JESUS C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE RAY ALAN T. DRILON G.R.
He then told private respondent
No. 179267, June 25, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE PERLAS BERNABE (DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)
FACTS:
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when
she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years
her senior. They have three children. Petitioner, who is
of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at
one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed. Things turned for the worse when
petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother
of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights
that left private respondent physically and emotionally
wounded. In 2005, while at home, she attempted
suicide by cutting her wrist. Petitioner simply fled the
house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven days in
which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. When private
respondent informed the management of Robinson's
Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank
manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job.
that he was leaving her for good. Private respondent is
determined to separate from petitioner but she is
afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had
previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle
with him, she would not get a single centavo. The RTC
issued a temporary restraining order and temporary
protection order. Petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition, with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for
being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and
(2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being an unwanted product of an invalid
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and
violative of the equal protection clause and runs
counter to the due process clause of the constitution.
RULING:
R.A.9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws. The distinction between men
and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women
and children. The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to
address the discrimination brought about by biases
and 29 prejudices against women. As emphasized by him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Thus, the fear of petitioner of being stripped of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
correcting discrimination through specific measures employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
focused on women does not discriminate against men. without an inkling of what happened is a mere
Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is product of an overactive imagination. The essence of
discriminatory and that it is an anti due process is to be found in the reasonable
male,husband- bashing, and hate-men law opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
deserves scant consideration. Relatively few cases of may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard"
violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid. may be heard also through pleadings.
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to
the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but
to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety
and security of women and their children is threatened
by violence and abuse. There is likewise no merit to
the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband
or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may
likewise be committed against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Clearly, the use of the gender -neutral word person
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. There
need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The grant of a
TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the
petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition. The respondent of a petition for protection
order should be apprised of the charges imputed to

BIRAOGO VS PTC
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
Issue:
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
Held:
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is law of the nation to which all other laws must conform
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited and in accordance with which all private rights
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to determined and all public authority administered. Laws
all members of the same class. that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as of the Constitution.
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,

that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past

administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
People vs. Cayat

Ponente: MORAN, J

Facts:

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars

native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other
liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks.
Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-
1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged
and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in
case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He
averred, among others, that it violated his right to
equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said
this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or
mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law
sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Act violates the equal

protection clause.

HELD:

The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the

requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of
a group have the characteristics that distinguish them
from others. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites
to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based
upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then,
does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an
inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of
their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of
those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education,
the government has endeavored, by appropriate
measures, to raise their culture and civilization and
secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the
ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
Himagan vs People
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
Facts:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan,
Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of
Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec
47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon
the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
(6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan
assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension
should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that
an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days
is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection
of laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal
protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD:
The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA
6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of
the member of the PNP charged with grave offense
where the penalty is six years and one day or more
shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of
the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time
from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application
of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in
the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him
are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47
of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policemans constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING vs. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY G.R. No.
179736, JUNE 26, 2013
PONENTE: JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO (RIGHT TO PRIVACY)
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners
of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Basak, City of
Mandaue, Cebu. The respondents are the owners of
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located
adjacent to the property of petitioners. The
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building
(Aldo Goodyear Servitec). In April 2005, Aldo filed a
case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO against the
petitioners who were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that the said construction would
destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property. The court denied Aldos
application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations. Later, in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo
Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners property and respondents, through
their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
construction. On the other hand, the petitioners
asserted that the acts of respondents violate their
right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that
respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners
right to privacy.
RULING:
Yes, there is. In ascertaining whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated. In this day and age, video
surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose
right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy
of anothers residence or business office. In this case,
considered that petitioners have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their property, whether they
use it as a business office or as a residence and that
the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
Ponente: BIDIN, J.
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-
law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and
Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if
she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and
eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making
it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for
delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of
the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures.
Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious
odor which made him took sample of the substance he
found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the
presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the
suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves
inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation
of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo.
Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming
that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and
that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be
enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of
Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs
the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant
to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will
be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened
the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place
of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr.
Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed
by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
Alih vs. Castro CASE DIGEST
151 SCRA 279 June 23, 1987
Ponente:
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine
marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents,
killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger
printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite
their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to
have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done
without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting
under superior orders and that operation was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem due to the assassination of the city
mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the
taking of the fingerprints and photographs of
the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin
testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion
that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty
provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to
due process and should be protected from the
arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation
was urgent nor was there any showing of the
petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit
approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.
The items seized, having been the fruits of the
poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation
by the respondents was done without a warrant and so
the items seized during said operation should not be
acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia
egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the
provision against self-incrimination, the court held that
the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in
Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material.