensive use in the future as more economic and sensitive
and where switchgear ratings permit it, should be a fault detectors become available.
recommended practice. The third type of grounded system is the solidly
Despite the precautions stated in the preceding para- grounded system, in which the system neutral is connected
graph, however, arcing-fault currents sometimes may have solidly to ground, without the intentional use of any neutral
values less than the minimum permissible settings of in- impedance. Ground fault currents in this system may have
stantaneous or short-time trips; in fact, as observed earlier,values approaching or exceeding the bolted 3-phase short-
such currents may be less than the normal load current in circuit values, and automatic, prompt interruption of cir-
the circuit. Even where the fault current value is sufficient cuits faulted to ground is the intended (though not always
to operate the long-time delay element of the circuit actual) mode of operation. The solidly grounded system is
breaker trip, the operating time of these elements is the most widely used low-voltage distribution system, in
generally so long, that it is impossible for circuit interrup-either the industrial or commercial building domain.
tion to be accomplished before extensive arc damage has To provide a limit to the scope of this presentation,
occurred. the following discussion on specific relaying methods is
intended to apply expressly to solidly grounded low-volt-
SUPPLEMENTARY ARCING-FAULT RELAYING age systems. In these systems the relaying methods con-
Because of the inadequacies of fuses and conventional sist generally of ground-overcurrent and some form of
circuit breaker trips in handling arcing-fault currents, re- ground-differential relaying.
course to supplementary relaying is necessary to secure
adequate protection. The type of supplementary relaying GRO UND-OVERCURRENT RELAYING
which would be used and its degree of effectiveness under The shortcomings of phase-overcurrent devices in detect-
various conditions are dependent on the nature of the low- ing low-level arcing faults have already been cited. This
voltage system grounding. It should be immediately ob- suggests that the ideal solution to the problem would be
served, as a matter of caution on this topic, that both sensitive to arcing-fault current alone. Since arcing faults
grounded and ungrounded systems have proved vulnerable in grounded systems almost invariably involve ground,
to arcing-fault burndowns. While the "ungrounded" (in this fact permits a near-perfect approach to the ideal solu-
reality, grounded through distributed system capacitance) tion.
power system tends to present higher probable minimum In a normal, healthy power distributiOn system there
values of arcing-fault current under certain conditions, is essentially no significant flow of current in the ground
when compared to the grounded system, it, too, is subject path or no zero-seqvience current. The presence of cur-
to a drastic reduction of fault current magnitude in the rent in the ground circuit is directly indicative of an elec-
event of single-pole interrupter operation. At the same tric circuit fault. Arcing faults involving ground will pro-
time, as the technical literature displays, the ungrounded duce a distinct ground-fault current. Therefore, monitoring
system has a unique problem in the matter of transient the ground or zero-sequence circuit provides an effectual
overvoltages. means of detecting the existence of arcing faults.
These observations are made simply to make it clear An excellent method of monitoring the presence of
that the ungrounded power system does not possess any ground fault currents (zero-sequence currents) is provided
distinct advantage with regard to arcing faults and is de- by the use of a window or ring-type (sometimes called
ficient in its ability to control transient overvoltages. The doughnut) current transformer in combination with an
purpose of this comment is to forestall any presumption overcurrent relay (Fig. 6). All of the phase conductors of
that the author advocates the use of ungrounded power the circuit to be monitored (plus the neutral conductor, if
systems. used) are passed through the window of the current trans-
With regard to grounded power distribution systems, former (ct). With this arrangement, which in the author's
three varieties are in use which may be identified by the company is called a low-voltage ground-sensor relay (GSR)
degree to which the ground-fault current level is controlled combination, only circuit faults involving ground will
during a line-to-ground fault. The high-resistance grounded produce a current in the ct secondary to pick up the relay.
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20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS JAN /FEB
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1967 SHIELDS: POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 21
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22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS .JAN /FEB
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1967 SHIELDS: POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 23
A CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate that raising the relay-pickup GSR-O INSTANTANEOUS
GROUND -FAULT
GSR-1
settings to avoid nuisance tripping on low-current ground GSR-I
RELAY
TIME-DELAY
faults sacrifices the maximum protection these relays can GROUND-FAULT
RELAY
provide against low-level arcing ground faults in their area
of action. Thus, a choice of alternatives must be made when
ground-sensor arcing-fault protection is only partially GSR-0
U N ITSm
TO N ON-ESSENTIAL
applied throughout the distribution system. Choosing GSR LOADS
maximum sensitivity and minimum operating time pro- TO EQUIPMENT REQUIRING
BURNDOWN PROTECTIO
vides maximum protection but may result in nuisance
tripping for low-level ground faults; selecting less-sensitive Fig. 12. Means of obtaining selectivity for ground faults on circuits
requiring burndown protection.
relay settings and increased operating time improves sys-
tem service continuity but may lead to aggravated burn-
ing damage and possibly a more prolonged downtime
should an arcing ground fault occur. GSR-
on ground faults. It will be a rare case, however, in which Fig. 13. An arrangement for securing ground-fault protection
justification of complete system ground-fault protection and freedom from nuisance tripping on circuits supplying critical
or essential loads.
can be shown. In particular, out at the outer fringes of the
distribution system, where circuit ratings and protective
devices are usually small and where continuity of service of a burndown but which does not demand uninterrupted
generally is much less vital than at the main switchboards service. Breakers C, at the same time, might supply various
and substations, the risk of an occasional burndown due to small circuits of nonessential character. For fast protection
an arcing ground fault may be accepted because the of the costly equipment the B breakers could be supplied
alternative of protecting every branch circuit is unaccept- with instantaneous GSRs, as shown, while a time-delay
ably costly. In the future, of course, new product develop- GSR, selective with the B breaker relays, could be applied
ments and cost reduction will make the desired protection to breaker A. Because of cost considerations, breakers C
economically more feasible. For the present, it can be would not be equipped with GSRs. In this case, the costly
expected that only the more vital and important of branch equipment on the B circuits would have excellent protec-
circuits will be equipped with instantaneous ground-fault tion against burndown, but would be subject to occasional
protection. The remaining branch circuits may rely on unnecessary shutdown whenever the GSR at breaker A
only their phase-overcurrent devices, such as circuit operated for ground faults beyond breakers C. Service to
breaker direct-acting trips or fuses. all unfaulted circuits could be restored quickly by reclosing
Closer to the source, at the bulk power centers where breaker A after the appropriate C breaker had been opened
continuity of service is essential and the risk of burndowns to disconnect the faulty circuit.
must be minimized, time-delay ground-sensor relaying on As a contrast to the foregoing arrangement, consider
the feeder circuits will be imperative. Fig. 13. Now the B breakers supply loads which are essen-
Short of providing ground-sensor-type or residual ground tial to the process or service being powered and which must
overcurrent relaying on all circuit protective devices (as is not be interrupted except for faults in these critical circuits.
done in medium-voltage systems) there is no single guide The C breakers, as before, supply noncritical load and may
which cain be proposed for low-voltage systems to cope with not warrant individual protection against arcing-fault
the dilemma of wanting, at the same time, sensitive pro- burndown. Now, however, to protect the vital B circuits
tection and selectivity between protective devices. What is from shutdown (due to operation of the GSR at breaker A)
done in any given case will depend on such factors as the for ground faults on the C circuits, breaker D has been
cost of protective devices, the age and cost of the circuit or added ahead of the C breaker grouping. An instantaneous
equipment to be protected, the critical nature of the ser- GSR on breaker D will operate for ground faults on the C
vice, operation, or process being supplied with power, the circuits, and will be selective with the GSR unit at breaker
existence of nonessential loads, and the resourcefulness of A avoiding unnecessary shutdown of the vital B circuits.
the distribution engineer. The B breakers may or may not be equipped with an in-
As an example, referring to Fig. 12, breakers B might stantaneous GSR, depending on whether these circuits can
supply equipment, such as a distribution switchboard or be shutdown independently for ground faults. If loss of one
large motor, which would be costly to replace in the event B circuit requires shutting down the other(s), then the
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24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS JAN /FEB
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1967 SHIELDS: POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 25
Francis J. Shields (M'52) was born in Brooklyn, N. Y., on February 3, 1924. He received the
B.E.E. degree from the City College of New York, N. Y., in 1949.
Since graduation he has been with General Electric Company. After several assignments
on the company's test program, he joined the engineering staff at the Lynn, Mass., plant, in
1950, where, until 1956, he worked on plant power generation and distribution problems, and
in that interval was Project Engineer for a major modernization and expansion program of
the plant's medium-voltage power distribution facilities. In 1956, he transferred to Sche-
nectady, N. Y., where he is now a Power Systems Engineer in the Industrial Power Systems
unit. His work involves industrial plant electrical power distribution problems, with particular
emphasis on distribution system design and low-voltage circuit protection and coordination.
He has written several articles on load-center distribution and on the application and coordina-
tion of circuit protective devices.
Mr. Shields is a member of Eta Kappa Nu and Tau Beta Pi, and is a Registered Professional
Engineer in the State of New York.
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