SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 1 of 140
Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768, G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
Forum Shopping; Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule
against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, it may also constitute direct contempt.
To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute
direct contempt. Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitionersIvan Tapuzdid not sign, in violation of Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the
Notary Public.
Writ of Amparo; The Writ of Amparo, Explained.To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo
was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparoin line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact.
Same; The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed.The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in
the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, that are essentially
repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition.
Same; If the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally
accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.Under these legal and factual
situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would
justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat
to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Same; The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as substitute for the
appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processesthe
situation obtaining in the present case.Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but
consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present
recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders
that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an
improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out
above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary
remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and
sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of
certiorari nor that of amparoextraordinary though they may bewill suffice to serve as a curative
substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for
the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processesthe
situation obtaining in the present case. While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filed
criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a
subsequently filed criminal and civil action. These rules were adopted to promote an orderly
procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort
to other parallel recourses.
Writ of Habeas Data; Section 6 of the Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data.
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data: (a) The personal
circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated
or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The
actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of
the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or
in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Same; Allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on
Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much
less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than
those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of
the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also

been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
fishing expedition that this Courtin the course of drafting the Rule on habeas datahad in
mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright
denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. Tapuz vs. Del
Rosario, 554 SCRA 768, G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA,
EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON
DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18 th DIVISION,
SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION-BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4
of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and
Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff
Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in
Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private
respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the
"MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay
Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does
numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio
Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's
prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private
respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of
the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
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The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the private
respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report
and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted.
It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed
by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch
Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing
findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that
after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A',
Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence
sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual
physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a
portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L.
Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed
an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of
the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when
the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John
Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along
the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in
question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs'
Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April
19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate
to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open
continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter
fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report
and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual
physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted
therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the
possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must

be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on
April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D',
Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner
who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on
April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry
thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint
Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of
armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed
men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and
resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April
18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the
security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as
annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and
(sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the
instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question
prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (" RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo,
Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance
conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del
Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied
with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the
private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to
Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 3 of 140
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent Judge nevertheless
issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the
Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition
for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition
on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008.
The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions
diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners
maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the
private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns
intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in
uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m.
two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their
shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified
as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad,
Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to
ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by
one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns
and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who
resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing
Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of
high-powered weapons.

[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners
continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men
and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political
clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by
the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are
therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T.
Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired
men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry
that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact
involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed
value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable
by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was
appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly
issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that
the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the " CA petition") for the review
of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never
disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA
petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that
the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were
received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on
April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the
present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders
by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 4 of 140
of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for
reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance
with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime
the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel
but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008
by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because
of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the
petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists
independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition.
It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an
administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order
on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly
assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows.17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful
and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA
- G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the
present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for
the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case
moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is
determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the
same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that
the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS
is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the
resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the
same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is
replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners'
act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that " the CA did not act on the petition up to
this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the
intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us
into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had
already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition,
the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The
petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before
the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that
are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently
serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the
fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and
Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the
Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation
where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the
recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute
direct contempt."20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one
(1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as
petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or
an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even
before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to
the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 5 of 140
involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced
into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery
of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite
Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts
or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation.
As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional
error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies,
for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary
character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every
petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report ;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations
are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners,
id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts
committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of
guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's
affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the
incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,
including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally
burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of
the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty
can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 6 of 140
The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing
and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that
the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon
y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer
Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y
Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry
case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and
detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of
a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with
incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon
by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later
brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on
interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the
petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism
that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear
to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish
to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more
in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry
the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the
RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators,
clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo
is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify
before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this
from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum
shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 7 of 140

amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of complained of; and
improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary
though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
"1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP
institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the
may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal
violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with
petitioners with copy of the same;
petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute
and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right
to life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however,
to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on
appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National
Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation
was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security.
The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the
control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts
made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of
drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas
data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Ass'n., I-XIII, Inc., 554 SCRA 208, G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Petitioners claim to their dwelling, assuming they still
have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right
to life, liberty and security; There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo.The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court,
which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768,
177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-
quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to
their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse
to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal
basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Same; Same; No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.The factual and legal
basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court
can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in
the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation
of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Under Section 6 of
the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face,
the court ought to issue said writ. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Ass'n., I-XIII, Inc., 554
SCRA 208, G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,
vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the
following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private
and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is
the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the
Rules the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 8 of 140
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious
land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth
these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the
"squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings,
the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous
political protges. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the
Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of
the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their
participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in
the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this
Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in
the possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for
reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme
Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present
petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely,
this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might
affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own
previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but,
only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for
the Writ of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 9 of 140

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in
this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701,
177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted
Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to
them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis
for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged
in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already
been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued
unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to
be protected.

Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition,
only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.

Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue.
The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which
shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be
issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty
and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on
matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628, G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or omissions.The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission.To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will
not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.
Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the
efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the
writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the
efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which
cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property
dispute.It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data.At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal proceedings. Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628, G.R. No. 182165 November
25, 2009
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN,
EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P.
MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA,
"TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T.
CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 10 of 140
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos,
challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a
petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses
Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which
judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to
vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province 2 and the judges who presided
over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged
before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before
Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction
to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent
events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and
executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10,
2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are
hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves
the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq.
meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ
of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting
of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province

returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report submitted to
the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of
January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before
Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for
hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been
implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their
sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container
vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,"
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC
July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they
shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally
raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the
property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, 6 and
arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February
20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by
Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged
offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going
hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006,
before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated
July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008,
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 11 of 140
February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance,
however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the
Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound,
converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of
the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police
operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the
afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm,
mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law
police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-
77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78
for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the
commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners
is declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 10 of The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the
petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in
substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on
October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the
Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or
on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights
to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement
that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and
its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety
of petitioners entry into the property.
Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 12 of 140
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners
therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed land
with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of
the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty
can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged.
The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments
implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat
to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.18(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use
of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents)
and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact,
respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. 20
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the
writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the
efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 13 of 140

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the
Joint Affidavit, viz: Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang
nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo Associate Justice
ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang
aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that
petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family,
home and correspondence.

As for respondents assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the
Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on
account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners. 22

Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008,
petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic
by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of
amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing
threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for
insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of
the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.

At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested
in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 24 of the Rules of
Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set
up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The
reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in
the criminal proceedings.25

Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
Writs of Amparo; Nature; Words and Phrases; The Writ of Amparoa protective remedy against
violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and securitydoes not deter-mine
guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or
at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance; Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts; Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparoa protective remedy
against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies,
as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsi-bility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so
that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
Same; Same; The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and
finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that
Congress may promulgate.We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to
stress that the unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations
and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard
measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read,
too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 14 of 140
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertaintythe petitioner may not be able to describe
with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance.The framers of the Amparo Rule never
intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of
a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding,
which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him
or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is
to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elementsnamely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or securityare
present.
Same; Same; Where the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a
verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement
that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.If a defect can at all be attributed to the
petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo
Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution
of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement, however,
should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict
need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the
failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to
swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot
be faulted.
Same; Same; Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petitionthat otherwise is
not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of actionas a means to fish
for evidence.These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to
the police authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state
the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally
stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very

least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition.
To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly
strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents frustrations in securing an investigation
with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations
of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing
the petition forward. Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petitionthat
otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of actionas a
means to fish for evidence. The petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify
what legally available efforts were taken by the respondent, and that there was an undue haste
in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent
immediately invoked the Courts intervention.
Same; Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances; The phenomenon of enforced
disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass
or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941; In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced
disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering
anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have disappeared during the military regime in
Argentina.The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted
notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The
Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
endangering German security; they were transported secretly to Germany where they
disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted
persons. In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to
have disappeared during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in
Latin America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread
and systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor and during
the Dirty War in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly
arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form
of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media
standardized the term disappearance to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the desaparecidos, which literally means the disappeared ones.
Same; Same; Three Different Kinds of Disappearance Cases.In general, there are three
different kinds of disappearance cases: 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without
positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again; 2) those of prisoners who
are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or
months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities
deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and
3) those of victims of salvaging who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Although the writ of amparo specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction; As the law now
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 15 of 140
stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House
of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and
resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee
instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided
the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to
carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these
criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to
enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to
act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, since
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or
private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and securitythe
legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets
in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.Even without the benefit of
directly applicable substantive laws on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however,
the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature
and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to
life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can
be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and
thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a differenceeven if only
procedurallyin a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a
hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; The Courts intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address it; The burden for the public authorities to discharge in

these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold: the first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this
Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require; and, the
second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her
liberty and security restored.Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again
that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on
our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has
taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in
these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this
Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is
to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and
security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully
addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the
production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in
the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Same; Same; International Law; From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced
disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.From the International Law
perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human
rights. It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects
their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of
the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be a double
form of torture, with doubly paralyzing impact for the victims, as they are kept ignorant of their
own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved
ones and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the
disappearance of the household breadwinner. The UN General Assembly first considered the issue
of Disappeared Persons in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed
the General Assemblys deep concern arising from reports from various parts of the world relating
to enforced or involuntary disappearances, and requested the UN Commission on Human Rights
to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making appropriate
recommendations.
Same; Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention); In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and fourteen years
later (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.In 1992, in response to the reality
that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration). This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: Deeply concerned that in
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 16 of 140
many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that
persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of
the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons
outside the protection of the law. Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Convention). The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on
February 6, 2007. Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the
purposes of this Convention, enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert
that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-
derogable.The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a
right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. It provides
that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of
war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify
enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal
law. It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a
whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and
results of the investigation. Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense,
such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention,
so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a
crime.To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country
is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence
of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore
mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through
its rule-making powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the
Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the
UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the
conventions touching on humans rights.Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its
terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a
member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified,
particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines
pledged to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental

freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion. Although no universal
agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms guaranteed to all by the Charter, it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on
enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: Any act of enforced disappearance is an
offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments
in this field. As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a
UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country,
given our own adherence to generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law
today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the
Court shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.The
most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. The material sources of custom include
State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international
organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. Sometimes referred
to as evidence of international law, these sources identify the substance and content of the
obligations of States and are indicative of the State practice and opinio juris requirements of
international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international
law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the
extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.While the
Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or
by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance
as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has
been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we
should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions
that bind us.
Same; Same; Past experiences in other jurisdictions relative to enforced disappearances show that
the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold: first, there may be a deliberate concealment of
the identities of the direct perpetrators; second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of
the disappearance is a distinct possibility; and, third is the element of denial.These difficulties
largely arise because the State itselfthe party whose involvement is allegedinvestigates
enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of
the direct perpetrators. Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually
members of the military or police forces. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 17 of 140
the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearancei.e., the corpus delicti or the victims bodyis usually concealed to effectively
thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun. The problem for
the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez
that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the States power to
destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the
State to commit the perfect crime. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State
authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. Deniability is central
to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it
easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights. Experience
shows that government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos
by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the
country, or that their names have merely been invented.
Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary
and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual
preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)reveal the
clear intent of the framers to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations; In these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs
only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as
discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence, and once a rebuttable case has
been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard
of diligence required.These characteristicsnamely, of being summary and the use of substantial
evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof
beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence requiredthe duty of public officials and
employees to observe extraordinary diligencepoint, too, to the extraordinary measures expected
in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo
petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a
rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses
based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating
authorities to appropriately respond.
Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Words and Phrases; The
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), provided the Court
its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in
administrative proceedings.The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a
valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adducedwe reduce our rules to
the most basic test of reason, i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.Velasquez stresses the lesson that
flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to
the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the
evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and
appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an
effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the
commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules
and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the
proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are
not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our
mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reasoni.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Elements
of Enforced Disappearance.The Convention defines enforced disappearance as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law. Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially
fourfold: (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by
agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of the disappeared person
outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; As a rule, minor inconsistencies indicate truthfulness rather
than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies
from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail the latter cannot but generate witnesses that
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 18 of 140
the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and
prefabricated story.Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears
clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute
the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners
point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the
respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points. We note, for example,
that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and
confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such
as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative
value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter
cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts
of a well thought of and prefabricated story. Based on these considerations and the unique
evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim
informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a
liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was in good hands
and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar
Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. The respondents
and Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim
that he had destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates
the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this lettereffectively, a
suppression of this evidenceraises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of
what the respondent claimed. For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to
the respondent to be the Kasim evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token
gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely
remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may requirethe Court has no choice but to meet the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties
demand.To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it
substantively states is to acknowledgeas the petitioners effectively suggestthat in the absence
of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal
for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Ruledespite its termsis
ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in
Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo
Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern
for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and
profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties
demand.
Same; Same; Same; In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or
details on the depth and extent of the investigation madeto be sure, reports of top police officials
indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and
meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to

search for the missing subject; Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to
come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.As the CA found through
Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a
man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared
no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of
Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of
Tagitis was a black operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of
custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual
police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top
police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute
exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities
undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed
to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
Same; Same; Same; The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations
cannot but point to the conclusion that there was government complicity in the disappearance, for
why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had
not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance?Based on these considerations,
we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the
haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and
its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they
already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least
credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that
the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, the
evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance
and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials
and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection
of the lawa situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Same; Same; Same; The Court believes and so holds that the government in general, through the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (PNP-CIDG),
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitisthe Court holds these organizations
accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal
responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires,
is applied in addressing the enforced disappearnce of Tagitis.Following the lead of this Turkish
experienceadjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has
established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this casewe believe and so hold
that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs
of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP Law, specifies the PNP as the governmental office with
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 19 of 140
the mandate to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante
(then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the investigative arm of the PNP and is mandated to
investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
those considered as heinous crimes. Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is
tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates
against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever
directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were
remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary
diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organization accountable through their
incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it
that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Same; Same; Same; The Court holds Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath
information relating to the enforced disappearance, and for the purpose of this accountability, he is
impleaded as a party to this case.We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under
oath information relating to the enforced disappearance. For the purpose of this accountability, we
order that Col. Kasim be impleadead as a party to this case. The PNP is similarly held accountable
for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could and did not provide, and, as the
entity with direct authority over Col. Kasim, is held with the same obligation of disclosure that Col.
Kasim carries. We shall deal with Col. Kasims suppression of evidence under oath when we finally
close this case under the process outlined below. Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No.
182498 December 3, 2009
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM,
PNP, Petitioners,
vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-
in-Fact, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the
petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this
is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 20 of 140

the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the
Tagitis. substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga
City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON
AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the
Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in
life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of
the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately
amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to
checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return
this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of
trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
respondents.
longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti- activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and
distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
budget.
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.9
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the
courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition
nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
Tagitis personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the
of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his
liberty and security are restored. 8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house,
and was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations was not also around and his room was closed and locked;
that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to
address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in 9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to
ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr.
Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress,

Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the
room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB
scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities
in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by
the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong
reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible
officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the
office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the
information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the
hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with
the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondents]
request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that
her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good
time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners] refusal to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr.
Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 21 of 140
whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so
much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM
Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including
[those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses
for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial
help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these
police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but
assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondents] request for
help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance
in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007
which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical
possession and custody of [respondents] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the
[petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects
human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case
for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within
seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or
at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not
have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had
been designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK
FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task
Force, inter alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case conferences,
rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following summary:13

xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a
report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said
report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in
the morning and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was
only after a few days when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to
Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace
and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is
still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of
the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director,
CIDG. The said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education
Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga,
Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 oclock
in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty
Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 oclock in the morning of
the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for
Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about
10:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as
stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student
instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis,
but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a
continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to
find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP
Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search,
records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or
divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and
actions available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant
case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the
PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the
perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also
attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused
the following:14
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 22 of 140
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this
Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on
October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around six oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was
assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was
also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic]
Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six
oclock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft
ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension
house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found
anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the
police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case
of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the
government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no
such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic]
alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will
pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas
affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged
abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a
matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by
elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of
ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP
intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.

That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or
eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our
society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after
kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is
anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER
Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the
subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related
to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person
or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES
JR., to submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination
with Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police
Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the
instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in
the instant case are brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just
issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also
submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis
disappearance, viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the
incident;
xxxx
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 23 of 140
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me
through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30
p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the
Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced
Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member
of the Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible
abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student
scholar, was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express,
however, when the student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis
there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts
[sic], the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on
October 30, 2007 around 1 oclock p.m. and never returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu
Police Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct
investigation [sic] to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the
disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning
his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and
apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought
before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division,
I have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD
Sulu PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD
Sulu PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our
series of directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive
coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in
order to secure corroborative statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of
said personality;

d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to
maximize efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the
cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary,
for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all
clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting
assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis
considering that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report
regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct
investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the
circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-
10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still
monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police
Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of
the facts of the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for
Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but
our office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and
coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 24 of 140
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so
far taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the
area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head
TASK FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE
TAGITIS was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As
planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second
hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing
would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and
other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence
report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible
motive for Tagitis disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn
affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of
Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB
Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly
taken and carried away more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted
to his [personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
which [was] intended for the IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular
inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG,
while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied
any knowledge or complicity in any abduction. 25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he
had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their
respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in
Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area
had no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr.
Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the
Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal
account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it
could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the
scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the
coordinator of said program.

20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive
behind the disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his
personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well
as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a
professional jealousy among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and
dismissed considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are
exerting their efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence
monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our
office, in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and
religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to
be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds:28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have
been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for
the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to
all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL
GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr.
Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since
the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when
battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on
January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the
missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis claim that they already had an
"all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How
could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM
was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated post. Yet,
P/Supt KASIMs subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioners unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par.
15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts subpoena
and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the
CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 25 of 140
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she
went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from
Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her
information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the
petition."29 This friend also told her that her husband "[was] in good hands." 30 The respondent also
testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch
Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced
Tagitis."31 The respondent recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met
Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were
then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer
Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial
investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second
wife, and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife.33 She
last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text
messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007
when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her
father since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent
explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to
report her husbands disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that
her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phones battery did not have
enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phones battery. 36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found
in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in
Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other
people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental,
when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan,
Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with
people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told
Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the
Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his medication. 38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the
respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col.
Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her
meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight
from Davao City is 9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00

oclock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to
West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got
information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all
information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of
the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his
daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his
condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After
the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied
us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I
were discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes
last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the
whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the
groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact
location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did
not give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana
ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was
thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the
reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me
that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced
Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet
Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be
abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the
military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately
called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me
gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied
me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a
short conversation. And he assured me that hell do the best he can to help me find my husband.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 26 of 140
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time
that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with]
different terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a
certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a
supplier. These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond
paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He
assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial
investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he
recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to
corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with
the information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the
respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there
was a report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone,
which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007. 43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together
with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk
to Col. Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis.
Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was
with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based
on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because
he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January
2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos
of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give
a copy of the report because it was a "raw report." 45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not
tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof.,
lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit
indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money
entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail
report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking

assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal
account.54
On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008
affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that
although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of [its] contents." 56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the
respondents testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the
custody of either the military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by
the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of
medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the
military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is
"probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that
the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the
custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was
merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and
"follow-up" as to its veracity.60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given
to him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as
"unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for
reading by others.62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the
respondent and her companions because "it was not important to him" and also because the
information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. 63He explained
that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information regarding the
whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his abduction. 64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior
Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents
allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the
CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all
cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous
crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in
the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu
before or after Tagitis reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel
assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only
assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation. 68 He denied that his office
conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latters disappearance. 69 Col. Pante further
testified that his investigation of Tagitis disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was
"still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 27 of 140
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed
the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case
qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on
the respondents testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the
information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis abduction came
from no less than the military an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied
on the "raw report" from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the CIDGs involvement in Tagitis
abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence
world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement
that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous
brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money
entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that
he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that
Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the
respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim
faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry
the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the
ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and
the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for
payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task
Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo
A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time,
the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander
Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was
involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute
the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of
the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to
life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the

conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for
the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition by substantial evidence.74
THE COURTS RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the
petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life,
liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondents source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their
consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody
over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their
duties in the investigation of Tagitis disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of
her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in
terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 28 of 140
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the
pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In
this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The
petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts,
to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action,
and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under
which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was
nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7,
in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were
the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and
security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of
burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the
respondents police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP
Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge
about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the
failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as
well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure
in its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as
required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for
the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants
direct testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the
petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully
cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings
held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must
have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this
requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public
authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section
5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong
and his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo,
Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however,
gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or
other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition
that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of
"an intriguing tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman."
The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the
ARMM, followed by the respondents personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her
petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police
authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the
manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated
the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least,
their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To
require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict
interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents frustrations in securing an investigation with
meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of
the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the
petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not
supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to "fish" for
evidence.81 The petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify what "legally
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 29 of 140
available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing
of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked
the Courts intervention.
We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege
"the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of
the respondents petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she
encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his
early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the
knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB
scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities
in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by
the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported
the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their
friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being

held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with
the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and
in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondents]
request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the
police headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which
entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings
[sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions
of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present
time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect
and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners],
their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is
sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its
consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this
Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and
enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf
Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reichs
Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering
German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 30 of 140
trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government
officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons. 83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging
the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
"disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin
America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor84 and during the
Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly
arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form
of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media
standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared
ones."87 In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the
arresting agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in
complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually
reappear in one detention center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855
cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595
remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon
C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when
only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada
yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of
March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance
under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights
records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this
number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering
the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008. 92
Enforced Disappearances
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 31 of 140

Under Philippine Law constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts
disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights,
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public
disappearance:94 authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious,
judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the
very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific
violations of constitutional rights.
definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can
proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any
issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and
that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our
enforced disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these
intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept
responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So well have to agree
remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under
among ourselves about the nature of killings and disappearances for instance, in other
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts
efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the disappearances
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that
which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So, again we
are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed
need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
Representatives96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and
Enforced Disappearance
resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee
Under International Law
instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided
the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts.98 From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a
flagrant violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of
the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are
regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances
not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
have been said to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the
special laws.99 The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and
determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts
poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under
the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure.
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978
under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
from "reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances,"
enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own
and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced
constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations." 103

In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had
become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time,
provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances
occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized
groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such
persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention).105 The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6,
2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to
be subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no
one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify
enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal
law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a
whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and
results of the investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense,
such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not
yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a
specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore
mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 32 of 140
life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through
its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on
Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and
by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans
rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex,
language or religion."112 Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent
of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN
itself that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: 114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed
and developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN
Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given
our own adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III,116 we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis
supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or
customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis
in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 118 The material sources
of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions,
recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the
practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General
Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify the
substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and
"opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States
(OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of
Persons in June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or
tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of
individual guarantees."123 One of the key provisions includes the States obligation to enact the
crime of forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction
over such cases when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a
national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed
to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties
to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have
defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing
with the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
however, has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying
rights affected by enforced disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life;
Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6,
paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading
example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v.
Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared
person when the applicants son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in
the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared
persons mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the
authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the
lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of
customary international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law:
The Third,128 which provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy,
it practices, encourages, or condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals."129 We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close identification with
enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on torture had attained the status
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 33 of 140
of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations,
as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of
member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that
they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N.
Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable
for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated."
Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits
into the dichotomy of binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an
authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an
expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a
declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."
Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto,
a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a
State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7
(prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to
liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against
humanity.131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against
humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the
Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and
hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in
Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 134 In addition, the
implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number
of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance.135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance
as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is
now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law
of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the
international conventions that bind us.

The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR
and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed
in the course of a disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
[Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective
remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR
violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights,
States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate
those rights The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate
judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 34 of 140
law Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to
investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and
impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an
essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure
to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and
of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant
rights, States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to
investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise
to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations
recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced
disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these
violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing
element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of
persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As
the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the
State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative
of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by
the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not
only as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition

of a positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following
ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that
individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason,
Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against
the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim
that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court
made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled
through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards
on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo
Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the
Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts
note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces,
thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of
governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program
are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are
generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary
credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take
their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture
without fear of judicial or other controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually
afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 35 of 140
have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we
acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility;
the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims
body is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of
one that may have begun.145 The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of
access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the
landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is
the deliberate use of the States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the
concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime. 147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.149 Experience shows that
government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by saying
that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the country,
or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form
or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the
degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the
required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule
to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing
Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees
to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the
protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must
then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on
the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first
opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative
proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides
that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion
of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we
recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard
regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We
said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 36 of 140
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis
supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique
difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which
difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its
objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and
responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie
every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence
that the government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a
relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental
responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general
practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice. 154 The
IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove
that an individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether
testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in
reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long
as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of
disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all
information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents
who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including
the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velsquez, the victims sister, who described Manfredos
kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by
men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military
official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under
orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony
of a second witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the
disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who
identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that
enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of
evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be

arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights
and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is
addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our
evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases;
precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we
must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible
if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the
most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel
in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the
admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse
in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-
examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in
light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability
of the child witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case
under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence,
including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the
meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 159 Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: 160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 37 of 140
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis
supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at
hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with
the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from
all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected
the causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or
arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga
custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG
Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col.
Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis
was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis
was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent
but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent,
together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant
portions of the respondents testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my
husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
"parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly
confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, maam.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 38 of 140

Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation? A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
A: Yes, maam. location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report? He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case.
A: Yes, maam. He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report? he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is
a military report, maam. also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked
Q: But you were able to read the contents? him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam. told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim? Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was
A: There were three of us, maam. it in the computer or what?
Q: Who were your companions? A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but Im
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam.162 certain that it was typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
xxxx Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
do? xxxx
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
"Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, maam."163 A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was
xxxx reading to us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in supplied]166
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided
because I know that they would deny it, maam.164 them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the
husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz: custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely
a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with
veracity.167
you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners
Q: Only the two of you?
pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
her that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is
Q: Who were they? allegedly parang liason ng J.I." The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir. certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time? whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir. officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military."
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir. Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the
Q: The four of you? petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the
A: Yes, sir. respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time? than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs.
Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that these

witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion
between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these
indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value,
in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but
generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well
thought of and prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance
cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based
on the informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under
surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for
complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies
cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his
informants letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties conflicting
claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence
raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to
be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of
direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government
participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in
this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by
the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use
of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis
custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs.
Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand (the informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively
states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct
evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this
reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as
it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo
situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was
not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and
profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties
demand.1avvphi1
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 39 of 140
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez,
we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of
every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine
whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis
and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was
reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who
attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated
by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he
arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A
colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken
funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis
of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in
locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. Other than these pieces of
evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of
Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo
petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available
direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived
in Jolo and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above
aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police
investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings
into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent,
characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that
Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No
evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why
the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer
that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that
this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry
with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes.
Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story,
however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or
abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more
significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with
Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin

mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies
participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this
information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then
PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional
Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the
open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions
with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts."
PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after
searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis
. . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained
in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina
and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their
affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search
for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task
Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns
on the writ were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the
previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took
money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG
consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis
to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis;
he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his
custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation about
the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background
and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged
custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged
IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in
investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA
findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that
the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial
because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirims
replacement in the latters last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation
even an internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims
"asset" and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments
denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col.
Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he
ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism.
Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the governments dismissive
approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 40 of 140
initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself
reported and inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the
authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and
reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching
for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious,
if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially
unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not
be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record
contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be
sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative
reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from
the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent
but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For
why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had
not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the
governments cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the
evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of
enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration,
heretofore cited and quoted,173 the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the
fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent
and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively
placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international
enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run
very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that
case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap
Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government
of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations
of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and
security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes
apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the
Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the
apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred
him to another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the
apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his

version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of
gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest
and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of being a
leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps
enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the
Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this
case we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known
as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate
and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9)
testified, is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all
cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous
crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major
crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups,
unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by
assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were
remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully
enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed
at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of
their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these
investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its
consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as
further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative
efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations,
copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1)
full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of
this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for
lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the
following terms:
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 41 of 140
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with
the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given
to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the
Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of
contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute
less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of
this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant
circumstances, these directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are
specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 42 of 140

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
Writ of Amparo; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; The doctrine of command responsibility is a
rule of substantive law that establishes liability and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis
to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition; The doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.It
must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-
respondent in an amparo petition. The case of Rub-rico v. Arroyo (613 SCRA 233 [2010]), which
was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed
that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
Same; Same; The doctrine is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case
rather than in a summary amparo proceeding; The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the
nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence; Commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command
responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.It must
be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders
on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
In Razon v. Tagitis (606 SCRA 598 [2009]), the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility
and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo
proceeding.
Same; Same; In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances
as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators; Direct evidence of identity when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity.In Amparo proceedings, the weight that
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 43 of 140
may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly
proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the
former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly
and directly ascertain.
Same; Same; An order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability.To the mind of this
Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the
petitioner. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The
order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
Same; Same; Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property rights.But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying
the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is
already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by
the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ,
clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
Same; Same; Inspection Order; An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision.An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim
of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the
Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision,
it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting
allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown
above, petitioner failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner
are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an
inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the

right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates
to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner
failed to do. Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY
GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision,
the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the
return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no
evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner,
said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who
are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her
family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion
as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled
in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion,
petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz,
Tarlac for a future medical mission.7
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 44 of 140
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external
hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo
(Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of
someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied
her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc,
already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her
name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17The van then sped
away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered
to alight.19After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its
metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and
landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of
Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to
"the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating
the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during
which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a
few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings. 28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of
her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon
City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.37Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of
her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as
respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or
even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of
detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be
ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not
limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es
prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the
records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa
Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner
her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. 41 The Resolution also
directed the respondents to file their verified written return. 42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs43 on behalf
of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In
support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo,
as contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and
his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 45 of 140
distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way
of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner
and her companions themselves.48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her
claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted
that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her
wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein.
Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a
charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time,
bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents
insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a)
as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity
from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of
any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the
commission of such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the
truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the
government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of
19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police
Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting
on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner
Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house.57 Mr.
Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and was
perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other
witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an
unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59

At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was
transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy
Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police
Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time,
pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional
Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN
(Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the
victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and,
ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with
Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by
petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing
investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of
the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the
abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her
fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing
him and the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a
Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among
others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in
the abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP
Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General
Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to
cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74
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For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen.
Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing
the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated"
and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. 78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The
appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her
affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that
the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded
speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they
were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the
petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very
injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was
handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was
released.83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the
failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus,
the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the
public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records
from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives
Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner
participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video
came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court
of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating
that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of
the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this end, the

appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents
to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military
or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the
Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture
of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same
fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A. Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from
any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the
part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. 96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her
amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-
respondent in an amparo petition.100
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 47 of 140
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws
of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is
made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it
is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an
enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by
so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil
or administrative under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary
of National Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the
basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to
wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading
the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her
assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who
were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces. 112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she
was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard
while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the
present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the
involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence
based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 48 of 140
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and
hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the
cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind
of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the
police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained
and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to
take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they
were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to
reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners
claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed
with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and
torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason
used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been

fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact
that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric
of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. 119 Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of
property rights.
B.The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the
military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would
be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule
in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused
by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the
Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision,
it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting
allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown
above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture."
Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting
the grant.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 49 of 140
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege
of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of
Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another,
to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing
acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public,
Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by
persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or
veracity certainly violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We,
thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ operates to protect a
persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is
the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to
do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of

investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence,
clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows
that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain
from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being
kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any
form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can
guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction
and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to
its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights,"128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture,
may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government
itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to
investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the
"evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the
"respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 50 of 140
the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that
effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same
time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to
ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims
is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly
outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the
petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of
her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in
their investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would
have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the
formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other
means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence
before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that
must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the
Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to
explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the
victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any
attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of
the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included
in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of,
and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction
and torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be
unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation
under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write
finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 51 of 140

because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this
perpetrators before the bar of justice. decision.

To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner
upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust 1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal
and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings belongings;
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention
promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus,
areas of Fort Magsaysay.
vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to
any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under
the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
abduction and torture. petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor,
petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the
relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports
a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and
of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
existing laws.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this
be determined by this Court.
case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of
reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b)
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of
to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or
Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 52 of 140

visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the

CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting
under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the
public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO
AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for
any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Burgos vs. Esperon Jr., 715 SCRA 208, G.R. No. 183713 February 4, 2014
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; As the Supreme Court held in
Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the writ of amparo merely embodies the Courts
directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual.We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted
above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As
we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the writ merely embodies the Courts
directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It
is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and
remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the
tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of
Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek
to achieve. In Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, we defined what the terms responsibility and accountability
signify in an Amparo case. We said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Account-ability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court emphasized that its role in a writ of amparo proceeding is
merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is
merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in
the present case with the CAs final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for
the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga.
At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of
the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us. Burgos vs. Esperon Jr., 715 SCRA 208, G.R. No.
183713 February 4, 2014
G.R. No. 183711 July 5, 2011
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183712
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 53 of 140
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, LT. COL. NOEL
CLEMENT, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183713
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; Chief of the Philippine
National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We review,1 in light of the latest developments in this case, the decision2 dated July 17, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated petitions for Habeas Corpus, 3 Contempt4 and Writ of
Amparo5 filed by Edita T. Burgos (petitioner). The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare the
respondents in Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. 6
On June 22, 2010, we issued a Resolution7 referring the present case to the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the
investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the
obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We found the referral
necessary as the investigation by the PNP-CIDG, by the AFP Provost Marshal, and even by the CHR
had been less than complete; for one, there were very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview
of eyewitnesses to the abduction.8 We held:
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude
that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation
into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the
performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation - among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two
(one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses
to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly
involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana
Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No
search and certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other

branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no
significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the
cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State
Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the
present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to
inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA
DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate
whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and
whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding
that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its
representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ
for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG,
the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights ( CHR) have been less than
complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
Following the CHRs legal mandate, we gave the Commission the following specific directives: 9
(a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the
two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts;
(b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the
persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of
Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco
(Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP;
further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue
the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible
abductors;
(c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a
certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG;
(d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the
identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and
(e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be
necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 54 of 140
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CAs dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for
the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as
President to immunity from suit.10
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010
Resolution.11 In this Report, the CHR recounted the investigations undertaken, whose pertinent
details we quote below:
On June 26, 2010, the CHR issued Resolution CHR IV No. A2010-100 to intensify the investigation
of the case of the Burgos enforced disappearance; and for this purpose, created a Special
Investigation Teamheaded by Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag.
xxx
In compliance with the directive mentioned in the above-quoted En Banc Resolution of the
Supreme Court, the Team conducted field investigations by: (1) interviewing a) civilian authorities
involved in the first investigation of the instant case; b) military men under detention for alleged
violations of Articles of War; c) Security Officers of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City; d) two (2) of the three (3) CIDG witnesses; e) two (2) eyewitnesses who described to
the police sketch artist two (2) faces of a male and female abductors of Jonas Burgos; f) Rebel-
Returnees (RRs); g) officers and men in the military and police service; h) local officials and other
government functionaries; and i) ordinary citizens; (2) inquiring into the veracity of CIDG witnesses
Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of
the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (3) securing case records from the prosecution service and courts
of law; (4) visiting military and police units. Offices, camps, detention centers, and jails and
requesting copies of documents and records in their possession that are relevant to the instant
case; (5) searching for and interviewing witnesses and informants; and (6) pursuing leads provided
by them.
S. Emails "Star-Struck"
38. Pursuing the lead mentioned in the anonymous e-mail, which was attached to the Burgos
petition as Exhibit "J", "that the team leader (T.L.) in the Jonas Burgos abduction was a certain
Army Captain, (promotable to Major), a good looking guy (tisoy), and a potential showbiz
personality known otherwise as Captain Star-struck," the Team requested the CHR Clearance
Section, Legal Division for any information leading to T.L. or to all Philippine Army applicants for
CHR clearance whose ranks are Captains or Majors promoted during the years 2007 to 2009.
39. Sometime in November 2010, the Team was able to track down one CHR clearance-applicant
who most likely possesses and/or matches the information provided in the said lead. But when his
photo/picture was presented to the eyewitnesses, they failed to identify him.

40. Undaunted with the negative identification, the Team suspected that the "team leader" might
not have participated in the actual abduction inside Hapag Kainan Restaurant, the scene of the
crime, but most probably was in one of the "three cars" allegedly used during the operation while
giving orders or commanding the actual abductors.
41. In relation to the above suspicion, the Team has theorized that officers below the rank of
Captain might have perpetrated the actual abduction.
42. The Team explored this possibility and focused its attention on the officers of the 7th ID, PA,
namely: Lt. Vicente O. Dagdag, Jr., the S-4 of 65 IB who executed an affidavit relative to the
alleged stolen Plate No. TAB-194; 2Lt. Rey B. Dequito of 56th IB, the witness against Edmond Dag-
Uamn for the alleged crime of murder; and 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Team Leader with the 56th
IB who issued a Custody Receipt in connection with the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in Angeles
City relative to the 2006 Emerito Lipio abduction case against the police and military personnel.
T. Face-book account
43. Google search of the names of the above mentioned individuals yielded negative result except
for 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, whose name was connected to a social networking site, the Face-book
account of PMA BATCH SANGHAYA 2000.
44. In the Facebook account Sanghaya, the contents of which is categorized as "PUBLIC" or open
to public viewing, it appears that "Malik" Tayaban is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Batch Sanghaya of 2000. Other leads were also discovered, such as the following:
vernacular description of "tisoy" which was mentioned by one of the users in the "comment
portion" of the account which incidentally was also mentioned in the anonymous e-mail as the
"team leader" (T.L.); the picture of a man sporting a "back-pack", which was also mentioned by
witness Elsa. Per Elsas account, the person in the cartographic sketch was wearing a "back-pack."
45. Aware of the intricacies of the above-mentioned leads, the Team caused the reproduction of all
pictures in the Facebook account for future reference; and requested the NBI (Burgos) Team for a
copy of the PMA Sanghaya Batch 2000 Year Book, also for future reference.
U. The PMA Year Book
46. Through the efforts of the NBI (Burgos) Team, the Team was able to get the PMA Year Book of
Sanghaya Batch 2000 and the location of one important eyewitness in the abduction.
V. JEFFREY CABINTOY
47. On December 1, 2010, the Team together with the NBI Team were able to locate Jeffrey
Cabintoy (Jeffrey), one of the two (2) eyewitnesses who provided the police cartographic artist
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 55 of 140
with the description of two (2) principal abductors of Jonas Burgos. Jeffrey narrated in details (sic)
the circumstances that happened before and during the abduction.
48. On December 7, 2010, the Team and Jeffrey went to the place of incident at Ever Gotesco Mall,
Quezon City to refresh his memory and re-enact what transpired. In the afternoon of the same
date, the Team invited Jeffrey to the CHR Central Office in Quezon City, where he was shown for
identification twenty (20) copies of colored photographs/pictures of men and the almost two
hundred forty-four (244) photographs/pictures stored in the computer and lifted from the profiles
of the Philippine Military Academy Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000.
49. Jeffrey pointed to a man in the two (2) colored group pictures/photographs, that he identified
as among the 8-man group who abducted Jonas Burgos. For record and identification purposes,
the Team encircled the face that Jeffrey identified in the two pictures; then he affixed his signature
on each picture. Also, while leafing through the pictures of the PMA graduates in the Year Book of
Sanghaya 2000 Batch, the witness identified a picture, with a bold and all-capitalized name HARRY
AGAGEN BALIAGA JR and the words Agawa, Besao, Mt. Province printed there under the
capitalized words PHILIPPINE ARMY written on the upper portion, as the same person he pointed
out in the two group pictures just mentioned above. Immediately thereafter, the Team caused the
production of the photo identified by Jeffrey and asked him to affix his signature, which he also
did.
50. After examining each of these pictures, Jeffrey declared that it dawned on him that based on
his recollection of faces involved in the abduction of Jonas Burgos, he now remembers the face of
a man, other than the two (2) faces whose description he already provided before to a police
sketch artist, who was part of the 8-man group of abductors. And he also confirms it now that the
person he is referring to was indeed seen by him as one of those who abducted Jonas Burgos at
Hapag Kainan Restaurant of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
51. When asked how certain he was of the person he identified, considering that the printed copy
of the photo lifted from the Face-book Sanghaya Account was taken sometime in the year 2010;
while the picture appearing in the computer was lifted from the PMA Sanghaya 2000 Batch Year
Book, Jeffrey replied "Ang taong ito ay aking natatandaan sa kadahilanan na nuong una siya ay
nakaupo na katabi sa bandang kaliwa nang taong dumukot at natapos silang mag usap lumapit sa
akin at pilit akong pinipigilan na wag daw makialam at ang sabi nya sa akin ay "WAG KA DITONG
MAKIALAM KASI ANG TAONG ITO AY MATAGAL NA NAMING SINUSUBAYBAYAN DAHIL SA DROGA"
kahit pa halos nagmamakaawa na nang tulong ang taong dinukot; at matapos nuon ay sapilitan na
nilang binitbit sa labas ang biktima." ( I remember this man for the reason that at first he was
seated at the left side of the person abducted; and after they talked, he approached me and was
preventing me forcefully saying not to interfere and he said to me: "DONT YOU INTERFERE HERE
SINCE WE HAVE BEEN DOING SOME SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MAN FOR SOME TIME ALREADY
BECAUSE OF DRUGS" despite that the man was already pleading for help, and after that, they
forcibly dragged the victim outside.)

52. When asked if he could identify the picture of Jonas Burgos, Jeffrey affirmed that the person in
the picture is the person referred to by him as the victim of abduction and his name is Jonas
Burgos. He further stated that he learned of the victims name when he saw his picture flashed on
TV and hear his name. When asked if he is willing to execute an affidavit on the facts that he has
just provided, he answered yes and at that juncture the Team assisted him in the preparation of
his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" based on his personal knowledge and in a language known to him.
After which, the Team asked Jeffrey to read, examine and determine whether all the information
he just provided are reflected in his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and Jeffrey answered yes. Thereafter,
Jeffrey affixed his signature after being sworn to before a lady CHR lawyer and a duly
commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City.
W. Daguman confirmed Tayabans and Baliagas actual affiliation with the military and their
assignment at the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th ID
53. On December 10, 2010, the Team went to the Bulacan Provincial Jail to visit Edmond Dag-
Uman and asked him to identify his former Company Commander at the 56th IB, 71 ID, Lt. Usmalik
Tayaban and to identify the pictures.
54. Edmond Dag-uman identified the encircled in the picture as LT. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR., and
the man with a receding hair as LT. USMALIK TAYABAN, his former Company Commander.
55. When asked if he was willing to reduce in writing his precious statements and those that just
mentioned, he replied "BAKA MAPAHAMAK AKO NYAN! (That might endanger me!). Following a
lengthy discussion on the pros and cons of executing a sworn statement and the assurance of the
Team to exclude his statements that are critical to the military establishment, it dawned on Dag-
uman that his statement would be of help to the Commission in bringing his case to the proper
authorities for review and appropriate action, that he eventually expressed his willingness to do so.
56. After which the Team immediately went to a "Computer Caf" nearby to encode the "Salaysay",
then the printed copy was presented to him for his determination whether he is in full accord with
the contents therein. Edmond spent about thirty (30) minutes reading it and changed the word
"Charlie" to "Bravo" and then affixed his initial on it. He also signed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
after being sworn to before a team member authorized to administer oath.
X. Second visit to ELSA AGASANG and her Supplemental Sworn Statement
57. On January 26, 2011, the Team along with witness Jeffrey went to Bicol to meet witness Elsa.
The aim was to help Elsa recall the faces of those she saw in the abduction by showing to her
recently-acquired pictures of suspects.
58. For the first time they would re-unite, after almost four years since that fateful day of April 28,
2007, when both of them had the experience of witnessing an abduction incident, which rendered
them jobless and unsafe.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 56 of 140
59. The Team told Jeffrey to sit in front of Elsa without introducing him to her. After about half an
hour into the conversation, she expressed disbelief when she realized that she was facing in person
he co-worker that she knew very well.
60. On January 29, 2011, Elsa executed her Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay affirming her
Salaysay given before PCI Lino DL Banaag at the CIDU, Quezon City Police District Office, Camp
Karingal, Quezon City; and corroborating the material allegations contained in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Jeffrey.
On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR submitted the following findings: 12
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life
liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible
abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
xxxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who
at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at
Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the
cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures
in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years
thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-
uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Dagumans Sinumpaang
Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company Commander in the 56th IB while
he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th
IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and
brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp.
The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass
unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight
they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide
their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.

Moreover, when the Team asked how Jeffrey how certain was he that it was indeed Baliaga that he
saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas abduction, Jeffrey was able to give a
graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the incident, including
the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and
prevented him from interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the
female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her
identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the Team
that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were
involved in counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the
battalion from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozadas
involvement in counter-insurgency operations together with Lt. Fernando was among the facts
gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated
August 13, 2008.
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is
otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military
elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents does
not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would
be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in
the disputable presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."
(Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on
Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested
documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two
abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one of the intelligence operatives
involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A.
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG
witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliagas true identity and affiliation with the military
have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper
Dag-uman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance
of Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution.
Of particular importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in the
cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza
Concepcion-Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @
Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and Attempted Murder was
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 57 of 140
dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army man of the 56th IB to testify against
him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice
(UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was
among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament,
Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down
the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so-called "Erap 5" abduction on the
ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated
September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts
cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the
same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the "Erap 5" on its own time and
authority as an independent body.
Based on the above-cited findings, the CHR submitted the following recommendations for the
Courts consideration, viz:13
i. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ), subject to certain requirements, to immediately admit witnesses
Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program under Republic Act
No. 6981;
ii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ) to commence the filing of Criminal Charges for Kidnapping/Enforced
Disappearance and/or Arbitrary Detention against 1LT. HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. of the Philippine Army, as
Principal by Direct Participation in the abduction of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos on April 28, 2007 from Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City;
iii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to cause the filing of Obstruction of Justice against Emerito Lipio y Gonzales;
Marlon Manuel y de Leon; and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes for giving false or fabricated information to the CIDG and for
their willful refusal to cooperate with the CHR Team in the investigation of the herein enforced disappearance;
iv. To DIRECT Cavite Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco to appear before the Supreme Court and to divulge his
source/informant as the same does not fall under the privilege communication rule;
v. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG RC, NCRCIDU, Atty. Joel Napoleon M. Coronel, to explain his Memorandum to the CIDG-
CIDD stating that "the witnesses were reportedly turned over by the Bulacan PPO and Philippine Army to the CIDG for
investigation," considering that said witnesses were not under police or military custody at the time of the supposed
turn-over in the evening of August 22, 2007 and to identify the PNP officer who directed the CIDG operatives to fetch
Emerito G. Lipio in Bulacan and the two other CIDG witnesses for tactical interrogation;
vi. To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of
Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army) and three (3) other enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the

Supreme Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt.
Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; (b) copies of
the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives
involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and individual
pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and
the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their
corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any;
vii. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to comply with its mandate under paragraph (3) of the dispositive portion of the
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution promulgated on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases;
viii. To DIRECT Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., the Philippine Armys 56th Infantry Battalion in Bulacan and 7th Infantry Division
at Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija to produce the living body of the victim Jonas Joseph T. Burgos before this
Court;
ix. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review and determine the probable liability/accountability of the officers
and enlisted personnel concerned of the Philippine Armys 56th IB and the 7th ID, relative to the torture and/or other
forms of ill-treatment of Edmond M. Dag-uman, while he was in detention at Fort Magsaysay sometime in October
2005, as part of the collateral discoveries in the conduct of this investigation;
x. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review the case filed against Edmond Dag-uman alias DELFIN DE GUZMAN
with the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 in Malolos City docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1844-M-2005 and 186-M-
2006; and the legal basis, if any, for his continued detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail in Malolos City; and
xi. To DIRECT the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to study the probable liability of Adelio A.
Asuncion, former Jail Warden of Bulacan Provincial Jail for his failure to account the records of the inmates more
specifically the records of turn-over Edmond Dag-uman from the 7th ID.
Pursuant to our June 22, 2010, the CHR furnished the petitioner with the copy of its report, which
the petitioner apparently relied upon in filing a criminal complaint against Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr.
and other members of the military.14
OUR RULING
A. Amparo
After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our findings in our June 22,
2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga,
Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the
abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect
of the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present
Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report within a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution. The CA shall continue with the hearing
of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it already
conducted and the subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter,
the CA shall rule on the merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Baliaga
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 58 of 140
be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This directive to
implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others
whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations.
We also note that Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) failed and/or refused to provide the
CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby disobeyed our June 22,
2010 Resolution. To recall, we issued a Resolution declaring the CHR as the Courts directly
commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas abduction and the
gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to
this Court. In this same Resolution, we required the then incumbent Chiefs of the AFP and the PNP
to make available and to provide copies to the CHR, of all documents and records in their
possession and as the CHR may require, relevant to the case of Jonas, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
In its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR recommended, for the Courts consideration:15
vi. To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of
documents relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and
Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other
enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En
Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt.
Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to
2007; (b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the
complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including
their respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the
officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry
Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the
said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and
the cases filed against them, if any.
Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who otherwise disobeys or
resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished for contempt, viz:
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a
return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful
process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or
imposed a fine
Acting on the CHRs recommendation and based on the above considerations, we resolve to require
General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our
June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP,16 to show cause and explain,

within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should
not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
B. Habeas Corpus
In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively
identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest
of justice, we resolve to set aside the CAs dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew
the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer
the writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839).
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus
petition and require him together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent
Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time of
the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano to produce the person of Jonas and to show cause
why he should not be released from detention.
The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in light of the evidence previously
submitted to it, the proceedings already conducted, and the subsequent developments in this case
(particularly the CHR report) as proven by evidence properly adduced before it. The Court of
Appeals and the parties may require Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund Dag-
uman, Melissa Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon Manuel to testify in this case.
C. Petition for Contempt
In dismissing the petition, the CA held:17
Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view thereof, the rules in
criminal prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents constitutional rights inevitably come
into play. As held in People v. Godoy:
In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioners allegations, said
circumstantial evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that is required to establish the guilt
of an accused in a criminal proceeding, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas Corpus
proceeding, is Section 16, Rule 102, which provides:
Sec. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. - A clerk of a court who
refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 59 of 140
writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the
command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf
of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand
therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the
sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, and may also be punished by
the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied]
In Montenegro v. Montenegro,18 we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to
create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as
"disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." 7 The power
to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts;
and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
xxx
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of
the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of
the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was
made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
[emphasis supplied]
We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of the charge filed
by the petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the
charge of filing a false return constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to
mislead, impede and obstruct the administration of justice by the Court. In People v.
Godoy,19 which the CA cited, we specifically held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the
elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either
proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary
nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that the strict rules
that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; that the accused is
afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings under
statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.20

Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed
innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.21 The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more
likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and
moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon it.22
For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing false
returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces
of evidence on record as of the time of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not
provide a direct link between the respondents and the abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had a hand in the abduction of Jonas, and
consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their returns to the Writ of habeas corpus
denying custody of Jonas.
However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative findings
presented to us by the CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a
twist to our otherwise clear conclusion. Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of
Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and these investigations may
yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only
conclude that the CAs dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e., without
prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step warranted
by the evidence in the proceedings related to Jonass disappearance, including the criminal
prosecutions that may transpire.
To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly
identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with
our directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Director
General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case
without need of naming their current incumbents, separately from the then incumbent officials that
the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for possible responsibility
and accountability.
In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the
longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines, she should now be dropped as a party-
respondent in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to:
I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 60 of 140
a. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that decided the habeas
corpus petition;
b. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No.
183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the
Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding
Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of the
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the
person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe,
and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be released from detention;
c. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals
which shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have been filed and
render a new decision within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted for decision; and
d. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from the original
respondents impleaded in the petition, and the dropping or deletion of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent.
II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioners petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
100230, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by
the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-
respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against her.
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No.
183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose
identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings;
h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.1avvphil
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 61 of 140

i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy SO ORDERED.
Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then
Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within ARTURO D. BRION
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they Associate Justice
should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010
Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by the CHR,
particularly:

1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt. Aron
Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly assigned with Military
Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency
operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;

2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City
and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert
military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and
individual pictures; and

3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th
Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30,
2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and pictures;
including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps
and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports
and the cases filed against them, if any.

These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to
determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public
disclosure.

j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in representation of their
respective organizations, separately from the original respondents impleaded in the
petition; and the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;

k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice
for admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and

l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may
investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.

Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA 650, G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; None is more well-settled than the rule that
jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred by law.None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and
authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the
nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall
exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on
any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.A.O. No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the
Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority.
These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where
an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or
tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. It also cannot be delegated to
another office or agency of the Government. Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states
that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned
for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Continuing Mandamus; The concept of continuing mandamus was first
introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
574 SCRA 661 (2008); Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in
form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright.The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008). Now cast in
stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than
that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take
further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned,
however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an
exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of
the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Same; Same; Same; On matters of form, the petition for continuing mandamus must be verified
and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is
also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 62 of 140
hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an
actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the
issuance of the writ.On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary
that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates
that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect
or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ,
viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the
act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined
by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4)
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed
of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law. The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein.The writ of
continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of
an act specifically enjoined by law. The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final
judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing
mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued
by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or
officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing
compliance with a final judgment as it permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in
order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts
decision.Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the
case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law
and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final
judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
courts decision.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect
such that the case should be dismissed.Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just
required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be
remembered that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax

compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity
to be heard. Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA 650, G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
SORSOGON, PETITIONER vs.HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE,
GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO,
ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT
MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-
8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the
Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a
petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:
(1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe
and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the
southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted
with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground
subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did
not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally
Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
(6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of
the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
the Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of
Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of
an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages;
and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 63 of 140
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the
designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution10 dated
October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the
RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No.
2011-8338. The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is
no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the
case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011,
apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the
Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-
2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x
x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities
of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain,
hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin.
Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had
jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the
court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. 16 It may either be over the nature of the
action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the
pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the
RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129,
which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise
its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the
venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on
any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact,
explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the
branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was
also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the
National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof
would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the
administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical
location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial,
and does not restrict their access to the courts. 22 Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio dismissal
of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was
that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the
"[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x
x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin. 24 But
even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be
waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an
essential element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even
expressed that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case
(an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice28 if
the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and
speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 64 of 140
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008
constituting the different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in
the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made
in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following
grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General,
in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the
writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar
to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may
dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give
due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in
a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of
seeing to it that justice is served.31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section
1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation
or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law,
rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an
act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the
law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.1wphi1

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one
who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer
concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or
instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by
the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3)
such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of
an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of
the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency
or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed
by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and
such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure
that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor
the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order
or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with
a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision." 35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case
with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No.
7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. 36 But
the petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the
alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 65 of 140
Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality
of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these
entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue.
Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members
of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development
Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, 37 the Court stated
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the
parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and
the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It
is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or
agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot
be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract
are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature
and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a
judicial function.38 (Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach
judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain
supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is
only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the
time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be
attached to the petition/complaint.39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the
case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the
petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by
technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the
most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to
litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard." 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated
October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case
No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for
further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the
respondents with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 66 of 140

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Paje vs. Casio, 749 SCRA 39, G.R. No. 207366 February 3, 2015
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is
Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), was issued by the Court
pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, in particular, the individuals right to a balanced and healthful ecology.The Rules on the
Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued
by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, in particular, the individuals right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Section
1 of Rule 7 provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ.The writ is a remedy available to a natural or
juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, nongovernmental organization,
or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or
actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or
degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries.The writ is categorized as a
special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to
provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. It is intended to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial
efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen
short and seeks to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary
remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do
not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently
grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this
extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to
be decided on a case-to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.As
earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of
the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage
of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes
the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege
and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 67 of 140
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action refiled before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of
the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Due to the extreme urgency of the
matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case
and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional character of this
case. We take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that our nation faces. Thus, the resolution
of all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to finally determine the
fate of the project center of this controversy. If we were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ
of kalikasan case and dismiss those not proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues
open to another round of protracted litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient to resolve
all the issues presented herein. We also rule that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at
hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As
we have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure in order to
achieve substantial justice, and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of
our nation.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because
of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because
of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Thus, we shall review both questions of law and fact in resolving the issues presented in this case.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) sustains the appellate courts findings that the
Casio Group failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by
the construction and operation of the power plant.In upholding the evidence and arguments of
RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as to the alleged significant environmental damage that will
be caused by the project, the appellate court relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we
find to be in accord with judicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case: Although courts are not
ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such
testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly
fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effects. (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058) The problem of

the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of
the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion. Hence, we sustain the appellate courts findings that the Casio Group failed to establish
the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the construction and operation of
the power plant.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts
with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect or
safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology.The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient
information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology. In Section 6(l) of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to settle, the judge shall,
among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services of a qualified expert as a friend of
the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12 of Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), a party may avail of
discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or inspection of documents or things.
The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling information, specifically with regard to
the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained in this wise: [T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to
bridge the gap between allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be environmental
litigants to compel the production of information within the custodyof the government. The writ
would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to information about the
environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything related to the issuance,
grant of a government permit issued or information controlled by the government or private entity
and (2) [i]nformation contained in documents such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC)
and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also be employed to compel the
production of information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is analogous to a
discovery measure, and may be availed of upon application for the writ.
Same; Same; Same; In environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the court in order to
shed light on matters requiring special technical expertise as well as the power to order ocular
inspections and production of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind,
the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule on the
issues presented for its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology
may be adequately protected.In environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the court
in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical expertise as well as the power to order
ocular inspections and production of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit
behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule
on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology may be adequately protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional
rights of an accused, when life or liberty is at stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be compelled
as an attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the path of caution and
prudence by compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; A court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in
order to attain substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into
consideration matters not originally within the scope of the issues raised in the pleadings or set
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 68 of 140
during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.A court has the
power to suspend its rules of procedure in order to attain substantial justice so that it has the
discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into consideration matters not originally within the scope of
the issues raised in the pleadings or set during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. In the case at bar, the importance of the signature cannot be seriously
doubted because it goes into the consent and commitment of the project proponent to comply with
the conditions of the ECC, which is vital to the protection of the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of those who may be affected by the project.
Environmental Compliance Certificate; The laws governing the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not specifically state that
the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of invalidating the ECC.The
laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not specifically
state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of invalidating the
ECC. Unlike in wills or donations, where failure to comply with the specific form prescribed by law
leads to its nullity, the applicable laws here are silent with respect to the necessity of a signature in
the Statement of Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This is, of course,
understandable because the Statement of Accountability is a mere offshoot of the rule-making
powers of the DENR relative to the implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To determine,
therefore, the effect of the lack of signature, we must look at the significance thereof under the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the DENR and the surrounding circumstances of
this case.
Same; While the signature is necessary for the validity of the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), the particular circumstances of this case show that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy) were not properly
apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
arguments on this point, as the matter only developed during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the appellate court.In sum, we rule that the appellate court erred
when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECCs
Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the
appellate court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular
circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the
issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on
this point, as the matter only developed during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory
questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the
certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been invalidated on the ground
of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of the appellate court.
License and Permit, Distinguished.The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do not define the
terms license and permit so that resort to their plain or ordinary meaning in relation to the
intendment of the law is appropriate. A license has been defined as a governmental permission
to perform a particular act (such as getting married), conduct a particular business or occupation,
operate machinery or vehicles after proving capacity and ability to do so safely, or use property for
a certain purpose while a permit has been defined as a license or other document given by an

authorized public official or agency (building inspector, department of motor vehicles) to allow a
person or business to perform certain acts.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; Ancestral Domain; Even if the indigenous
community does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the government agency would still
be required to obtain the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) precisely to rule out the possibility that
the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain.Even if the indigenous community
does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the government agency would still be required
to obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches upon
an ancestral domain. The reason for this is that an ancestral domain does not only cover the lands
actually occupied by an indigenous community, but all areas where they have a claim of ownership,
through time immemorial use, such as hunting, burial or worship grounds and to which they have
traditional access for their subsistence and other traditional activities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That the project site was formerly used as the firing range of the U.S.
Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or future claim of ancestral domain
may be made over the aforesaid site.That the project site was formerly used as the firing range
of the U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or future claim of
ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site. The concept of an ancestral domain
indicates that, even if the use of an area was interrupted by the occupation of foreign forces, it
may still be validly claimed to be an ancestral domain.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that the power to
approve or disapprove projects within the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) is one such power
over which the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authoritys (SBMAs) authority prevails over the Local
Government Units (LGUs) autonomy.In the case at bar, we find that the power to approve or ground involves an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one such power over which the SBMAs authority prevails
over the LGUs autonomy. Hence, there is no need for the SBMA to secure the approval of the
concerned sanggunians prior to the implementation of the subject project. This interpretation is
based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA over all administrative matters relating to the
SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227, as aforediscussed. Equally important, under Section 14, other
than those involving defense and security, the SBMAs decision prevails in case of conflict between
the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters concerning the SSEZ.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; In exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may
be availed of to challenge defects in the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).In general,
the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal process provided in
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal
process, recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. However, as earlier discussed, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan
may be availed of to challenge defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked
or reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated
under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or
falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or primary
jurisdiction.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 69 of 140
Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; View that the special civil action for a writ of
kalikasan under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC for brevity) is, I
submit, the best available and proper remedy for petitioners Casio, et al.The special civil action
for a writ of kalikasan under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC for
brevity) is, I submit, the best available and proper remedy for petitioners Casino, et al. As
distinguished from other available remedies in the ordinary rules of court, the writ of kalikasan is
designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental
rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the
violation of ones constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology. As a matter of fact, by
explicit directive from the Court, the RPEC are SPECIAL RULES crafted precisely to govern
environmental cases. On the other hand, the remedies that can contribute to the protection of
communities and their environment alluded to in Justice Leonens dissent clearly form part of the
Rules of Court which by express provision of the special rules for environmental cases shall apply
in a suppletory manner under Section 2 of Rule 22. Suppletory means supplying deficiencies. It
is apparent that there is no vacuum in the special rules on the legal remedy on unlawful acts or
omission concerning environmental damage since precisely Rule 7 on the writ of kalikasan
encompasses all conceivable situations of this nature.
Same; Same; Same; View on the Requisites for the Proper Availment of the Kalikasan Writ.
Availment of the kalikasan writ would, therefore, be proper if the following requisites concur in a
given case: 1. that there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; 2. the actual or threatened violation is due to an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; 3. the situation in the
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; View that in proceedings involving enforcement or violation of environmental
laws, where arbitrariness or caprice is ascribed to a public official, the sharper weapon to correct
the wrong would be a suit for the issuance of the kalikasan writ.Anent Justice Leonens argument
that there are other remedies that can contribute to the protection of communities and their
environment other than Rule 7 of RPEC, doubtless referring to a Rule 65 petition, allow me to
state in disagreement that there are instances when the act or omission of a public official or
employee complained of will ultimately result in the infringement of the basic right to a healthful
and balanced ecology. And said unlawful act or omission would invariably constitute grave abuse of
discretion which, ordinarily, could be addressed by the corrective hand of certiorari under Rule 65.
In those cases, a petition for writ of kalikasan would still be the superior remedy as in the present
controversy, crafted as it were precisely to address and meet head-on such situations. Put a bit
differently, in proceedings involving enforcement or violation of environmental laws, where
arbitrariness or caprice is ascribed to a public official, the sharper weapon to correct the wrong
would be a suit for the issuance of the kalikasan writ.
Same; Same; Same; View that the advent of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC to be sure brought about
significant changes in the procedural rules that apply to environmental cases.The advent of A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC to be sure brought about significant changes in the procedural rules that apply to
environmental cases. The differences on eight (8) areas between a Rule 65 certiorari petition and

Rule 7 kalikasan petition may be stated as follows: 1. Subject matter. Since its subject matter is
any unlawful act or omission, a Rule 7 kalikasan petition is broad enough to correct any act taken
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which is the subject matter of a Rule 65 certiorari petition. Any form of abuse of
discretion as long as it constitutes an unlawful act or omission involving the environment can be
subject of a Rule 7 kalikasan petition. A Rule 65 petition, on the other hand, requires the abuse of
discretion to be grave. Ergo, a subject matter which mordinarily cannot properly be subject of a
certiorari petition can be the subject of a kalikasan petition. 2. Who may file. Rule 7 has liberalized
the rule on locus standi, such that availment of the writ of kalikasan is open to a broad range of
suitors, to include even an entity authorized by law, peoples organization or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened to be violated. Rule 65 allows only the
aggrieved person to be the petitioner. 3. Respondent. The respondent in a Rule 65 petition is only
the government or its officers, unlike in a kalikasan petition where the respondent may be a private
individual or entity. 4. Exemption from docket fees. The kalikasan petition is exempt from docket
fees, unlike in a Rule 65 petition. Rule 7 of RPEC has pared down the usually burdensome litigation
expenses. 5. Venue. The certiorari petition can be filed with (a) the RTC exercising jurisdiction over
the territory where the act was committed; (b) the Court of Appeals; and (c) the Supreme Court.
Given the magnitude of the damage, the kalikasan petition can be filed directly with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. The direct filing of a kalikasan petition will prune case delay. 6.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. This doctrine generally applies to a certiorari petition, unlike
in a kalikasan petition. 7. Period to file. An aggrieved party has 60 days from notice of judgment or
denial of a motion for reconsideration to file a certiorari petition, while a kalikasan petition is not
subject to such limiting time lines. 8. Discovery measures. In a certiorari petition, discovery
measures are not available unlike in a kalikasan petition. Resort to these measures will abbreviate
proceedings. It is clear as day that a kalikasan petition provides more ample advantages to a suitor
than a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; View that each organism, inclusive of the human of the species, reacts
differently to a foreign body or a pollutant, thus, the need to address each environmental case on a
case-to-case basis.To require that there should be no possibility of any countervailing interests
existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born would likewise
effectively remove the rule on citizens suits from our Environmental Rules or render it superfluous.
No party could possibly prove, and no court could calculate, whether there is a possibility that
other countervailing interests exist in a given situation. We should not lose sight of the fact that the
impact of an activity to the environment, to our flora and fauna, and to the health of each and
every citizen will never become an absolute certainty such that it can be predicted or calculated
without error, especially if we are talking about generations yet unborn where we would obviously
not have a basis for said determination. Each organism, inclusive of the human of the species,
reacts differently to a foreign body or a pollutant, thus, the need to address each environmental
case on a case-to-case basis. Too, making sure that there are no countervailing interests in
existence, especially those of populations yet unborn, would only cause delays in the resolution of
an environmental case as this is a gargantuan, if not well-nigh impossible, task.
Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; View that the rule on res judicata should not likewise be applied
to environmental cases with the same degree of rigidity observed in ordinary civil cases, contrary to
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 70 of 140
the dissents contention.The rule on res judicata should not likewise be applied to environmental
cases with the same degree of rigidity observed in ordinary civil cases, contrary to the dissents
contention. Suffice it to state that the highly dynamic, generally unpredictable, and unique nature
of environmental cases precludes Us from applying the said principle in environmental cases.
Same; Same; Same; View that the imposition of the suggested conditions would virtually render
the provisions on citizens suit a pure jargon, a useless rule, in short.The true and full extent of
an environmental damage is difficult to fully comprehend, much so to predict. Considering the
dynamics of nature, where every aspect thereof is interlinked, directly or indirectly, it can be said
that a negative impact on the environment, though at times may appear minuscule at one point,
may cause a serious imbalance to our environs in the long run. And it is not always that this
imbalance immediately surfaces. In some instances, it may take years before we realize that the
deterioration is already serious and possibly irreparable, just as what happened to the Manila Bay
where decades of neglect, if not sheer citizen and bureaucratic neglect, ultimately resulted in the
severe pollution of the Bay. To my mind, the imposition of the suggested conditions would virtually
render the provisions on citizens suit a pure jargon, a useless rule, in short. Paje vs. Casio, 749
SCRA 39, G.R. No. 207366 February 3, 2015
G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE
JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES,
HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA
CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO,
MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207276
REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE
JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES,
HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA
CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO,
MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, RAMON JESUS P. PAJE,
in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207282
HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA,
JR., HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON.

AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSA,
RODOLFO SAMBAJON, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207366
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE
JESUS, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR.,
HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANOGARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA, GREGORIO LLORCA
MAGDARAOG, RUBELHPERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P.
JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLELATINAZO, EV ANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN
CARLO DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated
January 30, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated May 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00015, entitled "Hon. Teodoro A. Casio, et al. v. Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, et al."
Factual Antecedents
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized and
established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,4 and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power
plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park
(SBIP).5
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build and
operatea coal-fired power plant.6 In the said MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at
SitioNaglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project
and another site of approximately 10 hectares tobe used as an ash pond. 7 TCC intends to lease the
property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at$3.50 per square meter, payable in 10
equal 5-year installments.8
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation
(TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC,9 for the construction, installation,and operation of 2x150-MW
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.10
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 71 of 140
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),11 a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and operating powerplants in
the Philippines, among others.12Accordingly, an Addendum to the said MOU was executed by SBMA
and RP Energy.13
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance
ofan ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 14 On August 27,
2008, the Sangguniang Panglungsodof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008,
expressing the city governments objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and
urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay. 15
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for
the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.16
Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its proposed coal-
fired power plant. Due to the changes in the project design, which involved the inclusion of a barge
wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge pipeline, raw water collection system,
drainage channel improvement, and a 230kV double-circuit transmission line,17 RP Energy
requested the DENR Environmental Management Bureau(DENR-EMB) to amend its ECC.18 In
support of its request, RP Energy submitted to the DENR-EMBan Environmental Performance
Report and Management Plan (EPRMP), which was prepared by GHD. 19
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA)
over a 380,004.456-square meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired
power plant.20
On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMBissued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion
ofadditional components, among others.21
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC.22 Instead of
constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought toconstruct a
1x300-MWcoal-fired power plant.23 In support of its request, RP Energy submitted a Project
Description Report (PDR) to the DENR-EMB.24
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).25
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149,
opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at SitioNaglatore, Brgy. Cawag,
Subic, Zambales.26

On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series
of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.27
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casio, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano,
Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C. Paulino,Hon. Eduardo
Piano, Hon. James de los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah Lugerna Lipumano-Garcia,
Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog,
Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus Hermoso,Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge,
Carlito A. Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q. Rodriguez, and John
Carlo delos Reyes (Casio Group) filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR. 28
On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of Kalikasan; and (2) refer
the case to the CA for hearing and reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. 29 While the
case was pending, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its ECC (third amendment) and
submitted another EPRMP to the DENR-EMB, proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-
MW coal-fired power plant.30
B. Respondent RP Energy
On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of Kalikasanwas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015
and raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA.31 In the Petition, the Casio Group alleged, among
others, that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage; 32 that it would
adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic,Zambales, Morong,
Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;33 that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without
the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code (LGC);34 that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA8371 or
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law); 35 that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allowsamendments of ECCs is ultra viresbecause the
DENR has no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the
absence of a new EIS;36 and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments
to RP Energys ECC are null and void.37
On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference wherein the parties, with their
respective counsels, appeared except for Hon. Teodoro A. Casio, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon.
Emerencia A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo,Evangeline Q.
Rodriguez, and the SBMA.38 The matters taken up during the preliminary conference were
embodied in the CAs Resolution dated November 5, 2012, to wit:
I. ISSUES
A. Petitioners (Casio Group)
1. Whether x x x the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC x x x) in favor of
RP Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project (Power Plant, x x x )
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 72 of 140
and its amendment to 1x300 MW Power Plant, and the Lease and Development
Agreement between SBMA and RP Energy complied with the Certification Precondition as
required under Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA Law, x x x);
2. Whether x x x RP Energy can proceed with the construction and operation of the 1x300
MW Power Plant without prior consultation with and approval of the concerned local
government units (LGUs, x x x ), pursuant to Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160
or the Local Government Code;
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DENRAdministrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO No. 2003-
30, x x x ) providing for the amendment of an ECC is null and void for being ultra vires;
and
4. Whether x x x the amendment of RPEnergys ECC under Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-
30 is null and void.
1. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked;
1.1 Whether x x x the same is valid until annulled;
2. Whether x x x petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to the
amended ECC for the 1x300 MW Power Plant;
2.1 Whether x x x the instant Petition is proper;
3. Whether x x x RP Energycomplied with all the procedures/requirements for the issuance
of the DENR ECC and its amendment;
3.1 Whether x x x a Certificate of Non-Overlap from the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples is applicable in the instant case;
4. Whether x x x the LGUs approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code is necessaryfor the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendments, and what
constitutes LGU approval;
5. Whether x x x there is a threatened or actual violation of environmental laws to justify
the Petition;

5.1 Whether x x x the approved 1x300 MW Power Plant complied with the
accepted legal standards on thermal pollution of coastal waters, air pollution,
water pollution, and acid deposits on aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems; and
6. Whether x x x the instant Petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
requirements of properverification and certification of nonforum shopping with respect to
some petitioners.
C. Respondent DENR Secretary Paje
1. Whether x x x the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment in favor of RP Energy
requires compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law, as well as Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code;
2. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked in this
proceeding; and
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is valid.
II. ADMISSIONS/DENIALS
Petitioners, through Atty. Ridon, admittedall the allegations in RP Energys Verified Return, except
the following:
1. paragraphs 1.4 to 1.7;
2. paragraphs 1.29 to 1.32; and
3. paragraphs 1.33 to 1.37.
Petitioners made no specific denial withrespect to the allegations of DENR Secretary Pajes Verified
Return. x x x
Respondent RP Energy proposed the following stipulations, which were all admitted by petitioners,
through Atty. Ridon, viz:
1. The 1x300 MW Power Plant is not yet operational;
2. At present, there is no environmental damage;
3. The 1x300 MW Power Plant project is situated within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
and
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 73 of 140
4. Apart from the instant case, petitioners have not challenged the validity of Section 8.3
of DAO No. 2003-30.
Public respondent DENR Secretary Paje did not propose any matter for stipulation. 39
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Casio Group presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond V. Palatino, a two-term
representativeof the KabataanPartylist in the House of Representatives;40 (2) Alex C. Hermoso, the
convenor of the Zambales-Olongapo City Civil Society Network,a director of the
PREDA41 Foundation, and a member of the Zambales Chapter of the Kaya NatinMovement and the
Zambales Chapter of the People Power Volunteers for Reform;42and (3) Ramon Lacbain, the
ViceGovernor of the Province of Zambales. 43
RP Energy presented five witnesses,namely: (1) JunisseP. Mercado (Ms. Mercado), an employee of
GHD and the Project Directorof ongoing projects for RP Energy regarding the proposed power plant
project;44 (2) Juha Sarkki (Engr. Sarkki), a Master of Science degree holder inChemical
Engineering;45 (3) Henry K. Wong, a degree holder of Bachelor of Science Major in Mechanical
Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute;46 (4) Dr. Ely Anthony R. Ouano (Dr. Ouano), a
licensed Chemical Engineer, Sanitary Engineer, and Environmental Planner in the Philippines; 47 and
(5) David C. Evangelista (Mr. Evangelista), a Business Development Analyst working for RP
Energy.48
SBMA, for its part, presented its Legal Department Manager, Atty. Von F. Rodriguez (Atty.
Rodriguez).49
The DENR, however, presented no evidence.50
Meanwhile, on October 31, 2012, a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) was issued in connection with
RP Energys application for the 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant.51
On November 15, 2012, the DENR-EMB granted RP Energys application for the third amendment
to its ECC, approving the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant, among
others.52
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 30, 2013, the CA rendereda Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasanand
the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casio Group to prove
that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened. 53 The
CA likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 ofDAO No. 2003-30. It said that the provision
was not ultra vires,as the express power of the Secretary of the DENR, the Director and Regional
Directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the

same.54 In any case, the CA ruled that the validity of the said section could not becollaterally
attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan.55
Nonetheless, the CA resolved to invalidate the ECC dated December 22, 2008 for non-compliance
with Section 59 of the IPRA Law56 and Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC57 and for failure of Luis
Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), Director of RP Energy, to affix his signature in the Sworn Statement of
Full Responsibility, which is an integral part of the ECC.58 Also declared invalid were the ECC first
amendment dated July 8, 2010 and the ECC second amendment dated May 26, 2011 in view of the
failure of RP Energy to comply with the restrictions set forth in the ECC, which specifically require
that "any expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the activity x x
x shall be subject to a new Environmental Impact Assessment." 59 However, as to the ECC third
amendment dated November 15, 2012, the CA decided not to rule on its validity since it was not
raised as an issue during the preliminary conference.60
The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without the
prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required under Sections 26 and
27 of the LGC,61and in violation of Section 59, Chapter VIII ofthe IPRA Law, which enjoins all
departments and other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification
that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.62 The CA noted that no CNO
was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA, 63and that the CNO dated October 31,
2012 was secured during the pendency of the case and was issued in connection with RP Energys
application for a 2x300-MW coalfired power plant.64
Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the privilege of the writ
of kalikasan and the application for an environmental protection order. The prayer to declare the
nullity of Section 8.3 of the DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 for being ultra vires is
DENIED; and the following are all declared INVALID:
1. The Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC Ref. Code: 0804-011-4021) dated 22
December 2008 issued in favor of respondent Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. by former
Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;
2. The ECC first amendment dated 08 July 2010 and ECC second amendment dated 26
May 2011, both issued in favor ofrespondent Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. by OIC
Director Atty. Juan Miguel T. Cunaof the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Environmental Management Bureau; and
3. The Lease and Development Agreement dated 08 June 2010 entered into by
respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc.
involving a parcel of land consisting of P380,004.456 square meters.
SO ORDERED.65
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 74 of 140
The DENR and SBMA separately moved for reconsideration.66 RP Energy filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,67 attaching thereto a signed Statement of Accountability.68 The Casio Group, on
the other hand, filed Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration.69
On May 22, 2013, the CAissued a Resolution70 denying the aforesaid motions for lack of merit. The
CA opined that the reliefs it granted in its Decision are allowed under Section 15, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as the reliefs enumerated therein are broad,
comprehensive, and nonexclusive.71 In fact, paragraph (e) of the saidprovision allows the granting
of "such other reliefs" in consonance with the objective, purpose, and intent of the Rules. 72 SBMAs
contention that the stoppage of a project for non-compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law may
only be done by the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples was also brushed aside
by the CA as the Casio Group did not file a case under the IPRA Law but a Petition for a Writ of
Kalikasan, which is available to all natural or juridical persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened to be violated. 73 As to RP Energys belated
submission of a signed Statement of Accountability, the CA gaveno weight and credenceto it as the
belated submission of such document, long after the presentation of evidence of the parties had
been terminated, is not in accord with the rules of fair play.74 Neither was the CA swayed by the
argument that the omitted signature of Luis Miguel Aboitiz is a mere formal defect, which does not
affect the validity of the entire document.75 The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authoritys Motion for
Reconsideration dated 18 February 2013, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary Ramon Jesus P. Pajes Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 February 2013, and Redondo
Peninsula Energy, Inc.s Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 22 February 2013, as well as
petitioners OmnibusMotions for Clarification and Reconsideration dated 25 February 2013,are all
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.76
Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.
The Casio Groups arguments
The Casio Group, in essence, argues that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan as it was able to
prove that the operation of the power plant would cause environmental damage and pollution, and
that thiswould adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly
the municipalities of Subic, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. It cites as basis RP
Energys EIS, which allegedly admits that acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal;77 that the
incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may increasedue to
exposure to suspended particles from plant operations;78 and that increased sulfur oxides (SOx)
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions may occur during plant operations.79 It also claims that when
the SBMA conducted Social Acceptability Policy Consultations with different stakeholders on the
proposed power plant, the results indicated that the overall persuasion of the participants was a
clear aversion to the project due to environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural

concerns.80 Finally, it contends that the ECC third amendment should also be nullified for failure to
comply with the procedures and requirements for the issuance of the ECC. 81
The DENRs arguments
The DENR imputes error on the CAin invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a
Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.82 And even if it is within the scope, there is no reason to invalidate
the ECC and its amendments as these were issued in accordance with DAO No. 2003-30.83 The
DENR also insists that contrary to the view of the CA, a new EIS was no longer necessary since the
first EIS was still within the validity period when the first amendment was requested, and that this
is precisely the reason RP Energy was only required to submit an EPRMP in support of its
application for the first amendment.84 As to the second amendment, the DENR-EMB only required
RP Energy to submit documents to support the proposed revision considering that the change in
configuration of the power plant project, from 2x150MW to 1x300MW, was not
substantial.85 Furthermore, the DENR argues that no permits, licenses, and/or clearances from
other government agencies are required in the processing and approval of the ECC. 86 Thus, non-
compliance with Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC as well as Section 59 ofthe IPRA Law is not a
ground to invalidate the ECC and its amendments. 87 The DENR further posits that the ECC is not a
concession, permit, or license but is a document certifying that the proponent has complied with all
the requirements of the EIS System and has committed to implement the approved Environmental
Management Plan.88 The DENR invokes substantial justice so that the belatedly submitted certified
true copy of the ECC containing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz on the Statement of Accountability may
be accepted and accorded weight and credence.89
SBMAs arguments
For its part, SBMA asserts that since the CA did not issue a Writ of Kalikasan, it should not have
invalidated the LDA and that in doing so, the CA acted beyond its powers. 90 SBMA likewise puts in
issue the legal capacity of the Casio Group to impugn the validity of the LDA 91 and its failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.92 In any case, SBMA contends that there is no legal basis to
invalidate the LDA as prior consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC is not required in this
case considering that the area is within the SBFZ.93 Under RA 7227, it is the SBMA which has
exclusive jurisdiction over projects and leases within the SBFZ and that in case of conflict between
the LGC and RA 7227, it is the latter, a special law, which must prevail. 94 Moreover, the lack of
prior certification from the NCIP is alsonot a ground to invalidate a contract. 95 If at all, the only
effect of non-compliance with the said requirement under Section 59 of the IPRA Law is the
stoppage or suspension of the project.96Besides, the subsequent issuance of a CNO has cured any
legal defect found in the LDA.97
RP Energys arguments
RP Energy questions the proprietyof the reliefs granted by the CA considering that it did not issue a
writ of kalikasanin favor of the Casio Group.98 RP Energy is of the view that unless a writ of
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 75 of 140
kalikasanis issued, the CA has no power to grant the reliefs prayed for in the Petition. 99 And even if
it does, the reliefs are limited to those enumerated in Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases and that the phrase "such other reliefs" in paragraph (e) should be limited
only to those of the same class or general nature as the four other reliefs enumerated. 100 As to the
validity of the LDA, the ECC and its amendments, the arguments of RP Energy are basically the
same arguments interposed by SBMA and the DENR. RP Energy maintains that the ECC and its
amendments were obtained in compliance with the DENR rules and regulations; 101 that a CNO is
not necessary in the execution of anLDA and in the issuance of the ECC and its
amendments;102 and that prior approval of the local governments, which may be affected by the
project, are not required because under RA 7227, the decision of the SBMA shall prevail in matters
affecting the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), except in matters involving defense and
security.103 RP Energy also raises the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies on the
part of the Casio Group.104 Preliminaries
This case affords us an opportunity to expound on the nature and scope of the writ of kalikasan. It
presents some interesting questions about law and justice in the context of environmental cases,
which we will tackle in the main body of this Decision.
But we shall first address some preliminary matters, in view of the manner by which the appellate
court disposed of this case.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan,105 which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,106 was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights,107 in particular, the individuals rightto a balanced and
healthful ecology.108 Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, peoples organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary
remedy,which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that
transcends political and territorial boundaries.109 It is intended "to provide a strongerdefense for
environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement,
implementation and legislation have fallen short"110 and seeks "to address the potentially
exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats."111
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary
remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property ofinhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not definethe exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only
that it must be sufficientlygrave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as tocall for
the grant ofthis extraordinary remedy. The gravity ofenvironmental damage sufficient to grant the
writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court shall render judgment
granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the
petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15of Rule 7, to wit:
Section 15. Judgment.- Within sixty (60) daysfrom the time the petition is submitted for decision,
the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or
neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity
to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
It must be noted, however,that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that
may be granted under the writ are broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.112
Prescinding from the above, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in arguing that the reliefs
granted by the appellate court, i.e.invalidating the ECC and its amendments, are improper because
it had deniedthe Petition for Writ of Kalikasanupon a finding that the Casio Group failed to prove
the alleged environmental damage, actual or threatened, contemplated under the Rules.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 76 of 140
Ordinarily, no reliefs could and should be granted. But the question may be asked, could not the
appellate court have granted the Petition for Writ of Kalikasanon the ground of the invalidity of the
ECC for failure to comply with certain laws and rules?
This question is the starting point for setting up the framework of analysis which should govern
writ of kalikasan cases.
In their Petition for Writ of Kalikasan, 113 the Casio Groups allegations, relative to the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, may be
grouped into two.
The first set of allegations deals withthe actual environmental damage that will occur if the power
plant project isimplemented. The Casio Group claims that the construction and operation of the
power plant will result in (1) thermal pollution of coastal waters, (2) air pollution due to dust and
combustion gases, (3) water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste, and (4) acid deposition in
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, which will adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of
Bataan and Zambales, particularly the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of
Olongapo.
The second set of allegations deals with the failureto comply with certain laws and rules governing
or relating to the issuance ofan ECC and amendments thereto. The Casio Group claims that the
ECC was issued in violation of (1) the DENR rules on the issuance and amendment of an ECC,
particularly, DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30 (Revised Manual),
(2) Section 59 of the IPRA Law,and (3) Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. In addition, it claims that
the LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy violated Section 59 of the IPRA Law.
As to the first set of allegations, involving actual damage to the environment, it is not difficult to
discern that, if they are proven, then the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan could conceivably be
granted.
However, as to the second set of allegations, a nuanced approach is warranted. The power of the
courts to nullify an ECC existed even prior to the promulgation of the Rules on the Writ of
Kalikasanfor judicial review of the acts of administrative agencies or bodies has long been
recognized114 subject, of course, to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 115
But the issue presented before us is nota simple case of reviewing the acts of an administrative
agency, the DENR, which issued the ECC and its amendments. The challenge to the validity ofthe
ECC was raised in the context of a writ of kalikasancase. The question then is, can the validity of
an ECC be challenged viaa writ of kalikasan?
We answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.

As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasanis principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental
damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who
invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only
allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but mustalso provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This must be so ifwe are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of
the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably
warrant the granting of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there are
serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the application for the ECC, which, if not
immediately nullified, would cause actual negative environmental impacts of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules, because the government agenciesand LGUs, with the final authority
to implement the project, may subsequently rely on such substantially defective or fraudulent ECC
in approving the implementation of the project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to
merely allege such defects or irregularities, but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with
the environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the case at bar, no
such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid
second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the
issuance of the ECC. This would havebeen sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such
issues in a writ of kalikasan case.
However, inasmuch as this is the first time that we lay down this principle, we have liberally
examined the alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and find that there is only
one group of allegations, relative to the ECC, that can be reasonably connected to anenvironmental
damageof the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. This is withrespect to the allegation that
there was no environmental impact assessment relative to the first and second amendments to the
subject ECC. If this were true, then the implementation of the project can conceivably actually
violate or threaten to violate the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of the inhabitants near
the vicinity of the power plant. Thus, the resolution of such an issue could conceivably be resolved
in a writ of kalikasan case provided that the case does not violate, or is anexception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction. 116
As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the LDA,
likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find the same not to be within the coverage of the writ of
kalikasanbecause, assuming there was non-compliance therewith, no reasonable connection can be
made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 77 of 140
To elaborate, the alleged lackof approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject project
would not lead toor is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an
affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the alleged lack of a certificate precondition that
the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain would not result inor is not reasonably
connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the right of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains. These alleged
violationscould be the subject of appropriate remedies before the proper administrative bodies (like
the NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance before the courts, as the case may be.
However, the writ of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy to address and resolve such
issues.
Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and those
which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional character of this case. We
take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that our nation faces. Thus, the resolution of all the
issues in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to finally determine the fate of the
project center of this controversy. If we were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ of
kalikasancase and dismiss those not proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues open to
another round of protracted litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient to resolve all the
issues presented herein. We also rule that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the
present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.117 As we
have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve
substantial justice, and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of our
nation.
Issues
In view of the foregoing, we shall resolve the following issues:
1. Whether the Casio Group was able to prove that the construction and operation of the
power plant will cause grave environmental damage.
1.1. The alleged thermal pollution of coastal waters, air pollution due to dust and
combustion gases, water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste, and acid
deposition to aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems that will becaused by the project.
1.2. The alleged negative environmental assessment of the project by experts in a
report generated during the social acceptability consultations.
1.3. The alleged admissions of grave environmental damage in the EIS itself of
the project.
2. Whether the ECC is invalid for lackof signature of Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, as
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability of the ECC.

3. Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to undergo
a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of inappropriate
EIA documents.
4. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a
precondition to the issuanceof an ECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC
invalid.
5. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a
precondition to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA)
between SBMA and RPEnergy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA invalid.
6. Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval
of the concerned sanggunianrequirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the
power plant project.
7. Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved in this case.
Ruling
The parties to this case appealed from the decision of the appellate court pursuant to Section 16,
Rule7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, viz:
Section 16. Appeal.- Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment or
denialof motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule45 of
the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions of fact. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because
ofthe extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan.118 Thus, we shall review both questions of law and fact in resolving the issues presented
in this case.
We now rule on the above-mentioned issues in detail.
I.Whether the Casio Group was able to prove that the construction and operation of the power
plant will cause grave environmental damage.
The alleged thermal pollution of coastal
waters, air pollution due to dust and
combustion gases, water pollution from
toxic coal combustion waste, and acid
deposition in aquatic and terrestrial
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 78 of 140
ecosystems that willbe caused by the
project.
As previously noted, the Casio Group alleged that the construction and operation of the power
plant shall adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly, the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo, as well as the sensitive
ecological balance of the area. Their claims of ecological damage may be summarized as follows:
1. Thermal pollution of coastal waters. Due to the discharge of heated water from the
operation of the plant, they claim that the temperature of the affected bodies of water will
rise significantly. This will have adverse effects on aquatic organisms. It will also cause the
depletion of oxygen in the water. RP Energy claims that there will beno more than a 3C
increase in water temperature but the Casio Group claims that a 1C to 2C rise can
already affect the metabolism and other biological functions of aquatic organisms such
asmortality rate and reproduction.
2. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases. While the Casio Group admits that
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal technology, which will be used in the power plant, is a
clean technology because it reduces the emission of toxic gases, it claims that volatile
organic compounds, specifically, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) will also be
emitted under the CFB. PAHs are categorized as pollutants with carcinogenic and
mutagenic characteristics. Carbon monoxide, a poisonous gas, and nitrous oxide, a lethal
global warming gas, will also be produced.
3. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste. The waste from coal combustion or
the residues from burning pose serious environmental risk because they are toxic and may
cause cancer and birth defects. Their release to nearby bodies of water will be a threatto
the marine ecosystem of Subic Bay. The project is located in a flood-prone area and is
near three prominent seismic faults as identified by Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology. The construction of an ash pond in an area susceptible to flooding and
earthquake also undermines SBMAs duty to prioritize the preservation of the water quality
in Subic Bay.
4. Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. The power plant will release 1,888
tons of nitrous oxides and 886 tons of sulfur dioxide per year. These oxides are
responsible for acid deposition. Acid deposition directly impacts aquatic ecosystems. It is
toxic to fish and other aquatic animals. It will also damage the forests near Subic Bay as
well as the wildlife therein. This will threaten the stability of the biological diversity of the
Subic Bay Freeport which was declared as one of the ten priority sites among the
protected areas in the Philippines and the Subic Watershed and Forest Reserve. This will
also have an adverse effect on tourism.119
In its January 30, 2013 Decision, the appellate court ruled that the Casio Group failed to prove the
above allegations.

We agree with the appellate court.
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casio Group are not experts on the CFB technology
or on environmental matters. These witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that theyare
not competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject project. What is wanting in
their testimonies is their technical knowledgeof the project design/implementation or some other
aspects of the project, even those not requiring expertknowledge, vis--vis the significant negative
environmental impacts which the Casio Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casio Group failed
to carry the onusof proving the alleged significant negative environmental impacts of the project.
In comparison, RP Energy presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casio Group.
As aptly and extensively discussed by the appellate court:
Petitioners120 presented three (3) witnesses, namely, Palatino, Hermoso, and Lacbain, all of whom
are not experts on the CFB technology or even on environmental matters. Petitioners did not
present any witness from Morong or Hermosa. Palatino, a former freelance writer and now a
Congressman representing the Kabataan Partylist, with a degree of BS Education major in Social
Studies, admitted that he is not a technical expert. Hermoso, a Director of the PREDA foundation
which is allegedly involved on environmental concerns, and a member of Greenpeace, is not an
expert on the matter subject of this case. He is a graduate of BS Sociology and a practicing
business director involved in social development and social welfare services. Lacbain, incumbent
ViceGovernor of the Province of Zambales, anaccounting graduate with a Master in Public
Administration, was a former BancoFilipino teller, entertainment manager, disco manager,
marketing manager and college instructor, and is also not an expert on the CFB technology.
Lacbain also admitted that he is neither a scientist nor an expert on matters of the environment.
Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites culled from the internet.
However, the said scientific studiesand articles including the alleged Key Observations and
Recommendations on the EIS of the Proposed RPE Project by Rex Victor O. Cruz (Exhibit
"DDDDD") attached to the Petition, were not testified to by an expert witness, and are basically
hearsay in nature and cannot be given probative weight. The article purportedly written by Rex
Victor O. Cruz was not even signed by the said author, which fact was confirmed by Palatino.
Petitioners witness, Lacbain, admitted that he did not personally conduct any study on the
environmental or health effects of a coal-firedpower plant, but only attended seminars and
conferences pertaining to climate change; and that the scientific studies mentioned in the
penultimate whereas clause of Resolution No. 2011-149 (Exhibit "AAAAA") of the Sangguniang
Panlalawiganof Zambales is based on what he read on the internet, seminars he attended and what
he heard from unnamed experts in the field of environmental protection.
In his Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "HHHHH"), Palatino stated that he was furnished by the concerned
residents the Key Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE Project by Rex
Victor O. Cruz, and that he merely received and read the five (5) scientific studies and articles
which challenge the CFB technology. Palatino also testified that: he was only furnished by the
petitioners copies of the studies mentioned in his Judicial Affidavit and he did not participate in the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 79 of 140
execution, formulation or preparation of any of the said documents; he does not personally know
Rex Cruz or any of the authors of the studies included in his Judicial Affidavit; he did not read other
materials about coal-fired power plants; he is not aware of the acceptable standards as far as the
operation of a coal-fired power plant is concerned; petitioner Velarmino was the one who furnished
him copies of the documents in reference to the MOU and some papers related to the case;
petitioner Peralta was the one who e-mailed to him the soft copy ofall the documents [letters (a) to
(o) of his Judicial Affidavit], except the LGU Resolutions; and he has never been at the actual
Power Plant projectsite. It must be noted that petitioners Velarmino and Peralta were never
presented as witnesses in this case. In addition, Palatino did not identify the said studies but
simplyconfirmed that the said studies were attached to the Petition.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness
knows of his orher personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned
from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned.
This is known as the hearsay rule. Hearsay is notlimited to oral testimony or statements; the
general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. There
are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are learned
treatises under Section 46 of Rule 130, viz:
"SEC. 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subjectof history,
law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the
court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert
in the subject."
The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be classified as learned treatises. We
cannot take judicial notice of the same, and no witness expert in the subjectmatter of this case
testified, that the writers of the said scientific studies are recognized in their profession or calling as
experts in the subject.
In stark contrast, respondent RP Energy presented several witnesses on the CFB technology.
In his Judicial Affidavit, witness Wong stated that he obtained a Bachelor of Science, Major in
Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute; he is a Consulting Engineer of Steam
Generators of URS; he was formerly connected with Foster Wheeler where he held the positions of
site commissioning engineer, testing engineer, instrumentation and controls engineer, mechanical
equipment department manager, director of boiler performance and mechanical design engineering
and pulverized coal product director. He explained that: CFB stands for Circulating Fluidized Bed; it
is a process by which fuel is fed to the lower furnace where it is burned in an upward flow of
combustion air; limestone, which is used as sulfur absorbent, is also fed to the lower furnace along
with the fuel; the mixture offuel, ash, and the boiler bed sorbent material is carried to the upper
part of the furnace and into a cyclone separator; the heavier particles which generally consist of

the remaining uncombusted fuel and absorbent material are separated in the cyclone separator
and are recirculated to the lower furnace to complete the combustion of any unburned particles
and to enhance SO2 capture by the sorbent; fly ash and flue gas exit the cyclone and the fly ash is
collected in the electrostatic precipitator; furnace temperature is maintained in the range of 800 to
900 C by suitable heat absorbing surface; the fuel passes through a crusher that reduces the size
to an appropriate size prior to the introduction into the lower furnace along with the limestone; the
limestone is used as a SO2 sorbent which reacts with the sulfur oxides to form calcium sulfate, an
inert and stable material; air fans at the bottom of the furnace create sufficient velocity within the
steam generator to maintain a bed of fuel, ash, and limestone mixture; secondary air is also
introduced above the bed to facilitate circulation and complete combustion of the mixture; the
combustion process generates heat, which then heats the boiler feedwater flowing through boiler
tube bundles under pressure; the heat generated in the furnace circuit turns the water to saturated
steam which is further heated to superheated steam; this superheated steam leaves the CFB boiler
and expands through a steam turbine; the steam turbine is directly connected to a generator that
turns and creates electricity; after making its way through the steam turbine, the low-pressure
steam is exhausted downwards into a condenser; heat is removed from the steam, which cools and
condenses into water (condensate); the condensate is then pumped back through a train of
feedwater heaters to gradually increase its temperature beforethis water is introduced to the boiler
to start the process all over again; and CFB technology has advantagesover pulverized coal firing
without backend cleanup systems, i.e., greater fuel flexibility, lower SO2 and NOx emissions.
Moreover, Wong testified, inter alia, that: CFBs have a wider range of flexibility so they can
environmentally handle a wider range of fuel constituents, mainly the constituent sulfur; and is
capable of handling different types of coal within the range of the different fuelconstituents; since
CFB is the newer technology than the PC or stalker fire, it has better environmental production; 50
percent ofthe electric generation in the United States is still produced by coal combustion; and the
CFB absorbs the sulfur dioxide before it is emitted; and there will be a lower percentage of
emissions than any other technology for the coal.
In his Judicial Affidavit, Sarrki, stated that: he is the Chief Engineer for Process Concept in
FosterWheeler; he was a Manager of Process Technology for Foster Wheeler from 1995 to 2007;
and he holds a Master of Science degree in Chemical Engineering.He explained that: CFB boilers
will emit PAHs but only in minimal amounts, while BFB will produce higher PAH emissions; PAH is a
natural product of any combustion process; even ordinary burning, such as cooking or driving
automobiles, will have some emissions that are not considered harmful; it is only when emissions
are of a significant level that damage may be caused; a CFB technology has minimal PAH
emissions; the high combustion efficiency of CFB technology, due to long residence time of
particles inside the boiler, leads to minimal emissions of PAH; other factors such as increase in the
excess air ratio[,] decrease in Ca/S, as well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal
will likewise minimize PAH production; and CFB does not cause emissions beyond
scientificallyacceptable levels. He testified, inter alia, that: the CFB technology is used worldwide;
they have a 50% percent share of CFB market worldwide; and this will be the first CFB by Foster
Wheeler in the Philippines; Foster Wheeler manufactures and supplies different type[s] of boilers
including BFB, but CFB is always applied on burning coal, so they do not apply any BFB for coal
firing; CFB has features which have much better combustion efficiency, much lower emissions and
it is more effective as a boiler equipment; the longer the coal stays inthe combustion chamber, the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 80 of 140
better it is burned; eight (8) seconds is already beyond adequate but it keeps a margin; in CFB
technology, combustion technology is uniform throughout the combustion chamber; high velocity is
used in CFB technology, that is vigorous mixing or turbulence; turbulence is needed to get contact
between fuel and combustion air; and an important feature of CFB is air distribution.
In his Judicial Affidavit, Ouano stated that: he is a licensed Chemical Engineer, Sanitary Engineer
and Environmental Planner in the Philippines; he is also a chartered Professional Engineer
inAustralia and a member of the colleges of environmental engineers and chemical engineers of the
Institution of Engineers (Australia); he completed his Bachelor in Chemical Engineering in 1970,
Master of Environmental Engineering in 1972 and Doctor of Environmental Engineering in 1974; he
also graduated from the University of Sydney Law School with the degree of Master of
Environmental Law in 2002 and PhD in Law from Macquarie University in 2007. He explained in his
Judicial Affidavit that: the impacts identified and analyzed in the EIA process are all potential or
likely impacts; there are a larger number of EIA techniques for predicting the potential
environmental impacts; it is important to note that all those methods and techniques are only for
predicting the potential environmental impacts, not the real impacts; almost all environmental
systems are non-linear and they are subject to chaotic behavior that even the most sophisticated
computer could not predict accurately; and the actual or real environmental impact could only be
established when the project is in actual operation. He testified, inter alia, that: the higher the
temperature the higher the nitrous oxide emitted; in CFB technology, the lower the temperature,
the lower is the nitrogen oxide; and it still has a nitrogen oxide but not as high as conventional
coal; the CFB is the boiler; from the boiler itself,different pollution control facilities are going to be
added; and for the overall plant with the pollution control facilities, the particulate matters,
nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide are under control. (Citations omitted)121
We also note that RP Energy controverted in detail the afore-summarized allegations of the Casio
Group on the four areas of environmental damage that will allegedly occur upon the construction
and operation of the power plant:
1. On thermal pollution of coastal waters.
As to the extent of the expected rise in water temperature once the power plant is operational, Ms.
Mercado stated in her JudicialAffidavit thus:
Q: What was the result of the Thermal Plume Modeling that was conducted for RP Energy?
A: The thermal dispersion modeling results show that largest warming change (0.95C above
ambient) is observed in the shallowest (5 m) discharge scenario. The warmest surface temperature
change for the deepest (30 m) scenario is 0.18C. All the simulated scenarios comply with the DAO
90-35 limit for temperature rise of 3C within the defined 70 x 70 m mixing zone. The proposed
power plant location is near the mouth of Subic Bay, thus the tidal currents influence the behavior
of thermal discharge plume. Since the area is well-flushed, mixing and dilution of the thermal
discharge is expected.

It also concluded that corals are less likely to be affected by the cooling water discharge as corals
may persist in shallow marine waterswith temperatures ranging from 18C to 36C. The predicted
highest temperature of 30.75C, from the 0.95C increase in ambient in the shallowest (5 m)
discharge scenario, is within this range.122
In the same vein, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial Affidavit:
Q: In page 41, paragraph 99 of the Petition, it was alleged that: "x x x a temperature change of 1C to
2C canalready affect the metabolism and other biological functions of aquatic organisms such as
mortality rate and reproduction." What is your expert opinion, if any, on this matter alleged by the
Petitioners?
A: Living organisms have proven time and again that they are very adaptable to changes in the
environment. Living organisms have been isolated in volcanic vents under the ocean living on the acidic
nutrient soup of sulfur and other minerals emitted by the volcano to sub-freezing temperature in
Antarctica. Asa general rule, metabolism and reproductive activity [increase] with temperature until a
maximum is reached after which [they decline]. For this reason, during winter, animals hibernate and
plants become dormant after shedding their leaves. It is on the onset of spring that animals breed and
plants bloom when the air and water are warmer. At the middle of autumn when the temperature drops
to single digit, whales, fish, birds and other living organisms, which are capable of migrating, move to
the other end of the globe where spring is just starting. In the processes of migration, those migratory
species have to cross the tropics where the temperature is not just one or two degrees warmer but 10 to
20 degrees warmer. When discussing the impact of 1 to 2 degrees temperature change and its impact
on the ecosystem, the most important factors to consider are (1) Organism Type specifically its
tolerance to temperature change (mammals have higher tolerance); (2) Base Temperature it is the
temperature over the optimum temperature such that an increasewill result in the decline in number of
the organisms; (3) Mobility or Space for Migration (i.e., an aquarium with limited space or an open ocean
that the organism can move to a space more suited to [a] specific need, such as the migratory birds);
and (4) Ecosystem Complexity and Succession. The more complex the ecosystem the more stable it is as
succession and adaptation [are] more robust.
Normally, the natural variation in water temperature between early morning to late afternoon could be
several degrees (four to five degrees centigrade and up to ten degrees centigrade on seasonal basis).
Therefore, the less than one degree centigrade change predicted by the GHD modeling would have
minimal impact.123
On cross-examination, Dr. Ouano further explained
ATTY. AZURA:
x x x When you say Organism Type you mentioned that mammals have a higher tolerance for
temperature change?
DR. OUANO:
Yes.
ATTY. AZURA:
What about other types of organisms, Dr. Ouano? Fish for example?
DR. OUANO:
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 81 of 140
Well, mammals have high tolerance because mammals are warm[- ]blooded. Now, when it comes to
cold[-]blooded animals the tolerance is much lower. But again when you are considering x x x fish
[e]specially in open ocean you have to remember that nature by itself is x x x very brutal x x x where
there is always the prey-predator relationship. Now, most of the fish that we have in open sea [have]
already a very strong adaptability mechanism.And in fact, Kingman back in 1964 x x x studied the coal
reefaround the gulf of Oman where the temperature variation on day to day basis varied not by 1 degree
to 2 degrees but by almost 12 degrees centigrade. Now, in the Subic Bay area which when youre
looking at it between daytime variation, early dawn when it is cold, the air is cold, the sea temperature,
sea water is quite cold. Then by 3:00 oclock in the afternoon it starts to warm up. Sothe variation [in
the] Subic Bay area is around 2 to 4 degrees by natural variation from the sun as well as from the
current that goes around it. So when you are talking about what the report has said of around 1 degree
change, the total impact x x x on the fishes will be minimal. x x x
ATTY. AZURA:
x x x So, you said, Dr. Ouano, that fish, while they have a much lower tolerance for temperature
variation, are still very adaptable. What about other sea life, Dr. Ouano, for example, sea reptiles?
DR. OUANO:
Thats what I said. The most sensitive part of the marine ecology is physically the corals because corals
are non-migratory, they are fix[ed]. Second[ly] x x x corals are also highly dependent on sunlight
penetration. If they are exposed out of the sea, they die; if theyare so deep, they die. And that is why I
cited Kingman in his studies of coral adaptability [in] the sea ofOman where there was a very high
temperature variation, [they] survived.
ATTY. AZURA:
Would you be aware, Dr. Ouano, if Kingman has done any studies in Subic Bay?
DR. OUANO:
Not in Subic Bay but I have reviewedthe temperature variation, natural temperature variation from the
solar side, the days side as well as the seasonal variation. There are two types of variation since
temperatures are very critical. One is the daily, which means from early morning to around 3:00 oclock,
and the other one is seasonal variation because summer, December, January, February are the cold
months and then by April, May we are having warm temperature where the temperature goes around
32-33 degrees; Christmas time, it drops to around 18 to 20 degrees so it[']sa variation of around
seasonal variation of 14 degrees although some of the fish might even migrate and that is why I was
trying to put in corals because they are the ones that are really fix[ed]. They are not in a position to
migrate in this season.
ATTY. AZURA:
To clarify. You said that the most potentially sensitive part of the ecosystem would be the corals. DR.
OUANO:
Or threatened part because they are the ones [that] are not in a position to migrate.
ATTY AZURA:
In this case, Dr. Ouano, with respectto this project and the projected temperature change, will the corals
in Subic Bay be affected?
DR. OUANO:
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 82 of 140

As far as the outlet is concerned, they have established it outside the coral area. By the time it reaches Guideline Values
the coral area the temperature variation, as per the GHD study is very small, it[]s almost negligible.
SO2 6.12 g/Nm3 80 g/Nm3
ATTY AZURA:
NO2 No standard ---
Specifically, Dr. Ouano, what does negligible mean, what level of variation are we talking about?
DR. OUANO: CO No standard ---
If you are talking about a thermometer, you might be talking about, normally about .1 degrees
centigrade. Thatsthe one that you could more or less ascertain. x x x 272. Q: What other findings resulted from the Air Dispersion Modeling, if any?
ATTY. AZURA:
Dr. Ouano, you mentioned in youranswer to the same question, Question 51, that there is a normal A: It also established that the highest GLC to CleanAir Act Standards ratio among possible
variation in water temperature. In fact, you said there is a variation throughout the day, daily and also receptors was located 1.6 km North NorthEast ("NNE") of the Power Plant Project. Further, this
throughout the year, seasonal. Just to clarify, Dr. Ouano. When the power plant causes the projected ratio was valued only at 0.434 or less than half of the upper limit set out in the Clean Air Act. This
temperature change of 1 degree to 2 degrees Celsius this will be in addition to existing variations? What means that the highest air ambient quality disruption will happen only 1.6 km NNE of the Power
I mean, Dr. Ouano, just so I can understand, how will that work? How will the temperature change Plant Project, and that such disruption would still be compliant with the standards imposed by the
caused by the power plant work with the existing variation? DR. OUANO: Clean Air Act.127
There is something like what we call the zonal mixing. This is an area of approximately one or two
hectares where the pipe goes out, the hot water goes out. So that x x x, we have to accept x x x that The Casio Group argued, however, that, as stated inthe EIS, during upset conditions, significant
[throughout it] the zone will be a disturb[ed] zone. After that one or two hectares park the water negative environmental impact will result from the emissions. This claim was refuted by RP
temperature is well mixed [so] that the temperature above the normal existing variation now practically Energys witness during cross-examination:
drops down to almost the normal level.124
2. On air pollution due todust and combustion gases. ATTY. AZURA:
To establish that the emissions from the operation of the power plant would be compliant with the If I may refer you to another page of the same annex, Ms. Mercado, thats page 202 of the same
standards under the Clean Air Act,125 Ms. Mercado stated in her Judicial Affidavit thus: document, the August 2012. Fig. 2-78 appears to show, theres a Table, Ms. Mercado, the first
271. Q: What was the result of the Air Dispersion Modeling that was conducted for RP Energy? table, the one on top appears to show a comparison in normal and upset conditions. I noticed, Ms.
A: The Air Dispersion Modeling predicted that the Power Plant Project will produce the following Mercado, that the black bars are much higher than the bars in normal condition. Can you state
emissions,which [are] fully compliant with the standards set by DENR: what this means?
Predicted GLC126 for 1-hr National Ambient Air Quality MS. MERCADO:
averaging period Guideline Values
It means there are more emissions that could potentially be released when it is under upset
SO2 45.79 g/Nm3 340 g/Nm3 condition.
NO2 100.8 g/Nm3 260 g/Nm3 ATTY. AZURA:
CO 10 g/Nm3 35 g/Nm3
I also noticed, Ms. Mercado, at the bottom part of this chart there are Receptor IDs, R1, R2, R3
and so forth and on page 188 of this same document, Annex "9-Mercado," there is a list identifying
Predicted GLC for 8-hr averaging period National Ambient Air Quality these receptors, for example, Receptor 6, Your Honor, appears to have been located in Olongapo
Guideline Values City, Poblacion. Just so I can understand, Ms. Mercado, does that mean that if upset condition[s]
CO 0.19 mg/ncm 10 g/Nm3 were to occur, the Olongapo City Poblacion will be affected by the emissions? MS. MERCADO:
All it means is that there will be higher emissions and a higher ground concentration. But you
Predicted GLC for 24-hr averaging period National Ambient Air Quality might want to alsopay attention to the "y axis," it says there GLC/CAA [Ground Level
Guideline Values
Concentration/Clean Air Act limit]. So it means that even under upset conditions say for R6, the
SO2 17.11 g/Nm3 180 g/Nm3
ground level concentration for upset condition is still around .1 or 10% percent only of the Clean
NO2 45.79 g/Nm3 150 g/Nm3 Air Act limit. So its still much lower than the limit.
ATTY. AZURA:
Predicted GLC for 1-yr averaging period National Ambient Air Quality

But that would mean, would it not, Ms. Mercado, that in the event of upset conditions[,]
emissionswould increase in the Olongapo City Poblacion?
MS. MERCADO:
Not emissions will increase. The emissions will be the same but the ground level concentration, the
GLC, will be higher if you compare normal versus upset. But even if it[]s under upset conditions, it
is still only around 10% percent of the Clean Air Act Limit.
xxxx
J. LEAGOGO:
So you are trying to impress upon this Court that even if the plant is in an upset condition, it will
emit less than what the national standards dictate?
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, Your Honor.128
With respect to the claims that the powerplant will release dangerous PAHs and CO, Engr. Sarrki
stated in his Judicial Affidavit thus:
Q: In page 42, paragraph 102 of the Petition, the Petitioners alleged that Volatile Organic
Compounds ("VOC") specifically Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon ("PAH") will be emitted even by
CFB boilers. What can you say about this?
A: Actually, the study cited by the Petitioners does not apply to the present case because it does
not refer to CFB technology. The study refers to a laboratory-scale tubular Bubbling Fluidized Bed
("BFB") test rig and not a CFB. CFB boilers will emit PAHs but only in minimal amounts. Indeed, a
BFB will produce higher PAH emissions.
xxxx
Q: Why can the study cited by Petitioners not apply in the present case?
A: The laboratory-scale BFB used in the study only has one (1) air injection point and does not
replicate the staged-air combustion process of the CFB that RP Energy will use. Thisstaged-air
process includes the secondary air. Injecting secondary air into the system will lead to more
complete combustion and inhibits PAH production. There is a study entitled "Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions from a Coal-Fired Pilot FBC System" byKunlei Liu, Wenjun Han, Wei-
Ping Pan, John T. Riley found in the Journal of Hazardous Materials B84 (2001) where the findings
are discussed.
Also, the small-scale test rig utilized in the study does not simulate the process conditions
(hydrodynamics, heat transfer characteristics, solid and gas mixing behavior, etc.) seen in a large
scale utility boiler, like those which would be utilized by the Power Plant Project.
xxxx
Q: Aside from residence time of particles and secondary air, what other factors, if any, reduce PAH
production?
A: Increase in the excess air ratio will also minimizePAH production. Furthermore, decrease in
Calcium to Sulfur moral ratio ("Ca/S"), as well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of
coal will likewise minimize PAH production. This is also based on the study entitled "Polycyclic
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 83 of 140
Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions from a Coal-Fired Pilot FBC System" by Kunlei Liu, Wenjun
Han, Wei-Ping Pan, John T. Riley.
In RP Energys Power Plant Project, the projected coal to be utilized has low sulfur and chlorine
contents minimizing PAH production. Also, due to optimum conditions for the in-furnace
SO2capture, the Ca/S will be relatively low, decreasing PAH production.
Q: In paragraph 104 of the Petition, it was alleged that "Carbon monoxide (CO), a poisonous,
colorless and odorless gas is also produced when there is partial oxidation or when there is not
enough oxygen (O2) to form carbon dioxide (CO2)." What can you say about this?
A: CFB technology reduces the CO emissions of the Power Plant Project to safe amounts. In fact, I
understand that the projected emissions level of the Power Plant Project compl[ies]with the
International Finance Corporation ("IFC") standards. Furthermore, characteristics of CFB
technology such as long residence time, uniform temperature and high turbulence provide an
effective combustion environment which results [in] lower and safer CO emissions.
Q: I have no further questions for youat the moment. Is there anything you wish to add to the
foregoing?
A: Yes. PAH is a natural product of ANY combustion process. Even ordinary burning, such as
cooking or driving automobiles, will have some emissions that are not considered harmful. It is only
when emissions are of a significant level that damage may be caused.
Given that the Power Plant Project will utilize CFB technology, it will have minimal PAH emissions.
The high combustion efficiency of CFB technology, due to the long residence time of particles
inside the boiler, leads to the minimal emissions of PAH. Furthermore,other factors such as
increase in the excess air ratio, decrease in Ca/S, as well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine
contents of coal will likewise minimize PAH production. CFB does not cause emissions beyond
scientifically acceptable levels, and we are confident it will not result in the damage speculated by
the Petitioners.129
3. On water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste.
With regard to the claim that coal combustion waste produced by the plant will endanger the
health of the inhabitants nearby, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial Affidavit thus:
Q: In page 43, paragraph 110 of the Petition, it was alleged that: "[s]olid coal combustion waste is
highly toxic and is said to cause birth defects and cancer risks among others x x x." What is your
expert opinion, if any, on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?
A: Coal is geologically compressed remains of living organisms that roamed the earth several
million years ago. In the process of compression, some of the minerals in the soil, rocks or mud,
the geologic media for compression, are also imparted into the compressed remains. If the
compressing media of mud, sediments and rocks contain high concentration of mercury, uranium,
and other toxic substances, the coal formed will likewise contain high concentration of those
substances. If the compressing materials have low concentration of those substances, then the coal
formed will likewise have low concentration of those substances. If the coal does not contain
excessive quantities of toxic substances, the solid residues are even used in agriculture to supply
micronutrients and improve the potency of fertilizers. It is used freely as a fill material in roads and
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 84 of 140

other construction activities requiring large volume of fill and as additive in cement manufacture. and treatment method is in fact suitable for disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes
After all, diamonds that people love to hang around their necks and keep close to the chest are although fly ash is not classified as toxic and hazardous materials. 131
nothing more than the result of special geologic action, as those in volcanic pipes on coal. 130 Anent the claims that the plant is susceptible to earthquake and landslides, Dr. Ouano testified
RP Energy further argued, a matter which the Casio Group did not rebut or refute, that the waste thus:
generated by the plant will be properly handled, to wit: J. LEAGOGO:
4.1.49 When coal is burned in the boiler furnace, two by-products are generated - bottom In terms of fault lines, did you study whether this project site is in any fault line?
and fly ash. Bottom ash consists oflarge and fused particles that fall to the bottom of the DR. OUANO:
furnace and mix with the bed media.Fly ash includes finegrained and powdery particles There are some fault linesand in fact, in the Philippines it is very difficult to find an area except
that are carried away by flue gas into the electrostatic precipitator, which is then sifted Palawan where there is no fault line within 20 to 30 [kilometers]. But then fault lines as well as
and collected. These by-products are non-hazardous materials. In fact, a coal power earthquakes really [depend] upon your engineering design. I mean, Sto. Tomas University has
plants Fly Ash, Bottom Ash and Boiler Slag have consequent beneficial uses which withstood all the potential earthquakes we had in Manila[,] even sometimes it[]s intensity 8 or so
"generate significant environmental, economic, and performance benefits." Thus, fly ash because the design for it back in 1600 they are already using what we call floating foundation. So if
generated during the process will be sold and transported to cement manufacturing the engineering side for it[,] technology is there to withstand the expected fault line [movement].
facilities or other local and international industries. J. LEAGOGO:
4.1.50 RP Energy shall also install safety measures to insure that waste from burning of What is the engineering side of the project? You said UST is floating.
coal shall be properly handled and stored. DR. OUANO:
4.1.51 Bottom ash will be continuously collected from the furnace and transferred through The foundation, that means to say you dont break
a series of screw and chain conveyors and bucket elevator to the bottom ash silo. The J. LEAGOGO:
collection and handling system is enclosed to prevent dust generation. Discharge chutes Floating foundation. What about this, what kind of foundation?
will be installed at the base of the bottom ash silo for unloading. Open trucks will be used DR. OUANO:
to collect ash through the discharge chutes. Bottom ash will be sold, and unsold ash will It will now depend on their engineering design, the type of equipment
be stored in ash cells. A portion of the bottom ash will be reused as bed materialthrough J. LEAGOGO:
the installation of a bed media regeneration system (or ash recycle). Recycled bottom ash No, but did you read it in their report?
will be sieved using a vibrating screen and transported to a bed material surge bin for re- DR. OUANO: It[]s not there in their report because it will depend on the supplier, the equipment
injection into the boiler. supplier.
4.1.52 Fly ash from the electrostatic precipitator is pneumatically removed from the J. LEAGOGO:
collection hopper using compressed air and transported in dry state to the fly ash silo. Two So it[]s not yet there?
discharge chutes will be installed at the base of the fly ash silo. Fly ash can either be dry- DR. OUANO:
transferred through a loading spout into an enclosed lorry or truck for selling, re-cycling, It[]s not yet there in the site but it is also covered inour Building Code what are the intensities of
or wet-transferred through a wet unloader into open dump trucks and transported to ash earthquakes expected of the different areas in the Philippines.
cells. Fly ash discharge will operate in timed cycles, with an override function to J. LEAGOGO:
achievecontinuous discharge if required. Fly ash isolation valves in each branch line will Have you checked our geo-hazard maps in the Philippines to check on this project site?
prevent leakage and backflow into non-operating lines. DR. OUANO:
4.1.53 Approximately 120,000m will be required for the construction of the ash cell. Ash Yes. It is included there in the EIA Report.
will be stacked along the sloping hill, within a grid of excavations (i.e. cells) with a 5m J. LEAGOGO:
embankment. Excavated soils will be used for embankment construction and backfill. To It[]s there?
prevent infiltration [of] ash deposits into the groundwater, a clay layer with minimum DR. OUANO:
depth of400mm will be laid at the base of each cell. For every 1-m depth of ash deposit, a It[]s there.132
10-cm soil backfill will be applied to immobilize ash and prevent migration via wind. Ash 4. On acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.
cell walls will be lined with high-density polyethylene to prevent seepage. This procedure Relative to the threat of acid rain, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial Affidavit, thus:
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 85 of 140

Q: In page 44, paragraph 114 of the Petition, it was alleged that "the coalfired power plant will Because it[]s going to be mixed withthe air in the atmosphere; diluted in the air in the
release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides (NOx) per year and 886 tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2) per year. atmosphere. And besides this 886 tons, this is not released in one go, it is released almost
These oxides are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric acid which are throughout the year.
responsible for acid deposition." Whatis your expert opinion on this matter alleged by the J. LEAGOGO:
Petitioners? You also answered in Question No. 61, "acid raintakes place when the NO2 AND SO2 concentration
A: NO2 is found in the air, water and soil from natural processes such as lightning, bacterial are excessive." So whendo you consider it as excessive?
activities and geologic activities as well as from human activities such as power plants and fertilizer DR. OUANO:
usage in agriculture. SO2 is also found in air, water and soil from bacterial, geologic and human That is something when you are talking about acid
activities. NO2 and SO2 in the air are part of the natural nitrogen and sulfur cycle to widely J. LEAGOGO:
redistribute and recycle those essential chemicals for use by plants. Without the NO2 and SO2 in In terms of tons of nitrous oxide and tons of sulfur oxide, when do you consider it as excessive?
the air, plant and animal life would be limited to small areas of this planet where nitrogen and DR. OUANO:
sulfur are found in abundance. With intensive agricultural practices, nitrogen and sulfur are added It is in concentration not on tons weight, Your Honor.
in the soil as fertilizers. J. LEAGOGO:
Acid rain takes place when the NO2 and SO2 concentration are excessive or beyond those values In concentration?
set in the air quality standards. NO2 and SO2 in the air in concentrations lower than those set in DR. OUANO:
the standards have beneficial effect to the environment and agriculture and are commonly known In milligrams per cubic meter, milligrams per standard cubic meter.
as micronutrients.133 J. LEAGOGO:
On clarificatory questions from the appellate court, the matter was further dissected thus: So being an expert, whatwill be the concentration of this kind of 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide? What
J. LEAGOGO: will be the concentration in terms of your?
x x x The project will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide per year. And he said, yes; that witness DR. OUANO:
answered, yes, itwill produce 886 tons of sulfur dioxide per year. And he also answered yes, that If the concentration is in excess ofsomething like 8,000 micrograms per standard cubic meters,
these oxides are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric acid. Now my then there isalready potential for acid rain.
clarificatory question is, with this kind of releases there will be acid rain? J. LEAGOGO:
DR. OUANO: I am asking you, Dr. Ouano, you said it will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide?
No. DR. OUANO:
J. LEAGOGO: Yes .
Why? J. LEAGOGO:
DR. OUANO: In terms of concentration, what will that be?
Because it[]s so dilute[d]. DR. OUANO:
J. LEAGOGO: In terms of the GHD study that will result [in] 19 milligrams per standard cubic meters and the
It will? time when acid rain will start [is when the concentration gets] around 8,000 milligrams per
DR. OUANO: standard cubic meters. So we have 19 compared to 8,000. So weare very, very safe.
Because the acid concentration is so dilute[d] so that it is not going to cause acid rain. J. LEAGOGO:
J. LEAGOGO: What about SO2?
The acid concentration is so diluted that it will not cause acid rain? DR. OUANO:
DR. OUANO: SO2, we are talking about ... youwont mind if I go to my codigo. For sulfur dioxide this acid rain
Yes . most likely will start at around 7,000 milligrams per standard cubic meter but then sorry, it[]s
J. LEAGOGO: around 3,400 micrograms per cubic meter. That is the concentration for sulfur dioxide, and in our
What do you mean it[]s so diluted? How will it be diluted? plant it will be around 45 micrograms per standard cubic meter. So the acid rain will start at 3,400
DR. OUANO: and the emission is estimated here to result to concentration of 45.7 micrograms.

J. LEAGOGO:
That is what GHD said in their report.
DR. OUANO:
Yes. So that is the factor of x x x safety that we have.134
Apart from the foregoing evidence, wealso note that the above and other environmental concerns
are extensively addressed in RP Energys Environmental Management Plan or Program(EMP). The
EMP is "a section in the EIS that details the prevention, mitigation, compensation, contingency and
monitoring measures to enhance positive impacts and minimize negative impacts and risks of a
proposed project or undertaking."135 One of the conditions of the ECC is that RP Energy shall
strictly comply with and implement its approved EMP. The Casio Group failed to contest, with
proof, the adequacy of the mitigating measures stated in the aforesaid EMP.
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as to the
alleged significant environmental damage that will be caused by the project, the appellate court
relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord withjudicial precedents.
Thus, we ruled in one case:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative
weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in
favor of the side for whom he testifies,the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities
for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which
serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it isto
be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effects (20 Am. Jur.,
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable inthe
absence of an abuse of that discretion.136
Hence, we sustain the appellate courts findings that the Casio Group failed to establish the
alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the construction and operation of the
power plant.
In another vein, we, likewise, agree with the observationsof the appellate court that the type of
coal which shall be used in the power plant has important implications as to the possible significant
negative environmental impacts of the subject project.137 However, there is no coal supply
agreement, as of yet, entered into by RP Energy with a third-party supplier. In accordance with the
terms and conditions of the ECC and in compliance with existing environmental laws and
standards, RP Energy is obligated to make use of the proper coal type that will not cause
significant negative environmental impacts.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 86 of 140
The alleged negative environmental
assessment of the project by experts in a
report generated during the social
acceptability consultations
The Casio Group also relies heavily on a report on the social acceptability process of the power
plant project to bolster itsclaim that the project will cause grave environmental damage. We
purposely discuss this matter in this separate subsection for reasons which will be made clear
shortly.
But first we shall present the pertinent contents of this report.
According to the Casio Group, from December 7 to 9, 2011, the SBMA conducted social
acceptabilitypolicy consultations with different stakeholders on RP Energys proposed 600 MW coal
plant project at the Subic Bay Exhibition and Convention Center. The results thereof are contained
in a document prepared by SBMA entitled "Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy,
Inc.s 600-MW Coal Plant Project" (Final Report). We notethat SBMA adopted the Final Report as a
common exhibit with the Casio Group in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court.
The Final Report stated that there was a clear aversion to the concept of a coal-fired power plant
from the participants. Their concerns included environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural
factors. Pertinent to this case is the alleged assessment, contained in the Final Report, of the
potential effects of the project by three experts: (1) Dr. Rex Cruz (Dr. Cruz), Chancellor of the
University of the Philippines, Los Baos and a forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a
toxicologist, who related information as to public health; and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a marine
biologist.
The Final Report stated these expertsalleged views on the project, thus:
IV. EXPERTS OPINION
xxxx
The specialists shared the judgment that the conditions were not present to merit the operation of
a coal-fired power plant,and to pursue and carry out the project with confidence and assurance
that the natural assets and ecosystems within the Freeport area would not be unduly
compromised, or that irreversible damage would not occur and that the threats to the flora and
fauna within the immediate community and its surroundings would be adequately addressed. The
three experts were also of the same opinion that the proposed coal plant project would pose a
wide range of negative impacts on the environment, the ecosystems and human population within
the impact zone.

The specialists likewise deemed the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted by RPEI to
be incomplete and limited in scope based on the following observations:
i. The assessment failed to include areas 10km. to 50km. from the operation site, although
according tothe panel, sulfur emissions could extend as far as 40-50 km.
ii. The EIA neglected to include other forests in the Freeport in its scope and that there
were no specific details on the protection of the endangered flora and endemic fauna in
the area. Soil, grassland, brush land, beach forests and home gardens were also
apparently not included in the study.
iii. The sampling methods used inthe study were limited and insufficient for effective long-
term monitoring of surface water, erosion control and terrestrial flora and fauna.
The specialists also discussed the potential effects of an operational coalfired power plant [on] its
environs and the community therein. Primary among these were the following:
i. Formation of acid rain, which would adversely affect the trees and vegetation in the area
which, in turn, would diminish forest cover. The acid rain would apparently worsen the
acidity of the soil in the Freeport.
ii. Warming and acidification of the seawater in the bay, resulting in the bio-
accumulationof contaminants and toxic materials which would eventually lead to the
overall reduction of marine productivity.
iii. Discharge of pollutants such as Nitrous Oxide, Sodium Oxide, Ozone and other heavy
metals suchas mercury and lead to the surrounding region, which would adversely affect
the health of the populace in the vicinity.
V. FINDINGS
Based on their analyses of the subject matter, the specialists recommended that the SBMA re-
scrutinize the coal-fired power plant project with the following goals in mind:
i. To ensure its coherence and compatibility to [the] SBMA mandate, vision, mission and
development plans, including its Protected Area Management Plan;
ii. To properly determine actual and potential costs and benefits;
iii. To effectively determine the impacts on environment and health; and
iv. To ensure a complete and comprehensive impacts zone study.
The specialists also urged the SBMA to conduct a Comprehensive Cost And Benefit Analysis Of The
Proposed Coal Plant Project Relative To Each Stakeholder Which Should Include The Environment
As Provider Of Numerous Environmental Goods And Services.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 87 of 140
They also recommended an Integrated/Programmatic Environmental Impact Assessmentto
accurately determine the environmental status of the Freeport ecosystem as basis and reference in
evaluating future similar projects. The need for a more Comprehensive Monitoring System for the
Environment and Natural Resourceswas also reiterated by the panel.138
Of particular interest are the alleged key observations of Dr. Cruz on the EIS prepared by RP
Energy relative to the project:
Key Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE Project
Rex Victor O. Cruz
Based on SBMA SAP on December 7-9, 2011
1. The baseline vegetation analysis was limited only within the project site and its immediate
vicinity. No vegetation analysis was done in the brushland areas in the peninsula which is likely
to be affected in the event acid rain forms due to emissions from the power plant.
2. The forest in the remaining forests inthe Freeport was not considered as impact zone as
indicated by the lack ofdescription of these forests and the potential impacts the project might
have on these forests. This appears to be a key omission in the EIS considering that these
forests are well within 40 to 50 km away from the site and that there are studies showing that
the impacts of sulphur emissions can extend as far as 40 to 50 km away from the source.
3. There are 39 endemic fauna and 1 endangered plant species (Molave) in the proposed
project site. There will be a need to make sure that these species are protected from being
damaged permanently in wholesale. Appropriate measures such as ex situconservation and
translocation if feasible must be implemented.
4. The Project site is largely in grassland interspersed with some trees. These plants if affected
by acid rain or by sulphur emissions may disappear and have consequences on the soil
properties and hydrological processes in the area. Accelerated soil erosion and increased surface
runoff and reduced infiltration of rainwater into the soil.
5. The rest of the peninsula is covered with brushland but were never included as part of the
impact zone.
6. There are home gardens along the coastal areas of the site planted to ornamental and
agricultural crops which are likely to be affected by acid rain.
7. There is also a beach forest dominated by aroma, talisai and agoho which will likely be
affectedalso by acid rain.

8. There are no Environmentally Critical Areas within the 1 km radius from the project site.
However, the OlongapoWatershed Forest Reserve, a protected area is approximately 10
kmsouthwest of the projectsite. Considering the prevailing wind movement in the area, this
forest reserve is likely to be affected by acid rain if it occurs from the emission of the power
plant. This forest reserve is however not included as partof the potential impact area.
9. Soil in the project site and the peninsula is thin and highly acidic and deficient in NPK with
moderate to severe erosion potential. The sparse vegetation cover in the vicinity of the
projectsite is likely a result of the highly acidic soil and the nutrient deficiency. Additional acidity
may result from acid rain that may form in the area which could further make it harder for the
plants to grow in the area that in turn could exacerbate the already severe erosion in the area.
10. There is a need to review the proposalto ensure that the proposed project is consistent with
the vision for the Freeport as enunciated in the SBMA Master Plan and the Protected Area
Management Plan. This will reinforce the validity and legitimacy of these plans as a legitimate
framework for screening potential locators in the Freeport. Itwill also reinforce the trust and
confidence of the stakeholders on the competence and authority of the SBMA that would
translate in stronger popular support to the programs implemented in the Freeport.
11. The EGF and Trust Fund (Table 5.13) should be made clear that the amounts are the
minimum amount and that adequate funds will be provided by the proponent as necessary
beyond the minimum amounts. Furthermore the basis for the amounts allocated for the items
(public liability and rehabilitation) in Trust Fund and in EGF (tree planting and landscaping,
artificial reef establishment) must be clarified. The specific damages and impacts that will be
covered by the TF and EGF must also be presented clearly at the outset to avoid protracted
negotiations in the event of actual impacts occurring in the future.
12. The monitoring plan for terrestrial flora and fauna is not clear on the frequency of
measurement. More importantly, the proposed method of measurement (sampling transect)
while adequate for estimating the diversity of indices for benchmarking is not sufficient for
long[-]term monitoring. Instead, long[-]term monitoringplots (at least 1 hectare in size) should
be established to monitor the long[-]term impacts of the project on terrestrial flora and fauna.
13. Since the proposed monitoring of terrestrial flora and fauna is limited to the vicinity of the
project site, it will be useful not only for mitigating and avoiding unnecessary adverse impacts
ofthe project but also for improving management decisions if long[-]term monitoring plots for
the remaining natural forests in the Freeport are established. These plots will also be useful for
the study of the dynamic interactions of terrestrial flora and fauna with climate change, farming
and other human activities and the resulting influences on soil, water, biodiversity, and other
vital ecosystem services in the Freeport.139
We agree with the appellate court that the alleged statements by these experts cannot be given
weight because they are hearsay evidence. None of these alleged experts testified before the
appellate court to confirm the pertinent contents of the Final Report. No reason appears in the
records of this case as to why the Casio Group failed to present these expert witnesses.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 88 of 140
We note, however, that these statements, on their face, especially the observations of Dr. Cruz,
raise serious objections to the environmental soundness of the project, specifically, the EIS
thereof.It brings to fore the question of whether the Court can, on its own, compel the testimonies
of these alleged experts in order to shed light on these matters in view of the rightat stake not
just damage to the environment but the health, well-being and,ultimately, the livesof those who
may be affected by the project.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and
methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect orsafeguard the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6 (l)140 of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to
settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services of a
qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12 141 of Rule 7 (Writ of
Kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or
inspection of documents or things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling
information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained in this wise: [T]he writ of
kalikasanwas refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between allegation and proof by providing a
remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel the production of information within the
custody of the government. The writ would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of
the right to information about the environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1)
anything related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or information controlled by
the government or private entity and (2) [i]nformation contained in documents such as
environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit
may also be employed to compel the production of information, subject to constitutional
limitations. This function is analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of upon
application for the writ.142
Clearly, in environmental cases, the power toappoint friends of the court in order to shed light on
matters requiring special technical expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and
production of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind, the Rules to
allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule on the issues
presented for its resolution, to the end that the right toa healthful and balanced ecology may be
adequately protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional rights of an
accused, when life or liberty isat stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be compelled as an
attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of a
substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the path of caution and prudence by
compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final Report, there is no
sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses for the
following reasons.
First, the statementsare not sufficiently specificto point to us a flaw (or flaws) in the study or
design/implementation (or some other aspect) of the project which provides a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the construction and operation ofthe project vis--vis
potential grave environmental damage. In particular, they do not explain why the Environmental

Management Plan (EMP) contained in the EIS of the project will notadequately address these
concerns.
Second, some of the concerns raisedin the alleged statements, like acid rain, warming and
acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants were, as previously discussed, addressed
by the evidence presented by RP Energy before the appellate court. Again, these alleged
statements do not explain why such concerns are not adequately covered by the EMP of RP
Energy.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain aspects of the EIS, do
not clearly and specifically establish how these omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that
will pose significant negative environmental impacts once the project is constructed and becomes
operational. The recommendations stated therein would seem to suggest points for improvement in
the operation and monitoring of the project,but they do not clearly show why such
recommendations are indispensable for the project to comply with existing environmental laws and
standards, or how non-compliance with such recommendations will lead to an environmental
damage of the magnitude contemplatedunder the writ of kalikasan. Again, these statements do not
state with sufficient particularity how the EMP in the EIS failed to adequately address these
concerns.
Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged expert witnesses does not
appear on record, we cannot assume that their testimonies are being unduly suppressed.
By ruling that we do not find a sufficiently compelling reason to compel the taking of the
testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses in relation to their serious objections to the power
plant project, we do not foreclose the possibility that their testimonies could later on be presented,
in a proper case, to more directly, specifically and sufficientlyassail the environmental soundness of
the project and establish the requisite magnitude of actualor threatened environmental damage, if
indeed present. After all, their sense ofcivic duty may well prevail upon them to voluntarily testify,
if there are truly sufficient reasons tostop the project, above and beyond their inadequate claims in
the Final Report that the project should not be pursued. As things now stand,however, we have
insufficient bases to compel their testimonies for the reasons already proffered.
The alleged admissions of grave environmental damage in the EIS of the project.
In their Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration before the appellate court and
Petition for Review before thisCourt, the Casio Group belatedly claims that the statements in the
EIS prepared by RPEnergy established the significant negative environmental impacts of the
project. They argue in this manner:
Acid Rain
35. According to RP Energys Environmental Impact Statement for its proposed 2 x 150 MW Coal-
Fired Thermal Power Plant Project, acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal, to wit x x x x
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 89 of 140
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions of particulates SOx and
NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of acid rain due to elevated SO2 levels in the
atmosphere. High levels of NO2 emissions may give rise to health problems for residents within the
impact area.
Asthma Attacks
36. The same EPRMP143 mentioned the incidence of asthma attacks [as a] result of power plant
operations, to wit
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may increase
due to exposure to suspended particulates from plant operations. 144
RP Energy, however, counters that the above portions of the EIS were quoted out of context. As to
the subject of acid rain, the EIS states in full:
Operation
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions of particulates, SOx and
NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of acid rain due to elevated SO2 levels in the
atmosphere. High levels of NO2 emissions may give rise to health problems for residents within the
impact area. Emissions may also have an effect onvegetation (Section 4.1.4.2). However, the use
of CFBC technology is a built-in measure that results in reduced emission concentrations. SOx
emissions will beminimised by the inclusion of a desulfurisation process, whilst NOx emissions will
be reduced as the coal is burned at a temperature lower than that required to oxidise
nitrogen.145 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the subject of asthma attacks, the EIS states in full:
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may increase
due to exposureto suspended particulates from plant operations. Coal and ash particulates may
also become suspended and dispersed into the air during unloading and transport, depending on
wind speed and direction. However, effect on air quality due to windblown coal particulates will be
insignificant as the coal handling system will have enclosures (i.e. enclosed conveyors and coal
dome) to eliminate the exposure of coal to open air, and therefore greatly reduce the potential for
particulates from being carried away by wind (coalhandling systems, Section 3.4.3.3). In addition,
the proposed process will include an electrostaticprecipitator that will remove fly ash from the flue
gas prior to its release through the stacks, and so particulates emissions will be
minimal.146 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with RP Energy that, while the EIS discusses the subjects of acid rain and asthma
attacks, it goes on to state that there are mitigating measures that will be put in place to prevent
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 90 of 140

these ill effects. Quite clearly, the Casio Group quoted piecemeal the EIS in sucha way as to of the DENR. This is your "Exhibit "18." Would you like to go over this? Are you familiar with this
mislead this Court as to its true and full contents. document?
MS. MERCADO:
We deplore the way the Casio Group has argued this point and we take this time to remind it that Yes, it[]s my Annex "3," Your Honor.
litigants should not trifle withcourt processes. Along the same lines, we note how the Casio Group J. LEAGOGO:
has made serious allegations in its Petition for Writ of Kalikasanbut failed to substantiate the same
I would like to refer you to page 3 of the ECC dated December 22, 2008. Page 2 refers to the
in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court. In particular, during the preliminary
conference of this case, the Casio Group expressly abandoned its factual claims on the alleged Environmental Compliance Certificate, ECC Ref. No. 0804-011-4021. Thats page 2 of the letter
grave environmental damage that will be caused by the power plant (i.e., air, water and land dated December 22, 2008. And on page 3, Dr. Julian Amador recommended approval and it was
pollution) and, instead, limited itself to legal issues regarding the alleged non-compliance of RP approved by Sec. Atienza. You see that on page 3?
Energy with certain laws and rules in the procurement of the ECC.147 We also note how the Casio MS. MERCADO:
Group failed to comment on the subject Petitions before this Court, which led this Court to Yes, Your Honor.
eventually dispense with its comment.148 We must express our disapproval over the way it has
J. LEAGOGO:
prosecuted itsclaims, bordering as it does on trifling with court processes. We deem itproper,
Okay. On the same page, page 3, theres a Statement of Accountability.
therefore, to admonishit to be more circumspect in how it prosecutesits claims.
MS. MERCADO:
In sum, we agree with the appellate court that the Casio Group failed to substantiate its claims Yes, Your Honor.
thatthe construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the J. LEAGOGO:
magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. The evidence it presented is inadequate to Luis, who is Luis Miguel Aboitiz?
establish the factual bases of its claims. MS. MERCADO:
During that time he was the authorized representative of RP Energy,
II.Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), as Your Honor.
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability of the ECC. J. LEAGOGO:
Now, who is the authorized representative of RP Energy?
The appellate court ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz failed to sign the Statement of MS. MERCADO:
Accountability portion of the ECC.
It would be Mr. Aaron Domingo, I believe.
J. LEAGOGO:
We shall discuss the correctness ofthis ruling on both procedural and substantive grounds.
Procedurally, we cannot fault the DENR for protesting the manner by which the appellate court Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, the Statement of
resolved the issue of the aforesaid lack of signature. We agree with the DENR that this issue was Accountability?
not among those raised by the Casio Group in its Petition for Writ of Kalikasan. 149 What is more, Because the Statement of Accountability says, "Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Director, representing
this was not one of the triable issues specificallyset during the preliminary conference of this Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address located at 110 Legaspi Street, Legaspi Village,
case.150 Makati City, takes full responsibility in complying with all conditions in thisEnvironmental
Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]" Will you tell this Court why this was not signed?
How then did the issue oflack of signature arise? MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasnt signed. My apologies, I was the one who provided
A review of the voluminous records indicates that the matterof the lack of signature was discussed, this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was not signed because during.
developed or surfaced only inthe course of the hearings, specifically, on clarificatory questions from
J. LEAGOGO:
the appellate court, to wit:
But this is your exhibit, this is yourExhibit "18" and this is not signed. Do you agree with me that
J. LEAGOGO: your Exhibit "18" is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
I would also show to you your ECC, thats page 622 of the rollo. I am showing to you this MS. MERCADO:
Environmental Compliance Certificate dated December 22, 2008 issued by Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. Thats correct, Your Honor.151

We find this line of questioning inadequate to apprise the parties that the lack of signature would
be a key issue in this case; as in fact it became decisive in the eventual invalidation of the ECC by
the appellate court.
Concededly, a court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in order to attain substantial
justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into consideration matters not
originally within the scope of the issues raised in the pleadings or set during the preliminary
conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In the case at bar, the importance of the
signature cannot be seriously doubted because it goes into the consent and commitment of the
project proponent to comply with the conditions of the ECC, which is vital to the protection of the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology of those who may be affected by the project.
Nonetheless, the power of a court tosuspend its rules of procedure in exceptional cases does not
license it to foist a surprise on the parties in a given case. To illustrate, in oral arguments before
this Court, involving sufficiently important public interest cases, we note that individual members of
the Court, from time to time, point out matters that may not have been specifically covered by the
advisory (the advisory delineates the issues to be argued and decided). However, a directive is
given to the concerned parties to discuss the aforesaid matters in their memoranda. Such a
procedure ensures that, at the very least, the parties are apprised that the Court has taken an
interest in such matters and may adjudicate the case on the basis thereof. Thus, the parties are
given an opportunity to adequately argue the issue or meet the issue head-on. We, therefore, find
that the appellate court should have, at the very least, directed RP Energy and the DENR to discuss
and elaborate on the issue of lack of signature in the presentation of their evidence and
memoranda, beforemaking a definitive ruling that the lack thereof invalidated the ECC.This is in
keeping with the basic tenets of due process.
At any rate, we shall disregard the procedural defect and rule directly on whether the lack of
signature invalidated the ECC in the interest of substantial justice.
The laws governing the ECC, i.e., PresidentialDecree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not
specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of
invalidating the ECC. Unlike in wills or donations, where failure to comply withthe specific form
prescribed by law leads to its nullity,152 the applicable laws here are silentwith respect to the
necessity of a signature in the Statement of Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This
is, of course, understandable because the Statement of Accountability is a mere off-shoot of the
rule-making powers of the DENR relative tothe implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To
determine, therefore, the effect of the lack of signature, we must look atthe significance thereof
under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the DENR and the surrounding
circumstances of this case.
To place this issue in its proper context, a helpful overview of the stages of the EIA process, taken
from the Revised Manual, is reproduced below:
Figure 1-3 Overview of Stages of the Philippine EIA Process153
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 91 of 140
1.0 SCREENING Screeningdetermines if a project is covered or not covered by the PEISS. 154If a project
is covered, screening further determines what document type the project should
prepare to secure the needed approval, and what the rest of the requirements are in
terms of EMB office of application, endorsing and decision authorities, duration of
processing.
2.0 SCOPING Scopingis a Proponent-driven multi-sectoral formal process of determining the focused
Terms of Reference of the EIA Study. Scoping identifies the most significant
issues/impacts of a proposed project, and then, delimits the extent of baseline
information to those necessary to evaluate and mitigate the impacts. The need for and
scope of an Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is also done during the scoping
session. Scoping is done with the local community through Public Scoping and with a
third party EIA Review Committee (EIARC) through Technical Scoping, both with the
participation of the DENR-EMB. The process results in a signed Formal Scoping
Checklist by the review team, with final approval by the EMB Chief.
EIA STUDY and The EIA Studyinvolves a description of the proposed project and its alternatives,
3.0 REPORT characterization of the project environment, impact identification and prediction,
PREPARATION evaluation of impact significance, impact mitigation, formulation of Environmental
Management and Monitoring Plan, withcorresponding cost estimates and institutional
support commitment. The study results are presented in an EIA Reportfor which an
outline is prescribed by EMB for every major document type
EIA REPORT Review of EIA Reportsnormally entails an EMB procedural screening for compliance
4.0 REPORT with minimum requirements specified during Scoping, followed by a substantive review
and of either composed third party experts commissioned by EMB as the EIA Review
EVALUATION Committee for PEIS/EIS-based applications, or DENR/EMB internal specialists, the
Technical Committee, for IEE-based applications. EMB evaluates the EIARC
recommendations and the publics inputs during public consultations/hearings in the
process of recommending a decision on the application. The EIARC Chair signs EIARC
recommendations including issues outside the mandate of the EMB. The entire EIA
review and evaluation process is summarized in the Review Process Report (RPR) of
the EMB, which includes a draft decision document.
5.0 DECISION Decision Making involves evaluation of EIA recommendations and the draft decision
MAKING document, resulting to the issuance of an ECC, CNC or Denial Letter. When approved,
a covered project is issued its certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment
(ECC) while an application of a non-covered project is issued a Certificate of Non-
Coverage (CNC). Endorsing and deciding authorities are designated by AO 155 42, and
further detailed in this Manual for every report type. Moreover, the Proponent signs a
sworn statement of full responsibility on implementation of its commitments prior to
the release of the ECC. 156 The ECC is then transmitted to concerned LGUs and other
GAs for integration into their decisionmaking process. The regulated part of EIA Review
is limited to the processes within EMB control. The timelines for the issuance of
decision documents provided for in AO 42 and DAO 2003-30 are applicable only from
the time the EIA Report is accepted for substantive review to the time a decision is

issued on the application.
MONITORING. Monitoring, Validation and Evaluation/Audit stage assesses performance of the
6.0 Proponent against the ECC and itscommitments in the Environmental Management and
VALIDATION, Monitoring Plans to ensure actual impacts of the project are adequately prevented or
and mitigated.
EVALUATION/
AUDIT
The signing of the Statement of Accountability takes placeat the Decision Making Stage. After a
favorable review of its ECC application, the project proponent, through its authorized
representative, is made to sign a sworn statement of full responsibility on the implementation ofits
commitments prior to the official release of the ECC.
The definition of the ECC in the Revised Manual highlights the importance of the signing of the
Statement of Accountability:
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) - a certificate of Environmental Compliance
Commitment to which the Proponent conforms with, after DENR-EMB explains the ECC conditions,
by signing the sworn undertaking of full responsibility over implementation of specified measures
which are necessary to comply with existing environmental regulations or to operate within best
environmental practices that are not currently covered by existing laws. It is a document issued by
the DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC application, certifying that the Proponent has
complied with all the requirements of the EIS System and has committed to implement its
approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC also provides guidance to other agencies and
to LGUs on EIA findings and recommendations, which need to be considered in their respective
decision-making process.157(Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the signing of the Statement of Accountabilityis an integral and significant
component of the EIA process and the ECC itself. The evident intention is to bind the project
proponentto the ECC conditions, which will ensure that the project will not cause significant
negative environmental impacts by the "implementation of specified measures which are necessary
to comply with existing environmental regulations or tooperate within best environmental practices
that are not currently covered by existing laws." Indeed, the EIA process would be a meaningless
exercise if the project proponent shall not be strictly bound to faithfully comply withthe conditions
necessary toadequately protect the right of the people to a healthful and balanced ecology.
Contrary to RP Energys position, we, thus, find that the signature of the project proponents
representative in the Statement of Accountability is necessary for the validity of the ECC. It is not,
as RP Energy would have it, a mere formality and its absence a mere formal defect.
The question then is, was the absence of the signature of Mr. Aboitiz, as representative of RP
Energy, in the Statement of Accountability sufficient ground to invalidate the ECC?
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 92 of 140
Viewed within the particular circumstances of this case, we answer in the negative.
While it is clear that the signing of the Statement of Accountability is necessary for the validity
ofthe ECC, we cannot close oureyes to the particular circumstances of this case. So often have we
ruled that this Court is not merely a court of law but a court of justice. We find that there are
several circumstances present in this case which militate against the invalidation of the ECC on this
ground.
We explain.
First, the reason for the lack of signature was not adequately taken into consideration by the
appellate court. To reiterate, the matter surfaced during the hearing of this case on clarificatory
questions by the appellate court, viz:
J. LEAGOGO:
Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, the Statement of
Accountability?
Because the Statement of Accountability says, "Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Director, representing
Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address located at 110 Legaspi Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City, takes full responsibility in complying with all conditions in this Environmental
Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]" Will you tell this Court why this was not signed?
MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasnt signed. My apologies, I was the one who provided
this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was not signed because during
J. LEAGOGO:
But this is your exhibit, this is yourExhibit "18" and this is not signed. Do you agree with me that
your Exhibit "18" is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
Thats correct, Your Honor.158 (Emphasis supplied)
Due to the inadequacy of the transcriptand the apparent lack of opportunity for the witness to
explain the lack of signature, we find that the witness testimony does not, by itself, indicate that
there was a deliberate or malicious intent not to sign the Statement of Accountability.
Second, as previously discussed, the concerned parties to this case, specifically, the DENR and RP
Energy, werenot properly apprised that the issue relative to the lack of signature would be decisive
inthe determination of the validity of the ECC. Consequently, the DENR and RPEnergy cannot be
faulted for not presenting proof during the course ofthe hearings to squarely tackle the issue of
lack of signature.
Third, after the appellate court ruled in its January 30, 2013 Decision that the lack of signature
invalidated the ECC,RP Energy attached, to its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, a certified true

copy of the ECC, issued by the DENREMB, which bore the signature of Mr. Aboitiz. The certified
true copy of the ECC showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on
December 24, 2008.159
The authenticity and veracity of this certified true copy of the ECC was not controverted by the
Casio Group in itscomment on RP Energys motion for partial reconsideration before the appellate
court nor in their petition before this Court. Thus, in accordance with the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, it remains uncontroverted that the ECC on file with the DENR
contains the requisite signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion.
As previously noted, the DENR and RPEnergy were not properly apprised that the issue relative to
the lack ofsignature would be decisive in the determination of the validity of the ECC. As a result,
we cannot fault RP Energy for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned
that the appellate court had invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack ofsignature in its January
30, 2013 Decision.
We note, however, that, as previously discussed, the certified true copy of the Statement of
Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008 or two days after the ECCs official
release on December 22, 2008. The aforediscussed rules under the Revised Manual, however, state
that the proponent shall sign the sworn statement of full responsibility on implementation of its
commitments priorto the release of the ECC. Itwould seem that the ECC was first issued, then it
was signed by Mr. Aboitiz, and thereafter, returned to the DENR to serve as its file copy.
Admittedly, there is lack of strict compliance with the rules although the signature ispresent. Be
thatas it may, we find nothing in the records to indicate that this was done with bad faith or
inexcusable negligence because of the inadequacy of the evidence and arguments presented,
relative to the issue of lack of signature, in view of the manner this issue arose in this case, as
previously discussed. Absent such proof, we are not prepared to rule that the procedure adopted
by the DENR was done with bad faithor inexcusable negligence but we remind the DENR to be
more circumspect in following the rules it provided in the Revised Manual. Thus, we rule that the
signature requirement was substantially complied with pro hac vice.
Fourth, we partly agree with the DENRthat the subsequent letter-requests for amendments to the
ECC, signed by Mr. Aboitiz on behalf of RP Energy, indicate its implied conformity to the ECC
conditions. In practical terms, if future litigation should occur due to violations of the ECC
conditions, RP Energy would be estopped from denying its consent and commitment to the ECC
conditions even if there was no signature in the Statement of Accountability. However, we note
that the Statement of Accountability precisely serves to obviate any doubt as to the consent and
commitment of the project proponent to the ECC conditions. At any rate, the aforesaid letter-
requests do additionally indicate RP Energys conformity to the ECC conditions and, thus, negate a
pattern to maliciously evade accountability for the ECC conditions or to intentionally create a
"loophole" in the ECC to be exploited in a possible futurelitigation over non-compliance with the
ECC conditions.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 93 of 140
In sum, we rule that the appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECCs Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC
submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of
the ECC, the particular circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not
properly apprised of the issue of lack ofsignature in order for them to present controverting
evidence and arguments on this point, as the matter only developed during the course of the
proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot
be faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had
been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of the
appellate court.
The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of
Accountability portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB and remains uncontroverted. Itshowed that
the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Although the
signing was done two days after the official release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, absent
sufficient proof, we are not prepared to rule that the procedure adoptedby the DENR was done
with bad faith or inexcusable negligence. Thus, werule that the signature requirement was
substantially complied with pro hac vice.
III.Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to undergo a new
environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of inappropriate EIA documents.
Upholding the arguments of the Casio Group, the appellate court ruled that the first and second
amendments tothe ECC were invalid because the ECC contained an express restriction that any
expansion of the project beyond the project description shall be the subject of a new EIA. It found
that both amendments failed to comply with the appropriate EIA documentary requirements under
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. In particular, it found that the Environmental Performance
Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) and Project Description Report (PDR), which RP Energy
submitted tothe DENR, relative to the application for the first and second amendments,
respectively, were not the proper EIA document type. Hence, the appellate court ruled that the
aforesaid amendments were invalid.
Preliminarily, we must state that executive actions carry presumptive validity so that the burden of
proof is on the Casio Group to show that the procedure adopted bythe DENR in granting the
amendments to the ECC were done with grave abuse of discretion. More so here because the
administration of the EIA process involves special technical skill or knowledge which the law has
specifically vested in the DENR.
After our own examination of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual as well as the voluminous EIA
documents of RP Energy appearing in the records of this case, we find that the appellate court
made an erroneous interpretation and application of the pertinent rules.
We explain.

As a backgrounder, PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy. Notably, this law recognized the
right ofthe people to a healthful environment.160 Pursuant thereto, in every action, project or
undertaking, which significantly affects the quality of the environment, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms, and entities were required to prepare, file and
include a statement (i.e., Environmental Impact Statement or EIS) containing:
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the longterm productivity of the
same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a
finding must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.161
To further strengthen and develop the EIS, PD1586 was promulgated, which established the
Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS). The PEISS is "a systems-oriented and
integrated approach to the EIS system to ensure a rational balance between socio-economic
development and environmental protection for the benefit of present and future
generations."162 The ECC requirement ismandated under Section 4 thereof:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation ofEnvironmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President
of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his dulyauthorized representative.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, which is mandatory for
private orpublic projects thatmay significantly affect the quality of the environment. It involves
evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of the project on the environment, designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to
protect the environment and the communitys welfare.163
PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30 which, in turn, set up a system or procedure to
determine when a project is required to secure an ECC and when it is not. When an ECC is not
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 94 of 140
required, the project proponent procures a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC).164 As part of the EIA
process, the project proponent is required to submit certain studies or reports (i.e., EIA document
type) to the DENR-EMB, which willbe used in the review process in assessing the environmental
impact of the project and the adequacy of the corresponding environmental management plan or
program to address such environmental impact. This will then be part of the bases to grant or deny
the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
Table 1-4 of the Revised Manual summarizes the required EIA document type for each project
category. It classifies a project as belonging to group I, II, III, IV or V, where:
I- Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) in either Environmentally Critical Area (ECA) or
Non-Environmentally Critical Area (NECA),
II- Non-Environmentally Critical Projects (NECPs) in ECA,
III- NECPs in NECA,
IV- Co-located Projects, and
V- Unclassified Projects.
The aforesaid table then further classifies a project, as pertinent to this case, as belonging to
category A,B or C, where:
A- new;
B- existing projects for modification or re-start up; and
C- operating projects without an ECC.
Finally, the aforesaid table considers whether the project is single or co-located.165 After which, it
states the appropriateEIA document typeneeded for the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case
may be.
The appropriate EIA document type vis--vis a particular project depends on the potential
significant environmental impact of the project. At the highest level would be an ECP, such as the
subject project. The hierarchy of EIA document type, based on comprehensiveness and detail of
the study or report contained therein, insofar as single projects are concerned, is as follows:
1. Environmental Impact Statement166 (EIS),
2. Initial Environmental Examination167 (IEE) Report,
3. Initial Environmental Examination168 (IEE) Checklist Report,
4. Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan169 (EPRMP), and
5. Project Description170 (PD) or Project Description Report (PDR).
Thus, in the course of RP Energys application for anECC, it was required by the DENR-EMB to
submit an EIS because the subject project is: an ECP, new and a single project.
The present controversy, however, revolves around, not an application for an ECC, but
amendments thereto.
RP Energy requested the subject first amendment to its ECC due to its desire to modify the project
design through the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge

pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement and a 230-kV double
transmission line. The DENR-EMB determined that this was a major amendment and, thus,
required RP Energy to submit an EPRMP.
The Casio Group argued, and the appellate court sustained, that an EPRMP is not the correct EIA
document type based on the definition of an EPRMP in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
In DAO 2003-30, an EPRMP is defined as:
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) documentation of the actual
cumulative environmental impacts and effectiveness of current measures for single projects that
are already operating but without ECC's, i.e., Category A-3. For Category B-3 projects, a checklist
form of the EPRMP would suffice;171(Emphasis supplied)
Further, the table in Section 5 of DAO 2003-30 states that an EPRMP is required for "A-2: Existing
and to beexpanded (including undertakings that have stopped operations for more than 5 years
and plan to re-start with or without expansion) and A-3: Operating without ECC."
On the other hand, the Revised Manual delineates when an EPRMP is the proper EIA document
type, thus:
For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for clearance to modify/expand
or re-start operations, or for projects operating without an ECCbut applying to secure one to
comply with PD 1586 regulations, the appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA Report
incorporating the projects environmental performance and its current Environmental Management
Plan. This report isx x x anx x x Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP)
for single project applications x x x172 (Emphasis supplied)
In its "Glossary," the Revised Manual defines an EPRMP as:
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) - documentation of the actual
cumulative environmental impacts and effectiveness of current measures for single projects that
are already operating but without ECCs.173 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Table 1-4, in the Revised Manual, states that an EPRMP is required for "Item I-B: Existing
Projects for Modification or Re-start up (subject to conditions in Annex 2-1c) and I-C: Operating
without ECC."
From these definitions and tables, an EPRMP is, thus, the required EIA document type for an ECP-
single project which is:
1. Existing and to be expanded (including undertakings that have stopped operations for
more than 5 years and plan to re-start with or without expansion);
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 95 of 140
2. Operating but without ECCs;
3. Operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for clearance to
modify/expand orre-start operations; and
4. Existing projects for modification or re-start up.
It may be observed that, based from the above, DAO2003-30 and the Revised Manual appear to
use the terms "operating"and "existing" interchangeably. In the case at bar, the subject project has
not yet been constructed although there have been horizontal clearing operations at the project
site.
On its face, therefore, the theory of the Casio Group, as sustained by the appellate court that
the EPRMP is not the appropriate EIA document type seems plausible because the subject project
is not: (1) operating/existing with a previous ECC but planning or applying for modification or
expansion, or (2) operating but without an ECC. Instead, the subject project is an unimplemented
or a non-implemented, hence,non-operating project with a previous ECC but planning for
modification or expansion.
The error in the above theory lies in the failure to consider or trace the applicable provisions of
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to an ECC.
The proper starting point in determining the validity of the subject first amendment, specifically,
the propriety of the EIA document type (i.e., EPRMP) which RP Energy submitted in relation to its
application for the aforesaid amendment, must of necessity be the rules on amendments to an
ECC.174 This is principally found in Section 8.3,Article II of DAO 2003-03, viz:
8.3 Amending an ECC
Requirements for processing ECC amendments shall depend on the nature of the request but shall
be focused on the information necessary to assess the environmental impact of such changes.
8.3.1. Requests for minor changes to ECCs such as extension of deadlines for submission of
post-ECC requirements shall be decided upon by the endorsing authority.
8.3.2. Requests for major changes to ECCs shall be decided upon by the deciding authority.
8.3.3. For ECCs issued pursuant to an IEE or IEE checklist, the processing of the amendment
application shall not exceed thirty (30) working days; and for ECCs issued pursuant to an EIS,
the processing shall not exceed sixty (60) working days. Provisions on automatic approval
related to prescribed timeframes under AO 42 shall also apply for the processing of
applications to amend ECCs. (Emphasis supplied)
Implementing the afore-quoted section, the Revised Manual pertinently states in Section 2.2,
paragraph 16:
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 96 of 140

16) Application Process for ECC Amendments 3

Figure 2-4 presents how Proponents may request for minor or major changes in their ECCs. Annex
2-1c provides a decision chart for the determination of requirements for project modifications, The ECC-endorsing EMB office assigns a Case Handler to evaluate For EPRMP/PEPRMP-based requests, EMB forms a Technical/Review
particularly for delineating which application scenarios will require EPRMP (which will be subject to the request Committee to evaluate the request. For other requests, a Case Handler
may solely undertake the evaluation. EMB CO and RO will process
Figure 2-1 process) or other support documentations (which will be subject to Figure 2-4 process). P/EPRMP for PECC/ECC under Groups I and II respectively. (Go to
Figure 2-4, in turn, provides: Figure 2-1)

3 4
Figure 2-4. Flowchart on Request for ECC Amendments175

Scenario 1: Request for Minor Amendments Scenario 2: Request for Major Amendments
ECC-endorsing Authority decides on the Letter-Request, based on CH ECC-endorsing/issuing Authority (per Table 1-4) decides on Letter
1. Typographical error 1. Expansion of project area w/in catchment described in EIA recommendation Requests/EPRMP/PEPRMP/Other documents based on EMB CH and/or
Tech/Review Committee recommendations.

2. Extension of deadlines for submission of post-ECC requirement/s 2. Increase in production capacity or auxiliary component of the Maximum Processing Time to Issuance of Decision Max Processing Time to Issuance of Decision
original project
EMB CO 7 workdays CO PEPRMP CO EPRMP RO RO
3. Extension of ECC validity PEPRMP EPRMP
3. Change/s in process flow or technology
EMB RO 7 workdays 120 90 60 30
4. Change in company name/ownership
4. Addition of new product
workdays workdays workdays workdays
5. Decrease in land/project area or production capacity
5. Integration of ECCs for similar or dissimilar but contiguous projects Other document applications: max 30 workdays (EMB CO and RO)
(NOTE: ITEM#5 IS PROPONENTS OPTION, NOT EMBS)
6. Other amendments deemed

6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC Conditions

"minor" at the discretion of the
EMB CO/RO Director
7. Other amendments deemed "major" at the discretion of the EMB
CO/RO Director
Noteworthy in the above, which is pertinent to the issue at hand, is that the amendment process
1 [Start] 1[Start]
squarely applies to projects not started, such as the subject project, based on the phrase "[w]ithin
Within three (3) years from ECC issuance (for projects not Within three (3) years from ECC issuance (for projects not three (3) years from ECC issuance (for projects not started) x x x".
started)176 OR at any time during project implementation, the started)177 OR at any time during project implementation, the
Proponent prepares and submits to the ECC-endorsing DENR-EMB Proponent prepares and submits to the ECC-endorsing DENR-EMB
office a LETTER-REQUEST for ECC amendment, including office a LETTER-REQUESTfor ECC amendments, including Annex 2-1c, in turn, provides a "Decision Chart for Determination of Requirements For Project
data/information, reports or documents to substantiate the data/information, reports or documents to substantiate the requested Modification." We reproduce below the first three columns of Annex 2-1c, as are pertinent to the
requested revisions. revisions.
issue at hand:
2

For projects that have started implementation, EMB evaluates request ANNEX 2-1c
based on Annex 2-1cfor various scenarios of project modification.
Documentary requirements may range from a Letter-Request to an
2 EPRMP to the EMB CO/RO while for those with Programmatic ECC, a DECISION CHART FOR DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR PROJECT MODIFICATION178
PEPRMP may need to be submitted to the EMB CO to support the
request. It is important to note that for operating projects, the
appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA Report incorporating
the projects historical environmental performance and its current EMP,
Proposed Modifications to Analysis of Proposed Resulting Decision
subject to specific documentary requirements detailed in Annex 2-1cfor the Current Project Modifications Document/Type of EIA Report
every modification scenario. Required

Operational projects, or those

 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 97 of 140

which have stopped for 5 years be developed.

and plan to re-start 7. Downgrade project size or area No incremental adverse impacts; may From ECC Amendment to Relief of ECC
For Groups I and II EISbased Projects or other units of measure of result to lower project threshold or may Commitments (Conversion to CNC):
with an ECC applying for modification thresholds limits result to non-coverage /Letter-Request only

1. Expansion of land/project area Since the modification will be in an area ECC Amendment /Letter Request with 8. Conversion to new project type Considered new application but with New ECC /EIS
w/in catchment or environment already described and evaluated in the brief description of activities in the (e.g. bunker-fired plant to gas- lesser data requirements since most
described in the original EIA original EIA Report, incremental impacts additional area fired) facilities are established; environmental
Report from additional land development will performance in the past will serve as
have been addressed in the approved baseline; However, for operating
EMP projects, there may be need to request
for Relief from ECC Commitment prior
2. Expansion of land/project area It is assumed the modification proposal ECC Amendment /Environmental to applying for new project type to
OUTSIDE catchment or may have significant potential impacts Performance Report and Management ensure no balance of environmental
environment described in the due to absence of prior assessment as Plan (EPRMP) accountabilities from the current project
original EIA Report to how the project may affect the
proposed expansion area 9. Integration of ECCs for similar No physical change in project size/area; ECC Amendment /Letter Request with
or contiguous projects no change in process/technology but consolidated Project Description Report
3. Increase in capacity or auxiliary Non-exceedance of PDR (non covered ECC Amendment /Letter Request with improved management of continuous and integrated EMP
component of the original project) threshold is assumed that brief description of additional capacity projects by having an integrated
(Note: Integration of ECCs is at
project which will eithernot impacts are not significant; or component planning document in the form or an
the option of the Proponent to
entail exceedance of PDR (non- integrated ECC (ECC conditions will be
request/apply)
covered project) thresholds or harmonized across projects; conditions
Modification scenario and decision relating to requirements within other
EMP & ERA can still address
process are applicable to both agencies mandates will be deleted)
impacts & risks arising from
nonimplemented and operating projects
modification
issued ECCs 10. Revision/ Reformatting of ECC No physical change on the project but ECC Amendment /Letter Request only
Conditions ECC conditions relating to requirements
4. Increase in capacity or auxiliary Exceedance of PDR (non-covered) ECC Amendment /Environmental within other agencies mandates will be
component of the original threshold is assumed that impacts may Performance Report and Management deleted
project which will either exceed be potentially significant, particularly if Plan (EPRMP)
PDR (noncovered project) modification will result to a next higher
thresholds, or EMP & ERA level of threshold range We now apply these provisions to the case at bar.
cannot address impacts and
risks arising from modification
Modification scenario and decision
process are applicable to both To reiterate, the first amendment to the ECC was requested by RP Energy due to its planned
nonimplemented and operating projects change of project design involving the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater,
with or without issued ECCs subseadischarge pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement and a 230-
kV double transmission line. The DENR-EMB determined179 that the proposed modifications
5. Change/s in process flow or EMP and ERA can still address impacts ECC Amendment /Letter Request with
technology & risks arising from modification brief process description
involved a major amendment because it will result in anincrease in capacity or auxiliary component,
as per Scenario 2,Item #2 of Figure 2-4:
EMP and ERA cannot address impacts & ECC Amendment /Environmental
risks arising from modification Performance Report and Management
Plan (EPRMP) Scenario 2: Request for Major Amendments

6. Additional component or
products which will enhance the
environment (e.g. due to
compliance to new stringent
requirements) or lessen impacts
on the environment (e.g. thru
utilization of waste into new
products)
Activity is directly lessening or
mitigating the projects impacts on the
environment. However, to ensure there
is no component in the modification
which fall under covered project types,
EMB will require disclosure of the
description of the components and
process with which the new product will
ECC Amendment /Letter Request with
consolidated Project Description Report
of new project component and
integrated EMP
1. Expansion of project area w/in catchment described in EIA
2. Increase in production capacity or auxiliary component of the original project 180
3. Change/s in process flow or technology
4. Addition of new product
5. Integration of ECCs for similar or dissimilar but contiguous projects (NOTE: ITEM#5 IS
PROPONENTS OPTION, NOT EMBS)
6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC Conditions

7. Other amendments deemed "major at the discretion of the EMB CO/RO Director
The Casio Group does not controvert this finding by the DENR-EMB and we find the same
reasonably supported by the evidence on record considering that, among others, the construction
of a 230-kVdouble transmission line would result in major activities outside the project site which
could have significant environmental impacts.
Consequently, the amendment was considered asfalling under Item#4 of Annex 2-1c, and, thus,
the appropriate EIA document typeis an EPRMP, viz:
4. Increase in capacity or auxiliary Exceedance of PDR (non-covered) ECC Amendment /Environmental
component of the original project thresholds is assumed that impacts may Performance Report and Management
which will either exceed PDR (non- be potentially significant, particularly if Plan (EPRMP)182
covered project) thresholds, or modification will result to a next higher
EMP & ERA cannot address level of threshold range
impacts and risks arising from
modification
Modification scenario and decision
process are applicable to both
nonimplemented and operating projects
with or without issued ECCs181
Note that the Chart expressly states that, "[m]odification scenario and decision process are
applicable to both non-implementedand operating projects withor without ECCs."183 To recall, the
subject project has not been constructed and is not yet operational, although horizontal clearing
activities have already been undertaken at the project site. Thus, the subject project may be
reasonably classified as a non-implemented project with an issued ECC, which falls under Item#4
and, hence, an EPRMP is the appropriate EIA document type.
This lengthy explanation brings us toa simple conclusion. The definitions in DAO 2003-30 and the
Revised Manual, stating that the EPRMP is applicable to (1) operating/existing projectswith a
previous ECC but planning or applying for modification or expansion, or (2) operating projects but
without an ECC, were not an exclusive list.
The afore-discussed provisions of Figure 2-4, in relation to Annex 2-1c, plainly show that the
EPRMP can, likewise, be used as an appropriate EIA document type for a single, non-implemented
project applying for a major amendment to its ECC, involving an increase in capacity or auxiliary
component, which will exceed PDR (non-covered project) thresholds, or result in the inability of the
EMP and ERA to address the impacts and risks arising from the modification, such as the subject
project.
That the proposed modifications in the subject project fall under this class or type of amendment
was a determination made by the DENR-EMBand, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion,
the DENR-EMBs findings are entitled to great respect because it is the administrative agency with
the special competence or expertise to administer or implement the EIS System. The apparent
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 98 of 140
confusion of the Casio Group and the appellate court is understandable. They had approached the
issue with a legal training mindset or background. As a general proposition, the definition of terms
in a statute or rule is controlling as to its nature and scope within the context of legal or judicial
proceedings. Thus, since the procedure adopted by the DENR-EMB seemed to contradict or go
beyond the definition of terms in the relevant issuances, the Casio Group and the appellate court
concluded that the procedure was infirm.
However, a holistic reading of DAO2003-30 and the Revised Manual will show that such a legalistic
approach inits interpretation and application is unwarranted. This is primarily because the EIA
process is a system, not a set of rigid rules and definitions. In the EIA process, there is much room
for flexibility in the determination and use ofthe appropriate EIA document type as the foregoing
discussion has shown.184 To our mind, whatshould be controlling is the guiding principle set in DAO
2003-30 in the evaluation of applications for amendments to ECCs, as stated in Section 8.3 thereof:
"[r]equirements for processing ECC amendments shall depend on the nature of the requestbut
shall be focused on theinformation necessary to assess the environmental impact of such
changes."185
This brings us to the next logicalquestion, did the EPRMP provide the necessary information in
order for the DENR-EMB to assess the environmental impact of RP Energys request relative to the
first amendment?
We answer in the affirmative.
In the first place, the Casio Group never attempted to prove that the subject EPRMP, submitted
by RP Energy to the DENR-EMB, was insufficient for purposes of evaluating the environmental
impact of the proposed modifications to the original project design. There is no claim that the data
submitted were falsified or misrepresented. Neither was there an attempt to subpoena the review
process documents of the DENR to establish thatthe grant of the amendment to the ECC was done
with grave abuse of discretion or to the grave prejudice of the right to a healthful environment of
those who will beaffected by the project. Instead, the Casio Group relied solely on the definition
of terms in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, which approach, as previously discussed,was
erroneous.
At any rate, we have examined the contents of the voluminous EPRMP submitted by RP Energy and
wefind therein substantial sections explaining the proposed changes as well as the adjustments
that will be made in the environmental management plan in order to address the potential
environmental impacts of the proposed modifications to the original project design. These are
summarized in the "Project Fact Sheet"186 of the EPRMP and extensively discussed in Section
4187 thereof. Absent any claim or proof to the contrary, we have no bases to conclude that these
data were insufficient to assess the environmental impact of the proposed modifications. In
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the DENR-EMB
must be deemed to have adequately assessed the environmental impact of the proposed changes,
before granting the request under the first amendment to the subject ECC.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 99 of 140

In sum, the Revised Manual permits the use of an EPRMP, as the appropriate EIA document type,
for major amendments to an ECC, even for an unimplemented or non-implementedproject with a
previous ECC, such as the subject project. Consequently, we find that the procedure adopted by
the DENR, in requiring RP Energy to submitan EPRMP in order to undertake the environmental
impact assessment of the planned modifications to the original project design, relative to the first
amendment to the ECC, suffers from no infirmity.
We apply the same framework of analysis in determining the propriety of a PDR, as the appropriate
EIA document type, relative to the second amendment to the subject ECC.
Project Description (PD) - document, which may also be a chapter in an EIS, that describes the
nature, configuration, use of raw materials and natural resources, production system, waste or
pollution generation and control and the activities of a proposed project. It includes a description of
the use of human resources as well as activity timelines, during the pre-construction, construction,
operation and abandonment phases.190
We will no longer delve intothe details of these definitions. Suffice it to state, similar to the
discussion on the EPRMP, that if we go by the strict limits of these definitions, the PDR relative to
the subject second amendment would not fall squarely under any of the above.

Again, the Casio Group, as sustained by the appellate court, relied on the definitions of a PDR in However, again, these are not the only provisions governing the PDR in the Revised Manual.
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual:
After the favorable grant of the first amendment, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its
Project Description (PD) document, which may also be a chapter in an EIS, that describes the ECC, this time inconsideration of its plan to change the configuration of the project from 2 x 150
nature, configuration, use of raw materials and natural resources, production system, waste or MWto 1 x 300 MW. In practical terms, this meant that the subject project will still produce 300 MW
pollution generation and control and the activities of a proposed project. It includes a description of of electricity but will now make use of only one boiler (instead of two) to achieve greater efficiency
the use of human resources as well as activity timelines, during the pre-construction, construction, in the operations of the plant. The DENR-EMB determined191this amendment to be minor, under
operation and abandonment phases. It is tobe used for reviewing co-located and single projects Scenario 1, Item#6 of Figure 2-4:
under Category C, aswell as for Category D projects.188
Scenario 1: Request for Minor
xxxx
Amendments
a) For new projects: x x x For non-covered projects in Groups II and III, a x x x Project Description
Report (PDR) is the appropriate document to secure a decision from DENR/EMB. The PDR is a 1. Typographical error
"must" requirement for environmental enhancement and mitigation projects in both ECAs (Group 2. Extension of deadlines for submission of post-ECC requirement/s
II) and NECAs (Group III) to allow EMB to confirm the benign nature of proposed operations for 3. Extension of ECC validity
eventual issuance of a Certificate ofNon-Coverage (CNC). All other Group III (non-covered) 4. Change in company name/ownership
projects do not need to submit PDRs application is at the option of the Proponent should it need 5. Decrease in land/project area or production capacity
a CNC for its own purposes, e.g. financing pre-requisite. For Group V projects, a PDR is required to 6. Other amendments deemed "minor" at the discretion of the EMB CO/RO Director 192
ensure new processes/technologies or any new unlisted project does not pose harm to the
environment. The Group V PDR is a basis for either issuance of a CNC or classification of the
because (1) there is no increase in capacity; (2) it does not constitute any significant impact;
project into its proper project group.
and (3) its EMP and ERA as specified in the submitted EPRMP remain the same. 193 Relative to
Annex 2-1c, the requested amendment was, in turn, determinedto fall under Item#3:
b) For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for clearance to
modify/expand or re-start operations, or for projects operating without an ECC but applying to
3. Increase in capacity or auxiliary Non-exceedance of PDR (non covered ECC Amendment /Letter Request with
secure oneto comply with PD 1586 regulations, the appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA
component of the original project project) thresholds is assumed that brief description of additional capacity
Report incorporating the projects environmental performance and its current Environmental which will either not entail impacts are not significant; or component195
Management Plan. This report is either an (6) Environmental Performance Report and Management exceedance of PDR (non-covered
Plan (EPRMP) for single project applications or a (7) Programmatic EPRMP (PEPRMP) for co-located project) thresholds or EMP & ERA
Modification scenario and decision
project applications. However, for small project modifications, an updating of the project can still address impacts & risks
process are applicable to both non-
description or the Environmental Management Plan with the use of the proponents historical arising from modification
implemented and operating projects
performance and monitoring records may suffice.189 issued ECCs194

xxxx

We make the same observation, as before, that the above applies to an unimplemented or non-
implemented project with a previous ECC, like the subject project. Although it may be noted
thatthe proposed modification does not squarely fall under Item#3, considering that, as previously
mentioned,there will be no increase in capacity relative to the second amendment, still, we find
nothing objectionable to this classification by the DENR-EMB, for it seems plain enough that this
classification was used because the modification was deemed too minor to require a detailed
project study like an EIS or EPRMP. Since this is the classification most relevant and closely related
to the intended amendment, following the basic precept that the greater includes the lesser, the
DENR-EMB reasonably exercised its discretion in merely requiring a letter request with a brief
description of the modification.
As earlier noted, the PDR is the EIA document type with the least detail, and, thus, applicable to
such minor modifications. Thus, the DENR-EMB cannot be faulted for requiring RPEnergy to submit
a PDR relative to its application for the second amendment. Consequently, as before, we findthat
the Revised Manual supports the procedure adopted by the DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to
submit a PDR in order to assess the environmental impact of the planned modifications relative to
the second amendment.
In their Petition before this Court, the Casio Group boldly asserts that "[t]here is nothing in the
Project Description Report that provides an environmental impact assessment of the effects of
constructing and operating a single 300-MW generating unit."196 However, to our dismay, as in
their other serious allegations in their Petition for Writ ofKalikasan, the same is, likewise, baseless.
Apart from such a sweeping claim, the Casio Group has provided no evidence or argument to
back up the same.
An examination of the PDR readily reveals that it contains the details of the proposed
modifications197 and an express finding that no significant environmental impact will be generated
bysuch modifications, as in fact it is expected that the operation of the power plant will become
more efficient as a result of the change from 2 x 150 MW to 1 x 300 MW
configuration.198 Consequently, the PDR merely reiterates the same mitigating measures that will
presumably address the minor modifications to the project design. Again, no evidence was
presented to show substantial errors or misrepresentations in these data or their inadequacy for
providing the bases for the DENR-EMB to assess the environmental impact of the proposed
modifications under the second amendment.
In fine, absent proof to the contrary, bearing in mind that allegations are not proof, we sustain the
procedure adoptedby the DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR and, on the basis
thereof, approving the request for the second amendment.
In another vein, we note that the appellate court proceeded from the erroneous premise that the
EIA is a document, when it repeatedly stated that the amendments to the ECC require a new EIA,
and not merely an EPRMP or PDR. The appellate court relied on the provisoin the ECC, which
stated that "[a]ny expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the
activity or transfer of location shall besubject to a new Environmental Impact Assessment." 199
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 100 of 140
However, as correctly pointed out by the DENR and RP Energy, the EIA is not a document but a
process:
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) processthat involves evaluating and predicting the likely
impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction,
commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate preventive,
mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment
and the community's welfare.The process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent
and/orEIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and other
stakeholders.200 (Emphasis supplied)
When the provisoin the ECC, therefore, states that a new EIA shall beconducted, this simply means
that the project proponent shall be required to submit such study or report, as warranted by the
DENR Rules and circumstances, which will sufficiently aid the DENR in making a new EIA and, thus,
determine whether to grant the proposed amendment (or project modification). Aswe have seen,
consistent with DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, the DENR required RP Energy to submit an
EPRMP and a PDR relative to the latters request involving the first and second amendments,
respectively, which led to the new EIA of the project in compliance with the provisoof the ECC.
Verily, the various EIA documents, such as the EPRMP and PDR, are mere tools used by the DENR
to assess the environmental impact of a particular project. These documents are flexibly used by
the DENR, as the circumstances warrant, in order to adequately assess the impacts of a new
project or modifications thereto. Being the administrative agency entrusted with the determination
of which EIA document type applies to a particular application for an amendment to an ECC, falling
as it does within its particular technical expertise, wemust accord great respect to its
determination, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
In sum, we find that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments
to the subject ECC wereinvalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30
and the Revised Manual. The appellate court failed to properly consider the applicable provisions in
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to ECCs. Our examination of the provisions
on amendments to ECCs, as well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR
reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second
amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was
conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent sufficient showing of grave
abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both the procedure and substance of the
amendment process, we uphold the validity of these amendments.
IV.Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a
precondition to the issuance of anECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC issued in favor of RP Energy on December 22, 2008 is
invalid because the CNO covering the subject project was issued only on October 31, 2012 or
almost fouryears from the timeof issuance of the ECC. Thus, the ECC was issued in violation of

Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules which require that a CNO be obtained prior
to the issuance of a government agency of, among others, a license or permit. In so ruling, the
appellate court implicitly upheld the Casio Groups argument that the ECC is a form of government
license or permit pursuant to Section 4 of PD 1586 which requires all entities to securean ECC
before (1) engaging in an environmentally critical project or (2) implementing a project within an
environmentally critical area.
The DENR and RP Energy, however, argue that an ECC is not the license or permit contemplated
under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules as may be deduced from the
definition, nature and scope of an ECC under DAO 2003-03 and the Revised Manual. The DENR
explains that the issuance of an ECC does not exempt the project proponent from securing other
permits and clearances as required under existing laws, including the CNO, and that the final
decision on whether a project will be implemented lies with the concerned local government unit/s
or the lead government agency which has sectoral mandate to promote the government
programwhere the project belongs.
We agree with the DENR and RP Energy.
Section 59, Chapter VIII of the IPRA Law provides:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession,license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that
the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT:
Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 9, Part II, Rule VIII of National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
Administrative Order No. 01-98201 states:
SECTION 9. Certification Precondition Prior to Issuance of any Permits or Licenses.
a. Need for Certification. No department of government or other agencies shall issue, renew or
grant anyconcession, license, lease, permit, or enter into any production sharing agreement
without a prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap any ancestral
domain.
b. Procedure for Issuance ofCertification by NCIP.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 101 of 140
1) The certification, above mentioned, shall be issued by the Ancestral Domain Office, only after
a field based investigation that such areas are not within any certified or claimed ancestral
domains.
2) The certification shall be issued only upon the free, prior, informed and written consent of
the ICCs/IPs who will be affected by the operation of such concessions, licenses or leases or
production-sharing agreements. A written consent for the issuance of such certification shall be
signed by at least a majority of the representatives of all the households comprising the
concerned ICCs/IPs. (Emphasis supplied)
As may be deduced from its subtitle, Section 59 requires as a precondition, relative to the issuance
of any concession, license, lease or agreement over natural resources, a certification issued by the
NCIP that the area subject thereof does not lie within any ancestral domain. 202 This is in keeping
with the State policy to protect the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains in order to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-
being as well as to recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of such ancestral domain.203
The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do not define the terms "license" and "permit" so that
resort to their plain or ordinary meaning in relation to the intendment of the law is appropriate.
A "license" has been defined as "a governmental permission to perform a particular act (such as
getting married), conduct a particular business or occupation, operate machinery or vehicles after
proving capacity and ability to do so safely, or use property for a certain purpose" 204 while a
"permit" has been defined as "a license or other document given by an authorized public official or
agency (building inspector, department ofmotor vehicles) to allow a person or business to perform
certain acts."205
The evident intention of Section 59, in requiring the CNO prior to the issuance of a license or
permit, is to prevent the implementation of a project that may impair the right of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains. The law seeks to ensure that a project willnot overlap with any ancestral
domain prior to its implementation and thereby pre-empt any potential encroachment of, and/or
damage to the ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs without their prior and informed consent.
With these considerationsin mind, we now look atthe definition, nature and scope of an ECC in
order to determine if it falls within the ambit of a "license" or "permit" to which the CNO
requirement, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules, finds application.
Section 4 of PD 1586 provides, in part:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any suchdeclared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an

Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President orhis duly authorized
representative.For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by his
proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or
instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific
functionsand responsibilities. (Emphasis supplied)
While the above statutory provision reveals that the ECC is an indispensable requirement before (1)
the conduct of an environmentally critical project or (2) the implementation of a project inan
environmentally critical area, it does not follow that the ECC is the "license" or "permit"
contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules.
Section 3(d), Article I of DAO 2003-03 defines an ECC in this wise:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.
For the purpose of this Order, the following definitions shall be applied:
xxxx
d. Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) document issued by the DENR/EMB after a
positive review of an ECC application, certifying that based on the representations of the
proponent, the proposed project or undertaking will not cause significant negative environmental
impact. The ECC also certifies that the proponent has complied with all the requirements of the EIS
System and has committed to implement its approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC
contains specific measures and conditions that the project proponent has to undertake beforeand
during the operation of a project, and in some cases, during the project's abandonment phase to
mitigate identified environmental impacts.
In turn, Section 1.0, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the Revised Manual provide, in part:
3) Purpose of the EIA Process
As a basic principle, EIA is used to enhance planning and guide decisionmaking. In this Manual, EIA
is primarily presented in the context of a requirement to integrate environmental concerns in the
planning process of projects at the feasibility stage. Through the EIA Process, adverse
environmental impacts of proposed actions are considerably reduced through a reiterative review
process of project siting, design and other alternatives, and the subsequent formulation of
environmental management and monitoring plans. A positive determination by the DENR-EMB
results to the issuance of an Environmental Compliance Commitment (ECC) document, to be
conformed to by the Proponent and represents the projects Environmental Compliance Certificate.
The release of the ECC allows the project to proceed to the next stage of project planning, which is
the acquisition of approvals from other government agencies and LGUs, after which the project can
start implementation.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 102 of 140
xxxx
6) The EIA Process inRelation to Other Agencies Requirements It is inherent upon the EIA Process
to undertake a comprehensive and integrated approach in the review and evaluation of
environment-related concerns of government agencies (GAs), local government units (LGUs) and
the general public. The subsequent EIA findings shall provide guidance and recommendations to
these entities as a basis for their decision making process.
a) An Inter-agency MOA on EIS Streamlining was entered into in 1992 by 29 government
agencies wherein ECC of covered projects was agreed to be a prerequisite of all other
subsequent government approvals;
b) DENR Memo Circular No. 2007-08 issued on 13 July 2007 reiterates in effect the intent
of the MOA and reinforces the role of the ECC/CNC as a guidance document to other
agencies and LGUs, as follows:
i) "No permits and/or clearances issued by other National Government Agencies
and Local Government Units shall be required in the processing of ECC or CNC
applications.
ii) The findings and recommendations ofthe EIA shall be transmitted to relevant
government agencies for them to integrate in their decision making prior to the
issuance of clearances, permits and licenses under their mandates.
iii) The issuance of an ECC or CNC for a project under the EIS System does not
exempt the Proponent from securing other government permits and clearances as
required by other laws. The current practice of requiring various permits,
clearancesand licenses only constrains the EIA evaluation process and negates the
purpose and function of the EIA."
iv) Henceforth, all related previous instructions and other issuances shall be made
consistent with the Circular.
c) "Permits, licenses and clearances" are inclusive of other national and local government
approvals such as endorsements, resolutions, certifications, plans and programs, which
have to be cleared/approved or other government documents required within the
respective mandates and jurisdiction of these agencies/LGUs.
xxxx
f) The final decision whether a project will be implemented or not lies either with the LGUs who
have spatial jurisdiction over the project or with the lead government agency who has sectoral

mandate to promote the government program where the project belongs, e.g. DOE for energy
projects; DENR-MGB for mining projects.(Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the issuance of the ECC does not, by and of itself, authorize the implementation of
the project. Although it is indispensable before the covered project can be commenced, asper
Section 4 of PD 1586,the issuanceof the ECC does not, as of yet, result inthe implementation of the
project. Rather, the ECC is intended to, among others, provide guidance or act as a decision-
making tool to other government agencies and LGUs which have the final authority to grant
licenses or permits, such as building permits or licenses to operate, that will ultimately result in, or
authorize the implementation of the project or the conduct of specific activities.
As a consequence, we find that the CNO requirement under Section 59 of the IPRA Law is not
required to be obtained prior to the issuance of an ECC. As previously discussed, Section 59 aims
to forestall the implementation of a project that may impair the right of ICCs/IPs totheir ancestral
domains, by ensuring or verifying that a project will not overlap with any ancestral domain prior to
its implementation. However, because the issuance of an ECC does not result in the
implementation of the project, there is no necessity to secure a CNO prior to an ECCs issuance as
the goal orpurpose, which Section 59 seeks to achieve, is, at the time of the issuance of an ECC,
not yet applicable.
In sum, we find that the ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the
IPRA Law and its implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section
59 before an ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the
aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.
V.
Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a precondition
to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RP
Energy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA invalid.
We now turn to the applicability of Section 59 of the IPRA Law to the LDA entered into between
the SBMA and RP Energy on June 8, 2010. Similar to the ECC, the LDA was entered into prior to
the issuance ofthe CNO on October 31, 2012.
Before this Court, SBMA and RP Energy reiterate their arguments on why the CNO is no longer
necessary in the instant case, to wit:
1. Prior to entering into the LDA withRP Energy, SBMA entered into a lease agreement with HHIC206 -
Philippines, Inc. and a CNO was already issued therefor which, for all intents and purposes, is
applicable to the area leased by RP Energy being part of contiguous lots in Redondo Peninsula.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 103 of 140
2. The site of the power plant project is very distant from the boundaries of the lone area at the
Subic Bay Freeport Zone covered by an Aeta Communitys Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT).
3. There was no indigenous community within the vicinity of the project area as stated in RP Energys
EIS.
4. The land where the project is located was subsequently classified as industrial by the SBMA. 5. The
scoping/procedural screening checklist classified as "not relevant" the issue of indigenous people.
6. Ms. Mercado, who was part of the team which prepared the EIS, testified that she visited the
project site ten or more times and did not see any Aeta communities there.
7. Mr. Evangelista testified that the project site used to be a firing range of the U.S. Armed Forces
which would make it impossible to be a settlement area of indigenous communities.
8. Atty. Rodriguez stated that the project site is not covered by a CADT and that from the start of
negotiations on the LDA, the SBMA Ecology Center verified with the NCIP that there was no
application for said area to be covered by a CADT.
RP Energy further argues that, in any case, as a matter of prudence, it secured a CNO from the
NCIP. On October 31, 2012, the NCIP issued the subject CNO over the project site, which should
erase any doubt as to whether it overlaps with an ancestral domain.
Upholding the arguments of the Casio Group, the appellate court ruled that SBMA failed to comply
with the CNO requirement and, thus, the LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy is invalid.
It rejected the reasons given by SBMA and RP Energy, to wit:
1. RP Energys reliance on its own field investigation that no indigenous community was
found within the vicinity is unavailing because it was not the field investigation by the NCIP
required by the IPRA Law.
2. RP Energy acknowledged that Aetas were among the earliest settlers in the municipality
where the project will be built. Hence, it was not clearly shown that in 2008, at the time
the LDA was entered into, there were no indigenouscommunities in the project site.
3. SBMAs representation that the project site is industrial relies on a letter dated March 5,
2008 and the scoping checklist, which are hearsay evidence.
4. The statements of Atty. Rodriguez have no probative value because he is not an officer
of SBMA Ecology Center oran officer of NCIP.
5. At the time the CNO was issued on October 31, 2012, and the field investigation relative
thereto was conducted by the NCIP, the project site no longer reflected the actual

condition on December 22, 2008 when the LDA was entered into because the households
which occupied the site had already been relocated by then.
6. SBMA, prior to entering into a lease agreement with HHIC, secured a CNO, but oddly
did not do the same with respect to the lease agreement with RP Energy, considering that
both leases cover lands located within the same peninsula. RP Energy appears to have
been accorded a different treatment.
7. The CNO issued in favor of HHIC cannot justify the lack of a CNO for the power plant
project because the two projects are situated in different locations: the HHIC project is
located in Sitio Agusuhin,while the power plant project is located in Sitio Naglatore.
While we agree with the appellate court that a CNO should have been secured prior to the
consummation of the LDA between SBMAand RP Energy, and not after, as was done here, we find
that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the subsequent and belated compliance
withthe CNO requirement does not invalidate the LDA.
For convenience, and as starting point of ouranalysis, we reproduce Section 59 of the IPRA Law
below:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any productionsharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that
the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT:
Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process. (Emphasis
supplied)
The law is clear but its actual operation or application should not be interpreted beyond the bounds
of reason or practicality.
We explain.
Indeed, a CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease by all government agencies, including the
SBMA. Again, the evident intention is to prevent the impairment of the right of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains. A lease, such as the LDA under consideration, would result in, among others,
granting RP Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the project site to the exclusion of third
parties.207 As such, the lease could conceivably encroach on an ancestral domain if the CNO is not
first obtained.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 104 of 140
However, implicit in the operation of Section 59 is the practical reality that the concerned
government agency must make a preliminary determinationon whether or not to obtain the
required certification in the first place. To expound, a government agency, which wishes to lease
part of its property located near Padre Faura Street, Manila City could not, and should not be
reasonably expected to obtain the CNO, as it is obviously inapplicable to its planned lease. In
contrast, a government agency, which intends to lease a property in a valley or mountainous
region, where indigenous communities are known to reside, conduct hunting activities, perform
rituals, or carry out some other activities, should be reasonably expected to secure the CNO prior
to consummating the planned lease with third persons.
Even if the indigenous community does not actuallyreside on the proposed lease site, the
government agency would still be required to obtain the CNO preciselyto rule out the possibility
that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for this is that an
ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually occupied by an indigenous community, but
all areas where they have a claim of ownership, through time immemorial use, such as hunting,
burial or worship grounds and to which they have traditional access for their subsistence and other
traditional activities.208
The wording of the law itself seems to presuppose that if the concession, lease, license or
production-sharing agreement is over natural resources, then the CNO should be first obtained.
This is because the lastterm, "production-sharing agreement," normally refers to natural resources.
But the problem arises as to what should be considered "natural resources"; for a vacant lot,
nearPadre Faura Street, or a forest land, in Mt. Banahaw, could both beconsidered as "natural
resources," depending on the restrictive or expansive understanding of that term.
After due consideration, we find that the proper rule of action, for purposes of application of
Section 59, is that all government offices should undertake proper and reasonable diligence in
making a preliminary determination on whether to secure the CNO, bearing in mind the primordial
State interest in protecting the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. They should consider
the nature and location of the areas involved; the historical background of the aforesaid areas
relative to the occupation, use or claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs; the present and actual condition
of the aforesaid areas likethe existence of ICCs/IPs within the area itself or within nearby
territories; and such other considerations that would help determine whether a CNO should be first
obtained prior to granting a concession, lease, license or permit, or entering into a production-
sharing agreement.
If there are circumstances that indicate that a claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs may be present or a
claim of ownership may be asserted in the future, no matter how remote, the proper and prudent
course ofaction is to obtain the CNO. In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
securing the CNO and, thus, the government agency is under obligation tosecure the aforesaid
certification in order to protect the interests and rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. This
must be so if we are to accord the proper respect due to, and adequately safeguard the interests
and rights of, our brothers and sisters belonging to ICCs/IPs in consonance with the constitutional
policy209 to promote and protect the rights of ICCS/IPs as fleshed out in the IPRA Law and its
implementing rules.

In the case at bar, we find, applying this rule of action, that the SBMA should have first secured a
CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy for the following reasons.
First, the Subic area is historicallyknown to be the home of our brothers and sisters belonging to
the Aeta communities. In particular, the EIS210 itself of RP Energy noted that Aeta communities
originally occupiedthe proposed project site of the power plant. Thus, even if we assume that, at
the time of the ocular inspection of the proposed project site in 2008, there were no Aeta
communities seen thereat, as claimed by RP Energy, the exercise of reasonable prudence should
have moved SBMA and RP Energy to secure a CNO in order to rule out the possibility that the
project site may overlap with an ancestral domain. This is especially so, in view of the observation
previously made, that lack of actual occupation by an indigenous community ofthe area does not
necessarily mean that it is not a part of anancestral domain because the latter encompasses areas
that are not actually occupied by indigenouscommunities but are used for other purposes like
hunting, worship or burial grounds.
Second, SBMA and RP Energy claim that the SBMA Ecology Center verified with the NCIP that the
project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain. However, the person, who allegedly did the
verification, and the officer from the NCIP, who was contacted in this alleged verification, were not
presented in court. Assuming that this verification did take place and that the SBMA Ecology Center
determined that there is no pendingapplication for a CADT covering the project site and that the
presently recognized CADT of Aeta communities is too far away from the project site, it still does
not follow that the CNO under Section 59 should have been dispensed with. The acts of individual
members ofa government agency, who allegedly checked with the NCIP that the project site does
not overlap with an ancestral domain, cannot substitute for the CNO required by law. The reason is
obvious. Such posture would circumvent the noble and laudable purposes of the law in providing
the CNO as the appropriate mechanism in order to validly and officially determine whether a
particular project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain. It would open the doors to abuse
because a government agency can easily claim that it checked with the NCIP regarding any
application for an ancestral domain over a proposed project site while stopping short of securing a
CNO. To reiterate, the legally mandated manner to verify if a project site overlaps with an ancestral
domain is the CNO,and not through personal verification by members of a government agency with
the NCIP.
Third, that the project site was formerlyused as the firing range of the U.S. Armed Forces does not
preclude the possibility that a present orfuture claim of ancestral domain may be made over the
aforesaid site. The concept of an ancestral domain indicates that, even if the use ofan area was
interrupted by the occupation of foreign forces, it may still be validly claimed to be an ancestral
domain.211
Fourth, that the project site was subsequently classified by the SBMA as forming part of an
industrial zone does not exempt it from the CNO requirement. The change in the classification of
the land is not an exception to the CNO requirement under the IPRA Law. Otherwise, government
agencies can easily defeat the rights of ICCs/IPs through the conversion of land use.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 105 of 140
Fifth, SBMA argues that the CNO issued to HHIC should, for all intents and purposes, be applicable
to RP Energy. However, ascorrectly ruled by the appellate court, the CNO issued to HHICs shipyard
cannot be extended to RP Energys project site because they involve two different locations
although found within the same land mass. The CNO issued in favor of HHIC clearly states that the
findings in the CNO are applicable only to the shipyard location of HHIC. Last, the steps taken by
SBMA, in securing a CNO prior to its lease agreement with HHIC, was the proper and prudent
course of action that should have been applied to the LDA with RP Energy. It does notmatter that
HHIC itself asked for the CNO prior to entering into a lease agreement with SBMA, as claimed by
SBMA, while RP Energy did not make such a request because, as we have discussed, SBMA had the
obligation, given the surrounding circumstances, to secure a CNO in order to rule out the possibility
that the project site overlapped with an ancestral domain.
All in all, we find, applying the foregoing rule of action,that SBMA should have secured a CNO
before entering into the LDA with RP Energy. Considering that Section 59 is a prohibitory statutory
provision, a violation thereof would ordinarily result in the nullification of the contract. 212 However,
we rule that the harsh consequences of such a ruling should not be applied to the case at bar.
The reason is that this is the first time that we lay down the foregoing rule of action so much so
that it would be inequitable to retroactively apply its effects with respect to the LDA entered into
between SBMA and RPEnergy. We also note that, under the particular circumstances of this case,
there is no showing that SBMA and RP Energy had a deliberate or ill intent to escape, defeat or
circumvent the mandate of Section 59 of the IPRA Law. On the contrary, they appear to have
believed in good faith, albeiterroneously, that a CNO was no longer needed because of the afore-
discussed defenses they raised herein. When the matter of lack of a CNO relative to the LDA was
brought to their attention, through the subject Petition for Writ ofKalikasan filed by the Casio
Group, RP Energy, with the endorsement of SBMA, promptly undertook to secure the CNO, which
was issued on October 31, 2012 and stated that the project site does not overlap with any
ancestral domain.213
Thus, absent proof to the contrary, weare not prepared to rule that SBMA and RP Energy acted
inbad faith or with inexcusable negligence, considering that the foregoing rule of action has not
heretofore been laiddown by this Court. As a result, we hold that the LDA should notbe invalidated
due to equitable considerations present here.
By so ruling, we clarify that we reject RP Energys claim that the belated submission of the CNO is
an "over compliance" on its part. Quite the contrary, as we have discussed, the CNO should have
been first secured given the surrounding circumstances of this case.
In the same vein, we reject SBMAs argument thatthe belated application for, and submission of
the CNO cured whatever defect the LDA had. We have purposely avoided a ruling to the effect that
a CNO secured subsequent to the concession, lease, license, permit or production-sharing
agreement will cure the defect. Such a ruling would lead to abuse of the CNO requirement since
the defect can be cured anyway by a subsequent and belated application for a CNO. Government
agencies and third parties, either through deliberate intent or negligence, may view it as an excuse

not to timely and promptly secure the CNO, even when the circumstances warrant the application
for a CNO under the aforediscussed rule of action, tothe damage and prejudice of ICCs/IPs. Verily,
once the concession, lease, license or permit is issued, or the agreement is entered into without
the requisite CNO, consequent damages will have already occurred if it later turns out that the site
overlaps with anancestral domain. This is so even if the ICCs/IPs can have the project stopped
upon discovery thatit overlapped with their ancestral domain under the last proviso 214 of Section
59. To prevent this evil, compliance with the CNO requirement should be followed through the
aforediscussed rule of action.
In sum, we rule that a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of the LDA
between SBMA and RP Energy. However, considering that this is the first time we lay down the rule
of action appropriate to the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating the LDA due to
equitable considerations.
VI. Whether compliance with Section 27, inrelation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the
concerned sanggunianrequirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the power plant
project.
Sustaining the arguments ofthe Casio Group, the appellate court ruled that the subject project
cannot beconstructed and operated until after the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunianrequirement, under Section 27 of the LGC, is complied with. Hence, the ECC and LDA
could not be validly granted and entered into without first complying with the aforesaid provision.
It held that all the requisites for the application of the aforesaid provision are present. As to the
pertinent provisions of RA 7227 or "TheBases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," which
grants broad powers of administration to the SBMA over the Subic Special Economic Zone(SSEZ),
the appellate court ruled that RA 7227 contains a provision recognizing the basic autonomy ofthe
LGUs which joined the SSEZ. Thus, the LGC and RA 7227should be harmonized whereby the
concerned sanggunianspower to approve under Section 27 must be respected.
The DENR impliedly agrees with the Casio Group that compliance with Section 27 is still required
but without clearly elaborating its reasons therefor.
The SBMA and RP Energy, however, argue that the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunianrequirement, under Section 27, is inapplicable to the subject project because it is
located within the SSEZ. The LGC and RA 7227 cannot be harmonized because of the clear
mandate of the SBMA to govern and administer all investments and businesses within the SSEZ.
Hence, RA 7227 should be deemed as carving out an exception to the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunianrequirement insofar as the SSEZ is concerned.
We agree with the SBMA and RP Energy.
Preliminarily, we note that Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate two requirements: (1) prior
consultations and (2) prior approval of the concerned sanggunian,viz:
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 106 of 140
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It
shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland,
rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, non governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the
goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the peopleand the community in
terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent
or minimize the adverse effects thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the Casio Group only questions the alleged lack of the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunians under Section 27 of the LGC. Thus, we shall limit our discussion to the
resolution of this issue. (Parenthetically, we note that prior consultations, as required by Section 26
of the LGC, appear to have been complied with. This may begleaned from the EIS of RPEnergy
which contains the documentation of the extensive public consultations held, under the supervision
of the DENR-EMB, relative to the subject project, as required by the EIA process, 215 as well as the
socialacceptability policy consultations conducted by the SBMA, which generated the document
entitled "Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.s 600-MW Coal Plant
Project," as noted and discussed in an earlier subsection. 216)
We also note that the Casio Group argues that the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement was necessary prior to the issuance of the ECC and the consummation of the LDA; the
absence of which invalidated the ECC and LDA.
We shall no longer discuss at length whether the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement must be complied with prior to the issuance of an ECC. As discussed in an earlier
subsection, the issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project.
Hence, the purpose or goal of Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC,like Section 59 of the IPRA Law, does
not yet obtain and, thus, the ECC may be issued evenwithout prior compliance with Sections 26
and 27 of the LGC.
We, thus, limit the discussion as to whether the approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement
should have been complied with prior to the consummation of the LDA, considering that the LDA is
part of the implementation of the subject project and already vests in RP Energy the right to the
use and enjoyment of the project site, asin fact horizontal clearing activities were already
undertaken by RP Energy at the project site by virtue of the LDA.

The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an attribute and implementation of
the local autonomy granted to, and enjoyed by LGUs under the Constitution. 217 The LGU has the
duty to protect its constituents and interests in the implementation of the project. Hence, the
approval of the concerned sanggunian is required by law to ensure thatlocal communities partake
in the fruits of their own backyard.218
For Section 27, in relation to Section 26, to apply, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
planning and implementation of the project or program is vested in a national agency or
government-owned and-controlled corporation, i.e., national programs and/or projects which are to
be implemented in a particular local community; and (2) the project or program may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or
forest cover, extinction of animal or plant species, or call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where the project will be implemented. 219
In the case at bar, the two requisites are evidently present: (1) the planning and implementation of
the subject project involves the Department of Energy, DENR, and SBMA; and (2) the subject
project may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of
cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species,or call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where the project will be
implemented. Hence, Section 27 of the LGC should ordinarily apply.
It is not disputed that no approval was sought from the concerned sangguniansrelative to the
subject project.1a\^/phi1 Whatis more, the affected LGUs have expressed their strong oppositions
to the project through various sanggunian resolutions.220 However, it is also undisputed that the
subject project is located within the SSEZ and, thus, under the territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA
pursuant to RA 7227.
Thus, we are tasked to determine the applicability of the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement, under Section 27 of the LGC, relative to a project within the territorial
jurisdiction of the SBMA under RA 7227.
RA 7227 was passed on March 13, 1992 in the aftermath of the Mount Pinatubo eruption and the
closure of the Subic Naval Base ofthe U.S. Armed Forces. It sought to revivethe affected areas by
creating and developing the SSEZ into a "self-sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and
promote productive foreign investments."221 The SSEZ covered the City of Olangapo and
Municipality of Subic in the Province ofZambales and the lands and its contiguous extensions
occupied by the former U.S. Naval Base, which traversed the territories of the Municipalities of
Hermosa and Morong in the Province of Bataan. Under Section 12 of RA 7227, the creation of the
SSEZ was made subject to the concurrence by resolution of the respective sanggunians of the City
of Olongapo and the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, viz:
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the
sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayanof the Municipalities
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 107 of 140
of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone
consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined
by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as
amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa,
Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and
bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines.
Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its
resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the office of the President.
Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and
bounds of the Zone as provided herein.
Subsequently, the aforesaid sanggunians submitted their respective resolutions of concurrence and
the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 532, Series of 1995, defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ.
In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,222 we described the concept of SSEZ as
a Freeport:
The Freeport was designed to ensurefree flow or movement of goods and capital within a portion
of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate
with the least governmental intervention. The concept ofthis zone was explained by Senator
Guingona in this wise:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is successful in many places,
particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port. The difference between a special economic zone and
an industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense that the commercial activities, including the
establishment of banks, services, financial institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe agriculture
to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of government intervention, and the running
of the affairs of the special economic zone would be run principally by the investors themselves,
similar toa housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their representatives to run the
affairs of the subdivision, toset the policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong, Mr. President, where there is a
hub of free port and free entry, free duties and activities to a maximum spur generation of
investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule, because of red tape and
perceived delays, we envision this special economic zone to be an area where there will be
minimum government interference.

The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the Authority as envisioned here, but
from them themselves, because they would be encouraged to invest not only for the land but also
for the buildings and factories. As long as they are convinced that in such an area they can do
business and reap reasonable profits, thenmany from other parts, both local and foreign, would
invest, Mr. President.223 (Emphasis in the original)
To achieve the above-mentioned purposes, the law created SBMA to administer the SSEZ. In the
process, SBMA was granted broad and enormous powers as provided for under Section 13(b) of RA
7227:
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, otherwise knownas the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and function:
(1) To operate, administer, manage and develop the ship repair and ship building facility,
container port, oil storage and refueling facility and Cubi Air Base within the Subic Special
Economic and Free-port Zone as a free market in accordance with the policies set forth in
Section 12 of this Act;
(2) To accept any local or foreign investment, business or enterprise, subject only to such
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Subic Authority in conformity with the policies
of the Conversion Authority without prejudice to the nationalization requirements provided for
in the Constitution;
(3) To undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities,
other services and infrastructure in the Subic Special Economic Zone including shipping and
related business, stevedoring and port terminal services or concessions, incidental thereto and
airport operations in coordination with the Civil Aeronautics Board, and to fix just and
reasonable rates, fares charges and other prices therefor;
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own or through contract,
franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the private sector and build-operate transfer
scheme or joint-venture the required utilities and infrastructurein coordination with local
government units and appropriate government agencies concerned and inconformity with
existing applicable laws therefor;
(5) To adopt, alter and use a corporate seal; to contract, lease, sell, dispose, acquire and own
properties; to sue and be sued in order to carry out its duties and functions as provided for in
this Act and to exercise the power of eminent domain for public use and public purpose;
(6) Within the limitation provided by law, to raise and/or borrow the necessary funds from
local and international financial institutions and to issue bonds, promissory notes and other
securities for that purpose and to secure the same by guarantee, pledge, mortgage deed of
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 108 of 140
trust, or assignment of its properties held by the Subic Authority for the purpose of financing
its projects and programs within the framework and limitation of this Act;
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism related activities subject to priorities
and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and amusements, except horse
racing, dog racing and casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion
Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;
(8) To authorize the establishment ofappropriate educational and medical institutions;
(9) To protect, maintain and develop the virgin forests within the baselands, which will be
proclaimed as a national park and subject to a permanent total log ban, and for this purpose,
the rules and regulations of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and other
government agencies directly involved in the above functions shall be implemented by the
Subic Authority;
(10) To adopt and implement measures and standards for environmental pollution control of
all areas within its territory, including but not limited to all bodies of water and to enforce the
same. For which purpose the Subic Authority shall create an Ecology Center; and
(11) To exercise such powers as may be essential, necessary or incidental to the powers
granted to it hereunder as well as to carry out the policies and objectives of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied) The Implementing Rules of RA 7227 further provide:
Sec. 11. Responsibilities of the SBMA. Other than the powers and functions prescribed in Section
10 of these Rules, the SBMA shall have the following responsibilities:
(a) The SBMA shall exercise authority and jurisdiction over all economic activity within the SBF224
xxxx
(f) Consistent with the Constitution, the SBMA shall have the following powers to enforce the law
and these Rules in the SBF:
x x x x(8) to issue, alter, modify, suspend or revoke for cause, any permit, certificate, license, visa
or privilege allowed under the Act or these Rules;
(11) to promulgate such other rules, regulations and circulars as may be necessary, proper or
incidental to carry out the policies and objectives of the Act, these Rules, as well as the powers and
duties of the SBMA thereunder.225

As can be seen, the SBMA was given broad administrative powers over the SSEZ and these
necessarily include the power to approve or disapprove the subject project, which is within its
territorial jurisdiction. But, as previously discussed, the LGC grants the concerned sangguniansthe
power to approve and disapprove this same project. The SBMA asserts that its approval of the
project prevails over the apparent disapproval of the concerned sanggunians. There is, therefore, a
real clash between the powers granted under these two laws.
Which shall prevail?
Section 12 of RA 7227 provides:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. x x x
The abovementioned zone shall be subjected to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall
bedeveloped into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to
generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive
foreign investments;
x x x x(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their
respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. (Emphasis supplied)
This section sets out the basic policies underlying the creation of the SSEZ. Indeed, as noted by the
appellate court, Section 12(i) expressly recognizes the basic autonomy and identity of the
LGUscomprising the SSEZ. However, the clause "[e]xcept as herein provided" unambiguously
provides that the LGUs do not retain their basic autonomy and identitywhen it comes to matters
specified by the law as falling under the powers, functions and prerogatives of the SBMA.
In the case at bar, we find that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one
such power over which the SBMAs authority prevails over the LGUs autonomy. Hence, there isno
need for the SBMA to secure the approval of the concerned sangguniansprior to the
implementation of the subject project.
This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA over all administrative
matters relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227, as afore-discussed. Equally important,
under Section 14, other than those involving defense and security, the SBMAs decision prevails in
case of conflict between the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters concerning the SSEZ, viz.:
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 109 of 140
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
the Subic Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of
funds over the Subic Special Economic Zonein conformity with the oversight function of
the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units
concerned on matters affecting the Subic Special Economic Zone other than defense and
security, the decision of the SubicAuthority shall prevail. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the subject project does not involve defense or security, but rather business and
investment to further the development of the SSEZ. Such is in line with the objective of RA 7227 to
develop the SSEZ into a self-sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and investment center.
Hence, the decision of the SBMA would prevail over the apparent objections of the concerned
sanggunians of the LGUs.
Significantly, the legislative deliberations on RA 7227, likewise, support and confirm the foregoing
interpretation. As earlier noted, Section 13 b(4) of RA 7227 provides:
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
x x x x(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise knownas the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers
and function: x x x x
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own or through contract,
franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the private sector and build-operate transfer scheme
or joint-venture the required utilities and infrastructure in coordination with local government units
and appropriate government agencies concerned and in conformity with existing applicable laws
therefor;
In the Senate, during the period of amendments, when the provision which would eventually
become the afore-quoted Section 13 b(4) of RA 7227 was under consideration, the following
exchanges took place:
Senator Laurel. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Laurel is recognized.
Senator Laurel. Relative to line 27 up to line 31 of page 16, regarding the provision to the effect
that the Authoritywill have the following functions: "to construct, acquire, own, etcetera," that is all
right.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 110 of 140

My motion is that we amend this particular line, starting from the word "structures", by deleting the This amendment to the amendment has been rejected by the Sponsor. So, we are voting now on
words that follow on line 31, which states: "in coordination with local government unitsand", and this amendment.
substitute the following in place of those words: "SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN COORDINATION WITH." As many as are in favor of the Laurel amendment, say Aye. (Few Senators: Aye.)

So, this paragraph will read, as follows: "to construct, own, lease, operate, and maintain on its own Those who are against the said amendment, say Nay. (Several Senators: Nay.)
or through contract, franchise, license permits, bulk purchase from the private sector and build-
operate-transfer scheme or joint venture the required utilities and infrastructure SUBJECT TO THE
Senator Laurel. Mr. President, may I ask for a nominal voting.
APPROVAL OF THE SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN
coordination with appropriate government agencies concerned and in conformity with existing
applicable laws therefor." The President. A nominal voting should beupon the request of one-fifth of the Members of the
House, but we can accommodate the Gentleman by asking for a division of the House. Therefore,
those in favor of the Laurel amendment, please raise their right hands. (Few Senators raised their
The President. What does the Sponsor say?
right hands.)

Senator Shahani. I believe this would cripple the Authority. I would like to remind our Colleagues
Senator Laurel. I was asking, Mr. President, for a nominal voting. The President. A nominal voting
that in the Board of Directors, the representatives of the local government units that agree to join
can be had only upon motion ofone-fifth of the Members of the Body. Senator Laurel. That is
with the Subic Special Economic Zone will be members of the Board so that they will have a say,
correct, Mr. President. But this issuch an important issue being presented to us, because this
Mr. President. But if we say "subject," that is a very strong word. It really means that they will be
question is related to the other important issue, which is: May an elected public official of a
the ones to determine the policy.
particular government unit, such as a town or municipality, participate as a member of the Board of
Directors of this particular zone.
So, I am afraid that I cannot accept this amendment, Mr. President.
The President. The ruling of the Chair stands. The division of the House is hereby directed.
Senator Laurel. May I respond or react, Mr. President.
As many as are infavor of the Laurel amendment, please raised (sic) their right hands. (Few
The President. Yes. Senators raised their right hands.)

Senator Laurel. The Constitution is there,very categorical inthe promotion and encouragement of As many as are against the said amendment, please do likewise. (Several Senators raised their
local autonomy, and mandating Congress to enact the necessary Local Government Code with right hands.)
emphasis on local autonomy.
The amendment is lost.226 (Emphasis supplied)
We have now Section 27 of the new Local Government Code which actually provides that for every
projectin any local government territory, the conformity or concurrence of the Sanggunian of every
Indubitably, the legislature rejected the attempts to engraft Section 27s prior approval of the
such local government unit shall be secured in the form of resolutionthe consent of the
concerned sanggunian requirement under the LGC into RA 7227. Hence, the clear intent was to do
Sanggunian.
awaywith the approval requirement of the concerned sangguniansrelative to the power ofthe SBMA
to approve or disapprove a project within the SSEZ.
The President. Well, both sides have already been heard. There is the Laurel amendment that
would make the power of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority to construct, acquire, own, lease,
The power to create the SSEZ is expressly recognized in Section 117 of the LGC, viz.:
operate and maintain on its own or through contract, franchise, license, permits, bulk purchases
from private sector, buildoperate-and-transfer scheme, or joint venture, the required utilities and
infrastructure, subject to approval by the appropriate Sanggunian of the local government TITLE VIII.
concerned. Autonomous Special Economic Zones
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 111 of 140

SECTION 117. Establishment of Autonomous Special Economic Zones. The establishment by law
of autonomous special economic zones in selected areas of the country shall be subject to
concurrence by the local government units included therein.
When the concerned sanggunians opted to join the SSEZ, they were, thus, fully aware that this
would lead to some diminution of their local autonomy in order to gain the benefits and privileges
of being a part of the SSEZ.
ofthe clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was no infirmity when the LDA was entered into
between SBMA and RP Energy despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians. VII.
Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved by the Court.
The Casio Group argues that the validity of the third amendment should have been resolved by
the appellate court because it is covered by the broad issues set during the preliminary conference.

Further, the point of Senator Shahani that the representation of the concerned LGUs in the Board
of Directors will compensate for the diminution of their local autonomy and allow them to be
represented in the decision-making of the SBMA is not lost on us. This is expressly provided for in
Section 13(c) of RA 7227, viz:
SECTION 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
RP Energy counters that this issue cannot be resolved because it was expressly excluded during the
preliminary conference.
The appellate court sustained the position of RP Energy and ruled that this issue was not included
in the preliminary conference so that it cannot be resolved without violating the right todue process
of RP Energy.

xxxx We agree with the appellate court.

(c) Board of Directors. The powers of the Subic Authority shall be vested in and exercised by a Indeed, the issue of the validity of the third amendment to the ECC was not part of the issues set
Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of fifteen (15) during the preliminary conference, as it appears at that time that the application for the third
members, to wit: amendment was still ongoing. The following clarificatory questions during the aforesaid conference
confirm this, viz.:
(1) Representatives of the local government units that concur to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone; J. LEAGOGO:
So what are you questioning in your Petition?
(2) Two (2) representatives from the National Government; ATTY. RIDON:
We are questioning the validity of the amendment, Your Honor.
(3) Five (5) representatives from the private sector coming from the present naval J. LEAGOGO:
stations, public works center, ship repair facility, naval supply depot and naval air station; Which amendment?
and ATTY. RIDON:
From 2 x 150 to 1 x 300, Your Honor.
(4) The remaining balance to complete the Board shall be composed of representatives J. LEAGOGO:
from the business and investment sectors. (Emphasis supplied) Your Petition does not involve the 2 x 300 which is still pending with the DENR. Because you still have
remedies there, you can make your noise there, you can question it to your heart[]s content because it
SBMAs undisputed claim is that, during the board meeting when the subject project was approved, is still pending
exceptfor one, all the representatives of the concerned LGUs were present and voted to approve xxxx
the subject project.227 Verily, the wisdom of the law creating the SSEZ; the wisdom of the choice of
J. LEAGOGO:
the concerned LGUs to join the SSEZ; and the wisdom ofthe mechanism of representation of the
Atty. Ridon, I go back to my question. Were not yet talking of the legal points here. Im just talking of
concerned LGUs in the decision-making process of the SBMA are matters outside the scope of the
power of judicial review. We can only interpret and apply the law as we find it. what are you questioning. You are questioning the 1 x 300?
ATTY. RIDON:
Yes, Your Honor.
In sum, we find that the implementation of the project is not subject to the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of the LGC, and the SBMAs decision to approve the J. LEAGOGO:
project prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned sangguniansof the LGUs, by virtue Because it was 2 x 150 and then 1 x 300?

ATTY. RIDON:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Up to that point?
ATTY. RIDON:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Because there is no amended ECC yet for the 2 x 300 or 600. Thats clear enough for all of us.
ATTY. RIDON:
Yes, Your Honor.228
Given the invocation of the right to due process by RP Energy, we must sustain the appellate
courts finding that the issue as to the validity of the third amendment cannot be adjudicated in this
case.
Refutation of the Partial Dissent.
Justice Leonen partially dissents from the foregoing disposition on the following grounds:
(a) Environmental cases, such asa petition for a writ of kalikasan, should not, in general,be
litigated viaa representative, citizen or class suit because of the danger of misrepresenting
the interests and thus, barring future action due to res judicata of those not actually
present in the prosecution of the case, either because they do not yet exist, like the
unborn generations, or because the parties bringing suit do not accurately represent the
interests ofthe group they represent or the class to which they belong. As an exception,
such representative, citizen or class suit may be allowed subject to certain conditions; and
(b) The amendments to the ECC, granted by the DENR in favor of RP Energy, are void for
failure to submit a new EIS in support of the applications for these amendments to the
subject ECC, and a petition for writ of kalikasanis not the proper remedy to raise a defect
inthe ECC.
We disagree.
A.Justice Leonens proposition that environmental cases should not, in general, be litigated via a
representative, citizen or class suit is both novel and ground-breaking. However, it isinappropriate
to resolve such an important issue in this case, in view of the requisites for the exercise of our
power of judicial review, because the matter was not raised by the parties so that the issue was
not squarely tackled and fully ventilated. The proposition will entail, as Justice Leonen explains, an
abandonment or, at least, a modification of our ruling in the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran.229 It will also require an amendment or a modification of Section 5 (on citizen suits), Rule
2 ofthe Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Hence, it is more appropriate to await a case
where such issues and arguments are properly raisedby the parties for the consideration of the
Court.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 112 of 140
B.Justice Leonen reasons that the amendments to the subject ECC are void because the
applications therefor were unsupported by anEIS, as required by PD 1151 and PD 1586. The claim
is made that an EIS is required by law, even if the amendment to the ECC is minor, because an EIS
is necessary to determine the environmental impact of the proposed modifications to the original
project design. The DENR rules, therefore, which permit the modification of the original project
design without the requisite EIS, are void for violating PD 1151 and PD 1586.
We disagree.
Indeed, Section 4 of PD 1151 sets out the basic policy of requiring an EIS in every action, project
or undertaking that significantly affects the quality of the environment, viz:
SECTION 4. Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and
goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned
or -controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and
include in every action, projector undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the
environmenta detailed statement on
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the
same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a
finding must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having
jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft
environmental impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the same. (Emphasis supplied)
As earlier stated, the EIS was subsequently developed and strengthened through PD 1586 which
established the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System. Sections 4 and 5 of PD 1586
provide:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. 1avvphi1 The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National

Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation
reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities
including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the proper
land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental
quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective measures
against calamituous factors such as earthquake, floods, water erosion and others, and (d) perform
such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to time.
SECTION 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall
not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental
Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical
projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem
necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
These laws were, in turn, implemented by DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
As correctly noted by Justice Leonen,Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 was subsequently issued
which, among others, classified fossil-fueled power plants as environmentally critical projects.
In conformity with the above-quoted laws and their implementing issuances, the subject project, a
coal power plant, was classified by the DENR as an environmentally critical project, new and single.
Hence, RP Energy was required to submit an EIS in support of its application for an ECC. RP Energy
thereafter complied with the EIS requirement and the DENR, after review, evaluation and
compliance with the other steps provided in its rules, issued an ECC in favor of RP Energy. As can
be seen, the EIS requirement was duly complied with.
Anent Justice Leonens argument thatthe subsequent amendments to the ECC were void for failure
to prepare and submit a new EIS relative to these amendments, it is important to note thatPD
1586 does not state the procedure to be followed when there is an application for an amendment
to a previously issued ECC. There is nothing in PD 1586 which expressly requires an EIS for an
amendment to an ECC.
In footnote 174 of the ponencia, it is stated:
Parenthetically, we must mention that the validity of the rules providing for amendments to the
ECC was challenged by the Casio Group on the ground that it is ultra vires before the appellate
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 113 of 140
court. It argued that the laws governing the ECC do not expressly permit the amendment of an
ECC. However, the appellate court correctly ruled that the validity of the rules cannot be collaterally
attacked. Besides,the power of the DENR to issue rules on amendments of an ECC is sanctioned
under the doctrine of necessary implication. Considering that the greater power todeny or grant an
ECC is vested by law in the President or his authorized representative, the DENR, there is no
obstacle to the exercise of the lesser or implied power to amend the ECC for justifiable reasons.
This issue was no longer raised before this Court and, thus, we no longertackle the same here.
Because PD 1586 did not expressly provide the procedure to be followed in case of an application
for an amendment toa previously issued ECC, the DENR exercised its discretion, pursuant to its
delegated authority to implement this law, in issuing DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
Justice Leonens argument effectively challenges the validity of the provisions in DAO 2003-30 and
the Revised Manual relative to amendments to an ECC for being contrary to PD 1151 and 1586.
We disagree.
First, to repeat, there is nothing in PD 1586 which expressly requires an EIS for an amendment to
an ECC.
Second, as earlier noted, the proposition would constitute a collateral attack on the validity of DAO
2003-30 and the Revised Manual, which is not allowed under the premises. The Casio Group itself
has abandoned this claim before this Court so that the issue is not properly before this Court for its
resolution.
Third, assuming that a collateral attack on the validity of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual can
be allowed in this case, the rules on amendments appear to be reasonable, absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
Essentially, the rules take into consideration the nature of the amendment in determining the
proper Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) document type that the project proponent will
submit in support of its application for an amendment to its previously issued ECC. A minor
amendment will require a less detailed EIA document type, like a Project Description Report (PDR),
while a major amendment will require a more detailed EIA document type, like an Environmental
Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) or even an EIS.230
The rules appear to be based on the premise that it would be unduly burden some or impractical to
require a project proponent to submit a detailed EIA document type, like an EIS, for amendments
that, upon preliminary evaluation by the DENR, will not cause significant environmental impact. In
particular, as applied to the subject project, the DENR effectively determined that it is impractical
to requireRP Energy to, in a manner of speaking, start from scratch by submitting a new EIS in
support of its application for the first amendment to its previously issued ECC, considering that the
existing EIS may be supplemented by an EPRMP to adequately evaluate the environmental impact
of the proposed modifications under the first amendment. The same reasoning may be applied to

the PDR relative to the second amendment. As previously discussed, the Casio Group failed to
provethat the EPRMP and PDR were inadequate to assess the environmental impact of the planned
modifications under the first and second amendments, respectively. On the contrary, the EPRMP
and PDR appeared to contain the details of the planned modifications and the corresponding
adjustments to bemade in the environmental management plan or mitigating measures inorder to
address the potential impacts of these planned modifications. Hence, absent sufficient proof, there
is no basis to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was done with grave abuse of
discretion.
Justice Leonens proposition would effectively impose a stringent requirement of an EIS for each
and every proposed amendment to an ECC, no matter how minor the amendment may be. While
this requirement would seem ideal, in order to ensure that the environmental impact of the
proposed amendment is fully taken into consideration, the pertinent laws do not, however,
expressly require that such a procedure be followed.As already discussed, the DENR appear to
have reasonably issued DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manualrelative to the amendment process of
an ECC, by balancing practicality vis--vis the need for sufficient information in determining the
environmental impact of the proposed amendment to an ECC. In fine, the Court cannot invalidate
the rules which appear to be reasonable, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent
illegality.
We next tackle Justice Leonens argument that a petition for certiorari,and not a writ of kalikasan,is
the proper remedy to question a defect in an ECC.
In general, the proper procedure to question a defectin an ECC is to follow the appeal process
provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative
appeal process, recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. However, as earlier discussed, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan
may be availed of to challenge defects in the ECC providedthat (1) the defects are causally linked
or reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and magnitudecontemplated
under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception
to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or primary jurisdiction.
As previously discussed, in the case at bar, only the allegation with respect to the lack of an EIA
relative to the first and second amendments to the subject ECC may be reasonably connected to
such an environmental damage. Further, given the extreme urgency of resolving the issue due to
the looming power crisis, this case may be considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably resolved in
a writ of kalikasan case.
More importantly, we have expressly ruled that this case is an exceptional case due to the looming
power crisis, so that the rules of procedure may be suspended in order to address issues which,
ordinarily, the Court would not consider proper in a writ of kalikasan case. Hence, all issues,
including those not proper in a writ of kalikasan case, were resolved here in order to forestall
another round of protracted litigation relative to the implementation of the subject project.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 114 of 140
Conclusion
We now summarize our findings:
1. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casio Group failed to substantiate its
claims thatthe construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental
damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other
hand, RP Energy presented evidenceto establish that the subject project will not cause
grave environmental damage, through its Environmental Management Plan, which will
ensure thatthe project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and
standards;
2. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECCs Statement of Accountability relative to the copy
of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court. While the signature is
necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular circumstances of this case show
that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of
signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on this
point, as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory
questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for
submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had
been invalidatedon the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of
the appellate court. The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr.
Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB, and
remains uncontroverted. It showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed
by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Because the signing was done after the official
release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, wenote that the DENR did not strictly
follow its rules, which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability
should be done before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that the
issue was not adequately argued norwas evidence presented before the appellate
court on the circumstances at the time of signing, there is insufficient basis to
conclude that the procedure adoptedby the DENR was tainted with bad faith or
inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR, however, to be more circumspect in
following its rules. Thus, we rule that the signature requirement was substantially
complied with pro hac vice.
3. The appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to
the ECC were invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-
30 and the Revised Manual. It failed to properly consider the applicable provisions in
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual for amendment to ECCs. Our own examination
of the provisions on amendments to ECCs in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual,
as wellas the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR reasonably exercised
its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second amendments,
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 115 of 140

respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was
conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent sufficient
showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both the
procedure and substance of the amendment process, we uphold the validity of these
amendments;
4. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC for failure to comply with
Section 59 of the IPRA Law.1wphi1 The ECC is not the license or permit
contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules. Hence,
there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an ECC may be
issued, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid
certification does not render it invalid;
2.1. The January 30, 2013 Decision and May 22, 2013 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 are reversed and set
aside;
2.2. The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
00015, is denied for insufficiency of evidence;
2.3. The validity of the December 22, 2008 Environmental Compliance
Certificate, as well as the July 8, 2010 first amendment and the May
26, 2011 second amendment thereto, issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in favor of Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc., are upheld; and

5. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the LDA between SBMA and RP 2.4. The validity of the June 8, 2010 Lease and Development
Energy for failure to comply withSection 59 of the IPRA Law. While we find that a Agreement between Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Redondo
CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of the LDA between SBMA Peninsula Energy, Inc. is upheld.
and RP Energy, considering that this is the first time we lay down the rule of action
appropriate to the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating the LDA for SO ORDERED.
reasons of equity;
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
6. The appellate court erred when it ruled that compliance with Section 27, in relation Associate Justice
to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is
necessary prior to issuance of the subjectECC. The issuance of an ECC does not, by
itself, result inthe implementation of the project. Hence, there is no necessity to
secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement,
and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with the aforesaid
requirement does not render it invalid. The appellate court also erred when it ruled
that compliance with the aforesaid requirement is necessary prior to the
consummation of the LDA. By virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227, the project is
not subject to the aforesaid requirement and the SBMAs decision to approve the
project prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians. Thus, the
LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy suffers from no infirmity despite the
lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians; and

7. The appellate court correctly ruled thatthe issue as to the validity of the third
amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved in this case because it was not one of the
issues set during the preliminary conference, and would, thus, violate RP Energys
right to due process. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Petition in G.R. No. 207282; and

2. GRANT the Petitions in G.R.Nos. 207257, 207366 and 207276:


Manila Electric Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
Writ of Habeas Data; Right to Privacy; Labor Law; Transfers; An employees plea that she be
spared from complying with her employers Memorandum directing her reassignment under the
guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data; The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by
means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individualit is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.Respondents plea that she be
spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang
Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data.The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data
rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
Same; Same; Same; Like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearancesits intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules; The writs
of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtfulemployment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.It
bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. Castillo
v. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (2009), underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario, 554
SCRA 768 (2008), that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons
for her transfera legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment
are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
Same; Same; Same; To argue that the employers refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to the employees safety amounts to a violation of her right to
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 116 of 140
privacy is at best speculative.In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis--
vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right
to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a punitive move.
Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs.ROSARIO
GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of
the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted
therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation
it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa
as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 117 of 140

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for
a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job
security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified
alleged threats to her security in this wise:
written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application
for a TRO.
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter
alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even
alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction
serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled,
over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 7
it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful
or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a
"sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its
expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data
managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to
would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person.

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule
resolution of the issues she raised. on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and
cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees,
and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition 5 for the issuance of a
of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus
prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following: Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative,
and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
labor-related cases.
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the
nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the
writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family
information; and
or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 118 of 140

The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan
RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: SO ORDERED.

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to
life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. 13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. 16 Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is
evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law
with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on
the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals
in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of
work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.
Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.As defined in Section 1 of the
Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the
Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence
showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy right to the cogent rights
to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.In this case, the Court finds that
Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or
would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject
sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the
nexus between ones privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in
habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 119 of 140
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended
the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan
(Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he
and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee at the latters condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his
office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. 4 On August 23, 2011, Lee
confronted Ilagan at the latters office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she
discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the
video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lees head against a wall inside his office and walked away. 6Subsequently, Lee
utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: ( a) a criminal
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and ( b)
an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lees acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to
distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet
violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman,
and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25,
2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagans digital camera, as
well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified
written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of
the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize
the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship
with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011,
and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her
condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagans petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the
evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 120 of 140

The RTC Ruling protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagans favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.14 in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
The RTC did not give credence to Lees defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting suppression of this video which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in
or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject the internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection between such interest and
video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latters right to any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive
privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke,
opined that Lees use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan alleging and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals. 15 certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
The Issue Before the Court submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. violating Ilagans right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead
a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve
The Courts Ruling unlawful ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagans reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced
The petition is meritorious. the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative
cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise and dismiss the habeas data petition.
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. 16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional
individuals,17which is defined as the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
dissemination of data about oneself.18 Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri
A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or SO ORDERED.
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy
is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to

Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.Locus standi is a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in
a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged,
and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of
the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
Constitutional Law; Balance and Healthful Ecology; In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,
224 SCRA 792 (1993), the Supreme Court (SC) recognized the public right of citizens to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA
792 (1993), we recognized the public right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from
the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suit; On the novel element in the class suit filed by the
petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing
to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own
and future generations.On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations. Thus: Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 121 of 140
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This traditional rule of State immunity which
exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the formers consent or
waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).This traditional rule
of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without
the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Same; International Law; International Law of the Sea; Words and Phrases; The international law
of the sea is generally defined as a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses
of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime
regimes.The international law of the sea is generally defined as a body of treaty rules and
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise
of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the
relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans. The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty
which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by
the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th
ratification.
Same; Same; Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3)
contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States
more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.The
UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
worlds marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS
gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea
which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone,
and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels
depending on where the vessel is located.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; Visiting Forces Agreement; Writ of Kalikasan; The waiver
of State immunity under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.The
VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines to promote common security interests between the US and the Philippines in the
region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines
the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is
the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA

pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that
a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.The filing of a petition for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province
of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the
application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of
an environmental law.
Same; Same; Foreign Relations; It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative the political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.A rehabilitation or restoration
program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained
under a judgment rendered in a citizens suit under the Rules, viz.: RULE 5 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a
citizen suit.If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorneys fees,
costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator,
or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. In the
light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled
that [t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative the political departments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR.,
Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V.
PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION,
MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 122 of 140
National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE
ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL
RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine
Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command
and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-
Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise
known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of
environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS
Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language
which means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the
north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20
kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of
Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines'
oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine
life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally
threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value
as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an
example representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of
exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of
the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the
"no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the
resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management
Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4 On January 6, 2013, the
ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.1wphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in
a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over
the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United
States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By
March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the
grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the
present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A.
Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents");
President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major
General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces
of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 123 of 140
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No.
10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 );
obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and
destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being
unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1.
Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over
the Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer
zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence
of clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require
Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and
environmental damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away
from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v.
Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;

d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all
meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less
severe than those applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had
been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the
disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post
salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef
absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the
Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust
Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of
the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other
similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency
and accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all
stages of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual
Defense Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the
damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the
Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 124 of 140
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs
as are just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a
motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection
and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a
TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS
Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the
petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive
branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present
petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is
"a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1wphi1 Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.14

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of
whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-
suability of the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from
suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section
3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we
have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 125 of 140
society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by
Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical
reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace
of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120]
In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which
reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign
states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit

must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21(Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability;
it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a
Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was
charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said
employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion
but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and
dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of
the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which
distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 126 of 140
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from
suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US
respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting
in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise
of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article
31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31
of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the
territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
"traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous
declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United
States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary
norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of
jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations
of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was
opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the
Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th
ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the
world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. 30 The UNCLOS
gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea
which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone,

and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels
depending on where the vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends
to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30 - Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31 - Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.
Article 32 - Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions
may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite
this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S.
delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed
mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to
induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 127 of 140
decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration,
which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President
Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its
advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and
an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required
for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th
Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence
over U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman
Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest
priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th
Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10,
1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as
reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and
others under international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's
reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to
traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31
relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the
rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is
more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the
Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN
CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that
such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on
navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the
ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable
maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage,
transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by
preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign
immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the
ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental
shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept

of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of
coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its
obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs,
unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to
protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197 - Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they
invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their
immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US
respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines
in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further
defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper
considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew
navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 128 of 140
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can
be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with
a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding
of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from
the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the
collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law. 37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the
court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor
strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make
periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to
the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in
the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been

accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to
Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat
adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However,
we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian.
The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in
assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be
gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration
of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from
the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties
or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for
purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal
researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day
period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the
pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch
clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
x x xSEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their
counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute.
The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance
with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 129 of 140
x x xSEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to
compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of
judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS
Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained
stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was
reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused
by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the
damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced
the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the
Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on
assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage
and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate
Philippine government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from
Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major
relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs
which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the
payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which
shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to
the control of the court.1wphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues
impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the
VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a
review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the
parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under

the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the
issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA
513, G.R. No. 181527 April 21, 2015
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Citizen Suits; Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases; The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
which allow for a citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws.It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and
environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing
because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-
interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason,
many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus
standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglass paradigm
of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of
procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. Recently, the Court passed the
landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a citizen suit, and permit
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; Even before the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases became effective, the Supreme Court (SC) had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.Even before the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on
the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993),
we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that
does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of
the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the
legal standing to file this petition.
Same; Same; Same; Unwilling Co-petitioners; Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 130 of 140
public policy against embroiling the President in suits, to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands
undivided attention.Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 10. Unwilling co-
plaintiff.If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may
be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. Under the foregoing
rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she
may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction
of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling partys
name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such
would be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for
including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an
unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act
she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is
a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention.
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in
this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Service Contracts; In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that the deletion of the words service contracts in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on them per se.This Court has previously settled the issue of whether
service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held that the deletion of the words service
contracts in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that
decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they
were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.
Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972; The disposition,
exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines
are governed by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972.The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the
discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or
local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the
revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to the petitioners argument, Presidential Decree
No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a
valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Statutory Construction; In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution,
but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction
should be preferred.In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but

a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should
be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA 283 (1999),
expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of
the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit
and intent. x x x. (Citation omitted) Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners contention that
SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform
terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Oil Explorations; Natural Resources; Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for
the exploration of petroleum.Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires
that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary,
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such
contract. Public respondents implied argument that based on the alter ego principle, their acts and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with his endeavor is
are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyos, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,
290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency and its limit in this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Same; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992;
Natural Resources; True to the constitutional policy that the State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature, Congress enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act)
to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.True to the constitutional policy that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature, Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the
perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to
ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the
greatest extent possible. The following categories of protected areas were established under the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 131 of 140
NIPAS Act: a. Strict nature reserve; b. Natural park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife sanctuary; e.
Protected landscapes and seascapes; f. Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other
categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine
Government is a signatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act
of 1992 (NIPAS Act), a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected
against human exploitation.Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions
of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to
enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation. The Taon Strait, pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of
Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national
significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and
economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect
the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any
activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is
obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmentally Critical Area; Environmental Impact Statement
System; The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative.The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was
established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas
without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas,
Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be considered as
environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No.
2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as an
area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are
expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented
in it; thus, before a project, which is any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may
have significant impact on the environment, is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages
on the environment.DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical
area as an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental
impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it; thus, before a project, which is any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude,
which may have significant impact on the environment, is undertaken in it, such project must

undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment. An
EIA is described in detail as follows: h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process that
involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on
the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes
designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these
consequences to protect the environment and the communitys welfare. The process is undertaken
by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee,
affected communities and other stakeholders.
Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; Service Contracts; Oil Explorations; While Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the
Taon Strait is a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) area.SC-46 was not
executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in the
Taon Strait as it also provides for the parties rights and obligations relating to extraction and
petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done
in said protected seascape. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait vs.
Reyes, 756 SCRA 513, G.R. No. 181527 April 21, 2015
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS,
PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible
Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L.
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R.
SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Taon Strait Protected
Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J.
SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,
LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG,
FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in
his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Taon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII,
DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Until one has loved an animal, a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 132 of 140
Anatole France
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their
personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the
issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians
of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic
environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. 3 As the
representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the
obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Taon Strait as well as to protect the
environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty
under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court
will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary
jurisdiction."5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to
continue to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However,
the space for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so
unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by current substantive
and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between
competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and
convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for
animals through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept
the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Taon Strait; (b) they
were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they
were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal
principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests.
Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that they, the
human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had
they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree
with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of
guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot
be founded on feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have
legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have
already been liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental
rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be
authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent
in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the
following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the
law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 133 of 140
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the
provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine
Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in
interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another
party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both material and
based on an enforceable legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party
in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by
a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the
title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a
trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.(3a)9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly
or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified
real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule
provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the
rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for
the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine
Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or
the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species inhabiting Taon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue
of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse
in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.

In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan
explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may
obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With court
approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the
same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans who
possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek judicial
redress even though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate
challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already well-
equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially
established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such as
corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf.
There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution,
avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The
court indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established
history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for
Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might
have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more
than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not
well-established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it
could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a
qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on
behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit
organizations with an established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve
as official guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system
has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges
inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal compared
to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans
and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless
plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is
even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient beings with the
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 134 of 140
ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from
other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the
integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless.
Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided
for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf
of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans
are suitable representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman
animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly
situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive
disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their
very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as
having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The
same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as
humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we
represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we
cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what
remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 15 the court held that
an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within
the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a
substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent animals was
further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting
animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing
doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of
animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the
court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the
ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The
court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established
history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for
Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might
have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more
than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not
well-established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it
could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a
qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on
behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human
stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable
rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign
representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of
environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have
given to the rule on standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on
their part, they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is
imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the
suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It
is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential
"injury."20
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 135 of 140
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casio21 regarding this rule alongside the
appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined
that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be used with great
caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental
concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility"
is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude future
generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present
generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a
different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to
representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from protecting their own
rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and
our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make their
own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be
allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual
concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing
interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there
is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent
that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks,
we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or
she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In
other words, he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of
lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in interest. 24 The term
"interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity
about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is
not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as
representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a
representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The
person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be a third
party to the action instituted on behalf of another.
....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an
identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the
representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit
under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law
on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows
persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in
interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet
unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the
capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future
generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is
dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit,
putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this
court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet
unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of
the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others.
Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on
their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries,
which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's decision will be res
judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real
party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.
At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a
right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and
representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be
considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 136 of 140
with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it
carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the
human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest
and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose
rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly
affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish
harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they suffered, which has potential long-term
effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners,
most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the
Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal
guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also
impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Taon Strait." 28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her
consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but
was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule
3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim
is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall
state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a
waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained
should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but
who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other
court processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who
does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied
due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal
constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions
by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained
public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's name
should be stricken out of the title of this case.
IV I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Taon Strait as a
protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution.
V Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a
technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of
the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of
paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34 Public respondents further
aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing
resources.35
VI Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 137 of 140
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and
use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the
clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and
1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or association at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The
Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations
to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance
with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, the technical,
management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer
interpretation from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the
product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on
recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence
on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who
spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their
words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The Constitution
was their product. Its words were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society
relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the
standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 138 of 140
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.37(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three
important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides
standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf
of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30 days of
execution.
VII The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87
or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.1wphi1 It is my opinion that this law is
unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President
may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means
that service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an
important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided
the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial
quantities in the area. The Taon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No.
123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly
covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof,
protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration
only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is
carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made
available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any
exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)

No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil
exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Taon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could
have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as
Taon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.
VIII Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the
requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente
S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the
Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be
delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's
involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere
formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom
deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term
service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
assistance. They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate
service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would
eliminate or m minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. 42 (Emphasis
in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in
the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement
renders SC-46 null and void.
IX Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the
execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to
the validity of any service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of
Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took
away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.
SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 139 of 140
X I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also
null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Taon Strait. In particular, SC-46
was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Taon Strait is covered by the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all
components of the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource
exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of protecting and
maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with
biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal life,
it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as
provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological
values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that
effective administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation among national
government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these
protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS),
which shall encompass outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that
are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as
"protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Taon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact
Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope
of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under
the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system.
 SPECPRO CIAR PREROGSTIVE WRIT-Page 140 of 140

In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry
them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial
action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The
program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to
Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy
resources found within a protected area such as Taon Strait:
Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any
environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992.
XI Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient
species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources
that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly
causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any other
species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of
our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully
shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed on our species.

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, ACCORDINGLY, I vote:
protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration
only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is (a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former
carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made
available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only
through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an
Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-
46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental Compliance Associate Justice
Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Taon Strait is not a
nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c)
measures were in place to ensure that the exploration caused the least possible damage to the
area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases
involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of resource
exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources under
the most favorable conditions. With the status of Taon Strait as a protected seascape, the
institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based
on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second
subphase of its project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. 51