Proceedings of the ASME 2013 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition
IMECE2013
November 15-21, 2013, San Diego, California, USA
ROBUST DESIGN OF NORTH AMERICAN POWER GRID TO MITIGATE
CASCADING FAILURES
Joseph R. Piacenza
Irem Y. Tumer
Complex Engineered System
Design Lab
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon 97331
piacenzj@engr.orst.edu
irem.tumer@oregonstate.edu
ABSTRACT
Catastrophic cascading system failures such as the August
13th Blackout of 2003 highlight the vulnerability of the North
American power grid, and emphasize the need for research to
mitigate failure events. The incorporation of robust design, the
insensitivity of system performance in the presence of noise (or
uncertainty) from both internal and external sources, into
existing and future power grid design strategies can increase
system reliability. This paper presents a high-level topological
network approach to power grid robust optimization as a
solution for designing against cascading system failure. A
mathematical model was created representing a standard power
grid network consisting of generation and demand nodes, as
well as node connections based on actual topological
transmission line relationships. Each node possesses unique
power generation or demand attributes, and various network
connection configurations are examined based on system
demand requirements. In this model, failure events are initiated
by the removal of a single network connection, and remaining
loads are redistributed throughout the system. Cascading
failure effects are captured when the existing network
configuration cannot support the resulting demand load, and
transmission line failures continue propagate until the system
again reaches a steady state, based on remaining nodes and
connections. The primary goal of this research is to facilitate
an understanding of design trade-offs between system
robustness and performance objectives. In this research,
robustness is defined as the resilience to initiating faults, where
a robust network has the ability to meet system generation
requirements despite propagating network failures. Primary
performance objectives are total system cost and the ability to
IMECE2013-62970
John J. Fields
Mir Abbas Bozorgirad
Christopher Hoyle
System Optimization Lab
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon 97331
fieldsjo@engr.orst.edu
bozorgim@onid.orst.edu
chris.hoyle@oregonstate.edu
satisfy network demand after a failure, while robustness is
represented as the lack of variability in the amount of demand
which is satisfied after a failure. By understanding network
reactions due to cascading failures, as well as performance
trade-offs required to mitigate these failures, reliability in
power grid systems can be increased.
INTRODUCTION
Large-scale propagating system failures in the North
American power grid remain constant over the past few
decades as the rising population and distributed geography
continues to drive increases in energy demand and
transportation. Political influences, such as industry
deregulation and multiple stakeholders, add further system
complexity. Beyond increasing energy demand availability,
power grid infrastructure reliability is a vital concern when
addressing system expansion. Major system failures such as
the Blackout of 2003 highlight the vulnerability of subsystems
within the North American power grid, and support the need for
reliability research to mitigate failure events [1]. Cascading
hardware failures are primarily responsible for system
blackouts; however, communication deficiencies also
contribute to significant failure propagation in the Northeast
U.S during the Blackout [2]. Although there have been
significant advances in power grid reliability and optimization
methods, data provided by the North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) shows that the frequency of
blackouts has not decreased over the past 25 years [3].
Current literature shows many existing tools available to
understand effects of failure propagation in power systems.
1 Copyright 2013 by ASME
However, these methods dont typically address the formalized
concept of robustness, and how complex systems can be
designed to be resilient to failures [4-8]. In addition, it would
be difficult to scale component level failure propagation
methods to represent the entire North American power grid in
terms of computational efficiency. Robust design provides a
methodology to design systems robust to sources of
uncertainty, such as failures in the power grid, without the need
to understand or reduce sources of uncertainty. Robust design
is typically defined as the insensitivity to noise (or uncertainty)
on system performance from both internal and external sources
[9]. The primary issue, however, is creating designs robust to
the various types of failures and uncertainty present in a
complex and largely distributed systems such as the power grid.
Many system failures occur as a result of natural occurrences
such as extreme weather conditions, and predicting the effects
of these events is challenging, specifically due to cascading
faults resulting from a single initiating event.
The research presented in this paper is a system-level
approach to power grid robust optimization, as a solution for
mitigating cascading system failure. The primary goal is to
facilitate an understanding between design trade-offs in system
performance and robustness. For example, if system
optimization objectives (e.g., cost, ability to meet demand)
were purely deterministic, a traditional optimization approach
would suffice. This would provide the lowest cost option,
assuming negligible vulnerabilities to system failure.
Conversely, if a system required invariant performance with
respect to all potential failure scenarios, a purely robust strategy
would be implemented, which would be the most reliable,
highest cost option. Robust optimization examines trade-offs
between performance and robustness, considering effects of
both external and internal system uncertainties.
In this paper, a methodology is presented for modeling
power grid failures, including generation, demand, and
transmission components, as well as system topology. An
adjacency matrix is used to represent a power grid network,
where nodes represent either power generation plants (Ng) or
demand populations (Nd), and node connectivity represents
physical transmission line connections. Optimization tradeoffs
are between performance objectives (e.g., cost, ability to meet
expected demand after a cascading failure) and performance
variability.
In addition to the North American power grid, this
methodology could be applied to other complex systems,
specifically where a single variable is a driving objective. For
example, maximizing expected demand is a desired objective in
power grid optimization, as generation is affected by other
system elements such as demand and infrastructure reliability.
In this case, designing energy generation strategies that lead to
system robustness will include optimizing control factors, while
considering the magnitude of unintended or stochastic events
resulting from external environmental effects. This is
analogous to aerospace design in that driving system variables
such as weight must be traded with other performance attributes
(e.g., fuel consumption, cost, payload capacity), and contribute
significantly to system robustness.
BACKGROUND
Power Grid Optimization
Despite continuous research in energy systems and
advancements in hardware and software technology, overall
power system reliability has remained constant over the past
two decades [10]. Organizations such as the North American
Electric Reliability Council, Edison Electric Institute, and the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) contribute this issue
to Federal reorganization and deregulation of the North
American power grid, citing growing discontinuity between
transmission and distribution systems [11]. Currently,
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods are considered a
best practice for evaluating these types of faults, which
ultimately lead to system failures, causing measureable system
blackouts. The Long Island Power Authority uses a PRA tool,
developed by EPRI, to determine likelihood and magnitude of
occurrences within their local power system [12]. One issue,
however, is the localization of the failure analysis, and this
software does not account for propagating failures that occurs
over multiple utilities.
A primary objective of power grid optimization is
maintaining system reliability while considering various
generation sources, transmission infrastructure, physical
hardware, and demand populations. Understanding subsystem
relationships on a system level creates a challenge for
researchers to create computer simulation models that
effectively capture significant interactions among these
components. Events that most often trigger power grid system
failures are natural occurrences such as hurricanes, ice storms,
and lightning. Although wind and rain accounted for 31.4% of
blackouts between 1984-2006, equipment failure was the
second greatest source of failure accounting for 19.9% of
events [10]. Several accepted hardware solutions have been
developed to respond to failure such as the Flexible AC
Transmission System (FACTS), introduced by Hingorani [13].
This technology enables the control of power flow on
Alternating Current (AC) transmission lines to optimize loading
[14]. Lininger et al. have incorporated the FACTS device into
a computer simulation using a Maximum Flow algorithm to
detect failure types in various outage scenarios [8]. Similar
research by Carrers et al. has led to a computer model to
replicate power outages due to line outages or losses due to
excessive load limits [6]. Pinar et al. have also addressed
power grid vulnerability by outlining optimization strategies for
power line failure prevention [15]. Pahwa et al. have examined
system failure modes by simulating a power grid within a
standard network such as the IEEE 300 bus to examine
cascading system failures [16]. Mitigation strategies to reduce
failures include targeted range-based load reductions and
intentional islanding. .
Examining and modeling system failure due to cascading
faults is an area of research intended to predict the probability
2 Copyright 2013 by ASME
of outages across regions. Talukdar et al. have focused on
power grid failure predictions addressing partial functionality
of a grid after a failure event, instead of attempting to find a
solution to prevent them all [17]. This methodology addresses
system uncertainty from dynamic periods of change due to
intended switching operations designed to bring systems back
online. Fairley comments on this methodology, supporting the
premise that failure is a byproduct of such a large complex
system and research in mathematical modeling for failure
management, instead of elimination, should be a primary
strategy for increased reliability [1].
Incorporating robustness into power grid optimization will
allow designers to examine important tradeoffs affecting
reliability. Historically, robust design has been used in
manufacturing to minimize unintended consequences
(variability) from uncontrollable environmental effects [18].
One drawback of robust design in manufacturing is the focus
on optimizing a single variable (e.g., size, weight). Expanding
on Taguchis fundamental methods, Chang et al. have scaled
these principles to complex systems where multiple subsystems
must be optimized independently with limited knowledge of
other system design parameters [19]. This work outlines the
need for a distributed robust optimization method, accounting
for both physical and intangible noises that are out of the
designers control.
Social Network Theory
Based on the distributed nature of the North American
power grid (NAPG), understanding geographic effects is
important when designing for failure resistance. As the NAPG
was originally constructed ad hoc based on sprawling
population and increasing demand, network topology
optimization was not a primary consideration. Current
literature addresses optimization of power grid network
topology, often drawing from social network theory, where
networks are represented mathematically [20]. To address
network relationships, several centrality indices are studied in
the literature, but can be primarily categorized into three major
classes: reachability measures, vitality measures, and flow
measures. Kinney et al. model the power grid with an
adjacency matrix, where each node represents either a
generation or demand component in a network, and arcs
connecting the nodes represent connectivity [21]. In this work,
failures are examined by removal of a single node, which
triggers an overload cascade in the network. Similar methods
are used by Leonardo and Vemuru, where connectivity loss ! ,
measures network performance [22]:
!
! !! !!
! = 1 ! !! (1)
!!
where n! is the number of generation nodes, n! is the number
of demand nodes at the unperturbed network state, and !! is
the number of generation units able to supply flow to
distribution (demand) vertex i after disruptions take place.
Subsequent averaging is done over every demand node i of the
network.
Another method by Ash and Newth examines the
optimization of complex networks with respect to the average
efficiency of the network [23]. Average efficiency was first
introduced by Crucitti et al. and is among the vitality measures,
and can be calculated as follows [24]:
!
E G = !!!! !" (2)
! !!!
where !" denotes the efficiency of the most efficient path
between i and j. In this definition, the adjacency matrix is an
NN matrix of {e!" } where 0 < e!" 1 if there is an arc
between node i and node j, otherwise e!" = 0.
CONTRIBUTIONS
Current literature in power grid optimization shows a
deficiency in strategies for incorporating robustness in design.
This is because most methods focus on absolute failure
prevention, instead of the ability of a system to successfully
operate in a degraded state after a failure event. Since the
majority of failures occur from extreme environmental effects,
the ability of a system to continue operation in the event of an
initiating failure event is essential in creating reliable systems.
In addition, topology considerations are typically not included,
specifically when using standard test cases (e.g., IEEE).
This work integrates state-of-the art robust optimization
techniques with social network analysis in order to minimize
cascading failure effects from a single initiating event. This
novel approach presents design trade offs between performance
and performance variability (robustness) of a degraded complex
system, after failure has occurred. Using this method, network
designs can be created that account for, and are resilient to,
uncertainty from external events (e.g., natural disasters) often
affecting highly distributed networks. Specifically, this
research accounts for system specific stochastic environmental
effects, and accounts for the ability to meet specified
requirements, as well as considering cost. It will provide a
novel approach to distributed complex system design by
minimizing the effect of failures through topology design, and
optimizing for both performance and variability.
In this paper, a methodology has been developed to include
failure resistance into high-level power grid design, by
incorporating robustness into power grid network topology. In
this method, robustness is represented as the ability of a
network to satisfy demand, after a cascading failure event. A
mathematical representation of a power grid network was
created using an adjacency matrix, where system attributes for
power generation, regional demand, and system topology were
included. This model is based on the IEEE 14 test bus.
However, it was created with scalability in mind for larger
networks. The result is an optimization tool that creates a
power grid network, based on user data for power generation
and demand requirements. System robustness is evaluated
based on tradeoffs between performance objectives, and
3 Copyright 2013 by ASME
variability of each. A case study is presented, using data from
the IEEE 14 test bus, and performance values are compared
between the optimized solution, the robust solution, and the
original network.
METHODOLOGY
Power Grid Parameter Design
In the case of the N.A. power grid, applying Taguchis
Parameter Design to the system displays how different sources
of uncertainty effect system response (Fig. 1) [9, 18]. In this
method, the system control factors are elements that can be
varied within the system, and noise factors are environmental
elements that cannot be controlled. When addressing potential
initiating events for fault propagation, both types of factors
must be considered. Failures from external events are
addressed in the context of Type 1 (Parameter) robust design,
or design intended to minimize performance loss from external
noise. To address internal noise, Type II (Tolerance) robust
optimization can be applied to a design. This method reduces
performance losses due to uncertainty from internal control
variables within the system. In the context of the power grid,
this would include uncertainty due to fluctuations in energy
generation from variable sources such as wind generation or
demand fluctuation.
Figure 1: PARAMETER DIAGRAM OF POWER
GRID SYSTEM
Lewis et al. combine both Type I and Type II robust design
principles and apply them to complex systems, in an effort to
address uncertainty from both internal and external
environment [25]. The goal of Lewis formulation was to meet
performance requirements, while minimizing the variation
about the mean. Figure 2 outlines this relationship, displaying
how the optimized solution may exist at the boundary of an
objective, where variability is greatest [9, 25]. The objective
value of the robust solution is slightly higher, although with
less performance variation. Power grid designs can benefit
from applying this method, as uncertainties from both sources
are present, including external noise factors (e.g., natural
disasters) and internal noise variables (e.g., expected demand).
Figure 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPTIMAL
SOLUTION AND ROBUST SOLUTION [25].
Numerical Implementation
The research presented in this paper combines ideas on
social network theory and known robust optimization
strategies. In the methodology presented, the power grid
network is created in MatLab, represented by an NN
adjacency matrix, were = ! + ! , ! being the number of
generation nodes and ! representing the number of demand
populations. This matrix is created randomly, based on user
inputs for the number of generation and demand nodes desired.
The generated network is then tested for connectivity, as each
demand population must be serviced (connected) to a
generation node to meet expected demand. In this model, an
algorithm based on breadth first search was used to check the
connectivity of the network.
Since the goal of this work is to design for failure
resistance, it is assumed that greater system connectivity leads
to higher reliability. For example, if a design exists where
individual nodes have multiple connection degrees to other
nodes in the network, it would be more reliable than a network
with limited connections in the event of an arc (transmission
line) failure. The tradeoff however, is the cost of each
transmission line, as it is not feasible to incorporate line
redundancy between each connection. The relationship
between transmission line cost with respect length is described
in Eq. 3 as
! ! !"#$%!
!"# = !!! !!! !"#$%! !" !" !" (3)
where !! is the adjacency matrix, !! represents the actual
!"#$%!
length between all pairs of nodes, and !! includes the cost
for the unit length between all pairs of nodes. Intuitively, the
most robust solution would have the highest connectivity as
well as the highest cost.
Power Grid Structure
To accurately represent a power grid, both generation
nodes and demand nodes are assigned to represent power
generation and demand sources respectively, and are user-
defined values. Generation values are based on power plant
energy production, and demand values are the total power
demand required to reliably service a given area. It is assumed
4 Copyright 2013 by ASME
that, if connected, power can flow unaffected between both
types of nodes.
As with the NAPG, the arcs (between nodes) are modeled
to have a maximum available capacity for power transportation,
and a specified line load based on the number of nodes they are
transporting power to. Line load (!"#$ ) is the amount of
power flowing through an arc based total system demand and
connectivity, assuming the load path always travels through the
shortest path available from a generation node to a destination
node. This is calculated based on the number of shortest path
connections (SP) and magnitude of the demand nodes it
services along the way (Eq. 4).
!"
!"#$ = !!! ! (4)
Where ! is the demand that has to be satisfied by shortest path
. Line capacity (!"# ) is defined as the maximum power that
can flow through an individual arc before a failure occurs,
based on an arc factor of safety () (Eq. 5).
!"# = 1 + !"#$ (5) ! : = {0,1}!!
Connectivity relationships are based on previous research
by Kirk, where Dijkstras algorithm is used to determine the
shortest path distances between generation and demand nodes
which are used to calculate the loads on the connection lines
[27]. The average demand that is satisfied after a typical failure
has happened is referred to as Expected Demand (! ). Failure
events are administered randomly by the removal of a single
arc, and resultant demand being satisfied after cascading failure
is calculated as (! ). Arc removal is performed 10 times within
a given power grid network design, and Expected Demand is
calculated based on the average of resultant demand for each
failure scenario, given total network connectivity (Eq. 6).
!!!!"
! = (6)
!"
Arcs can also be removed according to the distribution of
failure events anticipated based upon historic data using a
Monte Carlo simulation approach.
Cascading Failure
In this model, a failure event is initiated by the random
removal of an arc, forcing the original load on that arc to be
redistributed to the next available shortest path in the system.
This is an iterative process where !"#$ () is the initial arc
load at a given time t, and its value is based on the demand
node values associated with it. For an arc failure to occur, line
load must exceed line capacity. Ten arcs were selected
randomly for removal, although future work will include actual
transmission line failure rates. After a failure, the arc is
removed from the network and load is recalculated for all
remaining arcs. If load exceeds capacity in another arc, this
one is also removed from the network and the redistribution
process is repeated. The cascading failure will eventually end
when the system has reached a steady state where all arcs can
meet capacity.
Optimization Objective
To understand important power grid interactions and
design for failure resistance, the optimization objective was
developed based on the ability of a network to satisfy
population demand after a cascading failure, for the lowest cost.
Robustness is incorporated into the objective by considering the
variation of Expected Demand (DE) in the solution.
find (7)
minimize
! = !"# ()
! = ! ()
! = !!! ()
subject to
! : !"#$ 1 = 0
Where and !"#$ are the adjacency matrix and the number
of disconnected components of the network, respectively.
CASE STUDY AND RESULTS
IEEE 14 Test Bus System
The IEEE 14 Test Bus system (Fig. 3) was used to validate
the methodology presented [26]. This network consists of two
power generation stations, and 12 additional demand
connections. Since cascading failure is being evaluated in
terms of transmission line loading, the physical topology of
lines was considered (Fig. 4). Based on IEEE 14 transmission
line lengths calculated by the Power Systems Engineering
Research Center, a geographical power grid map was
constructed [27]. This is an important system attribute as line
lengths directly drive connectivity costs. In order to accurately
represent system demand, nominal demand node power
requirement values were used from the IEEE 14 system.
Optimization Algorithm
A genetic algorithm (GA) was used within the MatLab
Optimization Toolbox to solve objectives [28]. Since Expected
Demand Variability is part of the objective function, values
were normalized so the GA could evaluate solutions on the
same scale. Values were calculated for Cost, Expected
Demand, and Expected Demand Variability from the original
IEEE 14 transmission line configuration. These nominal values
were included in the fitness function for each objective (Eq. 7).
5 Copyright 2013 by ASME
 In addition, a penalty function was used to penalize solutions in
which the grid is disconnected. This was included to ensure
network connectivity after a cascading failure. The objective is
stated as:

!"#!
= + !"## (8)
!"""!"!

where the ! is the value of the objective functions, IEEE14n

is the calculated objective value from the original IEEE 14 test
bus, and !"## is the penalty function for disconnectivity.

Figure 3. IEEE 14 TEST BUS SYSTEM [26]

13' 94.7"
14'

54.4"
11'

34.44"
54.1"
12' 73.6"

69.6"
52.3"

6'
5'
2.86"
11.8" 4'
15.2" 10'
12.0" 11.6"
1(Gen)' 9'
23.0"
2(Gen)' 13.46"
3'
4.02"
30.0"

8' 48.0"
7'

Figure 4. IEEE 14 POWER GRID GEOGRAPHICAL NETWORK (LINE LENGTHS IN MILES)

Optimization Results
The simulation was run for approximately 600 iterations.
From these results a plot of Pareto optimal solutions is
displayed in Figure 5. In this plot, design values are
normalized with respect to the performance of the original
IEEE 14 network configuration. Tradeoffs between each
objective solution are explored within this design space, and an
optimal value calculated. In the Robust Design solution (Fig.
5), the normalized Cost is slightly less than one, determining
the robust solution was less expensive than the original IEEE
14 network. The cost was reduced, primarily due to the
efficiency of transmission line topology used in the robust
design, since the number of node connections was the same.
Expected Demand is greater than one, signifying a greater
ability of the robust solution to meet demand requirements after
a cascading scenario. Expected Demand Variability is less than
0.1, displaying a significantly lower variance. These results are
expected as the IEEE 14 network was physically constructed
based on both population demand and geography, and was
unlikely optimized for performance. The physical topology of
the robust network, compared to the original IEEE 14 is shown
in Figure 6 and 7.

6 Copyright 2013 by ASME

 respectively for the non-robust solution. The non-robust
network configuration is a direct result of the Variability
objective being removed, where the optimal solution focuses
exclusively on meeting performance objectives Cost and
Robust Design Expected Demand. Although the robust solution contains the
same number of connections as the original IEEE 14 network,
this solution is significantly less expensive, and resilient to
cascading failure due to the efficiency of the arc placement.
For example, the generation nodes (node 1 and 2) of the
original solution each have 2 and 4 degrees of connectivity
respectively.
It should be noted that neither model (robust or
deterministic) currently accounts for physical geographical
constraints between nodes (e.g., mountains, rivers, preservation
areas), and assumes the shortest path is always available.
However, the original IEEE 14 network is constrained by the
Figure 5. NORMALIZED CUMULATIVE PARETO physical distances between nodes, which were originally
SOLUTIONS FOR ROBUST NETWORK constructed around such topology restrictions, as well as
demand. Additional constraints will be included in future work
To verify this method is producing an optimized robust by penalizing node connections to represent various topological
solution, the simulation was tested with the removal of features.
Expected Demand Variability objective. In this version of the
solution, only Cost and Expected Demand are considered as
objectives, and variance is ignored (i.e., a deterministic
optimization). All existing constraints remained, and the
normalized fitness function values are also based on the
original IEEE 14 solution. Based on this simulation, the pure
optimal solution for Cost is slightly lower than the robust
solution (Table 1). In addition, Expected Demand is also lower,
since a low cost (smaller number of network connections)
solution is more affected by failure events. This optimal
solution represents an actual power grid design that is low cost,
but less resistant to cascading failure than the robust solution
since the ability to satisfy demand is lower. A summary of
objective solutions for all three scenarios is given in Table 1.
While the percentage difference between optimized and robust
solutions is small, this proof of concept simulation displays Figure 6. ROBUST NETWORK CONNECTION
how performance objective values can greatly affect result TOPOLOGY (19 LINES)
variability. The differences are expected to be greater when
optimizing larger grid systems.

Table 1. OBJECTIVE VALUES FOR STANDARD AND

OPTIMIZED IEEE 14 TEST BUS

Network Expected Exp. Demand Network

Cost Demand Variance Connections
Origional IEEE 14 1212 182 5738 19
Optimized Network 660 224 769 17
Robust Network 666 235 235 19

Network Topology
In terms of network topology, the robust network (Fig. 6)
consists of 19 transmission lines, versus 17 in the optimal
solution (Fig. 8). The network is fully connected, with no
disconnected demand nodes or sub-networks. The generation
Figure 7. IEEE 14 ORIGIONAL CONNECTION
nodes (node 1 and 2) of the robust solution each have 3 and 5
TOPOLOGY (19 LINES)
degrees of connectivity respectively, versus 3 and 4 degrees

7 Copyright 2013 by ASME


Figure 8. OPTIMAL NETWORK CONNECTION
TOPOLOGY (17 LINES)
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a methodology for high-level power
grid design by incorporating robustness into network topology.
Simulating this system mathematically provides the opportunity
to iteratively test various network connection strategies against
an initiating failure event, and address subsequent cascading
failure effects. Failure resistance in systems can be improved
by examining tradeoffs between robustness and performance in
early design. In this research robustness is represented as the
variability in performance metrics as a result of external effects
on the system, such as transmission line failure.
The IEEE 14 Test Bus case study demonstrates the
application of the method presented, and compares objective
values between the original network, the optimized network,
and the robust network. This proof-of-concept simulation
highlights the importance of topology configurations when
designing to mitigate cascading failures. It also validates the
use of a mathematical model as a tool in early power grid
design.
A primary benefit of the method presented is its ability to
be scaled to more complex power grid systems. Larger
networks can be evaluated, based on user inputs for desired
system topology, demand requirements, and availability of
generation sources. This is limited however, by the
computational requirements of the evolutionary algorithm. One
direction for future work is the division of computational
workload using multi-core processing capabilities to create
large and distributed network simulations. While this may be
considered a brute force method, the availability of remote
computing facilities makes it a viable strategy.
As an alternative strategy to increase simulation efficiency,
social network analysis could be applied. In this method,
smaller demand populations would be optimized independently
of each other, and connected using a second optimization
objective which optimizes the topology of the total system.
This method would allow the examination of performance
tradeoffs between demands regions, and the effect of cascading
failures from one population to another. This would be an
accurate abstraction of how power grid networks are currently
physically constructed between regional interconnections.
One challenge in this research is the ability to validate the
method as an accurate abstraction for modern power grid
systems. While the case study presented shows merit, scaling
the method to a larger network will assist in determining the
solution accuracy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the
University of Alabama in Huntsville Center for System Studies
and NASA Marshall under grant SUB2012-052
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