Notes Articles Used For Theoretical Framework

Hendrix & Salehyan Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in

Africa (2012)
This article addresses whether deviations from normal rainfall patterns affect the
propensity for individuals and groups to engage in disruptive activities such as
demonstrations, riots, strikes, communal conflict, and anti-government violence.
In contrast to much of the environmental security literature, it uses a much
broader definition of conflict. The results indicate that rainfall variability has a
significant effect on both large-scale and smaller-scale instances of political
conflict. [35]1
The authors find that: rainfall correlates with civil conflict and insurgency,
although wetter years are more likely to suffer from violent events. Extreme
deviations in rainfall particularly dry and wet years are associated with all
types of social conflict, though the relationship is strongest with respect to violent
events, which are more responsive to abundant rather than scarce rainfall. [36]
The literature on environmental security suggests at least five mechanisms
through which rainfall deviations may lead to sociopolitical conflict. First,
rainfall deviations may lead to conflict among consumers of water. Second, both
excess and shortages of water can lead to price disputes between rural producers
and urban consumers. Third, as livelihoods in affected areas come under stress,
many will opt to migrate to urban areas in search of alternative work. Fourth,
states often intervene in markets in order to increase their revenues and expand
patronage opportunities. Fifth, rainfall variability can have negative
macroeconomic effects. [37-38]
Main findings: first, there is some evidence that rainfall correlates with civil war
and insurgency, although conflict outbreak is more likely in wetter years. [45]
Second, very high and very low rainfall years increase the likelihood of all other
types of political and social conflict. Third, rainfall scarcity and excess have
differential impacts across the various types of social conflict events. [46]
See 46-47 for the societal relevance of this topic, which is directly connected to
climate change.
Adano et al. Climate Change, Violent Conflict and Local Institutions in
Kenyas Drylands (2012)
This article critically discusses the relevance of geographical and climatic
parameters in explaining the connection between poverty and violent conflicts in
Kenyas pastoral areas. [65]

1 In contrast to many other studies, the authors do not expect full-blown civil
wars to emerge from water scarcity. Launching an insurgency entails significant
start-up costs, planning, and organizational capacity (compare to: Von Uexkull
2014 who also has made this observation) However, grievances and
competition over water resources can generate social conflict in ways that do not
require the level of organization/funding needed for sustaining an insurgency.
[36]
Climate change predictions for Africa suggest increasing scarce water resources
associated with a high risk of violent conflict, and declining and failing
agricultural yields in the Horn of Africa. [66] In combination with economic,
social and political uncertainties, climate change might increase the risks of
conflict and instability, especially under conditions of poor governance. [66] The
authors do not argue that resource scarcity or abundance bring about conflict by
themselves, but aim to provide evidence of how and under what conditions
natural resources contribute to violent conflict. [66]
Case study: northern Kenya: no evidence that drought years were more violent
than wet years. On the contrary, there was more violence in years of high rainfall.
[69] Explanation: during droughts people are more inclined to keep the peace, to
cooperate and to use wells together. Livestock raiding is easier during the wet
periods, which is why these periods are generally more violent. [71]
Case study: the Loita forest case shows that with increasing pressure on
resources due to population growth and drought impacts of climate change, there
are opportunities for moderation of potential conflict. This case also shows that
old institutional arrangements can link up with new institutions and organizations
to achieve this moderation. [76] Thus, resource abundance can be a blessing.
Von Uexkull Sustained Drought, Vulnerability and Civil Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa (2014)
With climate change projections indicating a likely future increase in extreme
weather phenomena, it is an urgent matter to assess the effect of drought on civil
conflict. This paper evaluates the relationship between sustained drought,
rainfed agriculture and civil conflict violence at the subnational level. In line with
the argument, areas with rainfed croplands see an increased risk of civil conflict
violence following drought. There is also some support for the proposition that
areas experiencing sustained droughts have a higher risk of conflict. [16]
Common worries are that drought or other extreme climatic events may serve as
catalysts for conflicts over food and water and trigger regional and ethnic
tensions to escalate into violent clashes. However, in contrast to popular belief,
the scientific evidence for the link between climate variability and rebellions is
inconclusive and evidence for a direct link is rather weak (see: Theisen, Gleditsch
& Buhaug 2013). One reason for this inconclusiveness may be that previous
empirical assessments have not sufficiently taken into account local conditions
under which drought and other extreme climatic events can be expected to have
a measureable impact on the onset/dynamics of civil conflict. [16]
The author suggests that areas experiencing sustained droughts and depending
on rainfed agriculture are more likely to see civil conflict, as individuals in these
regions are more likely to partake in rebellion to redress economic grievances or
simply to obtain food and income. [16-17]
Literature review: the assessments of local effects and conditional effects in
recent studies represent major advances in the debate. Yet there are still
significant theoretical and empirical gaps. In order to assess the link between
climate variability and conflict, we need to theorize upon, and empirically assess,
under what circumstances droughts most likely translate into economic
grievances and income shocks for affected populations. In particular, the
question of how vulnerability and coping capacities shape the impact of drought
and related disasters has been only insufficiently reflected in empirical studies on
the effect of climate variability and conflict so far. [17]
It is unlikely that economic hardship resulting from drought is a sufficient cause
for rebellion (see also Homer-Dixon 1999). However, it can add to pre-existing
grievances thereby making civil conflict more likely, as well as provide incentives
for affected individuals to join or support rebellion. [17]
A drought that decreases the supply of income and food makes people more
likely to engage in civil conflict violence. These linkages between drought and
conflict mainly rely on the adverse economic impact of droughts. The author
identifies two conditions that increase drought impact.
1. The duration of exposure to droughts
2. The vulnerability of local agricultural production patterns to drought. [18]
Hypotheses: 1. Sustained droughts increase the risk of civil conflict violence. 2.
Regions with rainfed agriculture have a higher risk of civil conflict violence
following droughts than other regions. [19]
Drought mostly adds fuel to already existing conflicts/tensions in agricultural
regions. In these cases, at least some of the fixed costs of initiating war against
the gvmnt. have already been paid. [24]
Gap in the literature: There is a need for future research to further scrutinize
possible conditional effects and causal mechanisms. Another underexplored
field of study is how rebel groups and government manage drought during
conflict. It should be a priority for future research to further disentangle micro-
level processes shaping vulnerability to disaster and conflict behavior. [24]
Theisen, Gleditsch & Buhaug Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed
Conflict? (2013)
State of the literature on climate change/conflict: The world is becoming less
violent, but the debate on climate change raises the specter of a new source of
instability and conflict. Although comparative research on security implications
of climate change is rapidly expanding, major gaps in knowledge still exist. Taken
together, extant studies provide mostly inconclusive insights, with contradictory
or weak demonstrated effects of climate variability and chance on armed conflict.
[613]
Fears that climate change threatens the global peace have been expressed by
the Nobel Committee, the UN Security Council and President Barack Obama.
Despite this rhetoric, there is little systematic evidence to date that short-term
climate variability, such as prolonged droughts or unusually warm weather, has
any observable effect on the general pattern of conflict in modern times. [614]
There is only limited support for neo-Malthusian hypotheses in the literature.
[618]
Research priorities: first, we need to develop a better understanding of plausible
indirect links between environmental variability and change and armed conflict.
To date, most research on the security effects of climate change are limited to
investigating direct associations despite the fact that the literature on resource
scarcity and violence as well as that on climate change and conflict point to the
importance of mediating factors. One of the most frequently mentioned yet
critically understudied topics is the effect on migration and its social
consequences including conflict. [621]
Second, more work needs to be put into the geographical disaggregation of the
effects of climate change since these effects will not follow national boundaries.
Third, focus should be on the poorer parts of the world, where the adaptive
capacity is low today. Particular attention needs to be paid to countries that are
not only poor but also stagnating. Finally, we need to go beyond severe, state-
based violence considered in most statistical studies to date. [622]
See 622-623 for a discussion of the relevance of climate change/violence
research.
Scheffran et al. Climate Change and Violent Conflict (2012)
Current debates over the relation between climate change and conflict originate
in a lack of data, as well as the complexity of pathways connecting the two
phenomena. [869]
Although some quantitative empirical studies support a link between climate
change and violent conflict, others find no connection or only weak evidence.
[869] A major challenge is to find adequate data. Instead of using data on the
long-term average and variability of temperature, precipitation, and other
climatic variables that would clearly fall under the IPCC definition of climate
change, many studies have used proxies, such as short-term data on weather
and extreme weather events, or on natural phenomena of climate variability like
the El Nino phenomenon. [869]
Methodology flaw: It is important to distinguish between the types of conflict
used in various data sets. The widely used Armed Conflict Dataset of the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP-PRIO), for
instance, sets a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and involvement of
at least one state government to be considered as armed conflict. This excludes
other forms of violent or nonviolent behavior that may be affected by climate
change such as protests, riots, or livestock theft, let alone conflict as a positional
difference over interests, values, or goals. These distinctions are relevant as, in
recent decades, climate variability may have been more associated with low-level
violence and internal civil warwhich fall below the UCDP-PRIO definition cutoff
than with armed conflict or war between countries. [870]
Since the 1990s, there has been an extensive scientific debate on how the
scarcity of natural resources affects violence and armed conflict. More recently,
conflict studies pay attention to the vulnerability of natural and social systems to
climate impacts. Vulnerability can be broken down into three factors: exposure to
climate change, sensitivity to climate change and adaptive capacity. [870]
International efforts to prevent and manage conflicts have been strengthened
and the number of armed conflicts has declined since the end of the Cold War. In
recent years, however, this trend slowed down or is being reversed. While the
number of democratic states has grown over the past half-century, the number of
fragile states with weak institutions has also increased. [870]
Relevance of this research: the balance between political and social factors and
climate change could shift when the global temperature reaches levels that have
been unprecedented in human history. There is reason to believe that such a
change might overwhelm adaptive capacities and response mechanisms of both
social and natural systems and thus lead to tipping points toward societal
instability and an increased likelihood of violent conflict. [871]
Kevane & Gray Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict (2008)
Rainfall in Darfur did decline, but the decline happened over 30 years before the
conflict erupted. Preliminary analysis suggests little merit to the proposition that
a structural break several decades earlier is a reasonable predictor of the
outbreak of large-scale civil conflict in Africa. [1]
Influential voices such as Al Gore and Ban Ki-moon have asserted or implied that
the Darfur civil war is a climate crisis. The contention is that declining rainfall and
land degradation intensified violent struggles over water, pasture and farmland
culminating in a full-blown civil war in 2003. [1]
This paper makes two points. The first is that Darfur rainfall patterns only weakly
corroborate the claim that climate change explains the conflict. The second is
that structural breaks to lower mean rainfall levels appear to be uncorrelated with
subsequent conflict in other countries in Africa. Other Sahelian African countries
have experienced similar breaks in their overall average rainfall, yet levels of
violence have been nowhere near those of Darfur. Many African countries that
have not experienced declines in rainfall nevertheless saw increased conflict over
the past several decades [2]
Raleigh & Kniveton Come Rain or Shine: An Analysis of Conflict and
Climate Variability in East Africa (2012)
In this study, the authors focused on small-scale conflict over East Africa where
the link between resource availability and conflict is assumed to be more
immediate and direct. Using the parameter of rainfall variability to explore the
marginal influence of the climate on conflict, the article shows that in locations
that experience rebel or communal conflict events, the frequency of these events
increases in periods of extreme rainfall variation, irrespective of the sign of the
rainfall change. [51]
The authors explore the relationship between rainfall conditions and different
types of conflict. The rationale for looking at different types of conflict rests in the
premise that climate is never the only determinant of political violence. Climates
influence is mediated via other drivers of conflict such as resource availability,
political unrest and economic pressures. [52]
Why East Africa as casus?: this region has a history of various conflicts, so the
assumption that core socio-political factors of instability exist is met. Conflict data
for this region are comprehensive, and there is relatively strong agreement
between different climate models over climate change in East Africa, despite
widespread uncertainty over rainfall changes in the future in the low latitudes.
[52]
The climate-conflict literature suffers from a lack of theoretical connections
between its main driver (climate) and its possible consequence (conflict). Rainfall
is a key climate variable in terms of its impact on society. This impact is
particularly pronounced in Africa where the majority of the population relies on
rain-fed agriculture and pastures as the basis for their livelihoods. [54]
Four possible relationships can link rainfall variability to political conflict:
1. Increased conflict is likely to follow periods of above average decreases in rainfall. This
leads to scarcity of resources, which sparks conflict. People will fight over these resources
(Zero sum).
2. Decreases in conflict are likely to be correlated to decreased rainfall as there is little to
fight for (No gain).
3. Increases in political violence will directly follow periods of higher than average rainfall
(Abundance).
4. There may be decreased frequency in political violence following increases in rainfall as
individuals and groups are self-sufficient and unlikely to motivate participants during
these times (Equal access). [54]

Previous studies have contested climate as a significant driver of conflict. In part

this disagreement has arisen because of a concentration on large-scale conflict.
[60]
The results of this analysis for conflict over East Africa support a theoretical
linkage between the climate and conflict that focuses rainfall variability as a
marginal driver of conflict frequencies. The results show that disaggregated
conflict frequencies are exacerbated by both extreme wet and dry conditions. In
the setting of East Africa, rainfall provides an indicator of resource availability
through its impact on natural and agricultural resources. Therefore, these
findings moderately support both a zero-sum narrative, where conflicting groups
use force and violence to compete for ever-scarcer resources, and an
abundance narrative, where an abundance of resources spur rent-
seeking/wealth-seeking and recruitment of people to participate in violence. [61-
62]
Anomalous rainfall conditions, irrespective of sign, are likely to enhance the
probability of conflict. However, when looking in more detail, the highest
incidence of rebel conflict appears to occur in extreme dry rather than wet
conditions. By contrast, it is shown that the highest incidence of communal
violence appear to occur in extreme wet rather than dry conditions. [62]
The differences in control variables coefficients for the communal and rebel
sample indicate a critically understudied aspect of the environmental security
literature: the locations, which have both extreme climate variability and very
high rates of communal conflict, are poorer relative to the remainder of the state.
This conclusion supports a wider case-based literature on communal and pastoral
violence in the Sahel belt which suggests that conflict is a competition for power
and access to resources in areas of government absence and a dearth of public
goods. [62]

Salehyan From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet (2008)

Because climate change is likely to have profound effects on agriculture,
settlement patterns, natural disasters, disease, and economic activity more
generally, many have begun to speculate about future scenarios and potential
human impacts. Some scholars have suggested that climate change will
exacerbate resource scarcity, create mass population dislocations, and
ultimately, fuel violent conflicts. These effects will be particularly acute in
developing countries where infrastructure is lacking and agricultural economies
are most sensitive to environmental stress. [315]
The argument about the connection between climate change and conflict boils
down to an argument about resource scarcity (or abundance) and competition
over the means to sustain livelihoods. [316]
State of the literature: A recent special issue of Political Geography (Nordas &
Gledtisch 2007) presents some of the most sophisticated and carefully conducted
empirical analyses to date of the nexus between climate change, environmental
degradation and armed conflict. Yet, most contributors to the special issue are
rather circumspect about the relationship between climate change and political
violence. The general impression left by this new wave of research is that direct
links are few and weak; causal pathways are complex and contingent on a host of
additional factors (see for instance: Raleigh & Urdal 2007; Barnett & Adger 2007).
[316-317]
Despite this work, there is a disjunction between scholarly research on
environmental conflict and often-heard assertions in journalistic accounts and
policy papers. The main purpose of this article is to close this gap by engaging in
discussion with the policy community. [317]
Salehyan: claims of environmental determinism leading seamlessly from climate
change to open warfare are suspect. The overly structured logic linking climate
change to armed conflict ignores human agency, ingenuity, the potential for
technological innovation, and the vital role of political institutions in managing
conflict (or failing to do so). Additionally, ignoring the role that governments play
in managing and redistributing resources, as well as mediating conflict, leads to
incorrect predictions and policy prescriptions, and allows decision-makers to shift
blame for civil wars and grave human rights violations (compare to the Darfur
case and the Sudanese government) [317].
It is important to note that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to
be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain. While fundamental
shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what
is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently
argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate
inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to
develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given the changes in the Earths
atmosphere. [318]
The authors purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental
processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will
occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is
critical for understanding organized armed violence. [318]
First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when
conflicts will break out. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification
led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and
ethnic cleansing. Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many
countries particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but similar problems elsewhere
have not led to large-scale violence (compare to Kevane & Gray 2008). [318-319]
Resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are
ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by
themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. [319]
Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not
always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While IPV is more or less
common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict
on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Local hostilities need not escalate to
serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.
[319]
Third, states often bear responsibility for environmental for environmental
degradation and resource shortfalls, either through their own projects and
initiatives or through neglect of the environment. [319] Fourth, violent conflict
is an inefficient and sub-optimal reaction to changes in the environment and
resource scarcities. Less costly options are available, such as migration. [319-
320]
Four areas of improvement for research on environmental conflict.
1. Develop better measures of political institutions.
2. Develop exogenous measures of environmental stress.
3. Model endogenous relationships.
4. Look for interactive, contingent effects. [321-322]
Empirical research on the environment-conflict nexus has typically focused on
proving/disproving the deterministic view. By better specifying the political
processes by which governments intervene (or fail to intervene) in resource
conflicts, and circumventing concerns about endogeneity, proponents and
doubters of environmental conflict theory may be able to find areas of
agreement. [322]
Slettebak Dont Blame the Weather! Climate-related Natural Disasters
and Civil Conflict (2012)
The results from research on the topic of climate change and security are mixed
and the academic community appears to be far from a consensus on how climate
change is likely to affect stability and conflict risk in affected countries. This study
focuses on how climate-related natural disasters such as storms, floods, and
droughts have affected the risk of civil war in the past. The results indicate
that the relation between climate change and conflict is opposite to common
perceptions: Countries that are affected by climate-related natural disasters face
a lower risk of civil war. [163]
Slettebak does not provide a clear explanation for his findings. Also, he
investigated whether there is a systematic tendency that climate-related natural
disasters cause civil conflict to arise, or re-ignite, within the same or the following
year. The incubation period of civil war may be longer. [163]